


The Deilin Congress.



GABRIEL HANOTAUX

Translated from the French by E. SPARVEL-BAYLY

With Portraits

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HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY FRANCE

CHAPTER I

THE SIXTEENTH OF MAY

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The Marshal demands of the Senate the dissolution of the Chamber—The declaration of the Government to the Chamber—Interpellation—M. de Fourtou—"The Deliverer of the Land"—Rally of the Republicans—The 363—Dissolution in the Senate-house—Speeches by the Duc de Broglie, by M. Bérenger and M. Laboulaye—Dissolution voted—
Promulgation of the law.

I

Jules Simon sent in his letter of resignation to Marshal MacMahon than he hastened to interview M. Thiers, not allowing even the funeral of M. Ernest Picard to delay his purpose. M. Thiers vol. IV.

had just been informed of the death of an old friend; M. Simon found him much moved, but also much embarrassed; the Moderate Republican party with which he had marched as guide was now dispersed; fresh means were necessary for the realization of a future still alluring to the active octogenarian.

M. Thiers was upon his guard.

M. Jules Simon thus explains the situation from his own point of view:—

"My fall was desired by three parties; these were the Marshal, the Left and myself. I withdrew between two dictatorships, one of which had offered me support, while the other marvelled at having supported me so long."

That which had offered help was the party of the Marshal; the other belonged to Gambetta, the impatient. From the very opening of the conflict these two names had been connected and opposed.

At one o'clock that day M. Jules Simon convoked a meeting of the Ministers; till then he had acted alone.

His resignation being in the hands of the President of the Republic, there remained nothing but to consider the idea of raising a debate in the Chamber, and of gaining help in resistance to the Marshal. Duc Decazes proposed to attempt conciliation. M. Jules Simon merely laid stress upon the point that General Berthaut should maintain the war Ministry, and General Berthaut declared that as long as he had power "The army should remain unbiassed by politics." The ministers vied with each other in indignant sympathy for their departing chief, vowing unchanging loyalty. Amidst cordial hand-clasps the old athlete bade farewell to friends and power; his active part was played and over.

The news that the Cabinet had fallen soon spread through Paris. Political circles were the first to be affected, then by degrees the whole city shared in this excitement. Public feeling was, however, less strong than it had been on the twenty-fourth of May.

By three o'clock the Republican Lefts had gathered in the Assembly Hall of the Boulevard des Capucines. The Republican Left was the moderate party, opposed to Gambetta's tactics through their conviction of ultimate union. The leaders doubtless wished to take the direction of the movement, but Gambetta, leaving the discussion of the Budget, had hastened to join them. He advised a general protestation, voted by a general meeting of the Lefts.

The resolution taken by the Marshal appealed to the advanced elements of the Republican party. The moderates had fallen with Jules Simon's Cabinet. They tried in vain to combat the idea of a general meeting.

Under the presidency of M. de Marcère, the Left Centre decided that this group should stand aside.

The current, however, was too strong. At ten o'clock that evening the general meeting took place, three hundred deputies being present. Gambetta spoke. He advised moderation, but recommended the accord of all the Lefts in defence of three propositions which he proceeded to read aloud.

Re-establishment of the principles of parliamentary government based on scrupulously respected ministerial responsibility.

Consideration of Republican policy as a guarantee of order and prosperity.

Resistance of any line of policy by which France,

the land of peace, order and thrift, might be plunged

into dynastic and military adventures.

Gambetta still appeared to desire cautious dealing with the Marshal, and aimed at a camarilla. Nothing was known as to what was happening at the Elysée. A resolution in conformity with Gambetta's propositions was passed unanimously by the three hundred Republicans present at the meeting.

On leaving the building, Gambetta found himself the hero of an ovation from the crowd outside. He was universally acclaimed as leader, his name alone being on all lips. The events of the day had established his position.

In a letter to a friend written that same evening, he remarks: "War has been declared and battle offered us. I have accepted the challenge, and our position is impregnable. The papers will show you how my forces are arranged, but they will not tell you of the immensity of my ovation from the people of Paris. I was almost overwhelmed by the enthusiasm of the crowd, and the air was rent by cries of Vive la République! Vive Gambetta!"

The following day he wrote confidently: "We have now a Broglie Cabinet. There are three months of difficulty and toil before us, and then we shall have our triumph. This I can guarantee. . . . I have gained the heart of the people as I did in August and September of 1870. I shall succeed; have no fears for the contrary. Right, might, public opinion, and all Europe is on our side!"

Here spoke the leader, here flashed the general's eye.

On May 17th the Chamber met at three o'clock. There was no Ministry. M. Devoucoux announced

the request of the Lefts for an interpellation, and the Chamber decided on an immediate discussion. A Havas announcement had just been made to the effect that the Marshal "had firmly resolved to suppress all ultramontane intrigues." "Exactly what we require," exclaimed Gambetta, and the interpellation was carried further. His object apparently was to stay the Marshal in his downward course. As he wrote that evening: "Either a Republican government or a dissolution." He laid stress upon the dread of "ultramontane intrigues," which had been so imprudently raised by some officious meddler; he appealed to the judgment of Europe; he evoked the spectre of war; he exclaimed to the President: "You have been deceived; a false policy has been forced upon you. Our endeavour has been to entreat you to return to constitutional paths. We address the President, appealing to his reason and his patriotism, which will be his surest guide. Our advice is: Act constitutionally, keep to the constitution. Constitution in hand, demand whether a government is desired composed of the Republican party of every shade, or whether, on the contrary, by the recall of men refused several times by the general electors, a dissolution is to be forced upon the country, which may prove to be but the introduction to a war. . . . "

It is evident, therefore, that from the very first the Republican party worked profitably upon the ideas of ultramontane intrigue, and the prospect of a Continental war. These dangers were expounded publicly by Gambetta, though not without some prudent reservation, and also brought to the notice of the President of the Republic. The resolution

At five o'clock the meeting rose. Rumour had it that a Broglie Cabinet had been formed. That meant a "Cabinet Militant."

During the course of May 17th Marshal Mac-Mahon had had an interview with M. Dufaure. Was it true that a new Left Centre Ministry was being contemplated? Was there any hesitation as to breaking with the majority? Gambetta had just made his appeal to the good sense and the patriotism of the Marshal.

M. Dufaure did not lend himself to overtures which seemed to him obscure and pointless. In fact, the Cabinet Militant had already been decided on. A little later the Marshal said to a Senator: "I have written to M. de Fourtou; I count on him to get me out of this." Since the evening of the 16th the Duc de Broglie had been privately assuring M. de Meaux that having a Ministry to form he was counting upon him. In order to obtain the support of the Duc Decazes, the Marshal had written the following letter, published in the Officiel: "I wish it to be well understood that friendly relations are to be maintained with foreign powers. Nothing is to be altered in the foreign policy which you represent."

The Broglie by the evening of the 18th the Journal Officiel had published the decree by which the Cabinet was constituted.

President of the Council and Minister of Justice.— Duc de Broglie.

Minister of the Interior.—M. de Fourtou.

Finance.—M. Caillaux.

Education, Public Worship, Arts.—M. Brunet. Public Works.—M. Paris.

Agriculture and Commerce.—Vicomte de Meaux. Foreign Affairs.—Duc Decazes.

War.—General Berthaut.

Baron Reille was nominated Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior; M. Louis Passy was no longer Under-Secretary in Finance. The Naval Ministry remained vacant for a few days, but was given on May 29th to Admiral Gicquel des Touches, a concession to the Legitimists, who had been loudly complaining of having no share in the combination.

The Cabinet was Left Central; MacMahonistic rather than monarchical. The Duc de Broglie, who had plunged into the adventure with a kind of calculated carelessness, remained on the narrow ledge to which the Marshal's letter had restricted him. M. de Fourtou, Minister of the Interior, had no very pronounced opinions; he passed, however, as a strong-handed coadjutor, and his support seemed indispensable. Such men of the moment were subject to the ebb and flow of political tides. His colleague, M. de Meaux, remarks of him: "He succeeded in creating confidence in his ability, without, however, having had much opportunity of using it."

Another man of well-known ability on the benches of the Left was M. Depeyre, but the Duc Decazes opposed his nomination to the Ministry. M. Brunet, however, was accepted; he was a Bonapartist and had been a magistrate,—a man whose honest "obstinacy" addicted him to strong party feeling, and who figured as the champion of energetic tactics in the Cabinet.

M. Caillaux was a man of experience, very zealous, but cold in manner, and not very popular with his colleagues.

M. Pâris had always remained faithful to the Left Centre, and had worked actively towards the voting of the Constitution; his was a rather ponderous mind but a kindly disposition; and his function was to tender mattresses for the ambitious leaps of his colleagues, this being, however, usually a futile task.

The most intimate collaborator of the Duc de Broglie was the Vicomte de Meaux, whose interesting Recollections enable the student of to-day to penetrate within the arcanum of that jealously guarded world. In his fine intellect, his loyalty to monarchical traditions, and the natural distinction of his bearing, he was an excellent representative of a fast-vanishing type—that of the aristocratic follower of some great feudal potentate, fighting out the supreme conflict in dilettante fashion, more concerned, perhaps, with the honour than the triumph of his cause.

"On leaving the Marshal's room," writes M. de Meaux, "Broglie and I crossed the Champs Elysées together. It was the hour for the fashionable promenade. As we watched the careless crowd of elegant and wealthy folk walking in the sunshine between the Arc de Triomphe and the Obelisk, Broglie turned to me with sudden penetration. These people, he remarked, are better suited for a coup d'état than for the serious effort that we mean to demand of them."

The constitution of the Cabinet determined the exact attitude of the Lefts. To a Cabinet militant a military organization was opposed. A sitting was arranged for two o'clock on the 18th, and before this the Left Centre met under the presidency of M. de Marcère and passed the following resolution:—

"In view of the new situation originated by a new Cabinet, which is led by a man who on May 24th attempted the restoration of the monarchy, this group now decides to hold closely to Republican opinions of every diversity in order to support our institutions."

The three groups then resolved to form from henceforth but one general meeting.

The sitting took place at Versailles at half-past two o'clock, when a message from the President was read by M. de Fourtou. In the pin-pricks directed against Dufaure, Jules Simon and Gambetta, it was easy to recognise the Duc de Broglie's influence. . . .

After the failure of these two attempts (those of MM. Dufaure and Jules Simon) I could take no further step without appealing for support to another faction of the Republican Party, that party, namely, which considers that the strengthening of the Republic can only be accomplished by means of the radical modification of all our great institutions, whether administrative, judicial, financial or military, as complement and consequence. . . . Neither my conscience nor my patriotism allows me to associate myself, however distantly, with the triumph of these ideas. I consider them inopportune both for the present and the future. . . .

The attack was direct. Gambetta wished to speak. The Marshal's message continued:—

As long as power is vested in me, I intend within legal limits to use this power to oppose what I consider harmful to my country. . . . I have, therefore, had to choose, and according to my constitutional right, such advisers as are at one with me upon this point, which is, in fact, the only one at issue. . . . Until the year 1880 it devolves on myself alone to propose any alteration in our institutions. I have no intention of doing anything of the kind. . . .

Then followed very definite assurances as to the

maintenance of peace, after which, among exclamations from the Left and applause from the Right, the minister proceeded to read the decree which in conformity with the constitutional law of July 16th, 1875, adjourned the Chambers for a month.

Gambetta wished to speak, but was prevented by the President. Some tumult followed, but silence was gradually established. President Grévy, who had been slightly overlooked, but who had no intention of remaining so, then rose, and ended a short harangue with the words: "My dear colleagues, keep to constitutional lines. Do so with firmness and with confidence."

The Left rose, applauding loudly. There were shouts of "Vive la République!" from the benches of the majority, and of "Vive la France!" from those of the Right.

Adjournment message was read by the Duc de Broglie, who was questioned by M. Bérenger, and by Jules Simon, who on the reading of the passage aimed directly at himself, demanded permission to speak on a personal subject. The order for adjournment was, however, read directly after the message. The sitting was dissolved, the session closed, and the Chambers adjourned until June 16th.

A general meeting of the Lefts was then held at the Hôtel des Réservoirs. M. de Marcère acted as chairman, supported by MM. Louis Blanc and Floquet—an arrangement which spoke for itself. Gambetta made his speech, and M. Spuller drew up a manifesto addressed to the nation. Dissolution was considered as the only possible ultimate issue.

"This trial will be of short duration; within five months at the latest France will be able to express

her opinion, and we are already convinced that she will be true to herself. The Republic will arise stronger than before from the ballot-boxes of the electors."

The manifesto was signed by the leaders of the Left and by the members of the majority, classified according to departments. A few members who were not present at the meeting sent in their names later, Thiers, the most influential, being of this number. The signatures reached the number of 363.

The three groups of the Left within the Senate-house also rallied round each other. Another manifesto was signed by a hundred and seven senators, who formed, however, a minority; and the success of the manœuvre depended on a majority amongst the senators. By the next day the Lefts had decided on a permanent committee in Paris, by which the members of the bureaux and a certain number of influential deputies should affirm the union of the groups and organise compaigns.

The press took up a strong position on the battlefield. M. de Cassagnac exultingly remarked: "It is no longer a struggle for a certain form of government; the life or death of social institutions is at stake."

The Legitimist papers sulked over the expression, "ultramontane intrigues," attributed to the Duc Decazes. The *Français* was disturbed over Gambetta's speech: "By using the words, 'Dissolution will mean the preface to a war,' Gambetta has afforded the foreigner an excuse for ill-will, which is a serious mistake."

All the organs of the Left were loud in their cry: "The Republic is in danger!"

By the foreign press the Presidential decision was

ill received, the ultramontane papers, L'Osservatore Romano, and the Berlin Germania, alone excepted. The Times declared the Act of May 16th to be "the prelude of great disasters for France." The German press considered it advisable to be ready for emergencies; Italy, still more perturbed, predicted the very gravest consequences. The "temporal power" party were to govern French affaires.

MM. Savini and Cavallotti, members of the Italian Chamber, questioned their government as to "the relations of Italy with the French Government in view of the events which had changed the course of politics." M. Melegari, Minister for Foreign Affairs, affirmed that the new French Cabinet had realised the necessity for "specially" reassuring Italy. "I shall never be able to believe the French Government capable of placing itself under the guidance of a party desirous of disturbing our unity," he said. M. Depretis, President of the Council, was less reserved—

I do not deny the possibility of an awakening of religious feeling allied with political feeling. A certain sect exists which uses religion as a weapon on behalf of temporal power. . . . We also have a religion in common with many other believers, and this religion is civilisation. . . . We should have an ally in the French people. Governments come and go, but peoples remain. . . . I conclude with the advice I tendered a year ago: Let there be no manifestation of hostility, but let no conciliatory illusions be entertained.

The names of foreign diplomats were connected with the quarrels at home. Rumour had it that an interview had been arranged between Thiers and Gambetta in presence of Prince Orloff, the Russian Ambassador; and the Government considered it

advisable to make of this the subject of a communication to the *Journal Officiel*.

Uneasiness was general in the land. Those even who were to benefit by the Act of May 16th reserved their approbation. The Comte de Paris was dining at the Château d'Eu with M. Estancelin on May 19th, M. Limbourg, préfet of Seine-Inférieure, being also present. M. Estancelin admired neither Broglie nor Decazes.

"You are surrounded by fools," he told the prince, "whether they belong to the French Academy or not, and they will ruin your cause."

The Prince had just learned of the fall of the of Jules Simon and of the constitution of the new Cabinet. "It is absolutely ridiculous!" he remarked. "I know these men to be altogether incapable of carrying out the campaign they have begun. I shall oppose it strenuously."

"Monseigneur," replied Estancelin, "success is certain if the plans are carried out with energy. I cannot answer for those now concerned; personally however, I could guarantee a victory by the use of necessary methods."

"By a coup d'état managed on Bonapartist lines?" inquired the prince.

"No, Monseigneur, but by legalised force. It can be done within constitutional limits. The country must be made to realise that resolute men are prepared to do their duty and to flinch before no obstacle in the way of success. The country will applaud and follow them."

"Possibly," replied the prince, "but these are Bonapartist methods, and such I repudiate entirely. Should occasion arise, I would take my

gun in defence of the constitution and the liber-

ties of my country." 1

M. de Meaux records: "The leaders of the Right Centre disapproved of the affair. Reduced to a choice between the two camps they remained in ours; their support, however, though not withdrawn, was very grudgingly accorded. The Marshal had never been their chosen man; and they still cherished disappointment at the overlooking of the Duc d'Aumale."

It is clear that from the heights of the senatorial presidency developments were watched with jealous

Liberalism by the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier.

Neither were the Royalists more satis-Agreement with the fied. Negotiations in their name were carried on by M. Chesnelong, who had been Legitimist since quitting the Comte de Chambord. They demanded a share in the Ministry, electoral guarantees and the promise not to keep the King waiting in the year 1880, when Marshal MacMahon's turn of office should be expired.

It was necessary to yield to them in order to obtain their indispensable support, or the success of the campaign would have been compromised.

Admiral Gicquel des Touches was therefore made Minister for Naval Administration, and the promise of electoral support was given as demanded. to the date of 1880, Marshal MacMahon thus expressed himself to M. de Blacas and the leaders of

¹ Recollections of M. Estancelin in the Messager Eudois for February 17th, 1901. M. Limbourg, in a letter of May 7th, 1899, thus confirms the words of M. Estancelin: "I can still hear the exclamation of the Comte de Paris at the words 'Bonapartist' and 'force.' 'Were the Bonapartists to attempt it, our only recourse would be to take up arms in defence of the liberties of our land!""

the party: "I have received from the Assembly my right of remaining in power until 1880, and of this I intend fully to avail myself. Before this date I have no intention of lending myself to any attempt at Imperialistic or Monarchical restoration. My attitude then will depend on circumstances."

The agreement was sealed on June 9th. A declaration then appeared in the *Union*, as a circular from M. de Dreux-Brézé to the leaders of the Royalist committees, dated June 14th, which was as compromising as possible for the Marshal and his Ministers:—

"Two questions dominated the debate," remarked the *Union*. "It was necessary that the right of royalistic electors to a just and adequate representation should be definitely established; and further, that the Act of November 20th, 1873, should not be modified either by a prolongation of the Marshal's term of office or by the establishment of a presidency for life. A frank declaration, which, properly attested, should be received with full confidence as the best of guarantees, can give assurance to the Royalists of the satisfaction of their claims."

The Ministry was thus obliged to face both ways, and endeavoured manfully to satisfy every one at once.

The Bonapartists concluded the course of embarrassing demands and embarrassed declarations. M. Paul de Cassagnac remarked in *Le Pays*: "The gaps of the Constitution are admirably filled by a well-commanded battalion." And again: "Let the cleansing process be continued. May the broom become an emblem and serve as flag-staff to the flag of France at home."

The Bonapartist group had not given its support without some hesitation, and was not without its private calculations. The gulf, however, was over-

wide between Rouher and Gambetta. With the Prince Imperial still too young to profit from the confusion and join personally in the fray; with the Legitimist turn given by the Empress to the staff of the party, it was full necessary to march forward, and M. Rouher kept step with the Marshal. Yet in all the heat of party strife the Bonapartists preserved their own methods and their own tactics, which consisted in compromising every one and confusing everything in order to become themselves indispensable as speedily as possible.

Hence it arose that in this critical position the Duc de Broglie could conjure with but one name, that of MacMahon, and with one thesis, that of "conservation." MacMahon would last till 1880, and this was all he had to offer. As was observed by de Meaux: "What a prospect to offer to the nation! A stability of three years' duration at the longest!"

True, there remained the thesis "conservative," but this sorceress was dry and pinched of face, and niggardly of heart. And phantoms of terror stalked abroad. That of Clericalism filled men's hearts with fear, yet it was for this that they were labouring: that of Monarchy was eyed askance, yet Royalty was the logical result of all the enterprise: Europe also was to be dreaded, yet they pleaded to preserve the country from the isolation of a Republic! Interests were invoked, and interests took alarm. These men of understanding, to whom the Marshal had allowed free play, these subtle theorists. these wise academicians for ever giving counsel as to conduct and the art of government, these readers of Machiavelli and followers of de Tocqueville: each one of all the groups was intimidated by the

task before them. The broad light of day and the cries of universal suffrage bewildered them as they left their drawing-room debates. They lost sight of their own methods and did what any sub-prefect of the Empire could have accomplished vastly better.

The situation has been coldly criticised by the conservative de Circourt. He writes on June 3rd to Cardinal de Bonnechose:—

The Marshal's mind is only set on defending social order and on guarding the country from any return of demagogic terror.

The approach of the departmental and municipal elections left him no possibility of distinction. His object is to rule until 1880 at least, by keeping as long as possible within the strict limits of the constitution. . . . The Comte de Chambord, on the one hand, and M. Rouher on the other, adhere to this point of view until the termination of the provisional arrangement and the solution of the terrible problem. . . . Another great inconvenience is the extreme precipitation with which ministers have to act. We are literally on the brink of a precipice; the expiration of the hour of reprieve is at hand.

II

Every political crisis in France is manifested by circulars and "administrative movements." Functionaries make and unmake the majorities by which they themselves are made and unmade. Were engineers to think of nothing but their roads, and treasurers of nothing but their treasury, were one and all—sub-prefects included—to reach the end of their honourable careers in peace and quietness, it would be an abomination of desolation for this land of "patronage."

Like all the others, the "Conservatives" upset and compromise administrations. The Duc de Brovol. iv.

glie, President of the Council and Minister of Justice, wrote thus to the Procureurs-Généraux: "If the Marshal intervened in the march of politics, it was that he might stay the invasion of radical theories. . . . Among the laws committed to your keeping the most sacred are those that, originating in principles superior to all political constitutions, protect morality, religion, property and the essential foundations of all civilised society. Under whatever form falsehood presents itself, as soon as it is uttered publicly it can be punished."

The very essence of May 16th! An act of violence, legal but ineffectual; phrases by which no one was deceived;—" falsehood punished,"—solemn puerilities.

M. de Fourtou followed the President of the Council, and struck directly at "the speech held, and the word spoken in public." He recommended close surveillance of cafés and drinking-houses; daily life was to be watched by spies.

By a circular dated June 5th the prefects were ordered to make careful inspection of the licences of colporteurs, and an attempt was made to control the propaganda of the Lefts in newspapers and pamphlets. It was an irritating system which would become unbearable if vigorously applied. However, all ended in words. Little was wanting to furnish occasion for invectives from the opposition. Facia feroce.¹

¹ Edmond de Goncourt wrote in his *Journal* of May 24th: "The *coup d'état* has all the weakness of things that are not fashioned clearly and decidedly. It cannot profit from the advantages of downright illegality, yet it rouses against itself all the opposition called forth by any violation of the law. I greatly fear that its failure will be due to its honesty." (See p. 330; see also Taine.)

The shifting of officers, however, was much more than mere words. There were those watching who had much at stake. There hovered round the Minister for the Interior a Bonapartist of the old school, crafty yet energetic, M. de Saint Paul, with friends to provide for and several prefects up his sleeve. He had gained particular favour from Mac-Mahon at Nancy, and, given free scope to his activity, the Imperial officials reappeared who for the last eight years had been passed over.

The first prefectorial movement of the new Cabinet affected sixty-two departments; twentyone prefects were displaced, twenty-five revoked, ten were dispensed with, and three gave in their resignation. Forty-one prefects were made by the new government. A further arrangement of May 22nd affected fourteen more departments. the succeeding days 226 general secretaries and subprefects figured on the lists, and of this number eightythree were recalled and thirteen dispensed with. Oscar de Poli, once a pontifical Zouave, was sent to Le Cantal: Baron de Nervo to the Haute-Loire: M. de Biancourt to l'Allier; M. de Tracy to the Gironde; the Marquis de Fournès to Morbihan; M. Gueidan to Le Gard; the Comte de Langle-Beaumanoir to the Côtes-du-Nord; M. Scipion Doncieux to the Loire.

Many a withered ambition grew green once more beneath this unexpected tide. There were also councillors of prefectures, procureurs-généraux, procureurs of the Republic, justices of the peace.

M. de Boislisle was replaced in Paris by M. Le Roux de Bretagne as head of the Committee for Public Safety.

M. Lavedan was nominated Director of the Press,

and M. E. Villetard Director of the official journals. There were also seen some strange and also laughable things; at Châteaulin, for instance, six subprefects succeeded each other within the space of two months.

Journeys of the Marshal attended the Agricultural Display at Compiègne, accompanied by M. de Meaux.

"He entered Compiègne with all the pomp of sovereignty, and allowed himself to be approached with all his usual simplicity and geniality." There were present at the luncheon the Duc d'Aumale, President of the General Council and Commander of the Army Corps of Besançon; the Duc de Mouchy; M. Drouyn de Lhuys, president of the Agricultural Society of France; General Pajol; the Mayor of Compiègne and M. Aubrelique, senator, who trimmed between the Right and Left Centres, and who was decorated on this occasion. The meeting was very representative of the majority from whom support was hoped, and was much shadowed by the past! Neither enthusiasm nor hostility was manifested by the crowd. Peace and order were once more promised by the Marshal: "France will take no part in any foreign complication; there is no one in all Europe who doubts my word, and I receive daily assurance to this effect."

The Left, however, was already girded for the combat, and entered into it with an energy and ardour increased by the valour of Gambetta. While the various government parties stood regarding each other with suspicion, the "future Danton," as de Circourt terms him, breathed assurance to his followers, and inspired discipline

and harmony. In view of a possible Presidential crisis he proposed the candidature of M. Thiers. The ex-President was firmly attached to moderate opinions, but, as he said himself, "His honour was rooted none the less in the foundations of the Republic." Since May 24th his house had been the centre of the most active opposition. "The only sentiment approaching hatred that I have ever seen in him dates from that day," writes M. de Marcère. "He did not conceal the fact that it was directed personally against the Marshal, and he cherished the hope of satisfaction. He had always built upon the eventuality of his own re-nomination to the presidency, and this seemed rendered probable by the check of May 16th. We encouraged him in a hope that was brightening his age."

He appreciated the incomparable valour of Gambetta better than in the past, and grew resigned to the idea of collaborating with him in the task of founding the Republic. "We shall be obliged to march through Radicalism," he remarked to friends, and added, as if for self-assurance, "The road will be short, however, and the Republic will emerge from it with added strength."

On May 31st, in the office of La République Française, Gambetta received a deputation of young students.

He deemed the hour fit for bringing into daylight what had been prepared behind the scenes. "The struggle is against what is left of the old epoch, of the old castes, of the privileges of the old Régime; between the agents of Roman theocracy and the sons of 1789. . . . The Republican party is not lacking in men of eminence who would make very

constitutional Presidents. There is one in particular who has already passed the test, and who descended from his post with a simple and disinterested nobility which we would do well to imitate when necessary. Let us patiently await the issue of events; deliverance will come to us through the ballot-box."

As was then aptly expressed, this was a "coup de vigueur," aimed directly at the Marshal. Merely by the naming of M. Thiers, the bourgeoisie was assured in advance. On Thursday, June 7th, there was held a meeting of the Left, at which M. Thiers was present. The eventualities of the probable dissolution were searchingly discussed. It was decided that no candidate of the Left would be opposed to any of the 363 deputies who had signed the manifesto. The proposition emanated from the Left Centre, and in order to cement the union the initiative was left with them.

Speech by On June 9th Gambetta spoke at Amiens Gambetta at a banquet presided over by M. René Goblet. He also spoke at Abbeville, denouncing the personal power wielded by the Marshal, and the presidential letter written without the countersign of any of the ministers. He insisted, too, upon the influence gained by Clericalism, "for it was the Act of May 4th by which events had been precipitated. . . . For the third time France will pronounce her decree, and to it every one must bow,—every one without exception."

Gambetta surpassed himself in activity. On June 12th the Budget Commission, for which he acted as chairman, met to examine the demand of the Government for the separation from the Budget of the direct taxation of 1878. The Commission

declared that: "It could but express surprise at a request presented by a Cabinet which had not yet expounded to the Chambers either its financial or its parliamentary policy. The Commission had no reply to make upon the matter. As a mere fraction of the Chamber, it could not attempt to discuss the question until the Cabinet of May 17th had explained its opinions and its programme."

The legal and parliamentary weapon of opposition was thus levelled: the refusal of the Budget. The tactics were confirmed in a meeting of the Lefts held June 15th.

In the provinces banquets and meetings were being held in order to arouse protestation and resistance. The manifesto of the 363 was published abroad with comments by the Republican papers, which were being distributed broadcast everywhere.

An acute commercial crisis was everymercial where being felt, and was particularly sensible in France. Petitions were made by the Chambers of Commerce and by groups of merchants. On May 22nd a petition was addressed to the President of the Republic by the merchants of the Rue du Sentier, which ran as follows: "We take the liberty of acquainting you with complaints which can no longer be suppressed. . . . The new conditions have shaken that confidence which is indispensable to commerce." It was useless for the Government to endeavour by means of the Journal Official to prove "that the crisis is general, and due more to the Eastern Question than to French home politics."

There was decided suffering, and every one complained.

On Saturday, June 16th, the Chambers met again in accordance with the decree of the Chambers which had adjourned them for a month.

An important resolution had been made by the Government, that of announcing to the Chamber and requesting from the Senate the dissolution of Parliament. There was some hesitation. Certain ministers were for temporising, for demanding the voting of the Budget and of useful laws; for forcing the ascendant party to explain its programme and its attitude, for irritating it and placing it in the wrong. They further desired to prove to the country that it was the ascendant party which by Radical violence and by ill-will towards the Marshal was hindering the harmonious working of the national institutions. The parliamentary campaign might have been long and difficult, but it had perhaps given time for the extreme parties to cool down and for intermediary combinations to be formed. And since the Marshal constituted a government, it were perhaps advisable to use this government. Appeal to the country might mean the maximum of risk with the minimum of favourable chances. And at a time when the authority of the suffrage was under discussion, was it not an error to appeal to this suffrage?

However, a very simple calculation, many times repeated by M. Emile de Girardin, who had not been won over, and who in *La France* was carrying on a most spirited and efficacious campaign against the Government of May 16th, proved with no gainsaying that, whatever might be the result of the elections, it could not benefit the abettors of May 16th. There was no surer means of a defeat for them than an appeal to the nation.

The elections of 1876 were still too near the present. The electors were requested to re-consider their decision of fourteen months past, requested unexpectedly and by men who were little known and hardly trusted; Conservatives in general were asked to take up a definite public attitude upon the guarantee of a single man, and for a future dependent on this one man-the Marshal; and the Conservatives included not only the rich and independent classes, not only the clergy bound to the fulfilment of one object, but the middle classes, the lower "bourgeoisie," the tradesmen and the fathers who have to calculate the effect of their votes upon their families; in short, the large and timid class. apathetic and undecided, who fear above all things to be "compromised."

This was the weak point, the natural hesitation of a country which for the last ten years had been suffering from instability. "Where are we being led? Which road do you take?" The answer could be supplied by figures. After obtaining dissolution from the Senate, after a vigorous campaign, what, in the most optimistic terms, would be the result? 363 Republicans showed themselves unanimous. Could more than 120 seats gained by the Right be reasonably counted on? In this case there would be 280 deputies of the Right, of whom the greater part would be Bonapartist, joined to 130 senators of the Right, to attack the great problem following the election—the revision of the Constitution. So great an effort had not been produced in order to leave things as before. The year 1880 was rapidly approaching; the institutions had led to a Radical Republic—they would have to be reformed. And this was now public property; no

other programme would be possible; the revision would need to be accomplished.

Which revision, however? Monarchists and Imperialists shared the precarious majority which both in Senate-house and Chamber was to decide on the re-assembly of the Congress. The Comte de Chambord had not more than one hundred votes at his command; the Comte de Paris was waiting in the background until his cousin's death; the Prince Imperial was still young.

And these three antagonisms had always to be faced.

A Monarchical solution of any sort was impossible, and a formidable Republican minority numbering some 100 senators and 250 deputies—350 members of the Congress—was checkmating all and every combination which was not of the Republic.

There remained no other issue but a life Presidency of the Marshal. MacMahon was born in 1808; he would have reached the age of seventy-two in 1880. And it was on this they were relying, for this a world was being shaken, for this, with bandaged eyes, men were rushing into battle. Logic and history are more exacting, and public common-sense concluded with M. Emile de Girardin:

"That Marshal MacMahon, more accustomed to lead armies than to guide the destinies of a great parliamentary State, should not have fully grasped the import of the resolutions taken on May 16th, 17th, 18th, is to some extent conceivable. What, however, remains difficult to understand is that the Duc de Broglie should have accepted the leadership of the Ministry in the circumstances under which it was proposed to him, and which, in the most favourable view, can only lead to the triumph of Imperialism in the elections and to a return of the Empire, not that of 1870, but of 1852 with aggravations. And in this case, why have combated it at all?"

M. Emile de Girardin was in agreement with the Comte de Paris. Perhaps too, on the whole, with the Duc de Broglie also. The latter, however, was no longer free; he was a prisoner of his allies, of his friends, of his own self-confidence, and of his faults.

It was not only among the Ministers that deliberations were held.

M. Buffet was energy incarnate. There were solemn conclaves attended by the trusty,—MM. Buffet, Bocher, Lambert de Sainte-Croix, Grivart, Delsol, Depeyre, Kerdrel, Chesnelong, Clément, Daru, etc.

The Monarchical Right was usually in the ascendant at these meetings, but the Bonapartists were loud-voiced, and, as often happens in meetings, the most aggressive carried the last word. The Imperialistic leaders considered that the fray once entered on nothing should be neglected that might gain the country; a Cabinet dominated by themselves, an administration composed of their disciples, a complicated outlook, and—as a conclusion—a coup de force; all this entirely appealed to them. The army, the leaders, were, they believed, already at their feet; hence they clamoured loudly for the dissolution.

It was M. Brunet, their friend and agent, who imposed it on the Ministerial Council. "At the end of the month, after the prorogation, after the deputies' return to Versailles, we decided on demanding the immediate dissolution of the Chamber. The resolution was taken unanimously on the suggestion of M. Brunet. It was, however, a mistake, and as such I recognised it later." Such was M. de Meaux's confession. He endeavours to explain

the decision by the state of uneasy semi-lassitude of the Duc de Broglie. Not so, however. The Duc de Broglie did not fear the struggle; his whole career is a proof of this. But feeling no longer master of his convictions, he abandoned himself to the current. Error is often due to mere compliance.

III

June 16th and 17th saw the great ParDissolution demanded its friends had conceived the plan of carrying the friction to an extent that would justify the demand for dissolution. "The Chamber is ungovernable; the Chamber is Gambetta." Such was the import of what was circulated everywhere. The Marshal and Gambetta were systematically opposed. The general tactics attempted to draw the Marshal from his attitude of calm, from the difficult moderation to which he still clung.

The Duc de Broglie presented the presidential demand for dissolution to the Senate.

"On May 16th last I was forced to acquaint the country with the differences between the Chambre des Députés and myself. I verified the fact that no ministry can be maintained in this Chamber unless it seeks the support and yields to the conditions of the Radical party. . . . Hardly had the prorogation been pronounced when in a manifesto of which you already know the terms, more than three hundred deputies protested against the use I had made of my constitutional privilege."

Then follows the decisive paragraph:-

"I shall address myself with confidence to the nation. France desires, as I desire, the mainten-

ance intact of the institutions by which we are governed. No more than I do myself does she desire any modification of these institutions by radical tendencies. Nor does she wish to find in the year 1880—which may be a time of revision for the Constitutional laws—a prepared disorganisation of all the moral and natural forces of the country."

Defiance of Radicalism in good sooth! And 1880! The fatidical date,—the "Messianic year" of J. J. Weiss, when all was to be renovated and refreshed, when a providential interposition should smooth away all difficulties and save Church and State, Rome and France! 1880—towards which with heavenward gaze the faithful marched! "The following of the star!"

The presidential declaration was coldly received by the Senate. There was no applause whatever. The announcement was handed in to the *bureaux* which on Monday, the 18th, were to nominate the Commission.

Within the Chamber all was warfare. M. de Fourtou, Minister of the Interior, spoke in the name of the Government, announcing the proposed dissolution and giving the leading features of the presidential message. Great excitement followed on a simple intervention on the part of Gambetta.

A demand was made by M. Bourgeois for the accounts of the Committee for National Defence. M. Caillaux then enumerated the Acts which the Government desired to pass before the dissolution: as to trusts for the liquidation, supplementary trusts for 1876-77; direct taxation for 1878.

The debate was opened by the interpellation of the Lefts, arranged for on May 17th. M. Bethmont of the Left Centre carried it on, and M. de Fourtou

replied. It was M. Fourtou's day of triumph. The sturdy Perigorder began the fight with some pugnacity.

We do not enjoy your confidence, and you have no share of ours! It is not only Radicalism, but Opportunism that is in question. What Opportunism implies is well known to every one; it is by no means a modified Radicalism. It is patient, stealthy Radicalism, which, watching its chances, attempts to seize the nation after having lulled it into slumber. . . . I have no fear that M. Gambetta may object to this definition of Opportunism, for I borrow it from the history of his own political development.

Then with reference to the programme of 1869 (suppression of standing armies, income tax, etc.), he repeated the expression used on May 23rd, 1875: "The compact holds for ever."

Gambetta had in truth nothing to reply to in this definition. Radicalism or Opportunism, whatever were its name, the policy of the Republican party is the more or less rapid, but logical, development of the democratic principle. Had M. de Fourtou been able to peruse the private letters that now lie before us, he would have found in them an explanation of the method, the secret thought thus expressed by the great "Opportunist":—

What a task is mine! Before taking any active steps I must gain the right of letting reason and justice triumph under guise of violence. I must allay the suspicions of some, check the calumnies of others, and deceive all alike in order the better to serve all. By whose decree is it ordered that truth may never walk openly in the land? By the strongest characteristic of mankind, that of refusing obedience unless forced to it by means of seduction or of violence.

Yet secret thoughts, that the mind hardly ventures to reveal to itself alone, can be divined and brought to light by the fierce instincts of hatred.

And hatred stirred the agitated drama of the period, and intensified the secret strife of spirits within the outward harmony of public paths.

It was de Fourtou who hastened on the duel. It was the President of the Budget Commission, the leader of the majority, against whom he directed his attack.

You have promised the nation many things. Where is the performance of your words? Vain discussions, invalidations—this is all you have to show. You have unsettled sixty-seven propositions of the law; forty-seven of these are still undecided. M. Gambetta, however, has not been inactive; he has produced a statement which has shaken our whole financial system. You have delayed the question of the Budget to the closing days of an unusual session. As to the matters of transport, of our great railway system, of the questions so close to the heart of a great nation, three months of discussion have led to nothing but the solemn constatation of your incapacity.

The attack reached its mark; criticism of parliamentary delay will always find some echo. The speech was heard with serious attention. The Minister, carried away by his own eloquence, went further and lost balance. Contrasting the conduct of the Marshal with that of the Assembly, he attacked with temerity a more grave and delicate subject.

While you were troubling, he was pacifying. You did not fear to state that the Act of May 16th was a menace for our foreign relations. You forget that the men who lead the government of to-day arose from the elections of 1871; that they were a part of that National Assembly of which it can be said that it was the pacifier of the country and the deliverer of the land.

Ovation. At these words a member of the Left, for M. deputy from the Ardennes, mayor of Charle-ville, where he had valiantly borne the bombardment and occupation of the Germans, M.

Gailly—"a man of cool and steady mind, honoured by all"—arose. Pointing with outstretched hand to M. Thiers, who was seated on a bench of the Left, below and a little to the right of himself: "The deliverer?" he said, his voice resounding through the hall, "behold the deliverer of the land!"

The Left rose simultaneously, the same word upon their lips. Two-thirds of the deputies were on their feet; the cry was repeated some score of times amidst a thunder of applause. President Grévy, upright and motionless, his face turned towards M. Thiers, offered his homage; M. Gambetta, whose hand perhaps had been the first directed to the veteran, pointed still. M. Thiers remained seated amid the benches of the Left; head bent, with tear-dimmed, half-closed eyes, his hands crossed upon his breast, he heard the sudden ovation which made up for past ingratitude. Upon the tribunal de Fourtou stood, "impassive, speechless, before a sight to unnerve the strongest orator."

The story of the past seven years was crowded into this one unexpected incident; the war, the Commune, the delivery, May 24th, May 16th, service and injustice, titles and pretensions. M. Thiers could now breathe his *Nunc Dimittis*.

M. de Fourtou had to continue his discourse. Its tone was changed, however; haughty assurance was followed by vague words that fell unheeded amid the surging of emotions. He was applauded and surrounded by the Rights, and he had need of consolation.

Gambetta then replied. The mighty orator knew what lay before him. He it was who was hated,

against whom the blows were aimed. Never had he been more eloquent; his speech was no mere flow of beautiful words, it was an expression of strong personality. Me, me, adsum. To be in such a post and yet be calm, to avoid the dangerous pinnacle to which it was sought to raise him,—in all of this to lose nothing either of himself or of his cause, and this was done amid a storm of fury, a passionate endeavour to force him from the tribune and rob him of his self-possession. Gambetta's marvellous political intuition had divined all this; it rose triumphantly athwart his thundering eloquence—clear-cut, throbbing and victorious.

M. Paul de Cassagnac had determined to prevent Gambetta's speech; it was a personal encounter. M. Grévy, however, was at his post, and flung himself before the interruptor. The struggle lasted long; order was hard to keep. De Cassagnac's harsh voice rose from time to time as the bell tinkled and the sonorous voice of Gambetta continued a sentence interrupted, but always brought to its conclusion:—

"Purveyor of the prison! purveyor of the guillotine, the shame of France!"—such were the words recorded by the journalists.

At length ungovernable tumult rose from the benches on the right. Desks clattered, knives were rapped on tables, cries of animals resounded, there was cat-calling and whistling. Yet Gambetta still spoke on; he uttered the word that once more kindled fire that was not to be extinguished.

"No one has been deceived; in fact, one exclamation has resounded through all France (cries of Oh! oh! from the Right), an exclamation that you also will soon hear, a cry that in itself is both

punishment and rescue—a Government of priests! (cheers from the Left, and protests from the Right), a cabinet of curés!" (repeated cheers from the Left).

A Government of curés. a monarchical reaction, the threat of foreign complications,—all this recalled and ceaselessly repeated was to occupy French thoughts for very long. The leitmotiv of foreign complications answers to a personal theory of Gambetta's: "You have no right to bring the foreigner into our discussions," he was told. His answer was: "Not only have we the right, but it is our duty to make mention of the foreigner on the French rostrum. It is our right and our duty to make known beyond the Alps that if by passing accident the Government of France should fall into distrusted hands. the French nation will disavow this Government." . . . He alluded to the terrible responsibility, present in the minds of all, that the defenders of the temporal power had assumed in 1870; he conjured a similar peril in denouncing it; and there was yet more than this within his thoughts. . . .

Master of himself and of his actions amid a surging tide of agitation, he elected to end his speech by a note of wisdom and of confidence. As the leader that he was henceforth to be, he well knew that the opposition has its responsibilities no less than has the Government:—

It is not because the Chamber is radical that you wish to rid yourselves of it, but because it is serious and prudent; because it has not given you the satisfaction of subversive votes, of immoderate propositions; because it has proved to be a guarantee of peace and progress to the public mind. Because the nation was associated with its work; and because you saw that its unity impressed all France, you strove to bias the Marshal against it and plunge him into unknown paths. And why is this? In order to maintain the hopes of the several parties

to which you belong. The nation knows all; the nation will be judge of us and you.

Then in reply to the boast of M. de Fourtou, he exclaimed:—

"We leave, numbering 363; we shall be 400 on our return!"

Gambetta left the tribunal, where he had stood three hours; he was much wearied, but upheld by the enthusiastic cheering of the Left, though as he reached his seat he is said to have been greatly suffering from his exertions.

A sitting which had witnessed the apotheosis of M. Thiers and the triumphant effort of Gambetta was great even in the eyes of contemporaries, even without the glorifying touch of history. M. Emile de Girardin wrote the following evening of the incident: "What an acclamation! what an ovation. It was a reparation, a well-merited triumph. And what a favourable presage!"

He remarked as to Gambetta:-

What an admirable and powerful improvisation was this proud reply to the Minister for the Interior, to the unworthy contumely that proves what the empire would be with such supporters! The Republic can indeed without presumption bid defiance to her detractors.

What men can they oppose to M. Thiers, to M. Gambetta, who vieing in their patriotism combine with equal disinterestedness against the attempt of clerical rule, whether royal, imperial or ministerial, to expose France, wounded as she is already, to two disastrous risks—those of foreign and of civil warfare! Imperialists, name your champions!—M. Rouher has given us his measure. Royalists, name yours! M. de Broglie has done all that he can do!

The assurance, the glad activity of these dramatic hours, affirm their character. The spoken and the

written word sufficed for the polemic; there was no violence of any sort. The Figaro, engaged on the side of Government, caused no small irritation by the articles of M. de Saint-Genest and the Nouvelles à la Main, aiming at the leaders of the Republican party; all Paris quoted them with laughter in the evening. Sunday the 17th saw much animation in the boulevards, the cafés and the newspaper offices; the town, however, remained quiet. A chronicler remarks: "The evening most fraught with passion was that on which La Duchesse de la Vauballière, a somewhat crude old melodrama, was revived. People tore themselves from the newspapers to hasten to the theatre; those who found the piece too dull resorted to the reading of a telegram, and vice versâ."

There was no demonstration and no shouting. Singing and amusement went on as usual in the Latin Quarter. All was quiet in the outer boulevards. The people were not moved, for since the Commune they had not willingly borne part in "bourgeois quarrels." The tranquillity was looked upon as complimentary to the new order of things. "What a great nation!" exclaimed M. Emile de Girardin. The good humour originated, in fact, in the assurance of success.

On Monday the 18th the discussion was continued. It fell to Duc Decazes, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to reply to M. Gambetta. His speech hinted a reproach which needed protest, that of having risked foreign complications for the nation. The Act of May 16th coincided with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war. The position of France was delicate, placed, as she was, between two diplomatic combinations, in one or

other of which all the Powers were ranged, and which might lead to hostility. Would England suffer the advance of Russia upon Constantinople? would she allow the Ottoman Empire to be dismembered? Might not Germany consider that a moment had arrived for expressing her opinion and turning the scales? And whether in peace or war, what was to be the rôle of France? The declaration read by the Duc Decazes, May 1st, 1877, affirmed the resolution of keeping the neutrality. Neutrality, however, is not always possible, nor is it always wise. Sooner or later the day must surely come when it would be necessary to join issues. It was assuming a heavy responsibility to hurl the nation into the throes of inward discord at a moment when all her attention was needed at the frontier.

The programme of the Ministry, the Roman Question defended, the recent manifestations of the Catholic Committees and of the bishops in favour of the temporal power, offered ground, on the other hand, for serious distrust. Whether rightly or wrongly, Italy was up in arms. It was further reported that the Duc Decazes had only consented to join the Ministry on the signing of a formal agreement to repress in case of need "the ultramontane intrigues." It was to him that the wording of the Havas note of May 17th was attributed, which had so irritated the leaders of the Legitimist party.

It was necessary before all things to tranquillise the Powers, should they really be uneasy. Public opinion had to be also reassured; the solemn and weighty accusations of Gambetta were waiting for

an answer, especially that repeated declaration: "A dissolution is the preface to a war."

The intervention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs had this object. He read on the tribunal the instructions sent by the French Government to its foreign representatives, that in particular to the Marquis de Noailles, representative at the Italian Court. He affirmed the sufficiency of these explanations, stating that M. Melegari had declared through General Cialdini that "they were entirely satisfactory." He conjured the different factions not to compromise the position of France and the cause of peace by imprudent allegations.

His statements, however, were brief and colourless; he was visibly embarrassed. In all directions there were hidden movements, while from afar Bismarck watched the game; the question of the temporal power had already proved a weighty trump card in his hands.

Then followed a speech from M. Pâris, Minister for Public Works, clever and insinuating from both parliamentary and constitutional points of view. Till 1880, he maintained, Marshal MacMahon was invested with regular authority; he considered, and the Cabinet agreed with him, that the hour of Radicalism need never dawn. If all Conservatives would rally to his appeal, they would help to save their country.

M. Jules Ferry replied. His well-trained mind enabled him to strike directly at the argument of M. Pâris: "The policy of the Marshal, the policy of the Cabinet, is anti-parliamentary and anti-constitutional. Are we, in short, governed by the sword of a Marshal of France, or are we governed by constitutional laws?"

These words deserve consideration: the mander or gist of the whole struggle lies in them. a Consti- There were no longer two parties, but two systems in opposition. A COMMANDER OR The long centuries of French A CONSTITUTION? endeavour had ultimately abolished all deliberative powers, all intermediary authority, in order to concentrate the State in the will of a prince. The long spontaneous appeal of the people to a master raised above all prejudice and passion, persons and parties, above the inadequate provisions of constitutions and of rules, all the long past, consistently developing from St. Louis to Louis XI, from Louis XII to Henri IV, from Louis XIV to Napoleon, had culminated with expiring strength in the attempt of Marshal MacMahon! He also was a military chief, the last of such; the victor of Magenta, though the conquered of Sedan. And he claimed the powers of a chief. In the face of this demand arose an adverse claim; that of deliberative, parliamentary opposition had also been transmitted from generation to generation through the ages. Personal power saw itself confronted with written institutions, with the law.

It was a new experience again, for a nation that had once so delighted in its masters; the abandonment of a long-cherished dream, the rude shattering of an illusion which in spite of cruel discouragements had long delighted this people, so self-confident, so easily infatuated, so desirous of glory. It had needed very popular men till now to enforce a strict observance of the written code.

Amid the tumult of the conflict distant thunderings of past storms still muttered ominously—a coup d'état on the one hand, a rebellion on the other;

1830, 1848 and 1871—these years had left descendants in the land. How far would the new wisdom

be supported by past experience?

It fell to a civilian, M. Jules Ferry, to support the claims of legality and to invoke the cool reason, the respect of rules and regulations of which his long career had been a stern exposition. Sparta, Rome and London had grown the flowerless plant that it was sought to acclimatise upon the banks of sunny Seine; and in the hearts of Frenchmen the royal lilies were fading very slowly.

Such was the dilemma expounded by the philosophic orator, the son of lawyers, the descendant of ancient parliamentarians:—

The sixth article of the constitutional law forbids the President to claim the slightest fraction of personal power. Otherwise this personal power would become irresponsible; it would be the sword and not the law that governed. M. Pâris helped, so I am told, in the making of this law; how can he, then, invoke the right of dissolution and the right of prorogation as justification for the personal power of the President? He forgets one thing—that the presidential privileges can be exercised alone through a responsible ministry. . . . All would have been made easy through the constitution had it been loyally applied.

The subordination of the executive to the deliberative stood out clearly. M. Wallon's voluntary ambiguity and insidious test was being forced.

The Right rebelled against this redoubtof Jules able logic, and the utterance of the word
"loyally" was denounced by M. de Cassagnac as an insult to the President. There ensued
a further passage of arms with M. Grévy, who was
not slow to defend the sacred authority of the written
code. With Olympic thunderings he attacked M.
de Cassagnac, and the last word remained with him.

The speech of M. Jules Ferry, brusque and harsh in accordance with the nature of the speaker, then continued amid outcries. His tone was haughty, sarcastic and offensive:—

The nation must pronounce between us and the executive. When an abuse of power has reached this degree it becomes our personal affair. . . .

And in menacing conclusion:-

We shall return here, and we shall this time not content ourselves with annulling improper elections. We shall prove to functionaries of all and every degree, however high they may be placed, that there are judges left in France. To all alike we give this solemn warning: There is present in the legislative power not only the natural right of self-purification by means of the annulment of improper elections, but there exist also civil and correctional powers, and these we shall unhesitatingly apply.

Appeal to the tribunals! The supreme recourse of the irritated civilian! If Gambetta were a leader of men and a master of human hearts, then Jules Ferry was henceforth to appear as the constitutional statesman.

The discussion was continued rather fruitlessly on the Tuesday following; a clever speech was made, however, by M. Léon Renault, former préfet of police and a friend of the Duc Decazes. He spoke in the name of the moderate Republicans, the conservative Republicans, and remarked very wisely:—

You have compromised the Conservative guarantees introduced by us into the constitution.

What have you achieved since May 16th with Marshal Mac-Mahon and with the Senate? What would you do if, against all probabilities, you were to succeed? And what if, as is certain, you fail? In forcing the name of Marshal MacMahon

into our debates, a name hitherto more respected than that of any sovereign, have you reflected as to the position in which you place him after his defeat? As to the Senate, you risk its very existence. . . . It would be speaking harshly of the cabinet of the Prince de Polignac to compare it to the present ministry; you have neither aim, nor creed, nor pretext.

M. Léon Renault was loudly applauded.

Then remained nothing more to do but vote. The resolution of the Lefts was read by another moderate man, M. Horace de Choiseul.

The Chamber of Deputies considers that the Ministry formed on May 17th by the President of the Republic, and of which the Duc de Broglie is the leader, has been called to office contrary to the law of majority, the principle of parliamentary government.

Further, that this Ministry from the day of its formation has avoided explanation of its programme to the representatives of the nation;

Further, that this Ministry has unsettled home administration for the purpose of profiting by all available means of the decisions of universal suffrage;

Further, that in its origin and composition it represents but a coalition of parties hostile to the Republic, a coalition led by the promoters of clerical manifestations already condemned by the Chamber;

Further, that since May 17th it has granted impunity to attacks directed against national representation and to direct provocation of violation of the laws;

Further, that this Ministry constitutes a menace to public peace and order, as well as to public interests.

This Chamber, therefore, declares that the Ministry does not enjoy the confidence of the representatives of the nation.

M. Pâris spoke a few words on behalf of the Government: "The nation will decide as to which is right, whether the coalition of the Lefts or the union of Conservatives."

To this Gambetta replied: "Yes, we shall appeal to the nation; all then without exception will

have to bow the head to a master—common to all—universal suffrage."

The resolution of the Lefts was passed by 363 votes against 158.

The Senate-house was now the place of interest. The senators were astounded at the demand for dissolution, and by June 18th a committee was appointed for discussing the situation. Of nine members, three were hostile to the idea—MM. Le Royer, Bérenger and Jules Favres; while Comte Daru, MM. Grivart, Depeyre, Audren de Kerdrel, de Ventavon and Léon Clément were in favour of it. These were the leading names of the National Assembly. M. Depeyre acted as reporter. The favourable resolution was read on Wednesday, June 20th:—

That this house has read the Message of the President of the Republic, dated June 16th, by which he makes known to the Senate his intention of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies and asks for ratification of this decision in accordance with Article 5 of the Act of Public Powers. That this house is in agreement with the decision of the President of the Republic.

The demand of the Duc de Broglie for an urgent settlement was adopted. The discussion was arranged for Tuesday, June 21st.

On the 21st a speech was made by Victor Hugo: "The Senate is to be judge; the Senate will be judged." His closing words were: "I vote against the catastrophe; I protest against the dissolution."

M. Jules Simon then expounded his point of view as to the crisis of May 16th: "As to the fall of the Cabinet, it may be observed that we were a Republican cabinet, and that the ascendant party was Republican. We have fallen together with the Parliamentary régime."

Then came the Duc de Broglie.

With what impatience had he been Speech by the awaited! He stood as the originator of Duc de the crisis, a leader devoid of blindness. Broglie self-interest or even, perhaps, ambition. He was a gambler, obstinate and thorough, slightly mocking in his attitude towards both men and fate; more confident in himself, perhaps, than in an enterprise whose issue he had hardly cared to calculate; fully convinced that public welfare and the heritage of history had been entrusted to his hands; reserved and silent even with his friends, bristling with sarcasm towards his enemies; all his energies were concentrated on the war of eloquence in which he was so brilliant a master despite his natural disadvantages—abruptness of gesture, harsh voice and stern demeanour. His slightly bowed shoulders bore traces of the burden of this ephemeral power; the pallor of his countenance betrayed the uncertainties and concentrated passions of his faction. Too independent a condottière, too wise a chief, too acute a thinker, his personal nobility lent a shade of grandeur to the causes he embraced. He took no pains to argue; he affirmed.

The action of the President is called unconstitutional. The President is in himself an independent public power. . . . The Senate is the arbitrator of the present moment, but the dissent existing between the President and the Chamber exists also between the Senate and the Chamber. If you wish to know the motive by which the President of the Republic has been guided, you have but to question your own conscience.

The President of the Republic has always been determined to yield in no wise to the Radical spirit. M. Gambetta now effaces himself before M. Thiers with a patience not hard for youth to practise. But he is the real leader of the majority. . . . This cannot satisfy the Marshal MacMahon. When a man bears the name of Marshal MacMahon; when he stands as

representative of law, order, discipline, of all that men respect in civilised society; when he has passed a stainless life in the fulfilment of the duties and in the respect of all the principles which serve as foundation to all regular associations, he cannot suddenly become ally and soldier of the reverse of what he has believed in all his life and stood for in the eyes of the populace. He who bears the name of Marshal MacMahon cannot become the ally and the hireling of the honourable M. Gambetta,—such is the bare truth.

Cruel the moment when art seeks but to wound!

We are reproached with being neither constitutional nor Republican. The Constitution in no wise necessitates the Republic, since the Constitution reserves the right of self-revision, of changing the form of government, since the Constitution has maintained in power the Marshal MacMahon. He, forsooth, is no Republican by birth, nor would he ever have consented to preside over a government from which the comrades of his youth and his brothers-in-arms were to remain excluded. . . .

There remains the reproach of clericalism. Having no personal understanding of the charge, and no proofs as to the grounds of the accusation being given, I cannot undertake to answer it... Are we called upon to justify ourselves for not desiring war? The manœuvre is doomed to failure; it is a mere matter of words. Universal suffrage will have to choose between Marshal MacMahon and the dictator of Bordeaux or the orator of Belleville; it will find the control of Radicalism and the rising of new social strata no very easy task.

MacMahon or Gambetta, such was the Government alternative. The subtlety had overreached itself; things were not quite so simple, and as a precedent this choice between two men was not without its dangers.

M. Bérenger then spoke:-

You have premeditated this crisis, premeditated and prepared; and you will fail in it. You are working for the violent, and the moderates exclaim with anger that their work is being undone. Should the Senate vote for dissolution, it will mean an opening of the gates for intrigues. The Duc de Broglie is

obliged to own that the election will lead to no other alternative but Radicalism or a coup d'état; such is the pass to which the least false step will bring us.

There was a sitting on June 22nd. M. Bertauld spoke and was answered violently by M. Brunet. Good M. Laboulaye flung himself into the fray, defending the Constitution with wise and measured words:—

A plébiscite is to be made. Its terms will be: "The Marshal or the Republic." The term Marshal is to mean all that is not of the Republic. You are doomed to failure; a nameless government uncemented by any common ideas is a chimera, it cannot be defended. . . . You live within a world of salons. Throughout all time salons have been unworthy counsellors, cross-grained and utterly unpractical. You will not succeed, and you will have placed the Marshal between humiliation and abdication.

This was already the famous "Resignation or Submission." But the voice of M. Laboulaye did not have much weight.

The position was stormed; the Government made no further answer. The votes were taken solemnly, resulting in a majority of 19—149 to 130—for the dissolution. M. Peyrot remarked: "This is the death of the Senate." "Lord, forgive them," said M. Lasserre, "they know not what they do!"

There were further sittings on the Thursday, Friday and Saturday in order to discuss certain urgent measures.

At two o'clock on Monday, June 25, the sitting was opened by a short speech from M. Jules Grévy: "Gentlemen, before tendering my thanks for the communication I have received, I wish once more to thank the Chamber for the great honour it has paid me, and for the kindness I have received from

it. The country to which it now returns will soon declare that during its too short career no day has passed without witnessing its well-deserving of France and the Republic."

President Grévy had the secret of the epitaph.

He then read the decree of dissolution. The sitting rose at ten minutes past two. The same decree was read in the Senate-house by the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, who pronounced the adjournment till the new Chamber should be convoked. Tuesday, June 26th, saw the publication in the Journal Officiel of the resolution of the Senate and the decree thereto annexed.

CHAPTER II

THE EASTERN QUESTION

- I.—The new European politics—Importance of France in the European system—Consequences of the German hegemony upon general politics—The rôle of Russia, Austria, Germany and the East—Beginning of the new Oriental crisis—Troubles in Herzegovina—Russia appeals to France for help—The struggle between Sclavonism and Germanism—Intervention of England—Tactics of Prince Bismarck and of Prince Gortschakoff—Russia makes overtures to France—The programme of Pesth, or programme of "the three emperors."
- II.—Origin of the Eastern question—The rayas—Turkish reform and Christian reform—The Russian crusade—Traditional policy of the Powers in the East—The Crimean War, Treaty of Paris, the Hatti-Humazoun of 1856—Situation on the eve of the war of 1870.
- III.—The two chancellors—Bismarck and Gortschakoff—Russia opens the Oriental crisis—Attitude of England—Disraeli and the East.
- IV.—Recrudescence of disorder—Turkish armaments—The Memorandum of Berlin—Non-adherence of England—General embarrassment—The meeting at Ems—France seeks conciliation—Bismarck as the holder of the threads—Convention of Reichstadt—Struggle of Servia and Montenegro against Turkey—Defeat of the Servians—The Bulgarian atrocities—English opinion and Disraeli—Rise of Abdul-Hamid—Bismarck pronounces for Austria and opposes England to Russia—Russia unready—The conference at Constantinople—Ultimatum of Europe against Turkey—Turkish mobilisation—The Protocol of London—War inevitable.

May 16th as an epoch of liquidation

THE crisis of May 16th is not only an incident of French home politics, it belongs to more general history. Its cause in France was the fate of the genera-

tion that had seen the end of the reign of Louis-Philippe, the Revolution of 1848, the Second Empire, the War and the Commune.

It meant the liquidation of a period; be-whiskered gentlemen and military veterans, doctrinists and St. Simonians, Guizotians, Lamartinians and Prudhonians, all were about to sail away upon a boat of which popular suffrage was to cut the cables.

An analogous upheaval was taking place throughout Europe. The diplomatists and statesmen who had grown grey over the treaties of 1815 (whether hostile or beneficial), were also leaving the stage. A formidable realist had, in 1863, 1866 and 1870, given the signal for the curtain of the new piece to rise, though as yet the curtain had not moved.

Napoleon III was dead. M. Thiers, Victor-Emmanuel and Pius IX were soon about to die. Few survivors remained of the men who had trodden the boards—Gortschakoff, Disraeli, Gladstone; but still another sign was needed before the new act could begin.

The results of the war of 1870 were still in evidence. It was during the enforced retirement of France that Fate selected the propitious moment for breaking with the past, that past in which the rôle of France had been so great. The Europe that had seen the wars of Greece, of the Crimea and of Italy was now to pass away; the dawn of a new Europe was at hand, in which the conflict of nationalities and principles was to be succeeded by wars of expansion and of profit, commercial competitions, colonial conquests, imperialism and world-policy; all this was coming to the fore just as the internal revolutions of France were being concluded.

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How the young Republic, impeded by her troubles, missed her part in the first scene of the drama, the Eastern war; how, consolidated and quieted, she resumed her place among the family of nations and extended her position in the world before her wounds had all been healed, this is a story that, though treating of foreign politics, is none the less important in its influence upon her inward growth.

The Republic escaped the dangers that, coming from abroad, had menaced her development; she grew in strength and unity, and commanded new respect; she could now boldly take her share in the questions that moved the world during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The two stories are essentially one.

The history of Europe is a logical result European of her geographical configuration. A projection of the ancient continent of Asia, Europe consists of two vast regions standing back to back—the elevated region around the Mediterranean Sea, and the great low plain around the German Ocean.

These two great regions have each their own portal upon the ancient world; one, maritime, through the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Archipelago; the other, continental, through the valleys of the Russian streams.

The boundary line between the two stretches diagonally from the Ural Mountains to the Pyrenees. It divides France almost equally, from Mezières to Bayonne. This diagonal line is also a line of ethnographical demarcation. The peoples of the plains have often beset the peoples of the mountains, who in their turn have directed their hostility to the peoples of the plains; European annals recount

the alternative march from south to north, and from north to south.

Overlapping has been inconsiderable and not of long duration. Homo Mediterraneus, the brownskinned, black-eyed being, has remained in possession of the four peninsulas that constitute southern Europe; while the tall Homo Europeus, fair-haired, blue-eyed, white-skinned, has multiplied upon the northern shores and overflowed into the world beyond.

If, in all the extent of Europe, there is Importance of a territory at once favoured and exposed, France it is that in which these two regions meet, European in which the two systems touch and almost overlap, either combining their resources or disputing their hegemony. Standing as she does where the seas of north and south most closely meet, France, of the Atlantic and of the Mediterranean, of the plains and of the mountains, of the Latins, of the Germans, is perforce the field of secular conflict as also of truces that are but far too short. Her aspect, and her language, bear trace of all that has lived on the old continent. France is both agent and umpire of the balance; it is she that turns the scales. Her humiliations and her glories form the central interest of the European drama.

All deep thinkers recognise this necessary rôle of France. Joseph de Maistre remarks: "I see in the destruction of France the germ of two centuries of massacres, the sanction of the most odious Machiavellism, the irrevocable ruin of the human race." He does not say, but he considers that the world would thereby lose her smile. He resumes the history of ancient Europe by the remark of the Marquis d'Ormea: "What think you of the balance

of Europe?" said this wise Minister of Victor-Amadeus. "It is to be found within the Cabinet of Versailles. May it realise its responsibilities!"

Unfortunately, however, neither Versailles nor Paris have always done so; they do not always preserve the equal balance; they abandon sometimes the duty of regulation. Louis XIV, with Spanish blood within his veins; Napoleon, who was Italian, allowed the southern element to encroach beyond all reasonable bounds; to them is partly due the ruin of the elegant construction raised by Richelieu. By the second Napoleon the sacrifice was consummated. Weakened by the two parties which sought to profit by him, he could not manage to escape their combined pursuit.

The Treaty of Frankfort gave the holocaust to Prussia that Joseph de Maistre feared to see devoted to Austria: "The dismemberment of France would entail the dreadful system of convenance, by which we should be carried back to the jurisdiction of the Huns. It is to the poor Austria they propose to give Alsace and Lorraine! Good heavens! what a balance!... There will always be preponderating powers, and France is worth more than Austria."

"There will always be preponderating powers!" Authority had been placed elsewhere; the scales dipped no longer to the south but to the north; no longer towards Paris, but Berlin. Such changes, however, are not realised by a stroke of the pen. During the space of many years European history is but the application of the sentence pronounced at Frankfort in 1871.

And after Frankfort, a rapid preliminary arrangement had created an apparent order. "The alliance

of the three Emperors had given Europe all realisable stability in the absence of a Congress, which was, at all costs, what Bismarck most desired to avoid. This was but an appearance, however. Accounts had not been settled; all was in suspense, and the disputes of the moment—religious, economic and territorial,—gave further complications to the tasks that Europe had accumulated. A crisis must prove fatal.

According to strict logic the storm should burst on Germany, should Germany find no means for turning it aside. It was this fear that caused so much torment to Prince Bismarck, the while his nervous vigilance, his quick imagination and his unwearied activity left nothing untouched and untried, and his brilliance dazzled Europe.

The rise of Prussia, lifting with it whole districts of ancient Germany, had shaken the old boundaries around the region of the cataclysm. France, through the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, had been pushed southwards and meridionalised; Austria-Hungary had been driven towards the Danube and Magyarised; Russia herself, pushed back upon the Urals, had been made more Asiatic. The weight of the new empire was crushing the Low Countries and Belgium, and stifling the three kingdoms of the North. The extension was being felt at Madrid, even at Constantinople. A phase of the secular duel between France and Germany was closed, also a phase of the interior strife in Germany; it was Northern Germany, Lowland Germany, that stood as conqueror; the last eddy of the triumph was still agitating Europe. After Austria and France there remained but one more Continental power

to enter the lists and dispute the hegemony; this was Russia.

What France weighed in Europe remained now to be seen!

As had been the case with France in 1866, Russia in 1870 had missed her hour. It has become usual to declare that the attitude of the Muscovite empire towards France at the beginning of the war of 1870 was chiefly caused by the affection that bound the Emperor Alexander to his uncle, the King of Prussia. The sentiment indeed existed; Gortschakoff and Bismarck dealt with it very skilfully; yet more than once it had to yield to the necessities of a political line of action that other interests and more general sentiments had traced.

Prince Gortschakoff, who had full faith in his own star, and especially in his own perspicacity, had a fixed object for his dreams; this was to repair the disasters of 1855. He wished at the same time to assure the Russian Empire against the increasing dangers of the Polish question. For these two objects he saw but one means of achievement, one that was easy, popular and brilliant; the opening of the portals of the East to the Orthodox religion and the Sclavonic element. Russia, who held the great continental road leading into Asia, would complete the power of her position by placing a sentinel at the entrance of the maritime route.

With such an aim in view, Russian politics became involved with three adversaries rising against her simultaneously or successively—Austria-Hungary, the Western Powers and Northern Germany. Of these the most redoubtable was that which penetrated like a wedge into the empire and placed

an obstacle to the Sclavonic overflow, whether in Poland or in the Balkans, and this was Austria-Hungary.

France and weakened and almost ousted from Germany by Prussia; this defeat had seemed a Russian victory in the eyes of Prince Gortschakoff. In 1870 there came the turn of an Occidental Power, of the Power and the dynasty that had forced on Russia the Treaty of Paris and defended the cause of Poland with the most persistence and disinterestedness; this was Imperial France.

It is difficult to affirm that Prince Gortschakoff did not foresee the consequences of his mistake in letting France be crushed. Doubtless he would have preferred to obtain a revision of the Treaty of Paris without too much weakening the balancing power of France, to the advantage of Prussia and North Germany.

Before the development of matters, or during the war, he made, at intervals, sufficiently clear overtures to the different French Governments. He styled himself "promoter of the alliance with France"; he declared that "while he lived he would continue to defend this policy."

On July 6th, 1870, as he received the news of the Hohenzollern incident, before even the French Ambassador, General Count Fleury, had been informed of it, he approached the latter with a definite suggestion: "Russia is always desirous of seeing an 'entente cordiale' established between herself and France. France, however, is in the debt of Russia; it would be necessary for her to give some guarantees of conciliation upon the Eastern Question. Not that revision of the humiliating treaty

of 1856 would be required, a treaty to which Russia yields with sorrow; she fully understands that in this serious question France is not independent, that she must act in concert with Great Britain. . . . The moment will dawn, however, for re-consideration of the ideas of alliance and equilibrium, which will prove true guarantees of peace and prosperity for Europe."

The Ambassador received such important overtures at so grave a moment with some coldness, and contented himself with transmitting them to Paris. The state of diplomatic relations immediately preceding the outbreak of the war so absorbed the attention of the Imperial Government that the opportunity, and perhaps it was unique, was not seized. How, too, could the Imperial policy have destroyed with its own hands the famous contracts celebrated as the glory of the reign? M. Thiers, who, a few months later, on this journey to St. Petersburg, heard similar words from this same Prince Gortschakoff, either did not, or would not, understand their import.

The help of France was easily dispensed with in the annulment of the Treaty of Paris; and Northern Germany magnified her victories by the famous telegram from the new Emperor to his imperial nephew: "It is with inexpressible feelings and much gratitude to God that I inform you of the signing of the preliminaries of peace. Prussia will never forget that it was due to you that the war did not assume more extensive proportions. May God bless you for it.—Your grateful friend for life. . . ."

Russia accepted this telegram as a cheque that she would cash in all good time.¹

¹ Prince Bismarck in his Memoirs confirms a fact communi-

Prince Gortschakoff publicly congratulated himself upon his double success; both Sadowa and Sedan had worked for his advantage. The Austrian adversary and the Western adversary had been brought low by the victories of Prussia, and German gratitude assured a reliable ally for the Muscovite. There now remained but to gather in the harvest so skilfully prepared.

The Alliance of the Treaty of Paris relative Emperors to the Black Sea. The colleague of Berlin had frowned over this, fearing, as he did, the idea of a congress to which the preliminaries of Versailles would have to be submitted. However, all had turned out satisfactorily; and no sooner had he returned to Germany than Prince Bismarck reverted to the subject of family relations and of monarchical solidarity for the purpose of cementing a combination which should sanction the victories of Prussia and consolidate the basis of a new Europe; this combination was the "Alliance of Three Emperors."

It was, however, only the façade. The Emperor Alexander declared to General Le Flô in an interview of December 28th, 1875, that "what is termed the Alliance of the Three Powers of the North has never had other cause or object than the maintenance of peace." With more precision, M. Laboulaye, the French chargé d'affaires, wrote to his Government, November 23rd: "The union of the three

cated to M. Blowitz in 1879 by Prince Gortschakoff. The Czar Alexander II is said to have written as follows to the Emperor William before the interview of Alexandrovo: "Your Majesty's Chancellor has forgotten the promises of 1870" (vol. ii. p. 260).

Empires is the mask to hide a diversity of policies, which up to the present moment none of the three Powers desires to divulge." There was no desire to divulge them to the public, but each of the partners kept his own in petto, and Bismarck, for his own part, explains them sufficiently in his Memoirs: "It is easy to understand that Russia desires to set a limit beyond which the influence of France is not to be diminished. This limit I believe to have been effected by the Treaty of Frankfort, and probably in 1870 and 1871; this desire was possibly not fully realised till another five years later."

In this passage, which struck at Prince Gortschakoff, the Chancellor was laughing in his sleeve; the latter, however, thought himself still more astute, and believed that France, wounded and defeated, would allow him to dominate Germany through "the bugbear of a coalition," and that in this wise, from the new empire founded by his auspices, he would receive carte blanche for the only matter he really had at heart—that of the Eastern Question. He had obtained a European factotum free of charge.

Bismarck, however, felt no vocation for this kind of service. Divining the object of the Russian Chancellor, he had drawn him out in the incident of 1875, and had then been shown his rival's cards. The German Chancellor then realised the complexity of the Muscovite game. Irritated at the warning, he withdrew into his habitual reserve and waited. He knew that it would not be for long; Gortschakoff, with old age close at hand, had little time to spare.

The irons were put into the Eastern furnace. On January 15th, 1875, four months before the famous incident of 1875, Prince Gortschakoff had had a

serious interview with General Le Flô. At the close of the troubles born in the summer of 1874, a scuffle had taken place at Podgoritsa between Turks and Montenegrians, and an investigation having been decided on, Prince Nicholas of Montenegro demanded that it should be held on Montenegrian territory instead of Turkish, in order to affirm the independence of the principality with regard to Turkey.

The Ambassadors of the Powers at Constantinople had, on the instigation of General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador, interviewed the Grand Vizier in order to hasten the solution of the difficulty. General Ignatieff, who needed little urging, had received most energetic instructions from the Emperor, who was personally interested in the cause of the Montenegrian prince.

From that moment a strong feeling reigned in St. Petersburg that matters would go further. General Le Flô heard the following words from Prince Gortschakoff himself: "The prince said to me, speaking without a break, as if talking to himself, but like a man wishful to have his slightest hint well understood: 'We have done all in our power to avoid a conflict; we have never ceased to recommend prudence and moderation to the vassal states, and to warn them that we shall in no wise support them in any aggressive action. . . . Austria has owed much to this principle. . . . But Montenegro is not a vassal state. . . . We do not consider ourselves bound to prevent the neighbouring peoples from giving to it their protection and their aid.' This sentence was meant for the understanding of Austria. The Chancellor explained his meaning more definitely: 'Russia, Austria and

also Greece appear to me resolved not to stir from their position in this question, and if, by misfortune, a conflict should arise, their agreement, which as yet is but a *rapprochement*, will become a definite alliance. . . . The situation is-extremely grave, and the attitude you take may be perhaps decisive.' This was still more definite. The name of England was only uttered once, and then with little sympathy, in this farseeing interview."

From henceforth, then, and through an incident of secondary importance, war was declared and the question of alliance propounded. Prince Gortschakoff reverted to the subject that had served with both General Fleury and M. Thiers. What would France do in the East? Weakened and impoverished, would she still persist in the policy of the Western Powers?

It was pure condescension that inspired the address. Were not the Northern Powers already well assured? Was not the plan of action to be carried out in common with Austria already traced, and even that of Austrian intervention? Was not Russian diplomacy handling at her pleasure, by means of Berlin—that formidable weapon—the Alliance of the Three Emperors?

The Germanic The position of the Germanic race in Europe is terrible both to herself and others. Scattered over an indeterminate territory, attached to the mountain masses that separate north and south, her geographical position and her ethnographical expansion are equally ill-regulated. It is divided almost necessarily into two, even three, groups—Southern, Central and Northern. Thus divided, the race is at war within herself;

combined, she causes uneasiness to her neighbours, and calls for coalition against her. The remark of Joseph de Maistre on Austria may be applied to her: "Neighbours all around and no frontiers anywhere." This steady, industrious and multiplying population, when not exhausted by terrible dissensions, is eager for migration and for conquest. Germany supplies both men and reasons for European conflicts. The test of European statescraft will always be the aptitude for discovering the winning number of German influence.

Even after 1863, after 1866, and even also after 1870, unity through the hegemony of the North was not a quite accomplished fact. The dividing line ran rather vaguely at the foot of the Bohemian mountains; there was, in fact, a double Germany. In the Northern Empire the peoples were not all of the same blood, not all amalgamated—Poles, Alsatians, Lorrainians, even the Roman Catholic Bavarians, the Badenians, the Saxons and Würtembergers were but tied together, not actually united. And in the Empire of the South, though the German element still predominated, it was surrounded and confused by the strange mixture of alien races left by different invasions along the valley of the Danube and in the neighbouring regions.

Hindered by unfinished conquests, by many causes for disunion, by unsatisfactory neighbours—either irritated or exacting—such was the condition of the German Empire when Prince Bismarck first began his reflections on what might be the ambitions of "the other Chancellor." The mission of de Radowitz to Moscow, the incident of 1875 with France, the numerous interviews for the purpose of consolidating the "Alliance of the Three

Emperors," the sudden silence of German diplomacy after the journey of the Czar Alexander to Berlin in 1875,—all these were proofs of Bismarck's disquietude as he felt the storm approaching.

During the month of July, 1875, troubles in Herze- broke out in Herzegovina. The Orthodox and Sclavonic populations were of opinion that the hour had struck for their deliverance and that they should now force the hand of their great chief, friend and protector, the White Czar. Pan-Sclavonic committees began to take decisive steps. Prince Gortschakoff was not then at St. Petersburg, and Baron de Jomini acted in his absence. De Jomini was a man who had ideas, a literary diplomat, a foreigner obliged to offer some equivalent for his welcome to the country that employed his services. Gontaut-Biron has thus defined the Baron: "Speculative, dreamy, somewhat eccentric on the whole and not quite easy to depend on. He has talent, of that there is no doubt, but his principal merit is that of having made himself a confidant of the Chancellor."

If he did not altogether share the views of General Ignatieff, Ambassador in Turkey, his actual services were equal to those of the General.

On August 5th, 1875, Baron de Jomini in a diplomatic interview re-opened the "Eastern Question": "There is great uneasiness and perplexity abroad here: the insurgents, who numbered 300 a fortnight ago may be 7,000 to-day, well supplied with arms and ammunition; while the Turks, with their habitual indifference, instead of acting with energy and thus commanding some respect, show hesitation and confine themselves to skirmishes. Russia, Austria and Germany endeavour

to come to an agreement for a common enterprise, in which Austria is to take the leading part, being more interested than the others in the re-establishment of order, through her geographical and political situation. . . . An interposition is desired, not an intervention. . . . Whatever happens, that which is now going on warns us that the Eastern Question may explode at any moment and that foresight is most necessary."

Austria was put into the van; the Intervention of Alliance of the three Empires was being the Czar consolidated. There was, apparently, but little fear as to what the Western Powers might do. There was no desire, however, to lose, with France, the benefit of the Imperial intervention of May. Its memory was ever present to some extent, and the Emperor himself was to invoke it. On August 13th, at the theatre, the Emperor approached the Ambassador and said: "Baron Jomini has acquainted me to-day of his interview with you. . . . I immediately gave orders to my Ambassador that he should ask the help of your Government, and tell the Duc Decazes of my satisfaction in seeing him associated with the action of the Emperors of Germany, Austria and myself with regard to Constantinople, an action which originates in the sole interests of peace." An official letter from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg at once confirmed this intimation. The situation was explained as follows: "The Imperial Cabinet has offered support to that of Vienna in any measure that may be considered diplomatically useful, with the object of circumscribing and appeasing all disorders and preventing any crisis dangerous to the general peace. The Cabinet of Berlin has made

the same proposal.... There is no question of intervening in the home affairs of Turkey, but the Powers may exert their influence to bring the insurgents to submission, the Servians and Montenegrians to neutrality, and Turkey to clemency and just reforms. It would be very desirable that the French Government should join in this endeavour..."

Baron d'Avril who quotes the above from the Yellow Book, observes with reason that it contains the germ of all subsequent developments. Vienna was placed in the front rank. The agreement of the three Emperors in this particular object is constantly affirmed; there is no single mention of Great Britain. This was brought to notice by the Ambassador, and he says in his telegram of August 10th: "Russia and Austria are convinced that England, whatever be their action, will always be systematically opposed to them as regards Constantinople." The knot was tightening; France was now also to declare herself. She found herself standing between her former policy and the new order of things, and it was becoming clear how important to Prince Gortschakoff would be her support. The gain of France would signify a leaning upon Germany and the isolation of Great Britain.

The Ambassador, General Le Flô, flushed still from his recent "success," convinced that from henceforth the only policy of France should be the "Russian alliance," sensible, both for his country and himself, of the attentions of Alexander and his Ministers, and impressed by such peremptory declarations on the subject of the agreement of the three Empires, laid stress upon the matter to his Government. "I do not shut my eyes to the

delicacy of the situation from a certain point of view, but I most decidedly consider that it would be a great mistake to leave France in isolation outside the already too intimate alliance of the three great Powers." France might well have her reasons for standing aside, reasons caused by her disasters. Great Britain did not appear the worse for not joining the Alliance, and was this union of the Empires really quite so close? Bismarck surely realised that he did not inspire complete confidence, since support was sought elsewhere.

Importance of paid much consideration to what was passing in Vienna. France defeated, Vienna was the centre of German diplomacy; it was in Vienna that the struggle between Northern and Southern Germany would have to be fought out—the real problem of the unity; it was in Vienna that would be solved, if ever, the question of Protestant and Roman Catholic dualism; the problem of Pan-Sclavonism and Pan-Germanism, the problem of East and West.

Russia, as has been said, must "take her passport at Vienna" to find her way towards the Mediterranean. Prussia, in order to keep Russia within bounds, must have a base-line at Vienna; and should she fear to rouse the opposition of England and the Western Powers by substituting for the march towards the West the march towards the East, Germany also is obliged to walk warily near the Danube. Vienna, therefore, is, with Pesth, the great consideration of Berlin. Bismarck had then but one idea—the wish to form a third in an agreement between Russia and Austria in order to watch and guide it, and, if necessary, embroil it.

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And it was in this that all the "intimacy" con-The foundation of things does not escape the perspicacious eve. M. Laboulave, chargé d'affaires during the holidays of General Le Flô, explains it with some energy in a noteworthy letter addressed to the Duc Decazes, November 23rd, 1875: "The situation can be briefly summarised: the Cabinet of St. Petersburg feels that the destinies of Russia are bound up with the enfranchisement of the Sclaves: this eventuality is, however, the greatest apprehension of the Cabinet of Vienna. Prussia, on her side, needs the division of her neighbours in order to maintain her hegemony on Europe and even upon Germany. She hopes that, once opened, the bag of the Eastern mystery will blow forth discord; a hope which, nevertheless, does not prevent her utterance of pacific declarations. ... Such is the true state of affairs. peace resist these divergencies, it will assuredly be because Russia and Austria, having equal reasons to fear Germany, do not wish to furnish her with the pretext that she seeks for intervening in their affairs or re-kindling war in Europe."

It was, in the first instance, the problem of Constantinople, but it was also the German and the Sclavonic question, the rush of the European empires for the hegemony, that revealed itself in the explanations of Baron Jomini and in the reflections of Prince Bismarck.

For Bismarck, who had steadfastly maintained this, there was but one thing certain: come what might, as long as Austria would go with him, he could not separate himself from her. Even should Russia leave him in the lurch, which she did a few months later, even should Russia seek alliance

with France, it would be best to run the risk. In an important letter, addressed to Count Schouwalow in February, 1877, he speaks of the sang froid with which he faces the eventuality. And elsewhere he recalls the time when Frederic II led the coalition of the three Powers. He was, however, not the man to seek out peril unnecessarily; he did all in his power to avert it.

Pan-Before entering upon the details of the Germanism astonishing campaign, which turned so cruelly against those who entered on it, and which diplomacy succeeded in ultimately turning to account, though rather by an adaptation to circumstances than by any preconceived design, it is necessary to prove that the policy indeed originated with Bismarck, understood and divined by careful contemporaries.

M. Laboulaye, in the already quoted letter of November 23rd, 1875, writes: "The German interests of Austria are as dear to Germany as those of Prussia. In the eyes of every German all that is comprehended in the Empire of Austria is the heritage of Germany, and all that may be added to this will be considered a German acquisition. Hungary is the vanguard of Germany in the same way in which the Hohenzollern prince in Roumania stands to her as outpost. Therefore in a war directed against Turkey and against Austria, which is the same thing in my opinion, as the one would inevitably lead to the other, Russia would find Germany behind Austria."

Germany and Austria herself had, however, the same reasons for avoiding this eventuality, in the case of which Russia would have had to hurl herself against so resolute and powerful a combination

that she would not dare to play her last card. Count Andrassy, guided as he was as a Hungarian by his anti-Sclavonic instincts, and urged on by the German Chancellor, had need of all his skill in following, with regard to Russia, a parallel road that allowed of surveillance and restraint towards her, while assuring himself of the benefits of the entente and avoiding the risks of war.

For this, however, other interests had to be brought into play. Great Britain still remained to take into account. The tradition of Great Britain consisted in always and everywhere opposing Russian policy. And Great Britain, who had just laid hands on the Suez Canal and opened the campaign that was to bring her Egypt as a vassal, cherished a fixed desire to wrest from Russia that Ottoman inheritance of which she adjudged so large a portion to herself. For these several reasons, and in spite of what was imagined in St. Petersburg, Great Britain was the inevitable ally of Austria in the Eastern Question. Austria knew this very well; she would claim her ally at the opportune moment.

It would be attributing to the Russian statesmen a most extraordinary lack of knowledge and of perspicacity to admit that they had not grasped something of such an obvious situation—obvious, in spite of its complexity—and to state that they did nothing to prepare for difficulties. Gortschakoff and Jomini certainly perceived that which escaped neither General Le Flô nor M. Laboulaye. But both were influenced by Sclavonic aspirations, by preconceived ideas, by an exaggerated confidence in their power, by too optimistic an opinion of the plans of Austria and of France after Sadowa and Sedan, and by too hasty an appreciation of the

fear that German domination might inspire in Europe. Above all, they were urged on by their destiny. In all the thousands of succeeding incidents which go to make up history, things are not only dependent upon reflection and will-power. Great men are helped by luck.

After having attempted to gain the help of France, the scheme that Gortschakoff conceived for spoiling Bismarck's game consisted in clinging firmly to the side of Austria and offering this Empire in the East, on his own responsibility, all the authority, influence and advantages that could be hoped from a union with the rival powers of Russia. He hoped to reduce and compromise the Cabinet of Vienna, and by making use of the old German memories of hostility towards Prussia to draw it from the influence of Bismarck.

The Russian Chancellor endeavoured likewise not to irritate Great Britain; and even still more skilfully, as he knew the sensitiveness of the English feeling, he tried to bring about a re-consideration of this feeling.

From the month of October, 1875, the formula of the three-sided intervention was modified into what had been explained to General Le Flô. After having obtained the hesitating help of France on the basis of the status quo and the maintenance of peace; after having astonished the Cabinet in London by recounting the excellent intentions of the Continental Powers, there was no longer any question but of "the common action of the Powers as vouchers for the Treaty of Paris." There were no views as to Constantinople but the safeguard of the peace, and nothing seemed more prudent and more honourable.

True, however, that a new word was now being introduced among the ready-made phrases of formal protocols. People spoke no longer only of the status quo, but of the improved status quo.

The first sign of disagreement appeared about this time between St. Petersburg and Vienna. The Viennese Government discovered that it was being employed too much and bound over to too much. Both at Belgrade and Constantinople it was necessary to act in common, in order to prevent hostilities between Servia and Turkey. The chargé d'affaires of Austria-Hungary drew up again, with Baron Jomini, the declaration that was to be addressed to the Servian Government: "The Powers vouching for the Treaty of Paris would find it impossible to protect Servia from a Turkish occupation were the Servian Government to commit any act of aggression against the Porte."

However, when it came to a question of putting the scheme planned at Constantinople into effect, Vienna would not accept the prominent part that had been offered her. M. Laboulaye telegraphed that: "While affirming on the part of St. Petersburg the desire to work in harmony with Vienna, it does not appear to me as if there were much sympathy between the two Cabinets. I am even led to believe that in withdrawing the Consul from Constantinople Count Andrassy's special object was to dispossess General Ignatieff of an influence which caused him umbrage, and which was also exercised upon Count Zichy. I have just been informed that Count Andrassy has pronounced against a military pressure beyond the Austrian frontiers, which would constitute an intervention quite contrary to his intentions."

The significant retreat did not discourage Russia. On October 25th, Baron Jomini had another interview with M. Laboulaye, and explained the situation ex professo. It might be termed an echo of the famous conversation between the Emperor Nicholas and Lord Seymour.

"M. de Jomini does not appear to attach much weight to the decisions of the Porte; he insists chiefly on the necessity of preparing for events which may, in his opinion, command the attention of Europe by next spring. There will then probably be a fresh outbreak of the insurrection. already sees Epirus and the Island of Crete preparing to take part in it. The thought of the blood that must be shed is overpowering, he says. hammedan fanaticism will be roused, and it will mean war to the death. Will it not be better to open our eyes at once and recognise that the time is near when the incapacity of the Turkish Government must inevitably bring about its ruin? not its bankruptcy the most certain sign of its decrepitude? In order not to be taken by surprise Europe must without delay look to those naturally appointed as its heirs. . . . "1

¹ We must remember the actual words addressed in February, 1853, by the Emperor Nicholas to Lord H. Seymour. Another proof may be observed in these as to what has always been the policy of Russia in the East: "At the present moment Turkey has fallen gradually into such a condition of decrepitude, that however much we may desire to lengthen the life of the patient, we may find ourselves at any moment with a corpse before us. We cannot raise the dead, and should the Turkish empire fall, it will be to rise no more. For this reason I put this question to you: Is it not better to provide for such a contingency than to expose ourselves to chaos and confusion and the certainty of a European war which will be the inevitable consequence of such a

The utterance once made, the Minister Plan longer hesitated, and proceded of the Oriental no expound a scheme before the rather federation astonished chargé d'affaires, in which the Russian projects were unfolded. In her opposition to a declaration of war against Turkey by Servia, Russia had contracted a certain "moral obligation" towards this principality and the neighbouring states: "We have bound ourselves to guard the interests of the Christians." He dwelt upon the future of the Christian provinces after the retreat of the Turks, and went so far as to foresee their union by means of federal bonds with a free city as their capital—Constantinople as an Oriental Frankfort.

While studying the account of these "rather distant visions," the chargé d'affaires remarked that such projects, while certainly in agreement with the traditional policy of Russia, were in no wise reconcilable with the interests of Austria. He questioned whether the Triple Agreement could last for very long. It was still a period of preparation.

The insurrection in Herzegovina, which was caused by difficulties attendant on taxation and by the oppression of the Christians, developed during the summer. The Consuls of the intervening Powers endeavoured to arrange a truce, but the insurgents flatly declined all direct accord with Turkey, and rejected as derisory the reforms promulgated by the Sultan in an irade of October 2nd and a firman of December 12th: they also claimed a re-arrangement with the Turkish

catastrophe? Is it not advisable to make some definite plans for the eventuality.

landowners, and a European commission and constitution; in fact, their independence. Turkey would not yield. Prince Gortschakoff returned from Berlin at the beginning of the winter. He judged the situation as "extremely serious," and considered it advisable to come to an understanding with the Sultan. "Thorough reforms" would be exacted from him under the control of the Powers. This was the programme of the insurgents, more generalised than before.

What were the intentions of Russia? Gortschakoff deemed it necessary to free his policy from the suspicion by which it was shadowed. The Emperor himself should give his explanation.

On December 28th the Emperor received General Le Flô. The Russian Government was persuaded that a peaceful solution of the grave questions of the moment could only be furthered by the accord of all the Christian Powers. An express appeal was made to France, and it was hoped that England would not refuse her help. Russia offered the following guarantees: "The efforts of all should be directed to the maintenance of the status quo in the East, less for the sake of Turkev than because of the difficulty there would be in replacing her. His Majesty repudiates all charges of ambitious designs upon the East, and declares that neither his father nor himself at any time desired to seize Constantinople; charges to this effect constitute a serious calumny. Russia would, however, never suffer the establishment there of any other great Power, of England in particular, nor the establishment of a Byzantine Empire, which would mean a Greek Empire. "This I have long intimated to the King of Greece," added the Czar. "I wish to live

on good terms with him; my sympathies are with the Hellenes, but they must confine themselves to Athens." ¹

It is well to observe the drift of this statement: it substitutes the Sclave question, the ethnical question, for the Orthodox and religious questions.

The Emperor recalled the satisfactory issue of the crisis in the preceding spring; he believed that his aim and the object of the agreement of the three Emperors being the maintenance of peace, he could rely upon the help of France.

Prince Gortschakoff spoke more definitely on the following day. New propositions were awaited from Vienna, exacting reforms in Turkey to be carried out under European control.

"Turkey, unaided, is incapable of re-establishing peace in her dominions; she needs men and money, and must therefore accept our help and the help of Europe."

The guarantee of Europe was indispensable. The Chancellor invoked European solidarity. "Bismarck observed to me on my last visit to Berlin: 'It is yourselves and Austria who are most interested in this matter. We have full confidence in both of you; act as you consider most beneficial for the

With regard to Greece, the Czar declared: "That Russia had no interests in allowing Greece such power of expansion as might bring about her development as a powerful state." See also Klacko's Deux Chancelliers.

¹ Interview of Nicholas I with Lord Hamilton Seymour: "My empire is so vast and so favourably situated that I should be unreasonable in desiring more territory and power than I already possess. . . . I will, however, frankly declare to you that should England think of establishing herself at Constantinople, I should definitely oppose her. . . ."

interests of all, and we will agree with closed eyes to whatever you decide upon."

Bismarck could well afford to give carte blanche; he was, through Vienna, already master of the situation.

Italy remained firm, said Prince Gortschakoff again; the language of Lord Derby was satisfactory. The "entente" was actually accomplished. As to Turkey, she had but to bow her head and submit to the guidance of Europe. All was ready; things had to be somewhat hastened in order to avoid worse calamities.

The French Ambassador entered fully into the spirit of the Russian Minister. He also was optimistic, placing complete confidence in such definite statements, and he urged the Duc Decazes to action. "The time of uncertainty and of tergiversation has passed; we must now act."

The year 1875 ended with this vigorous impulse from the part of Russia just as Gortschakoff returned.

Turkey, as has been stated, had tried to parry the blow by publishing a new programme of reforms. Thereupon the agreement between the Central Powers was manifested by the issue of an entirely different programme, in which Count Andrassy had taken the initiative. This was drawn up in Pesth, December 30th, and submitted to all the Powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris with the exception of Turkey. This was the "Programme of the Three Emperors."

Drawn up rather lengthily, it affirmed its origin to have been due to "an influential exchange of ideas" between the three Cabinets of Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg. As "the Turkish army had

not been able to quell the insurrection, and as the Turkish reforms were inadequate," the general peace had thereby been menaced. It was therefore incumbent upon the Powers "to act in common" in order to be able to face an imminent danger. Of the reforms suggested by Count Andrassy, some, in conformity with the recent firmans of the Sultan, demanded a general improvement of the administration and the Government within the Empire; others applied more especially to the insurgent provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, in which Austria had much interest. For these provinces full and complete religious liberty was asked, also the abolition of tax-farming, the assurance that the taxes levied should be applied within the provinces, the institution of a commission composed of an equal number of Mohammedans and Christians empowered to control the carrying out of these reforms; further, a new agrarian government in the provinces, and the guarantee of the Powers that all this should be effected. It was a sort of autonomy, and—in view of what had passed—a first step in the direction of dismemberment. For the first time Vienna used the language of St. Petersburg. The reform particularist was opposed to the reform centralist. Christian to Turkish reforms. Here lay the heart of the problem—this is what has now to be explained.

II

Character of the Ottoman Occupation

Occupation

Character of the Ottoman Occupation

Occupation

Character of the Ottoman and a half of Turks, who have long caused her considerable anxiety. These strangers dominate the chief highway of communication

tion between the east and west; they stand at the junction of the roads that connect the south and north; they command the shores of the sea passages—the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal, and as a still greater complication, these Asiatics occupy the holy lands in which the European religions had their birth—Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Constantinople.

Within the last inheritance of the Roman Empire they stand as conquerors rather than as tenants. Something of precariousness, of unrest, shadow these nomads from the desert; but though their tents are lightly pitched, their intention to enjoy their conquests while courage and energy avail is strongly marked.

For three centuries Western Europe hurled herself against the Turks, without disturbing them in any marked degree; she on her side suffered much at their hands. During the seventeenth century the Ottoman arms were measured against those of the Emperor, the King of Poland, the King of Spain, and Louis XIV. Their Empire seemed in no wise menaced, notwithstanding. Most of the European Powers—Venice, Genoa, France, the Pope himself—treated with them in all formality, accepting them as a necessary evil. All changed, however, when on the unknown plains of Eastern Europe a new adversary arose. With one foot still in Asia. this stranger dominated the other Continental highway; through her geographical position she attacked the flank of the Turkish Empire which Europe had only challenged from the front. Still more redoubtable was she through the fact that in her veins flowed the same blood as that of the peoples bowed beneath the Mussulman yoke; she

also adored the Christ, the Christ of the *labarum*, of Oriental Rome, of Orthodoxy, the Christ awaited by St. Sophia. When the White Czar appeared upon the shores of the Black Sea, a tremor of expectancy ran through the lands the Turk had conquered.

The Turkish Empire was indeed shaken. The first hint of its possible decadence was uttered in 1774, after the armies of Catherine II had crossed the Danube and after the fleet of Alexis Orloff had challenged Mustapha III outside the Golden Horn. It was then that the question of the East was first propounded—a question territorial, religious and ethnical—and it singularly complicated all European affairs.

The newcomer intended to make her own position among the members of the Christian family, and conducted very thoroughly the three campaigns which were to assure her introduction; the northern campaign reduced the Scandinavian Powers, the central one annihilated Poland, the war in the south dismembered Turkey. In the north the success was relatively easy, as the snows and Baltic pines were but half-heartedly disputed; in the centre much was gained by the complicity of the two Powers which had the most to fear from Russia's possible aggrandisement; in the south allies and adversaries alike arose, triumphs and defeats; the march of Destiny was suspended for a time.

The Turkish domination was fierce and rapacious, but not fanatical. When Mo-bomination hammed II took possession of Constantinople he did not interfere with the faith of his new subjects. Quite on the contrary, he tolerated their beliefs and did not mistrust their organisation.

Not only did he leave them the free exercise of their own cult, but a berat sent by the Sultan to the Patriarch Gennadios recognised him as civil leader of the "community" or Greek nation (Roummilleti) throughout all the Empire. The Mohammedan mind recognising but the differences of religion, this measure cut the population into two divisions, Mohammedan and Roum Milleti, a Christian community—Greeks, Servians, Bulgarians, Albanians. Later on an analogous constitution was accorded by Mohammed II to the Armenians; forty years later also to the Iews; two centuries later still another to the Roman Catholics. A profound divergence of traditions, customs and administration distinguished these communities from the very opening of the Mussulman rule; they were still living remnants of the old conditions, and it was from this initial decision that Turkey was to suffer.

If the Turkish voke appeared unbearable to the Christian communities, it was not for its violence, avarice and craftiness. but for its disdain of themselves. In the eves of the believer the infidel is as if he had no existence. His sons become janissaries or eunuchs; his daughters fill the harems; his money is taken from him as a matter of course; his harvests are transferred before they ripen; the perfect tranquillity with which the lowest Turkish vali carries out these razzias adds to the dreadful pusillanimity of the raya. He bears with trembling the humiliations by which he is degraded in his own eyes and made lower than the lowest of humanity. He buries himself in his abasement, in his unnatural terror, till the tardy hour arrives. when his terror and abasement turn to fury and raise him up to heights of heroism. The continual

refrain of every page of the naïve biography of the Bulgarian Bishop Sofroni is: "What terror came upon me! Whither did I not flee!" And Sofroni lived at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the time of Pasvan Oglou.

With such an atavism of suffering, such shame and such despair, the Christian communities formed a source of permanent dissociation in the Turkish Empire. The conqueror had taken but one precaution. He had forbidden the Christians all use of arms, reserving to himself the honours, perils and benefits of the military profession, and only enrolling the raya when trained and converted from his childhood. Thus disarmed, the Christian peoples had submitted to their fate. Any attempt at revolt, the daughter of extreme desperation, had only led to precarious success, which was usually confined to the life and influence of a single hero.

When, however, the "Czar deliverer" appeared, strong enthusiasm turned towards him every eye and heart; he had as many followers as there were Christians in the empire.

The deliverance of the Oriental Christians—such was the object of the new campaign, though there was in this as much of politics as of religion. Within the religious difficulty there lurked another, the difficulty of race. While the name of Christ gave colour to the projects, it was spoken by the instincts of nationality. The Sclaves, detached members of the last Indo-Europeans to come to Europe, were seeking out each other in the enterprise of deliverance begun by the great Sclave of the North. But they were not alone; among the Christians sub-

¹ Translated by L. Léger in La Bulgarie (p. 85).

ject to the Turk there lurked a latent antagonism only waiting for deliverance in order to reveal itself.

In 1875 the Turkish Empire contained some twenty-eight millions and a half inhabitants, of which eleven millions dwelt in Europe. Of these eleven million Europeans, barely five millions were Mohammedan, and in all the Empire there were nineteen million Mussulmans and nine and a half million Christians. These nine and a half million Christians formed seven different communions: to the Orthodox Greek Church belonged 3,250,000; to the Bulgarian Church, 2,920,000; there were 2,450,000 Armenians; 130,000 Nestorians; 65,000 Jacobeans; 670,000 Roman Catholics; several thousand Protestants; and lastly, 150,000 Israelites.

· From a racial point of view the question was no less complicated. Among the subjects of the Sultan, thirteen millions and a half were Turks (Osmanlis, Turcomans and Tartars); the Greeks, scattered along the sea coast and on the islands, numbered barely 2,000,000; Albanians, Tzintares and Routzo-Valaquians a little over 1,500,000 souls; the Sclaves (Servians, Croatians, Bulgarians and Cossacks), numbering five millions to five millions and a half, were dispersed throughout Turkey in Europe. There were also the Georgian group of some 600,000 members; 200,000 belonging to the Hindoo race; and 500,000 collectively to the Persian or Armenian race, with some two millions and a half of these scattered through the Empire; probably just over one and a half million Kurds; 50,000 to 60,000 Druses: and, lastly, of the Semitic races— 150,000 Israelites; 11 million Arabs; 300,000 or VOL. IV. 8т

400,000 Syrians and Chaldeans; and 200,000 Maronites.¹

In short, a tangle of races, histories, religions, pretensions and rivalries, amongst which a single ruler could only maintain a careful balance in measure as he was just, powerful and respected. And Turkey had not found so great a ruler. And things grew even worse when the successive victories of the Russians hastened on the decadence of the Ottomans. The pricking of the hollow bubble of their Empire revealed its outward weakness and its inward cancer.

It is remarkable that the remedy should have been formulated both by the Turks and by their adversaries in one phrase—Reform. The word, however, was not understood by all in exactly the same way. The Christians took reform to mean an overthrow of the Turkish administration, which, by the localisation of authority, should lead to its dismemberment. The Turkish Government understood the word to imply a reinforcement of power with the restoration of the Sultan's authority, but more evenly balanced and adapted. For the Christians the object of the reform was to be a series of provincial constitutions, a kind of Balkan federation; for the more enlightened of the Mussulmans reform meant a centralised and slightly Europeanised constitution, with a complete remodelling of the army and of the military institutions.

It may well be said that the nineteenth century

¹ These figures, which are approximate and which vary astonishingly according to the origin and interests of the statistic-makers, are taken from a serious and impartial book published in 1876 by MM. Ubicini and Pavet de Courteille, Etat présent de l'Empire Ottoman.

has played a game of hide-and-seek with the word reform as applied to Turkey. Each of the two parties endeavours to accept the word according to its own interpretation solely; each attracts its friends and allies to the question, who all support with violent aggression their faith in its principles and methods.

Turkey has in no way been at a standstill; quite on the contrary, she has never ceased her efforts for "reform." The Turkish administration reformed itself à la turca by a series of catastrophes and revolutions; while the Christian provinces have, with the same meritorious object in view, accomplished disjunction and separation from the central state. No part of the whole world has been more actively engaged in this direction!

The enterprise of Turkish reform is called the Tanzimat. By reason of its initial tendency towards Europeanisation, it generally encompassed by means of certain Occidental Powers. It was inaugurated towards the close of the eighteenth century by Abdul-Hamid I and by Selim III; it reached its apogee under the famous Mahmoud II, its most brilliant achievement in the massacre of the janissaries. Applied towards military matters, it has re-united and prepared the formidable armies which have saved the empire some ten times within the century. Tanzimat is also judicial and administrative. various intervals it has endeavoured to show itself constitutional and parliamentary. It may be said that it is financial, for it has caused Turkish credit to enter into European calculations, and has interested capitalists in the settlement of Turkish affairs by the intervention and assistance of technical

Europeans. To a certain extent it has helped the exchequer of the Empire, and has offered resources that a traditional indifference had hitherto but squandered. Finally, after the close of the Crimean War, and after the Powers, in Article IX of the Treaty of Paris, had accepted the famous Hatti-Houmazoun of 1856, it accomplished an improvement of conditions under the guidance of the syndicate of European Powers which stood as guarantees of the "integrity of the empire."

Christian This famous Article IX, however, in Reform which a quasi-secular policy and "Turkish reform" were definitely proclaimed, took another current of ideas into account, by the fact of its registration of the intervention of the Powers—a current no less a factor in the destinies of Turkey and opposed to the "Turkish reform." This was the "Christian reform." At this point the two streams flowed in conjunction.

"Christian reform" originates in the separate existence in the bosom of the Empire of non-Mussulman communities. The subjected peoples have found in their religion and their nationality a perpetual reminder both of their defeat and of their hope in a deliverance.

The life and name of the rayas is looked upon by them with horror. But all vengeance, hope and victory will arise for them in some sort from that berat of Mohammed II which is the legal attestation of their existence. Through a secular effort, which can here be but recalled, the non-Mussulman communities have supported themselves and increased their privileges; the subtle Levantine has reaped some profit from his daily intercourse with his more barbarous masters; several have become agents

and collaborators of these in the large cities; their patience has been repaid to them and theirs by favours and by baschischs.

Since the beginning, however, the relations have developed an entirely different character in the provinces, and especially the frontier provinces, which were the latest conquests and where the Christian element is most considerable. It is here that suffering is most acute and hope most fervent; here it is that the word reform most deeply signifies order, security and autonomy or local semi-independence. In Moldo-Wallachia, in Bosnia, in Herzegovina, in Greece, Crete, the Archipelago and Armenia, the same cry is raised, the same aspiration for independence goes forth. With the slightest relaxation of the conquerors' yoke, the head of the conquered is raised in search of freedom. "Christian reform" has but one single object; this is Liberty.

Except for some quickly repressed local insurrections, so bold an ambition could hardly have been manifested by so down-trodden a people had not outward intervention to some extent been awaited, and had not provincial efforts been based upon the hope of renewing the traditional crusade against the Turk. Western Europe having lost interest in the enterprise, Oriental Europe in her turn donned the martial cross. It was Voltaire who to his friend Catherine II. the Catherine of philosophers, boasted this heritage of the ancient faith. On the grounds of religion, of policy and of race, Russia took upon herself the protection of the vanquished Christians, and in 1774, after a decisive victory over the Turks, the Treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardgi in its Articles VII, VIII, XII, XIV and

XVII, sketched out a plan for the coming dismemberment of Turkey. Article XII recognised Russian protection of Moldavia and Wallachia; by which was meant their pending separation. Articles VII, XIV and XVII combined, stipulated guarantees for the Christians under a certain supervision on the part of Russia, and this signified a permanent intervention; Article VIII aimed at protection of the holy places; the future rivalries of Christians found herein their expression.

Russia, in short, was the protagonist of "Christian reform," since by virtue of her victory she undertook the supervision of the gradual progress towards liberation and entire independence. She acquired at the same time so lofty a position that the panegyrics of Voltaire were but justified; a position gained less by Christianity than by worldly policy, and through the marvellous instrumentality of the Semiramis of the North, Turkey was open to the domination of the Sclave; the two great highways of Europe were in the hands of the Czar, the true successor of Constantine.

The French Revolution, which has stirred of the so many things within this globe, has French Revolution also had some influence upon these great in the East designs. Discussion could be carried on ad infinitum as to the origin and consequences, in foreign policy, of the movement that has given the peoples a voice in the direction of affairs no longer alone the property of Cabinet intrigues. Among the incidents, sometimes contradictory incidents, which characterised this prodigious episode of human history, it was the designs of Bonaparte on Egypt that brought Great Britain to the Mediterranean. It was just when Russia was successfully

England advancing upon Poland and on Turkey and the Ottoman that an unforeseen movement at either end of the vast maritime crescent girding Europe from the North Sea to the Dardanelles brought a formidable adversary against her, and this adversary was Great Britain.

Great Britain has evinced fervent interest in the "integrity" of the Ottoman Empire. Since she desires this integrity, she is necessarily bound to further reform à la Turque; and, in view of her influence in matters naval, financial and constitutional, she becomes its chief collaborator. In the event of Turkey's annihilation, which she would strenuously combat, her next provision would be the re-constitution of a Greco-Byzantine Empire. The two policies stand clearly opposed: Christian policy—Sclavonic-Russian; and Turkish policy—Anglo-Greek.

Austria and France vacillate between the two, carried occasionally to extremes by the imprudence of a Joseph II, the vigour of a Metternich, with his famous dictum "Restez Turcs," or by the visions of a Napoleon III. In the background stands Northern Germany, apparently uninterested in such distant matters and unanxious to "risk the life of a Pomeranian Grenadier." She is, however, to some extent a sharer in the destinies of her copartners in Poland; with knitted brows she watches the expansion of her neighbours; she never loses sight of the possibilities of Greater Germany, and she is also much pre-occupied with the doings of Great Britain. The Prussia of the Fredericks knows the value of the Great Britain of the Wilhelms.

The Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, the Treaty of

Adrianople in 1829, were in harmony with that of Kutschuk-Kaïnardji.

The following developments were therefore natural: Greece and the dependent islands became detached completely in 1832; Servia and Roumania are no more than tributary states; Crete, since 1867, has been a privileged *vilayet*; Samos has its individual government.

It has been the same in Asia with the Lebanon district. The Khedivat of Egypt and the Regency of Tunis form "separate governments." Leaf by leaf the artichoke was being despoiled.

Russia was triumphing. Europe, inCrimean terested by the poets, novelists and
War journalists in the fate of these unhappy
provinces, looked on the doings of the Czar with
sympathy. Navarino became a second Lepanto,
and the Czar played the rôle of Philip II. It seemed
to Czar Nicholas in 1853 that the pear was fully ripe
and waiting to be plucked. Then arose the voice
of England; Europe awakened from a dream and
proceeded to denounce the Treaty of KutschukKaïnardji as prejudicial to her interests.

From henceforth the general endeavour European was not to leave Russia again alone with Turkey. At the price of a severe campaign and a very difficult victory, the Western Powers of Europe again laid hands upon the Eastern problem; helped secretly by Austria, herself astonished at her own ingratitude. In this way were drawn up the compendious clauses of the Treaty of Paris, which, firstly, confides to the "European syndicate" the task of watching over Turkish affairs; secondly, in Article IX, combines the two reforms, both Anglo-Turkish and Christian-Russian;

thirdly, affirms the necessity of the Turkish Empire and even of its integrity (a matter of mutual precaution between the Powers); and fourthly, regulates the destinies of the Christian communities under the eyes of Europe or certain qualified Powers; and finally, withdraws from Russia the eventual domination of the second European highway, by neutralising the Black Sea and closing the Straits.

The Sultan joined the European concert; as a member of the Paris Congress remarked to Ali Pacha, he went to see "what was going on." As a means of introduction, Turkey presented herself at the bar of the tribunal with a new ordinance of reform within her hand, the "Hatti-Humayoun" of 1856, "fruit of the solicitude of the Powers" and on which the Powers proceeded to act. Some of the text of this ordinance must now be quoted, for it annuls, on the one hand, the Treaty of Kutschuk-Kaïnardji, and on the other hand authorises the intervention of the European syndicate.

The These thirteen lines have caused the "Hatti-Humayoun" trenchments of Sebastopol.

Article IX.—His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, having issued a decree, which in improving their condition, without distinction of religion and race, confirms his generous intentions towards the Christian peoples of his Empire, and desiring to give a new proof of his sentiments in this respect, has resolved to communicate to the contracting Powers the said decree, which emanates spontaneously from his sovereign pleasure. The contracting Powers recognise the value of this communication. It is well understood that in no case does it give the right to the said Powers to intermeddle, either singly or collectively, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, or in the interior administration of his Empire.

This laborious document, many times re-constructed, shaded and balanced into contradiction and obscurity, offered an expedient, but in no wise a solution. Treaties are but truces; their function is to disguise difficulties, not suppress them. Diplomatists themselves are but duped by words in so far as they exalt their own importance. Therefore, after the effort of 1853–56, questions accumulated but were not improved. Russia still was "contemplative," Turkey moribund. Europe had other quarrels to engage her thoughts. Among the provinces and Christian communities of the Ottoman Empire, those which had not profited from the crisis to escape pulled hard upon their chains and made more noise than ever.

As to "reform," it was accomplished à la Turque, illogically, therefore heavily, incomprehensibly. After the lapse of ten years it was generally considered that the Hatti-Humayoun. and consequently Europe too, had been gradually forgotten. This was not, however, quite exact. The reconstruction of the army and the navy had been realised; administrative reform, the division of the Empire into vilayets, the right of acquisition of fortune accorded to foreigners, the establishment of the Ottoman Bank, the organisation of the Council of State—all this was not a negligible progress. Yet the Christian provinces were not more happy. From Bosnia and Herzegovina the people emigrated, encumbering the neighbouring districts on the Austrian frontier. In Bulgaria, Macedonia and Epirus, brigandage and rebellion were the general conditions. From Syria and Crete came continual complaints; petition on petition were addressed by the Christians to the Governments.

In the year 1860 Prince Gortschakoff, authorised by circumstances, addressed a circular to the Powers, reverting to the subject of Christian reform. There followed an "immediate declaration from the five great Powers to the effect that the conditions in the Christian provinces of the Ottoman Empire would no longer be tolerated, and demanding immediate organisation with the object of giving the Christian provinces of the Porte adequate guarantee that their legal wrongs would be redressed, and at the same time to reassure Europe as to the complications affecting general interests, as well as those of Turkey."

Hardly five years had therefore elapsed when the Russian project was once more submitted to Europe. Russia had attempted in the interval to draw France away from the concert of the Powers. Was the situation modified? It caused some trepidation, but it was only a symptom or a prodromus, not a foreseen and periodical crisis in the malady. 1861 the death of Sultan Abdul-Medjid and the succession of Abdul Aziz seemed to open a new era. The new Sultan, with his fine presence and his jetblack beard, became for a few weeks the favourite of English public opinion, and consequently of the world's opinion generally. It was rumoured that he meant to close the harem, and this caused considerable exultation. In order to congratulate and encourage him, the Prince of Wales paid a visit to Constantinople.

Soon, however, followed a reaction. The autumn of 1866, shortly after the battle of Sadowa, saw the old problems raised once more in the rising of the Christians of Candia. Panic was rife among the Cabinets. M. de Moustier,

intermediary of the "imperial action," considered it advisable to "consult" Europe as to the condition of the "Sick Man." Each Power had a remedy to offer. The centres of discussion were in Paris and Vienna, for Russia and Great Britain made no change in their attitudes. The Austrian Government, not yet resigned to the victory of Germany, held out a hand to Russia; France, uneasy as to the future, did the same. M. de Beust then proposed to proceed to a revision of the Treaty of Paris, the object being "the development of the Christian communities of the East, their autonomy, and a 'self-government' limited by a bond of vassalage. This was to magnify the part of Russia." The Cabinet at Paris declared itself ready for "heroic remedies."

But these advances from the defeated of Sadowa and the approaching adversary of Prussia were not welcomed by Prince Gortschakoff. Not considering that the appointed time had come, he maintained silence as to his designs. When the Franco-German war began, the Conference of Paris in 1869 had momentarily settled the Cretan difficulty; the Turkish Empire was agitated but not convulsed; a general sense of expectation occupied men's minds; incidents found their own solution, in like manner as Nature becomes quiet at the approach of tempest. Men realised that vaster interests were clashing among higher spheres.

"There is an understanding between St. Petersburg and Berlin." Thus wrote M. Benedetti in January, 1868, at the close of the mission of General de Manteuffel. He affirmed Prussia that in the East, Russia would henceforth have Germany as an accomplice in exchange for

free hands upon the Rhine. At St. Petersburg imagination ran rife. "A new era is at last developing," wrote the *Moscow Gazette* of February 17th, 1867. "This era is ours; it belongs to Russia. A new world is being called to life, a world that hitherto has been waiting in the shadows for the realisation of its destinies—the world of the Greco-Sclave. The present generation will see great changes, great actions, great formations."

The Napoleonic megalomania and logomania had made big projects fashionable. Europe was, therefore, divided between Sclaves and Teutons, and the business was in the hands of that Alexander Michaïlovich, "on whom," said the representative of the United States at St. Petersburg, "the eyes of two worlds are fixed." Politics grew more and more romantic in measure as literature ceased to be so.

At the close of the year 1869 the Emperor Alexander II sent to King William I the first class of the Order of St. George, an order only accorded to a conqueror. It was to the warrior of Waterloo and to the conqueror of Sadowa that this solemn homage of the Russian Government and nation was addressed. King William—the little Prussian monarch of Tilsit and of Olmütz—replied to his dear nephew: "profoundly touched, with tears within his eyes." 1

¹ King William telegraphed to his brother, Prince Albert, who was with the Czar: "What an immense happiness has befallen me! I am inexpressibly delighted, but completely overwhelmed.... After all the great and beautiful and unexpected things that have come to me, I was anxious to open out my heart to you.... I let fall the dispatch, then my eyes grew full of tears... in gratitude for this distinction, so honourable, so enormous, as I proceeded in its perusal..."—Louis Schneider, L'Empereur Guillaume, vol. ii. p. 98.

Behind this deeply-moved countenance was the thick moustache and the sardonic smile of the Pomeranian statesman, comrade and disciple of the man who thought himself master of the situation—Prince Gortschakoff.

III

From 1849 to 1854 the future Chancellor Two Chan- of Russia, Alexander Mikhaïlovitch Gortschakoff, born in 1798, had been at Stuttgart and at Frankfort the colleague of Otto Edward Leopold von Bismarck-Schoenhausen, born in 1815. the future Chancellor of the German Empire. had become acquainted in the close intimacy of that "secondary position," both pleasant and dangerous to diplomatists in that it provokes long confidences and allows of searching judgments, from which the strongest or the luckiest will later profit. Gortschakoff, skilful, subtle, vain, fond of fine speeches and fine things, had played the part of mentor towards his vigorous and sardonic colleague, who had come to diplomacy through Parliament, and to Parliament through paradox, and who would have preferred open-air life and "bathing-dress" diplomacy to well-furnished drawingrooms and the starry uniforms of petty courts. The intimacy of these two men had resulted in close intimacy between their Governments. In the matter of the Duchies, during the Austrian-Prussian war and the Franco-German war, Gortschakoff remained faithful to a course of action which he had doubtless chosen upon ripe reflection, but not without some bitterness of feeling towards Austria and even towards Europe.

Summoned to the administration after the fall of Sebastopol, he had sworn in petto to avenge and to repair. He sought support in the only Power that had held aloof from, and seemed disinterested in, the questions of the East; "Russia could not be alarmed by the power of Prussia" was what Prince Gortschakoff repeated through a term of fifteen years.

This position, which had become an attitude, would not always be maintained. At serious moments there was some velleity on the part of the acute and subtle Chancellor. He found his "pupil" overgrown and boisterous. But a too long compliance with his own system had enshackled him; it was not possible to free himself without breaking the machinery; he abode by his first stakes.

Gortschakoff was a man of ideas and of formulas. He had had some very happy ones, such as his famous phrase: "Russia does not sulk, she meditates." But his phrases sometimes duped himself. As has been remarked: "He gazed at his reflection in his inkpot," and it may be added that he drowned himself therein.

¹ The principal collaborator of Prince Gortschakoff in the succeeding diplomatic compaign was Count Peter Schouvaloff. Little indulgent towards his chief, he criticises him as follows in his Souvenirs Inédits on the Congress of Berlin: "The Cabinet of St. Petersburg has often been accused of versatility; I consider that the real reproach to be addressed to it is that of having made phrases and not business. Since the famous 'Russia does not sulk, she meditates,' we have contented ourselves with hurling clever speeches. The dispatches of Prince Gortschakoff are full of such, and I know that my colleagues and myself have often been placed thereby in most difficult positions; we awaited definite instructions, but received only literary passages full of sounding words. Even his telegrams were not exempt from this fault."

As to Bismarck, he had his own opinion about the Russia of his day. At the close of his embassy to St. Petersburg he had had engraved on a medallion suspended to his watch chain the simple words: "Russia, nitchevo." What was confidence and pleasing carelessness in the one, was coldness and severity in the other. In spite of this scarcely favourable opinion, Prince Bismarck, faithful to the teaching of Frederic II, took precautions none the less.1 He devoted the hidden part of his political career to keeping the court of St. Petersburg under the hypnotism of his flattery, his protestations, his explanations and his conjuring tricks. It is a matter for astonishment that this game, prodigious as it was, should have been understood so late by his subtle partner. While Bismarck gave assurance at propitious moments of gratuitous help and complicity, both open or concealed, he could, thanks to amiable words between the sovereigns, arrive at his own ends without having bound himself to anything; and he concluded his adventurous enterprise and his flank march upon Europe without having altered his reckoning of gratitude towards his esteemed friend of Stuttgart and of Frankfort.

Even at the termination of the war, when France had been defeated, when Russia had but to take the initiative in the congress proposed by Austria and Great Britain, when she could have most easily obtained from Europe a glorious and peaceable

¹ Frederic in a few lines formulated the policy of Prussia with regard to Russia: "Of all the neighbours of Prussia, Russia demands the most attention as being the most dangerous. The future Governors of Prussia will be equally under the necessity of cultivating the friendship of these barbarians" (History of My Own Time, Chapter ix.).

revision of the Treaty of Paris by pronouncing her quos ego in the new Congress of Vienna, Prince Gortschakoff's eyes remained obstinately closed. He replied to the Austrian and British overtures by advising "isolated action," each one for himself.

He left the conquered face to face with the conqueror—an act of politeness not returned to him six years later. M. de Beust exclaimed, in the name of Europe: "Russia has done us much harm!" Gortschakoff cared little about European disasters; he discounted the gratitude of his nation and the admiration of history.

With little difficulty in 1871 the Conference of London had given him the revision of the clause of the Treaty of Paris relative to the Black Sea. The horses were then harnessed for the grand Oriental race.

Among the Christians of the Balkans suffering had again become intense, since one of the conquerors of Sebastopol had disappeared at Sedan. The hour was striking. As the Berlin yoke-fellow lagged behind a little, the spur had been applied by a few skilful asides at Paris and Vienna. But why worry unnecessarily! He was compelled to action in any case by the French campaign of vengeance. It was a matter for the "Two Chancellors."

There was, however, in Europe a Power and a man. Diplomatists were loth to take the War them into account, but the day was coming when they were to have a voice in the game: that Power was Great Britain, that man was Benjamin Disraeli. Great Britain, like the other Powers, had had her share of profits and losses through the defeat of France. She had at first only seen the gains over which she had rejoiced; later she had realised the deficit and had altered her opinion.

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But so long as her interests are not endangered, this great commercial republic makes willing sacrifices to her tranquillity and business prosperity. The weakening of the only other productive, maritime and colonising Power then in Europe was not hard to bear at a time when the new Suez Canal was opening the world to the competition of the nations. Meditating new conquests, and satisfied with the maritime supremacy assured her by the divisions of Continental Europe, Great Britain stood aloof in her "splendid isolation."

This neutral attitude had been so prolonged that public opinion had at length recoiled in alarm from it. The Gladstonian Ministry, in power since the Franco-German war, had succumbed to reproaches against its foreign policy. Disraeli at the head of a Conservative Cabinet had quite different opinions. He needed, though, extraordinary energy to dissipate the atmosphere of beatific calm which prevailed in his party, and even in his Cabinet. At Liverpool in 1875 Lord Derby, his colleague at the Foreign Office, was still arguing in favour of the policy of reserve if not indifference:

"We have nothing to desire, nothing to fear. We have no frontiers to rectify. We can neither be invaded nor do we wish to invade. Our chief interest lies in the maintenance of peace, and in any advice that we may give no one can doubt our disinterestedness and sincerity." It was, in short, "moral influence" that was to be exerted, and this placid attitude furthered the schemes of bold adventurers that the caprice of Destiny started in England's track.

Disraeli was resolved to modify this attitude of nonchalance. He was any-

thing but a quietist, there was indeed no lack of loose tinder in his temperament. Benjamin Disraeli, son of the Semitic littérateur, the beau of 1830, the dandy with the white satin facings and ruffles of lace, the imaginative author of Vivian Grey and Coningsby, the clever inspirer of the "Young England" movement—such a man was not one to escape the seductions of international politics. The hero of his first book had been the protagonist of a European congress, a glory that his romantic mind would not have disdained to dispute with the classicism of Gortschakoff. After having attacked the inertia and the egoism of the English ruling classes, after being the champion of electoral reform and the founder of trade unions, this "Conservative," who had always and everywhere done revolutionary work, this active and penetrating orator, this party leader who had even overcome the instinctive aversion of Victoria, had but one more experience left, and this was to play his game against the great. European gamblers. The running was for the Orient stakes and the thoroughbred pricked his ears as he felt his Arab blood stir within him.

He had played his Bonaparte and gained his Egyptian campaign in sweeping in the shares of the Suez Canal; he had realised another dream of Bonaparte's in creating an "Empress of India." What obstacle could now arrest this subtle statesman with the mystic eyes! Even old age and weariness could not prevent him from coquetting with Fortune.

Great Britain, therefore, while she seemed to sleep beneath the ponderous words of Lord Derby, was really on the alert and ready for the spring.

Gortschakoff and Disraeli were survivors of a

generation that had known the splendours and the eclipse of the Napoleonic star; they had lived through the age of Byron and Garibaldi, sons of legend and romance; they had watched the renaissance of both Italy and Greece; they had had their mystic aspirations—of nationality and humanity—and now these two favourites of Destiny and Glory were to measure strength in an extraordinary combat. And the hunter of the Brandenburg marches was to supervise this combat; the realist of Sadowa and Sedan was to serve as umpire to these brilliant and imaginative champions.

IV

The note of Count Andrassy, communiAndrassy's cated to the Powers at the close of 1875,
Note aimed at combining both "reforms"—the
Christian and the Turkish. It was but a half
measure, and satisfied no one. Turkey avoided
the proposal; Great Britain, without definitely
refusing her assistance, needed much persuasion;
Russia endeavoured to engage Austria more exactly,
and Austria showed some annoyance at the pressure.

The latent discord between these two Powers was suspected, and this gave encouragement to Turkey, Great Britain and the insurgents. Finally, the proposals of Count Andrassy were rejected, and thereby came to nothing.

The winter of 1875-76 passed in these skirmishes, and in April, when the Balkan snows began to melt, Europe found herself face to face with certain facts—the recommencement of the struggle and insurrections in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina; military preparations in Servia; agitation in Bulgaria. Suspicious rumours, chiefly coming from

Berlin, fostered the dissensions. Under apparent frankness, the secret influence of one who knew and directed could be felt. In April, 1876, was written from Berlin: "The agreement of the three kingdoms of the North is put to a decisive test; ... the interests of Russia and of Austria in the affairs of Turkey was not identical; these two empires are rivals. Is it not to be feared that they may separate? The Cabinet of Berlin has for the moment connected the two Empires. Will it be powerful enough to ensure the duration of the understanding?" All the artifice of the German Chancellor is evident in these few lines.

Prince Gortschakoff was now urged on by events. It became known in St. Petersburg that on the refusal of the insurgents to accept Count Andrassy's proposals a council of war had met at Constantinople, and had decided the struggle against Montenegro and the insurgent provinces. Dervich Pacha had been appointed commander-in-chief and would be supplied with the necessary forces, while Mouktar Pacha would be given what was needed for the suppression of revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Ambassadors of the Powers were Russian summoned to the Russian Chancellor on cations to April 22nd. Gortschakoff was in uniform, and his demeanour very solemn. "His expression and his voice announced the gravity of his communication." "I summon you, gentlemen, by order of the Czar, who in this new crisis desires the help of your five Powers in order to arrest its consequences." Then followed an account of what had happened, and of the action taken by Constantinople: "Under such conditions Russia finds herself unable to control a movement that will prob-

ably extend to Servia, Epirus and Greece, and may prove the signal for a general conflagration.
... The great Powers have equal interests in preventing such catastrophes. ... It is necessary to act, and to act in concert. Things are most serious, and we must, at all costs, oppose this movement. The tranquillity of Europe lies within your hands. ..."

This peroration greatly perplexed the Ambassadors, who had no instructions and were taken unprepared. They remained silent, exchanging glances. Good General Le Flô saved the meeting from embarrassment by his assurances, and by declaring that "the Czar could absolutely depend upon the help of France." The others all abounded in amiable words. The party then broke up to telegraph the Chancellor's speech to their respective Governments.

On the next day the Journal de Saint

Assassination at Salonica of the French and German Consuls

On the next day the Journal de Saint

Pétersbourg published an official note affirming the agreement of the five Powers to oppose the "aggression" of Turkey against Montenegro. But the Ambassador of England "has not yet received his instructions."

A few days later it was learnt that at Salonica the French and German consuls, intervening in a complex case of family and religion, had been assassinated by a fanatical Mussulman populace (May 6th). Public feeling was aroused; there was general alarm.

The scene must be shifted to Berlin. The Emperor Nicholas, accompanied by his Chancellor and M. de Jomini, approached the Emperor William. It is probable that pressure was to be exerted

upon Bismarck. Bismarck, however, was prepared. Count Andrassy was requested to be also at Berlin, where he arrived May 10th. On the two succeeding days there were interviews between the three Ministers; on the evening of the 12th Prince Bismarck asked the Ambassadors of England, France and Italy to meet him at his house for a conference with the three Ministers. A project was submitted to them of a memorandum in the name of the six Powers to be addressed to Turkey as a remonstrance against war.

The memorandum is said to have been brought by Gortschakoff, but modified by his two colleagues; it was but a stronger edition of Count Andrassy's note. The Powers demanded the following from Turkey: An armistice of two months; immediate reconciliation between the Porte and the insurgents under the mediation of the Powers; a mixed commission for the provinces; a concentration of Turkish troops upon certain points (and this appeared like the beginning of evacuation); control by the consuls or delegates of the Powers of the application of reform; and in the last article, what was most significant: "The three Imperial Courts are of opinion that it would become necessary to add to their diplomatic action the sanction of an understanding in view of efficacious measures that would seem demanded in the interests of general peace, in order to arrest the evil and hinder its development."

In the interchange of views that preceded this communication, Gortschakoff declared, as usual, that Russia meant to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and had no particular object or ambition. In his conversation with Viscount Gontaut-Biron, the Chancellor seemed gay and brilliant;

the Viscount, however, suspected some disenchantment beneath his outward satisfaction.

"It was the influence of Count Andrassy, supported by Prince Bismarck, that triumphed over that of Prince Gortschakoff." The Russian Chancellor was garlanded but also chained. His movements were impeded. He affected to believe that the last articles (as to "efficacious measures") corrected the general mildness of tone. He considered that the Sultan, surrounded by the fanatical party at Constantinople, would not be able to accept the propositions, however modified, and was not disposed to sorrow over this. He wished France to take the direction of the naval manifestation before Constantinople, which was foreseen in the memorandum.--" It would honour your return into the coalition. Your Admiral could take command; you would be at the head of Europe. . . ." Nothing could be more flattering. Gontaut-Biron subtly remarks: "I think that Russia did not quite obtain what she desired. Matters were finally arranged, but a first disagreement between Austria and Russia occurred beneath the eyes of Germany. Russia encountered some resistance here, and an accord between the two Powers that she had not at all expected."

The French Ambassador received by telegram the adhesion of his Government. That of Italy arrived without delay. As to the answer of the British Government, Odo Russell, the Ambassador, "did not expect it quite immediately."

It was here that Disraeli came upon the scenes. After a few days of reflection Great Britain did not adhere to the note of the three Imperial Courts. Great Britain did not see to what she might be

led; she was annoyed at the pretensions of the Continental Powers in thus arranging Eastern matters at their pleasure. She stood aloof, and in order to emphasise her patronage of Turkey, sent her fleet to the Bay of Besika, near Constantinople.¹

Gortschakoff replied proudly that it was advisable to go on, leaving Great Britain outside the concert, and to present the note to Constantinople signed by the five Powers.

The Cabinet of Berlin was perplexed at this new proposition, and wanted time for reflection. But an answer was required at once, and Bismarck was being cross-examined. He consulted Vienna, but Vienna was not ready with advice. It was indeed a time of serious importance. The real meaning of the situation was thus expressed by publicists who were probably warned by the German Chancellor. "Reforms are being offered to the insurgents, whereas what they really want is separation from Turkey, separation out of harmony with the treaties and the general welfare. . . . As to the agreement of the Powers, this is never more than an appearance, since some are for the status quo, the others for the insurrection. . . . It is Pan-Sclavonism that lurks behind the questions of religion and reform. Now, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary can permit the Southern Sclaves to dominate in Central Europe. It would mean an inundation. Turkey, therefore, is no longer alone in question; religion is but a pretext; it is the rivalry of the Germanic and Sclavonic races that is the real pivot of a struggle both of nationality and equilibrium." In order fully to appreciate

¹ It was here that the fleets of the allied Powers concentrated just before the outbreak of the Crimean War.

the anxiety of Bismarck we must realise that for his still precarious task of unity there was no other means of help but in giving satisfaction to the ambitions of Austria-Hungary outside Germany and upon the Danube. However he might value an alliance with Russia, he would sacrifice everything to an alliance with Austria.

The views and aims of Austria are well known. They were clearly stated in the *Pester Lloyd*, which, probably inspired by Bismarck, began to dictate the future conditions of peace: "Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria; the mouths of the Danube made over again to Russia, with compensation to Roumania." ¹

The Future was unveiled. Two years of complications, frightful massacres, a bitter war, a Congress—all this was needed to achieve the object.

Can one now appreciate the passionate and moving interests of the life of the diplomatist?

In presence, therefore, of the Russian proposal of a fivefold alliance, not including Great Britain, Bismarck hesitated to reply. He left Berlin, and retired to his estate of Lauenburg on pretext of

¹ An undoubted proof of Bismarck's influence in this may be seen in a private letter from the Duc Decazes, dated March 7th, 1876: "What you tell us of the overtures to d'Oubril is most important. Bismarck advises Austria to make a military occupation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even should it have to become permanent, adding that Russia will find a natural opportunity for retaking Bessarabia. . . ." (Here speaks the realist.) "I am told that this proposal has been received most angrily in St. Petersburg. The Czar and his Chancellor have realised that it is only made in order to spoil the friendship between Austria and Russia. . . . I consider that an adequate solution can only be arrived at by giving Montenegro complete and material satisfaction." The French Minister fully realised that Montenegro was the centre of events.

illness. It was possible that he awaited something. Great Britain held firmly to her decision. There was mysterious diplomatic agitation in Paris, Berlin, Constantinople. The bold proposal of Gortschakoff hovered in the air.

Suddenly, once more the scene was Palace Revolution changed. May 29th brought astounding at Connews from Turkey. There had been a palace revolution; the Grand Vizier Mahmoud had been deposed; Sultan Abdul-Aziz conpelled to abdicate; his poor-witted cousin made to succeed him as Mourad V. The Reform party,—"young Turkey," the English party,—came to power with the Grand Vizier Midhat Pacha. A few days later, June 4th, Abdul Aziz "committed suicide." Bulgaria rose in revolt. On July 1st, Milan, Prince of Servia, having formed a ministry with Ristich, declared war against Turkey. He expected defeat, but wished to force the Powers to action.

Servia declares by a memorandum. Gortschakoff's proposal, the Quintuple Alliance, all this was brought to nothing. Bismarck was saved from a dilemma; Great Britain's triumph was assured.

All Europe met at Ems, where Alexander II, accompanied by Gortschakoff and Jomini, was taking the waters. The Viscount de Gontaut-Biron arrived to watch the difficult situation. The position of France was as difficult as that of Germany; from her also a decision was expected. As Germany stood wavering between Austria and Russia, so stood France between Russia and Great Britain, and she had everything to fear. The Duc Decazes had remained in the Ministry with the Dufaure Cabinet, but the new Chamber, led really by Gam-

betta, allowed him far less latitude and liberty of mind than the National Assembly. Public opinion had to be taken into account, and it was showing itself inclined to neutrality under cover of Great Britain's example. The year 1870 had caused some distrust of diplomatists. Thiers also was inclined in this direction, and he was known to be far-sighted. Gambetta, more hesitating perhaps, was hostile to the policy of Decazes; and the relations with Russia made the Radicals uneasy.

There was a game to play between the two parties, that of balancing and trimming, and endeavouring to heal what Bismarck tried to wound.

The Duc Decazes fully understood this, yet the weakness of his means, the irritability, the prejudice of Gortschakoff, rendered the task singularly difficult. Because the action of France might turn the scale, her slightest movement raised a hue and cry. From St. Petersburg General Le Flô preached entire abandonment to the policy of Russia in the hope of a definite alliance; from Berlin the curb was pulled; in Paris the press was Anglicised, as usual; London manifested little but cold reserve. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was forced into the business of Egypt, while financiers themselves brought their interests and ambitions to his door. However, he was not exacting; his policy was summarised in his declaration: "As long as I can prevent war, I do not care about the rest."

Gortschakoff was obliged to delay the presentation of his note. He was dissatisfied with every one, himself included. He could not venture to complain of Germany, though he knew well that resistance originated there. He affected a grievance against France, whom he accused of compliance

towards Great Britain, and reproached for having too easily acknowledged the new Sultan, Mourad. Gontaut-Biron at Ems was surrounded by agents who sought to compromise him. The attitude of Great Britain much annoyed the Russians. The British answer to the memorandum spoke of measures taken "to maintain the interests and the honour of the nation." The Czar himself pencilled on the margin: "And who was threatening these?"

The situation became worse. The designs of Great Britain were now publicly denounced, who calmly accepted the necessity of "blood-letting."

"Blood must flow," said Disraeli; and blood was flowing in streams.

"Prince Gortschakoff let me read the voluminous dispatches of May 25th from his Ambassador in Turkey," wrote M. de Gontaut-Biron. They described the horrors taking place in Bulgaria, the agitation in Constantinople, the Radical objections of Great Britain to the presentation of the note, the encouragement given to fanaticism in Turkey by her attitude, the plans of Midhat Pacha,—generally hostile to Christianity. The colours of the picture were evidently vivid, but they were probably not false.

The Duc Decazes endeavoured to fling himself between the two parties; a stronger, less divided France might have been mistress of the situation. He was, however, accused of acting inconsiderately, of seeking self-importance. Gortschakoff, easily offended, spoke of French "ingratitude." The truth is that he did not care to see too easy a solution of the problem. It was from this hour that the first coolness arose between France and Russia. Schou-

valoff informed Lord Derby of the conditions of peace should Russia be obliged to fight.

Great Britain needed some one to counteract the Russian policy. Towards the middle of June Prince Bismarck summoned Odo Russell, her Ambassador

Bismarck's "Far from bearing malice towards the Overtures British Government for refusing her adhertowards Great ence to the Berlin memorandum, he showed Britain himself quite satisfied at the attitude of Great Britain. He explained that for the moment he had but one desire, to maintain European peace and to act as a link between Austria and Russia; that otherwise he did not wish to see the latter as a conqueror in Turkey, where he well understood that Great Britain could not tolerate this. . . ."

There was no inconvenience—quite the contrary—in Great Britain's standing outside the Alliance. "At the right moment a combination would be formed which would allow the British Cabinet to join the other Powers in their designs."

In confidential relations with Great Britain and Austria, as indispensable adviser of Gortschakoff, Bismarck now held all the threads; war and peace were within his hands. Andrassy was calm. Supported as he was by Berlin, his hand was not difficult to play.

Gortschakoff had grievances. While France exerted herself to draw Great Britain from her haughty reserve and to arrange things satisfactorily, she found herself threatened with expulsion from the Alliance in which she contented herself with so modest but useful a place. "Some one in intimate relations with the Russian Court has told me that there is a question of inducing Great Britain to

enter the Alliance of the three Northern Kingdoms, at any rate as to the business of the East; and consequently France and Italy may be left outside. It is probably Prince Bismarck, always hostile towards France, who has inspired, perhaps mediated this idea. It would be extremely serious. . . ." This was imaginary, but it shows something of the secret machinations of the German Chancellor as regards Great Britain.

The Emperor William joined the Czar at Ems; Bismarck did not accompany him. There was a short interview, mainly of a personal nature, and of no political import. The Emperor William knew very little, and contented himself with sighing over the unhappy lot of the Balkan Christians and the responsibilities of Great Britain.

The Emperor Alexander and Gortschakoff left Ems disillusioned, discontented. The "Kur" had not proved satisfactory. The Balkan news was at its worst.

Prince Milan had refused to listen to advice, and had crossed the frontier; war had begun. The Turkish troops were mobilised. At Constantinople the active party carried all before them; two Turkish Ministers had been assassinated in full council by a fanatic.

Gortschakoff could grumble—or rejoice—according as he feared or desired complications. Preparations had to be made for the next developments "after the blood-letting."

Apparently about this time Russia made a supreme effort to escape the undermining from Berlin. Gortschakoff conceived the notion of a direct approach to Austria, an "entente à deux," in which no one else, not even Germany, should share. It was

areturn to the position at the opening of the crisis, to the tactics of Catherine and of Joseph II; but the times had changed.

At all events, a new meeting of potentates was suddenly announced; this time between the Czar and Franz-Joseph; it took place at Reichstadt, July 8th.

There had been rumours of a preliminary vention of visit of Gortschakoff to Bismarck at Kis-Reichstadt singen, but this did not come to pass. After a long conference the sovereigns and their ministers agreed as to the basis of a possible convention. The Hungarian Minister frankly explained the opposition of Austria to any serious aggrandisement of Servia; "which would become the Piedmont of the southern Sclaves of the Balkans." Russia abandoned Servia, and even the interests of Montenegro, which she had most at heart, were but weakly defended. Her sacrifice of the Eastern Balkans culminated in her authorising Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina in case of need. Austria-Hungary would therefore remain neutral in case of war: she had her hands full

Bismarck affected annoyance. He spoke of "Russia's distrust in concealing the Convention of Reichstadt." However, it was his policy that ultimately triumphed, and, as was soon declared, he had been "invisibly present" at the interview of Reichstadt. In his Souvenirs he thus remarks upon it: "Negociations were undertaken according to the terms of the Convention of Reichstadt, where on July 8th, 1876, the Emperors Alexander and Franz-Joseph had had an interview; the desire was expressed that we should be excluded from the agree-

ment. This Convention, and not the Congress of Berlin, is, for Austria, the basis of the possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and assures the neutrality of Austria in their war with Turkey." ¹

What was it Russia gained from such a sacrifice? We must once more refer to the indications of Prince Bismarck. She gained, or thought she gained, a free hand in the Eastern Balkans. "The acquisition of Bosnia by Austria, accorded by Russia at Reichstadt, allows the admission that M. d'Oubril did not tell us the truth when he hoped that the Balkan war only signified a military promenade. It would have been selling Bosnia far too cheaply. No doubt it had been hoped at St. Petersburg that Bulgaria, freed from Turkey, would remain dependent upon Russia. . . ."

A clearer outlook was being gained.

The summer of 1876 was very bellicose. While Europe remained in the background, (on July 13th Defeat of the Duc Decazes, replying to a question Servians of M. Louis Blanc, congratulated and "consoled" himself by affirming the impotence of the other nations), events were following their foreseen course among the Balkans. On July 1st

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¹ The Convention was not signed until January 15th, 1877. The preliminary agreement and the Convention itself were kept extremely secret. According to dispatches published in the Austrian Red Book, Count Andrassy had contented himself with telling an Ambassador "that the result of the interview meant non-interference for the moment and the awaiting of some decisive incident before a general agreement between all the Christian Powers could be made." All through this period the game of secret dealings beneath the outward march of events must be closely followed in order to understand this singular and instructive phase of European history.—See also the Souvenirs of Caratheodory Pacha.

Montenegro issued a proclamation in which she staked her all. On the same day Roumania drew up a statement of her claims, which strongly hinted at further complications.

At the same time Prince Milan, after having also declared the claims of Servia, began hostilities. His troops were commanded by the Russian General Tschernaïeff; Russian officers abounded in great numbers among the Servian soldiery. However, the Turkish General Dervich Pacha defeated him in every encounter, and after a campaign of six months' duration Belgrade was menaced by the Turkish army. Bulgaria had risen; here also Russian officers supported the cause of Sclave and Christian. Pan-Sclavonic committees made open demonstrations.

The Turkish suppression was violent Atrocities and ferocious. Mr. MacGahan, correspondent of the New York Herald, published his famous letters on the Bulgarian atrocities. The English Liberal press, led by the Daily News, took up the cause with much excitement. There had been wholesale massacres of peasants, women violated, children sold. The British Ambassador himself. Sir H. Elliot, at first incredulous, yielded at last to the actual investigations of Sir E. Baring and Mr. Blunt. Mr. Gladstone quitted his retreat and flung himself into the campaign against the atrocities, in spite of the policy of the Cabinet. Despite the strong feeling of the British public, the Cabinet still maintained its attitude of reserve. Lord Derby, in replying to pressing inquiries from the "Bulgarian party," kept to a heavy diplomatic hesitation. Disraeli, more ardent, took up the gauntlet. At first he denied the atrocities, then explained them

without offering to excuse them. It was a civil war, a religious war, which emperilled the status quo; therefore the Government had still more serious complications to provide for. "We have always considered the Mediterranean as one of the highways of our Indian Empire, and therefore that this sea, as well as those connected with it (the Straits and the Suez Canal), should be free and safeguarded. Our policy consists in assuring this result. . . "

As Disraeli has remarked, the world is not only composed of sovereigns and Cabinets: it abounds in emotional crowds, passionate hearts and secret societies. In Russia the victorious march of Turkey, the rumours of Servian defeats and Bulgarian massacres, caused a tremendous tide of sympathy and feeling among the masses. The movement reached the furthest villages; innumerable petitions reached the Czar, innumerable prayers were raised to heaven. The subscriptions and the enlistments filled the papers. The Government could not stem the tide, though admitting that it wished to do so. There raged through Europe a tempest of conflicting feelings when Prince Milan, definitely defeated, demanded the intervention of the Powers (August, 1876).

There was another crisis at Constantinoof Abdul ple. The Sultan Mourad was deposed as
Hamid II being an invalid. His brother, Abdul
Hamid II, took his place. The Government was
reinforced in "ancient Turkish" fashion. Abdul
Hamid was considered a capable, religious and
"Austrian-minded" sovereign. A lengthy reign
which was to see a sort of Mussulman restoration
began under tragic auspices; would a single man
be able to arrest the Empire on the brink of the
precipice?

Just when events were hastening developat St. ments, it was felt unwise at Berlin to Petersburg leave Russia isolated, taking counsel of none but her honour and her interests. Should she escape from German influence and carry Austria-Hungary in her flight, matters might be very greatly altered. Recourse was had to the procedure of serious circumstances; Marshal Manteuffel was sent to see the Czar. Manteuffel brought back reassuring messages, but that these were entirely satisfactory is hardly probable. The following note was published by inspired journals: "The Triple Alliance, which has just been strengthened by the mission of Marshal Manteuffel to Warsawa (it then needed strengthening!), is mainly a family alliance of special policy, or rather an agreement of exigency. as it has been termed (as well say that it did not exist at all!). In this triumvirate Prussia holds the best cards. She serves as connecting link between Austria and Russia, as well as between Russia and Great Britain. Her interest is a double one to separate Russia from France, and to maintain between Austria and Russia that agreement which was entirely due to herself. (Yes; but on condition of taking a third share in it!) If Russia desires to avoid a warlike and adventurous policy, she has but to follow the principles of the Triple Alliance. She must choose between this and isolation." (This was certainly a threat!)

Thus driven to the wall, Gortschakoff reverted to the policy of Bismarck. It was the most dangerous of all, but he had no other alternative.

"In the autumn of 1876," writes Bismarck, "I received at Varzin a telegram in cipher from our military plenipotentiary, General von Werder. In

this dispatch, dated from Livadia, he asked, at the request of the Emperor Alexander, whether we should remain neutral in case of war between Russia and Austria. . . . I attempted evasion. . . . As the Emperor Alexander, in the name of our political relations, asked through the Russian Embassy at Berlin for my personal opinion, I could not long elude this indiscreet inquiry. I begged the Ambassador von Schweidnitz, whose leave was just expiring, to visit me at Varzin before returning to St. Petersburg and to take my instructions. Schweidnitz was my guest from the eleventh to the thirteenth of October. . . . The instructions given to von Schweidnitz declared that our first duty was to maintain the friendship between two great monarchies, which, in face of the Revolution, had more to lose than gain by joining in the war. If, to our great sorrow, it proved impossible to prevent the strife between Austria and Russia, we could doubtless bear the losing or gaining of victories by our friends, but we could not suffer one or the other to be so seriously weakened as to compromise his position as an independent power in the European concert. This declaration, demanded of us through his master by Gortschakoff in order to prove the platonic nature of our friendship, caused the Russian thunders to be withdrawn from Eastern Galicia and directed towards the Balkans."

Gortschakoff's politeness of 1870 was repaid. He was hereby informed, in just as courteous a fashion, that in case of war the cause of Austria would be supported. He knew, at least, how much to hope for. If Russia wished to intervene in the Balkans she would be forced to buy Austrian neutrality, unless she preferred to have to face both

the Teutonic Empires. The Conferences of Reichstadt were therefore resumed, and Russia definitely agreed to allow Austria-Hungary free play in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Convention of January 15th, 1877).

The question now for Russia was to know whether she could obtain adequate compensation in Bulgaria. To minimise this compensation was the object of the second phase of the astounding course pursued by Germany with so much bitterness against her friend and ally.

To obtain this result the help of Great Britain had to be resorted to. But as there was nothing to be gained by gratuitously increasing the authority of Great Britain, it seemed advisable to use both British and Russian influences by playing them off, one against the other.

The campaign of "Bulgarian atrocities" strongly influenced public opinion in Great feeling in England Britain. Disraeli, and even the more reserved Lord Derby, were affected by the vehemence of Gladstone. A fiery polemic, in which the missionary and American elements were active, numerous meetings, manifestations aimed directly against the Ministry—all undermined the Cabinet. In the month of August Disraeli was made a peer with the title of Lord Beaconsfield; it was said that he desired to avoid the difficulties of his position in the House of Commons.

Towards the end of September a monster meeting was held at the Guildhall. The Lord Mayor and MM. Hubbard and Morley passed a resolution demanding from the Government "a policy calculated to give immediate help and permanent security to the Christians of the East."

Lord Derby replied heavily in his accustomed

manner: "I consider a plan for the establishment of a complete autonomy and for the creation of a new group of tributary states to be beyond the limits of practical politics. . . . You will remember that we are in the presence of six Governments which must be induced to act harmoniously; if we ask too much, we shall obtain nothing."

However, the English Cabinet now realised that something had to be done.

Defeated Servia implored the Powers for an armistice. Meanwhile, the troops of General Tchernaïeff made a pronunciamiento and acclaimed Prince Milan as King of Servia, thus breaking all bonds of vassalage with Turkey. General Tchernaïeff then resumed hostilities, and was again defeated. Lord Derby then flung himself between the combatants. proposed an armistice between Servia and Montenegro on the one hand and Turkey on the other. At the same time he sketched the preliminaries of peace; the status quo in Servia and Montenegro, a system of local and administrative autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; guarantees for equitable administration in Bulgaria. All the Powers agreed to this with the exception of Russia. The representatives of the six Powers took active steps together in Constantinople. The British fleet, reinforced, again anchored off Besika.

Was the preponderant rôle to pass to Great Britain? Russia had a reply all ready. On September 26th General Soumarokov, aide de camp of the Czar Alexander, started for Vienna and brought back a counter-proposition, evidently based on the agreement of Reichstadt. Russia demanded "that in case the conditions of peace were refused by the Porte, Bosnia should be occupied by Austrian

troops, Bulgaria by Russian troops, and that the united fleets of the Powers should command the Bosphorus." The Bosphorus for the Powers in common, Bosnia for Austria, Bulgaria for Russia—such was the division of the cake.

Reaction There was a prompt reaction in England. in England "It came like a thunder bolt. The indignation aroused by the massacres, the disdain inspired by the suspension of payment of the interest on the Turkish debt—all was replaced, as if by magic, by a twofold nightmare—the Cossack in Constantinople and India Invaded. The Standard wrote, voicing the nation's thoughts: "What we must declare is that Russia shall never establish herself on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and happily we shall be able to prevent this without any one's assistance."

Russia, having obtained Austrian neutrality, and having unveiled her designs, now went resolutely forward. General Ignatieff imposed on Turkey an

1 Viscount de Gontaut-Biron, always accurately informed. perhaps from high sources, telegraphed on July 3rd: "Here is an account of a conversation had with the Emperor vesterday. His questioner has just brought it to me, and I believe it to be sincere. He is very uneasy and irritated over the persistent refusal of the Porte (to agree to the armistice). You know the letter from the Czar to Franz-Joseph relative to the occupation (of Bulgaria). Should the Emperor of Austria refuse, Russia will make war on Turkey alone. All this has been provided for at Reichstadt. The nephew has written to the uncle that, pressed by the Sclavonic movement at home, and having already received some personal threats, he has been forced to act. Germany will let him do so. The Emperor William has sent Manteuffel to Varsova to promise the Czar a benevolent neutrality for the two cases above stated. He could not do otherwise, he added, after the services rendered by his nephew. He repeated that the chief object of his policy was to maintain the agreement between the other two Empires, but that if this

armistice of two months' duration from the beginning of November, under threat of demanding his passports at once. On November 10th the Czar said at Moscow: "You know, gentlemen, that Turkey has consented to the immediate arrangement of an armistice which I exacted from her in order to stay the useless flow of blood in Servia and Montenegro. In this unequal struggle the Montenegrians have proved themselves veritable heroes. Unfortunately the same praise cannot be accorded to the Servians, in spite of the presence of our volunteers amid their ranks, many of whom have shed their blood for the Sclavonic cause." (Servia was thrown overboard, according to arrangements made at Reichstadt.1) "I greatly hope that we shall now achieve a general understanding; but should this not be effected, and if I see that we are not obtaining valid guarantee for the execution of what we have justly claimed from the Porte, it is my firm intention to act

In London the same day Lord Beacons-England declares field spoke on his side. "Great Britain "herself" is not an aggressive Power. She has nothing to gain by war. Should, however, a conflict become necessary, no country is so well

did not succeed he would allow the Czar to carry out his plans. From this statement two alternatives are clearly set forth:

either occupation or war."

1 "Count Andrassy has just charged Count Karolzi to say that Austria would definitely veto any aggrandisement of Servia." Dispatch from Gontaut-Biron, July 3rd, 1876. After the Emperor's speech Gontaut-Biron also telegraphs: "M. de Bülow informs me that the chief part of the speech consisted of a stern criticism of the Servians, from which one may conclude that the Servian Question will hardly add to the difficulties of the present position" (Dispatch of November 14th).

prepared. This is not a land which, on beginning a campaign, has need to ask whether a second or a third campaign will be possible for her to undertake. She enters the lists with the firm resolve not to lay down her arms until justice has been done."

This allusion to the penury of Russia, which is supposed to have delayed the opening of hostilities, was wounding. It was from this time that the epithet of "Jingoism" began to qualify certain excesses of English Chauvinism.

On November 13th Prince Gortschakoff issued a circular announcing mobilisation, and declaring the resolve of Russia not to stay her course until adequate guarantee was given that the principles of humanity should henceforth be respected. It was his answer to Lord Beaconsfield. The Czar Alexander had an interview with Lord Loftus, in which he explained his intentions and his reasons for "acting alone," while reiterating his promise to the Powers that no territorial aggrandisement should be his object. Events seemed to indicate direct conflict between Russia and Great Britain. The two giants stood with clenched fists face to face. War might break out at any moment.

At Livadia, October 29th, the Czar informed the Grand Duke Nicholas that he was appointed to command an expedition against Turkey.¹ "What is the ultimate object of the campaign?" he in-

¹ The Grand Duke, two months later, learnt from the lips of the Emperor William the rôle that had been reserved for him. The German Emperor declared to the whole German étatmajor at the manœuvres: "You will soon be called upon to take command of a great army and to exercise your military talents" (Nouvelle Revue, June 1880, p. 477).

quired. The Czar answered with one word—"Constantinople."

Only four army corps were placed at Russian Council the disposition of the Generalissimo, Russia having to keep a large number of her troops to watch the Austrian frontier. "The generals met in council of war at Livadia; Prince Gortschakoff. Milioutine and Obroutscheff did not even admit the possibility of serious resistance on the part of the enemy. . . . The Grand Duke expounded the reasons that militated in favour of prompt declaration of war. Having only four corps at his disposition, he could not answer for success unless the attack were sharp enough to leave no time for Turkey to concentrate her forces and oppose the passage of the Danube and the Balkans. The entire council saw the force of the argument, and the Czar decided to begin hostilities in the autumn of 1876."

In spite of this, however, the project of an autumn campaign was abandoned. Russia was not ready. As has often happened, no one believed in the actual possibility of war, and trusted the diplomatic combinations of Gortschakoff; up to the last moment there was hesitation as to which adversary to attack—Austria or Turkey. But there was also Germany. The financial situation was not good; an immediate loan of a hundred million roubles had had to be resorted to, which was difficult to realise, European finances being in the hands of England. There were also foreign influences at work, which have always found easy access to the court of Russia. General von Manteuffel was sent on a new embassy to the Czar.

Russia finally agreed to Great Britain's propo-

sition, and the matter was postponed until the spring. "Peace was being negotiated and war was being prepared"—such was the general attitude. Turkey had no illusions. Edhem Pacha, Ambassador at Berlin, remarked on October 2nd: "For the past month Russia has considered herself at war with us. It is as well to know what to expect. At all events, we are prepared, and Russia will not master us quite as easily as she expects to do. Our fleet in the Black Sea is far superior to hers, and we can injure her as much as she can injure us."

All this was known in Berlin, and also known in London. If Russia desired to make war, she was at liberty to do so. Turkey would defend herself, and whatever were the result, intervention could always be taken into account. Bismarck did not conceal himself, as friend or arbitrator. With his usual custom of declaring his opinions very loudly, knowing that frankness deceives better than does falsehood, he explained his views before the Reichstag. "Austria may find herself compelled to take part in the war. But the duty of Germany is to guarantee the existence of Austria, and in general of the present map of Europe. Germany will show complete disinterestedness. She is the leaden weight thanks to which the toy can always keep its balance. Austria has also great vitality. This I pointed out to Lord Salisbury on his last visit to Berlin."

This was enlightenment for St. Petersburg, but the Russian Government was no longer master of events. There was no other issue but war with victory, and that complete. Now the country was not prepared for a great war. Time had to be

gained, and instead of following the impulse of the Grand Duke Nicolas, Russia agreed to England's suggestion of a conference at Constantinople.

It was Lord Salisbury, Colonial Secretary in the Beaconsfield administration, who, with Sir H. Elliott, was to represent Great Britain in this conference. From this time forth Lord Salisbury began to play that eminent part in British politics which has been his for nearly thirty years. Cultured, reserved, acute, he was termed the maître gabeur by Disraeli; and he was, in fact, an ironical and dangerous interlocutor. He would have been the least prejudiced of men if his English prejudices had not been so strong. He was more an artist in diplomacy and politics than diplomatist and statesman. Both dilettante and realist, old English, landowner and Imperialist, he was in all ways the perfect representative of the generation that saw the century die.

Before reaching Constantinople, Lord Salisbury visited the capitals of Europe. He arrived at Berlin November 21st. Bismarck, though unwell, had come back from the country in order to meet him. There is naturally very little known as to what passed during the interview. From all appearances, there was a strong desire for conciliation, and the Powers opened the Conference with honest anxiety to accomplish a peaceful solution of the difficulty. But besides the speech of Bismarck

¹ On May 31st, 1877, remarks being passed in the House of Commons on the absence of all documentary report of this interview in the Blue Book, Mr. Bourke, Under-Secretary of State, observed that "the English Cabinet considered these so extremely confidential that he would incur serious reproach were he to make them public."

quoted above, a dispatch from Gontaut-Biron needs some consideration.

"I have just received a visit from Prince Bismarck. He told me that he found Lord Salisbury's attitude very conciliatory. If Russia and Great Britain can agree, the most serious dangers will have been escaped. He had suggested to Lord Salisbury, in case of Russia's decision to enter Bulgaria, that an armed manifestation might be enough, and he had been informed that at Vienna the British plenipotentiary had expressed something of the same opinion. He therefore thinks that Great Britain would confine herself to occupying Constantinople."

Occupy Constantinople! If such were the "pacific" advice insinuated to Great Britain, small wonder that matters were not easily arranged!

Once again the two leaders found their slightest suggestions sufficient. In Vienna Lord Salisbury heard no less definite a hint. Count Andrassy declared to him "that Austria-Hungary would never suffer the formation of a great state or of new Sclavonic states on the southern frontiers of the monarchy." His course was very clear.

Conference at Constantinople under the presidency of Safvet Pacha, Foreign Secretary for the Sultan. Midhat Pacha, after suffering an eclipse, once more appeared as Grand Vizier.

Suddenly there came the sound of cannon and volleys of artillery. The president met the wonder of the delegates with a calm explanation. "Gentlemen, a great act, just accomplished, has changed a form of government that has lasted for six hundred years. The constitution which His Majesty the Sultan has bestowed upon his Empire has just been

promulgated. It inaugurates a new era for the happiness and prosperity of his peoples."

It was a coup de théâtre à la Midhat. He had got beforehand with the demands of the Powers. and "reformed" Turkey once again. The Empire of the Padishah became a parliamentary monarchy. There was much congratulation; then the delegates began their task. On the rough draft presented by the French delegate, Count de Chaudordy, a project was drawn up exactly contrary to reform à la Turque, for, as the Russian delegate, General Ignatieff, observed, decentralisation was accepted by the compilers. The drift of the scheme may be briefly summarised as follows. After establishing peace between Turkey, Servia and Montenegro on the basis of the status quo, it was decided that Bosnia and Herzegovina on the one hand, and Bulgaria on the other, should be reorganised under the supervision of the Powers. The governors of these two provinces should be nominated by the Sultan, with the consent of the Powers, during a period of at least five years; controlling commissions should be stationed in Bosnia on the one hand, and in Bulgaria on the other, which would thus become "privileged provinces," and supervise the carrying out of reforms. By this means the occupation of Bosnia by Austria and of Bulgaria by Russia would thus be avoided. Such were the last concessions of the Powers, what has been termed the mitigated or mutilated project.

Great Britain, therefore, for the first time, even under a very modified form, accepted "Christian reform," that is to say, the Russian view. In par-

¹ Were it necessary to prove by words what has been established by facts, it suffices to quote the words by which Lord

ticular, a "Bulgaria" was created, an immense Bulgaria, extending from the Danube to the neighbourhood of Adrianople, including Bourges and Monastir; it is true that Bulgaria escaped Russian occupation, perhaps also Russian influence.

Ultimatum against this advantage. On January 14th, pulling out his watch, he declared that should the Porte not yield on the two points in question (the nomination of the valis, during at least five years, under approbation of the Powers, and the acceptance of controlling commissions) the Conference would be broken up, and the Ambassadors of all the Powers would leave Constantinople. All the other delegates spoke to the same effect. It was an ultimatum, and directed also, as may be easily realised, against Russia over the head of Turkey. Was war desired or not?

Turkey did not fear war; Great Britain and Germany desired it; it was now Russia that hesitated. Such was the true state of affairs beneath all the artifice of words. Viscount de Gontaut-Biron telegraphed on January 5th: "From a rather obscure conversation that I have just had with M. de Bleichroeder, it would seem that Russia, losing confidence in her resources, is more anxious to find an honourable way of retiring than to go forward. Prince Bismarck appears to have said to my interlocutor

Salisbury announced the rupture of January 20th: "It was not to witness the conciliatory intentions of the Turkish Government, nor to register projects for the improvement of the administration of the Central Power that the conference was held at Constantinople. Its task was to establish an administrative autonomy and adequate guarantees against the bad administration of the revolted provinces" (D'Avril, p. 177).

that Turkey, well acquainted with the position of Russia, and proud of her superior troops, would not agree to the concessions demanded of her by the Powers. In this case, the Conference would be broken off. . . ." On January 14th, after an interview with Odo Russell, he further telegraphed . "London is not far from believing that Bismarck is urging on the war." And on February 7th, after the rupture, "When I remarked to M. von Bülow that this unhappy Eastern question would never terminate, he replied, 'It has only just begun."

Turkey was not afraid. As soon as the proposals of the Conference had been communicated to the Porte, a meeting of influential Mussulmans was held at the Palace on the summons of the Sultan, and presided over by Midhat-Pacha. An "appeal was made to public opinion." An explanation of the situation was presented by the Grand-Vizier, who seemed in no way disposed towards conciliation.1 The independence of Turkey was being menaced; rather would they fight to their last man. Such was the unanimous opinion of the assembly, which amidst loud applause decided to advise the Sultan to reject the proposals of the Conference. A few weeks later Lord Salisbury, giving in the House of Lords an account of his mission in the East, declared: "For my own part, I am convinced that one of the causes that has led Turkey to this decision is the belief-fostered by some one of whom I do not know—that the power of Russia has been broken,

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¹ Midhat-Pacha protested, after the war, against this interpretation of his attitude; he affirmed that a counter-project, drawn up by himself, had received the approbation of Great Britain. The force of the current, however, which drew all Turkey towards war, carried away the project and its author.

that her troops are diseased, her mobilisation a failure, and that consequently there is nothing to be feared from her."

In this speech, which is a true summary of the Eastern question, the noble lord depicts with a single stroke the difficulty there exists for any Power to come to an agreement with Turkey. "There is in Turkey nothing to which one can appeal. You appeal to the Sultan; he fears a revolution. You appeal to the revolution; it has no means of listening to you."

It may be added that Turkish diplo-Mobilisation in matists make excellent use of this twofold means of evasion. They play as adroitly as any European with rights and interests, documents and passions. Salisbury remarks further: "Their traditional policy is that of maintaining themselves by dividing the Powers; and they imagine, apparently not without reason, that the Powers are now again divided, and that Turkey may be saved by war. The advantage of these tactics was soon understood, even by the Press. On January 6th, 1877, there was written from London: "Turkey again is teaching Europe, both in military and diplomatic matters. Her prudent slowness in the one gives double appreciation to her feverish activity in the other."

It was the delay that gave Turkey the necessary time to collect her troops from all parts of her vast territory. Already 160,000 Turks were amassed behind the Danube, and reinforcements incessantly arrived. The Porte affirmed that 600,000 men would soon be under arms. At Constantinople Lord Salisbury and his colleagues of the Conference could have been much enlightened on what might prove

a war to the death against the Turkish Empire. The sight there offered was most impressive. to the merits of these soldiers," says a pamphlet written on good authority in defence of the Turkish cause, "we need invoke but one testimony, and this is the living and material proof of these scores of thousands of men who daily leave Constantinople to join the regiments for their different destinations. Amidst this ceaselessly increasing multitude no other sentiment but one of calm and thoughtful enthusiasm has been witnessed. Not a word, not a song, not a shout; legion succeeds to legion, and no sound of a voice strikes on the ear. Where has such a sight been afforded by armed or unarmed multitudes? Where has the sentiment of duty and of discipline been exercised with such powerful effect?

"The qualities of the Turkish soldier, his courage, abnegation, endurance, sobriety are well known. He fought beneath the standard of the Prophet for a holy cause, for his life and for his faith. He was well armed.—Money?—In critical circumstances gold is always to be had.—Leaders?—They had been trained in the school of war, among them illustrious generals-Dervisch, Osman, and Mukter. one of the most remarkable men in Europe of his time.—Navy? . . . * prepared and armed by English Hobart, theirs was superior to the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. A clear conviction of the highest interests of Turkey animating every mind around the new-made Sultan. Fanaticism spurred the masses, and rendered every difficulty light: and then some one-some one unknown, as Salisbury remarked—was fostering this confidence and urging to resistance."

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The proposals of the Conference were refused in a haughty answer from the Porte. The refusal was summarised in two simple statements: The proposals infringed the treaties; they sacrificed the independence of Turkey. Turkey is a free nation; peer of the other Powers, she will defend herself should she be attacked.

The national feeling manifested itself Midhat- immediately by an action which caused some bewilderment, even in London. Midhat, the great reformer, fell. The softas had caused his ruin. He was exiled on the strength of the constitution he had promulgated. This was the one and only application of this famous document.

What did Gortschakoff mean to do? "He is again addressing himself to the Triple Alliance," wrote some one from Berlin, "but the Triple Alliance will give him no real benefit." This was the moment chosen by Bismarck to announce his retirement. He was really ill, overwhelmed by the difficulties of so difficult a game. Perhaps some too pressing personal engagement troubled him. But on the whole he was calm. The situation was now such that it could develop of itself.

The retirement of Gortschakoff was also rumoured. But he, unlike his colleague, was bound to his post; to leave it would mean desertion. After a few days of reflection Gortschakoff, to gain time, issued another circular. Its object was to pass on the responsibility to Europe. Through the failure of the Conference, it was "Europe whose dignity had been impugned." Russia, therefore, asked what Europe meant to do, and by this was meant Great Britain.

Nothing is more difficult than foreign policy in parliamentary countries. The Government knows that all its actions will be pitilessly scrutinised by an opposition for which all means are good. There is no gesture which will not have to be accounted for to the public, which signifies its home and foreign enemies. The Government is forced to explain openly the most secret of its actions and its thoughts. It may only act on reasons entirely justifiable to the lowest of the commons, whether interested or not.

The subtlety and pressure of this discipline should be thoroughly appreciated; however vast and hidden may be his designs, the parliamentary statesman must always have sufficient arguments at his disposal to reassure his friends and keep his enemies at a respectful distance.

At the opening of the year 1877, the Beaconsfield Administration was faced by a public feeling, in arms at the thought of "Bulgarian atrocities," and uneasy as to the perils risked by "British interests." There were some who demanded the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, others claimed the application of the treaties of 1856 and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain had to deal with a Russia that was uncertain, inconstant, ambitious, passionate; with a Turkey violent, subtle, intractable, redoubtable; with a Europe led by a king among diplomatists, well-informed and crafty, who divined everything, and allowed no secret of his own to be suspected.

On the whole, there was a feeling in favour of a war. Some were eager to begin, and others more reserved, but the country was prepared. British policy was influenced by a principle enunciated by

Lord Salisbury in his speech of March 1st, and which should be always in the mind of every European statesman: "The military influence of Turkey will be always at the disposal of those Powers prepared to fight for Turkey." That is to say, that Turkey, with her 600,000 soldiers, is a formidable factor in European quarrels. Great Britain has found her "soldier" in the East.

After the failure of the Conference, quesmakes tioned as to the circular of Gortschakoff, Peace the British Government reverted to the idea of an armistice (February, 1877). It was giving diplomacy a bone to gnaw. The belligerents accepted, and Turkey with the others; being victorious, she meant to improve her own conditions.

Montenegro the basis of the status quo (February 28th). But Montenegro, little Montenegro, though also beaten, held her ground. She reclaimed some conquests, she would not conclude. . . . There was something underneath all this.

What passed in the councils of the Czar was kept extremely secret. Mobilisation continued very slowly; care was, however, taken not to be compromised too much. Russia desired to be free up to the last; the military staff was refused authorisation for collecting material for bridges. "Such preparations would betray a formal intention of declaring war, and might compromise the result of negociations carried on in Vienna and in London."

General In point of fact, negociations still con-Ignatieff tinued. The negociator this time was the man who had most contributed to place Russia in her difficult position—General Ignatieff. Ignatieff gained his diplomatic spurs in the easy affairs of the

Chinese Far-East. Belonging by birth to the petite noblesse, he attached himself to the popular party as a Sclave expansionist. No one evinced more ardour in declaring the impotence of Turkey and the necessity for war. Did he seek in Europe a last chance of avoiding conflict, or was the supreme responsibility forced upon him?

He reached Berlin, where Prince Bismarck, forgetting his illness and humours, received him ceremoniously. We know but little of the interviews between the great master of European politics and the great leader of the Pan-Sclavonic cause. One trait, however, is noted. "It appears from an account of this interview that the General, with the founder of the Triple Alliance, recognised that of two evils from which Russia suffers—war may be the lesser." Always the same echo. Bismarck "urges on the war." The General, thus encouraged, went the round of Europe. In Paris he met Schouvaloff and Salisbury, who had been beforehand with him. Not without hesitation he started for London, arriving there on the sixteenth.

The London Protocol nearer of accomplishment. The British ministers and the Russian diplomatist discussed things in the most conciliatory spirit, and at length came to an agreement. A protocol was signed, which was to be communicated to the Powers, and to which, in view of the conciliatory attitude of the two most interested parties, they would be only too glad to consent.

It implied peace on the basis of the Servian Convention, and an arrangement with Montenegro which would be easy to obtain if Russia advised Prince Nicolas to consent. As to reform, time

was to be left Turkey to put into execution what she had accorded in her recent communications to the Powers. The Powers proposed "to watch carefully, by means of agents in Constantinople and local agents, as to the way in which the promises of the Ottoman Empire were carried out." Disarmament was to proceed in both Turkey and Russia.

After so much noise, nothing more like an anodyne could have been produced. Was it then wished that war should be avoided? Turkey was triumphing in every direction; why should she not accept? It certainly meant peace. Congratulations abounded, and Bismarck went into retirement. The matter, however, needs further consideration.

In a note subjoined to the protocol, Ignatieff made the following statement relative to the method of disarmament: "Should peace be concluded with Montenegro, and should the Porte accept the advice of Europe, and evince a wish to place herself upon a peaceful footing, and to undertake in all seriousness the reforms mentioned in the protocol, she should send a special envoy to St. Petersburg in order to discuss disarmament, to which His Imperial Majesty will, also on his part, be ready to consent."

To this Lord Derby replied by another subjoined declaration: "It is understood, in advance, that should the object in view fail to be attained, that is to say, mutual disarmament and peace on the part of Russia and Turkey, the protocol in question is to be considered null and void."

Reservations made by flat Italy, who till then had been a passive spectator of all this, should suddenly have emerged

from the side-wings, and made no less serious reservations. "General Count Menabrea has declared that Italy is only bound by the protocol in so far as the agreement between the Powers through the protocol itself shall be maintained."

This signifies that should the protocol not establish the agreement, one of the Powers withdraws and undermines the whole structure. It is not hard to divine whence the blow proceeded. The precaution, however, was superfluous, for the edifice, built up with so much care, would fall of its own accord.

It is hardly necessary to state that in view of this unsatisfactory understanding, Turkey, in her turn, refused her consent. The clause that stipulated the sending of an envoy to St. Petersburg with no reciprocal conditions, reduced her to the level of a vassal. The "diplomatic honours" would fall to Gortschakoff, who perhaps would content himself with these. But Turkey was not disposed to sacrifice her honour at a time when she was practically triumphant. She rejected the protocol in the name of the treaties and of her independence. . . . She would not go to St. Petersburg in the garb of a conquered suppliant.

The meaning of the last diplomatic passage of arms must be fully understood. Russia had ob-

¹ There had been an understanding between Germany, Great Britain and Italy since the journey of Crispi in October, 1877. "The President of the Chamber, in agreement with the King, had during the Parliamentary vacations of 1877 undertaken a journey through Europe, in which he had come to an understanding with the Governments in London, Berlin and Vienna, for joint action should the war end in the defeat of the Turkish army."—From an article by Count Grabinski in the Correspondent of October 10th, 1901.

tained, by the protocol, a statement that justified her immediate demands of the Porte, since it was she who had made the greatest concessions; she had been playing au plus près. Great Britain had given incontestable proofs of her conciliatory spirit, since, till the last moment, she had consented to leave General Ignatieff as arbiter of war or peace; she also had been playing au plus près. As to Europe, she had laboured so assiduously for peace that she had made war inevitable. In case of need, the reserve of Italy was a resource against a peaceable solution which appeared most improbable. Bismarck had proved himself a sincere friend to his friend Gortschakoff, "the most faithful and reliable friend of Russia." He also had been playing au plus près. This is what he wrote, on February, 1877, to his other friend, Count Schouvaloff, Russian Ambassador in London, the real author of the protocol: "Whatever be the future of our two nations, I shall remain faithful to my life's traditions as to the necessity of alliance between our two nations."

The war then broke out. It has been thus characterised by a publicist who often seeks inspiration in Berlin: "The Eastern war now commencing is, at first sight, but a struggle between Russians and Mussulmans; in point of fact, however, it means war between the Russo-Sclavonic and the Teutonic races."

How much is it to be regretted, both for France and for the world in general, that France was "absent" at this moment!

CHAPTER III

THE ELECTIONS OF OCTOBER 14TH, 1877

- I.—Preparations for the electoral campaign—Official candidature —Its practices—The Marshal placed in the van—Declaration to the troops—Presidential journeys to Bourges and in Normandy—The Republican party acts aggressively—Union of the 363—Speech by Gambetta—"Submission or resignation"—Gambetta prosecuted—Polemics among the Conservatives—The Elections delayed.
- II.—The Clerical question—Crisis of the temporal power— Injunctions from the Pope to Roman Catholics—The Vatican and May 16th—The Jubilee of 1877—Feeling in Italy—Bismarck's attitude towards the clerical question—Crispi in France and Germany—German menaces—The Lefts denounce the danger.
- III.—Death of M. Thiers—His funeral—Jules Grévy nominated as leader of the Republican party—The Marshal's journey to Bordeaux and in the West—Manifesto of September 19th —The electoral campaign—Official action and Republican effort—Governmental optimism.
- IV.—The elections of October 14th—Defeat of the Government
 —Position of the Ministry and the Marshal—The balloting
 —Composition of the new Chamber—Survival of the
 Ministry—Departmental elections—New Republican victory
 —Constitution of the Committee of the Eighteen—Excitement—Opening of Parliament—Inquiry as to May 16th—
 Unsuccessful appeal of the Ministry to the Senate—Fall of the Broglie Cabinet.
- V.—The Rochebouët Cabinet—Refusal of the Chamber to deal with the Ministry—Refusal of the Budget—M. Dufaure summoned to the Elysée—Non-agreement of the Marshal to his conditions—M. Batbie asked to form a resisting Ministry—General excitement—The Committee of the

Fifteen refuses to support M. Batbie, and the Marshal refuses to proclaim the state of siege—Extreme advice of Gambetta rejected by Jules Grévy—The Labordère incident—Failure of M. Batbie—The Marshal agrees to summon M. Dufaure.

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"CHOULD a last battle be necessary, as well let it take place in 1877 Campaign as in 1880." This expression of Emile de Girardin's explains the crisis of May 16th. French impatience bears uncertainty badly. Wallon amendment was but a bridge; the stream once crossed, people wished to know whither they were to be led. Lefts and Rights, Conservatives and Radicals, all thought alike: "Let us have done with suspense." There are none like the French to accept an accomplished fact, but the fact must be first accomplished. In family life the influence of politics enters largely into the question of the children's career and gives a poignant interest to the inquiry as to what the next Government may probably be like. After the battle of principles followed the hand-to-hand struggle of officialdom. Hence the extraordinary bitterness that characterised this battle of the rear-guard, long after the chief positions had been carried.

M. de Meaux, in explaining the plan of "the last Conservative campaign" and the political method of the Ministry to which he belonged, delights in the enumeration of severe and coercive dealings with the mass of the electoral body. He much regrets that through fear of foreign complications the state of siege should not have been proclaimed.

As far as was possible the official candidature was restored. "The proclamation of the Marshal pro-

vided for this, and the official candidates remained unchanged."

In order that these should be supported, the Government put the prefects and sub-prefects into motion; to defend them against attacks the procureurs of the courts and Public Ministry were used. In virtue of ministerial instructions numerous prosecutions were carried out, all legal resources employed; it was regretted that by reason of judicial guarantees "repression could not have been more rapid in order to be more efficacious." It is rather striking that even non-success should not have shown these men of May 16th the real significance of this method.

It was Universal Suffrage that was aimed at, in the illusory belief that it could be intimidated by teasing rather than by vexatious measures irritating those in daily contact with it. The elector was distrustful.

Universal Suffrage, number; this is the real enemy! To use the royal sceptre in order to root up Universal Suffrage out of France—such is our doctrine and our task. . . . The immense majority of voters know to what to hold; the instinct of conservation is still strong. (Emile de Girardin.)

The date of the election was kept secret. A Havas note announced on July 5th that no date had been definitely arranged. There was uncertainty even in the Ministry. Some desired to hasten on the movement, leaving no time for preparation to the adversary; others wished for delay, so that the prefects and the sub-prefects could "work" on general opinion. Yet the departmental and municipal elections had to be delayed; in spite of everything things went very slowly.

It was desired not only to gain, but to surprise

the suffrage, to reduce and intimidate it. While doubt was reigning, the official electoral campaign was undertaken. On July 3rd M. de Fourtou, Minister for the Interior, addressed some instructions to the prefects—

The Government has not only the right but the duty to acquaint the voters with those candidates which support its policy and those who combat it... Appeal must be made to the union of Conservatives. The prefects must mediate in the coming struggle. We shall not tolerate hostility in any official... The Government will be able to take all responsibilities.

What was meant by this ministerial responsibility? A platform dispute, a general dismissal from office, and the mushrooms of a night all disappear. The better for those that remain. The officials are well acquainted with all this.

They knew, too, that they were fighting for themselves, and therefore whole-heartedly agreed to the second part of the circular, which made an agreement between the Government and the functionaries on the one hand and the Marshal on the other—

The Government claims all your energy and devotion. It associates you with a political effort of which the object is the assurance to France of order, security and peace. You will show yourselves worthy of the confidence of Marshal MacMahon, and you may rest assured that the President of the Republic will not forget individual services to the nation. I have already pointed out the perfect understanding between the Senate and the President. Thanks to this firm union Marshal MacMahon will, during his term of office, exercise his authority in maintaining peace amidst our discords, and in assuring, despite mistakes of parties, the future honour and glory of the French nation.

This was again the theory of the Deliverer, but of a deliverer chained to the destinies of those who had offered to help him in his work. The formula was repeated to satiety. "It is only necessary to name

the victor of Magenta to know that he will never abandon those who fight beneath his banner." The Bulletin des Communes announced on July 20th that should the elections not secure a Government majority, the Chamber would be once more dissolved. A Bureau d'opinion was established at the office of the Ministry for the Interior under the direction of M. Lavedan. From this political telegrams were daily addressed gratuitously to the prefects and sub-prefects for publication under the title of "Correspondence of the Conservative Union" by the "well disposed" Press.

In the *Journal Officiel* interminable lists of dismissals or suspensions appeared. From the departmental administration, 217 functionaries were dismissed by de Fourtou within less than two months. Police-magistrates, school-directors, primary inspectors, many fell beneath his ban and were replaced by militant Bonapartists. Even Liberalism was suspected. Noisy and aggressive loyalty was the most safe. Every government is easily reinforced by place-seekers.

Soon came the turn of the mayors and municipal councillors. Towards the end of August all those mayors who had belonged to the 363 had been forced to leave their posts, also those assistants who held the same views. A number of Municipal Boards were dissolved. Appeal was made to the Suffrage while restricting its manifestations.

The Marshal was carried away with the stream. He was forced into every demonstration and became loquacious. On July 1st at the close of the review at Longchamps he addressed a speech to the troops which must have cost a pang to his military feelings—

Soldiers . . . you know your duty, you realise that the nation

confides her dearest interests to you. On all occasions, I depend on you for their defence. You will help me, I am convinced, to maintain the respect due to authority and law in the exercise of the office which has been confided to me and which I shall fulfil until the end.

The words "on all occasions," and "until the end" were pregnant with mystery and menace. They gave food for discussion to the papers for several months. The Deputies had not been invited to the review. The *Bulletin des Communes* caused the following appreciation to be posted on the walls of every commune in France:—

"The partisans of the Commune, the accomplices of the incendiaries and evil-doers of 1871, whom the Marshal crushed within the streets of Paris—these were not present at the great military ceremony. . ." M. Thiers and M. Dufaure were to recognise themselves as portrayed by the official pencil!

From July 27th to July 29th the Marshal visited the camp at Avor, and also Bourges. He made other speeches—

As to foreign relations, let us keep the peace. With regard to home policy, let us keep within constitutional limits and march forward at the head of law-abiding men of every party, protect them not only against subversive passions but against their own impulses, persuade them to forget their divisions in order to overcome Radicalism—our common peril. Such is my object, I have never had another.

This speech met with but a cold reception.

In spite of the formula "men of every party," the Government had deliberately broken with the more moderate Republicans. At the camp at Avor the Marshal was accompanied by General Ducrot and General Gallifet. Rumour stated that in the course of an interview with General Chanzy, the President

of the Republic seemed inclined towards the Left Centre. This was, however, contradicted.

From August 16th to August 21st a journey was made through Normandy and other speeches made. The Marshal stopped at Evreux, Caen, Bayeux, Saint-Lô, Valogne and Cherbourg. Much hope centred upon this quiet and Conservative region. Little but the cry of "Vive la République!" greeted the Marshal. An official wrote: "Had it not been for May 16th, the Marshal would have been more enthusiastically received; his personality in itself is popular." "The Marshal was almost pitied for being associated with such an enterprise."

On August 19th M. Brunet, speaking at Tulle, M. de Fourtou at Vieuvie (Dordogne), were already reduced to the defensive. They pleaded exten-

uating circumstances for the Cabinet.

The Republican party, united and drilled by Gambetta, had taken the offensive. They felt sure of success, and this confidence increased the number of their recruits. Behind the 363 stood a strong army of officials, agents and committees, already compromised in the last elections and already in possession of Government experience. The password was simple: Re-election of the 363.

From the date of June 23rd, the three groups of the Left within the Senate-house declared "the re-election of the 363 to be a civic duty as incumbent on the country as was, in 1830, the re-election of the 221." Appeal was made to the general patriotism, so that no Republican candidature should contest those of the 363.

A committee of lawyers was arranged to prosecute the abuse of authority; "legal resistance" was definitely organised,—" recourse to the law." Among VOL. IV.

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the members were Senator Renouard, MM. Crémieux, Simard, Jules Favre, Allon, Leblond, Hérold, Mimeret, Léon Renault, Durier—all the leading men. The weight of the lawyers is well known in parliamentary dispute. Those who apply the law are glad to influence those who make it.

On July 3rd there was a general meeting at M. Emmanuel Arago's, presided over by M. de Marcère, a little surprised at finding himself a leader of the extreme Left and standard-bearer of the anticlerical campaign. The union of the 363 was briefly declared, and a single electoral committee for all the Lefts was arranged, to be under the alternative presidency of MM. Calmon and Hérold, senators, with M. Herbitte, a former prefect, as general secretary.

Gambetta spoke on June 24th at the Hoche banquet at Versailles. On July 7th he deprecated the insinuations by which he was accused of personal ambitions. "The health of M. Thiers has never been better. I shall not figure in a plebiscite alternative."

Through every department a suppressed agitation followed the influence of the Lefts. Their programmes were collective, and there were some whose drift exceeded the limits of electoral circumscription. The manifesto addressed to the voters of Côte d'Or was signed by Magnin, Mazeau, Sadi-Carnot, Joigneaux, F. Lévêque, Hugot,—the most respected names; that addressed to the voters of the Puy de Dôme was signed by MM. Salneuve, Bardoux, Girot-Pouzol, Tallon, etc.

Everywhere special committees were established. Certain cases were brought into the courts of justice expressly calculated to undermine the influence of

the Government and its representatives. Newspapers, newsvendors, and all who complained, and thought they could complain, of the administrative measures, appealed to the courts. This made the administrative agents uneasy, more accustomed as they were to prosecuting than to being prosecuted themselves. They showed some reluctance at facing the new order of things; they saw themselves reprimanded from headquarters and criticised by the Figaro. At Bordeaux the Gironde engaged in warfare with M. de Tracy; a vigorous polemic was carried on as to the rights of sale of papers on the public roads, and the attitude of the Gironde was followed by the provincial press.

One month passed. A leader was necessary to rally the rather scattered energies of the Republican party. The battle tended to degenerate into a skirmish, and the dog-days were upon the land. The overcharged atmosphere could only be relieved by tempest.

It was Gambetta who invoked the storm. On August 15th he spoke at a private banquet of 163 covers, offered to him at Lille by Senator Testelin. The orator affirmed that the conflict was fought upon legal ground and that he should not abandon it. He defied all ideas of a coup d'état. "I do no one the wrong to believe that they wish to act on other but legal principles." He reviewed the electioneering districts, and by means of figures tried to prove the victory of the Republicans as already assured, and drew philosophy and moral from the event

The Republic will emerge triumphant from this last trial. The greatest benefit for history resulting from the events of May 16th will be the having shortened by three years the ten

years of uncertainty and stumbling to which we were condemned by the last decisions of the National Assembly.

And then the final passage, one of the brilliant phrases which were henceforth to gleam like meteors amidst his magnificent harangues—

Do not fancy that when these millions of Frenchmen,—peasants, artisans, civilians, electors of the free French land,—have made their choice and declared their will,—do not fancy that when all these have spoken, there will be found any to revile them, however high on the ladder of politics or administration he may stand. When France has given utterance to her all-sovereign voice, those who hear will have to yield or stand aside.

This was much more than mere rhetoric. The figure of the Marshal was reduced to its right proportions. The attempt at a plebiscite, under cover of his name, was brought to nothing." The "Marshal" became no more than an agent, one functionary among many; the subtle disdain of the last four words broke down a lofty pedestal of prestige and illusion. Winged words! strong words! The man remained, the hero vanished.

The Ministry felt the shock. It was decided that Gambetta should be brought to task for the reproduction in the *République Française* of his speech at Lille. He was summoned to appear, on Friday, August 31st, before M. Ragou, Juge d'Instruction.

M. de Meaux desired that Gambetta should be arrested. The whole Right press was thundering against the moderation of the Ministry and its agents. It was the famous campaign of the "trigue and of the gourdin,"—the cudgel and the club,—led by de Saint-Genest in the Figaro and by de Cassagnac in Le Pays. The Figaro criticised those ministers who were over-anxious to observe the legal forms—the

Duc de Broglie and General Berthaut, and wished the Duc de Broglie to make way for M. de Fourtou if he could not decide "to use force." M. de Saint-Genest, a lieutenant of the Reserve, was sentenced to thirty days of strict arrest. The Français of August 27th explained that the Marshal was incapable of a coup d'état such as had taken place on December 2nd and the 18th Brumaire.

Discord was rife amid the camps of the Conservatives. Orleanists, Legitimists, Bonapartists. quarrelled over the prey that they had not yet seized. The Soleil took up arms against the Pays, which was calculating on unfurling the imperial banner in 1880, and affirmed that the banner would be royal, not imperial. The Ordre attacked this imprudence: "We regret that the declaration of the Soleil should imperil the alliance arranged till 1880." The Union affirmed the tricolor to be a revolutionary flag, and would not recognise the right of the Bonapartists to speak in the name of the Conservatives. "It is as Royalists that we resolutely follow the Marshal." The Roman Catholic papers were indignant at the reserved attitude of the Ministry with regard to Catholicism. "If clericalism terrifies our rulers," wrote the Univers, "May 16th and June 20th will have been but a short interlude." It launched strong expressions of contempt at a ministry which had blushed at being termed the Cabinet of Curés. "In the great fight that was to follow, the Conservatives had but one rallying signal—the sign of the Cross."

The Duc Decazes, whose office put him on his guard against the foreign dangers of an extreme course, was violently attacked as "faint-hearted."

Paul de Cassagnac wrote:-

Should the Duc Decazes desire to break the bond by which the Conservatives are united, he has only to continue the dissolvent rôle which he has been playing imperturbably for the last few years. . . . Since 1870 the Orleanists have lived upon the bankruptcy of France. . . . It is with some unwillingness already that the Imperialists support the Duc Decazes. Let him not make this help impossible by attacks which nothing on our part can justify.

The Constitutionnel, the Moniteur Universel made timid advances towards the Left Centre. Favour was promised the Conservative and the Republican. But the militant press carried everything before it. "We desire to support the Marshal, who will lead us peaceably to an appeal to the people and the empire. And in this patriotic land we shall make of the Republic and Republicans a pâtée from which even dogs will turn away."

The expression of M. Cunéo d'Ornano, appearing in his organ of La Charente, Le Suffrage Universel, became famous. The polemic was carried on to infatuation, and passions were kindled by such dangerous sparks. The Constitutionnel recognised this: "The Conservative union is in danger. Hardly has it been created than it is threatened by ruin." The Journal des Débats summarised matters in the phrase: "An hypocrisy of false alliances during the struggle, and civil war after the victory."

During all this the Ministry hardly ventured to arrange a date for the elections. On July 3rd the Journal Official published an announcement stating that by reason of the refusal of the Chamber to pass the Bill for direct taxation, the summer session of the General Councils could not begin on the date arranged for by the Act of August 10th, 1871. "The Government has decided that it would be useless to

proceed to new arrangements before the legislative elections have been held."

It was a serious blow against electoral guarantees. "But," said M. de Meaux, "the prefects will have no objection to fighting two battles."

The elections of the Conseils d'Arrondissement were also postponed. The session of the departmental assemblies opened on Monday, August 20th. M. Dufaure, who was a member of the outgoing Conseil of Charente-Inférieure, raised his voice. He declared that "he had no special qualification for representation, but that he continued his office in virtue of that principle of public rights which holds that functionaries should remain in the exercise of their functions until they are replaced by others."

II

A more delicate subject must now be dealt with; one that was exciting every heart, and that requires all the frankness and sincerity due to history. A two-fold argument has been repeated to satiety by the organs of the Left; it certainly embittered the polemics and influenced the elections: not only was the Ministry denounced as clerical, but accused as such of exposing France to the dangers of a foreign war. After May 17th Gambetta formulated this charge with his accustomed energy]: "The clerical intrigues must inevitably lead us into war." A month later he declared "that France must be protected from Romish incursions." This was an exact statement of the difficulty. The question passed the frontier, taking a larger, almost European significance, becoming a question of civilisation and of culture.

The duel of philosophy had been begun Western Question when the spirit of revolt was first aroused against Roman Catholic domination. Besieged for centuries, and despite the eagerness, sometimes the violence of the attack, Rome has never yielded one inch as to her principles. The adversaries stood face to face. The struggle has been well named by Jules Ferry the Western Question.

Man is not permitted to look upon the clash of thoughts as a mere harmless passage of arms. Humanity, complaining of intolerance, looks askance on toleration. Logic descends from brain to fist; a firm faith is aggressive; faith is manifested by works.

The France of May 16th was, like Europe, divided into two almost equal camps as to philosophic and religious questions. The advisers of the Marshal, desiring to regenerate society, did not exclude the Church from their plans for the future; for the present her help was rather at a discount. Though their enthusiasm was bridled, it was a matter of tactics and of diplomacy; they would have been angry to know the object of their efforts attributed to material preoccupations. They believed in success because they believed in God.

Their adversaries held a different faith; the lever that the others applied to Heaven, they applied to earth; for them humanity sufficed unto itself; subject to the laws of Nature, they held it vain to implore from the Divinity any alteration of inviolable decrees. For these the upholders of celestial hope and of providential intervention were impostors.

However bitter their recriminations, both con-

tinued firm in their convictions. Neither violence nor death would conquer their aggressive zeal.

The philosophic struggle is carried on, according to the age, on more precise and concrete grounds, which may suddenly become matters of national importance; these secondary causes grow and die, while the essential disagreement is perpetuated.

The sixteenth century saw the crisis of discipline in the revolt of Protestantism; the seventeenth century saw the crisis of grace with the persecution of the Jansenists; the eighteenth witnessed the trial of faith beneath the onslaughts of philosophy. It was reserved for the nineteenth century to watch the problem as to "temporal power." Pope Pius IX had lived through "les années de Pierre" in order to gain the heritage of Peter.

This problem was of European importance—international, diplomatic. It cannot now be denied that the question of the "temporal power" had much influence in that war of 1870 in which the very existence of France was at stake. It is becoming evident that this question constituted the greatest anxiety of the reign of Napoleon III. The defeat of France decided the fate of Rome.

The defeated Pope, however, did not yield to circumstances, and his obstinate resistance prolonged until his death the dangerous political dilemma in which French Roman Catholics were placed.

It was some few days before May 16th that this problem was propounded by the Pope himself. On

¹ See the *Memoirs of Prince Bismarck* (vol. ii.), also the discussions in the papers of 1907 as to the origin of the war of 1870. The assertions of Emile Ollivier leave no doubt as to the importance of the Roman question, at any rate as to the attitude of Italy. See also Bourgeois.

March 12th, 1877, before the assembled Cardinals, Pius IX, then eighty-five years of age, made an earnest speech in which he summarised and vindicated his actions as pontiff. He depicted the sufferings of the Church, her persecutions and her losses, and what was most grievous, her loss of independence.

We lack our necessary power and liberty as long as we are subject to the yoke of rulers.

Injunctions were addressed to all Roman Catholics throughout the world to take action and to exhort the various governments not to shut their eyes to the most serious fault that can be committed by the human race, the suppression of the truth.

It is the duty of the pastors of all the churches scattered throughout the earth on receiving our message to make known to the faithful the dangers and the prejudices to which we are exposed. They must exhort them to employ all the means allowed them by their country's laws for bringing to the consideration of their rulers the painful situation in which the Head of the Church is placed, and for taking efficacious measures to remove the obstacles standing in the way of his complete independence.

This was an entreaty, but also an injunction. The old Pope, raising his arms to heaven, appeals to all the children of the Church for aid; his hands are loaded with chains; Saint Peter in bonds,—what son of the Church can bear the evil longer! Victory depends upon an act of faith; God will fight for His own.

"Be assured," said the Pontiff, whose face, transfigured by age, bore a supernatural aspect, "be assured that the Church will triumph and that the Revolution will perish. . . . Those born of the Revolution will be divided among themselves. The angels will fight against our enemies, and the Church will be victorious!"

It was at the close of this exhortation and through the effect of this command that the campaign began in France of episcopal mandates and Catholic petitions, a campaign which in more or less veiled terms demanded French intervention in the Holy City. The petition emanating from the general assembly of Catholics, carefully deliberated and unanimously voted, is thus expressed—

The undersigned, French citizens and Catholics, ask you to employ every means in your power for making the independence of the Holy Father respected, for safeguarding his administration, and for assuring to the Catholics of France the indispensable enjoyment of a liberty more dear than any other, that of their conscience and their faith.

The idea of a war cannot be said to have passed. Mgr. Berton, Bishop of Nimes, wrote in his pastoral letter:—

A strange soldier mounts guard at the door of the Vatican, proving that the Revolution guards the Pope as her prey. Italian unity is not accomplished; the Pope is still King; his temporal power will be renewed, and after far-reaching shocks in which many armies and crowns will be engulfed, there will arise in the policy of nations a unanimous cry throughout all Europe: "Give back Rome to her true masters! Rome belongs to the Pope; Rome belongs to God!"

How suppose that the hostile camp should not be made uneasy by such words pronounced by personages so eminent and under circumstances so solemn? How admit that if the opposing authorities and groups support also a political party, this party should not equally incur this same distrust, this same reproach? Were a more immediate and more marked intervention of the pontifical question to appear within French politics, how should alarm not be increased?

The Vatican and the fall of the Simon Ministry was a coup May 16th du Vatican. It had been announced a fortnight previously by the organ of Mgr. Dupanloup. The Germania wrote: "The Pope has spoken, he has been obeyed." The special communications between the Vatican and the Elysée during the days immediately preceding May 16th are not denied. Jules Simon was denounced in Rome as a Simon Magus—"skilled as he in all kinds of seductive arts."

In December, 1876, Pius IX received at the Vatican the Empress Eugénie and the Prince Imperial, his godson. He is reported to have said to the young Prince: "I hope that a speedy change may bring you back to France; I desire it for the sake of the Church, for the sake of Europe, for the sake of your country! . . . "

Was not this meeting of the Empress with the Pope a vivid reminder of the war of 1870 and its causes—a recognition of the Past, a symbol of the Future?

Is it over bold to conclude, as did Gambetta in the Chamber during the sitting of June 16th: "On May 21st M. Jules Simon declared that the alleged captivity of the Pope was a lying invention. Two days later these words of the Republican statesman reached the Vatican, and it is from thence that the blow of May 16th was struck." The press, more ardent, affirmed more categorically: "The priests desire war, they are seething an intrigue." The 16th of May appeared, therefore, as the supreme contrivance, which by bringing back the Roman Catholic party and—should need arise—the Empire (this, by the way, explains the mistrust of the Comte.

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de Paris and the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier), should create a new adjustment of policy not only in France but throughout Europe. All actions have their logical consequences.

The Papal Jubilee was celebrated on The Papal June 3rd. "A large proportion of Roman Catholic France is now in Rome." Never before, perhaps, had Pope and Church evinced such proofs of vitality as at this time, solemn and painful as it Money and treasures of art arrived from every French diocese. Cambrai brought 330,000 francs; Arras 145,000; Montpellier 100,000. The Pope welcomed the French pilgrims and spoke to them of France, his well-loved daughter, questa figlia eletta. . . . "I pray God to inspire you to choose representatives exempt from party-spirit, having before their eyes the fear of God, the dignity and grandeur of your nation and the defence of her true interests. . . . " The Pope was surrounded, venerated, adored. An Italian paper, hostile to the Holy See, wrote: "In presence of such demonstrations, in view of gifts and addresses from the savages of the most distant islands of America and Australia, as well as of masterpieces of industry and art from the civilised peoples of Europe, it is impossible not to be struck by the greatness of the worldly power known as the Papacy."

Rome was present at these rejoicings; the Quirinal watched the Vatican. The French pilgrims took back the Pontiff's words to France.

Now the government of May 16th was counting on these crowds, these committees, these bishops; they were its most faithful champions. Italian politics, Italian free-thought, still uneasy at the recent victory, took alarm. In reply, M. Melegari

and M. Depretis spoke in Parliament; but their reassuring diplomatic declarations were not trusted; they were themselves uneasy, or at least feigned uneasiness. The lay party in Rome seized an opportunity of aiming a blow at the Vatican by weighing heavily on French affairs.

M. Crispi left for Paris and Berlin.

Prince Bismarck, not yet free from the Bismarck perplexities of the Kulturkampf, was deeply engaged in the difficult task of solving the Eastern question. Nolens volens, he was the arbitrator of Europe. War was knocking at his gates. The alliance of the three Emperors, which against strong opposition he had originated and accomplished, was being dissolved; Prince Gortschakoff was escaping from his toils. The German Chancellor had not forgotten the diplomatic campaign of 1875, and still bore a grudge against the Duc Decazes. He denounced, at all hazards, an intrigue of Orleanists and Pan-Slavists, as tending to bring about a Franco-Russian agreement in Europe, as well as a restoration of the monarchy in France. His old alarms were reawakened as to "a white coalition." And what the German Chancellor feared above all else was to be caught in a Franco-Russian trap. The choice as to "Russia or Austria," which he had long been trying to avoid, was pressed heavily upon him. Forced to a decision in October, 1876, he had had to pronounce himself, and not on the side of Russia.

Amongst the various possibilities that exercised his powerful imagination, he did not discard the idea of an agreement between Germany, Austria and France. Some years later he explained to M. de Saint-Vallier the advantages that France would gain by joining the Austro-German alliance.

He dwelt upon the subject that for two centuries the great Central Powers of Europe had never ceased to discuss, though with no real advantage to themselves, England and Russia alone profiting by it to make themselves the rulers of the world. Let but France, Austria and Germany unite and they would dispose of the Eastern Question as seemed best to them and most profitable to their interests alone.

These ideas originated in the year 1875. The question is also said to have been broached from other quarters and, not without success, to M. Thiers, and at the time when the Duc Decazes was so criticised by the ex-President of the Republic. was planned to cause the fall of the Duc Decazes and to entrust the Foreign Office to the president of the Council, Jules Simon, who was to apply the programme of M. Thiers. The chief feature of this programme was to be the absolute neutrality of France in the Eastern Question, and her complete reconciliation with Germany. M. Thiers considered that after a lapse of seven years France should adopt the policy of forgetting the past, and that the best means of disarming the hostility of Germany was for France herself to propose an agreement by giving serious proofs of her pacific intentions.

The plan nearly succeeded on the arrival of the telegram announcing the fall of Midhat Pasha. But Jules Simon hesitated at the last moment. The 16th of May maintained the influence, together with the Duc Decazes, of the Orleanist if not of the Roman Catholic interests. A Roman Catholic triumph in France would have been particularly embarrassing for the Chancellor during the crisis absorbing his attention.

Prince Bismarck was indeed beginning to feel the weight and the fatigue of the Kulturkampf. He had, on the whole, obtained all that he could reasonably

desire from it; in the Empire the definite subordination of Catholic Bavaria to the Ghibelline policy; at court, the humbling of the Poles and the Roman Catholic element. He himself wrote, what can well be credited: "For myself personally, the direction of our policy is not determined by any religious inclination, but by the desire to consolidate as much as possible the unity gained upon the field of battle."

The parliamentary situation was also altered; the Roman Catholic party was becoming a power which had to be reckoned with. However, to effect the journey to Canossa, which the most practical of statesmen considered a necessity, he needed all his boldness and independence. It was also most expedient to see that the premises of a long-desired agreement with Italy were not altered. At the time when the alliance of the three emperors was weakening, the idea of the triple alliance was already developed in his mind, and, as he well knew, the Italian agreement was closely connected with the Roman question. He would not have sacrificed Italy to the Pope, had not the Pope afforded him a means of influence which the Pontifical authority alone was not able to assure him.1

¹ Considerable light is thrown on the sentiments of Bismarck with regard to the clerical question in France in the first chapter of Les dernières années de l'ambassade du Vicomte de Gontaut-Biron en Allemagne. With great impartiality, the numerous warnings of the Chancellor are here recorded, which sometimes amount to actual threats of war. "We cannot allow the Roman Catholic population of Germany to suffer passively the yoke of a foreign power. . . . The attacks from foreign bishops—Belgian, Austrian, English—cannot leave us indifferent, and we shall endeavour to arm ourselves against them. Those emanating from France are particularly serious. Whether the bishops are under orders from Rome to foment revolt amongst our subjects, or whether by means of the facilities they encounter, continued

All this was greatly occupying the German Chancellor when, towards the middle of September, M. Crispi, President of the Italian Chamber, patron and protector of the new Liberal Cabinet, and leader of the anti-clerical movement in Italy and Europe, arrived at Gastein after a short stay in . Paris.

M. Crispi was not considered to be a friend of France. He was accused of Franco-phobia, and in 1870 he had, at Florence, presided over the separatist committees which were endeavouring to obtain the cession of Nice to Italy.

As President of the Chamber, had he perhaps altered his views? Recalling some years of exile spent in France, he declared his unchanging affection for that country. In point of fact, M. Crispi, like Prince Bismarck, his illustrious model, prided himself on being a practical man. An accurate appreciation of his attitude seems to have been given by a correspondent of the *République Francaise*. After denouncing M. Crispi as "professing deep hatred towards France" in the issue of September 4th, 1877, he remarks three days later, "The Italian statesman is often wrongly represented as the adversary of France. . . . He is but the enemy of

attacks are made in France against the policy of the German Empire, we consider ourselves menaced. It is for us a matter of precaution. We shall be obliged to make war upon you" (p. 18). About the same time, in January, 1874, the Chancellor addressed a proclamation to Germans living abroad, in which the same idea was developed. "Should a rupture become inevitable, it would be against his duty to his conscience and his nation to await the time when it would be most convenient to France to begin the attack; the antagonist was pontifical Rome; France, once identified with Rome, became the sworn enemy of Germany; a France subjected to the Papal theocracy was irreconcilable with the peace of the world."

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theocracy and Cæsarism." At all events M. Crispi was a man to be reckoned with, and his approaching accession to power could be easily foreseen.

While in Paris, M. Crispi had met Gambetta and Thiers, the former on August 30th, the latter on the 3rst. If the published report can be believed, he had remarked to the illustrious tribune that "the army and the clergy were a source of danger to popular government." Gambetta agreeing, objected that the only remedy for this condition of things would be found in general disarmament. "And since I was on the point of starting on my journey, and about to see Prince Bismarck, he urged me to do what I could in Germany in order to broach this delicate question."

On the following day M. Crispi saw M. Thiers. According to the same report, he found him much vexed against Marshal MacMahon and his action of May 16th. "He manifested the highest hopes for the victory of the Republicans. Gambetta"—remarked M. Thiers—"is a very skilful politician and a wise man who has understood where moderation may be necessary."

M. Crispi met Bismarck at Gastein on September 17th. Thiers had died before he left Paris, and he had been present at his funeral. The Italian President requested Bismarck for concessions to Italy on the side of Trentin. The Chancellor did not lend himself to any overtures, qualifying Italy as a "young Power that had time to wait." He is said to have advised his interlocutor to direct his attention towards Nice, Corsica, Albania and Tunis, but what passed is very vague. Crispi remained more than a month in Berlin. At different meetings and banquets he manifested a strong desire for a rapproche-

ment between Italy and Germany. Replying to M. Bennigsen, who had alluded in a toast to the enemies common to both nations, the Italian minister made a strong statement. "Italy desires to be independent of all and everyone, and is determined to defend this independence with all her power. Woe be to those who touch her!" The *Diritto*, commenting on this, declared that between Italy and Germany there existed a strong bond of union.

The skilful stage-manager at Berlin had done what he could to make the subject attractive to the papers. A scheme was set on foot for establishing between the Liberals of every nationality, the Republicans of France included, an agreement as to the struggle against Rome. Bismarck was to figure as the leader of the movement and Crispi as his principal lieutenant.

Amongst modern nations words have so much strength that such affirmations, by dint of repetition, serve to conceal realities until the force of circumstances brings peoples and governments to a rude awakening and compels them to realise their true interests.

Crispi left Berlin, having obtained little and bound himself to much. He relates that during his conversations with Prince Bismarck he had approached the subject of disarmament, with which he had been charged by Gambetta. This, too, was without success. Bismarck replied: "Disarmament is not practically possible. We must leave this procedure to the Peace Society."

The relations of Bismarck with Gambetta during this critical period of European history were not to stop here. Shortly afterwards an agreement was arranged by intermediaries and accepted in principle

by the two statesmen. The circumstances were particularly serious. In the critical position in which Europe had been placed by the Russo-Turkish war, a single false step, a single misunderstanding, might arouse a general war; the memories of 1875 were still vivid, the uneasiness of Italy still marked, and Bismarck's projects very obscure. What would be the more advantageous policy of France?—that which by an agreement with the Vatican provoked threats from and possible rupture with her neighbours, or that which endeavoured to avoid both imminent peril and dangerous isolation?

Further, was it possible for home controversy to take fire from this redoubtable argument and bring out the bogey of a foreign war, declaring, in the words of Gambetta, "that clerical intrigues could only result in a war"?

The answer is as difficult to find to-day as was the decision at that period. Home and foreign affairs are closely connected. Consciously or not, every villager discussing matters with his neighbour takes his stand in the universal campaign. Guelph or Ghibelin, Pope or Emperor, a choice has to be made. The scrupulous are in ill-favour with the impatient.

When M. Thiers in 1866 and 1870 warned France of the risks she was incurring through her imperial policy, his patriotism was questioned, shouts of "À Berlin!" were raised, and the frankness was blamed that afterwards became his greatest claim to honour.

In 1877 the danger seemed real and imminent. The German press, the English press, and the Italian press proclaimed it daily, adding to its proportions. The *République Française* reproduced in July, 1877,

the following passage from the *Pungolo*: "What would be the significance of the triumph of Marshal MacMahon's policy in the forthcoming elections? There would be but one as regards foreign relations, and that one would be—war! And were France to hesitate, prudence would advise Germany and Italy to take the initiative in a struggle that no human power could possibly avert."

This feeling, more or less sincere, culminated in October, on the eve of the elections, by a crescendo, in which the Norddeutsche Gazette had the largest share: "The pending negotiations between Italy and Germany tend to a reciprocal agreement in the event that after the general elections the two nations should find themselves confronted by a clerical France—a France which would necessarily be aggressive, since her clericalism would constitute a standing menace to Italy."

The press campaign was accompanied by still more disquieting manifestations. Military movements were reported from the Italian frontier. On May 10th a concentration of troops and war material had been made at Vintimille. "These unexpected preparations," telegraphed the prefect, "create a strong impression here. . . . A reinforcement for the garrison of a thousand men is announced." The official journals reported that "artillery had been concentrated at Plaisance and that torpedoes had been placed in the port of Spezzia."

The Marshal's government suffered great disquietude. Both publicly and confidentially pacific sentiments were loudly declared, and the eagerness with which this was done betrayed the uneasiness. The task of appearing not to be defending France against this continual menace, whether real or

feigned, fell heavily upon the Duc Decazes. His correspondence with Gontaut-Biron is sufficiently convincing on this point. The latter, at Berlin, abounded in pacific assurances; he was in a state of nervous agitation at the slightest hint of new developments.

Count de Launay, the Italian Ambassador, who saw Prince Bismarck the day before yesterday (July 2nd, 1877) gave me an account, in almost the same terms as that of M. d'Oubril, as to the Prince's expressions regarding us. The Prince considers the present situation in France as requiring great vigilance on the part of Germany. Count de Launay, who is very moderate in his personal opinions, maintains, however, that the pre-occupation of Europe in this matter is natural, but that the tension will relax if the French Government persists in a correct attitude.

The word *if* is very striking.

This morning I was accosted by the Emperor William, and after having conversed with me upon the incidents of the Eastern war, he spoke, for the first time, a few words about the present situation in France.

The ambassador explained the situation and the struggle against Radicalism, and adds in his account—

The Emperor William maintained a certain reserve throughout the interview.

Later, on September 7th, he wrote again—

"I was able to see M. von Bülow to-day. I directed the conversation to what is occupying our attention, and spoke of the hostility of the German papers, even of those which support the Government. I also drew attention to the prejudices which represent us as practising, or as being induced to wish to practise, an entirely clerical policy. . . . As I expected, M. de Bülow scarcely lost his habitual reserve, although I pressed him more than usual. He spoke of the coldness encountered in Germany by clerical ideas. . . . He informed me that he was pleased to hear the assurances I gave him of the prudent and moderate views of the French Government.

All this is not very illuminating.

People, therefore, evidently believed in the danger. Its reality can be doubted after the events, but careful research can only recognise as a fact that the international situation was indeed shaken by the crisis of May 16th, and that a Roman Catholic triumph in French elections would have led to disastrous consequences abroad.

Sincere patriotic foresight had real ground for fearing the danger and endeavouring to warn the country against it. The reproach made to the Left also falls upon the party that by raising such questions accepted the risk of such eventualities and was itself reduced to bow before such painful incidents. Has not the Marshal himself confessed as much? At the end of the crisis, when he had been forced to "submit," he exclaimed, on speaking to M. Lefèvre de Béhaine, a diplomatist of great good sense and well acquainted with the European situation: "It is terrible! I should not be there if I had not feared a foreign war."

III

High patriotism, straightforward Liberalism, active ambition, all this accounted for the astonishing activity of M. Thiers. He awaited the triumph of the Republicans as an act of vengeance, reparation and resurrection, and had thrown himself heart and soul into the campaign. He was convinced that in the event of his defeat in the elections, Marshal MacMahon would give way to him. His relations with Gambetta had become close and confident, and he proposed to bring him

forward and "introduce him to Europe." betta was informed that, together with the presidency of the Council, he would receive the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs. The other posts were to be divided amongst MM. General Campenon, Jules Ferry, Léon Say, Admiral de Gueydon, Waddington, Giraud. Teisserenc de Bort, and Krantz. political programme was to consist of amnesty, "scrutin de liste," commercial treaties, liberty of the press, reformed laws as to the rights of selling books and papers, freedom of meetings, compulsory secular and gratuitous primary education, suppression of the mixed "jury d'examen," and revision of the contracts made with the large railway companies. It was, in short, the opportunist programme. was possible that personal ambition might cause M. Thiers to swerve from his desires; it was, however, but a matter of projects. He meditated the publication of his own particular plan of action, which, made public on the eve of the elections, would be the programme of his candidature for the presidential

During the month of August he had started for Dieppe, and there also he still held the hopes of influence and enjoyed the return of well-timed popularity. The following lines, written by him to M. de Marcère, evince much humour, but also a touch of uneasiness: "August 27th. I was received with much cordiality, meeting with something like affection amid the political enthusiasm, and was greatly touched by it. Amidst all the troubles of the times, there is yet a marked progress in the country which affords some consolation. Tidings grow better every day, and we can count on excellent elections. It will be our duty to evolve something

definitely satisfactory from this crisis, if such be possible."

This "if such be possible" is explained in another letter addressed to M. de Marcère. "You see, we shall have much trouble in extricating this country from the position in which it has been placed by the revolutions."

The old statesman had had his share in "the revolutions," but it seemed to him that the hour had come to consolidate the Future and to do "something definite."

He was eighty-four years of age!

Towards the end of August he returned to Saint-Germain, desiring to spend there a few weeks of the autumn, and from the Pavillon Henri IV he supervised Paris. To a delegation sent to welcome him he said: "As I have repeated during many years, I consider the Republic as the only government possible for France. . . . Count upon my constancy in supporting the Republic, but permit me to use the same constancy in making it conservative. . . . For my own part, I have no doubt of our success; everything announces it, and I do not hesitate to assure you of it." This confident language impressed all who heard it.

Three days later he was dead. He had been struck down painlessly by a sudden stroke—September 3rd.

M. Thiers, like Voltaire, had enjoyed all the benefits of a long life; like Voltaire, he died at the propitious moment. Nature and fortune smiled upon him till the end; death itself was indulgent towards him, she carried him away suddenly and on the shield of a renewed popularity. She spared him new experiences at an age when the old man

with his enfeebled hand was preparing to stake high. Death found him putting the finishing touches to a manifesto in which the first traces of weakness can be noticed in his vigorous spirit.

He insisted once again on his celebrated dictum—the Conservative Republic. J. J. Weiss remarked, "The Conservative Republic is mere nonsense." The Republic must, in short, be the Republic and nothing else; or rather, in view of universal suffrage, the Republic, in France, cannot be more than democratic. The most illustrious, the most sagacious, the most obstinate of bourgeois, Thiers would have suffered bitter disillusion had he lived a little longer.

Marshal MacMahon, who was in the country, sent a telegram of condolence to Mme. Thiers from Montbrison. The Government decided that the funeral of M. Thiers should be carried out at the expense of the State. However, his relations explained to M. de Fourtou that they would not accept the honour accorded by the Government unless they themselves could regulate the ceremony. The Journal Officiel of September 7th published a new decree referring to that of September 5th.

The funeral assumed the character of an antigovernmental manifestation. It took place on September 8th, and Paris, which conceives and executes these magnificent scenes with all an artist's spirit, surpassed herself. The conqueror of the Commune was carried from his house in the Place Saint-Georges to his tomb in Père-Lachaise amid universal emotion and mourning. The procession wound along the boulevards and the Rue de la Roquette; the bourgeois quarters confided the corpse to the poorer quarters, by which it was greeted with the same re-

spect. "It was a sight of unprecedented grandeur," said M. de Marcère. The manifestation was almost religious in its character. A contemporary paper, voicing the unanimous impression, describes it as a "silent insurrection, a dumb mutiny." The representatives of the Left within the Senate-house wrote to Madame Thiers the following day: "The population of Paris completely sympathised with your generous thought. In its dignified attitude, its solemn mourning, M. Thiers has been accorded the triumph most worthy of his memory. Paris has given the world the sight of a million men saluting the passing of a great citizen who knew how to lay down his power as nobly as he had exercised it."

1830, 1848, 1852, 1870—the echoing dates of the century—marched with the so lightly laden bier towards the Père-Lachaise, where the last shots of the Commune had been fired. While the friends of yesterday spoke slightingly of the dead, his former adversaries gave to streets and squares the name so suddenly exalted. The Government sent the papers a notice of laconic brevity: "Funeral ceremony yesterday accomplished without incident. . . . Perfect order maintained."

Within the cemetery speeches were made by M. Grévy, Admiral Pothuau, de Sacy, Vuitry and Jules Simon. Jules Grévy had come from Mont-sous-Vaudrey to be present at the ceremony. He extolled the Republic as a Government of order, peace and progress, the only "conservative" Government. All eyes were turned towards him. On the day following the death—September 4—the bureaux of the Left within the Senate-house, taking the initiative, and evidently desiring to prevent any other candidature, had elected M. Jules Grévy to hold

at the head of the party the place reserved for M. Thiers.

On September 7 the *Bien Public*, organ of the moderate Lefts, published the following notice:

M. Grévy, who is now in Paris, will pronounce a speech in the name of the former deputies above the tomb of M. Thiers. We also learn that complete harmony has been established amongst all the authorised representatives of the Republican groups, all without exception acknowledging the authority, competency and the character at once firm and conciliatory of the ex-President of the Chamber—M. Jules Grévy. The electoral committees of the IX. Arrondissement of Paris have resolved to support him as successor of M. Thiers.

Cambetta No room was found in the ceremony for the forgotten chosen heir, the proposed President of the Council, the prop of failing hopes—II Gambetta. At the news of the death of M. Thiers he had exclaimed: "I am overwhelmed—I need all the confidence with which the strength of France inspires me not to shudder before the consequences of this terrible blow. What a thunderbolt! I awaited M. Thiers at five o'clock this evening. He sent me word that he was unwell, and at half-past six he was dead!..."

On the day of the funeral his great mind was only sensible of the hopeful aspects of things. He noted nothing of speeches, of personalities. Only towards the end and after the cry of triumph, a sigh like the nescio quid amare glided into his confidences. "Never should I have dared imagine so dazzling a triumph, so decisive a manifestation. I have witnessed the most magnificent ceremony of the century which has produced so many and so great. . . . It was full evident that the people felt in the presence of friends reunited miraculously upon French soil. It is the people who have assured the triumph of our cause; who have completed our electoral endea-



Jules Grévy.

vours, who have intimated to the dreamers of a coup d'état both their impotence and their dismissal. . . . I can now defy the servility and the harshness of our judges—I am sure of the morrow whenever I desire it. I am therefore overwhelmed by the kindness of Destiny—yesterday came joy of heart, today national acknowledgment. But what shields me from disillusionment is the thought that whatever may be the ebb and flow of popularity, our love remains unalterable and enduring."

Why, in this day of triumph, this introspection, these thoughts of refuge and retreat amid the songs of victory? What dagger point had grazed the victor?

From the day of M. Thiers' funeral until the day of the elections, the life of the country can be compared to the puffing of two locomotives hurled on one line against each other. A moving drama,

The reduced to coldness of appearance once its Electoral campaign and doctrines will outlive what has been looked on as a *dénouement*, and both will resume, after the catastrophe, their course towards a definite goal.

On the part of the Government, official pressure was exerted to the verge of irritation, circulars were multiplied, money scattered, official zeal stimulated, public opinion biassed, the Marshal's name used and abused.

There was considerable difficulty in drawing up the list of official candidates. For 531 seats were 490 candidates of the *Affiche Blanche*, among whom were 240 Bonapartists, 125 Monarchists, 98 Legitimists and 27 Orleanists.

Between the 9th and the 16th September, the President, accompanied by MM. Fourtou and Caillaux, travelled through the south-western dis-

tricts, Bordeaux being their chief goal. The reception accorded to the Marshal must have opened the eyes of the most pronounced optimist. M. de Blowitz thus describes it:—

The drive through the town of Bordeaux was a veritable torture for this brave and loyal soldier. The howling mob continually pressed some new crown of thorns upon his brow. The street urchins, suspended from the lamp-posts, literally dropped into the carriage, and yelled into his face their ceaseless "Vive la République!" The Marshal, red with anger, brushed them aside with the painful yet ludicrous gesture of a man who drives off gnats,—then with tightly-pressed lips would wipe his brow and turn aside his eyes from the implacable and roaring mob.

Other journeys, however, especially to Angoulême and Poitiers, were more auspicious. The Duc Decazes writes to the Duc de Broglie:—

The two currents met and swelled at Bordeaux, without however producing untoward incidents. It was strikingly evident to all reasonable minds that the personal presence and popularity of the Marshal did much to moderate conflicting feelings, just as the wisdom of his policy restrains and moderates the feelings of the nation.

The diplomatist had the art of presenting unpalatable truths.

The campaign begun had to be carried out in full. Hardly was he back in Paris on September 19, when the Marshal addressed to the nation a manifesto calculated to "dissipate all doubts":—

Making use of my constitutional privilege, and on the advice of the Senate, I have dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. You have been told that I desired to overthrow the Republic; you will, however, not believe this. The constitution has been confided to my keeping, and I will see to it that it is respected. . . . Hostile elections would aggravate the conflict between the public powers, would hinder business and support agitation. . . . As for myself, my duty increases with the danger. I shall never become the instrument of Radicalism, nor shall I abandon the

post in which the constitution has placed me. With the support of the Senate, I shall remain to defend conservative interests and to protect with energy all loyal functionaries. . . .

The excellent Marshal had vastly much to do!

M. de Meaux says that it was M. de Fourtou who drew up the manifesto, but that it was unanimously accepted by the Council. Admiral Gicquel des Touches alone had criticised—"There is but one name missing—that of God!"

The manifesto was dispatched by post to every voter.

On the same day, September 19, the Duc de Broglie inserted a notice in the *Journal Officiel* which indicated very strict measures to be taken by the *procureurs généraux* during the electioneering period, while on September 22 appeared decrees appointing the elections for October 14 and convoking the two Chambers for November 7.

Then came a new deluge of notices, administrative measures, dispatches, ministerial speeches. The newspapers and newsvendors were marshalled more energetically than ever by M. de Fourtou, who was anxious over abstentions—always numerous—and who wished to lead the voters to the ballot-box like an army to the combat.

The prosecution of Gambetta for the reproduction by the *République Française* of the speech at Lille followed in due course. M. Gambetta was summoned to appear, on the 31st, before the Juge d'Instruction. Cries of "Vive Gambetta!" were raised by the mob, and the prosecution was submerged among the intricacies of procedure.

Even the calmest became exasperated by annoyances. The *Gazette de France* wrote: "It is a mistake to believe that these pinpricks and pettinesses

will have effect upon the masses. Intrigues and bravado were brought into fashion by the Empire."

The Journal des Débats took up the cudgels more vigorously than ever. M. de Montalivet compared 1877 to 1830. A dispatch addressed on September 13th, by the Minister of the Interior to the prefects and sub-prefects, declared that the President of the Chamber advised all Republicans to come to an agreement with the Marshal. And M. Jules Grévy, so awkwardly placed, replied by a letter to La France: "Permit me to assert, through the medium of your columns, that the attitude and language attributed to me by this dispatch constitute a calumny."

Embarassment caused
by the clergy was a difficult question for the
Clergy Ministry. With more ardour than was
quite desired by their champions, the clergy had
plunged into the fray.

The episcopal letters from the Archbishops of Bourges and Chambéry, the Bishops of Séez, Arras, Angoulême, etc., urged the voters to the ballot-box. "The faithful dare not hesitate," wrote the Archbishop of Bourges, "they have no sight to stand aside from this decisive conflict."

The Government was alarmed at so much zeal. On October 3rd, M. Brunet telegraphed to the Prefects:—

With excellent intentions, but which will, however, have a contrary effect to what they imagine, a certain number of prelates have appointed general prayers for the forthcoming elections and have given all publicity to their pastoral letters. request you to go to see the Bishop in your department, and to tell him that the Government requests from him and through him the most complete silence. Any other attitude would be imprudent and harmful.

A further notice was issued on the 6th:—

Request the Bishop in each diocese to urge the clergy to say nothing in the pulpit with regard to the elections; the Government attaches the greatest importance to these injunctions."

As Mgr. Pie crudely expressed it: "The Conservatives look on clericalism as their stumbling-block."

The Duc Decazes, in a more exposed situation, was vigilant and distrustful, perturbed over the slightest rumour from Rome. The Pope had remarked to some French Catholics—ex-officers presented to him by General Kanzler: "Certain Governments will not show friendship to the Pope for fear of being termed clerical."

Just when the Press became most aggressive, after the journey of Crispi to Prussia, the Minister for the Interior and the President of the Council addressed numerous notices upon the subject to the prefects and the Procureurs-Généraux. (October 5th, 6th, IIth, I2th):—

It is desired to spread a report as to an alliance, offensive and defensive, concluded or meditated, between Germany and Italy against France, and to represent a war against these powers as a possible consequence of elections favourable to governmental candidates. The Government most formally repudiates these rumours; all attempts at promoting them under whatsoever form will be immediately prosecuted as false reports, and you may take vigorous measure against their authors.

Then followed wholesale arrests of newsvendors, a tearing down of notices, and seizure of papers. . . .

By these means, the Ministry, satisfied with the half silence, counted on success. It believed in the reports of the prefects. But has a prefect ever prophesied defeat? Has a Government ever mistrusted prefectorial optimism? "Information received from every part of France grows more and

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more favourable to the Conservative cause,"—so telegraphed the Minister of the Interior. "In over 300 districts the Marshal's candidates were sure of victory. And the money market was

rising. . . ."

M. de Meaux in his Souvenirs Politiques, wrote: "The confidence of Fourtou, shaken from time to time, increased as the decisive day drew near. . . . On October 10th, four days before the balloting, he prognosticated the gain of over a hundred seats. The Duc de Broglie, less confident of success, remarked: "You are a good gambler." And he added: "The silence of the nation alarms me."

However, had not the Minister for the Interior done all that he could do? From the first of October onwards, the Journal Officiel published almost daily lists of nominations for the Légion d'Honneur in favour of prefects, mayors and Government candidates. The reverse of the medal is no less important. During the work of the session, 613 municipal councils were dissolved; 1,743 municipalities and 1,334 adjuncts were revoked; 334 clubs, unions and Masonic lodges were broken up; 2,067 saloons closed; 4,779 officials displaced; 1,385 revoked; 72 pamphlets and sketches seized; 421 prosecutions for Press offences, 849 for sale offences, 216 for shop infringements; 170 suspensions for seditious cries. The prosecutions amounted to 1,034,353 francs in fines and costs, and to 46 years 3 months 16 days in prison sentences. It was a veritable battlefield,—and also a hunting party. M. Bernard Lavergne's report declared that the electioneering expenses of the Government amounted to 8,009,105 francs, not counting the expenses of the Right committees, which, according to the

Gaulois, had accumulated to more than two millions since July!

Among the Lefts there was equal activity, but it was less nervous and more cordial. The Republicans thoroughly understanding each other, there was in the silence noted by the Duc de Broglie a confidence, vivacity and good humour that no violence could impair; an exclamation of anger was the utmost that was drawn from all attacks. M. de Marcère commented: "Never has the nation been more calm and yet more passionately animated." It was like a second youth for those men, interrupted in the ungrateful labour of political dissensions.

"I remarked from the first an elasticity, a generous enthusiasm, a disinterested devotion to the public welfare that carried me away in the delight of a strenuous life devoted to the service of the nation."

If a thoughtful man, an ex-Minister, could thus express himself, it can well be imagined what the time signified for young enthusiastic spirits, for the France of the Future, seizing the opportunity to sweep from the path the old staff responsible for a gloomy Past. The volunteers of Valmy did not advance more gaily to the cannonade.

Around the Marshal, as in the last days of the Empire, stood the Rouhers, the Cassagnacs, the Lachauds, the Gavinis, the Mouchezs, the Janvier de la Mottes, the Pascals, the Haussmans, the Maupas, and amongst them the ghosts of past régimes, the Broglies, the Depeyres—all the unpopular!

Despite apparent harmony, the "Conservative party" was hopelessly divided. The Republicans, on the contrary, were united. At the command

of the 363, all competition ceased. Alone in Paris M. Bonnet-Duverdier attempted an act of insubordination, which was speedily repressed. Even in the districts of the 156 deputies from the Right, there were, with six exceptions, but one Republican candidate.

The community of ideas then established between men had a lasting influence on the future of the Republic. Amidst these stormy days was born the policy of "concentration," which was to prove so often a safeguard in hours of danger.

The moderates were excited, the violent appeased, men grew accustomed to depend upon each other. Some learnt to appreciate help, others kind doings. others abnegation. All kept step and marched shoulder to shoulder. Defection was long considered the worst of crimes. And for this short period a rare feeling entered into politics—that of cordiality. It might be said that the soul of Gambetta, with its warmth and geniality, ruled this hour unique in the history of Republicanism and France.

The posthumous manifesto of M. Thiers, published broadcast by the Republicans, reassured the Moderates. This voice from the dead crying to the nation: "A monarchy is impossible. Create the Republic! National sovereignty, Republicanism, liberty, legality!" was the consent of the Past to the formulas of the Future. An agreement called for pride, which welded together all the links of a chain, and which gave the young Republic something of the authority of tradition.

Individual manifestations were rare. There were but few electoral meetings and these were peaceable and quiet. All the programmes could be sum-

marised in the cry of "Vive la République!" and in the formula "Re-election of the 363!" But there was a ceaseless propaganda, meetings in the smallest villages between the candidates and their supporters, low-spoken councils, firm promises, and hearty hand-shakings.

In Paris, M. Louis Blanc addressed the electors of the I. Arrondissement and spoke in praise of M. Thiers. M. Floquet said on October 4th in the XI. Arrondissement: "We await the triumph of our principles, but from the enlightenment of free discussion." On October 5th, Gambetta, in a notice to the voters of the XX. Arrondissement, declared: "The union of all good Frenchmen,—Liberals, Republicans—by conviction or by birth,—artisans, peasants, civilians, will keep us reasonable and render us invincible."

Always the same note of moderation, prudence and reserve. It was well known that the peril lay in the Centre; were defections to be produced there, what triumph for the adversary! The name of Jules Grévy was always on men's lips. He had been given a candidacy in the IX. Arrondissement in place of M. Thiers, Gambetta presiding over the committee which took this decision. In his customary prompt and vigilant fashion he wrote to the man whom others would have looked on as a rival: "You are the most worthy to occupy, at the head of French democracy, the place once filled by M. Thiers."

Without abandoning his constituents in the Jura, M. Grévy accepted the nomination in Paris. In his manifesto he describes the two camps: "On the one hand all the enemies of the Republic, supported by a Republican Government; on the other all the Republicans attacked by the Government

of the Republic. Such was the situation of 1849, from whence arose the Empire!"

The Left groups within the Senate came to the rallying point, the veterans hastened round the flag. They protested against the abuse made in the Marshal's manifesto of the authority of the Senate. No one was qualified to engage the votes of the High Assembly. "In all free states the casting vote belongs to the nation and when you have spoken your word will be obeyed" (October 9th). In the hall of the American Circus, Place du Château d'Eau, Gambetta, before an audience of 7,000 electors, made his supreme effort. He clearly propounded the eventual candidacy of Jules Grévy for the Presidency of the Republic.

This man, so well qualified by his disposition, so justly respected for his straightforward career, his conscientious adherence to duty,—this man, who can be presented on the one hand as a model of wisdom and forethought, on the other as a model of faithfulness and honour . . . Express your rights by deeds!—make use of your success by calling this man to the first office of the nation!

Then, with a side-glance on himself—and more poignant for those who understood:—

I have been accused of personal ambition. I wish to assert that I remain in the ranks with no desire to rise above the men who have devoted their lives to the service of our cause. I claim but one title—that of an impassioned supporter of democracy.

There were some carping critics who rejoiced over this half-retreat, over the substitution of the austere Franc-Comtoisian for the detested tribune. They had not taken the measure of the two souls.

The rest of the speech was one long appeal for union, a note of calmness and of confidence, a song of victory in advance. "We have fought to the

war cry of 'Clericalism is the enemy.' We shall sing to-morrow—'Clericalism is defeated.'"

The Government did not allow its opponents the last word. On October 9th, just as Gambetta was holding the public meeting at the Château d'Eau, the Duc de Broglie was addressing the delegates of the Conservative committees at M. Rolland Gosselin's. A full explanation had been awaited of the reasons of May 16th, but matters had become so complicated and diminished that the president of the last Conservative Government was reduced to invective for his closing words. The speech consisted of reproaches aimed at Jules Grévy and Gambetta.

Not M. Gambetta, but another adversary has been raised against the Marshal. M. Thiers is succeeded by M. Grévy—doubtless an honourable name, but one that is hardly redoubtable—its bearer seems himself surprised at the halo by which it is sought to surround it. We believe, therefore, that M. Grévy will but partially lend himself to a rôle which consists in masking the guidance of Gambetta.

This was placing the thumb on a wound that was never to be closed again. Was this irony perhaps skilful? In truth, however, the political effort which had shaken both France and Europe had the sole object of ousting from power a man, epitomised in one word by the Duke as the *Heir*.

Another manifesto was demanded from festo of the Marshal. It was published on October Marshal 12th, and it was desired that the voter should find it affixed to every wall on his way to the ballot-box.

Frenchmen! No! The Republican constitution is not in danger! The Government, respectful as it is towards religion, does not bow to so-called clerical influence, and nothing will induce it to embark upon a policy which may compromise the peace.

You are threatened with no manner of return to the abuses of the past. The struggle lies between order and disorder. Rally to my appeal, and I—placed by the Constitution in a post which duty forbids me to forsake—will answer for order and for peace.

Never had the Ministry appeared more confident than during the last three days before the battle.

M. Gambetta was sentenced, on October 12th. to three months' imprisonment and a fine of 4,000 francs for his speech at Lille, and great was the jubilation over this triumph, which was telegraphed to all the prefects. M. Caillaux, Minister of Finance, announced by telegram that the Budget for 1878 would be twenty-one millions to the good, and that by easy means the duties on patents and on petite vitesse could be reduced, also the postal and telegraphic rates. "The money market rises," this is decidedly the political thermometer. the 13th came another telegram: "Information received from every part of France is excellent; a great victory for the Government is assured." The remark was repeated to satiety. "Information as to the electoral outlook establishes more definitely than ever the prospect of certain success for the Hostile papers evinced discourage-Government. ment, and the Indépendance Belge itself recognised that the Radicals would lose many seats."

It was then that the Duc de Broglie remarked to M. de Fourtou: "You are a good gambler!"

IV

Result of the Elections Winisters were assembled in the Place Beauvau at the house of their colleague of the Interior. The elections had proceeded amidst the utmost calm. Telegrams announcing the result

of the balloting came in slowly at first, then in increasing numbers. Paris had given enormous majorities to the greater number of the Republican candidates, as also the large centres; this had been foreseen.

The suspense was prolonged for some the Governhours; the "Conservatives" were gaining seats, and several successes maintained the illusion. Little by little, however, hope faded away. Then the stern fact appeared—the Government was defeated. The position of the Republican party had never been seriously injured.

Towards the passing of the night—a night of weariness and exhaustion after so great an effort—the defeat became certain, and the last telegrams accumulated in disorderly piles upon the Ministerial desk before the pale, discouraged faces of the ten responsible men—men who had compromised and lost a System and a Past.

A dark and rainy October night annihilated the hopes which had blossomed in May. Men of action rarely have the faculty of foreseeing defeat. Gamblers who take all risks fairly into account, and generals who arrange for retreat are very rare. The optimism of the bold makes their fall the more severe. "Towards the dawn of day, the results of all the elections became known," said M. de Meaux, "the fact had to be faced that we had gained only forty seats and that we had no hope of more than fifty. The new Chamber was to confront us with a majority of over three hundred against a minority of two hundred."

M. de Fourtou was nervous, overwhelmed. He attempted to explain, but explanations always mean a sense of error. The Duc de Broglie, seated

before a table, pointed coldly to evidences. M. de Fourtou suddenly exclaimed: "All is over. I have only to retire. I shall send in my resignation to the Marshal, and shall leave Paris this evening. I have need of rest."

The Duc de Broglie rose and approached the Minister for the Interior. "Pardon, my dear colleague," he said drily, "others also have need of rest. We have undertaken a task and failed. Neither I nor you dare evade responsibility. The work is hard and painful, as I know; you must carry it out to the end." This was said in a cold dry manner which allowed of no reply. M. de Fourtou bowed.

It was decided that the Cabinet should face the Chamber and bear the attack. This time it was the Duc de Broglie who showed himself the born gambler.

Instructions were sent out to the prefects for softening the defeat and re-awakening courage.

The elections covered a total of 533 seats. The first polling was as follows: 315 Republicans elected, of which 288 belonged to the 363; 199 Conservatives elected, of which 132 were re-elections, and 67 new candidates; 15 ballotages, and 4 colonial elections, the results of these still unknown. Therefore, few ballotages—a victory and a defeat. The Cabinet could but count some forty seats gained from the Republican side—how little for such an effort! Amongst the non-elected deputies of the Right were the Duc Decazes, Viscount d'Haussonville, Count Bernard d'Harcourt, M. Raoul Duval, M. de Tocqueville, M. Tristan Lambert. Amongst the defeated Republicans were M. Devoucoux, by the Prince d'Arenberg; M. Paul de Rémusat; M.

Beaussire, of the Left Centre; MM. Naquet, Saint-Martin, Gent, deputies from Valcluse. At Lyons, M. Francisque Ordinaire was replaced by M. Bonnet-Duverdier. Amongst the new-elected, MM. Boissy d'Anglas, Jules Develle, Ménard-Dorian and Goblet, who had not been re-nominated in 1876. The elected of the Right resolved themselves into 99 Legitimists, 44 Bonapartists, 56 Monarchists and Orleanists. The Bonapartists retained their positions; the Legitimist party had especially benefited from the gain of the Conservatives.

The Fourteenth of October had this particular bitterness, that since all had been staked upon this card, all had been lost at one blow; none but gloomy morrows could be looked for.

From Monday, October 15th, the electors had to be convoked for November 4th for the second polling with the Conseils Généraux and the Conseils d'Arrondissement. Then were to come the municipal elections, to take place on December 18th. They would prove of great significance as to the partial renewing of the Senate. And—success increasing of itself—the laurels of the Conservative party would infallibly fade and die.

Political defeat nowadays is all the more painful to the vanquished in that it necessitates the drinking of the cup drop by drop. Sharp pin-pricks prolong the agony; the Florentine dagger was sometimes less cruel. A vain hope, sustained by the voluntary illusion of friends, dwells in the heart against all better judgment.

"As soon as the polling results were known we went to the Ministry for the Interior at the Elysée," writes M. de Meaux—the funeral procession wending its way beneath the dawn along the Place

Beauvau and the Rue du Faubourg-Saint-Honoré.
—"The Duc de Broglie declared to the Marshal that the country, though not quite satisfying us as yet, had begun to respond to our appeal by casting off some of our opponents, and that consequently we ought to continue the struggle . . . and, above all, not show ourselves inclined to yield at once."

The Marshal, like M. de Fourton, would have preferred to give in straightway. The Duc de Broglie, however, kept to his opinion, and wished at least for time for reflection. Had his fertile mind conceived some new machination? His advice was followed. On October 17th the Havas agency inserted the following notice:—

Certain Paris newspapers have been mistaken in announcing that the Ministry have given in their resignation to the Marshal. The Ministers have not for a single moment thought of quitting their posts, any more than has the President contemplated separating himself from them. The electoral struggle which commenced on October 14th, and which has given the Conservatives a gain of fifty new seats, will continue on Sunday 28th through the ballot, and on Sunday, November 4th, through the departmental elections as heretofore."

Then to the prefects was telegraphed: "Stocks continue to rise, a definite testimony to the general confidence in the Marshal's government."

The prefects hastened to Paris to see which way the wind was blowing; the Prefect of La Lozère telegraphed to his general secretary: "I have seen the Marshal, the President of the Council and the Minister of the Interior. The Government is not weakened."

There was a great effort to bind the Marshal, who could not conceal his annoyance.

"The Marshal has declared to numerous prefects received by him that he would never abandon

the Conservatives" (telegram of October 20th). . . . "It is untrue that the Marshal has proposed to arrange a new ministerial combination. There is no question of a change of Cabinet, and rumours as to this are of no value whatever" (telegram of October 24th). There was the same insistence from the 20th to the 28th of October.

The fact was that dismay was at the heart of things. Contradictory promises were energetically signed by the Marshal-President; he vowed not to retire and to remain till the end; he swore that he would abandon neither his Ministers nor his functionaries; he vowed that he would never yield and would defend the country "to the last" against Radicalism; but he also promised to respect Republican institutions, and not to have recourse to a coup d'état, and also not to embroil the army in the civil discords.—He read these forced promises in the uneasy eyes of all who approached him. "These are my last Ministers," he said, naming us," affirms M. de Meaux, "and we were led to suppose that he would never seek others in the hostile camp, that he had burnt his boats."

What then? There were some who maintained that an attempt would be made to govern with the majority of the Senate against the majority of the Chamber, that recourse might be made to a new dissolution and new elections. . . . But would the Senate agree? It was endeavoured to accustom both the country and the Senate to the idea: "Letters received from the provinces during the last few days declare that the Conservative Senators are determined to resist Radical ideas. The Conservatives may count upon the President."

During the fortnight's truce that preceded the polling, everyone was prolific of advice. The more compromised among the prefects urged resistance; as also did the Bonapartists. Cardinal de Bonnechose travelled from Rouen to Paris, where he was received by the Marshal, who spoke of resignation or of retirement in 1880. The Cardinal advised a plébiscite, with an appeal to the army. "All means must be employed in order to save the country." The Marshal appeared to listen with confidence and interest. "But what will be the decision, and when will it be known?" wondered the Cardinal on leaving the Elysée (Nov. 2nd). Mgr. Dupanloup, on the contrary, wrote to the Marshal that it was advisable to yield to the times and constitute a Cabinet Dufaure-Marcère with the support of the Left. Which was one to listen to?

The Press was neither unanimous nor reassuring: Conservative opinion was bewildered. The Univers declared itself aghast at the electoral disgrace. The Pays advised a new beginning, but this time "with the right methods." The Détense reminded the Marshal of his engagements, adding that he could not break his promises and sacrifice the many brave men who had followed his standard. There was a disquieting tone about the Soleil. The Soleil, which represented the Comte de Paris and the Right Centre, deplored the crisis which it had neither desired nor advised. "It is necessary," it added, "to accept the decisions of universal suffrage, to abandon the practices of personal government, and to return to constitutional truth. The nation desires the Republic. It is an experience that must be attempted."

And the Moniteur, reflecting the opinions of

certain Ministers, declared that there only remained to submit to the decree of universal suffrage and govern by means of a new Ministry. . . . Defections, calculations, combinations? Something was going on.

The Left lost no time over vain discussions, but affirmed its victory by its coolness and self-control. It admitted no compromise; the dilemma as stated by Gambetta still existed. On October 23rd the Lefts in the Senate addressed a new appeal to the electors in view of the approaching balloting and the departmental elections. These were of importance as significant of the coming elections for the Senate House. "After this new defeat," declared the manifesto, "the Ministry of May 16th have but to hand in their reports." Gambetta spoke at Château-Chinon, October 26th. His words were pacific, very prudent, very moderate; agreeable to the Centres, to the re-allied, to the peasants; to all the Conservative elements. It almost appeared as if he were intimidated by a victory so complete.

The polling took place October 28th for fifteen seats only. The Republicans obtained four of these; the coalition eight; three remained uncertain owing to error in the counting. Altogether, including the Colonial elections, which had proved favourable to the Republicans, the Chamber would count 326 Republicans against 207 deputies of the Right. The Republicans lost 37 seats and maintained a majority of 119.

This twenty-eighth of October was the last date of delay. A definite course had now to be engaged upon.

M. Pouyer- Marshal MacMahon, during his journey Quertier at through L'Eure, had been struck by a speech from an old Minister of M. Thiers,

M. Pouyer Quertier. Desirous of seeing him again, he had him summoned to Paris by a telegram from M. de Fourtou and had a long interview with him. After the interview, however—October 30th—in which the offer of constituting a Ministry appears to have been declined, the Cabinet announced that it would remain in office until November 5th.

It was said that a transactional combination would be formed under the auspices of the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, whose attitude had been very reserved during the crisis. On November 2nd M. Welche, Prefect for the North, was summoned to Paris, and was to enter the next combination as Minister for the Interior. The Duc Decazes, however, formally declined to retain the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and affirmed the necessity for a complete re-adjustment. The confusion was extreme.

The Duc de Broglie held firm. A certain number of Senators were urgently summoned to Paris. "The Marshal," he told them, "will remain in the post of honour assigned to him by the National Assembly, and when the hour comes for him to leave it, he will not suffer Radicalism to take his place. Such an event would be the ruin of the country, and the Marshal desires the welfare of his nation."

Might it not be thought that disaster still menaced? The Lefts began to show astonishment. "No re-varnishing!" exclaimed the Journal des Débats. And the République Française denied the Senate the right of interference with the formation of the Ministry. On November 2nd M. de Fourtou telegraphed to the prefects: "The Marshal can be depended on not to abandon either the post which France has given him or the Conservative cause."

In Paris there was open discussion as to whether the help of the Chamber for elaboration of the Budget could not be dispensed with, and the example of Prussia between the years 1862 and 1866 was quoted.

On November 4th the elections took Departplace in the Conseils Généraux and the Conseils d'Arrondissement. The Republicans gained 113 seats and a majority in 14 new departments. The Duc de Broglie, Vice-President of the Conseil Général, was defeated in L'Eure by a Republican, as well as five of his friends. The day succeeding the elections, November 5th, M. Doncieux, Prefect for the Loire, telegraphed to M. de "The Radical Terror is rampant and followed by the masses; help is only to be found in energetic action." On November 6th, the Marshal received a delegation from the Right in the Senate promising him "support in the defence of the country." He declared that his only policy would be Conservative.

The Left became uneasy; was their sang-froid ever put to the test, did the fate of the Republic ever hang in the balance, it was at this moment. Till then there had been confidence in the strength of legal weapons, and faith in the pacific issue of the crisis. The excitement of the elections had absorbed both parties and leaders. Suddenly what had hitherto been obscure became apparent. The Ministry could reckon upon the army, and upon an admirably enthusiastic administration; the elections, on the whole, had not altogether repudiated the campaign of May 16th, since the Republican party had appreciably suffered, and had lost over forty seats. The 363, who were to return reinforced VOL. IV. 193

to 400, had dwindled down to 315. There were in France 3,639,000 voters belonging to the more affluent classes—village leaders, farmers, tradesmen,—rather timid folk, yet capable and influential, who had resolutely seconded the Marshal's effort. The Duc de Broglie kept silence—could he be depended on? was he the man to carry on the campaign to the uttermost, to plan out new manœuvres with the Marshal and the majority in the Senate House, by which the Government, with all its resources at command, could do desperate battle?

The Republican leaders were anxious. The more impressionable lost time in long debates. From the provinces active members of committees came up to Paris to find out what was being done. The worst possibilities were rapidly reviewed. It was deemed advisable to strengthen party organization. At a meeting of the Lefts, November 6th, there

The Com- was instituted the Committee of the Eighteen to act as a sort of council of war, of the Eighteen, possibly permanent. It was composed as follows: For the Left Centre, MM. de Marcère, Germain Casse, H. de Choiseul. Léon Renault and Bethmont. For the Republican Left, MM. Jules Ferry, A. Grévy, Tirard and A. Piroust. For the Republican Union: MM. Gambetta, Brisson, Floquet, Lepère and Goblet. For the Extreme Left: MM. Louis Blanc, Lockroy, Madier Montjau and Clemenceau. The Committee met almost daily at M. Léon Renault's and enjoyed full powers. It was decided, on the advice of M. de Marcère, to pass no serious resolution without consulting M. Jules Grévy. In this Committee, Gambetta met his peers. He could not get a pro-

posal accepted which implied the general invalidation of deputies elected with *l'affiche blanche*. It was also understood that the Lefts should abstain from private interviews with the Marshal. Almost insensibly the policy of compromise was re-adopted. On November 7th, the day of the re-assembly of the Chambers, the *Journal Officiel* published the following notice:—

At the request of the President of the Republic, the Ministers have reconsidered their resignations. They have, however, insisted that it shall be well understood that their retainment of office in no wise affects the ultimate decisions of the chief of the State.

War therefore was declared! Such at least was the general impression.

On the evening of the 6th, the following telegram was despatched to the prefects from the Ministry for the Interior: "Request the Conservative senators of your department to start for Paris with the least possible delay; this evening if feasible."

It was, in fact, the majority in the Senate that proved the pivot of affairs. With it all could be attempted; without it, nothing was possible. On Thursday, the 8th, while the Chambers were assembled, there was a debate of the Rights within the Senate-house. A friend of the Cabinet of the proposed a question as to the resolution Senate.

of the proposed a question as to the resolution affirming the confidence of the Senate in the Marshal and his Ministry. Here, however, arose opposition. The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier pointed out the unconstitutional character of the motion in not acknowledging the irresponsibility of the President.

MM. Bocher and Lambert de Saint-Croix declared themselves unprepared to follow the Ministry in

the path of resistance. This attitude, much like that of the Duc Decazes, prepared by articles in the *Moniteur* and *Soleil*, makes the case very evident; the Comte de Paris and the Duc d'Aumale had never been favourable to the doings of May 16th; they had watched them with some indifference and some hostility, and this attitude was now revealed. And what was to be done without them?

The idea of a formal interpellation was abandoned; hopes being entertained from the movements of the groups near the Marshal. M. de Fourtou, once more interested in the game, telegraphed to the prefects: "At the close of a deliberation between representatives of all the Conservative groups in the Senate the delegates go this evening to the Marshal's in order to assure him of the support of this assembly in maintaining a Conservative policy."

The fever was increasing. The men with plans, the men with news, the men with secrets, roamed in every corridor and corner. The heavy yet tense atmosphere, indicative of tempest, accompanied the parliamentary trains between Paris and Versailles. Every face was drawn and anxious; careers were at stake and character revealed itself. "The country deputies are arriving in an exasperated frame of mind," writes M. Clamageran. In Paris itself disturbances were feared. The Prefect of Police conferred with the military governor of Paris and arranged for direct telegraphic communication with the military staff.

Re-assembly A sitting of the Senate took place at of the two o'clock, with a short and chilly speech from the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier. The Chamber met at half-past two with the cus-

tomary formalities. M. Jules Grévy was elected temporary president by 290 votes out of 461. There were 170 bulletins blancs. Then came the question of the validations, with restriction, however, as to the affiche blanche.

On Friday, the 9th, the number of validations sufficed to allow M. Grévy to request of the Chamber its definite constitution. The following day, M. Jules Grévy was elected president by 299 votes out of 460; there were 159 white bulletins. M. Grévy remarked: "I am convinced that the Chamber will fulfil its mission by moderation and firmness, influenced also by the admirable good sense and sovereign will of the country that is with it."

These few words meant a great deal. Now came the clash of arms.

On Monday, November 12th, there was a sitting of the Chamber. The Duc de Broglie and his colleagues were on the Ministerial bench.

M. Albert Grévy, in the name of the Committee of Eighteen, proposed the formation of a commission of inquiry, to consist of thirty-three members, "in order to examine the acts which, since May 16th, have exercised illegal pressure on the electors."

M. Grévy urged speed in the matter. The Duc de Broglie agreed with this proposal, but combated its main principle. "We do not fear the light. The strange constitutional doctrine will then be revealed, by means of which one of the three powers treats the other two as rebels."

A prompt arrangement was voted for. The more prudent among the Lefts saw in this procedure a dérivatif. They sought to gain time and to facilitate intermediation. The Havas agency, however, again announced the Marshal's intention to support the Ministry of May 16th.

November 13th saw a debate on the motion from the Committee of Eighteen. M. Léon Renault, in the name of the Moderates, supported the proposal for an inquiry. With great subtlety he criticised the 16th of May:—

What results have you obtained? In what position have you placed "the legal soldier," as you term the Marshal? You have so arranged things for him that "legal paths "crumble beneath his feet. What about the Senate? You claim its hearing by announcing that you intend to ask for a second dissolution. What about the great social interests that you are bound to protect? Is the administration more respected? Has the magistracy any higher position? . . . There is in France to-day no conservative interest that is not threatened and compromised by and through the Ministry.

The well-founded reproach of a former partisan was crushing in its effect. The gulf yawned deep, and distant consequences appeared. The calm, eloquent and moderate speech was the first moan made by the France of tradition from the depths of the abyss into which she had been so carelessly plunged.

After this impact with the Chamber, the Cabinet at last accepted defeat. On returning to the Ministry that evening, M. de Fourtou telegraphed to the prefects: "Let there be no further suspensions of mayors or councillors."

The following day, M. de Fourtou replied to M. Léon Renault. It was a vain plea for a lost cause, a last effort to keep back the Marshal.

What the elections have made apparent is the almost unanimous desire of the nation for the maintenance of a Government of peace, order and stability . . . beneath the shelter of a glorious name which is, now more than ever, the safeguard of its interests and future . . . in the post in which the Constitution has placed him—where he now is and where he will remain.

M. de Fourtou descended from a tribune on which be had once believed himself the instrument of Destiny.

M. Jules Ferry replied—a moderate man but a violent speaker. His speech was aggressive; he held the Ministry responsible for the threat of a coup d'état. "We do not fear it; the Republican party is within its rights in acting aggressively and in demanding full explanations."

Then came the Duc de Broglie, impatiently awaited. He was at this moment at the height of his career, yet few were ever more unpopular. The Lefts, hot from the fight, flung themselves upon the adversary who had nearly robbed them of their victory and still defied them with his inscrutable eyes. The Rights inwardly turned against the haughty, enigmatical leader, who had led them into a campaign of which he had not explained the object, and into a defeat which left him only on his feet. The Duke still cloaked himself in his obscure designs, just as the antique hero, before dying, veiled his face with the hem of his mantle. He was one of those orators to whom speech has been granted for the purpose of concealing his thoughts. Addressing himself to M. Jules Ferry: "More calm is necessary," he said, "for one who claims to be the organ of a Government, and for the prosecution on which you have embarked."

The tone of cold disdain permeated all his speech, any animation of manner was caused by a desire to attack:—

"I oppose the inquiry," he said, "not because I fear it, but because I do not acknowledge you as judges, and because I fear for my country that you may enter on the era of proscription which has dishonoured so many of your predecessors. I invite

new Committees of Public Safety to reflect well as to this consequence. I further oppose the inquiry because I am responsible for public order, and because the inquiry cannot fail to divide France into two camps, prosecutors and suspected."

The "I am responsible for public order" is not the expression of a defeated Minister.

He did not plead guilty. He haughtily claimed the responsibility and honour of the struggle; he brought a summons against his adversaries, the eternal suit of Radicalism.

When these last defenders of Conservatism were about to disappear, they must be allowed, at least, the opportunity to explain to History their previsions and their fears, their justification or excuse.

The Republic is Radicalism and Radicalism means social overthrow, there is no milder term. This explains "the scandal" of our alliances. It is perfectly natural that we should leave the political question for the social defence which we consider imperative, and that you should leave the social question for the defence of the Republic which you consider menaced. Yet the Republic, in herself, is no instrument of salvation. She can only redeem herself in so far as she redeems the social structure. This explains the Marshal's attitude. He has been, in politics, conciliatory and tolerant. When, however, the social structure was brought into the case, he pulled the reins and performed the action of May 16th. This action was essentially personal. For what has been done since, we take entire responsibility; the first rests with him alone. For all the rest we take away any kind of responsibility; that towards history; that towards the public powers; we take the penal responsibility as well. if needs must be, since you desire to frighten us with it. We take it on ourselves, whatever be the meaning of the enigmatical words of your thinkers, whatever be the meaning of the bold among you, whosoever they may be.

The second part of the speech refutes the terrible accusation of the adversaries of the Cabinet, that May 16th was to mean a war.

To intimidate the foreigner as to the attitude of France, then to intimidate France by the menace of the foreigner: such was the whole performance. . . . I feel the disgrace of it for my country.

Gambetta here interrupted: "Sir, you are insulting France!"

The speaker terminated :-

You have succeeded in influencing the masses, alarmed for their security and family interests. At this price, you have obtained your imperfect triumphs. I do not know whether this is what was called the other day the emancipation and virility of universal suffrage, I only know that there are 3,600,000 Frenchmen who have not yielded to this seduction, and who are glad to find some still in power who, like themselves, have stood aloof and who remain to protect them from the despotism of a new Convention. And now, make, or do not make, your inquiry. Summon, or do not summon, your prejudiced witnesses. As a Government we protest in the name of the law; as citizens we appeal to the equity of History and the justice of the land.

This was incomparable dialectic, lofty and caustic speaking, one of the finest speeches of this great parliamentary epoch. It describes the speaker, while it veils from us his thoughts, he is the desperate defender of a class lost by its egoism and its faults; he is the ingenious worker of an impossible restoration; he is the tenacious champion of an unhappy cause; it was the last and valiant effort of a falling athlete.

M. Gambetta needed all his thunders to efface the impression made by these penetrating words. There was also needed the apprehension of another drama, developing while the first was still unfinished. Hardly had Gambetta stood triumphant when he became the accused. The skilfulness, one might say the astuteness, of the Due de Broglie contrived to link the fate of the Republic with that of Radicalism, and, by ignoring degrees, to pit the men of the day

against those of the morrow. He had found out the weak spot. M. Gambetta, again attempting attack, found himself obliged to be on the defensive.

The minority plays off against the nation a phantom of its own raising as to social danger, radical and socialistic teachings, chimerical hypotheses, detailed only in subsidised newspapers and by writers under the patronage of the Minister for the Interior. . . . Yes, we indeed have differing views of French society! I do not desire to enter into class distinctions, but you, Duke, are not a man of the day; you, an aristocrat, remain hostile to democracy; with lordly elegance you have brought here your carefully prepared epigrams, but you have not told us how you became executor of the Bonapartist testament, how your effort and the policy of the Duc de Broglie have become reduced to seeking a name among the more skilful electoral operators of the fallen Empire.

This, indeed, was the weak spot. For what should be the object of such strife if it were not the *coup* d'état and an Imperial restoration?

M. Gambetta also defended himself; he attempted to unveil the dangerous tactics that already tried to isolate him from his party and reproached him with democratic suspicion as hoping for the dictature:

And do you think it really true and honest, this attack upon me posted up on every wall in every commune—representing me as antagonistic to the Marshal, classifying under alternative epithets official candidates and Republican candidates, some as adherents of the Marshal, the others of Gambetta? Gentlemen, the thought is far from me to make a personal use of the notoriety into which declared enemies have forced me. No, indeed, such a plebiscite cannot be made. I claim neither the honour nor the indignity! A Republican before all things I serve my party not to subject or to compromise it, but, through my strength, my work, my mind, to bring its ideas, its aspirations, and its rights into their true dominion.

The Lefts rose as one man to applaud these words—only too rapidly forgotten.

In truth the epoch that heard such orators was a noble time and mother of great things. The same

Italian origin and some magnetic feeling of mutual esteem subconsciously united the two opponents. But the necessities of the time imposed hostility upon them; each represented irreconcilable interests. Water must flow and history advance.

The inquiry was voted. On the whole, however, explanations had been given and the matter had been buried. The commission of thirty-three members had nominated, on the 16th, M. Albert Grévy as president. The star of the Grévys was high above the horizon.

The following day M. Tirard proposed the nomination of the Budget commission. This was done on the 20th, and was identical with that named by the Chamber before dissolution. M. Gambetta again presided. "The commission will wait to report the budgets, which are ready. It remains to be seen what the Government owes the country."

Fresh appeal The Ministry still held their ground.

to the What was their object? Did they still
Senate. cherish hope, either of the Senate or of the
Marshal? One or the other would have to strike the
last blow. November 16th saw a meeting of the
Ministry.

The Duc de Broglie spoke against recognition of the resolution; it would mean that the Marshal had submitted. "A fresh appeal to the Senate is desirable, particularly to the constitutional groups, in order to discover under what conditions and in what manner it will support the Marshal and oppose the majority in the Chamber."

"And suppose the Senate does not respond to this appeal; suppose it refuse to act; what would you then do?" suddenly inquired the Duc Decazes of the Marshal. "Well, then, I should remain," replied

the President. This was sufficient. The Ministry of May 16th received their dismissal. M. de Meaux, relating the incident, adds: "These words astonished us. The repudiation conveyed alarmed us, not for him, but for the country; the Marshal was going to repudiate his former line of conduct." M. de Meaux is severe. The Marshal simply reverted to his constitutional position.

But this was not yet enough! The meeting decided to appear before the Senate and demand the refusal of the inquiry," as a first step in the path of resistance."

In the Senate, therefore, the friends of the Cabinet brought forward a series of questions as to the resolution passed by the Chamber entailing a parliamentary inquiry. "It is not constitutional," declared MM. Jules Simon and Dufaure. The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, the President, said:—

If by the rather vague terms of the interpellation it is desired to criticise to some extent the action of the Chamber of Deputies, the President would consider it his duty to oppose such questioning. . . . As the Senate of the country, you are not, gentlemen, however, the executors of the constitutional agreement.

Even admitting, which for my own part I do not, that the Chamber has exceeded its powers, I ask you where in the Constitution you can point to your right to summon it to your bar and judge its actions. There is but one legal way of doing this, one procedure which has been provided for in the Constitution—this is—a request for dissolution.

The Duke had planted himself against the wall.

The Duc de Broglie, amid laughter from the Left, accepted the interpellation, on the terms by which it was posed by the President. This meant that it would be risking too much to demand another dissolution; the two Dukes were at cross purposes. A debate was arranged for on the Monday; it would,

however, be but a matter of formality, an act of courtesy between associates at variance.

The discussion proved a vain thing; it was already known that the Ministry had Broglie Cabinet the next day. M. Laboulaye gave an interpretation of the Constitution which harmonised with the views of the President. M. Dufaure was vigorously applauded. This veteran became again the man of the future: he proposed the ordre du jour pure and simple. The Government did not intervene; defunct already, it presided at its own funeral honours. The Duc de Broglie spoke but a few words, affirming the promise made by the Cabinet.

The Senate, by a large majority, passed the resolution accepted by the Government—this was

dropping a flower on the tomb.

On November 20th, the *Journal Officiel* published the following notice: "The Ministers have offered their resignations to the President of the Republic, who has accepted them. They will remain to direct affairs until the nomination of their successors."

Surely now all was over? No, it was not finished vet!

V

Temporary On Saturday, the 12th, Marshal Mac-Ministry Mahon had himself telegraphed to General de Rochebouët, then in command of the 18th Corps at Bordeaux: "I want to see you as soon as possible. Start for Paris at seven o'clock to-morrow, and be at the Elysée at half-past five in the afternoon."

The telegram did not surprise the General, for on the Sunday morning he telegraphed to General Ducrot at Bourges: "I am summoned to Paris by Marshal MacMahon. You can imagine my feelings

about the proposal that may possibly be made to me. I shall be in Paris this evening."

General Ducrot replied: "Under present circumstances you cannot refuse. Count on my entire support."

Marshal MacMahon received General de Rochebouët: "I have named you as Minister for War and President of the Council."

"But you know that I am no politician, and that this position requires a good orator."

"No, the present Cabinet is merely a temporary matter—to look after the country until things are settled. I have nominated you and count on you."

"Then I accept," replied the General.

On Saturday, November 24th, the *Journal Officiel* published the names of the new Ministry.

President of the Council and Minister for War: General de Grimaudet de Rochebouët.

Justice: M. Lepelletier, of the Cour de Cassation. Foreign Affairs: The Marquis de Banneville, an ex-ambassador.

Interior: M. Welche, Prefect for the North.

Finance: M. Dutilleul, ex-deputy.

Navy: Vice-Admiral Baron Roussin.

Education, Public Worship, Fine-Arts: M. Faye, Member of the Institute.

Public Works: M. Graeff, Inspector-General of Roads and Bridges.

Agriculture and Commerce: M. Ozenne, Councillor of State, General Secretary for Agriculture and Commerce.

It is to be noticed that MM. Dutilleul, Welche, and Faye had been non-elected official candidates.

The Ministry was a considering Ministry. The Left looked upon it as militant, an agent for the Coup

d'Etat, a Cabinet of functionaries, not parliamentarians. The most disquieting rumours were circulated, some of which imagined bands of insurgents everywhere, others the landing of the Prince Imperial at Dieppe. The general atmosphere was tense and threatening.

The Chamber had no other means of defence but the threat of a "strike," namely, the refusal of the Budget. All parties, however, feared to take decisive steps. Opinion everywhere was bewildered and perplexed.

On November 24th the members of the Cabinet appeared before the Chamber. General de Rochebouët read a fairly soothing declaration; it would be his part to "re-establish between the public powers the good understanding necessary for the wel-This alone was to be his mission." fare of the State.

M. de Marcère interrupted: "The Ministry represents neither the national powers nor the parliamentary powers, but personal government. . . . France is exasperated . . . France must be obeyed."

After a short reply from M. Welche, M. Ch. Floquet remarked: "We have been called latent Radicalism. You are certain strife." And, for the first time, he propounded the question of revision of the Constitution. M. Henri Germain deplored the present Everywhere complaints were being difficulties. made. Two milliards, stationary in the Banque de France, could not be exposed to the risks of the time.

Chamber with the Cabinet

Things must be brought to an arrangement. "You represent the business of May 16th refuses to kindly represent the business of the nation." enter into relations By 315 votes against 207, the Chamber refused to enter into relations with the Cabinet:-

The Chamber, considering the Ministry of November 23rd to be in construction and origin a negation of national and parliamentary rights, declares its inability to enter into relations with this Ministry, and passes a resolution to this effect.

Several suggestions as to the prevailing difficulties, colportage, and Primary Instruction, were made by the more moderate members of the Left.

On November 28th, the Ministry brought forward a Bill for separating from the General Budget certain actions relating to direct contribution for 1878. There remained but a few weeks for the course of public affairs to be uninterrupted. Would the Chamber grant or refuse the Budget? All depended upon this.

The short period that followed is but a swaying from one resolution to another, from one uneasiness to the next, a shuffling of contradictory decisions. Resistance and capitulation were alike being arranged. The General and the troops were ready for action, public opinion was alarmed. The most uneasy, hesitating and unhappy was Marshal Mac-Mahon. There were movements of the troops at Lyons and Marseilles; a large-sized cannon was dispatched to Versailles. The sending of this cannon was a noteworthy occurrence.

The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, President of the Senate, saw the Prefect of Police, M. Voisin, and expressed his apprehensions as to the security of parliamentary debates. He also said that he and M. Grévy, with the members of the bureau of the two Chambers, had resolved to settle at Versailles itself, where they could ask for a division to protect the two Assemblies.

For the second time it was the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier who struck the fatal blow. This conver-

sation was repeated to the Marshal, who forthwith summoned the President of the Chamber and the President of the Senate and declared that nothing was further from his thoughts than a coup d'état. However, he seemed inclined to ask for a second dissolution from the Senate. The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier maintained that the Senate would not agree to this. Both the leaders advised the Marshal to call the Moderate Republicans into power.

On the same day, the Marshal received M. Batbie, who represented the resistance policy. The Rochebouët Cabinet had meanwhile settled down and seemed inclined to last. The Senate, having to nominate six permanent Senators, selected MM. the Comte de Chabaud-Latour, Greffulhe, Lucien Brun, Grandperret, Baron de Larcy, and Ferdinand Barrot. This was reinforcement for the Right.

The Chamber continued the sittings, still engaged on the task of validations. On Sunday, December 2nd, the Republican Left again declared their intention of refusing the Budget unless constituted by a Ministry of the Left.

In the commercial world great excitement prevailed. All was in suspense. A meeting, in which 3,000 commercial men took part, resolved that an appeal should be made to the Marshal. Then on the Monday, December 3rd, M. Dufaure was called to the Elysée. In the Chamber, the Budget Committee made a solemn declaration: "We will only vote on the question of the four contributions for a really parliamentary Ministry." There followed a sharp passage of arms between Rouher and Gambetta Gambetta —representatives of the two systems. summarised the situation in these terms: "We will only give up our gold, our offices, our sacri-VOL. IV. 200

fices, when the national wish expressed on October 14th is obeyed. We claim to know whether France is governed by the nation or by an individual." His words evoked a storm of applause.

At the close of the sitting, some incident provoking M. de Cassagnac to deny the Marshal's right "to submit," M. Lorvis, of the Right Centre, declared in the name of his party that he did not agree with de Cassagnac. This was a splitting up of the Right.

M. Dufaure made known to the Marshal in writing the conditions under which he would endeavour to form a new Cabinet. These were: Homogeneity and absolute independence of the Cabinet; a public declaration from the Marshal under some form to the effect that the Government would return to parliamentary methods; the adoption by the Government of the Bills proposed by M. Bardoux as to Martial Law and colportage. The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier supported him in this.

For all alike, this was the end of May 16th.

Doubt and Hope still struggled for ascendancy, and Hope carried the day.

It needs the pen of a Retz or of a Saint Simon to describe the corridors of the Chamber. As M. Dufaure made his entrance after having made preliminary arrangements with the Marshal, distrust and satisfaction strove in turn on every face. Was this indeed an actual victory? Were the guarantees really adequate? The stupefaction and irritation among the members of the Right brought reassurance." ¹

Rupture of the Marshal insisted that the Ministers for with Moreon Marshal insisted that the Ministers for Marshal insisted that the Ministers for Marshal insisted that the Ministers for Marshal with Foreign Affairs, for the Navy and for War should not be changed.

Negotiations were re-opened with M. Batbie. The

¹ Revue politique et littéraire, 1877 (p. 545).

Marshal received General Fleury bearing an autograph letter from the Prince Imperial. At the Ministry for War preparations were made for all contingencies. There were people who said that the proposals made to M. Dufaure were but a mask for some trickery. M. Dufaure would not desert his party, and submitted to the President a list on which were the names of MM. de Marcère, Waddington, Léon Say, de Freycinet; the direction of Foreign Affairs was to be offered to M. de Saint-Vallier; that of War to General Gresley; that of the Navy to Admiral Pothuau.

The Marshal still insisted on these offices remaining in the same hands as before.

Senator Batbie was then asked to form a new Ministry. General de Rochebouët telegraphed this piece of news to General Ducrot, who replied: "Thanks! May the good Lord and the Marshal be blessed and glorified."

A dispatch from the Minister for the Interior to the prefects, dated the 8th, at twenty minutes past ten at night, thus declares the Marshal's sentiments:—

"I am resolved to remain, nevertheless," the Marshal said this morning. "They count upon my resignation, but they shall not have it. Would a Dufaure Cabinet have had a majority? I will not move until the refusal of the Budget. We shall see what the country will say if, by the end of the month, a twelfth has not been voted."

Was the poor Marshal sure of what he announced? Did he announce clearly what was attributed to him? M. Batbie began his preliminary skirmishing.

Once more it was the Senate that gave the last stroke of demolition to this last Committee of Fifteen ber 9th, the leaders of the Right in the

Senate, the Committee of Fifteen, were assembled at the house of M. de Bondy. There was a discussion on the constitution of a Batbie-Depeyre Cabinet—a Cabinet of resistance.

"Where are they leading us?" exclaimed M. Bocher, the friend and confidant of the "princes." "The President is being deceived if he is not being made aware of the disastrous consequences of such measures. For my own part, I care too much for the welfare of my country to share such a policy and to assume such terrible responsibilities."

The meeting would not support M. Batbie; the President of the Senate was requested to take steps with regard to a reconciliation between Dufaure and the Marshal. M. Dufaure, however, was immovable, and the Marshal repeated: "I will go on to the end."

M. Batbie pressed forward his case, and the Ministry was formed. There was wanting only a Minister for Finance, the hardest work from a parliamentary point of view. The post was offered to M. Pouyer-Guertier—and refused.

A meeting of the Ministry took place on the 10th. General de Rochebouët told the Marshal that things could not thus continue. He would have to declare himself openly, either resign or offer definite opposition, or else submit and call for M. Dufaure. All was ready for resistance. Telegrams had been sent to the commanders of army corps: "Send at once to every commune in order to be ready for the troops to-day; mobilisation; food supplies for two days, including tinned meats; also two days' supply of oats for the horses; send me reports."

The Batbie The political men round M. Batbie held Programme a sort of council at two o'clock on the Monday. The Budget was to be constituted, a

fresh dissolution called for, with general elections within the three months, proclaiming the state of siege; it was to be a reinforced May 16th.

Everything was submitted to the Marshal, who agreed with the plan of campaign. He accepted the idea of dissolution, but refused to put off the elections for another three months-only until the end of December at the latest. He proposed what had already been suggested, that the country should be asked for a definite yes or no, a sort of appeal to the people.

As to Martial Law-and this was the crucial moment-the Marshal declared that a plébiscite made under the influence of the état de siège would cast suspicion on his intentions. A coup d'état, a dictature, might be read into this. He "did not feel in himself the material for a dictator; he would like to be certain that the crisis would be passed without bloodshed, and he could agree to no measures of which the full consequences could not be foreseen."

Once more he proved himself a patriot and a man of common sense.

The meeting broke up. General de Rochebouët telegraphed to the commanders of the different army corps, arranging for a meeting at eleven o'clock on the Tuesday, under pretext of assembling the War Committee.

The news of these resolutions, exaggerated by the general alarm, gradually spread amongst the public.

How can these palpitating days be adequately described! The Republican party prepared for resistance, yet all had the remembrance of the vain parade of December, 1851, within their minds. The Commune still lived within the memories of Paris.

Would the population respond to the parliamentary appeal? Party leaders were certainly enthusiastic. From every provincial district arrived encouragement and offers of help. The deputies of the Left held meetings in which the faithful were counted and the conditions of the local compaigns investigated. There were arming and enlisting. Yet, however great were faith and enthusiasm, the resources seemed but slight. Certainly there was some talk of certain generals who had promised their support. Northern France, with its fortified towns, could be made a retreat and a resource. Securities had been taken and a definite plan conceived. The Committee of Eighteen was to remain in permanent authority.

Gambetta was the appointed leader, as the most experienced statesman, the best informed, the most enthusiastic—all eyes were turned to him. At one of the last meetings he hinted that he could rely on a portion of the army to support the Chamber. M. Marcère relates the scene that then ensued.

At a meeting of the Eighteen some one proposed to acquaint M. Grévy with this redoubtable eventuality.

"Grévy," says M. de Marcère, "who was already informed, listened with his rather sarcastic gravity and without much surprise, to the account given by Gambetta of the situation, which he believed even more critical than it was, and heard the details of the plan of campaign then developed . . . Then, he, in his turn, spoke—at great length—with a quietness and moderation, with a broadness of view, that contrasted with the rather artificial enthusiasm and the overbold suppositions on which the hope of success for armed resistance had been based. He first contested the idea of there being any serious danger of a coup d'état, but that in which he showed his superiority to his interlocutor was his exposition of what he considered to be a duty in case of such eventualities. As President of the Chamber, even as an ordinary deputy, he would never give the signal for a civil war; as long

as regular powers existed it was to regular means of resistance that recourse should be taken. Insurrection against the law once openly ignited, apart from our influence, we should then, as ordinary citizens, be free to act as might seem best to us. 'But I maintain,' he said, 'that no one has the right to use his public office in the fray and make of it the brand of civil war. The very thought of this is repugnant to me; I will never lend myself to this.'

"These words, pronounced with a deep feeling unusual in the speaker, the justice of his arguments and their bearing of true patriotism, struck me so much as to bring every detail of this moving incident vividly to mind. Grévy's language made a deep impression on the meeting, which was also, on the whole, but little inclined to adopt ill-considered and extreme resolutions, and which felt the weight of the responsibility imposed on it by the confidence of the Chamber. We were each closely questioned, and it was finally decided that no steps should be taken on the initiative given by Gambetta, but that the right of further deliberation should be reserved, should the projects supposed to exist in the Elysée ever come to a more tangible form."

M. Grévy had seen the Marshal; his fine understanding of human nature had probably read the real attitude of the President. He fully realised that in him material "for a dictator" was not to be expected.

Besides this, the Marshal had no great confidence in the attitude of the army. It is said that at the sitting of the Higher Council of War, presided over by General de Rochebouët, the ex-chairman, General de Cissey, had cut short the discussion by remarking: "This is all very well. I admit the possibility of success. But what next?"

The Labordere seem sure. The presence in Paris of generals not on duty there caused surprise.

One incident excited great comment. At Limoges, December 11th, an officer of the 14th of the Line,

Major Labordère, interpreted an order given in case of disturbance in the town as a political measure.

"None of us," he wrote, "could doubt but that it signified a coup d'état, and that arms were to be taken up that very night. I raised my voice and said to Colonel Billot: 'Colonel, a coup d'état is a crime. I will be no accomplice. I am an honest man, I will not play the part demanded of me in this criminal attempt.' The Colonel replied: 'You have no right to argue the matter; your duty is to obey.'" 1

M. Batbie imagined he had reached the goal. M. Pouyer-Guertier, to whom he offered the control of Finance, was present at a meeting in the Elysée at twelve in the morning. Then, however, M. Pouyer-Guertier vigorously protested against the extreme methods, and advised the summons of M. Dufaure. The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier was called to the Elysée; he met M. Batbie and had a hot debate. The President of the Senate took his colleague aside, reproaching him with following the policy of Ducrot and Miribel, and for wishing to ignite a civil war, which would be an act of criminal folly. M. Batbie was so roughly attacked that there was question of a duel.

At four o'clock there was a council of the Ministers. General de Rochebouët again pressed the Marshal to a declaration, resistance or submission, but things must be brought to a decision. M. de Banneville explained the complications that the policy of resistance might bring about abroad. (Plevna had just succumbed; Pius IX was ill, and a conclave might be imminent.) The Marquis de Banneville

¹ In consequence of this, on December 31st, Major Labordère was suspended. General de Bressolles, who had given the order wrongly that the Major refused to obey, was placed on the reserve list. Later on Major Labordère was recalled; he ultimately left the army and entered Parliament.

affirmed that he was in possession of dispatches which pointed to grave interventions on the part of Germany should the crisis be prolonged. Admiral Roussin had already left the Ministry. It was a breaking up.

The Marshal Every one reverted to the same name—yields that of Dufaure. The Marshal had a hard struggle with himself; he preferred resignation. At last, hardly pressed by his Ministry, with "tears in his eyes," he yielded, and announced his intention of appealing to M. Dufaure. General de Rochebouët returned to the Ministry for War greatly relieved. The following day, Thursday, 13th, he sent telegraphic orders to the commanders of the army corps countermanding the military measures. At the same time he telegraphed to Bordeaux: "Kindly tell the quartier-général in confidence to stop all preparations for departure. I shall probably reassume the command of the 18th Corps."

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND DUFAURE CABINET AND THE "LIBERAL PARTY."

I.—Constitution of the Second Dufaure Cabinet—Presidential Message—Change in the administrative staff—The municipal elections—General session of 1878—Public works—The Terminal Three per cents—The economic question.

II.—Parliamentary work—The Senatorial majority—The Bud-

get of 1878—Vote of amnesty at the Senate.

III.—Death of Victor Emmanuel and of Pius IX—Projected interview between Prince Bismarck and Gambetta—Visit of Gambetta to Rome—Election of Leo XIII.

IV.—Continuation of the General Session of 1878—Various Bills and Acts—The Universal Exhibition.

Ι

In the Presidency of the Republic, Marshal MacMahon Attitude of the Marshal had yielded to the objurgations of his personal friends and of his usual political advisers. His first reply to the suggestion of calling on M. Dufaure had been Never! He had already drawn up his formal resignation. At the close of the last Ministerial council, when General de Rochebouët had openly insisted on the Marshal's definite pronunciation, and when M. de Banneville had expressed the uneasiness as to peace caused by the simultaneous resignation of the Marshal, the surrender of Plevna and the illness of the Pope, Marshal MacMahon said:—

You have unanimously told me that I have still a duty to perform. I am compelled to believe you . . . I would rather be shot than decide as you wish me to decide. You ask of me my honour. Well, then, I give it to you. May you never reproach me for so doing!

He uttered some bitter words upon the Ministry of May 16th, then relapsed into silence. The dagger remained within his heart; from thenceforth his face took on a strained expression, his movements became more abrupt, deep mutterings of wrath often unconsciously escaped him, and were noted by visitors to the Elysée.

His ultimate decision was influenced to some extent by the hope of possible support in the senatorial majority. This majority was, on the whole, conservatively-minded; harmony existed between "two of the powers." All, therefore, was not absolutely lost before the approaching triennial renewing of the high assembly.

The Marshal had no personal prejudice against M. Dufaure. He valued his straightforwardness and influence, and did not object to his somewhat brusque manners. It was sufficiently realised by his immediate associates that from the moment of yielding the constitution of the Dufaure Cabinet became a means of escape from a Cabinet which would necessarily be headed by Gambetta.

M. Dufaure had his staff already summoned. M. Léon Say, M. Teisserenc de Bort, were with him. The help of M. de Marcère was sought for the Ministry for the Interior. The guiding principle of this new Cabinet, a principle which Dufaure had announced from the beginning in a letter to the Marshal, consisted in absolute Ministerial responsibility and integrity, with non-ability on the part of the President to select the Ministers for War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs. It was with great resistance that the Marshal had been compelled to yield to this.

There had been some difficulty in finding a Minister for Foreign Affairs; the choice finally devolved upon

M. Waddington, senator for Aisne, and an old colleague of M. Thiers. General Borel, who had served under Marshal MacMahon as head of the *État-Major*, was made Minister for War. The Cabinet was thus composed:—

The Justice, and as President of the Council:

Dufaure J. Dufaure.

Interior: M. de Marcère, deputy.

Foreign Affairs: M. Waddington. Education: M. Bardoux, deputy.

War: General Borel.

Navy: Vice-Admiral Pothuau, senator.

Finance: Léon Say, senator.

Agriculture and Commerce; Teisserenc de Bort, senator.

Public Works: Ch. de Saulces de Freycinet, senator.¹

The Presidential Political revolution, it might be called the political revolution, thus accomplished, and affirmed by the complete liberty given to the leader in the formation of the Cabinet, was to be finally acknowledged by a Presidential Message. Submitted to the Chambers and by them accepted, it would have the authority of a compact, and would define, once for all, the interpretation of the constitutional attributes of the President. The Message thus became an act of abdication for the Septennat. M. Dufaure had a private interview with the Marshal, and submitted to him the proposed form, of which the principal part is here given.

¹ Four Under-Secretaries of State were nominated: To the Ministry of Justice, M. Savary; for Education, M. Jean Casimir-Périer; for the Interior, M. Lepère; for Commerce and Industry, M. Girerd. A little later M. Cochery became Under-Secretary of State for Posts and Telegraphs, connected with the Ministry for Finance.

In obedience to Parliamentary conditions, I have formed a Cabinet selected from the two Chambers, composed of men determined to defend and maintain Republican institutions by the loyal use of constitutional laws. . . . The exercise of the right of dissolution is but a method of supreme appeal to a final court, and should not be looked upon as a system of government. I considered it advisable to use this privilege, and I conform to the reply of the nation. . . . The constitution of 1875 has founded a Parliamentary Republic in establishing my irresponsibility, while affirming the responsibility, general and individual, of the Ministry. Our respective rights and duties are thus determined; the independence of the Ministry is the condition of their responsibility. . . .

The rest of the Message was an appeal for concord and for confidence.

During the private interview between the Marshal and Dufaure, the former made use of some expressions on which the President of the Council eagerly seized; then the sitting of the Council began. The Marshal entered, "red of face, agitated, and humiliated in demeanour. His expression was that of a soldier called upon to yield his arms. His salute was cold and brusque, and he seated himself."

He said that "he formed the Cabinet, constrained and forced; that possibly he ought to have retired with the men who, with him, had done the action of May 16th, that his not doing so was caused by a conviction of duty, that he felt that his presence at the head of the Government was useful to France from the point of view of foreign policy."

The Ministers, M. Dufaure in particular, were troubled by the almost miserable condition in which they saw the Marshal. M. Dufaure read out the programme with an agitated voice, and as if he were endeavouring to soften the nasality of his pronunciation. A silence followed, "then the Marshal clutched the paper, roughly seized a pen, then hesi-

tated again. His face coloured suddenly, his eyes filled with actual tears, then, after a moment, he dashed down his signature and threw the pen on the table with the exclamation, 'There, then! If it *must* be so!' He got up at once and escaped out of the hall like a man choked with anger who can bear no more." ¹

Immense relief was felt throughout the Republican party and the whole of the country. The Press of the Right evinced anger, humour, disdain or irony according to their characteristics. The Gaulois remarked: "The Marshal has taken his part; let us see to it that we take ours." The Défense said: "We are defeated and dissatisfied." The Roman Catholic papers were disappointed and bitter; the Univers published the article by Louis Veuillot: "The Marshal has yielded simultaneously with Plevna!"

The Republican party, inadequately assured of so long disputed a victory, maintained some reserve. The new roads were slowly used; there was hesitation over activity in the Government. A pioneer was sought for, and, in needlessly violent demeanour, there was something embarrassed and constrained.²

The Cabinet alone was calm. The Liberal party considered that matters were at length satisfactorily adjusted, and that the present solution was definite

¹ See V. de Marcère's Le Seize Mai (p. 228).

² See a letter from M. Clamageran, dated December 20, 1877: "What is most amusing, or most sad, is that they who were trembling a fortnight ago, and declaring resistance to be impossible, are now exclaiming that too much conciliation has been shown and that the abdication of the Marshal should have been insisted on."

for all time upon the tablets of History—"France is the Left Centre."

On December 14, the Message was read to the Senate and to the Chamber, and was heard with applause by the Lefts, in silence by the Rights. Then business was begun.

The Chamber had held in reserve, as the parliamentary weapon par excellence, the voting of the Budget. The last hours of 1877 had come, and the resources of 1878 were not yet arranged. The Chamber of Deputies had unanimously voted, on December 15th, two-twelfths provisionally on the Budget of 1878—and this on the proposal of the Minister of Finance. No more, however; there was still distrust abroad. In the Senate-House, M. Lucien Brun, in the name of the Right, reserved the financial authority of the high assembly, and his suggestion met with approval.

The liquidation of May 16th was begun by a Governmental project of December 18th, offering amnesty for all delinquencies of the Press; also by a proposal from MM. Marcou and Bonnet as to the repression of official candidature. Since the beginning of the session, that is to say, since November 7th, the Chamber had validated 414 of its members, among these M. Jules Grévy, twice elected—in Paris and in Dôle. Seven deputies of the Right had been invalidated; it remained to test the powers of 107 deputies.

The extraordinary Session closed on December 18. The most urgent question, together with the inquiry on the acts of May 16th, was on the subject of the Ministerial staff. M. de Marcère, before accepting the charge of Home Affairs, had demanded carte blanche. The compromised functionaries, armed with the fine declarations showered upon them by former Cabinets,

with the signature of the Marshal, had only to pack up their belongings and were left without illusions. The Broglie-Fourtou Cabinet had given the example of *coupes sombres*. They felt the effects of the law dictated by their friends.

The first prefectorial change was recorded in the Officiel, December 19: 46 prefects were recalled, 7 put on the reserve list; 27 had foreseen the change and given in their resignation, some rather aggressively. The rest followed: Sub-prefects, general secretaries, councillors, agents; it was a new hecatomb.

M. Dufaure, on his side, reinstalled the juges de paix displaced by de Broglie. He deposed or pensioned off several magistrats des parquets who had taken part too ostensibly in the political struggle.

In the diplomatic service important changes were made. M. Fournier was made ambassador to Constantinople, in place of the Marquis de Vogüe, who had resigned. In Berlin, M. de Gontaut-Biron was

obliged to leave the Embassy. For some Gontaut- months past he had been regarded with disfavour by Prince Bismarck. The Prince, Biron whose moods ruled Prussia, Germany, and, generally speaking, Europe as well, met with little resistance, except in the court and family of the Emperor William, and this resistance emanated from the Empress Augusta and the Crown Princess-both known to him as the "Englishwomen." M. de Gontaut-Biron, whose diplomatic skill and clearsightedness were only equalled by his dignity and tact, had a privileged position in these groups. Through these channels he had acquired important information on various occasions, and in measure as Bismarck felt and knew this, his hostility openly increased. "The Empress,"

he remarked one day to the English ambassador, Odo Russell, "is the real Minister for Foreign Affairs in this empire, and M. de Gontaut is our sovereign's adviser. This must come to an end or else I must retire." When this was repeated to M. de Gontaut-Biron he replied: "I did not think myself so powerful."

The crisis of May 16th, sweeping off as it did so many influential personages, did not spare M. de Gontaut-Biron. He had taken no active part in the struggle, but his monarchical tendencies were well known. The Duc Decazes was no longer in the Ministry; it might well be asked whether the continuance in office of an ambassador in open rupture with the dictator of Europe might not prove a source of danger for his country. M. de Gontaut-Biron, did not, like many of his colleagues, think it necessary to offer his resignation, but he sent his son to Paris. The Marshal could but obey necessity. M. Waddington explained the exigencies of politics, and M. de Gontaut-Biron left Berlin with dignity and quiet, and accompanied by general esteem.

He was succeeded in Berlin by the Count de Saint-Vallier-a finished diplomatist, a colleague in the Senate of M. Waddington, and whose post with Marshal von Manteuffel had gained appreciation at the time of the liberation of the land.

In Paris M. Voisin was replaced by M. Albert Gigot as Préfet de Police. M. Petitjean was elected as first President of the Cour des Comptes, and Senator Humbert was made Procureur-Général.

The Government prepared the parliamentary inquiry upon the acts of May 16th. Ministerial notices removed the penalties imposed on republican offi-Several speeches indicative of the new order

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of things were made by the Ministers on the occasion of the New Year receptions. These can be summarised in the words of de Marcère: "We desire to go as far as not only Legality, but Liberty will permit us."

On January 6th elections were held Municipal Elections throughout France for the integral renewing of the municipal councils. These elections had a political bearing, since through them the character of the senatorial elections of January, 1879, would be decided. It was another step forward for the Republic. She was consolidating her forces and feeling herself mistress of the future. At the same time, she felt those first dissensions, natural, it is true, to all human society, but whose excess is specially dangerous to peoples only recently be-freed and of strong centralisation. France has often had to yield to personal questions, and has often been a prey to petty am-The legal parties, by the most deceptive of errors, watch these crises in the hope of letting them work out to their end; they practise the policy of "the excess of evil," and the country suffers both from the violence of faction and the mediocrity of calculation. Under the play of passion and ambition, the tide of democracy, however, rises. A strong undercurrent absorbs the surface waves, and if this powerful tide were not felt to be growing, the story of these stagnant years would hardly deserve to be recorded.

M. Louis Blanc spoke on January 5th—as the expounder of the new régime:—

The victory ought also to have done away with Marshal Mac-Mahon. The most pressing duty of the moment is the revision of that Constitution which the clerically-minded M. Wallon and his collaborators of the Right Centre have used as a strait-jacket

for the Republic. The army, too, must be watched: the worst danger for a Republic lies in the presence of a standing army in its midst.

The army chiefs, by their notorious participation in the *coup d'état*, had lent themselves to these reproaches. On January 9th, General Ducrot was relieved of his functions as commander of the 8th Army Corps at Bourges and made a member of the General Commission for Public Works.

On the 7th Gambetta spoke at Marseilles as the "opportunist":—

I have greatly feared the intoxication of success. We must make a halt among the positions we have conquered in order to fortify them for ourselves. For the senatorial elections of 1879 we must make no mistakes, not be over-bold and have no dissensions amongst us.

M. Léon Renault, on assuming the presidency of the Left Centre, January 8th, spoke as the "moderate":—

"The Dufaure Cabinet must avoid two stumbling-blocks—one is the hostility of the Senate towards the Republic, the other is the impatience of the Republicans. Reform must be put off until the Republican party has a majority within the Senatehouse."

Dissolution Upon these threefold lines proceedings of the Committee were developed. On January 11th, the Committee of Eighteen spontaneously dissolved; the former organisation was reverted to. Any underunderstanding between the Republican groups would be made henceforth, if necessary, by the various bureaux. It was a reply to Gambetta's appeal for no dissensions. Against him personally the cry again was raised of "No dictatorship!"

The Cabinet devoted itself to business, and of business there was no lack.

The Chambers re-assembled on January 8. The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier was elected President of the Senate by 172 voices. MM. Duclerc, Rampon. General de Ladmirault and Audren de Kerdrel were vice-presidents. Jules Grévy was elected President of the Chamber by 355 voices; MM. Bethmont. Rameau, Henri Brisson, and de Durfort de Civrac vice-presidents. M. Wilson, a particular friend of M. Jules Grévy, was made Rapporteur-Général of the Commission of Finance in place of M. Cochéry, a familiar of the President of the Chamber, who was made Under-Secretary of State for Posts and Telegraphs. The play of influences becomes apparent. M. Jules Grévy's speech advised a moderate policy. conciliatory, just, respecting everybody's rights; he laid stress on the value of "necessary agreement between the great powers." The politeness was significant for the Senate.

A bill, brought forward by M. Bardoux, Minister for Education, marks the philosophy of the new era; it was a request for credits relating to the enlargement of the Sorbonne and to the construction of a special building for the Faculty of Science in Paris.

M. de But now came something still more mo-Freycinet mentous for the Future. There appeared in the Ministry for Public Works a man of no conventional parliamentary standing,—a born administrator and a man of action—Charles de Saulces de Freycinet. He came of a Protestant family of Southern France, he was an ex-pupil of the École Polytechnique, a mining engineer, a manager of railways for the South, a sanitary specialist—one of the distinguished men flung by the "École" every year on the market of French talent. Of the rigidity and haughti-

ness of the "Tenth" he had none, but all the initiative and love of work. There was in him prodigious power of assimilation, extreme adaptability and intuition, lucid and straightforward eloquence, somewhat reminiscent of that of M. Thiers; and the whole tempered by a rather timid watchfulness of himself and others which savoured still of the official. exceptional qualities would have remained concealed behind an office desk had not M. Gambetta, at the time of the National Defence, had the inspiration and good luck to make of M. de Freycinet a "delegate" for war. The services that he then rendered are well known. He mobilised, clothed, armed and dispatched to the field some 500,000 men. highest honours of these gloomy days belong to de Freycinet, as collaborator of Gambetta. war over, he went back into obscurity. But in 1876 he stood for the senatorial elections of the department of the Seine, and was elected on January 30th. Then he produced the first of his remarkable papers on military reorganisation, and took up arms against the spirit of May 16th, and then to this new man the direction of Public Works was intrusted by Dufaure.

The first indication of faith in the future evinced by a Government or by a nation lies in the management of its public works, and that M. Gambetta fully realised this is well assured. And urgent necessity was forcing attention to these matters. Economic progress, arrested by the war and by the Commune, had suddenly revived. Agriculture, industry and commerce, in face of the extraordinarily favourable developments of the years between 1872 and 1876, clamoured for immediate output of national energy. On the contrary, however, certain enterprises of local

Railway railway companies, conceded towards the difficulties close of the Empire or directly after the war, especially in the North and West, were in danger of collapse. Several companies were in great distress.¹ The Chambers had already been obliged to draw up a scheme of safeguard, extension, or creation of a new network of railways.

The intervention of the public powers in so important a branch of national enterprise gave rise to further problems, especially as to the safeguarding of interests. The help, indispensable as primarily it was, offered later grave inconveniences, and often proved a premium on stagnation and red-tapeism. The opponents of the subsidy proposed subvention, or State management, or even free competition. State management had a socialistic tendency which pleased the parties of the Left, but alarmed financiers and economists. Nor were the large companies entirely satisfied with their conditions. The "Midi" was but scantily prosperous; the "Orleans" felt rather lost amidst its large domains, while the "Ouest," on the contrary, had its activity narrowed by maritime and river-way competition, and the "Est" had had to yield to Germany the most active portions of its tract, and had also been obliged to respond to the new exigencies for frontier mobilisation. All eyes were turned towards the State. In a centralised country such as France the State regulates and arbitrates. As opposed to an unorganized population, placed between the rivalries of producers

[&]quot; "Fidus" writes, just before the elections of October, 1877: "What most preoccupies the bourgeois of the West are the losses they have had in the small railways—Vendées, Charentes, etc. . They bear more of a grudge against the Chamber for these losses than for any of its projects" (p. 78).

and merchants, the State alone is rich, with any command over the future. In a country of equality the State alone is able to impose discipline and to appease the conflict of interests.

The political facts, the historical destiny of France, no less than her economic prosperity, were concerned with these questions.

Every living organism has the soul of its circulation. The body and limbs of France sought for new equilibrium; the directing organs having failed in their functions, remonstrance arose from the provinces and the democracy. They asked to be of consequence where Paris and the élite had once been all.

A crisis as to transport is a crisis of growth and even of vitality. The merchant service, too, had suffered since the commercial treaties, and drew upon itself by its complaints and evident decadence the solicitude of the public powers.

The The network of canals and river-ways, so Waterways remarkably conceived by the old régime, no longer sufficed for the new needs. The cession of Alsace and Lorraine had decreased its extent, the increase of traffic exacted a new and larger system of water contrivances, but an obstinate jealousy prevailed between the railway companies and the waterway promoters, the former, powerful, active, and possessed of large capital, trying to retard a progress in which they saw but dangerous rivalry.

Canals and rivers are terminated by ports. The needs of all were clamouring at one and the same time. Everywhere there was demand for quays, docks and wharfs. The larger size of merchant ships and war ships exacted requirements which the fretting attacks of the sea rendered no less urgent. The

success of the Suez Canal and the tunnelling of mountains brought a wave of feverish activity upon this planet, urging men to work for coming generations. Great designs had sprung into being—the Southern Canal, the Channel Tunnel, the Sahara Sea. There was not an isthmus on the globe which was not to be pierced. The whole earth stretched pleading hands towards Europe, asking of her her engineers, her money and her intellect.

Could France stand aside from the general activity? The former Chamber had been questioned by M. Cochéry on the subject of the railways. M. Savary, having renewed the matter, a committee of thirty-three members was appointed to make an inquiry into the general conditions of railways and navigation.

Hardly had M. de Freycinet come forward into public life than after a rapid survey of these conthe The Plan ditions and these projects, he resolved to Freycinet take instant action. On his recommendation, six technical and administrative commissions were instituted on January 2nd, corresponding to the six districts of North, East, West, Centre, South-west, and South, and deputed to establish after full inquiries a general plan for complete railway communication. The railway lines figuring in this programme were classed under two headings—general interest or local interest.

On January 12th M. de Freycinet brought forward a bill proposing to buy up ten of the smaller companies in the Centre and South-west of France. The matter was pronounced urgent. On January 14th the Minister for Public Works sent a notice to the prefects commanding an authorised inquiry as to the convenience of the proposed tracks; and on the 19th

another inquiry was authorised as to the work in commercial ports and on navigable waterways. On January 15th five technical and administrative commissions were appointed for the basins of the Seine, Loire, Garonne, Rhône and the tributaries of the North Sea, with a view of arranging a definite programme of improvements. The expense was estimated by M. de Freycinet at a milliard. With the projects as to railways, the expense for organising transport and traffic would amount to four milliards. These were large enterprises.

M. Léon Say, Minister of Finance, was not without uneasiness as to the large proportions of his colleague's outlay. The Government would incur heavy responsibility in putting so much upon the country only six years after the loans of M. Thiers. It is said that one evening M. Gambetta brought Léon Say and de Freycinet together, and that it was his eloquent intervention that brought about the consent of the Minister for Finance to the projects of the Minister for Public Works. It is as well to remember that M. Dufaure, who had been Minister for Public Works in 1839, was greatly in favour of railway extension and the improvement of the ports—and that he needed no persuasion to second the proposals of M. de Freycinet.

The decision once made, the two departments of Finance and Public Works laboured side by side at the double task of preparing the vast programme of improvements judged indispensable, and of providing for the heavy expenses that this programme would entail. The Supreme Highways Board was inaugurated with something of solemnity,—public opinion had to be impressed. M. de Freycinet presided, supported by the Minister of Finance

and three Under-Secretaries of State. The matters to be considered by this Board embraced every aspect of the question of transport, construction, management and traffic.

Preparatory measures once taken, the problem was then squarely faced. The first step was to make sure of resources. On February 7th M. Léon Say brought forward a motion for: Firstly, the establishment of a loan guaranteed on terminable annuities; secondly, a proposal addressed to the Minister of Finance for an appropriation of 331 millions in order to buy out certain railway companies; thirdly, authorisation for the Minister of Finance to issue redeemable Three per Cents. to the same amount, and for the conversion of stock for public works.

Some definite financial foundation was required.

The first thought of the originator was to assign yearly the funds in hand according to the importance of the expected operations; hence arose the idea of a new class of government stock, closely resembling the ordinary railway bonds. The new class were to be Three per Cents. with dividend of fifteen francs. It was intended that the new loan should terminate at the same time as the former concessions to the railway companies. Since the chief systems were to revert to the State between the years 1950 and 1960, the new loan would extend over a period of sixty-five years, lapsing in 1953. The interest on the debt and payment for its redemption combined, the total charge on the net capital would be five per cent. A sum of fifty millions would therefore have to be provided by the Budget for each milliard spent on public

works. The first operation, that is to say the buying out of the ten minor railway companies, with sundry other expenses, would mean an outlay of twenty-five millions. The proposal was to provide for these expenses partly out of Budget surpluses, partly on other terminable accounts.

As regards the carrying out of this, on March 1st, the Minister for Public Works brought a motion before the Senate, a proposed decree authorising the putting in hand of such railway works as were not already contracted for by the companies, as set forth in Clause 1 of the law of December 16th, and in the first and third clauses of the law of December 31st, 1875.

This may be called the first step in the direction of a State railway system. In spite of strenuous opposition on the part of M. Buffet, the Senate passed the motion on May 28th. Between March 7th and 15th, the great debate opened before the Chamber on this programme of public works, and on the manner of its execution and the general financial projects of the Government. On March 7th M. Keller maintained that the State was showing itself far too generous towards the defaulting companies, "M. Freycinet's project was a reckless enterprise. The State is already burdened with debt. An abyss opens in our Forum-where is our Marcus Curtius? The better and more cautious policy would be to demand of the six great companies the necessary funds to redeem their liabilities and make adequate provision for the future." de Rotours vehemently denounced state speculation. M. Rouher gave his approval to the general scheme for the construction of 16,000 kilometres of line, but was opposed to the State making itself

responsible for the redemption of the lines and their development. This, he said, is making a free gift to the defaulting companies out of the pockets of the taxpayer.

MM. Allain-Targé, Sardi Carnot, Léon Say, and de Freycinet supported the proposal. The Minister of Public Works, in a tactful and interesting speech, showed that a new programme was the natural outcome of an almost unanimous resolution adopted by the preceding Chamber, March 22nd, 1877. He sketched an attractive picture of new works set on foot in every district, and prosperity reviving throughout the whole of France. His words had their effect, and the discussion was closed. The adjournment proposed by M. Cherpin was refused by 317 votes to 155, amidst prolonged applause from the Left. The project was voted on Friday, March 15th, and carried to the Senate, March 18th, as needing speedy settlement.

The matter was brought forward by M. Wilson; there was no debate. M. Rouvier challenged the silence of the Chamber, and raised objections to the plan of automatic redemption. He would have preferred conversion. "Redeeming will simply mean fresh borrowing," he maintained, and the future was to prove that he was right. The project was adopted by 314 votes against 59.

The high roads were to be developed at the same time as the railways. The Second Empire, by the law of July 11th, 1868, had opened funds ad hoc; but the Government of the Republic had found these very low. M. de Marcère called together the technical committee and invited discussion on amendments to be made to the law of 1836, on financial resources, on the manner in which the

different departments and communes should assist, and on the work to be taken in hand.

There was another matter to be dealt Buildings with—no less important and no less connected with the march of the new order of things. On the motion of M. Ch. Floquet, the Chamber unanimously adopted a project for opening a School Fund. Sixty millions, payable in five annuities, were placed at the disposal of the Minister of Education, to be used, by means of subvention from the communes, for the purpose of improving or constructing school buildings. Sixty further millions were to be advanced to those communes desirous of borrowing for this object. School buildings throughout the country were in an adequate condition. Remarkable and active interest was being evinced by every one in the cause of general instruc-This feeling was manifested in the raising of school buildings, humble or imposing, which embodied the modern faith in knowledge, just as the spirit of the Middle Ages had incorporated its religious faith in church architecture. On the suggestion of M. Barodet, the Chamber nominated a committee of twenty-two members whose business was to inquire into plans relating to primary instruction.

Funds for railway companies, waterways, highways, and schools formed so many special Budgets, which with the liquidation fund and the special army funds, arose simultaneously with the already weighty Budget. There was thus shown from the very first one of the most striking features of a democratic government, a certain lavishness as to public expenses, which forms a ready theme for attack from the Opposition. Such enterprises,

however, will be easily managed, if they coincide with a period of general quiet, and if the expenses they entail are carefully combined and controlled.

More elasticity was needed in the public finances. Several measures were taken with this end in view: a decree passed January 31st, bearing on the revision of the decree of May, 1862, on public accounts; a law passed by the Chamber, January 31st, subjecting to stricter rules the governmental right of opening supplementary loans in the absence of the Chambers; and a motion brought forward by the Minister of Finance, bearing on a new agreement with the Banque de France and authorising the Government to procure resources for the Treasury by raising the permanent advance of the Banque de France from 60 to 140 millions. The agreement would hold good for ten years, until the lapse of privilege of the Banque de France. The Government also dealt with the position of the Crédit Foncier, which touches such important financial and agricultural interests. M. Albert Christophle, a former minister under M. Thiers, was made director of this establishment in place of M. Grivart.

The law of January 31st, 1878, suspended the issue of silver five-franc pieces. The postage for letters weighing fifteen grammes was lowered to fifteen centimes.

Another fact signalled the approach of a new system—the evolution of economic plans.

For some years past the commercial agreements, generally very liberal, between France and most of the Powers had reached their termination and could only be renewed for short periods. On December 20th, the commercial treaty and navigation agreement

with Italy, dating from 1862 and 1863, had been extended till April 1st, 1878; on December 24th the agreement with Austria-Hungary had been extended till June 30th, 1878. Henceforth a definite line of action would have to be taken, either Free Trade, which was favoured by the majority, or Protection. The men just arrived at power found themselves in a difficult position between overvaunted principles and rather complicated facts; definite pronunciation was difficult. On January 21st, 1875, M. Teisserenc de Bort brought forward a bill as to the establishment of a general customs tariff. The project, as could have been foreseen, was ill-proportioned. Two tendencies were more or less obvious in it, on the one hand a desire to arm France against the protectionist systems of the foreigner, and of Germany in particular; on the other, a wish to gain from the customs the means for providing for the heavy budgets looming very near.

It was decided to proceed by means of additional centimes on the former general tariff, a method which greatly facilitated the legislators' task, and allowed of the opening of the door to Free Trade, since in case of need it was but necessary to erase what had been added by a simple arithmetical process: the tariff majoré was raised from 8 to 15 per cent., which was not excessive, and seemed to be sufficient.

On the whole the measures taken were improvised and hasty. The French Chambers, perplexed by ponderous debates, inaugurated the series of regulations which have caused so much harm to French commerce and industry, and which have also, thanks to ill-consideration of our interests, brought France

unprepared to the struggle for which the other powers had armed. On March 22nd, 1878, the Chamber agreed to the commercial treaty signed December 8th, 1877, between France and Spain. The bad condition of the French vines, struck by phylloxera, was already evident; for the first time the vineyard industry abandoned its traditions of Free Trade for Protectionist ideas.

II

The There were animated debates before Amnesty the Chambers, and in the first place, on subjects which much moved the members, still warm as they were from the excitement of the parliamentary struggle. A bill was brought forward by M. Goblet proclaiming amnesty for the political prosecutions between May 16th and December 14th. The Right, with the rather puerile violence to which it was too much addicted, proposed a general amnesty, which would include the culprits of the Commune. This was intended to embarrass the Left, as if the differences between them were ever short of arguments.

M. Dufaure, in a very telling speech, described May 16th as "a great electoral enterprise which had come to grief." He asked the Opposition for good grace in the defeat. The amendment of the Right was discarded January 24th, 1878.

The cycle of distrustful measures issued against the executive power was completed by two motions from M. Pascal Duprot, brought forward on January 19th; one of these bore upon the responsibility of the President, the other on that of the Cabinet. It was the beginning of the campaign of revision.

On February 8th, M. Bardoux's proposal as to martial law was brought to a hearing. During the session martial law could only be proclaimed by Act of Parliament, either in the case of war or of armed insurrection. Should the Chambers be adjourned, it could be decreed by the President of the Republic on the advice of the Cabinet, but the Chambers were then to re-assemble. Should the Chamber be dissolved, martial law could only be established in case of war and in the departments invaded by the enemy. The bill was passed, on the reading by M. Franck-Chaveau, almost without discussion. On the same day a regulation was made as to newspaper traffic, which was to be free except for a preliminary declaration.

These bills provoked interesting debates within the Senate-house. What was the senatorial majority to do? Should it remain bound to the policy of May 16th? Should it sulk with the Republic and the Government, or should it resign itself to events? The usual speakers were for yielding in nothing, not even to the moderate Government chosen by the President of the Republic. fight against the Left was to be continued. elections which tried to shift the almost immovable defunct were greatly characterised by this feeling; but on January 23rd, when the position of General d'Aurelles de Paladine was to be attacked, a significant incident occurred—the candidate of the constitutional group, the Duc Decazes, was abandoned by the Right. M. de Carayon-Latour was substituted for him, and elected against M. Victor Lefranc. This was schism between the constitutional group and the Right properly so termed: 140 votes to 135.

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The constitutional group commenced inverse evolutions on February 11th, when the bill on colportage came before the Senate. The Right was defeated by 136 votes against 123, and the Bill of the Government was passed. Still more significant was the debate on the bill as to martial law. M. Bocher, an influential member of the constitutional group, intervened to rescue the union of the Rights and to support the project of the senatorial commission, which aimed at making a minority for the Government. However, the main tenets of the bill were adopted by 153 votes to 100. Good sense had gained the day, the policy of resistance had failed in the Senate.

The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier watched Bonapar- the events of these important days with something of cynical composure. Once again the path of the Republic was being smoothed by hostility towards the Empire. This notwithstanding, those who desired a Bonapartist restoration believed the time arrived for taking up their position and for announcing, more definitely than ever, the rightful successor to the throne, should the new institutions come to an end. It was sought to make some stir on the occasion of the military lot-drawing by the Prince Imperial, who had been born in Paris, 1857. The matter was reduced to a mere formality, in which the prince was represented by M. Rouher, at the Palais de l'Industrie. The number drawn was 307. About the same time the Prince Imperial requested M. Tristan Lambert and M. Eugène Loudun ("Fidus") to examine a constitutional plan which he presented to them already drawn up. The main features of this project represent the development in Bonapartist conser-

vative ideas; it was a disavowal of the democratic policy which so long had been the will-o'-the-wisp of the Imperial and Napoleonic party.

The results of the elections in France helped to consolidate the Republic. On January 27th and March 3rd, twenty-six legislative elections took place in the departments, owing to invalidations or deaths. They resulted in twenty victories for the Republicans against six seats gained by the Conservatives.

The Budget constitutes the true parliamentary weapon in the Government of the Republic; through a sort of confusion between the two authorities, legislative and executive, the mechanism of the three powers finds its impulse in this debate and proceeds to work without overmuch friction. The conditions of contact were not quite clearly defined in the Constitution. Delicate problems had already arisen as to the rights of the Chamber and the financial authority of the Senate. These difficulties are of those described by Cardinal de Retz as never better settled than in silence.

The silence of the law allows all parties to use the Budget as their weapon; discussion on the Budget forms the general arena of party strife, and affords a vast field for legislative interference.

¹ The voting of the Budget is termed in French a law. It is, in reality, an executive measure controlled by parliamentary authority. A "law" sanctions permanent relations between the inhabitants of a State; therefore, as the voting of the Budget takes place annually in France there can be nothing less permanent, less legislative in character. The conventional use of words in the technical parliamentary language of France would need much exposition.

On the occasion of the first Republican debate upon the Budget, M. Talandier, of the Extreme Left, declared in the name of his party, "that the Budget is not only the necessary means of providing for public expenses; it should also be the most powerful means of establishing the welfare of the nation and of the working classes."

At this time, however, by reason of the use the Chamber had made of it during May 16th, the voting of the Budget was considered as a political means of action. The scheme brought forward by the Broglie Cabinet had been resumed and much amended by the Dufaure Ministry. Since January 1st, the provisional twelfths had been much to the fore. The Budget commission exerted all diligence and the debate began January 28th.

M. Léon Say had made a prudent plan—he had, in his exposition, not failed to remind the Chambers of the redoubtable *Passivum* accepted by the Republic. The debate proved rapid. The Budget of Expenses was partially voted, and according to the wishes of the Government. Several important speeches were made on questions bearing on reorganisation, notably that of M. Lamy on the rôle and reform of the Navy—a masterly discourse, favourably heard but not sufficiently attended to. M. Georges Périn demanded that more consideration should be given to non-European matters—a door was opening for Colonial policy. M. Gambetta approved, from his bench; not, however, without a certain reserve.

Religious questions as usual excited strong feeling when the Public Worship Budget was introduced. For the first time a demand was made for the suppression, pure and simple, of this Budget, M.

Boysset being the obstinate initiator of this idea. Upon this subject the Right proffered opposition as bitter as it was sterile. M. de Mun spoke eloquently and warmly, as was his wont. His generous mind had certainly been carried away by the excitement of his subject when he turned to M. Dufaure with the query: "Are you a representative of liberty or of proscription?" M. Dufaure a representative of proscription! Save the mark!

The voting of the Budget of Expenses was concluded in the Chamber by February 21st, and immediately passed on to the Senate. The high assembly again gave proof of its good-will. On the intervention of M. Paris, a Minister of May 16th, and in spite of M. Buffet's opposition, the claim of urgency was recorded, and the Government was allowed a third provisory twelfth which permitted the voting of the Budget for March 25th.

Up till then, the Chamber, influenced by distrust as to the intentions of the Marshal, had held over the Budget of Receipts. There were still some who believed, or affected to believe, in a possible return to a policy of May 16th, still further aggravated. On March 12th, however, M. Léon Say insisted that the Chamber should bring forward the Budget of Receipts, so that the normal course of business could be established before the expiration of the new provisory twelfth. M. Madier de Montjau was for further delay, M. Gambetta, however, always allowed the prominent rôle, spoke with the voice of wisdom: "As statesmen, as men assured of the morrow and of the future of France, you must see that the time has come for the voting of the Budget." This was accomplished,

despite the counsels of M. Louis Blanc, on March 21st by the Chamber, and on March 26th by the Senate.

The Budget of Expenses, returned by the Senate, was voted by the Chamber with the changes introduced by the high assembly except, for a slight modification as to bursaries for seminaries, a modification ratified again by the Senate. At the close of these transactions, which inaugurated one of the fundamental procedures of the new constitutional system, M. Varroy, the reader, affirmed "that the financial rights of the Senate are no longer contested."

The Budget was promulgated March 31st.

The end of the session was approaching. Some play had to be given to the political passions that had been restrained by pressing business. From March 26th to March 29th there was a great debate within the Senate as to the Bill of Amnesty, voted by the Chamber. M. Eugène Pelletan brought May 16th again to trial. The Duc de Broglie stood at bay: "I ask for no indulgence from our adversaries, I have never expected anything from their justice. I do not fear their vengeance." He put the Senate and the Ministry on their guard against the projects of the Radicals and the ambitions of Gambetta:—

We, like the ancients, have our oracle, and what this predicts must come to pass. Now on the day when it foretold the capitulation of the Senate, it also added that the present Ministry was to last long enough in power to displace the Conservative majority in the Senate, that this was its special task, and that it would then have to give place to others, who would also have their work to perform. The oracle must be fulfilled.

M. Dufaure in his reply set forth that the manœuvre of May 16th had caused 845 personal sen-

tences, and 321,000 francs in fines for cases bearing on electoral pressure. Could the Ministry be asked to liquidate all this except by means of amnesty? The warmth of M. Dufaure's reply gave to the voting a hint of censure against May 16th. The Senate, however, accepted the law as presented by its committee, by 229 votes to one!

During the course of the session there were some hot incidents in the Chamber on the subject of the validations. Lively passages of arms took place between Gambetta, Rouher, de Cassagnac and Albert Joly. The *Officiel* was overwhelmed with these discussions, that seem to us so futile. For instance, M. de Cassagnac exclaimed to Gambetta: "You have told M. Rouher that the Imperialistic Right was composed of traitors and gamblers. The traitors . . . it is a September the Fourth." As a result, the deputies of the Right were invalidated.

The debate on the Bill as to martial law, adopted with modifications by the Senate, was resumed in the Chamber and the Bill passed April 3rd. Several urgent matters were settled before the end of the session. On April 2nd, M. Léon Say produced the Budget scheme for 1879. M. Cazeaux and M. Spuller startled their colleagues with a proposal to let the Chambers return to Paris (March 29th). A credit of 2,722,500 francs was voted for the official expenses of the President of the Republic and the agents for the country during the Universal Exhibition about to be opened. Baron Lafond de Saint-Mur asked a question as to the arrears of the Turkish Debt (of which, according to the speaker, two milliards were in French hands). A new agreement between the State and the Banque de France was decided on, and then, on April 3rd,

the Chamber and the Senate adjourned until the 29th.

There were some changes among the higher officials. Baron Baude, ambassador at the Holy Seat, was retired and replaced by the Marquis de Gabriac. Count Duchâtel, French representative in Denmark, was removed to Brussels and replaced in Copenhagen by M. Victor Tiby. General de Cissey took command of the Eleventh Army Corps at Nantes, succeeding General Espivent de la Villeboisnet. General Greslin, commanding the district of Paris, was relieved of his functions for having, in an order to his troops, qualified a disturber of the public peace as an "elector."

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During the course of the winter several prominent figures had disappeared. In France, Raspail had died, January 13th, 1878. Claude Bernard, buried at the expense of the State, February 11th; also Regnault and Becquerel. Abroad, on January 8th, died Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, and then on February 7th, Pope Pius IX.

Death of Victor Victor Emmanuel was made in a notice to the Journal Officiel. Marshal Canrobert and the son of Marshal MacMahon were dispatched as official representatives to the obsequies in Rome on January 17th. On the same day a solemn service was celebrated at the Church of the Madeleine. M. Gambetta wrote a note on January 16th, which well indicates both his own attitude and the spirit of the period:—

I shall go to the Mass to-morrow despite my anti-clerical feelings. Below my breath, and with no wish to plagiarise Henry

the Béarnais, say that "Rome is well worth a mass." I expect a good deal of ridicule, but I have gone through plenty of the kind and it is not such things that frighten and hinder me. During the service I shall read a pleasant *Provinciale* of Pascal's on the art of hearing mass, which since the death of M. Thiers I keep for such occasions in a small and handy volume.

The expression, "Rome is well worth a mass," is significant of an attitude which, if not new, was at any rate more definitely expressed by Gambetta in measure as he approached power. The death of Pius IX was soon to complete this development.

The men of this generation were sincere in their distinction between clericalism and religion. What they fought against was the intermeddling of sacerdotalism with politics. "The priest for the Church," such was their device. They were not averse to seeking for means of agreement, one day, between Catholicism and a lay Republic. It was a desire for peace at home and expansion abroad that animated this policy inspired by M. Thiers; there was, therefore, beneath all the fierceness of polemics, a strong essential moderation.

Faith is easy in what one wishes to believe, and the leaders of the Republican party, inadequately informed as to the basis of the Roman policy, persuaded themselves that Rome had outstepped her true domain in publishing and in announcing the acts of the Vatican Council. The France of their youth had heard the words of Lamennais, of Lacordaire, Montalembert and Darboy. The new era need not rise till the passing of Pope Pius IX, a good old man in the hands of the Jesuits.

Death of Pius IX, one Pius IX month after that of Victor Emmanuel. The two adversaries, reconciled by death, seemed

to carry the great quarrel of the century with them to the tomb. In Paris the Pope's death was the object of a remarkable ceremonial, and a solemn service was held in Notre Dame on February 14th. The Chambers, in token of mourning, did not sit that day.

Gambetta wrote on February 20th:-

This will be a great day, peace coming from Berlin and probable conciliation with the Vatican. The new Pope has been nominated, the elegant and subtle Cardinal Pecci, Bishop of Pérouse. The old Pope, Pius IX, jealous of his influence, attempted on his deathbed to deprive him of the tiara by making him camerlingue. This Italian, more of a diplomatist than a priest, has gone through all the intrigues of the Jesuits and the foreign clergy; he is now Pope, and the name of Leo XIII which he has assumed seems to me of better augury, and I hail his accession as being one of promise. He does not openly break with the traditions and declarations of his predecessor, but his bearing and his actions are of more weight than speeches, and if he does not die too soon we may hope for a reasonable union with the Church.

A whole policy lies in this noteworthy epistle. Gambetta's secret thoughts were thus interpreted, both for himself and for the generation that he represented. But how had the leader of the Republican party grown acquainted with these details? What, at a moment when the crisis of things and beings was thus troubling France and Europe, was the secret of the relations between Europe and France?

The Eight leagues away from Paris, the Château de Pontchartrain raises its long chartrain façade and square, slate-tiled turrets, from the hollow of a pleasant valley and in the midst of a domain of which the broad outlook gives a sense of grandeur and repose. One of the courtiers of Louis XIV, the Chancellor de Pontchartrain,

devised here his retreat. "A large and rich estate, a most delightful dwelling-place," commented Saint-Simon, and La Bruyère exclaimed, "What beautiful verdure, what pleasant streams! I am all enchanted with Pontchartrain!"

Towards the decline of the Second Marquise Empire Pontchartrain was the property de Païva of a woman well known to Paris, the Marquise de Païva. A Russian Jewess, born in poverty. who had arrived in Paris on foot, and had been the wife of a Polish tailor, she was brought forward by the pianist Hertz, and finally became the Marquise de Païva. Thérèse Lachmann had succeeded, as things and people do succeed in a certain international and pushful sphere, by means of savoirfaire, and good luck, but also by means of an indomitable will. The imperial court had sternly closed its doors to her, but with the shadow of old age upon her, still beautiful, or rather strikingly and terribly unusual, wrapped in the silence of the past, she built the mansion of the Champs Elysées. There she kept open table in face of the Tuileries, and from the heights of an insolent luxury surveyed the fortunes of the woman she most hated, the Empress Eugénie.

At her celebrated dinners, frequented by Eugène Delacroix and Paul Baudry, Taine and Sainte-Beuve, Théophile Gautier and Goncourt, Emile de Girardin and Arsène Houssaye, there sometimes appeared a "German personage," described by another guest as "silent and good-looking, a dandy of Borussia, dominating the feast with his hair parted in the middle and a diplomatic smile." This personality, "the count," also surveyed the imperial feasts in his own particular

manner, silently calculating by how near France approached her ruin. He was of good birth, owned some mines, was employed by Bismarck on government service and was already rich, though covetous of fresh enjoyments and fresh wealth.

Count Henckel had administered Lor-Henckel raine during the war. During the peace Donners- negotiations, Bismarck had introduced him and M. Bleichroeder to M. Thiers with the comment: "Two of our foremost financiers, who have studied a combination by which you will be able to pay off the six milliards (then demanded) without knowing anything about it." M. Thiers, as is well known, contrived to do without their services. A few weeks later the woman known to Paris as La Païva had married Count Henckel, with the diadem of the Empress on her head.1

In spite of the war and the Commune, the couple still possessed Pontchartrain after their marriage. The dinners were resumed.² It is said that M. Thiers put Gambetta into relations with Count Henckel. It is not impossible that the idea of a Franco-German rapprochement which seems to have been in the mind of M. Thiers for some time before his death, may have been the motive for this.

In August, 1877, the Prussian financier boasted of having received confidences which allowed him

du Sommerard, A. Gaiffe, Baudry, etc.

¹ Journal des Goncourts, vol. iv. p. 357. See also vol. v. p. 94: "October 24, 1870. On going down the Champs-Elysées I looked at this mansion of La Païva and wondered whether it had not served as the great Prussian spy-office in Paris. . . ." Here speaks, indeed, a Frenchman.

² See Arsène Houssaye's Confessions, vol. iv, p. 90. He names amongst the guests, General Fleury, Prince von Hohenlohe,

to affirm the success of the Left in the elections, and on October 17th he wrote to Prince Bismarck that he was sufficiently intimate with Gambetta to invite him to his house of Pontchartrain. He therefore offered his services to the Chancellor in anything that might be needed.

Count Herbert von Bismarck hastened to reply, from Varzin, in his father's name, October 30th. He sent instructions to Count Henckel congratulating him on his initiative, and mentioning Gambetta with esteem. He also remarked that it would be expedient to avoid compromising the *prestige* of the French statesman by his relations with the "Prussian Bismarck," from whose ascendancy he could not altogether withdraw himself. He further added that a long peace with France was hoped for if she could escape ultramontane influence.

We do not desire, nor have we need of a war with France; we also believe that it will not necessarily break out unless the Pope should give express orders for it.

The letter indicates an intention to seek in anti-clericalism a common ground for friendship between the two nations, just at the time when the French elections would confirm the victory of the Republican party. It is known that Prince Bismarck had on several occasions, officially and otherwise, made overtures to this effect, and in the height of the crisis of 1875 the interviews of Prince Hohenlohe with the Duc Decazes had, once at any rate, tended in this direction.

Encouraged by such confidence, the Count showed activity; on December 28th, 1877, just when, according to his own expression, Berlin became aware of the particulars of the Marshal's "change of front," he informed the Chancellor that Gambetta had

just communicated to him on good authority the following indications as to the new Government's policy. Count Henckel having intimated that the German Government would not be prepared to enter into closer relations with the French Government while this was under clerical influence and while M. Gontaut-Biron was ambassador in Berlin. M. Gambetta had observed that the choice of a Protestant, M. Waddington, as Foreign Secretary, and the substitution of M. de Saint Vallier for M. de Gontaut-Biron would indicate the desire of France to put her relations with Germany on another footing. In return for this, M. Gambetta requested that Germany should officially testify to reciprocal feelings; for instance, by joining in the Exhibition about to be held. Henckel had replied by bringing out the ultramontane bogey more aggressively than ever. As to Count Herbert's remarks about the necessity of not compromising Gambetta's prestige, he affirmed that an interview of the latter with Prince Bismarck could be brought about with no risk of endangering the influence of M. Gambetta, who still remained the "Dictator of Tours."

If you will take my word for it, I personally guarantee to bring Gambetta to Varzin openly or not, as you prefer, and at your indication. It is a rapprochement, a collaboration with France, that the Father Joseph of the present Government and the leader of the majority will propose to you. He feels it necessary for the establishment of firm relations in Europe and for preparation against the industrial and commercial crisis, the understanding having especially in view an attitude to be taken by both France and Germany against Rome, the re-establishment of confidence between the two countries, and reciprocal enlightenment as to the Budgets for war.

At this very moment Gambetta was starting

for Rome, and also contemplating a visit to Germany. He wrote to his friend, December 21st:—

Till to-morrow, then, at five o'clock,—we shall have a thorough talk. I believe you have hit upon the right path, and next month we shall be off to Vienna. Meanwhile I am going to take your advice and start at once for Rome. I have an appointment with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and shall not return to Nice till after reconnoitring in Rome.

This journey took place, as he further informed his friend, for most pressing reasons. It was accomplished very rapidly. On January 1st he wrote from Rome itself:—

What I wished to do is done: to-morrow I shall pay off my final visits, then dine with our ambassador—the only invitation I have cared to accept, and then rush off to Nice.

M. Gambetta was received by the King, already very ill, probably also by the Crown Prince, who was to be King Humbert. He wrote on January 16th:—

I receive most interesting news from Italy, and it appears that the new King will not repudiate his father's policy, but will seek closer relations with the Gauls he was supposed to dislike as Crown Prince. . . . He will prove himself worthy of his race. I have the best hopes of it all.

He further added:-

It is a mere question of careful policy, that is to say in France, and we shall then be able to march forward together towards the common good.

It was in this same letter that, with reference to the funeral service in honour of King Victor

¹ Gambetta's visit to Rome was noticed by the press of the day. He received many visits "and an extraordinary number of "visiting cards." He saw the King, Depretis and Crispi, but he declined to take part in any manifestation and to receive democratic delegations. It is denied that he came "to take part in the approaching papal election." "He came to see Rome and exchange views with the Liberal party."

Emmanuel, Gambetta used the phrase already quoted: "Rome is well worth a mass." It proves, if proof be necessary, that the "careful" policy

proposed was at any rate quite independent.

Bismarck had replied to Count Henckel on December 28th. The news of M. de Gontaut-Biron's removal had given him great satisfaction; he did not refuse to recognise in this a sign of pacific sentiments in France. The question of participation in the Exhibition was evaded. As to the plan of meeting Gambetta, Prince Bismarck considered "that in his own interests it would not be advisable for M. Gambetta lightly to risk an influence which he also valued. The power which M. Gambetta had obtained, through personal qualities, over the divided parties of France is a capital which must be dealt with prudently."

On February 7th, three weeks after Victor Emmanuel's death, one month after Gambetta's visit to Italy, Pius IX passed away. New perspectives opened out simultaneously to both French and Leo XIII German statesmen. Gambetta's letter as and the Kultur-to the election of Leo XIII has already hampt. been quoted: "I hail this promising accession. . . . If this Pope does not die too soon we may hope for a reasonable alliance with the Church."

Now, on February 20th, the very day on which Gambetta wrote this letter, Pope Leo XIII, who had but just mounted the pontifical throne, forwarded to the Emperor William, through the Nuncio in Bavaria, a telegram expressing his desire "to see peace and tranquillity of conscience restored

¹ Some time later, March 16th, German artists were authorised to take part in the Exhibition.

to German Catholic subjects." The new Pope was aware that for some time past opinions had become modified at the Prussian court. Seizing the proffered hand, the Emperor addressed a letter one month later March 24th, to the pontiff, countersigned by Bismarck, which intimated the approaching end of the *Kulturkampf*.¹

This was just as the Russians were General Situation Completing their victorious campaign against Turkey; the Russian army stood at the gates of Constantinople, the Ottoman Government was asking for a cessation of hostilities. On February 14th, the English fleet received orders to pass the Dardanelles. Men stood on the threshold of serious events, possibly of a general European war.

These events, simultaneous, diverse, and equally dramatic, were followed with anxious attention by Paris and Berlin. Bismarck spoke in the Reichstag on February 19th, giving a bold outline of the situation and of the international relations. Gambetta read this speech of the "Monster" with some agitation, seeking in it a commentary on public events and also some allusion as to what was happening behind the scenes. He wrote the next day:—

I was able to read the "Monster's" speech before going to sleep. I am delighted with it, it is just what I had wished for and awaited, without daring to count upon it. Beneath the veil of allusion we occupy in it a most important and distinguished position. The balance and repartition of the continental forces are admirably indicated. It is really more than

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¹ These very important measures, and the rôle taken by Leo XIII as partisan of a new policy, are carefully indicated for the German official press in Dr. Brück's Die Culturkampfbewegung in Deutschland. See also Léon XIII et le Prince de Bismarck by Count Lefebvre de Béhaine.

we could have hoped for from the fantastic and vehement spirit of the adventurous genius who has constructed modern Germany out of blood and iron.\(^1\)... There now rises within this man the radiant dawn of rightful dealing. It now rests with us to profit from circumstances and rival ambitions, to state clearly our just claims, and with him to found a new order of things. I am, therefore, at the height of my hopes—peace assured for several years, the Exhibition no longer imperilled, the Powers ready to make advances to France should they wish for action, and also should they merely wish to deliberate and maintain. To-day will be a great day.

Nevertheless Gambetta's correspondent, with feminine intuition, experienced a kind of disappointment on her reading of the speech. Gambetta emphasised. What he saw, with a glance that grouped comprehensively the outlines while rather neglectful of the details, was the avoidance of a war, the end of a period of tension that France had found unbearable for the past seven years, and the entry of the French Republic as a great Power into the European Concert on the eve of important developments. It was the evolution of the policy over which he, after M. Thiers, had presided, and which, too, he might have criticised, but it was, on the whole, in conformity with the efforts of earlier Cabinets and was not without results. Was it to the interests of France to declare herself any longer absent from Europe?

It became more and more apparent that to put an end to the Oriental crisis a Congress would soon be held in Berlin under the presidency of Prince Bismarck. It was the hour of supreme decision. Should France accept the invitation addressed to her, and

¹ This, I think, is the expression in Bismarck's speech in which Gambetta sees an allusion to French policy: "The friendship which fortunately unites us to most of the European states—I can almost say to all just now, as those for whom this friendship is but a thorn in the flesh are not in power."

yield to the appeal of the victor? For a long while Gambetta debated the pros and cons of this with himself and with his friends and counsellors. There was some reason for believing that he inclined towards the negative. At last, consistent with himself, he declared for acceptance; on March 6th he wrote:—

I yield to you, wise Minerva; your words have conquered my last hesitation, and should there be a meeting in Berlin presided over by the "Monster" we shall go to it, especially should the invitation come from him. I have spent the evening with our Minister, I am deciding things, and am going to prepare the vote in defence of the desire for action. . . . The terrible words, cowardice or aggression (that is to say, refusal would be cowardice or aggression) sum up everything.

On March 7th, after a further declaration from Bismarck, there was another moment of hesitancy. The resolution, however, had been taken—at the meeting of the Powers France would play her part. Once again the plan of interviewing the man about to preside over all Europe arose in Gambetta's mind. Did he hope in a personal interview "to state our just claims clearly," and to seize through sheer eloquence what Thiers had not been able to obtain? Would he venture to touch upon the bitter problem? Would a negotiation preparatory for the Congress open the gates of the Future to a non-dismembered France, and would it prove, for Europe, the prelude of a disarmed peace?

On April 6th Count Henckel was requested to propose the interview. This time Bismarck was disposed for it. On the 12th the journey was delayed by the death of an aunt of Gambetta's, which obliged him to go to Nice. In a letter of April 14th Bismarck

[&]quot;If people were more just, a survey of the Past would prove that when free I declared for not going to Berlin." Speech of Gambetta in the Chamber, February 21st, 1881.

himself indicated the route to be taken, and the arrangements for the meeting. On April 22nd an interview between Gambetta and Count Henckel settled all the details. On April 23rd Gambetta wrote, "I have seen, I have promised; the 'Monster' is arranging to receive me." And Count Henckel on his side telegraphed to Friedrichsruh, "The envoy starts on Sunday, arrives in Berlin on Monday evening, and will be at your service on Tuesday." The interview was settled for the 30th, in Berlin, where Bismarck had to go for the session of the Reichstag.

The next day, April 24th, Count Henckel received the following letter from Gambetta:—

Man proposes—Parliament disposes. When I accepted yesterday with such readiness I had not reckoned on the unforeseen which holds us all in check. The questions relating to the Ministry of War have assumed the largest proportions. . . . I cannot abandon my parliamentary post. . . . I am therefore under the necessity of delaying the execution of the project until after the end of the session at least. After the adjournment of the Chamber perhaps you will allow me to avail myself of your intervention, if it is not then too late.

The parliamentary pretext was but an excuse. At the last moment Gambetta retired. The matter was not resumed in spite of courtesies from the "Monster," and the interview did not take place. In spite of his very definite assertion Count Henckel had not been able to dispose of M. Gambetta and bring him to Berlin "at a sign." ¹

These facts have aroused many comments and

¹ M. Caze, Senator, in the *Temps* of September, 1907, relates that Gambetta questioned him one day as to the probable effect of his journey to Berlin and interview with Prince Bismarck, and that in consequence of this conversation Gambetta renounced his idea.

various interpretations.1 Reproduced faithfully and connected with contemporary events, they-as well as Gambetta's plan—explain themselves by political ideas engendered by the gravity of the situation. France had much to rescue and much to regain in the abasement to which the harassing policy of Prince Bismarck had for so long reduced her. The incident of 1875 had caused her much alarm and driven her to the tiers, which is always unsatisfactory. In 1878, the exhaustion of Russia, even after a victorious war, might authorise a different policy, more profitable perhaps than the vague theme of revenge accompanied by unceasing uneasiness. Now, what occasion could be more favourable than that offered by the solemn assizes about to be held in Berlin? It was a case of re-entering the Concert or of not figuring there at all; what would be the advantage of standing aside and sulking? Either it would be that Europe would do without the help of France in modifying treaties concluded by or through her, or that France would have to stand alone in declared hostility to the new European attitude, or, further, that her reserve might induce such misunderstandings that a general conflict would be unavoidable. The idea of resuming her position, accompanied by an effort to gain something thereby, was justifiable. A meeting between Bismarck and Gambetta would probably not have produced the result hoped for by the latter and certain of his friends, but it would effected useful enlightenment. Whatever have

¹ To gain the thread of the matter employment has been made of Bismarck's correspondence and of Gambetta's letters to Léonie Léon, published in the *Revue de Paris*, December, 1906, and January, 1907. See also Francis Laur's *Le Coeur de Gambetta*. There is some partiality in the study of de Meaux in his *Souvenirs* (p. 340 et passim).

Count Henckel may have said about it, Gambetta would thereby have risked his popularity; it may be presumed that this feeling, as also the presentiment of ultimate disillusionment, altered his first decision.

One of the factors of the new policy was to be found in Rome. The death of Victor Emmanuel. at all events that of Pius IX, and the approaching Conclave, were being provided for; here, as in the Berlin Congress, France would have to resume her position and support her secular interests. Gambetta considered that such interests were worth a journey, just as "Rome was well worth a Mass." Whatever illusions may have been induced by his ardent imagination, the political line to be taken remained clear and firm in his mind. The proof of this in the particular circumstances accompanying this singular incident of contemporary history, is that the change of Pope should, both in Paris and Berlin, have brought about so sudden and complete a reconsideration. Bismarck was taking the first step towards Canossa just as Gambetta foresaw "a reasonable union between the Republic and the Church." And the plan of an interview faded into nothing. Both sides stood free; both adopted new plans and hastened on to other destinies.

It is therefore in Rome that the new motive must be sought of the drama in which these plans formed but an episode.

Victor Emmanuel was dead,—an almost sudden death had overtaken him at the age of fifty-eight. He had had the time to sign on January 1st, 1878, the decree regulating the funeral of the sovereign Pontiff in "unified" Rome. Pius IX survived him. He, in his turn, had time to

accord the king, described to him as penitent, absolution and burial in holy ground; he had just time to protest against the title of king "of Italy" assumed by Humbert I, and then he died.

The political and religious problem, cut through by force in 1870, was presented anew by the Pope's decease. Rome was now definitely Italian—was she to remain pontifical? or would Catholicism shake off the traditions that bound it to the Eternal City, and would the Pope, staff in hand, wander forth to seek a new dwelling-place in another part of the earth? As a more immediate question—was the Conclave to be free? Could the election be held with dignity and safety in this conquered capital, amidst this divided people, and under the guard of a Government struck by the Papal Interdict? And this Government was led by notorious adversaries of the Church and Papacy—Depretis the sceptic, Crispi the freemason!

Pius IX, with all his protests, had remained in Rome; at the back of his soul he felt himself Italian. When the Cardinal Camerlingue had struck the three times on the brow of the deceased with the question "Dormis ne?" the prelate who became during the interregnum the highest personage in the Church—Cardinal Pecci, Bishop of Perouse—immediately made the arrangements necessary for the holding of the Conclave in the quarter reserved to the Pope and

¹ The protestation addressed to the Powers on January 18th by the Secretary of State runs as follows: He declares "that in view of the actions of the eldest son of King Victor Emmanuel, His Holiness has ordered him to protest anew against the infringement of Church rights upon the ancient domains destined by Providence to assure the independence of the Sovereign Pontiffs, the full liberty of their apostolic ministry, and the peace and tranquillity of the Catholics scattered throughout the world."

respected by the law of "guarantees." Cardinal Pecci was a man of intellect who made no rash decisions. He, too, was "Italian," and reputed to incline towards-conciliation. Some one wrote from Rome on February 8th, the day when Pius IX passed away: "The Cardinal Camerlingue has taken up his functions. He is very cool and would only leave Rome if hostile manifestations were to be made." Through this attitude alone it was easy to foresee that the Conclave would be definitely located.

It has been said that Bismarck desired the Conclave to be held elsewhere, that manifestations had been organised in Rome in order to intimidate the Cardinals, that the Italian Government was preparing to claim that the Pope should be elected by the people's votes. The dynasty of Savoy, however, had good reason for not wishing to press the Papacy too far, and for having it regarded as a source of grandeur and prosperity for Italy and the Eternal City. Prince Bismarck, as is now known, desired not strife but peace,—besides which, his attention was otherwise engaged.

It was to the general interest that the Roman Catholic Church should maintain normal relations with the Powers.

Gambetta it was, who came to Rome to confer with M. Crispi. It was urgently necessary to come to an understanding on a subject that interested the whole earth. Crispi was not slow to give his hand to the skilful politician reputed for his suppleness and practical good sense.

Cardinal Pecci was suddenly observed to be making his arrangements so calmly as to make things seem assured. The "black" cardinals, creatures of the dead pope, tried to get up a debate. Thirty-

eight cardinals met and exchanged views as to the place where the Conclave should be held. The Head-Cardinal—di Pietro—and the Cardinal Camerlingue prevented the passing of any hasty resolution.

The French Ambassador, the Marquis de Noailles, had an interview with M. Crispi at this moment. The Minister for the Interior expressed strong views upon the maintenance of order and the dignity of the Conclave.

On the 9th, invitations were dispatched for the Cardinals to meet in *Rome*. The decision had been made.¹

Nine days' prayers were held within the basilica of St. Peter's. The dead Pope lay in state in a chapel, watched, behind a grating, by the gardes nobles, while Italian fantassins were drawn up in line along the nave open to the public. It was a combinazione. Things were arranged by means of compliances and compromise.

The Cardinals entered into Conclave Conclave on the 18th, with the customary ceremonial reduced to a minimum. Retired within the palace, they numbered sixty-one, of whom thirty-nine were Italian, seven French, seven German or Austrian, four Spanish, two English, one Belgian, one Portuguese. Three Cardinals were absent. Never had there been a better attended Conclave. The voting took place in the Sixtine Chapel beneath the vaulted roof fragrant with intellect and genius, before the sublime painting in which the beardless Christ of Michael-Angelo gives celestial sanction to

¹ M. Crispi intimated indirectly that should the Conclave leave Rome the law of guarantees would cease to exist and that the Italian Government would take immediate possession of the Vatican. See Battandier's *Cardinal J. B. Pittra* (p. 631).

the earthly mission of the Church while separating the elect from the condemned.

The Cardinal Camerlingue led the Conclave with a strong hand. The ambassadors waited and watched outside. In the office of the Ministry of the Interior M. Crispi, in no less difficult a situation, was still more energetic; the Roman Radicals and freethinkers surged tumultuously before him, demanding the abrogation of the law of guarantees; it was an attempt to intimidate the Cardinals. M. Crispi received the leaders of the troop, and harangued them in such sort that they dispersed.

Who would be elected by the Conclave? In the task of solemn import entrusted to these sixty elderly men, motives of the highest sublimity and of the lowest meanness were at work. The red electors, exponents of the Divine will, consulted both their conscience and their colleagues; so lofty in rank, yet bowed down towards the tomb, these men at halt upon the edge of earth had perforce to listen to voices both of heaven and of the world. Faith and prudence, but also prejudice and passion—many gusts were agitating those trembling beacon lights.

The pontificate of Pius IX had too well reflected the ardour of illusion and the violence of reaction characteristic of the nineteenth century. Mastaï, the Pope of 1848, had become the pope of the Syllabus and of the Councils, the bold and passionate apostle whom nor king, nor emperor, nor century had forced one inch from his position. Had the Church increased or decreased in this attitude of combat? In sounding the war-cry against modern thought, in opposing the Kulturkampf, in renouncing the Loysons and the Döllingers, in saddening the Dupanloups and the Strossmayers, in breaking with Cavour and

Victor Emmanuel, had her exigencies augmented her authority? had she, through her tenacity of purpose, gained in depth what she had lost in breadth?

These sixty elderly men alone were able to reply, but how many thousand souls would their answer not affect! Whether Catholicism were to accomplish her eternal mission, to be or not be the shelter of mankind, the temple of organised morality, the loftiest of all human political constructions, the surest of refuges for the sorrows of this life, whether the rock on which the Church was founded were to be strengthened or shaken, one name, the name pronounced by these sixty failing voices, would decide.

Amongst the Cardinals eligible for the papacy were Bilio, Franchi, Monaco La Valetta, Parocchi—although young, di Pietro—although old; also Panebianco, rendered popular by the mere fact of his patronymic (Whitebread).

In Rome, whose people take as much interest in a ceremony as in a show, and in an election as in a familiar game, the cry arose "No monk, No Jesuit!" The Powers were very moderate. No Government deemed the times propitious for playing the rôle of Charles V or Louis XIV. The general comment was "Be quick about it!" and the general feeling "Do something new."

These diverse movements of the world and of the people were reflected, greatly modified, in the thoughts and words, most delicately weighed, of the fathers of the Conclave. The French Ambassador, Baron Baude, wrote:—

The foreign Cardinals [in which he included the Frenchmen] certainly desire an Italian as pope, but they do not desire an

Italian pope, by which is meant a pope who would allow the papacy to be absorbed and submerged in the Italian nation. They consider that this would prove most dangerous to the papacy and to the religious peace of Europe.

Such as were animated by the zeal of Pius IX advanced the name of Bilio; the Liberals, supported by the Spaniards, wished for Franchi. There were rumours of petty intrigues carried on by Cardinal von Hohenlohe, who represented Germany and Austria. France had confided her privilege of "exclusion" to Cardinal de Bonnechose, in order to oppose Bilio in case of need.

The truth is that attention was inevitably directed to one name, which, announced first in Italy, then cardinal in France, by a resounding brochure, Pecci was supported by a very loyal and dignified campaign and excited much interest—this name was that of Cardinal Pecci.

He was the Camerlingue whose pale face Rome had watched emerging from the shadow during the last days of Pius IX, and whose function it had been to see that the Pope was really dead—the Pope who had never liked him. Little was known of him but that he had written some excellent literary and theological treatises, that he had proved himself an able delegate at Benevento, a skilful Nuncio in Brussels, and that he had been for over thirty years the Bishop of Perugia. He came of good family—a soldier's son born in that Umbria so often the nursery of Roman glories. He had been made Cardinal in 1853, and was now sixty-eight years of age. Natural prudence and craft had enabled him to turn his opponents to advantage without apparent calculation. At the Council of the Vatican he had kept silence, but he had voted for all the Roman pro-

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positions. The opposition, however, valued and appreciated him.

As if with the presentiment of his high destiny, he had published on February 6th, 1877, and February 10th, 1878 (three days after the death of Pius IX), two pastoral letters on "The Harmony between the Church and Civilisation." 1 Some sort of discreet correction of the Syllabus was sometimes read in these. The doctrine was the same, but the tone was different. These pious dissertations did not savour of the sacristy; the scholar and the gentleman were seen behind the firm and measured words of the prelate. And there was something else within these pages-in prevision of the social outbursts which were to shake the older world. The Bishop, once a Nuncio in Brussels, had looked into the factories, and remembered the "Black Country." He blamed the "overworking, heathenish and servile, which tends to chain man down to matter and to give him over to brute passions." The Bishop of Perouse did not deny the material progress of modern civilisation, but he called upon it to respect a higher work, the moral and religious amelioration of mankind. There was in these epistles no condescension to the ideas of the century, but yet there was true insight into the requirements of the age; the object of the writer was harmony, not discord.

Two men of influence in the French press, Count Conestabile and Count Grabinski, had tried to make the Cardinal-Bishop of Perouse known to France.

¹ For these details, besides the biographies of the two Cardinals Pitra and Bonnechose who took part in the Conclave, L. Teste's *Léon XIII et le Vatican*, also Henri des Houx's *Joachim Pecci* have been consulted. Private documents of well accredited diplomatists in Rome at this time have also been made use of.

They were in touch with Mgr. Dupanloup, with the *Univers*, and several political men, as MM. Duclerc and Etienne Lami; perhaps also with the circle of Gambetta, at all events the latter was well acquainted with the claims of Cardinal Pecci. It has been wrongly stated that Gambetta and the French Government desired the election of Cardinal Bilio.¹ An article by M. Bonghi in the *Nuova Antologia*, a brochure published by M. Teste, *Préface au Conclave*, represented Cardinal Pecci as the hope of a policy of peace and reconciliation. Everywhere there was the same expression.

The first voting took place after Mass on February 19th. The Cardinals defiled before the altar raised at the foot of Michael-Angelo's fresco, placing within an urn their closed papers. Cardinal Pecci obtained 27 votes, Cardinal Bilio 12, Cardinal Franchi 8, Cardinal Parocchi 1, Cardinal de Luca 10, Cardinal Ledochowski 2. Forty-two votes were required to be elected by a majority of two-thirds. Cardinal de Bonnechose, without pronouncing the "exclusive," intimated that France would not accept the nomination of Cardinal Bilio. At the second voting, Cardinal Pecci had 36 votes, Bilio 12. Cardinal Franchi rallied and made himself the agent for the Peruginian, who was then practically elected.

He trembled before the approaching burden.

¹ See Dom Battandier (p. 632). Baron Baude, Ambassador at the Holy See, wrote a little later, March 19, in a letter addressed to Marshal MacMahon protesting against his recall: "You have congratulated yourself on the results of the Conclave and on the elevation to the papacy of Cardinal Pecci. It would be difficult to deny that I have forwarded his candidature, that I have spoken for him to all the French Cardinals and all those Romans or foreigners with whom I have any influence." (See Vie du Cardinal de Bonnechose, vol. ii. p. 248.)

During the night of February 19th it is said that he went to see one of his colleagues: "I must speak to the Sacred College. Men are mistaken in me. They attribute to me wisdom and goodness; I am neither wise nor good. They are mistaken." "You are not the judge," replied the Cardinal. "As to what concerns your duty, we are your judges. As to your qualities, they are known to God—confide yourself to Him."

The third voting gave 44 votes to Cardinal Pecci, but 7 more to Bilio and 7 to de Luca. The spirit of Pius IX was still abroad.

The elected Cardinal was asked the customary questions. "Do you accept the election according to its ceremony? By what name do you desire to be known?" "I submit myself to the will of God," he replied, "In memory of Leo XII, I desire to be known as Leo."

In the long list of Popes, the Leos have been held as political and conciliatory, those of the name of Pius as saints and warriors. Gambetta would have known of this tradition; it explains an expression in his letter of February 20th. "He is elected Pope, and the name of Leo XIII that he has taken seems to me of good augury."

The new Pope had to make a definite decision at once. Should he, by his first action, carry on the policy of Pius IX by shutting himself within the Vatican, or should he give the benediction *urbi et orbi* from the outer *loggia* of St. Peter's? The crowd, which had acclaimed his election, waited, ready to prostrate themselves before him. "It was said that the cannons of the Castle of St. Angelo were loaded for a salvo should the white-robed figure appear on the balcony, and that the troops had received

orders to offer royal honours." It was also said that a hostile demonstration had been prepared.

The Pope announced that he would give the benediction inside the basilica. The Vatican remained closed, and the new Pope, for the whole duration of his reign, enclosed within it the secret of his policy.

Pope Leo XIII then showed himself what he was henceforth to be, wise, prudent, and politic. In his article in the *Nuova Antologia*, M. Bonghi had defined the Cardinal as "He who exceeds in nothing."

A Cardinal had also said on the eve of the election, "We desire a Pope who is firm in his principles and moderate in their application." These two phrases well characterise Leo XIII. He found his strength in his moderation.

Pius IX, stout, florid, ardent, amiable, Pius IX impassioned, eloquent, had had a reign more abundant in contrasts than any which the Church had known. Though he had great misfortunes, he was not unhappy. His broad and genial smile, his impulsive cordiality, his open countenance and natural good-will, gained him many friends. Never was Pope more loved and pitied, and, in spite of his disappointments, more warmly defended. Not deeply learned, but naturally trustful, and easily yielding, he submitted to the influences which entangled him by degrees in difficulties from which he could not free himself. He was always, and in every sense of the word, "the imprisoned pope." He lived through "the years of Peter to bear the chains of Peter." The tears caused by his sufferings formed his one joy and consolation. The last years of his unique reign were one long series of emotions.

Leo XIII was white and attenuated in visage, slender of form. An inward

lamp seemed to illuminate his emaciated face, and this lamp which lighted all his words and actions was that of intellect. During the exile in Perugia to which the hostility of Antonelli and the jealous prescience of Pius had condemned him, he had meditated at length. As a man of culture, as a theologian, administrator, diplomatist, he was ready for his high estate, while, as supreme proof of his qualification, he had learned how to keep silence. Yet he too was eloquent, with the eloquence that expounds and proves, not that which merely moves and charms. He had power of self-control, his strength lay in his careful tact: from his wild Umbrian fatherland he inherited a practical outlook. Guided by his own thoughts, performing his own actions, as son of a soldier he knew how to command. The generosity of his spirit was stirred but little by sufferings close at hand, greatly by woes vast and impersonal, the woes of the masses; in this, again, he showed the politician. His keenest sight was that of foresight.

He was in truth a Roman Pontiff, confident in the times and in the word of God, but drawing from this firm faith a patience, a moderation and an accommodating spirit which gave the wisest decisions time for birth and the happiest time to flower.

While compromising nothing, Leo XIII saved what could be saved. Bismarck, appeased for the first time, he brought even to Canossa. Throughout his reign he stood firm against the spirit of the age, though ignoring neither its boldness nor its force. The prophecies of Gambetta were not wholly unfulfilled, though not completely realised. Leo XIII sought to bring about the "marriage of reason" with the Republic. He loved France, which stood to him as the one Roman Catholic nation with a

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power of expansion and propaganda through the world. Some one spoke to him of General Duchesne after the campaign in Madagascar. "Bring him to Rome!" exclaimed the Pope, "I should like to see a conqueror!"

IV

The Lesson of 1878 lic was becoming assured. The elections in the Chamber between the months of April and June, with a view of deciding as to the invalidations were, for the most part, favourable to its institutions. As was said by J. J. Weiss in a famous article of May 1st which proved the tomb of "monarchical illusions," "a Republic had been formed; the electoral body considered that for the guidance of a republic there was need of Republicans; such were therefore chosen who declared themselves to be so without further preamble."

The lust of conflict had abated; men felt the need of peace. The Chamber met from April 29th to June 11th in order to expedite current business and allow the President of the Republic and his Government leisure to receive the visitors to the Exhibition. The session was short, but very energetic. There was much work done towards the Budget for 1879. M. Gambetta, again elected chairman of the Budget committee, declared himself for the policy of alleviation rather than for that of waiting and economy advised by Léon Say, Minister of Finance; the Republic was desired to pay for its welcome. The financial situation, up to a certain point, authorised a method which was not altogether without danger for the future. The liquidation of the war expenses

gradually faded from the parliamentary discussions, France was beginning to accustom herself to live beneath its burden.

On May 24th the Chamber voted the bill for the direct taxation of 1879. The bill was passed on to the Senate, where it occasioned a difficult debate as to the interpretation of the constitutional laws. direct contributions were separated from the Budget in order to allow of repartition by the General Councils and Conseils d'Arrondissement during their summer session. The Budget could, however, not be voted this year in the usual session, so that the Government introduced into the project an article declaring that the covering of the contributions could not be performed before the voting of the Budget complete. This was a precaution as to the velleities of independence in the executive power. The Senate wished to oppose this, and therefore threw out the article. The Chamber, however, having maintained the formula of government, the Senate yielded rather than recommence the dispute.

Military All that concerns the army has always Measures been as popular with the two Chambers as with the general public. On April 9th new credits of 120 and 224 millions were voted for the liquidation fund, and for the War Budget; and on the same day a law was passed allowing for a credit permitting the first call to the standard of the territorial army. On May 14th and 17th the Senate gave a second and third reading to the measure organising the new service of the êtat major. On May 18th a mixed committee from the Senate and the Chamber sat to examine numerous questions relating to the navy. Between May 6th and June 22nd the Senate and the Chamber, on the motion of Gambetta and Proust, voted a measure

improving the position of retired officers. Between June 6th and June 22nd, on the intervention of Gambetta in the Chamber, and not without debate in the Senate, a law was passed improving the conditions of non-commissioned officers, offering premiums for re-enlistment, as well as higher pay, and instituting the grade of adjutant. A decree of June 15th instituted a higher military college. Another of June 20th raised the pension of officers' widows from a quarter to a third. Another defined the enterprises to be undertaken by the public administration near the frontier. And, on July 11th, the Journal Officiel promulgated a measure organising hospital work in the army and mixed services.

Arrangements for the public works went on at the same rapid rate as did the military reorganisation. On April 27th a report of the Minister for Public Works addressed to the President of the Republic. stated the result of the inquiry entrusted to district committees; in general they approved of his pro-New measures were not lacking. April 20th the Senate considered projects for establishing local railways by the interested communes and departments. Between May 2nd and 10th the Senate discussed and voted, on the motion of M. Feray, a measure for the buying up of the debtencumbered railway companies. M. Buffet, as a prelude to a long course of opposition, declared as to this that the budgets would be thereby hampered for the next seventy-five years. The law was brought into force on May 18th.

Between March 16th and May 31st, the two Chambers discussed waterway projects, touching, firstly, the improvement of the Seine between Paris and Rouen (32 millions), and the

canal connecting the Aisne and the Oise (15 millions); secondly, the improvement of the Rhône between Lyons and the sea (45 millions); thirdly, the improvement of the Burgundian canal, of the Yonne and of the Seine between Paris and Auxerre (20 millions). These projects were attached to the general programme for the reconstitution of navigable water ways between Havre and Marseilles. The law was promulgated June 15th. On May 14th the Chamber adopted a measure for the construction of a deep-water harbour at Boulogne-sur-Mer, which was brought into force on June 17th (17 millions). Another measure, of June 14th, provided for the enlargement of the port of Cette (8,400,000 francs).

Then came a great deed. M. de Freyci-Railways net brought a motion before the Chamber on June 4th, as to the complementary classing of the larger railway lines. He concluded that there would be some 9,000 kilometres of new lines, and a general reviewing of 17,000 kilometres arranged for either by the present programme or by former laws. The new lines were to be constructed in every district throughout the country, making no exception of the more difficult and less favoured The extent of the small railway lines would regions. reach 30,000 kilometres, far in excess of that of the national lines. Ten years would be needed for the accomplishment of the undertaking, and the cost was estimated at more than three milliards. Besides this, the starting of the local lines was announced in the circular submitting the project to the consideration of the General Councils.

Throughout the nation arose the perspective of immense enterprises, vast movements of capital, great immediate gains, and indefinite ulterior profit.

The plans were certainly rather immature and hasty, and needed slow adoption and much testing; it would have been better to have taken the progress of science and industry more into consideration. The increasing tonnage of ships, the invention of the bicycle and motor-car have since greatly modified the conditions of some of the enterprises too hastily undertaken. Ideas were over-speedily incorporated, whose very greatness of conception was romantic and Caesarian. Public discussion, parliamentary and local rivalry, further exaggerated the faults and altered the character of the design, which was, on the whole, grandiose and beneficial.

The multiplicity of investigations needed in the realisation of these vast projects entailed the creation of an Under-Secretaryship of State in the Public Works department, and M. Sadi Carnot took the post.

For this colossal enterprise there was needed money,—again money, and immediate money. On May 21st M. Varroy read out the measure before the Senators on the creation of the Terminable Three Per Cents already voted by the Chamber.

M. Chesnelong spoke authoritatively against the scheme, and also against the projected public works. He foresaw financial disaster. M. Léon Say defended his system, while deploring the right of parliamentary initiative in the matter of credits. His regrets were of the Platonic kind. The measure was adopted on the second reading, June 3rd, and brought into force on June 11th. There remained but to go to the fountain-head. Emissions of terminable interest were decreed July 16 and August 6th, 1878.

Economic policy went forward on the declared lines. On March 20th a new general tariff of customs was

submitted to the consideration of a Committee of 33 members, selected by the Chamber and presided over by M. Jules Ferry. The committee proceeded to inquire into the general economic situation of the country. The work was carried on with great activity and brought the legislative powers into actual contact with the working forces of the nation. Few labours of this sort have had a more effectual bearing on the future of the Republic. All these men of labour and of enterprise, thus summoned to discuss and explain their business, felt a sense of pride in their importance, and attached themselves to those parliamentarians who had lent an attentive ear to their grievances and explanations. How many "conversions" had herein their origin! Interests are so easily harmonised!

A commission of inquiry into the position of commerce and industry had been constituted in the Senate during the crisis of May the Sixteenth. was, originally, political in character. Its aims were, however, modified by its success, and devoted to serious economic investigations. It was on May 21st that M. Ancel read the report of this commission. Its conclusions were, firstly, the necessity of establishing as soon as possible a general customs tariff with a raising of privileges. Secondly, the non-renewal of commercial treaties until the establishment of the said tariff. Thirdly, that the attention of the Government should be directed to the position of the merchant service—which also formed the object of another report read by M. Desseaux, May 17th.

First Immediate following was given by the Protectionist parliament to the protectionist tendencies desaure evinced on various sides.

After a grave debate, on June 7th, the Chamber refused to sanction the projected Franco-Italian commercial treaty which had been negotiated by the Duc Decazes; the new Government, fearing a reverse, had added to the proposed treaty a clause making it renewable from year to year. In spite of this concession, M. Jules Méline's powerful comments shook the Chamber. Italy had raised her tariffs; France desired to be free to do the same. M. Rouvier defended the treaties. Finally, by 225 votes against 220, the Chamber supported M. Méline and threw out the treaty. The tariff war began between Italy and France. Italy had found the men of May the Sixteenth easier to deal with, despite her loud complaints of them!

Schools Democratic feeling marched forward on Fund an open road. In the Senate on May 2nd M. Dauphin read the report on the construction of school-buildings. Funds amounting to a total of 120 millions would be at the disposal of the communes for the construction or improvement of educational buildings. A special fund, under the control of the State, was created for this purpose. Such outlay was made obligatory in each commune. The measure was adopted without debate, and brought into force on June 1st. It formed an inexhaustible subject for complaints, recrimination and reproach from the Opposition.

Military M. Laisant requested the Chamber to Service consider his measure for reducing military service to a period of three years, and for the suppression of the Volontariat. It was beaten by 201 votes against 154, but in view of the principle of equality, the idea gained ground. M. Naquet, on May 21st, brought forward a bill for the re-

institution of divorce—a serious attack on the established order! The press seized on the idea; articles and speeches thundered on the subject. Literature had prepared the road for the legislator. M. Naquet realised Alexandre Dumas the Younger, just as he had already represented a sanction of the doctrines of Taine.

A motion was brought forward on June 4th by MM. André Folliet and Pascal Duprat on the municipal government. Another on the right of meeting and association was introduced by M. Louis Blanc and others.

There was, on the whole, a strong feeling of enthusiasm and of assurance for the future. Despite the violence of the Opposition, manifested chiefly in the debates on invalidations, the country began to have confidence in the Republic. "In spite of abstract reasonings founded on the clause of revision," wrote J. J. Weiss, "nothing is lacking to the Republic in what constitutes a definite government—neither name, right, life nor action."

This optimism was almost unanimous towards the close of the session, and was shared by all Republicans. They confidently awaited the approaching renewal of the Senatorial third, and, as a great factor, the success of the Exhibition spoke more loudly still; the party sang hosannas for a definite victory.

Gambetta at the Hoche Banquet in Versailles replied to M. Henri Martin and M. Albert Joly, and repudiated the dangerous encomiums addressed to him:—

No! I have been nothing but the servant of my party in the time of foreign peril and of civil strife. Yes! I have never despaired of France, but there is no merit in this, so a truce to these

flatteries!... This occasion has the merit of uniting both the military spirit and the civil spirit. The attempt to create a gulf between the Republican party and the army in which the Republic was to sink, has not been in any wise successful.

M. Gambetta was the object of long ovations after this speech. The rumour spread, however, that his health was undermined, and that after having spoken he was a long while unconscious.

M. Bardoux at Lille, July 15th, and at Dreux, September 8th, propounded the scheme of scholastic reform:—

The democratic France of the future will be what the university will have made her. He who cares not for education is no patriot; whoever loves France must love education. And before all things, education must inspire the love of country.

At Maubeuge, July 22nd, M. de Marcère declared the favourable position of the Government brought about by events and by the merits of its members. He, however, also pointed out the religious dissensions already latent, and which might compromise the peace and stability.

The Chambers adjourned on June 11th. Exhibition One thing alone was attracting all attention, both at home and abroad. France was re-appearing smiling and resplendent to the world. The Exhibition of 1878 opened its portals on the day arranged for, May 1st. Neither the crisis at home, nor the circumstances in the East which threatened to imperil peace, had discouraged the initiators of the enterprise. Paris, with her love of splendid shows, her gifts of

¹ These were MM. Krantz, Alphand, Dietz-Monin and Berger, with Tisserend for the agricultural department. M. Alphand was the practical director. The palace of the Trocadero was constructed after plans by MM. Davioud and Bourdais.

decorative art and magnificence, her propagandist spirit, desired once more to attract the sympathy and admiration of the peoples, and she succeeded.

On the plain of the Champ de Mars and on the hill of the Trocadero there arose vast palaces guarding the riches of the Exhibition. The palace of the Champ de Mars, quietly elegant, was on the whole but a large cage of iron and glass. It was desired that the palace of the Trocadero should be more finished and more durable. The vast hemicycle of columns crowning the hill gave to the Acropolis of the Trocadero an imposing and harmonious aspect, spoilt unfortunately by the heavy capping of the central building and by the two Moorish minarets by which it was flanked.

The conception of an architecture in which Oriental and Byzantine memories are joined to classical ideas is fairly representative of the indecision of the age. At this moment Stanley and Brazza were returning from their African expedition. The whole world was opening out to European enterprise. Every mind was stirred by a vague uneasiness as to the new developments, by aspiration towards the unknown, by the call of the still untrodden regions of the earth, and by the dim presentiment of some new phase of life—dreamed of, yet still untried.

Scientific Science declared herself mistress of the Discoveries universe. The winged word flashed round the globe in some few seconds and gave itself a share in immortality; Edison brought forth the phonograph and telephone. Light and the powers of electricity were harnessed to the chariot of human industry and did domestic tasks. The conquests of Pasteur unveiled the secrets of the virus, perhaps, too, those of life. The older Europe

was crumbling beneath the work of practical statesmen; Bismarck, in his way, was a pioneer.

Yet the august shadow of Romanticism still influenced the new times. It was a troubled moment. rich in presentiment and intuition, lacking in definite achievement. Research was delighted in for itself alone; men's minds straining for the sound of the footsteps of the Future were moved by an

impulse of pure intellectual joy.

Powerful the evocation of the colossal and ephemeral "art of exhibitions," clear the expression of such fugitive and undefined emotions! Ingenious façades of the "Rue des Nations"; magical pavilions, gardens, cascades, fountains, with elephants and rhinoceroses from far Frémiet among them; with Russian isbas, Algerian mosques, Tunisian bazaars, cabins from Lapland and bowers from Japan at every step! Sumptuous architecture and decorations, gold and zinc, pine and bamboo-all this indeed was the work of faëry! Men stayed to gaze with fascination at the negro sweet-seller, the Turkish pedlar, the Chinese writer, the Hindoo weaving at his shawl. It was with pride that in this artificial corner of the city these varied types and strange costumes were noted. Was it not a summary of the whole vast earth! The sons of different nations defiled in rows of fives, with all their national insignia, in the ceremonial processions; thus did the prisoners of the kings on the Babylonian tablets. The exotic sovereigns demanded the revival of forgotten ceremonies.

The seven Algerian officers, draped in their burnous, were regarded with a curiosity that forgot the African campaigns. The Emir of Afghanistan, the Maharajahs of India, were so many figures from the

wonderland of the Arabian Nights. The Shah of Persia returned to France and walked at dusk incognito along the streets of Paris, as did Haroun al Raschid in Bagdad. An odour of musk, of the pastilles of the seraglio, floated out into the air of flowery gardens. The Spanish student thrummed his tambourine, and the aggressive call of gypsy fiddles led the wild uproar of those magic days.

Marshal MacMahon, with a reflective guration geniality, presided at the Carnival. quiet demeanour prevented any loss of dignity within it. On the 1st of May, surrounded by the new ruins of unfinished buildings, amid the muddy avenues and under a heavy thunder-shower, he declared the Exhibition open. The ceremony took The President of the place at the Trocadero. Republic, with the representatives of the Chambers and the constituted powers, was accompanied by king Don Francis d'Assise, the Prince of Wales, the Crown Prince of Denmark, the Duke of Aosta, and Prince Henry of the Netherlands. Despite the illhumour of Prince Bismarck, Europe took the risk of coming to Paris.

A speech from the Minister for Commerce gave expression to the spirit of the enterprise. "Reassured as to her future, and sheltered by a political régime in which she trusts, France renews her activity and energy." The speaker was no lyric poet, he merely expressed what was felt around him.

When the official ceremony was over, and when the cannon had responded to the Marshal's sacramental words, "The Exhibition is open," visitors were admitted, and 500,000 people thronged the gates. The crowd spread like a flood, in perfect order and with irrepressible cheerfulness. It was a sight in itself,

glad in its own gaiety, full of the joy of mere existence; good-humour, liveliness, surprise, emotion, reigned supreme. Paris labours ten years for one of these intoxicating hours; in such short moments she has the proud realisation of her position and her fame. Her citizens, arriving on the tops of penny omnibuses, mount also to the dignity of historical personalities.

In the evening the whole city was illuminated, even to the suburbs. The people overflowed into the streets, the weather became more clement, the stars fraternised with the illuminations, good feeling and cordiality prevailed.

The following day, M. Grévy, who had the gift of opportune improvisation, said to the Chamber:—

I yield to the desire of a number of my colleagues, and am sure of interpreting the feeling of the Chamber, in publicly expressing the satisfaction and deep sanction experienced yesterday at the brilliant opening of the Universal Exhibition. It was an emotion caused mainly by the patriotic joy of seeing France, her disasters hardly over, finding in her vitality, her power and her genius, the means of so magnificently convoking the entire world to this great feast of labour, commerce and industry.

No mention of it was made within the Senate. The parties of the Right were sulking, thus accentuating the victory of the Republic. Republican France was glad to profit by these days, since she was allowed them for her own.

Funds had been placed at the Government's disposal for adding splendour to the official ceremonies. Marshal MacMahon did the honours of the Elysée with magnificence; balls and dinners were given in the Ministerial offices. On May 24th a banquet was offered to the delegates of the foreign sections at the Exhibition by the Senators and Republican deputies, members of the Cercle National. After M. Duclerc, M. Teisserenc de Bort, and Sir Philip Cunliffe-Owen

had spoken, Gambetta made his speech; he was the hero of the day.

On June 30 a review of the troops of the government of Paris was held at Longchamps. The President of the Republic, loudly cheered along his way, returned to the Elysée on horseback.

During the course of the Exhibition the provincial schoolmasters came to visit it in detachments of five to six hundred at a time. They attended the educational conference and began to enter into the part reserved for them in the instruction of democracy. M. Bardoux addressed them on September 2nd:—

You must take back home with you a still deeper love of France; you have been able to judge for yourselves of the efforts made within the last eight years to restore her to her position. Help us to protect her from the evils that have unjustly come upon her. In short, see that you make your country loved.

The impulse once given, varied and numerous conferences, trades-meetings, national and international congresses, were multiplied, and filled Paris with the sound of speeches and of fêtes. The days and nights were not long enough for everything, the cafés hardly closed, and vehicles from which echoed choruses and cheers pervaded the streets till the opening of day.

There was one unprecedented day, not June 30th to be repeated, the Thirtieth of June; this was the people's fête, the true baptism of the Republic. This date had been selected in order to avoid the anniversary of July 14th. The weather was propitious, a sky veiled with tender clouds, the air sweet and fresh—the spring of Paris. During the morning the statue of the Republic, by Clésinger, was unveiled on the Champ de Mars. A kind of Phrygian cap upon her head, the pedestal of

the figure bore the rather chilly words Constitution

DE 1875.

The band of the Republican Guard was authorised to play the *Marseillaise*. The different Ministers made speeches. A general exodus was made to the wharfs to salute the colossal head of Bartholdi's "Liberty enlightening the World," which was to be a gift to the city of New York; the union of the two republics was celebrated as a symbol.

The whole of the morning was thus spent. The city was given over to the people in the afternoon, and smiled under flower wreaths and banners, triumphal arches and jubilant inscriptions. The older quarters were the gayest. The Cour des Miracles seemed a flowery garden. Every cab was decorated, each horse wore a garland or cockade. The garden of the Tuileries, the Place de la Concorde, the Avenue des Champs-Elysées, the Avenue du Bois de Boulogne, each in its magnificent setting was a gleam of green and gold. The crowd passed slowly, stopping to marvel, halting to watch the slightest incident. Carriage traffic soon became impossible. On the terrace of the Tuileries, a concert with M. Colonne's orchestra of two hundred players and five hundred choral singers under Dannhauser, was hardly heard above the tumult of the streets. There was dancing in the Halles, in the squares, at every street corner.

In the evening the city was again illuminated. Save for a dark blot in the Faubourg Saint Germain, a line of flame glided along the houses.

The streets were streams of light, the highest and narrowest being most resplendent. Along the Seine, on the lakes of the Bois de Boulogne, flotillas of Venetian barks, ablaze with many-coloured lights made glittering tracks across the water. Red lamps,

like exotic fruit, gleamed in the foliage of the trees; strings of electric light joined the Place de la Concorde to the Place de l'Etoile along the Champs Elysées, recently paved with wood, which glowed into an endless vista of delights. Fireworks sparkled forth from the heights of Montmartre, the Place du Trône, the Place d'Italie, and the Pont Neuf, while the torch-light procession of the Guards and Cuirassiers took its gleaming way from the gates of Passy to the Place de la Concorde.

Paris looked as if again ablaze,—a luminous mist was driven by the wind towards the heights of Suresne. It was a blaze of joy, not one of mourning. The ancient sorrows were forgotten.

CHAPTER V

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

- I.—Russia decides on war—Home and foreign situation of Russia—Defensive force of Turkey—The Powers in presence of war—Anglo-Russian arrangement—The Balkan countries—Roumania concedes a passage to the Russian troops—The rôle of France—The Austro-German agreement.
- II.—The war—The raid of Gourko—Russian difficulties—
 Impression in Europe—Roumania enters the lists—Surrender of Plevna and taking of Kars—The Russians at
 Adrianople—The veto of Great Britain—The armistice—
 The Russians at San Stefano—Intervention of Prince
 Bismarck—Germany as "I'honnête courtier"—The Treaty
 of San Stefano—The Schouwaloff-Salisbury convention
 —Programme of the Congress—The European missions—
 France accepts the invitation—Her reservations.
- III.—The Congress—The tactics of Prince Bismarck—Renewal of the Anglo-Russian differences—Work of the Congress in Europe and Asia—Germanic expansion in the Balkans—Satisfaction to the Powers—The Convention of Cyprus and the Egyptian question—Tunis opened to France—Birth of World-Policy.

I

The Russo-Turk- ish War her are never lost. While 1870 seemed so far away, while the Champ de Mars was a scene of pleasure and the lights of the Trocadero lighted joy, sorrow hovered near the gaiety, the fear of a general war agitated Europe. For over three months (since January 30th, 1878) the Russian army had stood at the gates of Constantinople. The coun-

sellers of the Powers weighed their forces as if to cast them in the balance. A whole year had just been passed in all the horror and uncertainty of a desperate conflict. The opening spring was full of storm and threat.

It was nine months since M. de Nélidoff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had quitted Constantinople after having notified the Porte of the breaking off of diplomatic relations. On April 24th, the Czar Alexander, in a manifesto to his people, had made known his decision to declare war against Turkey, "in order to effect better conditions of existence for the Christians of the East."

The Grand Duke Nicolas, as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, addressed his troops on April 24th, and used these words:—

We are called upon to execute the will of the sovereign and the sacred legacy of our fathers. It is not towards conquest that we march, it is to defend our insulted and oppressed brethren, to defend the faith of Christ.

Then was it to be a new Crusade, a Holy War? Not quite. In a note to the Powers (April 7th-9th) Prince Gortschakoff had deemed it expedient to use the language of practical politics.

Negotiations having failed, there remains no other alternative but to prolong a state of things declared by the Powers as incompatible with their interests and with those of Europe, or else to seek by coercion what the united efforts of the Cabinets have been unable to obtain from the Porte by persuasion. . . . The Emperor of Russia will therefore undertake alone what he had requested the Powers to perform with him. In taking up this task, he fulfils a duty imposed on him by the interests of Russia, whose peaceful development is hindered by the constant troubles in the East.

The interests of Russia? What did this formula

conceal? Was it not open to question by the Powers, themselves also *interested*?

Russia, on declaring war, was in a difficult position; hardly certain of her own intentions, she advanced bravely, even with temerity, on a ground she knew to be undermined. There was uncertainty as to the principle itself of the war-whether of interest or religion—also as to its object. "Constantinople is your object!" the Czar had told the Grand Duke Nicolas. "Have no fear for Constantinople!" the Powers had been repeatedly adjured. There was uncertainty as to those whose interests were to be supported in the Balkans—co-religionists or cousins. Orthodox or Slav. Uncertainty reigned also amid the governing powers and influences around the Czar, some determined on a fight to the death, on the obliteration of the Turkish Empire from the map of Europe; others inclined to moderation, according to the requirements of circumstances; The two tendencies can be summed up in two names -Ignatieff, Gortschakoff.

Gortschakoff, who by virtue of his position was most closely in touch with the problem, was especially preoccupied with the international attitude, no less obscure and uncertain than the real attitude of his own country. The first of his difficulties was to appreciate the actual bearing of the combination by which for so long the world had been lured—the Alliance of the Three Emperors. What did it value now that it was to be put to the proof? Gortschakoff could no longer cherish any illusions, since Bismarck had explained his intentions with some brusqueness in the month of October, 1876: obliged to choose between Russia and Austria—speaking to Russia herself, he had pronounced for Austria. With no

illusions left, this broken weapon had to be made use of, Europe had to be made to believe in its power, as to which its wielder had no hope whatever. Had Europe, Turkey, and Great Britain known the truth of the "confidential" explanation between the two great empires, what an encouragement they would have found it! And was it so sure that they did not know? It is sometimes to the interests of state secrets that they should be revealed.

Great Britain led the movement against Russia,—her hostility openly declared, it was at any rate easy to understand how to act towards her. But no! here again uncertainty prevailed. And this also troubled the game,—it was well known that at Constantinople M. Layard was an intimate adviser of the Sultan. English gold, English moral support, English political help, these would not fail Turkey. The English Government was most careful and punctilious as to every detail of political relations; it would cause much embarrassment to Russia. But would England go any further? would she play a decisive part?

England herself did not appear to know exactly what she wanted. There were discussions in the Government; a strong feeling, visible to all the world, was tearing at the soul of the English people, inclining them to sacrifice their interests and minister to "the bettering of the conditions of the Christians in the East."

How far would this feeling carry the nation? The profoundest calculations could be modified by a veering of the wind among this impressionable and imaginative people, redoubtable always in that they are always courageous.

On the other hand, was no account to be made of

the almost universal anti-Russian feeling in Europe? The Muscovite enterprises were analysed and bitterly discussed. As the constant troublers of the peace of Europe, the Slavs again threatened the repose which was so badly needed. The old leaven of Polish national feeling still worked strongly in editorial offices and in certain circles. German opinion was by no means favourable. M. Klaczko, M. Cucheval-Clarigny, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, had been asking awkward questions. They were but pinpricks, but the soul of Gortschakoff was over-sensitive. He appreciated praise. Europe was to him a theatre. Besides the susceptibilities of amour-propre his experience could not neglect the public opinion that weighs so heavily on days of traffic.

There was another subject of uneasiness which was still more immediate, and this was the difficulty of the campaign itself. Turkey was not a negligible quantity. It is true, that Ignatieff from Constantinople had not ceased to affirm the weakness of that country and to prophesy its fall at the first shock to its stability; it is true that the Turkish generals had not been able to put down the insurrections in Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria, and that they had had some trouble in dealing with small Servia. The Turk, however, is a born warrior; he would set himself to fight to the death for his faith, for his national existence. The Turkish fleet was strong, commanding the Black Sea and the Lower Danube, and rendering impossible all communication by sea; the double line of defence of the Danube and the Balkans, supported by the fortifications of the famous Quadrilateral, had always offered an impassable barrier to armies from the North.

And what most mattered was that Russia was obliged to divide her forces. Austria-Hungary, a silent spectator of the duel, was she not reserving herself for a brusque intervention in case of either victory or defeat? An offensive campaign, with an army like that of Austria-Hungary and a nation like Hungary on one's flank, would be a thing of grave imprudence. The Grand Duke Nicolas demanded a rapid and decisive attack of all the Russian forces upon the principal front, that is to say, on the Danube and the Balkans. His plan had not been followed; he had been given but four army corps, and the flower of the Russian army had been kept to watch the western frontier.

However great the ardour with which the whole nation had responded to the Czar's appeal, whatever the quality of the Russian soldier and the merit of his officers, the merits of the leaders were not entirely assuring. There was difficulty as to finance, on the subject of which the European Bank was found chilly and exacting. From the first moment of mobilisation provisioning had not gone smoothly, disorder had been found amid the military bureaucracy, untrustworthiness among the agents, and all the traditional nonchalance of the Nitchevo had become apparent. These causes of weakness escaped neither the Russian Government nor its opponents; by a fatal consequence they were productive of others which already affected the progress and result of the campaign. Never was giant, ready for the his war-cry, more battle and uttering and bound in his forward impetus than was the Russian giant in his first step towards the Balkans.

Lord Derby's operation. The English diplomacy was to the Russian Plans statesman offered a striking contrast to the brilliant Disraeli, but the caution of his manner was not without advantage, for in spite of his stolidity his strokes were often dealt more swiftly than had been expected, and he sometimes seized a favourable opportunity with a rapidity that had not been taken into account. This was soon perceived when at the outset of the campaign he gained the first advantage by a very simple method, that of seizing on the earliest opportunity.

The Czar had hardly published his manifesto,—
"that melancholy document," as it was at once
termed by the *Standard*,—when Lord Derby, while
announcing British neutrality, publicly expressed the
attitude of the British Government:—

"I affirm," he said to the Lords, May 7th, "that Russia has taken the gravest responsibilities upon herself in kindling the conflagration. The interests of Europe, the interests of Great Britain, the interests of the East are all involved. . . . Great Britain will remain neutral, but she will endeavour to localise and diminish the war."

This was a programme in itself. Soon afterwards Lord Derby declared with equal frankness:—

Should intervention become necessary, it were best to wait till the opponents are exhausted by the war. . . . We are no longer in 1853. The British Government, search as it will, has no allies, not, at least, for the moment. France will remain absolutely neutral, Austria is most uncertain. Italy shows some Russian tendencies, and Germany holds herself in reserve.

These wise views inspired confidence at St. Petersburg; it was delightful to have to deal with so

moderate an adversary! The British neutrality, it was believed, decided that of Austria-Hungary; Russia asked no better than to arrange things with Lord Derby and facilitate his task,—reasonable people must be reasonably treated.

There was near Lord Derby a Russian ambassador, who, like most accredited diplomatists in London, felt the influence of the British star. This ambassador enjoyed the confidence of the Czar, the friendship of Prince Bismarck, and the esteem of the British Government—his name was Count Peter Schouwaloff.¹

Lord Derby conferred with him on the subject of Gortschakoff's Note. He found fault frankly with it, especially with the use of the word interests. The interests of Europe were to be defended, so Gortschakoff affirmed: but England was part of Europe. The interests of Russia were invoked—yes, but there were also the interests of England to be considered, and England did not intend these to be overlooked or understood better than she understood them herself. Therefore, in the name of the interests of Europe, in the name of the interests of Europe, in the name of the interests of England, the British Government would maintain complete liberty of action, the decision of the Russian Government not being of a nature to call for England's help or approbation.

The ground of the discussion was rather limited in

¹ Thanks to the courtesy of M. Raffalovich, I have had access to the unpublished Memoirs of Count Schouwaloff on the Congress of Berlin. The extracts quoted will allow the reader to appreciate the interest of these Memoirs. The Ambassador, has, however, not included in his account the negotiations that took place before the war, and these were the true origin of the Congress.

its extent. It would have been better (and later on Lord Derby was reproached for not realising this), it would have been better to lay stress upon the treaties—the Treaty of Paris, the Convention of London. But Lord Derby was feeling his way. Perhaps he would have feared to invoke the "treaties." whose integral application might have offered difficulties. He therefore confined himself to interests -European interests, English interests. Such relative moderation was quite agreeable to St. Petersburg. It was probably believed that, by a few concessions, Great Britain could be kept outside a still menacing coalition, and she was asked to define what she meant by "English interests." It therefore came to pass that between the conciliatory statesman and the cordial ambassador an agreement was made, May 6th and May 20th, 1877, which created, after the declaration of war, but before a single shot had been exchanged, a rather singular situation. There was established between Russia and Turkev a "conventional" état de guerre, of limited action and responsibility.

Just as Gortschakoff wished to ignore what was passing in Berlin, so did he wish to ignore the consequences of his engagements towards Great Britain. Circumstances, Russian victories, chance, would arrange things in due course.

The Schouwaloff-Derby agreement can thus be briefly summarised: Russia undertook to carry on the war neither in the Suez Canal nor in Egypt, although these formed part of the Ottoman dominion. The Czar renewed his declaration to the effect that the conquest of Constantinople did not enter into his designs: "His Government recognises that whatever may happen, the future of Constantinople is a

question of general interest that can only be answered by a general agreement; should the possession of this city even be brought into the question it would not be possible to agree that it should belong to one or other of the great European Powers."

The question of the Straits was also to be settled by means of a general agreement.

Lord Derby having alluded to other "British interests," such as the Persian Gulf, and the route to India, the Russian Government affirmed "that the scene of the war would not be extended further than would be necessary for the attainment of the definitely and frankly declared object which had induced the Emperor to take up arms." The English interests mentioned by Lord Derby would be respected as long as England remained neutral. Upon "Russian interests" there was silence, and on the object of the war but one paragraph was used:—

The object of the war cannot be considered attained until the Christians of Turkey are placed in a position in which their lives and liberties are adequately protected against the intolerable abuses of the Turkish administration.

Position Gortschakoff hoped to extricate himself of Russia from difficulty by the subtleties of style. In point of fact, however, Russia, tied as she was between the Convention of Reichstadt on the one hand and the Derby-Schouwaloff agreement on the other, driven from the Western Balkans by the desire of the Germanic powers, restricted in the Eastern Balkans by the claims of Roumania, Servia and Greece, subjected to careful watching in Asia, Egypt, Constantinople, by Great Britain and by Europe—bound hand and foot—Russia began the war under most unfavourable circumstances. It could be foreseen from the first that the benefits of the opera-

tion would not be hers, even should she be successful.

Even in the Balkans, the "Czar deliverer" did not find the warm support on which he had been led to count. Every one had his own plans and "interests." Between Russia and Turkey a girdle of half-independent principalities formed a barrier of acquired situations and particular ambitions. Since the sea road could not be used, the entrance to Turkey could be gained only through Servia or through Roumania. The road through Servia had been blocked by Austria; there remained Roumania alone.

Roumania, according to the treaties, Roumania was still under the suzerainty of the Legally, she was obliged to take up arms for Turkey. Should she do so, however, it would be her territory, her population, that would have to suffer all the horrors of war. Did she remain neutral she would be equally exposed to the peril, without eventual profit in the probable case of a Turkish defeat. Roumania, or rather what was then officially known as the United Principalities of Wallachia, was presided over by Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, who had guided her with remarkable skill and patience between 1866 and 1876. This prince, loyal before all things to his family, had never forgotten, as he said himself, "that he was an outpost of the Germanic incursion in the East." 1 In conformity

¹ In a letter written by Prince Carol to King William when the latter was made German Emperor:—"I am here alone, a solitary outpost, the sentinel of the frontier against the East. . . . I am, however, neither so distant nor so wearied but that I can heartily join in the acclamations for the German Emperor."—See Jehan de Witte's Quinze ans d'histoire, 1866-81, from the Mémoires of the King of Roumania.

with the traditions of his race, he had applied himself to the making of an army, and was awaiting events.

Roumania appealed to the Powers, asking their advice and even a guarantee of neutrality. In reality, Prince Charles had decided to take the part of Russia, but he wished to sell his help as dearly as he could.

Berlin, which gave the key, replied to the effect "that everyone should do what he considered best for himself." Others gave more particulars, but the same idea prevailed throughout them all. Roumania, therefore, was thrown back upon herself. Russia *imperiously* demanded a road for her troops across the principality. In the month of September, John Bratiano, dispatched on a mission to the Czar, had not refused the passage, but had spoken of conditions.

As the price of her assistance, Roumania would like to assure herself of Bessarabia, and obtain extension of territory towards Bulgaria. Between Prince Gortschakoff and John Bratiano there was a lively dialogue. "You have no right to impose conditions on us," said the Prince; "if so, Russia, by means of the treaties in which Moldavia and Wallachia are made integral portions of the Ottoman Empire, will invade these territories without further ceremony."

¹ Through the Crown Prince, Bismarck offered the Prince more effective counsels, "through a personal interest for His Highness": "Not to offer serious opposition to Russia, to speak of a duty towards the Porte, conventional obligations, and then to yield to pressure. . . . The question of the passage of the Russian forces must be regularised by a treaty. . . . There is no hurry, however." But there was hurry, and the delay was a mistake. See also *Mémoires* of Prince Hohenlohe, vol. ii. p. 214.

"Very good," replied Bratiano coldly, "we must then oppose by force any attempt of Russia to enter on Roumanian soil."

These were vain threats! Roumania had no choice, and was obliged to give way. A Convention, on April 16th, 1877, regulated the conditions of the passage; as to the question of whether she would take part in the war Roumania held herself in reserve.

There is something touching in the position of this small but valiant nation, which, hardly more than just born, was facing such hard odds. It dared not even venture to discuss the conditions of its help towards the great patron whose redoubtable friendship had been imposed upon it; it dared not even ask in advance for a share of the benefits to be gained by common victory. That the lion would take the lion's share was a fear that became evident, despite official coldness, in the note of M. de Kogalniceano, dated May 3rd, 1877:—

When Europe consults no interests but her own, when Roumania is told: "Lasciate ogni speranza," our nation must submit to superior force, and draw counsel only from the terrible situation in which, against her will, she finds herself placed.

This anxious language astonished Russia, who thought she saw in it a new indication of growing "ingratitude" amongst the Balkan peoples.

Servia had never consulted anything but her own ambitions; listening to no advice, she had flung herself foolishly into the confusion, thereby arousing fresh difficulties. Now, defeated and dissatisfied, thrown back on her own resources, she was in sullen mood. Prince Milan was both an incumbrance and a man to be ignored, The manifesto of the Czar, in April, 1877, had informed Servia

that she was to be laid aside; through the meeting at Reichstadt, she had been sacrificed to the exigencies of Austria-Hungary. The grand project of a Servian empire was fading into nothing. It was not this that could inspire enthusiasm and generous impulse.

With Montenegro it was otherwise. This was the Benjamin of the family, the most distant, the most exposed, the best loved of all the Slavs. Her strong position amid the mountains, her foothold on the Adriatic, commanding the whole peninsula, and forming a bridge towards the western seas, gave a high value to her devotion. She was, however, so small, so weak, so hampered by the Austrian disquietude, that she was more embarrassment than help. Yet, with her it was a case of life and death. She was depended on, and would not be abandoned.

At the extreme end of the peninsula there was another "client" in a most difficult position, this was Greece.

Greece had been born at Navarino. She had full right to remind the Powers of Europe of "the rôle that at her cradle they had reserved for her in the East." Greece was one of the most direct heirs of the "Sick Man." She represented the most famous, the most cherished cause which western civilisation had at heart—the cause of Hellenism. Surely in this crisis she would rise? No! she remained motionless throughout the war. Greece was still more affected than was Servia; a brother in religion if not in race had been born to her, which suddenly attaining full growth was threatening to take the part she claimed for herself: this was Bulgaria, till then ignored among the Slavs.

The Czar had already intimated to Greece at various intervals that she would have to provide for herself; she was not needed at Constantinople, and even if she could content herself with Salonica, she was not needed at Salonica. After such vast and long-cherished hopes this was a rude awakening. The Greeks are not numerous within the Turkish Empire, but theirs are the seaports, the towns, the high places and the wealth. Hellenism is full of zeal and ardour; it is animated by an enterprising and devoted spirit, which through so many reverses, remains one of the most encouraging facts of history.

Narrowed in her situation on the Continent, Greece desired to enlarge her borders and strengthen her position; as daughter of the sea, she wished to reign at least upon the Archipelago, and in the ports and islands where Hellenic life still survived under the Turkish domination.

But she was weak, poverty-stricken, deplorably administered and organised. Neither a Cavour nor a Victor Emmanuel had yet arisen for her, and her position was the more difficult in that it was strained by doubts and fears. Russia feared in her a new Byzantium, Austria a second Macedonia. Meanwhile she was at the mercy of a sudden blow by sea, and though she desired strong strategical positions she would have no force sufficient to defend Were such to be yielded up to her, would she be able to guard the southern peninsula? During the crisis of 1877-78, Greece, forsaken by Russia, had timidly turned towards the western Powers, to Great Britain in particular, and Great Britain looked on her as a trump card, to be held over for emergencies.

There remained therefore the Bulgarians. Bulgaria This people had been so completely crushed for several centuries, that despite their large extent of territory, they were now practically overlooked. When, on leaving Europe, one arrived at Sofia, it was to encounter people garbed in the costume of the Turk, and to salute the East. It was hardly realised that this was a Christian and European nation. Crushed beneath their yoke, their national instincts still survived; little by little the very evils they endured were re-awakening them to national life. An incursion of Mohammedans-Tartars and Circassians-ordered by the Turkish Government after the Crimean War (1860) further increased their sufferings, and from 1868 onward began in these Balkan provinces commanding Constantinople a state of chronic insurrection, which, with the affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, originated the events of 1877.

In 1875 Bulgaria was still being considered. The tidings of the massacres that sought to quench this spirit in blood, told Europe that this people lived in that it suffered. Russia had heard the voice of her oppressed brethren; numerous, devoted, courageous, the Bulgarians were likely to form a sharp lance-head against Turkey. The compact was soon arranged, an understanding speedily arrived at. Just when the voice of Gladstone was uplifted, Europe received the manifesto of August 14th, 1876, "presented by the Bulgarian nation to the great Powers of Europe, protectors of the peoples of the East."

The In this manifesto Bulgaria described Manifesto itself:—

There exists in Turkey in Europe an unhappy people, VOL. IV. 305 X

scattered in great numbers on both sides of the Balkans. . . . A peaceful and hard-working people, if ever such there were, the Bulgarians for five centuries past have tilled their soil to the almost exclusive profit of their oppressors. . . . The so-called Turkish reforms have never been but bitter mockery.

The events which had brought Bulgaria to such painful notoriety were but too real in spite of the doubts professed at first by the British Embassy and Government.

The impartial inquiry conducted by Mr. Baring left no doubt upon the subject:—

The numbers given of fifteen to twenty thousand victims, and more than a hundred villages destroyed, do not appear to be exaggerated.

The true cause of these abominations, tolerated and perhaps ordered by the Turkish Government, lay in the recent progress of Bulgaria, incited by a dawn of hope.

"Thanks to their hard-working and moral habits," writes the Ambassador of France at Constantinople, "the Christian peoples of the Balkans were growing in wealth and culture; through the strength of these things they were daily gaining ground upon the Mussulmans. It is this progress, so natural and so legitimate, that certain Mohammedan patriots desire to crush by means of fire and sword.

The Bulgarian is diligent, primitive and obstinate. An excellent farmer, he draws abundant harvests from the rich plains that he inhabits, and does much breeding of cattle. He can reflect, he can read, and he can fight; his is a nation of peasants, teachers, and soldiers. Those who pleaded his cause did not fear to exaggerate his future destiny in the manifesto that his servitude dated still from Constantinople:—

The Bulgarian people, confiding in their traditions, their

geographical position, their numerical importance, their agricultural and industrial abilities, possess the requisite qualities for marching in the road of progress and of civilisation. . . . they demand full autonomy with a national government guaranteed by the great Powers which protect the Christians of the East. . . . Under these conditions alone can the autonomy of the Bulgarian people make it capable of becoming, through its own laws and through its own strength, one of the most active and persevering agents of progress and civilisation in Eastern Europe.

Such was the new cause that Russia was going to take in hand in the Balkans, to the detriment of the other peoples which she had at first supported. Roumanians, Servians, Greeks, were of the same religion, but not of the same race!

The rôle of France Europe, for the two adversaries standing face to face, or for the affected populations, the rôle of a third power, neutral and impartial, might become of considerable importance. This rôle could have belonged to France. But France stood aside, not only in the strictest neutrality, but in the most complete abstention. At the declaration of the war, the Duc Decazes, questioned in the Chamber, May 1st, 1877, had defined the policy of the Government. The desire to reassure the country as to the

"March 19th, 1877 (at Berlin): I have been to see Bismarck, and heard there what I had not expected. The motive for

¹ Were it necessary to give proofs as to the game played by Prince Bismarck in order to support this feeling, they would be evident in the *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe* (vol. ii. pp. 209, 215, et seq.): "March 6th, 1877, Ignatieff declared that he had seen great uneasiness in Paris with regard to Germany. The indiscretions of Ignatieff as to the suspicions of Bismarck, who thought that France was arming against Germany, frightened the Duc Decazes, who protested against any warlike intervention on the part of France."

possible extension of the conflict was shown in the only rather significant passage of his explanation :—

The declaration that I have just made will have more value in your eyes if you notice that the neighbouring Powers share with us the privilege of not being engaged in the present incidents by any direct interests.

The correspondence of the Duc Decazes most clearly shows that the fear of a Franco-German complication was his constant dread, his only share in these great movements. Prince Bismarck knew this fact. He feared, however, to see France growing bolder, and attempting to effect what he, in her place, would have effected, a union with Russia, or the preparation of a resolute action in common with Austria on the part of the Western Powers.

Either combination would have drawn France from her isolation, and consequently freed her from her fears by giving her a part and allies of her own, and forcing Germany to declare herself either for Russia, by breaking off with Austria, or against Russia by acting with the Western Powers. Perhaps, again, he would have preferred to make his services necessary to both parties in turn.

Throughout the course of the war Prince Bismarck was a prey to this nightmare. This explains his nervous irritation, his frequent testing of positions, his dealings with the French political parties, and the sulky humour which he generally concealed in his estate of Lauenburg.¹

my being desired to depict things in pacific fashion is the following. . . . There is no means of persuading the Emperor to send any cavalry into the frontier provinces. He is afraid of frightening the French; the influence of the Empress is increasing, and Gontaut stands behind her."

¹ In an interview with M. d'Oubril, Prince Bismarck revealed his personal feelings by the details of his real or imaginary

It was felt by all that Germany was in accord with Austria, but the inner workings of so complex an intrigue were not apparent.

The English Government itself, always so attentive and so well informed, did not accept it unconditionally. The formidable spectre of "the alliance of the three emperors" still intimidated everyone. A feeling of distrust prevailed, and a right understanding of matters was difficult to gain.

The tendency in France was, on the whole, to a rapprochement with Great Britain. M. Thiers, who was frankly anti-Russian, did not hesitate, some time before his death, to write to his English friends:

grievances against the French Government. He complained of the favour enjoyed by General Le Flô with the Emperor Alexander: "I would show you the exceptional position of this Ambassador by quoting his words to the Czar at the New Year reception, which were spoken loudly enough to be heard by those surrounding him: 'The present crisis has come two years too soon for France.' To which the Czar replied, 'True, and for us also.'"

Some time later he endeavoured to arrange the foundations of an Anglo-German agreement against Russia, in order to have free hands with regard to France. When the Czar Alexander received information on this subject, he wrote with his own hand: "This man (Bismarck) is decidedly mad."

The attitude of Bismarck in this so serious crisis was such that the Czar's expression came often to the lips of those who followed him, and who did not appear to have considered whether the attitude were not simply an effort of genius. Gontaut-Biron wrote: "On the Emperor's birthday I sat beside Bismarck and noticed with astonishment the strained appearance of his face and eyes." The Emperor William said: "You know what an extraordinary man the Prince is, how difficult to get on with he is, and how full of caprices." He deplored so much strangeness in him: "I am the only person," he said, "with whom he restrains himself." (See Gontaut-Biron's correspondence in Dernières Années (pp. 310 et seq.), and the Memoirs of you Hohenlohe.

"Europe has been hard upon the Turks, for justice and the real balance of power and peace is with them. The desertion of Turkey will be greatly regretted in the future." ¹

At the beginning of August the Duc Decazes wrote to the Marquis d'Harcourt, then Ambassador in England:—

It is essential that all should know that we have never refused to discuss the present questions with Great Britain, and that we have, on the contrary, sought this discussion on every occasion, maintaining naturally some reservations, but always having notified that the door was open to all indications, which could not come from us, but to which a welcome was promised and assured. This must be simply said, as is fitting from the part of people who, while not seeking an alliance, feel deeply that the interests of the two countries demand a close understanding, and desire this as much from a feeling of sympathy as from one of business requirements.

This feeling seemed to find response in London. The Prince of Wales, whose small interest in Germany was well known, went to Paris and did his best to further it.² M. Alphonse de Rothschild did what he could with the Duc Decazes; nothing, however, came of it. The rumour, skilfully spread, of a Franco-Russian agreement sufficed to hinder confidence; in the same way there were opposite rumours in St. Petersburg.

Between London and Vienna, which in the ordinary course of things should have agreed from the

¹ Letter to Mr. Henry Reeve, August 8, 1877.

² In 1878 this really prophetic character sketch was drawn: "The Prince of Wales represents an England which is youthful, courageous and high-spirited, replacing an England that has become decrepid, hesitating and morbid. . . The brilliant heir to the crown has still other ideas in his mind . . . all stamped with a great distrust of the policy of Prince Bismarck." Mémorial Diplomatique, 1878 (p. 184.)

first, there existed a rather inexplicable misunderstanding. Count Schouwaloff observes that this political inconsistency was much to blame for the difficulties in Europe, and he attributes it to the personal influence of the Comte de Beust.¹

However it may have been, diplomatic relations were struck with a sort of paralysis.

It is quite extraordinary that so intelligent and experienced a man as the Duc Decazes should have had the most accurate information in his hand as to the bearing of the Austro-German agreement and yet have been so little influenced by it. He was written to, as follows, from Vienna, June, 1877:—

Count Andrássy has thus explained, in a converProject of sation with one who enjoys his full confidence,
Count Andrássy that he sides with the views and position of Austria:
"The present events oblige us to familiarise ourselves with the idea that Servia and Roumania must be free
and independent; if these principalities preserve their present
extent of territory, their liberty and independence will not
interfere with us. . . . On the contrary, however, we could
not tolerate any extension of Servia towards the west, or of
Montenegro to the north. If the Turks are capable of keeping
Bosnia and Herzegovina, so much the better; if not, we shall
take them for ourselves. These provinces will either remain

These notes are valuable as a proof of the trouble into which the diplomatic world was plunged. It seems, however, as if Count P. Schouwaloff had not known everything as to the relations of London, of Vienna, or, rather, as if he had not guessed everything.

[&]quot;I mention this," said Count Schouwaloff, "because the misunderstanding between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain has had a great influence on all the bearings of the Oriental crisis. Had London and Vienna been able to come to an agreement in the beginning, if they had openly declared that they would not tolerate the war, the war would have been made impossible. . . . I foresaw that the *entente*, which was not to be established at a distance, would be arranged in Berlin." (Unpublished Memoirs.)

Turkish or belong to us.—" Would you make war upon this point?"—"Yes, with no hesitation."—"War with Russia?"— 'Official Russia agrees with and recognises our interests, and considers them legitimate (Agreement of Reichstadt); notwithstanding the eventual clamour of the Pan-Slavists, she will not make war on us in order to prevent our annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina."-" If you allow her, on her side, to annex Bulgaria, I suppose?"—"Official Russia dec'ares herself disinterested. She says she has only drawn the sword in order to improve the lot of the Christians. . . . She can occupy Bulgaria, organise it, and create a native administration, but she must go no further. The independence of the delta of the Danube is a principle with us. Should Russia deceive us in this, or ignore this principle, we shall fight her; this is definitely settled. Our military position assures us the advantage."-" What about Prussia?"-" Prussia will side with us, and we can count at least on friendly neutrality from her. We are sure of Prussia's attitude." Herein lies the secret of Count Andrássy's calmness of demeanour in confronting the question of the East.

It was after reading and appreciating this document, which throws light on everything—the Austro-German agreement, the Convention of Reichstadt, etc..-that the French statesman was once more mastered by his doubts and fears, not knowing how to liberate his line of action, and not venturing to take a further step. France was in a position to make her choice. Her wealth, her strength, had been restored to her, her Oriental influence: all this had weight. What was aimed at were the treaties which had been her work. She was qualified either to defend or to modify these treaties. Germany, no more than France, had any wish for war at a time when, in any case, she would have more than one opponent to deal with. This gave the French Government, even if pacific in tendency, much latitude of action.

Neither understanding nor warning as to events

was lacking in the French statesmen; what was needed was calm and clear determination. It was at the height of the crisis of May the Sixteenth. Home affairs were the centre of attraction, the seat of passion. Did the Government tremble for the country, it also trembled for itself, placed as it was in such a dangerous position and reduced to plead its cause before the foreigner. Why is it that the private correspondence of the Duc Decazes, so interesting and honourable from so many points of view, should close with the pleading *pro domo* that he addressed, in August, 1877, to de Gontaut-Biron:—

Is there, then, nothing to enlighten people's minds as to what we are wishing and doing to dissipate the fatal misunderstanding that is weighing on us? [He is speaking of the Cabinet.] For the last four years I have given every care, agreed to every sacrifice, and drained the cup of bitterness, in order to show the foreigner what is so obvious to my eyes and what I have declared in all sincerity, namely, that Conservative France is exclusively devoted to a policy of peace and moderation, that she has abandoned all feelings of anger and resentment, that she has repudiated all notion of revenge, that she alone, in short, could bring about a general peace, and that she alone desires it. . . . Yet the fact must be faced that all this was lost labour, that these sacrifices were made in vain; that monarchical and conservative Europe prefers to us—whom?—great gods!—the Radicals!

M. de Gontaut-Biron was already convinced of this and needed no fresh teaching. As to Prince Bismarck, if by any indiscretion of the post he could have known of this letter—indited, in fact, to his address, he would have been surprised not to find in it the close play of his adversary of 1875.1

¹ As to the personal embarrassment of the Duc Decazes and his colleagues before Europe, nothing is more demonstrative than the first chapter of the book; Dernières Années de l'Ambas-

II

War had been declared on April 12th, 1877. Although the Russians had decided on it in the previous November, they were insufficiently prepared, but the Turkish preparations had been still more inadequate. The first steps of the campaign had been slow on both sides. Diplomacy also had had a hand in things. General Le Flô wrote on June 7th:—

The Emperor and his Chancellor ardently desire to avoid any military and political action which might lead to rupture with Great Britain, and which might give to any Power a subject or the slightest pretext for suspicion. They desire not to be obliged to cross the Balkans through the course of military operations, and they believe that a first victory of the Russian army on the right bank of the Danube would be, for the great Powers, the natural occasion for a benevolent intervention, of which the immediate consequence would be a Congress.

They therefore counted on a duel for first blood, with immediate recourse to arbitration, but the two campaigns, begun simultaneously, one in Europe, the other in Asia, had been full of surprises. In Europe, the Turks had offered no serious resistance on the right bank of the Danube. The two Russian armies, operating at a distance of 300 kilometres the one from the other—one commanded by Zimmermann on the Lower Danube, and the other by the Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaïewich, Commander-in-Chief and brother of the Czar, on the Middle Danube, had approached the stream and crossed it

sade en Allemagne de M. de Gontaut-Biron, by André Dreux. As to German influence, see a passage of the Mémoires of Prince von Hohenlohe, September 6th, 1877: "We were talking with Bismarck of the French elections, and the Chancellor told me that he considered it necessary, during the election period, to do something threatening" (vol. ii. p. 220).

without a sword-stroke—Zimmermann at Galatz and the Grand Duke at Zimnitza, near Sistova.

Beyond the Danube, the only line of defence for the Turkish Empire consists in the Balkan range. Zimmermann had made his way as far as Trajan's Gate, and there, supported by the square base of Varna—Choumla—Routschouk—Silistria, he had made a halt.

The Turkish fleet, although commanded by an English officer, Hobart Pacha, who was considered able, had reduced its rôle to forbidding Russia the use of the sea. The destruction of two monitors by Russian torpedoes had demoralised the scarcely naval spirit of the Turkish sailors. The course of the Danube had been intercepted by a barrier of torpedoes between Nicopolis and Routschouk.

The Grand Duke Nicolas, finding no obstacle in his path, had sent on a vanguard of 15,000 men under Gourko, with orders to push on as far as possible. Gourko, full of enterprise, had marched by way of Biela, Selvi, Tirnova, to the foot of the Balkans. He penetrated the mountains as far as Khankioi, repulsed the only Turkish battalion that defended the pass, descended the southern slopes, took Kazanlik, July 14th, also Eski-Sagra, and then the important Schipka Pass by attacking it from the south. By means of this surprising raid he became free to enter the valley of the Maritza, which leads to Adrianople. Neither the Danube nor the Balkans had protected Turkey; they did not even afford Russia the decisive battle which was to stay her victorious arms. It was too easy a conquest, its very facility constituted its danger.

The Turks are never in a hurry. They had passionately wished for war and they had prepared for

it very badly. Having, it is true, a vast front to defend, they had covered it with troops, from the furthest confines of Armenia to the Adriatic Sea. troubling themselves little to inquire where they might be attacked. There was no unity either among the commanders or in the Government. Abdul Kerim, who was Commander-in-Chief, could not make himself obeyed by his officers; each man did practically what he chose. However, from Africa and from the heart of Asia soldiers arrived in vast Armed and clothed to some extent, they hastened to the frontiers and constituted an imposing effect. On the declaration of war, at the end of May, 1877, the Sultan's proclamation to his troops had aroused fierce enthusiasm: "You are entering on a Holy War against the enemies of the Faith. You bear not only the flag of the Ottoman Empire but the banner of Islam. The swords of the believers will open the gates of Paradise."

On finding Gourko so close to Adrianople the Turks awoke to their danger. They now saw that the war was serious, that it meant a fight for life.

It was decided to concentrate the efforts that till then had been scattered. Suleyman Pacha was recalled from Montenegro and opposed, with superior forces, to Gourko, who no longer ventured to advance but retreated, not without contributing to the defence of the Schipka Pass. This accomplished, he had to re-cross the Balkans and fall back on the Danube, where things were singularly complicated for the Grand Duke Nicolas.

The Army of the Centre, which he commanded, formed a triangle of which Gourko's vanguard was the apex. The more this triangle was lengthened the greater was the danger to its sides. On the left,

towards the Lower Danube, Zimmermann held the attention of Abdul Kerim, who was afterwards replaced by Mehemet Ali. For greater security the Russian leader had confided two army corps to the Czarewitch with orders to drive away from Roust-chouk the Turkish army forming on the Lom, which might threaten his rear. On the right, following the same idea, he ordered General von Krudener, commanding the 9th Corps, to establish himself on the road to Widin, in order to intimidate the force of Osman Pacha.

Osman Pacha, an officer of genius, who had learnt his first lessons in the rough school of the War of Secession, had a cool head and a steady eye. Arriving too late to raise the siege of Nicopolis, he had halted on the heights above the little town of Plevna, where met several roads, and which, from this side, held the key of Turkey. Knowing what he could expect of his troops, he began to entrench his position, forming triple firing lines, skilfully concealed. On July 20th, without reconnoitring, Krudener hurled himself on this position. He attacked and was repulsed. The next day, having received reinforcements, he attacked again, was once more repulsed and totally beaten. His defeat cost him 6,000 men.

It was no longer a question for the Russians of following Gourko and crossing the Balkans. The triangle had weakened on the right; it had to be strengthened and the bases of operation approached. The Grand Duke himself was defeated with enormous loss. There were not enough troops for blocking Osman Pacha, who had been able to keep his communications open, and receive men and provisions. His army, numbering 45,000, had held

off 150,000 Russians and lost them 50,000 men. Antumn had now approached.

On the Asiatic side, Fortune was also doubtful. Loris Melikoff, with a splendid army, had taken the offensive against Mouktar Pacha, an experienced soldier who knew how to wait and how to manœuvre. The Russians had Erzeroum as their object, and Erzeroum was covered by Kars, a fortified town of the first rank. The fate of Kars would decide the campaign in Asiatic Turkey. The Russians divided their army into four invading columns, separated by impassable mountains. They were, at the same time, besieging Batoum, which was protected by Turkish cuirassiers. At first they met with no obstacle, took Bayazid and Ardakan, and invested Kars. But Mouktar retired to a good position before Erzeroum, and there received reinforcements from Trebizond, and in his turn took the offensive and successively repulsed the different Russian corps. Kars was relieved, July 10th, just as, for the first time. Krudener failed at Plevna.

Europe experienced much surprise and agitation on the arrival of these tidings. It was exactly the reverse of what had been expected. During the month of August Russia had been considered defeated. Competent men, among them Marshal von Moltke, had declared that Russia would not finish with the Turks in one campaign and that the war would last at least ten years, were men and money still available. In London the Russian power was thought to be practically annihilated. Lord Beaconsfield intended to dictate the terms of peace, and let it be fully understood that moderate men like Lord Derby would soon have to quit the

Ministry. The streets of Pesth were illuminated in honour of the Turkish victories. Prince Bismarck quitted his retreat and met Count Andrássy at Salzburg. The Czar Alexander left the army of the Danube and went to the Austrian manœuvres, where he saw the Emperor Francis-Joseph.

Did he obtain any security from this quarter? However it may have been, an important development occurred—Roumania decided to take part in the war (August 24th). The proclamation of the Prince, dated August 27th to September 11th, declared the absolute independence of Roumania:—

How terrible would be our position if the Turkish troops were allowed to take the offensive and bring the scene of war across our frontiers. We are obliged to co-operate with the imperial forces of Russia in order to hasten on the end of the war at all costs.

Whether Roumania had assured herself any definite profit from the victory is not stated.¹

¹ During the month of May, Gortschakoff, in an official Note to the Roumanian Government, declared that "Russia had no need of help from the Roumanian army, that if Roumania entered on the war she would do so at her own risk." And nothing could have been much more definite than a conversation between Prince Charles and Gortschakoff at Ploïesti in the beginning of June. "The Chancellor recognised that Roumania needed the delta of the Danube for her economic and political development, but he claimed for Russia the arm of Kilia in Bessarabia, which the treaty of 1856 had ceded to the Principalities. The Prince replied that the time for dealing with these questions had not yet arrived, that only after a successful campaign would there be any question of extending the frontiers." (Witte, p. 299.) On the other hand, however, after the month of August the Russians solicited the immediate intervention of Roumania. The Roumanian statesmen were of opinion that delay would be advisable; it was the Prince who, strongly supported by Bratiano, took the decisive step and the responsibility of entering upon the campaign.

Prince Carol was invested with the general command of the allied troops before Plevna. The Roumanian army numbered 50,000 men and 180 cannon.

Reinforcements were also arriving for Surrender the Russians. It was resolved to attempt a fresh assault with the help of the Roumanians, September 14th—but it was again repulsed. Another sort of effort seemed required.

The old general Totleben, the hero of Sebastopol, was summoned, and allowed full liberty of action, with the Imperial Guard at his disposal. He surrounded Plevna with entrenchments, occupied the roads to Widin and Sofia, by which Osman was provisioned, and narrowly blockading the place he set himself to wait. A terrible winter tried the mettle of the allies. They suffered all that the men before Sebastopol had suffered, all that Vsevolod Garchine has described.¹ Osman, with no more food or ammunition left, attempted to break the iron bands by which he was encircled. Repulsed and wounded, he surrendered with 40,000 men. (December 10th 1877.)

The Turks had not been able to profit by

The Taking of Kars the unhoped for respite afforded by the admirable defence of Plevna. In Asia their position was no better. Mouktar Pacha, after his first successes, instead of confirming them by a vigorous advance, had contented himself with harassing the enemy; the Russians had regained some ground, the Grand-Duke Michael and Loris Melikoff had obtained reinforcements. In October they attacked the Turkish general entrenched before Kars, defeating him and driving him into Armenia. For

¹ La Guerre. Preface by Guy de Maupassant, V. Havard, 1889.

the second time Kars was invested; the garrison of 20,000 men, after a month of exhausting attacks, endeavoured to escape, but was surrounded and taken prisoner. The town itself, till then deemed impregnable, was carried by an heroic assault. The Turks fell back on Erzeroum. Mouktar Pacha, with part of his forces, was recalled to Europe. The fall of Erzeroum was but a question of time, when the Armistice intervened.

The campaign in Europe had not been interrupted by the winter. Plevna fallen, there was nothing to stop the onward march of the Russian troops. In spite of terrible sufferings, in spite of frost and snow, they crossed the Balkans, using every pass. It was a magnificent movement on to the vast breadth of the peninsula. In the west the Montenegrians drove the Turks before them; they occupied Antivari, January 10th, and besieged Scutari; further forward the Servian troops, which had entered the line of battle, gained the victory of Pirot and took possession of Nisch; towards the centre, General Gourko was victorious at Taschkesen and crossed the mountains during the early days of January. Radetzki, combining his movements with Mirsky and Skobeleff, surrounded and took prisoner Wessel Pacha, who was defending the Schipka Pass with a force of 30,000 men. An eve-witness writes:-

The enthusiasm with which the news was received at headquarters was indescribable. The Grand-Duke left his tent shouting hurrah to announce the great tidings. Thousands of voices echoed the shout, and a loud roar of sound arose, of songs and acclamations, while the band played the National Hymn, Bojié tzaria Krani!

It was a sudden, almost unexpected close to much suffering. All the roads to Constantinople seemed vol. IV.

to open simultaneously, while Greece also entered the lists and sent her army into Thessaly. Turkey, who till then had counted on a military intervention of the Powers, especially of England, was at the mercy of the enemy. On January 9th, the Sultan demanded an Armistice. The Grand Duke Nicolas refused to negotiate anything but terms of peace.

The onward march of the Russians was Russians at accelerated. It was now necessary to inform the diplomatic services of the accomplished facts. On December 15th, 1877, Lord Derby had notified Count Schouwaloff in writing that Great Britain would oppose a Russian entry into Constantinople. Gourko pursued his victories despite the opening of negotiations; after a three days' fight he crushed the army of Suleyman Pacha, the last resource of the Sultan, at Philippopolis January 15th. On January 20th Colonel Stroukoff entered Adrianople at the head of a detachment of cavalry. "The panic was such that the Turkish leaders made no attempt at resistance; their only care was to save their lives." Mehemet Ali had been told to defend Adrianople, which was strongly fortified; he fled, accompanied by two police officials, at sight of the first squadrons.

The whole of the Russian army was directed upon Adrianople. This time the triumph was irresistible.

The vanguard accomplished a march of 350 kilometres in sixteen days, through snow and mud, fighting all the time. The losses were enormous. Of the 5,000 men who had left Sofia, barely 2,500 reached Adrianople, and these shoeless and in rags."

On January 31st, the day the peace preliminaries were signed at Adrianople, the Russian forces covered the approaches to the Turkish capital—from Rodesto

to Silivri. This triumphal progress filled with joy and pride the Russia that had been trembling for her power and position.

The soldiers had now to hand on their task to the diplomatists. These sufferings, these enormous sacrifices—were they all to go for nothing? 1 Would any one attempt to snatch the prey from the victor? The sacred goal of the campaign was Saint Sophia; the Emperor had told the Grand Duke that it was Constantinople. Was the error of four centuries now to be repaired?—the Christians of the East delivered? Who would oppose the voice of the liberating and victorious Czar?

In Europe the Powers were surprised and irritated, but the advantage lay with quietness. The contemporary events have been already noted; in France the Republicans had come into power; in Italy, M. Crispi. Victor Emmanuel was dying, and the Pope was soon to follow him. Bismarck was keeping silence, but labouring at his projects. It was just the time that he was planning for Gambetta's journey to Berlin; he was soothing Austria, who was uneasy at events; and he was out of touch with England. During the early days of 1878, Count Münster, German Ambassador in London, a man of cool and practical mind, was the guest of Lord Derby in the country; they had long interviews together. Midhat Pacha was in London. Lord Derby was, as usual, very patient; he had no wish to act alone, but was waiting for Austria-Hungary, whom he still mistrusted, to take the initiative.

Public opinion in England was aroused. It was

¹ The Russian mortality during the war has been estimated at 80,000 men.

in the nature of things that the English Parliament should kindle the flame. On January 15th, the day on which the Turkish plenipotentiaries, Savfet Pacha and Namik Pacha, left Constantinople to interview the Russian General, there was and Russia a lively debate within the House of Commons. Sir Charles Dilke, an entant terrible. who was often a pioneer, proposed that England should take her share of the spoil as a matter of course and lay hands on Egypt. His proposal was not well received. Lord Beaconsfield made a haughty and somewhat threatening speech. Lord Derby, however, thought that there was still room for negotiation. Abandoning the ground of interests he made public the notification he had made to Russia, namely, that any convention modifying the Treaties of Paris (1856) and of London (1871) was an act of European significance, and as such should be submitted to the Powers. The declaration had been made to St. Petersburg by the Cabinets of London and Vienna simultaneously. As to the occupation of Constantinople, the British Government requested that no Russian force should be sent into the peninsula of Gallipoli. In order to support these views, a command was given, on January 25th, that the British fleet should leave the Bay of Smyrna for the Dardanelles, and should the order not be countermanded, to make its way from thence to Constantinople. The two opponents were standing face to face. All Europe was alarmed: war seemed inevitable.

For the space of a fortnight a bewilderment prevailed, which was still further increased by the complication in the English Government. In the Cabinet itself there was discord. Lord Carnaryon

had already left the Ministry; Lord Derby had offered to resign on the first suggestion of the moving of the fleet. Public feeling was uncertain; Mr. Gladstone's campaign had aroused a sense of shame in the support of a Government responsible for the "Bulgarian atrocities." Austria-Hungary was acting with great caution; France stood aloof.

The peace preliminaries signed at Adrianople, January 31st, were communicated to the Powers. Mr. Layard, British Ambassador at Constantinople, whose influence was decisive in this memorable crisis, criticised the Russian conditions and informed his Government that they signified the destruction of the Turkish Empire in Europe.

Prince Gortschakoff, in reply to Austria, agreed that the terms of peace should be discussed by the Powers; Russia was no longer ruled by Catherine II, in whose days she had claimed to settle the problems of the East alone with the vanquished; she had no intention of repeating what, thanks to her, Bismarck had done in 1871. She merely wished, however, to "communicate" the treaty, not to "submit" it to the European Cabinets. It was round this difficulty that the question raged. Prince Gortschakoff invented a "sounding phrase" in order to escape from the vaguely menacing objurgations of Lord Derby: "Let us keep," he wrote, "to the demand for liberty of action and liberty of appreciation." Beyond this he would not go.

The While the arrangements of the Armistice Russians at were slowly being evolved, the Russian San Stefano army was completing its successes. Russia had invaded the whole of the peninsula; she was advancing by forced marches; she occupied the neighbourhood of Constantinople, the ports of the

Black Sea; she was approaching the Bosphorus from one side and the Dardanelles from the other. Within a few days, possibly a few hours, the Turkish Empire might be annihilated by the conquest of its capital. Victory had urged the victors beyond their first ambitions and designs. Constantinople once within their hands, they would no longer have it within their choice to abandon it. As a reply to the approach of the British squadron, the Russian army installed itself on the heights of San Stefano, dominating Constantinople.

The Hour The hour that was now to strike was of Prince the hour of Prince Bismarck. He had long awaited it, and long prepared for it. He alone, in Europe, could now pronounce the quos ego.

Through a proposition that introduced him as arbitrator into the crisis of the negotiations, he quitted his retreat and his long silence. In the beginning of February he had counselled that the British fleet should retreat and that the Russian operations should be suspended; having thus obtained a moment's delay, while Europe waited in silence for a voice that was to save her from her fear—Bismarck spoke. Before the Reichstag he expressed what he saw and thought and wished for (February 19th). He took a singularly bold initiative, which, for the first time perhaps, made of diplomatic dealings a work of enlightenment, and gave him the advantages of a calculated and reflective publicity. This astonishing speech, with the debate of which it formed the crown, constitutes one of the most considerable acts of modern history. in that it proclaimed the situation and rôle of Germany in Europe, while among all the problems



Prince Bismark (Trom a portraitly Lombach)

calling for solution by the Future, it established positions which till then had been uncertain. The tendency that the world's business was long to take, even to the defeat of Russia at Moukden, and the distant concurrence of Germany and England, originated here.

This was the speech of "the Monster," awaited and read with so much emotion by Gambetta; it also influenced the home and foreign history of the French Republic. In the balance of the nations everything has value and connexion. The France of colonial expansion and the Russian alliance had, through the necessity under which Bismarck found himself to take a definite standing in 1878, to declare her own attitude in her turn. The future of Russia, France and England, the future of all the Powers, depended on the direction taken by Germany at these cross-roads of Fate.

It fell, indeed, to Germany to decide, and the German problem was expounded with extraordinary force and clearsightedness by the parliamentary opponent of Prince Bismarck, that "devil's advocate" whose words were necessary to complete the thoughts that the official speech had not definitely expressed. Herr Windthorst, replying to the legendary phrase as to the "bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier," remarked:—

I do not consider the interests of Germany in this conflict so small as we are taught to consider them to be. . . . In my opinion, the main point of this Eastern problem lies in the question—big with responsibility towards the future—which of the two elements, Germanic on the one hand, Slav on the other, is to dominate the world? (Cries of "very true"). We must embrace the German interest in its universality.

Herr Windthorst's speech was unprecedentedly

"Pan-Germanistic." What would Prince Bismarck reply to it?

The Prince found his part quite easy; he posed as the moderator. He advised Germany to be reserved, he told her that her strength, the strength of which for the last seven years she had enjoyed full possession, lay in distinguishing shades, in marking limits amid all the heat of political strife, in establishing what would preserve her proper physiognomy and leave her all her influence on men and circumstances.

In this tremendous and diffuse oration, weighty with matter and swollen with suppressed ideas, the great statesman produced the masterpiece of the parliamentary diplomatist; staking high, without revealing his designs, he advanced care fully towards his goal by a skilfully graduated course. Conjuring the Future, he opened her a path by the ingenuous fashion in which he explained the Present.

A rapid exposition announced the clauses of the preliminaries, such as they had just been officially communicated to the Powers; a vast and semi-independent Bulgaria, constituted after the proportions indicated by the Conference of Constantinople; the independence of Montenegro, Servia and Roumania; reforms establishing a kind of autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; a war indemnity either territorial or pecuniary. As to the question of the Straits, a vague and general engagement on the part of Turkey:—

His Majesty the Sultan would agree to come to an understanding with His Imperial Majesty the Czar of Russia in order to safeguard the rights and interests of Russia in the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

These conditions, which caused so much agitation in Great Britain, were reviewed by the Chancellor with haughty indifference. In all the matter Germany had but one interest at stake: the avoidance of a conflict in which Austria-Hungary must inevitably be engaged. The guarding of the interests of Austria-Hungary was the thought that never left the speaker's mind. "The Alliance of the Three Emperors" was, this time, frankly discarded; the relations between Germany and Russia were, it appeared, more definite than ever: Prince Gortschakoff was complimented with an emphasis that hinted at the claws of irony; the relations between Germany and England were explained in their most subtle shades. As to the rôle of Germany among the Powers, "it could not be that of either a judge or an arbitrator; at the most that of a mediator, of an honest agent, who desires to bring the business to a satisfactory conclusion."

All was thus softened and carefully glossed over; it was a prudently balanced speech, qualified next morning by the English papers as being "vague and cloudy." Three times had Prince Bismarck spoken, three times did he twine and untwine the subtleties of his arguments with subterfuges and interlacings of anecdotes, of aphorisms, of his customary brusqueness; he caught the ear and troubled the mind of his hearers and of Europe in order that in the midst of this strange and profound verbosity the phrase might be used which was to decide the European discussion, accepting at the same time the risks that the phrase might bring on his own nation. This was the phrase: "What will entail a change in the stipulations of

1856 will doubtless need the sanction of the Powers that signed them."

Through these simple words, the German Chancellor afforded public recognition to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, and consequently submitted the victories of Russia to the consideration of all Europe. As to his acceptation of the risk:—

Gentlemen, there are in Russia considerable parties who do not care for Germany, and who, fortunately, are not at the helm. . . . How would they speak to their compatriots, they, and perhaps other people, perhaps also other statesmen, who are as yet not our declared enemies? . . . They would say: It is our intimate friend, the friend from whom we thought to expect a return of ancient services rendered; it is Germany, who, with no interests of her own within the East, draws, behind our back, not the sword, but the dagger.

These statesmen "who are not as yet our declared enemies" (and the words are underlined in the official text), who are they, if not Gortschakoff whose work was being undone, if not the whole Pan-Slavist party, if not, in short, all Russians, who by reason of the choice made at Berlin between Russia and Austria-Hungary would soon turn towards a French alliance?

Bismarck met reproach half-way. He himself undertook to answer it, and avoid it, if possible, by his very frankness. But circumstances can be stronger than those prepared for them. The phrase evoking the treaties of 1856 was decisive. Herr Windthorst, sharply refuted, was not, on the whole, more thoroughly Pan-Germanistic and Anti-Slav. Perhaps he would not have so skilfully manipulated the "not the sword, but the dagger."

The Pre-Russia was now warned, but she could liminaries of not now draw back. She had accepted not only the idea of a conference, but,

perhaps in obedience to a new suggestion from the vanity of Gortschakoff, she had shown desire for a congress. The congress would be held in Germany and under the presidency of Prince Bismarck. He would hold the cards in his own hand.

Meanwhile, however, Russia continued her secret negotiations with Turkey, negotiations which exasperated England, who, accustomed to know everything, was kept in ignorance and anxiety as to "this subterranean peace." At last, on March 3rd, the peace preliminaries of San Stefano were brought about.

These preliminaries defined and reinforced the known conditions of the armistice. There was to be an independent Montenegro, tripled in size, and with two seaports on the Adriatic Sea; an independent Servia, slightly extended; Roumania equally independent, augmented by the addition of the Dobroutcha, but giving, in exchange, Bessarabia to Russia; a powerful Bulgaria, extending from the Danube to Thessaly, from the Aegean Sea to the Black Sea, leaving to Turkey in Europe but Constantinople and Salonica, with territories either insignificant or only communicating with each other by sea; Bulgaria would be long, with an autonomous prince, under the high protection of the Czar; Russia would gain, in Asia, the port of Batoum and important territory in Armenia; favourable stipulations were made for the pilgrims and Russian monks travelling in the empire.

For Bosnia and Herzegovina, for Armenia and Crete, there would be semi-autonomy; with a certain right of intervention on the part of Russia in the home affairs of what remained of Turkey; a war indemnity of 300 million roubles; and as to

what concerned the Straits, a clause opening them, in time of peace as in time of war, to Russian merchant vessels and to neutral ships sailing to Russian ports.

At certain intervals, it is true, the act provided for intervention, sanction or collaboration of the Powers, but always on particular points, not on the act in general. Gortschakoff, minutely weighing the terms of the preliminaries, did not abandon his phrase on "liberty of action and liberty of appreciation." He yielded in the latter, but held firm to the spirit of it. The act was signed on the part of Russia by General Ignatieff (the name speaks for everything), and M. de Nelidow; on the part of Turkey by Safvet Pacha and Sadoullah Bey.

Published the day after Prince Bismarck's declarations, after the reservations of Austria and the injunctions of Great Britain, it drove Europe into a corner.

In England it aroused great excitement. Anger of England. One of those sudden movements was awakened in which anger joins the national sangfroid, and in which the nation shows itself resolved to act if necessary, and impels its leaders forward. Such movements, spontaneous and yet disciplined, are among the finest phenomena of history and explain England's greatness. Amidst their dramatic unanimity the English show tactics, and, as they term it, bluff. But they must be taken seriously; they are in deadly earnest and will go on to the utmost if need be. Lord Beaconsfield ordered out the Reserve. Indian troops were dispatched to Port Said. Lord Derby, overwhelmed by the tide, was forced to leave the Cabinet (March 28th).

Lord He was replaced by Lord Salisbury, Salisbury in who was a follower of Beaconsfield. With Foreign of more energy and subtlety, he was perhaps less reliable and less calm than Lord Derby. He followed the current of opinion more closely. On April 1st he launched the famous note, which with a striking imprescience of future events, set up the bogey of the Slav amid the Balkans without perceiving that danger beckoned from Germany. Lord Salisbury and Lord Beaconsfield were to be for long enclosed within the orbit of Prince Bismarck.

In presence of the combination so long avoided by Lord Derby—England, Austria-Hungary and Germany—Russia was forced to yield. But in yielding there are degrees of ceremony. Gortschakoff yielded step by step. He overwhelmed the diplomatic circles with his notes, of which Lord Beaconsfield remarked in a speech to the Lords: "It would have been hard for the Delphic Oracle itself to have been both more obscure and more solemn."

There raged at this moment throughout all the European Press a hue and cry against Russia, which is a striking proof of the power that command of public opinion gives to England. By means of dispatches, by means of the Press, there arose a sort of English atmosphere of which the pressure grew more and more irresistible. Consciously or unconsciously, every one took the same direction. With England to deal with, delays are dangerous.

There remained for Russia to know on which side it would be the more advantageous for her to fall, on that of Germany, or that of England. To recognise the victory of Bismarck would be to own that the alliance of the Three Emperors was

over, it would be destroying the basis of the Russo-Prussian agreement on which so much had been built, it would be acknowledging a very painful blow to the *amour propre* of Gortschakoff, who would have to own himself both duped and beaten. Far better direct capitulation to the declared enemy. Russia therefore turned to England.

These were the developments: Bismarck was comfortably maintaining his suggestion of "simultaneous retreat"; this, as a witness observes, was "lazy strategy"; the London Cabinet exacted the entire communication of the treaty; Gortschakoff, holding to his formula, rupture seemed imminent. and would doubtless have been regarded philosophically in Berlin. It was then that Count P. Schouwaloff, Russian Ambassador in London, took upon himself, in an interview with Lord Salisbury. to say that in his opinion the two Powers should make a direct arrangement, or point out those clauses of the Treaty of San Stefano that could be maintained, and those that could be modified. "Were an understanding to be arrived at upon this point," added the Ambassador, "we should find a way out of the deadlock in which we are now placed."

The overture tended to detach Great Britain from the league that had arisen against Russia, and particularly to place Prince Bismarck face to face with an accomplished fact. England would take the lead, if she came to terms with the Ambassador.

The Anglo-Russian and replied to the following effect:—of May 30th "Should we enter upon such a discussion of these points as you propose, it would become

public; we do not wish to treat with you alone, but in concert with the other Powers." The Ambassador promised that the negotiation should be kept absolutely secret; if the examination undertaken by the Minister and himself appeared satisfactory, he would himself go to inform St. Petersburg of it. Lord Beaconsfield, consulted on the matter, warmly agreed. The negotiations lasted a week between the Minister and the Ambassador, and paved the way for the secret Convention that was signed on May 30th. It is evident that Count Schouwaloff could not have gone so far without obtaining the authorisation of his Government.

The general lines of the agreement were as follows: Russia consented to reduce considerably the proportions of the principality of Bulgaria; in short, abandoning the idea of dismembering Turkey in Europe, she spared the life of the Ottoman Empire. England, on her part, was no more to oppose the Russian developments in Asia, and would agree to the possession by Russia of Kars and Batoum. Besides this, Russia would submit the general terms of the treaty of peace to the Powers that had signed the Treaty of Paris. Prince Bismarck would be asked to take the initiative in Congress, with assembling the the following formula: "In accepting the Congress, each of the two Powers thereby declares herself ready to discuss all the points of the Treaty of San Stefano."

Count Schouwaloff, in his unpublished Memoirs, skilfully criticises the English point of view:—

From the opening of our negotiations I perceived that England's chief object was the division of Bulgaria into two parts, with the line of the Balkans left to the Sultan as a means of defence against our future aggressions. However serious was the change

of frontier in Asia Minor, and the abandonment of Kars to Russia, and of Batoum especially, it was the question of the Balkans that loomed most largely in the eyes of the British Government. This was an error on the part of Lord Salisbury and Lord Beaconsfield. It was evident that the separation of Northern Bulgaria from Southern Bulgaria would be but factitious, even with the defence of the Balkans left to Turkey, and I remember suggesting to Lord Salisbury, when he was considering names for these two Bulgarias, that one should be termed Bulgaria Satisfied, the other Bulgaria Discontented.

Count Further events were speedily to an-Schou- nihilate this combination of the British Waloff at Friedrichs- diplomatists.

The agreement secretly concluded between Russia and Great Britain, the Ambassador left London and went straight to Friedrichsruhe.

The Chancellor was much surprised when I informed him of my arrangements with the English Ministers. He showed himself much preoccupied with the fact that we had negotiated with England instead of treating with Austria, and it seemed greatly to displease him.

I replied that it was our obvious interest to negotiate with that one of the Powers who seemed most inclined to declare war upon us and whose fleets were ready prepared. Further, it was not Austria, but England, who contested our possession of Kars and of Batoum. Now, public feeling in Russia was as strongly enthusiastic over the annexation of these points as was ever the feeling in Germany in 1871 for the annexation of Alsace.

Prince Bismarck also showed excessive surprise on learning that England would consent to our occupation of Kars and Batoum; he considered—with reason—that this concession did not accord with the language and declarations of Lord Salisbury since he had entered the Foreign Office. The Prince even believed in a misunderstanding, and to convince him of the contrary, I had twice to read him the notes I had taken during my interview with the Foreign Secretary. The Prince, who was ill at the time, rose with much agitation and took a few steps backwards and forwards. "Well, then," he said, "in this case you have been right in negotiating with England. She would have made war upon you by herself, whereas Austria would have only have declared it with the help of allies."

When one considers the import of the expression, "with the help of allies," which necessarily implied Germany, one perceives the depth of the sentiments concealed in the mind of the Pomeranian; one can also divine with what an effort of self-control the statesman faced the accomplished fact presented to him.

The Prince wished to introduce some modifications into the wording of the formula that was to assemble the Congress. I begged him to do nothing, knowing what difficulties there would be with the English Ministers after the formula had once been accepted. They would immediately suspect reservations and insincerity. The Prince agreed to my request, and promised me, on the whole, his most whole-hearted support. In crossing Berlin I presented myself to the Emperor of Germany, who showed the same fears as had his Chancellor touching a direct understanding with Great Britain, and who also evinced great surprise on learning that the latter would agree to our occupation of Kars and Batoum.

It was indeed a matter for surprise!

In St. Petersburg the Ambassador found the door ready opened. "Peace! Peace!" was the general cry. The two commanders-in-chief, the Grand Duke Michael and the Grand-Duke Nicolas, described the situation of their armies in lamentable terms; the finances were exhausted, the soldiers exhausted, the country agitated by revolutionists.

Europe had watched these proceedings with growing anxiety. Pessimistic forecasts for the spring were not wanting. The men whose function it is to carry rumours, the Talleyrands of the carton, were in the blackest depths of despair.

The money market was much agitated. As most often happens, a financial campaign impeded the steps of the politicians. In the early part of April it was heard that General Ignatieff, after a short visit to Vienna (whither he had gone to make vol. iv.

a last effort 1), had been thrown overboard. Gortschakoff now posed as the man of conciliation and of peace.

The Convention was still a secret. Schouwaloff, who was to represent Russia in the Congress as First Plenipotentiary, went once more to St. Petersburg to receive direct instructions from the Czar. On his return he interviewed Prince Bismarck. It was the Berlin Cabinet that now stood guarantee to the Powers that Russia would submit the Treaty of San Stefano to the consideration of the Congress. Bismarck was now quite recovered and in excellent humour. On June 2nd he issued the invitations with the double formula, which was so precise and so painful to the feelings of the Russians. "With the object of discussing the stipulations of the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, the Powers consent to admit the free discussion of the whole contents of the Treaty of San Stefano." Things had to be brought to a decision: the twofold attempt on the life of the Emperor William (May 13th and

¹ On the subject of this journey, Carathéodory Pacha writes: "After the Treaty of San Stefano, General Ignatieff, coming from Vienna, had written to ask the Austrian Government to annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on condition that it would not oppose the carrying out of the other clauses in this treaty and the formation of a Great Bulgaria. . . . " According to other information, General Ignatieff heard, from Count Andrássy personally, a full account of the Austro-Hungarian views on the East, which went so far as to constitute a semi-independent Macedonia with Salonica as its capital and placed under the protection of Austria. The railway from Salonica to Mitrovitza should be under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and a Zollverein was to complete the work of opening up the peninsula. In return, Russia would be allowed free play in Bulgaria. General Ignatieff declared that he had no authority for treating on such lines.

June 2nd) caused the rulers fresh anxiety. Each had his revolutionists; it was not a time for playing with fire.

Beaconsfield Who would be the men to represent and Gort-the Powers at this Congress? As a rule the Conit was the business of the diplomatic gress circles. But this time Bismarck was presiding, the Ministers would therefore wish to figure in it. Lord Beaconsfield sought therein the apotheosis of his brilliant career. In urging Lord Derby from the Cabinet he had usurped this rôle. It was not without lively criticism that his resolve to attend the Congress was made known, even from the ranks of the Conservatives:—

From the constitutional point of view, it is rather despotic; from the standpoint of tradition it is without precedent, and one wonders what rôle is reserved to the other members of the Cabinet who are to remain in London. Lord Beaconsfield in the House of Lords took a lofty tone about it, announcing that he assumed the whole responsibility of this step, which was taken at the request of his colleagues." ¹

Such scenes have their equivalents under every rule. According to Count Schouwaloff this is what occurred in the Russian camp:—

On passing Berlin I went to see Prince Bismarck, and requested his support (at the Congress). I cannot exactly remember the precise terms of his promise, but it was to this effect: He was very satisfied at the choice made of myself; I was the only man in Russia in whom he had full and complete confidence, with whom he had pleasure in dealing. I could depend upon him, and he would, during the Congress, convince me of the sincerity of the feelings he had long held towards me.

He was still speaking, when he received a telegram from General von Schleidnitz. This announced that the Emperor had been

¹ London correspondence in the *Mémorial Diplomatique*, 1878 (p. 378).

to see Prince Gortschakoff to convince him of the impossibility, in his state of health, of his personally attending the Congress; but to say that, yielding to the insistence of his Chancellor, he had consented to name him First Plenipotentiary in my place. This information, which Prince Bismarck read aloud, brought a sudden and significant change to his expression. "Things are altered," he said to me. "We, personally, will remain friends during the Congress; but I shall not allow Prince Gortschakoff a second opportunity of using me as his pedestal."

The Ambassador adds a few observations as interesting as the account itself in giving the measure of these lofty personages:—

This is a further proof of how much is sacrificed with us to personal considerations. The Emperor knew that Prince Gortschakoff had no personal weight; he knew the strong feeling that Prince Bismarck harboured against the Russian Chancellor; his presence in Berlin could be only harmful to our cause. All this was quite palpable, and yet, in spite of everything, Prince Gortschakoff was authorised to come to Berlin.

Gortschakoff, Beaconsfield and Bismarck were to appear together on the stage!

They were attended by a following of the European statesmen. The representatives of Germany were, with Prince Bismarck, Herr von Bülow, the Prince von Hohenlohe, Ambassador in Paris; Dr. Lother Bücher, Herr von Radowitz, Herr Büsch, Baron von Holstein, Herr von Bülow, junior (the present Chancellor of the Empire), Count Herbert Bismarck, Count Rantzau, the whole Bismarckian phalanx. For Austria-Hungary, Count Andrassy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was accompanied by Count Karolyi, Baron von Haymerlé, Baron von Hübner, etc. Lord Beaconsfield was leader of the English delegates, which further numbered the

¹ See the bitter remarks of Bismarck on the subject of this incident, in his *Souvenirs* (vol. ii. p. 256, also p. 125).

Marquis of Salisbury, Foreign Secretary; Lord Odo Russell, Ambassador in Berlin; Mr. Currie, of the Embassy; Mr. Austin Lee, General Simmons, and an escort of young secretaries, among which were Mr. J. Bertie, Mr. Le Marchand Josselin, and, as Lord Salisbury's secretary, Mr. Arthur Balfour. From Russia came Prince Gortschakoff, Chancellor of the Empire: Count Schouwaloff, Ambassador in London; Baron d'Oubril, Ambassador in Berlin; Baron Jomini, Col. Bobrikow, Col. Bogoljubow, etc. Italy was represented by Count Corti, her Foreign Secretary; Count de Launay, Ambassador in Berlin. The Turkish delegates were led by Carathéodory Pacha, mustechar of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with Sadoullah Bey, Mohamed Ali Pacha, Feridoun Bey. France sent M. Waddington, accompanied by M. de Saint-Vallier as Second Plenipotentiary. The mission also included M. Desprey, director of political affairs, Count de Mouy, M. Ducléré, and a few attachés.

France, therefore, took her place in the family of the great European Powers. The question of doing so had been for some time debated by M. Gambetta, whose first impulse had been to refuse the invitation. He had yielded to the argument which was probably a reflection of his own thoughts: either cowardice or aggression. It was easy to perceive the inconveniences of participation in the Congress, but it would not be until afterwards that the perils of abstention would be known.

¹ A trace of the Government's hesitation is seen in even the official documents. M. Waddington telegraphed, February 16th, to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg: "Although the conference had no great attraction for us—etc."—Yellow Book, "Congress of Berlin" (p. 11).

Only one Power in Europe was bargaining for her help, and this was Great Britain. Were France to decline the invitation and were Great Britain fortified in her reservations, the Congress could not take place; the Treaty of San Stefano appearing inacceptable, there would be no other issue but war, or an undignified retreat for Russia.

Russia, therefore, eagerly sought an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Germany.¹ If France had not left her another honourable way out, what sacrifices would she not have made to assure herself in this crisis of the support of Germany? The ratified alliance of the Three Emperors revealed the indefinite submission of Europe.

If, on the other hand, matters were definitely arranged among the Powers, France not being with them, what would be her portion after not giving her solemn consent to the new European agreement? Would she keep to the old treaties annulled or modified by the new stipulations? Would she alone bear the burden of a Past that had dissolved of itself? Would she, together with her pleading for the return of her own provinces, pursue the fruitless claim of an Oriental system that had faded into nothing?

French reservations tion of the problem was for France to join the Congress. The French Government thought good to attach some formal "reservations" to

¹ See the very definite passage in Bismarck's memoirs, and the correspondence between him and Schouwaloff (p. 264, et seq.)—"Before the Congress, Count Schouwaloff hinted at an alliance, offensive and defensive, between Germany and Russia, then made me a direct proposal for this." And then the very technical discussion that follows.

her acceptance of the call, which had important effects on eventual developments. These were expressed, on March 7th, as soon as the first idea of a conference was announced, and were definitely stated, on June 4th, in the reply to the invitation addressed by the German Government to the Cabinet of Paris, also later on, in the declaration read on the platform of the Chamber of Deputies by M. Waddington on June 7th. They can be thus summarized:—

There should be no question in the Congress of Western affairs "which are not occupying attention at the moment," but further, France could not admit that any Eastern problem should be dealt with which had not been affected by the last events:—

To define our idea more clearly, we have stated from the first, in February last, that we should not agree to the raising in this Congress of the question of Egypt, nor of Lebanon, nor of the Holy Places. In our opinion, as these questions were not raised by the Treaty of San Stefano, they should remain entirely outside the scope of the Congress. . . . We have been guided in these reservations by the interests of France and by the general interests of Europe.

The reservations were greeted with good grace by the Powers. The British Government found them "prudent and skilful." At the utmost they would have been regarded as superfluous. Had the French Minister any interests in speaking of the West, since, on his own admission, no one was thinking of it for the moment? As to the careful avoidance of the question of the Holy Places and of Syria, and more especially, of Egypt, it meant, perhaps, that France wished to reserve for herself, in exchange for her participation in the Congress, the means of consolidating certain advantageous

and uniquely defensive positions within the Ottoman Empire. At all events, several of the "reserved" subjects were treated of in Berlin, either around the official table of the Congress, or behind the scenes—Cyprus, the Holy Places, Egypt itself, and Tunis. France took yet another step. The tendency of her policy reveals itself in the expression used by M. Waddington in the sitting of June 7th in the Chamber of Deputies: "France will go to the Congress. . . . In going, she will also remember that there are other Christians besides the Bulgarians in the Balkan peninsula . . . that there are other races which, at least in the same degree, merit the interest of Europe."

By these words she re-vindicated the most honourable traditions of her Eastern policy, but she also, up to a certain point, took a definite standing, and left, however slightly, the impartial attitude which might have assured her so much influence

in the high assembly.

In short, as the Powers were to settle, in Berlin, a general question as to European equilibrium, France joined the Congress, strong in her rights, in her peaceful intentions, in her restored military power. Between the two groups which were dividing Europe, her position was eminent and could be decisive.

III

The Opening of the Congress Chancellor's palace, under the presidency of Prince Bismarck, who opened the Congress, June 13th, 1878.

Exactly one month later, Saturday, July 13th, he was to pronounce its closing speech and congratulate his colleagues on the result of their labours. In this short space of time his rough hand had carved new outlines for Europe.

"It is for the purpose of submitting the work of San Stefano to the free discussion of the Governments that signed the treaties of 1856 and 1871 that we find ourselves assembled," he said on June 13th. And this was indeed the object of the gathering. Russia was on the stool of repentance, and, before she could answer for herself, was subjected to much inquisition on the matter of her victories. The different Powers came armed with pretensions, intentions, and "interests," which had already met with certain satisfaction in the preliminary measures that each of the delegations carried in its pocket. Austria-Hungary arrived with the Convention of Reichstadt: England with the Convention of May 30th, without counting the Anglo-Turkish agreement of June 4th, which was to come to light very unexpectedly; France made much of the "reservations" she had formulated. As to Prussia, she wished to receive the commission money due for her work as "honest agent"; she cherished the vast hope of a Germanic invasion of the East through a definite movement to the Danube through her old antagonist Austria-Hungary, and, in particular, she reckoned on the tacit agreement of the Powers to her continental hegemony.

In order to combine these divers calculations, preparations and ambitions, "Greater Europe," that of the Five Powers, took upon herself to decide the difficulties. At the gate of the Congress stood the smaller Powers, the Powers "in the making,"

humbly knocking for admittance. Greece, Roumania, Servia, Montenegro, and even distant Persia. They were, however, repulsed. At the utmost might they be admitted to expound their "grievances," and to pay their homage.

On the protocols of the Congress figured, alone, the names of the Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, of some score of qualified men, surrounded by a zealous battalion of secretaries.¹

It was upon this chosen assistance that Bismarck exercised his authority. Nowhere are the dominant traits of nations more strongly marked than in the assemblies in which their representatives meet and oppose each other.²

Prince Bismarck's attitude was, from the first, very natural and thoughtful. He was ill and could

The official protocols of the Congress have been published by most of the Governments. See the French Yellow Book. It is useless to add that they give a very incomplete view of the sittings. The following is a remark on the subject by one of the Plenipotentiaries: "The official protocols give a faithful report of the work of the Congress, and an official summary of it, but beneath the diplomatic envelope which uniformly covers all the parts, it is hard to find the true aspect of the details. Further, also, the protocols were not re-read during the meetings and very important modifications were permitted to be introduced into them" (unpublished memoirs of Carathéodory Pacha).

² Here is a thumb-nail sketch of the Congress: "Before the assembly we went to the Buffet, where we drank port wine and ate biscuits. By degrees the plenipotentiaries arrived: Count Costi, a very ugly little man, with a Japanese type of face, and Count Launay; then came the Turk, a man still young, but insignificant; Count Schouwaloff, and old Gortschakoff, who was very feeble; then followed the English and the French, Waddington in a grand uniform. The first meeting of Gortschakoff and Lord Beaconsfield was interesting, it was a historic moment." Mémoires of the Prince von Hohenlohe (vol. ii. p. 231). Compare Werner's picture.

only join the meetings by a strong effort of will. He was, therefore, rather hurried and exacting, but conducted the business to the end, surveying every detail without losing time over minute technicalities. Count Schouwaloff, who, if not a great man, was at least distinguished and determined, thus describes him:—

Prince Bismarck presided over the Congress with a certain military brusqueness of manner which did not displease those present and which the representatives of all the Powers took in good part, the two English Ministers not excepted, from whom I had awaited more haughtiness.

It is easy to judge of the impression made on the representatives of the weaker Powers—the timid and the intimidated. Long after the end of the Congress, the good Turk Carathéodory Pacha still trembled:—

The Congress of Berlin was completely dominated by Prince Bismarck. . . . Circumstances gave the Prince a position as unparalleled in Germany as in Europe. The confidence and fear that he inspired were general. . . . The Prince recognised no superior but the Emperor, on condition of being the sole interpreter of his will. Long accustomed to the most complete independence, he looked upon the slightest observation as a desire for resistance which he hastened to suppress with nervous impatience and a will of iron.

In the main, having brought Russia to the bar, Prince Bismarck meant to spare her as much as possible. He was conscious of the danger that Germany would be exposed to from a decided turn in Russian policy. He had, however, another design, skilfully manipulated; this was to oppose

¹ This fear of Bismarck is expressed very significantly by a remark of Prince Anton von Hohenzollern in a letter to his son, Prince Charles (April, 1877): "Bismarck desires to isolate completely France and Russia in order to have his hands free."

England and Russia so as to play, with regard to these Powers, the rôle of tertius gaudens. If war were avoided by the prudence of the two Governments, who had come to harmony before entering on the Congress, at least so much of their quarrel could be kept alive as would keep them for some time to come in a state of bitterness towards each other. Bismarck's line of conduct towards France, and towards the Eastern Powers, Turkey in particular, was no less carefully calculated.

In joining the Congress, France had given proof of good grace and conciliatory mood, and this was duly appreciated. She was needed and therefore had to be treated with politeness. The policy of the "hot douche," and the "cold douche" still subsisted, but with an appreciable difference. It was because the respective positions were altered; there was no advantage to be gained by perpetually irritating a nation whose forces were reconstituted, and who, on her return to the circle of the European Powers, would become a point of support for adverse combinations.

As for Turkey, whose existence and whose territories were in question, she should be treated as vanquished. Let her not attempt to oppose the complex projects of the leader of Europe. She had reason to be only too glad that his powerful arm was drawing her from the abyss into which she had been plunged.

The Prince is so dominated by the political instinct that, properly speaking, he has neither friend nor enemy at heart. This is true for things in general—and as to the Ottoman Empire, the prince has no faith in its future. . . . Of subtle intellect, he does not admit things by halves. He would perhaps appreciate a Turk of the old régime; the modern Turk with leanings to

European civilisation he can less understand.... Nor does he take the Oriental peoples more into consideration... Salisbury having requested, for the second time, that a day might be arranged for what he called "the Armenian Question," "Another one!" exclaimed Bismarck, obviously impatient.

Prince Bismarck lost no opportunity of showing that, in his opinion, the Eastern question, in so far as it relates to peoples and forms of government placed to some extent outside the zone of European civilisation and with no future before them, should only interest Europe through its effect on the relations of the Great Powers amongst themselves. For this cause alone would he deign to occupy himself with it. It was with this point of view that he presided over the Congress and worked to calm the rival pretensions of the European Governments, putting aside as vain and idle any question not of a nature to bear directly on the diplomatic relations of the Powers.

In short, at this important time, the Prince, controlling his personal feelings, took the rôle of judge. What he desired was a solid organisation of Central Europe, capable of holding its own, in case of need, against two directions at once, and independent of English influence without being hostile towards it. He set himself the task of inspiring confidence in himself, and of fomenting discord among others, and all this was done by the most simple and direct means. He in no wise compelled Destiny to act, like Socrates, he merely observed and furthered. Circumstances came to his assistance. He had to deal with uncompromising situations which he had the good sense to accept; he had to deal with personal vanities and susceptibilities at which his fine knowledge of human nature allowed him to glance sideways and exploit.

It is probably to such individual weaknesses that the serious mistake must be attributed of

¹ Unpublished Souvenirs of Carathéodory Pacha.

both Russia and Great Britain in not maintaining through the Congress the conciliatory attitude that had inspired the agreement of May 30th, and of having revived before the solemn court the differences anterior to this agreement, inasmuch as the gallery was often allowed the right of conflicts over points of detail when capital questions were concerned. What an influence would not mutual perseverance in the agreement have given to these two Powers, interested as they were in opposing the manœuvres of Prince Bismarck and in counterbalancing the efforts of Germanic Europe ranged skilfully against them!

Some account must be taken of the tide of opinion which, in England, during the course of the Congress, determined the announcement in the press of the Anglo-Russian convention. How came it that it was ever divulged? This is a mystery that has never been explained. It is certain that the general public was greatly opposed to the agreement. The English Ministers, as plenipotentiaries in Berlin, were much shaken by this unexpected blow, and endeavoured to explain in detail certain of the concessions they were reproached with having granted, that of Batoum in particular:—

We were in the third week of the Congress when the bomb burst of the announcement of the Anglo-Russian Convention. This event produced in England so strong and unfavourable a feeling that the two English Ministers informed me one fine morning that they would refuse to carry out the clause by which they undertook not to oppose the eventual ceding of Batoum to Russia. Thunderstruck by the news, I reminded the Marquis of Salisbury that he had given his signature, and begged him to stand by it. The Marquis was willing to acknowledge the obligations of the engagement, but declared that to obviate this he would hand in his resignation, when he would be replaced the same day by

another Foreign Secretary who would not be bound by his signature." 1

Bismarck, informed of matters, arranged this serious incident. Batoum should remain in the hands of Russia and should be declared a "free port," but surprises of this nature explain the mutual animosity of the two delegations.

It was between Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortschakoff especially that these stings were most keenly felt. The latter did not attend the sittings of the Congress, which he imagined would be too painful for his amour propre. More than once, however, did British irony wound Russian susceptibility to the quick. The protocols themselves, in their official connections, reveal something of these dangerous passages. On June 29th, with reference to a question extremely painful for Russia, the exchange of Bessarabia for the Dobroudja, Lord Beaconsfield thus expressed himself:—

The First Plenipotentiary of England calls for all the attention of the High Assembly on so serious a question.

Lord Beaconsfield deplores this alteration in the Treaty of Paris and protests against it without having to inquire whether or not the exchange in question is sanctioned by the present owner. The other signatories of the Treaty of Paris having declined to intervene in the matter, the First Plenipotentiary of Great Britain would not advise the Queen's Government to resort to force for maintaining the stipulations of this treaty, but he protests against the alteration and awaits explanation from his Russian colleagues—etc. . . .

What a tone! Gortschakoff was taken aback. He gave the required explanations "on the liberty of the Danube," and added that his Government would not care to return to this question, hoping

¹ From the unpublished Souvenirs of Count P. Schouwaloff.

that Lord Beaconsfield would not persist in his

objections.

These were differences that suggested the clash of arms, and Bismarck sometimes produced them in order to have the pleasure of arranging them!

The open enmity between the "two chancellors," German and Russian, offered both amusement and embarrassment to the Congress. Prince Bismarck overwhelmed his colleague with darts of biting pleasantry, hardly perceptible beneath the veil of careful courtesy.

On the first occasion that the Russian Minister of State took part in the debate, an incident arose which must have greatly tended to annoy him:—

Prince Gortschakoff was only present at the sittings of the Congress at long intervals, usually announcing that some indisposition kept him to his rooms. Apart from personal civilities on the part of Prince Bismarck, we can hardly remember a single occasion on which the German Chancellor showed, by word or deed, any special political deference towards the Chancellor of Russia. The latter, however, as the Nestor of the great European diplomatists, would have been extremely appreciative of a little incense from Prince Bismarck in the presence of the members of the Congress! Bismarck was well aware of this, and it almost seemed as if he purposely endeavoured to rid his Russian colleague of any illusion or hope upon this point.

At the third meeting of the Congress, the First Ottoman Plenipotentiary had asked to speak, and before the president had given him the opportunity, Prince Gortschakoff asked it in his turn. This was the first time that the Russian Chancellor was to speak before the Congress. The president intimated to the prince that the Turkish Plenipotentiary had the priority. Prince Gortschakoff insisted on his desire to speak first. The Turkish Plenipotentiary courteously offered to yield his turn to the Prince, who did not accept the offer. But Prince Bismarck was equally firm in his determination that the Plenipotentiary should speak first. All this occasioned a little scene which was the subject of much remark, and at its close Prince Gortschakoff tossed down

his spectacles and papers in so much annoyance that they fell to the other side of the table.¹

Prince Bismarck caused much hot feeling amongst his friends, and even in his own *Souvenirs* proofs of his implacable rancour are not wanting.

His incontestable superiority, the awe that he inspired amongst the be-medalled and be-ribboned dignitaries that surrounded him, ought to have made him more indulgent. The individualities of these lofty personages aroused his formidable criticism. Beaconsfield was not spared, any more than was Gortschakoff. He slyly mocked at their solemn methods of procedure, their romantic and slightly old-fashioned ways. Neither one nor the other had much notion of technicalities, and still less were they geographers. On more than one occasion they complicated questions which they were expected to elucidate.

Prince Gortschakoff, however brilliant he may have been at one time of his life, was not a man of business. He was skilful over phrasing, but kept always to generalities, and I do not exaggerate in affirming that before his failure of health, he was incapable of pointing out on the map, even approximately, the different countries of the Balkan peninsula, or, for instance, the position of Kars and Batoum. When the Prince talked business he liked to "tracer les magistrales," as he expressed it; in short, as he also said, to generalise. . . . I was, therefore, considerably alarmed when he informed me one fine day that he had given up all the other questions to me, but that he specially reserved that of Batoum to himself. . . . He could deal with it directly with Lord Beaconsfield. . . . The Congress was drawing to a close. Prince Bismarck, anxious to set off to Kissingen, endeavoured to bring matters to a settlement and questioned me daily as to whether an agreement on the Asiatic frontier had been arrived at between Russia and Great Britain. I told him that

¹ From the Souvenirs of Carathéodory Pacha.

Prince Gortschakoff had reserved this negotiation for his own handling. I made the same communication to the Marquis of Salisbury, who was drawing me very closely, and he replied with some vexation: "My dear Count, Lord Beaconsfield cannot negotiate! he has never seen a map of Asia Minor!"... Prince Bismarck at last announced that if we were not ready within the next twenty-four hours he would start off. A few hours afterwards we heard to our relief that a complete agreement had been arrived at between Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortschakoff. The Prince promised to announce it at the next sitting of the Congress.

It must be stated, in order to understand what follows, that each of us possessed a map of Asia on which our état major had traced the frontier of the Treaty of San Stefano in one particular colour, and another line of different colour to show the ne plus ultra of what the Plenipotentiaries could yield to the insistence of Great Britain. Needless to add, the second line was, to some extent, a state secret.

This last assembly, devoted to the Asiatic question, was a serious occasion. On its result hung the issues of peace or war. The president suggested that the two negotiators, Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortschakoff, should sit side by side to point out the tenure of their agreement. The two gentlemen therefore took their places, each one spreading out before him a map traced for the occasion. We others stood in a group behind them. I at once foresaw the trouble and confusion that would ensue. Gortschakoff's map had one line only, that of San Stefano, and the Prince declared emphatically that "my lord" had accepted it. Beaconsfield, however, replied to the Prince's declaration by a laconic "No, no!" and pointed out, on his own map, the line to which he had consented. Now, to my great astonishment, this line, in all its sinuosities, was precisely the one that we had the right to accept as the extreme limit of our agreement.

The contradiction between the two Plenipotentiaries tended to embitter the discussion. Each stood obstinately by his own line, when Prince Gortschakoff got up, seized my hand and said to me: "There is some treachery; they have had the map of our état major."

I learned afterwards that on the previous day Gortschakoff had asked for a map of Asia Minor. He was given the confidential map of the two lines. He showed it to Lord Beaconsfield, lending it to him for a few hours so that Lord Salisbury could see it. The Englishmen, noticing a line that threw back the frontier

of San Stefano, had adopted it for their own map. This was the explanation of the imagined treachery. . . .

The president of the Congress, perceiving the two negotiators more and more entangled in their difficulty, ironically suggested compromise: the Congress should be suspended for the space of half an hour, during which the Second Plenipotentiaries, Russian and English, together with the Second German Plenipotentiary, Prince von Hohenlohe, should put the matter to the vote.

... Well! the matter turned to our advantage. I stood by the line of San Stefano, the Marquis of Salisbury to the ne plus ultra traced by our état major. Prince von Hohenlohe proposed a middle line which would divide that under dispute into two equal parts. I accepted, and the question was decided. We signed the treaty two days afterwards.

This account gives a striking psychological reading of the Congress, and of the period. Each played his natural part. Yet the interests of the nations found their outlet, notwithstanding, and it is these interests which, combining under vigilant surveillance, give the Russian victories their extraordinary development.

The Moral of the Congress Had she any advantage in substituting for this hardly dangerous dominion that of the Powers commanding the Mediterranean and the Balkans? On the other hand, did England really think that she would prevent the collapse of the Turkish Empire; would she support to the end the author of the "Bulgarian atrocities," and had she no other rivals to fear but the Slavs, which were then her only anxiety?

Between these wavering and uncertain policies came Germany and took her spoils. Here lies the whole history of the Congress.

The first and greatest question was the question of the Balkans. The discussion presents two

¹ Souvenirs of Count P. Schouwaloff.

phases or two aspects. At first Great Britain, with much obstinacy, according to the agreement of May 30th, opposed the formation of a Great Bulgaria, and endeavoured to keep the Turkish forces on the Balkans. She succeeded, but her victory meant nothing. In point of fact, Great Britain had no durable combination to oppose to the project of constituting a new Slav state.

Two other solutions were possible; either to consolidate Turkey, or to make Greece the heir of the Turkish Empire. The first solution came to nothing through England's own desire; it was England who, by the Convention of Cyprus and the proposal as to Bosnia and Herzegovina, gave the example of "dividing." ¹

¹ On the reading of the English propositions on the subject of the Balkans, the Turkish plenipotentiaries, who were still unaware of the Schouwaloff agreement and all the secret arrangements that had prepared the Congress, were overwhelmed with astonishment. They had still believed that the English plenipotentiaries would help them to defend, as much as possible, the integrity of the Empire. What was in question was the separation from the new Bulgaria of Varna and the Sandjak of Sofia. "It was on June 22nd, it was said in town that the English were very insistent and that all might be broken off at any moment. . . . On the morning of the 22nd, it was affirmed that nothing was decided, by midday, however, it was announced that the agreement was effected, and soon after, Lord Salisbury read before the Congress his great proposition enclosed in Protocol IV. The Turkish plenipotentiaries were thunderstruck; a few hours previously they had been assured that the question of Varna was strongly discussed, and now they heard England preparing to abandon Varna and the Sandjak of Sofia to Bulgaria, contenting herself in return with the exclusion of the basin of Masth and of Struma-Carasson from the limits of Eastern Roumelia-of which till then had been no mention-and proposing to form, outside the principality of Bulgaria, an autonomic province, with frontiers, local militia, etc. . . . The poor man tried in vain to defend himself, Prince Bismarck cut him short: "Prince

As to the "Greek" solution, after a few subtleties England masked her intentions. Did she fear to see the rise of a new maritime power in the Eastern Mediterranean? On this delicate and obscure subject, Lord Beaconsfield made a speech, on July 5th, which Count Schouwaloff qualifies as "eloquent."

"An erroneous opinion," said the noble lord, "attributed to the Congress an intention of proceeding to portion out a wornout state, and not to fortify, as did the High Assembly, an ancient empire that it considers as essential to the maintenance of peace. It is true that often a great war occasions a shifting of territorial possessions; Turkey is not the only state that has suffered territorial losses; England, also, has lost provinces to which she attached much value and which she still regrets. [Did he mean Calais?] Such arrangements or retrocessions can hardly be called divisions, and the Greek Government would be much mistaken as to the views of Europe." Lord Beaconsfield added "that no one could doubt the future of Greece; that states, like individuals, with a future before them, can afford to wait for it."

This was stern consolation. Count Schouwaloff replied to Lord Beaconsfield by observing that the Slavs of the Balkans were "not alone in wishing to disturb the peace of Europe," and it came to a

Bismarck began very brusquely to tell the Ottoman plenipotentiary that if he had anything to say, he should do so at once without delay. "However," he added, "I cannot admit that even should the Turkish plenipotentiary desire to speak, he should thereby take the opportunity of offering objections; he has no right to do so, since his Government signed the Treaty of San Stefano. . . . Such an attitude towards a European committee would indicate an intention on the part of the Turkish plenipotentiaries to impede the course of the Congress. I could not tolerate it, and should the Turkish plenipotentiaries insist, I must declare that I should find myself obliged and ready to give a practical proof of my meaning." (This is word for word. From Souvenirs of Carathéodory Pacha.)

Such threats and ebullitions, the more alarming in their vagueness, completely took aback the Ottoman plenipotentiaries.

rather platonic agreement, on the lines of the French proposition, according Greece a simple rectification of frontier in Epirus and Thessaly. Hence Greece saw her opportunity escape her. England and Austria-Hungary had their eyes on Salonika.¹

We must understand the practical meaning of the expressions in the protocols. In spite of the protestations of Lord Beaconsfield, the policy to which the Powers were tending, either by the force of circumstances, or by the consciousness of their irreconcilable rivalry, was a partition of the Ottoman Empire, and if not exactly a partition of territory, at least a partition of "spheres of influence," as it was called later, through the distribution and cutting up of the Balkan peninsula among the local nationalities related to the great European families.

The conception of the Conference of Constantinople was thus reverted to, as revised and enlarged in the Treaty of San Stefano, and a "Bulgaria" was constituted. A Bulgaria, it is true, diminished, fettered and watched, but still a Bulgaria—that is to say, an orthodox Slav state in the very heart of the peninsula, on the high road to Constantnople.

Two millions of Slavs freed from the dominion of the Turk, united into an "autonomic and tribu-

¹ The situation of Crete was hardly touched on by the Congress. Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, which replaces Article 15 of the Treaty of San Stefano, says simply that the organic regulations of 1868 shall be applied to the island. M. Waddington is said to have thus addressed the Greek colony in Paris: "We encountered an iron will in the heart of the Congress which forbade our touching on the subject of Crete, and this will was that of Lord Beaconsfield."—Chrystaphides, "Cyprus or Crete" in the Correspondent of April 10th, 1895.

tary principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with a Christian Government and a national militia." Such was the prospect for the new people of the East. Such was the price of the victory of the Slav. There remained but to watch the growth of this young plant, which the ploughshare of Plevna had rooted up from its obscurity.

But this Bulgaria was not one and entire: her access to the sea had been taken from her. And, as a buffer between her and Constantinople, an "Eastern Roumelia" was interposed, a Bulgarian province also, but remaining under "the direct political and military authority of the Sultan," enjoying only "an administrative autonomy," a diplomatic conception admirable on paper, but in reality absurd and impracticable. Further, there remained in the other European provinces of the Empire, a third Bulgaria, a Bulgaria under yoke, but which, nevertheless, considered itself as worthy of European attention as were the others. There existed, therefore,—Bulgarians diminished by the detached Bulgaria, Bulgarians excited by the autonomic Bulgaria, Bulgarians exasperated by Turkish Bulgaria—and these would not remain passive!

The Congress, and Great Britain in particular, pushed precautions against the Russian conquest, as far as allowing the Sultan the right of passage for troops, munitions, etc., through the south of the Sandjak of Sofia, so that the Balkans remained, theoretically at least, the frontier and rampart of Turkey. It was with the greatest difficulty that Count Schouwaloff, by means of skilful diplomacy, gained from England the concession of the district of Sofia, without which Bulgaria would have been not only halved but decapitated.

Bulgaria remains none the less the original creation of the Congress. History registers the fact. A new Slav nation arose in the Balkans. Its personality was strong, so robust and pushful that within the space of ten years it had broken its bonds and effaced the demarcation established by the diplomatists between "Bulgaria Dissatisfied" and "Bulgaria Satisfied."

Bosnia and Hellenism brushed aside, Slavism having Herzegovina pushed forward to the approaches of Constantinople, Germanism also claimed its share. England, who had done all she could to suppress the first two elements, aided in the expansion of the last. No doubt she considered that she could obtain equilibrium through the opposition of the two forces. And before all she bowed to the dictates of Prince Bismarck, sic volo, sic jubeo. It was from this quarter that he looked for his acknowledgment and his commission fees as "honest agent."

Together with the progress of the Slav element in Bulgaria, the Congress sanctioned the extension of Germanic influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the same "eloquent" speech in which Lord Beaconsfield had disclaimed all idea of "partition," though resigning himself to it as a fact, he claimed, as an act of British initiative, the idea of placing these two provinces in the hands of Austria-Hungary. It was, however, on the whole, only the application of what the Convention of Reichstadt had formulated. So Austria-Hungary was to obtain the reward of her wise and prudent demeanour during the war.

This is how Lord Beaconsfield brought things before the Congress:—

His Excellency seized this opportunity for disclaiming the insinuations of a party of the press which had qualified as a "partition" the decision of the Congress as to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was, on the contrary, in order to prevent a "partition" that this decision had been made. Several historical precedents justified it fully: Bosnia, abandoned to herself, without the elements of good government, surrounded by independent, or semi-independent, states, would soon become the theatre of much conflict.

With this intention, Great Britain made appeal to a neighbouring Power, strong and interested in the maintenance of peace. Europe, sharing the same views, granted to Austria-Hungary the occupation and administration of Bosnia. His Excellency pointed out that several times, either in neighbouring countries or elsewhere (probably Italy and Belgium), the same mission had been confided to Austria. The initiative of Great Britain does not, therefore, prove her to be favourable to a partition. . . .

And this is what had now happened. From the beginning of complications, Austria-Hungary had fixed her eye on the two provinces; she had made known her intention not to allow, at any price, the Slav influence to develop in the Western Balkans. At Reichstadt, Russia, enlightened as to these designs, had consented, sacrificing both Servia and Montenegro.¹

¹ Carathéodory Pacha gives some interesting details on the Agreement of Reichstadt. "It is well to note that the origin of this question (of Bosnia and Herzegovina) can be traced, if certain accounts can be believed, to the interview of the Emperors at Reichstadt in June, 1876. This at least is what has been declared on oath by M. Cagalniceano. He affirms that he has seen two papers, written in pencil, one by Prince Gortschakoff, the other by Count Andrassy, and exchanged by the two at Reichstadt; both papers, which are drawn up as a simple statement of ideas, admitting, in case of a Russo-Turkish war, the retrocession of Bessarabia to Russia and the extension of Austria in Herzegovina and Bosnia. Several statements made by Lord Salisbury during the official and private discussions, give reason to believe that England, on her part, had familiarised herself with this idea at the time of the Conference at Constantinople."

Since then, Prince Bismarck had lost no opportunity of bringing forward the subject of Austro-Hungarian influence in the peninsula.

During the war, Austria-Hungary had set her hand to the business of the two provinces. England, in the beginning (as proved by Count Schouwaloff), had shown some distrust of Austria-Hungary. It was when the understanding was definitely made between the two Powers, probably at the time of the Conference of Constantinople, but more probably at Berlinitself and under Bismarck's eye, that England was allowed the "initiative" claimed by Lord Beaconsfield in his speech of July 5th.

All being thus prepared, Austria-Hungary, in the sitting of June 8th, had unmasked her batteries:—

Interested, in the first instance, as a neighbouring Power, Austria-Hungary must frankly declare that her most vital interests can only allow her to accept a solution of the problem concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina that tends to produce the permanent pacification of the said provinces and to prevent a recurrence of the incidents which have exposed the peace of Europe to such serious risks and brought Austria-Hungary—together with great sacrifices and large material losses, into an untenable position which she can bear no longer.

In reply, Lord Salisbury brought forward a proposition which can be briefly summarised:—

The Porte would give evidence of the greatest wisdom in refusing longer to undertake a task that is beyond her strength; and in intrusting it to a Power able to fulfil it, she would avert all the formidable dangers from the Empire. [This was persuading the victim to be decapitated.] For other reasons, Her Majesty's Government proposes to the assembled Powers that the Congress agree that the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary.

Prince Bismarck at once supported the proposal:—

It is not only an Austro-Hungarian interest, but a general duty. . . . Germany, who is connected by no *direct* interests with the matters of the East, is of opinion that only a powerful State, with means at her disposal for crushing all disorder, can there establish harmony and assure the welfare of these peoples.

The thesis could well be extended to apply to other provinces.

The Turkish plenipotentiaries had feared this terrible blow. For some days past they had been trying to avert it. The Treaty of San Stefano was again being corrected, but, this time, it was being aggravated. They knocked at every door, especially at that of the English delegates; there did they meet their second and no less painful disillusionment.

The Turkish plenipotentiaries sought out Lord Salisbury and Lord Beaconsfield, entreating them to exert their influence towards the postponement, at least, of the debate, when time might then be gained for an understanding. The English plenipotentiaries gave them but scant attention; for all reply, Lord Beaconsfield drily remarked that the decisions of the Ottoman Council were far from wise, to say the least. As to Lord Salisbury, he shrugged his shoulders and said: "I shall do nothing in the matter. You can do anything, as I know you will accomplish nothing. The policy of your Government consists in blinding itself to its own interests." After which he withdrew. . . .

To those who asked him why he had assumed the rôle of initiator of the Austrian occupation,-Lord Salisbury replied that as it was inevitable that the proposal should be made, it seemed to him better done by England than by Germany.¹

When, during the Congress, the proposal was brought forward, supported by the three Powers directing the high assembly and sustained by the eloquence of Lord Beaconsfield, Turkey could do nothing but bow to the inevitable.

There was, however, one Power much affected by the extension of Austria-Hungary towards the

¹ Souvenirs of Carathéodory Pacha.

Adriatic, and this was Italy. She was represented in the Congress by a diplomatist of the old school, experienced and prudent, whose long career had given him a certain confidence in himself. This was Count Corti.

The Turkish delegates had told him of their troubles, but had made nothing out of him. He said later that he had, or thought he had, some assurance from the part of Bismarck. However it may have been, the following incident occurred at a sitting:—

The only one who thought of-not supporting the Turkish delegates—but of uttering an opinion which was not quite in unison with that of the president, was Count Corti. He asked Count Andrassy what point of view his Government maintained as to the occupation. The demand was formulated in rather vague terms. However, on the utterance of Count Corti's question, Count Andrassy turned first towards Prince Bismarck, and then looking straight into the eyes of Count Corti-"Sir," he said, "Austria, occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina, maintains the European point of view—I have nothing further to add." This reply had a remarkable effect on Count Corti. Not only did he then make no reply, but later also, neither he nor his Italian colleague. Count de Launay, opened their lips, and when afterwards the Turkish plenipotentiaries begged him to propose that the occupation should be only of a provisory character, Count Corti refused to do so, declaring that he would do nothing in the matter and that he had been warned that his interference would be regarded as a casus belli," 1

All this, naturally, does not figure in the protocols. Beaconsfield completed his explanations by developing the only argument likely to appeal to public opinion in Great Britain:—

¹ Souvenirs of Carathéodory Pacha. See also the account said to originate in the papers of M. Waddington, and which appeared in the Neue Freie Presse of August 31st.

If the Congress were to leave the provinces in question in their present condition the predominance of the Slav race would soon be assured—and this is a race but little disposed to do justice to any other.

Gortschakoff, his hands tied by the Agreement of Reichstadt, could but drink the cup. He simply remarked that the "English proposal coincided with the general views of Russia."

The Turkish plenipotentiaries could not yet resign themselves to such a sacrifice. They had no instructions. They had neither yielded nor broken off; their position was most difficult, they "trembled," this being the expression used by themselves at various intervals to denote their state of mind.

Directly after the sitting they were vehemently attacked by their colleagues of Austria and England. . . . Lord Beaconsfield no longer advised but threatened openly. He accused the Ottoman plenipotentiaries—and this was more serious—of opposing the projects of Great Britain, of placing her in such a position that she could no longer defend Turkey, either against the principalities or against Greece.

And there were not only the threats of Lord Beaconsfield in question.

The Turkish plenipotentiaries had learned, the day after the sitting, that Prince Bismarck would suggest that Austria should enter Bosnia without waiting for the consent of the Sublime Porte. . . . The military preparations of this Power, the words of Prince Bismarck, his influence—the expression that the Powers would consult their own interests that he had used before the Congress, the verbal process already opened, the threats and reproaches of Lord Beaconsfield—all this sufficiently indicated the gravity of the situation and the necessity of circumventing it by some expedient (Souvenirs of Carathéodory Pacha).

The expedient consisted in the drawing up of a clause (July 11th) destined to remain secret, but

saving the dignity of Turkey and subordinating the *temporary occupation* by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the district of Novi-Bazar, to a preliminary agreement with Turkey.¹

These were but words. The finest conquest of the whole campaign was made by Austria-Hungary, with no outlay of life or gold, and despite Turkey, despite Russia, despite Italy. Bismarck could well repeat his mot: "Le Congrès, c'est moi!" ²

Germanic influence had stepped into the Balkans. Gortschakoff had wished to measure himself with Bismarck; he found himself defeated. The long political trials of Russia in 1863, 1866, 1871, had ended in this formidable check. Europe, meeting for the first time since Germany's success, might well have demanded of her, if not an account, at least some compensation, what she did was to contribute towards her further expansion.

Prince Bismarck, by collecting the benefits of

¹ The text of this secret clause is as follows: "On the desire expressed by the Ottoman plenipotentiaries in the name of their Government, the Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiaries declare, in the name of His Imperial Majesty's Government, that the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall suffer nothing from the occupation in question in the article relating to the said provinces in the treaty to be signed to-day; that the occupation shall be considered provisory and that a preliminary agreement as to the details of the occupation shall be made directly after the closing of the Congress, between the two Governments.

ANDRASSY, KAROLYI, HAYMERLÉ.

Berlin, July 13th, 1878.

² See J. de Witte's *Quinze ans d'Histoire*—Note of a conversation of the Roumanian agent Liteano with Odo Russell, British Ambassador, April 26th. "Up to the present Bismarck has done nothing but make witticisms on the subject of the Congress. His last is that of Louis XIV: "Le Congrès, c'est moi" (p. 78).

the Russian victories in the Balkans for the benefit of "Greater Germany," had won for himself the eternal fidelity of Austria; he directed towards the Danube the forces of Southern Germany, thus relieving pressure on the North; he laid the foundation of the Triple Alliance by showing Italy her weakness and that of the Western nations.

Neither England, France, nor Russia had been able quickly enough to take their stand in face of this new fact, the constitution of imperial Germany. They had been delayed by their ancient quarrels, their ancient passions and ideas. The English diplomacy in particular, with its somewhat haughty self-confidence, had fallen into the trap so skilfully set. England had undertaken to introduce Germany into the East and Constantinople.

Roumania Roumania was proclaimed independent. independent However, after a debate most painful for her feelings, in which she was abandoned by all, she had, nolens volens, to accept a slightly enlarged Dobroudja in exchange for Bessarabia rendered up by her to Russia. On the insistence of France, who, it is true, had tried to obtain a better frontier towards the Dobroudja, she ended by consenting to a clause of the treaty according nationality and equality of privilege to the Israelites of Roumania.¹

¹ The Roumanian delegates, MM. Bratiano and Kogalniceano although representing a belligerent and victorious state, were not allowed to share in the work of the Congress. They were merely "heard" by the representatives of the Powers. They presented a Memoir, pleading their cause with warmth, but it was known in advance that this was sheer waste of energy and that the positions had been already taken. One of the Secretaries of the Congress, Count de Mouy, writes thus: "For my own part, I pitied the two Roumanian delegates on hearing them develop

Russia as the reward of her victories, gained nothing in Europe but the return of Bessarabia. And this at the cost of the long enmity of the young kingdom lately her ally, and with whom she could have had so much interest in maintaining the remembrance of "confraternity of arms."

Servia and Montenegro were also de-Montenegro clared independent. They also received some territorial advantages. Yet the former saw her road barred to Salonika, and almost lost all hope of maritime development either towards the Ægean Sea or the Mediterranean.

Montenegro was better favoured, her sphere of action enlarged, especially towards the sea-coast, where she retained Antivari; but not obtaining the ports of Spizza and Dulcigno, she resigned herself, at least for the moment, to a considerable diminution of Slav influence on the Adriatic shore.

Turkey was saved once again. Not only did she keep Constantinople, more than ever a source of embarrassment to Europe, but she repossessed herself of all the territory that the treaty of San Stefano had taken from her, and from the Ægean Sea to the Balkans, except for a rectification of frontier, eventual but not yet determined, to the advantage of Greece, in Epirus and Thessaly. She broke loose from Russia's restraint, probably for ever. A war indemnity of 300 million roubles, to be specially arranged between Turkey and Russia, left, however, to Russia a certain hold on the Porte which could not be freed from it immediately.

their judicious and illusory argument. Both looked extremely downcast, and fulfilled their mission through a feeling of duty and with no hopes whatever " (Revue des Deux Mondes, November 1st, 1904).

Turkey still retained—Cyprus excepted—the islands of the Archipelago and the Mediterranean—even Crete. She was carefully maintained in her rôle as "Guardian of the Straits." Nothing better has been found for preserving the balance of the East. All Christianity, united once again to pass her decree, did not venture to abolish the fact of the Mussulman occupation nor to assert the rights of the European peoples over Europe. Lord Beaconsfield declared before the Congress that "one of the chief foundations of the general peace consists in the independence of the Sultan as a European Sovereign."

In Asia, the general conditions of the Treaty of San Stefano were not sensibly modified. Turkey yielded definitely to Russia the territories of Ardahan, Kars and Batoum; the two former constituted for Russia a high road into Asia Minor, and a pressure on the Mohammedan. The fears of England on the subject of the commercial route to India by the sources of the Euphrates had been appeased by the return of Bayazid and the valley of Alaschkerd to Turkey, and the re-yielding to Persia, by Turkey, of the town and territory of Rhotour.

On the whole, the most important result, in Asia, was the taking over of Batoum by Russia. Batoum, it is true, was declared a free port, but Batoum assures Russia her dominion of the Black Sea; Batoum reserves for her the working of the rich petroleum region of the Caucasus; Batoum influences Persia and Armenia.

It is easy to understand the energy with which Count Schouwaloff defended the conquest that Russian arms alone could not have kept; the illvol. IV.

will with which England saw the clause of the Convention of May 30th relative to Kars and Batoum set aside; and the irony with which Prince Bismarck remarked to Lord Beaconsfield, "that he would be glad to see the British Government, which had such large interests in these countries, satisfied by the arrangement." Lord Beaconsfield did not conceal his annoyance at an annexation of which "he could not approve"; but the decision was made, peace or war depended on the engagement taken on that thirtieth of May.

The fate of Batoum, and consequently The Question of the that of the Black Sea, was, for the Congress, but an element of the more general question of maritime equilibrium. In this lay England's chief anxiety, though her fears and desires were deeply hidden and hard to avow. England was awkwardly placed amid her old traditions, her declarations still favouring the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and her new aspirations which commenced to make her stand as heir to a part of this empire; On the part of the representatives at the Congress there was much complex effort towards covering the Past, saving the Present, and preparing for the Future. They sought to obtain for their country, on her natural element, the sea, a counterbalance for the extended influence obtained by the Slav and the German on the Continent.

As Chateaubriand expressed it, it was a "decree of Providence" that gave to a non-Christian power the guardianship of the Straits and of the Holy Places. The perpetual strife that divides the people of Europe on this subject meets but in this circumstance its short periods of truce. The conflict

is the more intense to-day in that the only free and natural highway between Europe and Asia has been doubled, in 1869, by the canal of de Lesseps. The commerce of the world hurled itself into this narrow pass. The regions that surround it, however, which have been the cradle of civilisation, remain a still undivided spoil, defended by Turkish arms alone against European enterprise.

The Eastern Mediterranean, at Constantinople, the Straits, the Archipelago, in Asia Minor, in Syria, in the Suez Canal, in Egypt, offers the great problem of the passages, land-roads and sea-roads; the Indian route, and route of the Pacific.

What would be decided in Berlin as to this?

The three imperial Powers, Russia, Germany and Great Britain, stood face to face; the Mediterranean Powers, France and Italy, rather in the background, watched the game; while the new nationalities—Greece, Bulgaria, Roumania—stood waiting to pick up the crumbs from the table.

Great Britain was the most energetic of the Powers. It was she who had "kindled" the flame. The Mediterranean, by reason of its importance as a highway to India, she looked on as her own affair. She had tried to regain control of the land-road by the clause debarring Russia from the sources of the Euphrates; there now remained but the sea-ways.

As to navigation in the Straits, in 1856 two or three arrangements had been made which had not appeared satisfactory. The Mediterranean Powers desired by means of the key of the Straits retained by Turkey, to block Russia in the Black Sea;—whereas Russia, on her part, wished to close the Black Sea to the Powers, while leaving its gates open to her

own warships. Turkey desired to make use of her position for the purpose of gaining allies and protecting herself against her adversaries. These were conflicting interests that no formula could reconcile.

In principle, by agreements made before the Congress, the idea adopted by the Powers was the closing of the Straits to ships of war.

The treaty of March 30th, 1856, had, however, authorised each of the Powers to maintain a permanent fleet in the Black Sea. This agreement had been annulled in London, 1871. During the preliminary arrangements at San Stefano, Russia, following up this advantage, had declared that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should remain open, in time of war as in time of peace, to the merchant ships of neutral states passing to or from the Russian ports; and had forbidden the Sultan to establish any means of blockading the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. This meant the door ajar. Russia had, however, recognised that the question of the Straits was a matter of European interest.

There was much embarrassment through this in Berlin; these excessive alterations had still further obscured the very obscure outlook. At the sitting of July 11th, Lord Salisbury made the following declaration:—

I declare, on the part of England, that the obligations of Her Britannic Majesty concerning the closing of the Straits are confined to an engagement towards the Sultan to respect on this point any determinations independent of Her Majesty in conformity with the spirit of existing treaties.

This meant, apparently, that the Sultan would be free to do as he pleased, and able, consequently, to open the Straits to his friends, and shut them,

if need be, to his enemies. Count Schouwaloff immediately replied:—

That the plenipotentiaries of Russia, without being able to take exact account of the British proposition, requested on their own part, the insertion in the protocol: That in their opinion the principle of the closing of the Straits was a European principle, that former stipulations were not abrogated and remained obligatory for the Sultan as well as for the other Powers.

Neither one nor the other proposition was voted by the Congress, and no opinion expressed. It was merely admitted that all previous stipulations not abrogated were maintained; a conclusion which appeared to favour the Russian propositions.

The Archipelago and without effect. In claiming liberty of action of cyprus one immediate, though considerable, fact in view, which, on the whole, explains her attitude towards the question.

Since June 4th, quite openly, but with no single mention of it in the discussions and protocols of the Congress, England had, or thought she had, armed herself with regard to the balance of the sea. She had contracted a defensive alliance with the Sultan, as a certain set-off to the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and as a territorial surety for the prominent position she acquired in the Levant, she had gained from the Sultan the right of occupying and administering the island of Cyprus.

Thus guaranteed by this unforeseen combination, the English believed themselves masters of the situation and were persuaded that they had counterbalanced for their country the advantages obtained by the other Powers.

The idea was Lord Beaconsfield's. Already in

1847, he had written in his *Tancred* that "The English have need of Cyprus and will acquire it as compensation. They will not do the business of Turkey again for nothing. They require a new market for their cottons. England will never be satisfied until the people in Jerusalem wear calico turbans." This was claiming the inheritance of both Cyprus and Palestine. Since 1847 France had particularly affected the question of Lebanon and of the Holy Places; M. Waddington's "reservations" had prevented this matter being dealt with by the Congress. There remained, therefore, Cyprus.

Such was the origin of the taking of the island; it was explained and justified for the benefit of the gallery by a Note from the Foreign Office, dated May 30th, 1878, which mentioned the agreement relating to Cyprus as a precautionary arrangement.

The only measure that can afford substantial guarantee for the Ottoman dominion in Turkey in Asia . . . is an engagement on the part of a Power strong enough to carry it out, that any new encroachment of Russia on Turkish territory in Asia will be prevented by force of arms. Such an engagement, if contracted fully and without reserves, will prevent the realisation of such an eventuality, and will give, at the same time, to the peoples of the Asiatic provinces the necessary confidence for Turkish dominion in Asia not to meet with speedy overthrow.

The two "precautions" taken by England against the Slav expansion on the Sultan's domains appear in full light. In Europe and on land, it was the constitution of Eastern Roumelia detached from Great Bulgaria, with military defence by Turkey of the Balkan range; in Asia and on sea, it was a defensive treaty between England and the Sultan, implying for the latter "the disposition of the Straits" (which meant the eventual occupation of

the Straits by an English fleet), and all this was supported by her occupation of Cyprus.

For both these advantages England had obtained the recognition of Germany by a preliminary negotiation at the Congress, at the price of giving support to Austria-Hungary in her claim for the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

All is thus simultaneously explained.¹ Amidst so much bargaining the real origin of the

¹ No one has better understood and better explained the drift of this Convention of June 4th, which bound all the parties engaged before the Congress, than has Carathéodory Pacha. It was he who suffered first and most cruelly, for the secret agreement impeded all his movements in advance. "The Anglo-Turkish agreement and the cession of Cyprus, which had just been divulged, contributed to excite the envy of the Austrians. They had early gained knowledge of the arrangement secretly concluded between England and Turkey; there is no room for doubting that M. von Bismarck had been admitted into the secret, as Count Andrassy would not have ventured to keep him uninformed on such an important matter, and while the English, in possession of Cyprus, found it quite natural to support the Austrians in their occupation of Bosnia, the latter, on their side, redoubled their efforts towards not leaving the Congress with less profit than did England.

"On July 4th, a telegram from the Porte to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries affirmed the existence of an agreement signed between England and Turkey on the subject of Asia Minor and Cyprus. They were most annoyed at not having been sooner informed of such an important fact (as they alone, therefore, were not in the secret), as if it had been known in time, it would have enabled them to exercise more pressure on the British delegates than had been the case. On July 7th, the agreement was rumoured, and probably published, in London. The fact became at once known in Berlin, and from this moment the Austrians, profiting by the perplexity in the ranks of those who had not known of it in advance (which means, of course, everyone but England, Germany and Austria itself), became more intractable than before in their demands."

war had been lost sight of to some extent, viz., "the amelioration of the circumstances of the Christians of the East." It must not be imagined, however. that the Congress was not occupied with such a noble cause. The president, Prince Bismarck, never failed to insist on the "high civilising mission" which belonged, on this head, to the Powers. Russia was watching it, of course; and France, who had set herself to maintain what remained to her in the East of the influence of her traditional labours, both re-Initiative ligious and Liberal, took the line of helping of France the secondary Powers as much as possible, defender as she is of tolerance and religious liberty. At the same time she supported the bearers of the Ottoman debt-France does much to promulgate both principles and capital.

They were French plenipotentiaries who submitted to the Congress an article (later Article LXII of the Treaty) assuring to members of all religions liberty, equality before the law, and right to employment and to honours. These measures, applicable even in countries detached from the Ottoman empire or obtaining autonomic administration, met with some difficulty, especially as regarded the Jews of Roumania, and the French motion here encountered lively opposition from the Russian delegates; England, however, was entirely favourable to the proposition, which was also supported by Prince Bismarck.

The equality of cults became, for the first time, a recognised law for the East.

It was again France who brought before the Congress the territorial claims of Roumania and Greece. The struggle was as ardent as the interests were complex, and though the Congress did not

entirely ratify her proposals, they were certainly considered, since Roumania was accorded a further extent of territory from Rassova to Silistria, as well as the delta of the Danube with the Isle of Serpents; further also, in accordance with the French proposition, Greece was allowed an important rectification of frontier in Epirus and Thessaly (Article XXIV), the Powers acting as mediators between Greece and Turkey should difficulties arise.

In extension of Article XXII of the Treaty of San Stefano, France proposed the right of official protection by the embassies for ecclesiastics, pilgrims and monks travelling in European Turkey and Asiatic Turkey, as well as for religious institutions in the Holy Places and elsewhere (Article LXII).

Her plenipotentiaries, who had joined the Congress with such carefulness and hesitation, had grown more confident, carried forward, to some degree, by the force of their position. They were met with much consideration, their slightest opinions taken into account, the most delicate tasks of mediation and expression confided to them. And no one endeavoured to facilitate and ennoble their task more than did Prince Bismarck. A change indeed! But no one better than the prince understood the importance of the French support for the labours of the Congress. Had France stood aloof or made objections, the unanimity would have been threatened on which everything depended.

Italy was not well satisfied. The vague satisfied opinions in favour of Russia which she had pronounced at the beginning (through fear of the growing influence of Austria-Hungary in the Adriatic zone) had not brought her much advantage. Her presence had been to some extent overlooked,

and her First Plenipotentiary, Count Corti, complained of having been mistaken in Prince Bismarck. The Prince probably tried to make the Italians see the advantage they might gain in sheltering henceforth beneath the wing of Germany.

However it may have been, Italy, alone, was not in a position to act; but although she had confided her grievances to France, although both nations, asserting before the Congress their rôle as Mediterranean and balancing Powers, had placed themselves resolutely between the two groups, Russia had been able to manœuvre.

The advantage that a more supple and detached attitude would have given France, was felt by the leaders of the Congress. They took the initiative for her so adroitly that she found herself in a better position than her representatives and Government had hoped for. It was thus that, despite the famous "reservations," the French plenipotentiaries were to some extent obliged to seize an occasion for bringing to acknowledgment by the Congress the traditional policy of France in the Holy Places, and, in a general way, what is termed the "Catholic protectorate," in the East. The Congress recognised on this account "the rights acquired by France," namely, a valuable influence throughout the extent of the empire, and especially in the important lands of Palestine and Syria.

Another circumstance soon arose to the further profit of France. It was French initiative that decided the future direction of European policy, it was then that France reverted to her Mediterranean interests. New horizons, therefore, opened out; the Powers rushed towards "colonial expansion."

The Egyptian question Said to form the secret framework of the Congress of Berlin, there was one which was not once broken, but which nevertheless much exercised men's minds. This was the Egyptian question.

Egypt—par excellence—is the road to India. Since the day of Aboukir, England has never lost sight of the land of the Pharaohs. The Suez Canal pierced by de Lesseps, increased her vigilance. The financial follies of Ismaïl gave her a hold on it. The buying of the Canal shares announced her ambitions.

The diplomatic situation of Egypt was singular enough. Still belonging to the Turkish Empire, she claimed, since the days of Mehemet Ali, a certain liberty of action which many Powers, France especially, had admitted and encouraged. She no longer followed entirely the fate of the empire. In 1877, during the negotiations previous to the war, this situation had been further complicated. England had stipulated that Egypt and the Suez Canal should be outside the sphere of hostilities, and yet the troops of the Khedive had valiantly fought at Plevna for the Turk.

When the hour for negotiation struck at Berlin, the precautions taken by England gained strength from France's "reservations." England had freed Egypt from the consequences of the war; France claimed to free her from the consequences of the peace. Egypt was mentioned by name in the French Note as among the regions not to be dealt with by the Congress.

It is a matter of consideration as to whether it would not have been wiser to leave Europe, who

then seemed to wish to consolidate what remained of the Turkish Empire, the possibility of extending along the African coast the guarantees she was taking so solemnly for the European and Asiatic provinces. But French policy was then under diverse influences. At all events the "Egyptian question" had arisen, and was developing simultaneously with the question of the East. If may be said to have ripened at Plevna. The financial crisis had come about through the expense of mobilising, equipping and maintaining the 30,000 men sent out to Macedonia.

Some time previously, in the latter part of 1875, the British Government had authorised an inquiry as to the Egyptian funds and had favoured the establishment, through the intermediary of the Anglo-Egyptian Bank (February, 1876), of a national bank intended to control the affairs of the Khedive.

France had intervened in the name of her own creditors. From this moment it was the bondholders who became the instruments of the two policies in Egypt.

France was rapidly distanced; in May, 1876, the Caisse de la Dette publique was established under European control. In December, 1876, came the Dual Control, the origin of the condominium; the general controllers were a Frenchman and an Englishman, one responsible for the receipts, the other for the accounts of the Public Debt; in brief, they assumed entire responsibility for the financial administration in Egypt, without, however, having the necessary authority for controlling the expenses.

At the close of the costly Turkish war the treasury was empty. A new inquiry was instituted by decrees from the Khedive on January 27th and March 30th, 1878. An international commission, in which a

Frenchman, M. de Lesseps, had the nominal presidency, and an Englishman, Sir Rivers Wilson, the practical leadership, was given the most extensive powers. It was then that the hand of England, stronger than ever, began to press its weight on Egyptian affairs. Things were rapidly developed. The French agent in Cairo writes:—

I remembered then all the phases of the period just past, and all the offers made so boldly to the English by the Khedive of a Governor-General or a preponderating ministry. These proposals were, no doubt, declined in London as inopportune or premature, but they raised neither astonishment nor indignation. . . . These symptoms made me strangely suspicious of our allies. From henceforth not the interests of the creditors and financial liquidation were to be in question, but the fate of Egypt itself (Baron des Michel's Souvenirs de Carrière, p. 181).

It was indeed the fate of Egypt that was hanging in the balance. The two Powers facing each other on the banks of the Nile were also being represented at the Congress of Berlin. It was the right moment for consolidation, innovation or bargaining.

England was openly manœuvring to detach Egyptian affairs from the Eastern question to her own advantage. She wished to have her hands free, though not inactive. The sea and the Straits were her constant preoccupation. This explains her cautious attitude as regards maritime Bulgaria, the Straits, Greece, and Turkey itself; she stood quiet, negotiating in silence. This also explains the surprising Convention of Cyprus, the profound mystery in which it was enveloped—so profound that the Turkish plenipotentiaries in Berlin knew nothing of it. From the heights of Cyprus all these different shores could be surveyed.

To conclude, however, France could not be dis-

pensed with. Without France, whom Italy would doubtless follow, the formidable machinery opposed to Russia would not work. Yet what was to be done? Egypt was specially mentioned in M. Waddington's "reservations": its name could not be pronounced. The problem, however, was solved none the less.

Since it was written in the books of Destiny that the vital questions of the Congress should be passed by pretermission before that august assembly, it was discussed behind the scenes. On July 7th, 1878—five days before the close of the Congress—Lord Salisbury communicated to M. Waddington the agreement as to Cyprus. The blow struck at the face of France and Italy, both Mediterranean Powers.

M. Waddington was both annoyed and perplexed. He was one of the most correct and straightforward of men, with little experience or resource, trembling before all these other mighty men, and inadequately supported by his French colleagues. With his well-known English tendencies, he had taken willing refuge in an obscure rôle, while agreeing to perform certain difficult commissions—how rude was therefore his awakening! He sought out Lord Beaconsfield and addressed him with unaccustomed vigour—France had nothing more to do but leave the Congress.

But Lord Salisbury was in no wise taken offered to aback. The time had come to examine the Mediterranean questions. Despite the "reservations" of France, all was submitted to inspection. Egypt was first debated, then came Syria—and then, to give himself more elbow-room, the English Minister judged it expedient to drop a hint as to Tunis.

With regard to Egypt, although the position of 382

France was very strong, her "reservations" embarrassed her and proved her embarrassment. M. Waddington was taken at a disadvantage. His tactics lay in the system which under pressure of the financiers had been that of France in the time of the Duc Decazes; France was persuaded that her interests lay in a tête à tête with England on the banks of the Nile. M. Waddington contented himself with declarations establishing the equality of situation and influence for the two Powers. As to Lebanon, England expressed herself most clearly; her Ministers recognised the rights and duties acquired by France in this district: "England had no prejudice concerning this."

Yet why Tunis? As has been seen, it was Lord Salisbury who made the first overtures. He said that England had resolved to offer no difficulty to French policy in this country. "Do as you please there," he added, "it does not affect us." In point of fact, he invited France to look here for compensations which would have been hardly afforded her elsewhere. This was the necessary ballast, enough to give appreciation to the peculiar influence of France in Berlin. This sacrifice had evidently been deliberated in the Royal Councils and Prince Bismarck kept informed of it. What was thereby risked? The immediate help of France was thus assured, help that was indispensable, without which the work of the Congress could not be completed, in exchange for very vague concessions which had also the advantage—in the present conjuncture—of setting the two Mediterranean Powers. France and Italy, at loggerheads. England, in return for an immediate gain—the possession of Cyprus—proffered a burdensome, perhaps impracticable benefit—the

concession of rights over Tunis. Before this offer.call it, perhaps, temptation,—the French representatives showed hesitation. France was suffering for lack of courage in adventures. They feared to be entrapped and compromised. However, after much consideration, MM. Waddington, de Saint-Vallier. and Despres, decided to seize the opportunity: they realised the advantage to be gained by ratifying during Congress the different proposals of Lord Salisbury, and they were apparently not sorry to have the chance of bringing back "something" in their turn from the international gathering. They accordingly drew up a motion to be placed before the Congress. and despatched it to Paris by a Secretary in order to obtain the approbation of Marshal MacMahon and the Cabinet.

It is said that hardly had the Marshal set eyes upon the document than he flew into a violent fit of fury. "They want to set Italy upon us!" he exclaimed, "Never will I agree to it! I will not have a fresh quarrel forced upon us—I shall not countenance anything of the sort!" His anger was so great that the unfortunate secretary who had brought the message was quite taken aback, and had to be assured by the Marshal that his demonstration was not personal.

The Cabinet agreed with the Marshal. The French plenipotentiaries were informed by telegram that the project would have to be abandoned, and the question between France and England as to a new arrangement for the Mediterranean was not brought before the Congress.¹

¹ The information as to Marshal MacMahon's attitude and language comes from an eye-witness worthy of credence, and has

After the Congress, did M. Waddington have more influence over the Marshal and his colleagues, or did he consider it his duty not to let the important declarations made to him fall into oblivion?

On July 21st he wrote a letter to the Marquis of Harcourt which was to be communicated to Lord Salisbury, and which touched on the Egyptian question and the question of Lebanon. He referred to the conversations which had taken place in Berlin, and added:—

We desire, in consequence, to be assured that in the future, as now, our two Governments will act together in view of preserving intact through a political friendship founded on reciprocal and just esteem their respective interests in the Valley of the Nile. Such are the conditions without which it would seem to me impossible to guarantee the continuation of cordial and frank relations between France and England. Lord Salisbury has admitted the rights and duties that we draw from the

been well attested. However, M. de Marcères' version is different: "Prince Bismarck, as professional agent, gave us to understand that we could take possession of Tunis without any difficulty. We debated as to whether we should not profit from this overture. A few of us remembered the adage: Timeo Danaos et dona terentes. I. however, had not this scruple. I had long considered, and General Chanzy agreed with me, that the possession of Tunis was indispensable to the security of our African Colony. Marshal MacMahon shared this opinion. He was very decided about it, and would willingly have entered on the matter which appealed to his patriotism, and would have cast a halo of glory on his presidency. The Cabinet Council, however, did not consider the time ripe for the matter." During the discussion of the Budget for 1879, in the Senate House, M. Waddington congratulated France on being in Berlin "free from engagements, in returning free from engagements and remaining free from engagements." This is what is termed the policy of the "free hand." There was some uncertainty as to all this until France, through MM. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire and Jules Ferry, took her decision and acted on it. (See as to this chapter ix.)

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situation acquired by us in Lebanon, and he has stated to me that no action of the British Government will prejudice this. His words have been no less explicit as to what concerns Egypt. He has assured me of his complete agreement with the ideas that I expressed to him as to the part that will fall in the future to our two countries in this region. I may add that Lord Beaconsfield, in several conversations, has adopted the same views and held the same language.

The communication was made to the Marquis of Salisbury in London, July 22nd, and he replied August 7th, 1878:—

I willingly renew these assurances on the part of the British Government. The language used by me is exactly reproduced in the dispatch of M. Waddington, though I cannot answer for all the expressions.

Then came the turn of Tunis. On July 26th, M. Waddington wrote to the French Ambassador in London:—

To this dispatch Lord Salisbury again replied on August 7th, the day on which he answered as to the Egyptian question, thus uniting the two matters in the following terms.

The subject to which M. Waddington refers was treated more than once in the very satisfactory conversations I had with him in Berlin. . . . Her Majesty's Government has testified to its lively satisfaction at the success of the experiments made by France in Algeria, and of the great work of civilisation that she accomplishes in that country. It has never failed to realise that the presence of France on this side, supported as she is by imposing military forces, must consequently give her, whenever she may deem it necessary, the power of exerting power with a decisive force on the Government of Tunis.

This is a consequence that the British Government has long considered as inevitable, and which it has accepted without repugnance.

England has, in this region, no special interests that might lead

her to view with apprehension or legitimate distrust the influence and expansion of France. In what concerns her entrance, which cannot long be delayed, I can only say that it will not alter the attitude of England. She will continue, as she now does, to recognise the natural results of the neighbourhood of a powerful and civilised nation such as France, and has no counter-claims to bring forward.

Our attention (that of Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington), is directed to the regency of Tunis. Lord Salisbury, spontaneously meeting the sentiments he believed to find in us, gave us to understand in the most amicable manner and in the most explicit terms that England was resolved to oppose no obstacle to our policy in this country. According to him, it lies with us to regulate as suits us best the nature of our relations with the Bey. and to extend them if we so desire. Her Majesty's Government accepted in advance all the consequences that the natural development of our policy would have on the definitive destiny of Tunis: "Do what you like with Tunis," said his Lordship, "England will make you no opposition and will respect your decision." Lord Beaconsfield, in Berlin, confirmed those statements; and, consequently, we cannot doubt the complete agreement of views in the two members of the British Government in what concerns this question.

It was indeed a great day for this nation, that saw, on the torn sky of Europe, the apogee of the British star.

Prince Gortschakoff, weak in health, and who had not been able to appear at the closing banquet of the Congress, was warmly received by Alexander II at Tsarkoie-Selo—and his eightieth birthday was celebrated by the court with much enthusiasm. His lamp of life was flickering out.

End of the Congress of Berlin concluded its Congress labours on July 13th. When Lord Beaconsfield returned to London, on July 16th, he was welcomed with enthusiasm and frantic acclamations by the crowd on his road from Charing Cross to Downing Street. He was obliged to show himself on the balcony of his ministerial residence, and from

this he pronounced the famous dictum: "We bring back peace with honour."

France, with her lightness of disposition, turned to the closing festivities of the Exhibition, and not without some thought of the Colonial future that the Congress had opened out before her.¹

Prince Bismarck departed quietly to take the waters at Kissingen.

The face of things had appreciably changed. Germany had successfully brought the great manœuvre to a close, begun by her at Düppel, pursued at Sadowa and Sedan; this time it was Russia she had beaten, and without a blow. After breaking her bonds on the north and west, she advanced towards the south and east, threw back Austria-Hungary upon the Danube, and the Slavs upon the Asiatic steppes.

England, profiting by such an upheaval, had slipped along the Mediterranean passage, and encircled the southern lands in which she desired to set foot.

Europe was thus compressed in her centre and circumference. She had need of space and air.

of the French statesman on the Berlin Congress, which appeared in the Times. It can be summarised in very few words: the end of the disunion among the European Powers; the end of the Triple Alliance of 1873; a rapprochement of France and England; "a Franco-Russian alliance on an arbitrary basis is not possible... France contemplates nothing that can make such alliances necessary or desirable..." The interpretation must be made cum grano salis. At a time when colonial policy was to be undertaken, England had to be dealt with circumspectly, and it was not the Times that would be taken into confidence on the subject of a Franco-Russian agreement. It was spoken of—that it might be denied—but this meant already a good deal.

And, in Berlin, the fatal words had been pronounced: Asia Minor, Cyprus, Egypt, Tunis. These were dream-lands. The golden gate was opened, imagination ran riot. If Europe were too small—beyond was the whole world.

European policy consolidated to the advantage of the German hegemony. The other Powers have but to seek their compensation abroad—a new period is beginning, that of World-policy.

CHAPTER VI

RESIGNATION OF MARSHAL MACMAHON. PRESIDENCY OF JULES FERRY.

- I.—Socialism again to the fore—Collectivism—Christian Socialism—Roman Catholic workmen's clubs.
- II.—The vacations of 1878—The Ministry and the "Old Republicans"—Oratorical campaign of Gambetta in Le Dauphiné—The extraordinary session—Invalidations—The Budget of 1879.
- III.—The Senatorial elections of January, 1879—Republican victory—The Senart interpellation—The Cabinet victorious but bound—Difficult position of Gambetta—Resignation of Marshal MacMahon—M. Jules Grévy elected President of the Republic.
- IV.—M. Jules Grévy and his origin—In 1848—Jules Grévy and Lamartine—The presidency of the National Assembly—Jules Grévy and Gambetta—The ideal of France—The ideal for the presidency—The election of M. Grévy a mistake.

Ι

August, 1878 JUST as general international policy became overthrown by the appearance of a new Germany, France was attempting a difficult experiment, the application of the absolute democratic system to an ancient nationality that was unified and centralised. J. J. Weiss remarks with his acute penetration: "The Conservative Republic is a fallacy." How suppose that the modern weapons of universal suffrage, free press, civil and political equality, should remain inactive? Had so much been attacked that all should be respected? so much overthrown that all should be

preserved? M. Thiers was not logical, though possibly sincere.

The history of the revolution could not stop at the victory gained over the Sixteenth of May, a victory which would have been too tame if it had merely signified the replacing of M. Jules Simon by M. Dufaure, of Dufaure, Minister of the "Marshal," by Dufaure, Minister of the "President." It was not for such slight gains that the battle had been fought. What was in question was the problem of society, that of the ruling classes, which had reached its apogee under Louis Philippe and still reigned in 1878. Room was now needed for new "social strata." The victors of May the Sixteenth were, on the whole, the middle-class men, but these also remained attached to the Civil Code, to the régime of family and property. Behind the troop that had planted the flag another was advancing. The lights of the Exhibition had hardly been extinguished when the cause of the bourgeois was taken up once more by the ghosts of the Commune and the disciples of Marxism-brought in the train of the German intellectual invasion.

Social aims the lot of humanity upon this earth. Its method lies in the accumulation and fairest possible division of material resources, just as the promise of a future compensation is the method of religious society. Man is both thrifty in increasing his terrestial capital and prodigal in its enjoyment. His life is extremely short, yet one of his most singular faculties, the faculty of hope, prolongs his existence into the future and satisfies him with joys that are simply foreseen, either for himself or his successors. Society thus becomes a personality

whose joys and sorrows are felt by every individual as his own, in the same way as the atom is affected by the health or weakness of the body of which it forms a part. The acceptation of the Past and the detachment of the Present in hope of the Future, these are the powerful and mysterious dispositions that animate and support society. Man is the function of his ancestors and perpetually exercised with regard to his descendants.

Revolutions are all daughters of Hope. For this reason they have generally—at any rate in their beginnings—a disinterested character that assures them the indulgence of History. In the name of Justice and Fraternity, the Revolution of 1789 abolished social distinctions, and despoiled the nobility and clergy of the wealth gained from ancestral conquests and the testamentary panic of the dying.

The expropriation was made by the authorisation of the State, which is, indeed, the necessary instrument of revolutions. In the strife of particularisms, the established will always gain the day, unless at certain times all society, moved by an extraordinary and common impulse, casts its sword into the scales. Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, the popular parties were persuaded that an economic operation far vaster than that of 1789 could be renewed to the advantage of a still greater number.

The idea of division pure and simple which was at first brought forward, became soon abandoned, as being difficult of application and precarious of extent.

Communism was next considered, in the laborious or fantastic formulas elaborated by Saint-Simon, Enfantin, Fourier, Cabet, Karl Marx and Engels, from the principle of previous polemics, after having, in the famous manifesto of 1847, determined

and named the two adversaries of future struggles—bourgeoisie and proletariat, and originated the doccollectrine of Collectivism, which seemed the tivism strongest and the weightiest.

The problem is mainly economic and industrial: the work supplied by the workmen is not paid in full; the produce of a portion of this work is usurped from the worker, and this is what makes room for the idle of Society. It is right that the working class should share in the reward of its activity, and it must in the future no longer be despoiled of its legitimate profit. This, therefore, means that Collectivism should control the surplus value acquired by the few, as also the instruments of labour, including the earth and natural riches. The plunderers shall be despoiled and robbery made no longer possible. Collectivity is the sole heir and repairer of the accumulated injustice of individualistic errors; she profits from the labour of Present, Past and Future. Such revolution will be more and more centralised and influential. Collectivists are organisers-also pessimists. They have no confidence in human nature, they would strangle it for its own good.

Anarchists, again, are optimists; they consider neither themselves nor others able to manage the complicated machine of human society. Holding this to be bad, but man in general good, they think that nothing but its destruction can bring about right order; they have neither God, nor lord, nor law, each man is to do as he pleases and things will turn out right. As disciples of Rousseau, they go back with him to the origins, but in order to destroy the "Social Contract." Anarchists do not wish to incur the reproach of seeking personal advantage in

their revolution. They despise Collectivists and Socialists, whom they suspect of lending themselves to transactions with the present state of society while awaiting the probable arrival of a future one.

Between these two schools of thought there must be much opposition of ideas, difference of aim and clash of temperament. Envy, distrust, and secret wounds, all this was latent and obscure in the same feeling of hostility towards the *bourgeoisie*, when things began to declare and define themselves about the year 1878.

During September 1877, there was held, at Gand, an International Socialistic Congress, in which the first attempts were made towards conciliation between Collectivists and Anarchists, Marxists and Bakouninists.

An aggressive programme had been drawn up in common against the established order of things: the State should resume the wealth appropriated by the few; there should be political action by the proletariat; an international union of the proletariat on the basis of the professional association.

The first number of the *Egalité* was issued by Jules Guesde (November 18th, 1877), with the collaboration of MM. Emile Massard, Gabriel Deville, Gerbier, (a pseudonym of M. Girard, a lawyer), and Oudin.

In a Workmen's Congress, held at Lyons between January 28th and February 8th, 1878, collectivist principles tended to prevail; however, through the intervention of M. Isidore Finance, a house-painter, the Collectivist amendment was withdrawn.

The Collectivists sought their revenge; on the occasion of the Exhibition it was decided to hold an international congress in Paris. M. Jules Guesde

took the head of the movement. The police intervened. The organisers were arrested and sentenced. Jules Guesde appeared before the magistrates, October 22nd, and defended his fellow-accused. He propounded his principles and claimed the substitution of equality for feudality in the social system of the day. His name became prominent.

A long and painful strike at Anzin, a strike among the Paris cab-drivers during the Exhibition, attracted general attention,—it was sought to "intimidate the bourgeoisie," and the bourgeoisie began to take alarm.

M. de Marcère, at Mortagne, made a speech reassuring his hearers and himself as to the "Socialistic danger" (August 25th, 1878). M. Gambetta, on November 8th, said to the delegation of workmen from Avevron at the Exhibition:—

They are the dupes of a chimera who imagine that it is possible for the Government to make everybody happy. The Government owes but one thing, strictly speaking, to everyone—and this is—Justice. Each man belonging to himself, it belongs to each man to make himself happy or unhappy by the good or evil use he makes of his liberty. The State contents itself with assuring to every man his rights—to the poor as to the rich, to the small as to the great.

People could no longer keep their eyes shut. The repression of the Commune had suspended, but not stopped, the movement. The rising among the poor, especially among the artisan classes, the insufficient wages, the close-herding and the starving-out engendered by industrialism, these were obvious evils that a democratic rule could neither deny nor indefinitely accept.

The theme of Laissez faire, laissez passer was already broken down. Illustrious Roman Catholics,

following the lead of Le Play, MM. Augustin Cochin, Maurice Meignen, Viscount de Melun, had interested themselves in the lot of the artisan and attempted

Catholic a twofold task: the union of the different Socialism parties of the nation in a common effort subject to the laws of Catholic teaching, and the reorganisation of the professional associations as a precious heritage of traditional experience. M. Harmel had given an example at Val-des-Bois in 1846. The workmen's clubs, founded in 1864 in the Boulevard de Montparnasse, by Augustin Cochin and Maurice Meignen, weakened for a while, but gained fresh vigour after the Commune.

Two army officers, René de La Tour-du-Albert de Mun and La Pin, then staff-captain, and Albert de Mun, Tour-du-Pin a lieutenant of Chasseurs, gave new life to this endeavour. The first-named was the elder of the two, a man of vigorous and energetic mind, well acquainted with foreign matters, well read, and of heroic faith,—a noble saviour of past ages; the other, younger and more eloquent, a great and powerful orator,—and these two, rising to the appeal of M. Meignen, became the apostles of the new doctrine. Their aim was the renewal of society through the Catholic faith; their device: "Counter-Revolution opposed to Revolution"; their method, the formation of Roman Catholic workmen's Clubs which, according to the ideas of the founders, should represent a form, scarcely modernised, of the ancient corporations.1

Roman Catholic teaching with no liberalism, obedience to the Papacy and the bishops, the *Syllabus*, the teaching of Joseph de Maistre, ultramontanism

¹ See M. de La Tour-du-Pin's book, entitled Vers un ordre Chrétien, Jalons de Route.

with the special influence of the Jesuits and something even of their military organisation, inspired this new crusade. From the month of April, 1872, steady progress crowned the efforts of the founders. Such clubs were instituted everywhere. The Comte de Chambord warmly congratulated the Comte de Mun. Pius IX gave the clubs the noble title of "The Army of God." The Comte de Mun wrote: "I have travelled the whole of France, and everywhere have I met with our well-loved work, with its banner, its insignia and its joyous fraternity." When on the platform from which the bishop opened the meeting with his pastoral benediction,—surrounded by local authorities, the prefect, and the patrons, the cavalry captain advanced towards an audience in which sat the associates of the order of St. Vincent de Paul, the members of the Catholic Club, the poor who had been helped and encouraged by the great confessional charity, all the pious,—when he appeared in his uniform, when after a brief reception, his vibrating voice arose, when he evoked the poignant memories of his military life, told of his meeting with La Tour-du-Pin on the battlefields of Gravelotte and Saint-Privat, when he spread the wings of faith upon the splendours of Catholicism, when he descended to the tenderest, most closely intimate palpitations of prayer—there would arise a tremor of the souls around him, an awakening of spirit, while horny hands clapped their enthusiasm.

It was under such an influence that the committee of Catholic Clubs was founded, uniting and grouping local efforts.¹

¹ The Marquis de La Tour-du-Pin, recalls, in his book, the influence exercised on the two prisoners in Germany, by the work of Em. Keller, L'Encyclique du 8 Décembre 1864 et les Principes

At the close of 1875, there were 130 committees, 150 clubs, and 18,000 members, of which 15,000 were artisans. The hour of hope still reigned—what might one not dream! These men had in their minds the thought of uniting in one vast association a France again made Catholic. To the proclamation of "The Rights of Man" was opposed the countercry "The Rights of God."

In September, 1878, when Collectivistic teaching made its attack on individualistic and liberal society, when the Republic was priding itself on the successful Exhibition, Count de Mun, at a meeting of artisan pilgrims at which Bishop Renault presided, spoke as follows:—

A great movement is beginning . . . There is no longer a religious nor a moral law . . . The law of self-interest invades everything . . . Small industries are crushed; professional labour falls into decadence; wages grow lower, pauperism extends like some hideous leprosy . . . what matters it? "Laissez faire, laissez passer!"—Such is the decree of Liberalism—such is your liberty!

It has but one name—it is the liberty of force ! . . . If in the tragic story of the sufferings of the people there is anything that moves us more than the rest, it is the sight of their blind confidence in the men who abuse it and exploit their wrongs for rousing their anger to the advantage of their own ambitions. . . . What we desire to do is to regain the right of workmen's associations suppressed in the name of liberty of work, to renew the Catholic Corporations and professional associations."

This time the Liberals, even the Catholic Liberals, were aroused. The first impulses began to cool, the help that had been hoped for did not come, the

de 1789. He says of it: "This was our bedside book." Count de Mun writes elsewhere: "Such was the book that fell providentially into the hands of two soldiers." Both speak also of the example and teaching of Mgr. Ketteler.

bishops did nothing more than give their benedictions, the patrons began to take alarm.

The Nestor of parliamentary struggles for liberty, the Comte de Falloux, collaborator of M. Thiers in 1850, raised his voice. He denounced the civil war in the bosom of Catholicism, already so much weakened:—

In a section of the Catholic press one meets more and more often the cry of Counter-Revolution. I can hardly imagine a symbol less vain and more ill-chosen.¹

And elsewhere:-

Do you not know that the majority of people will always translate *Counter-Revolution* by *Ancien Régime* . . .? To act thus is to strike blindly; it is to delight the Radicals, your natural enemies, to supply them with victorious arms and to compromise the Church.

The struggle was serious and deeply divided the Catholics. Mgr. Freppel, Bishop of Angers, threatened M. de Falloux with excommunication, and the *Univers* showed plenty of disdain. The quarrel grew bitter, and for long, and the work among

¹ See de Falloux's article in Le Correspondant for August 25th, 1878, entitled "On the Counter-Revolution." It is given in Discours et Mélanges, vol. ii. p. 363. See Daniel (p. 204)—"Une Lettre de Mgr. Thibaudier, Bishop of Soissons." Cf. E. Lecanuet (vol. i. p. 420) and Debidour (vol. i. p. 163). The most important paragraph of the Bishop's letter on the declarations of de Mun at Chartres is as follows: "I do not hesitate to affirm that these formulas, detached from their context . . . and taken in the meaning they would have for the generality of readers, would be passed over or subjected to considerable amendments by the great majority of Catholics, and would not gain the approbation of a single bishop." See, however, the Vie de Mgr. Pie (vol. ii. p. 488). He likens Count de Mun to Judas Maccabeus, especially in that he would not deal with the enemies of the faith: "Rogabat eos ne nostibus reconciliarentur."

Catholic artisans gained nothing, being, in fact, weakened from this time, while the number of recruits differed to the extent of 30,000 from what it had been at the height of the movement. Yet, amidst all the crisis and the struggle, one hope remained to the Catholic Neo-Socialists. Though their first protector, Pius IX, was dead, Leo XIII sat on the papal throne, and from the former Nuncio in Belgium a declaration was awaited, which should change the attitude of the Catholic world as to the duty of the Church towards the poor and as to its own social rôle.

II

The According to M. de Marcère, Minister Ministry for the Interior in the Dufaure Cabinet, this Ministry, strong in services rendered, believed itself assured of its longevity. It was mistaken. Each man *in petto* had set a term limit to his patience—that of the approaching senatorial elections. Marshal MacMahon was discontented and distrustful.

The majority in the Chamber had a leader, and this was not Dufaure, but Gambetta.

The Republican party could contain itself for some time longer, but feeling itself master of the country and of the majority in the Chamber, though it agreed to the halt advised by its more prudent leaders, it did not intend to remain long in the path of disinterestedness and inactivity. Cost what it might, it would achieve the part of power. Politics do not constitute a tent for repose.

The Ministry restricted its task to the minimum: the control of public business and the assurance of

favourable senatorial elections. M. Dufaure, while not lacking in vigour, wanted enthusiasm; age delayed his step. And he was well acquainted with the "urgencies"!

For the moment only one question occupied attention: the question of the staff—or, to be more exact, the question of administration, of bureaucracy. The part played by this has been explained by Lord Palmerston with much penetration; the criticism is the more valuable in that it comes from abroad—he had both France and Germany in view:—

In public service on the Continent there are a large number of men who spend the greater portion of their lives in offices. Thanks to their long experience, they have an intimate acquaintance with the things of the Past, and also understand the best and easiest way to do what may be demanded by the Present....

On the Continent Ministerial changes are more often changes as to individuals through personal motives, than party-changes due to political movements. . . . This class of subalterns has, in fact, such power that in the slang term of the day it has become known as *Bureaucracy*.

Now, after such a complete overthrow of national institutions, after a Governmental crisis which definitely abolished the Monarchy and substituted the Republic—was the bureaucracy, the administration, all the legacy of the Past, to remain unchanged? Such was the first difficulty by which the Dufaure Cabinet was confronted—the touchstone of the development that was preparing. All that could be done to defend the rather delayed conception of M. Thiers was to gain time.

The summer of the year 1878 was devoted to the Exhibition festivities. In a few Ministerial speeches—that of M. Lepère at Auxerre, of MM. de Freycinet and Léon Say at Boulogne, it was acknow-

ledged that the battle, on the part of the Right, was being stayed for lack of warriors, and a strong desire was evinced to manage public matters in all prudence.

The Right was, in fact, unhorsed. The Conservatives were disputing, as is usual after a defeat. In view of the Senatorial elections, a committee of the Right was organised, in August, 1878, which vainly tried to make the peace between Bonapartists, Orleanists and Legitimists.

The month of August saw much varied business transacted by the *Conseils Généraux*; roads, railways, primary instruction;—Republican organisation was laying its foundations. The *bourgeoisie* showed here its usual good qualities of prudence, *savoir-faire*, and balance, accepting the established order of things and consolidating it with discreet zeal. The true business was worked out far from the noise and parade of public functions.

France lived, as she always does live, from the good that she accomplishes without noise, while astonishing the world with the noise she makes to no good.

Europe grew accustomed to the new personage, who, amongst the Governments, played that of the Republic. Marshal MacMahon, with his other merits, filled a delicate and useful rôle, that of introducing new men and facilitating first contacts. On September 15th, he reviewed at Vincennes the troops of the IV Army Corps and those of the military government of Paris. fifty-five battalions, thirty-five batteries and sixty-two squadrons. The President appeared on horseback, accompanied by Marshal Canrobert and a brilliant escort. The Grand Dukes Alexis and Constantine Constantino-

witch, the Duke of Cambridge and the Landgrave of Hesse, were on the grand-stand. The Marshal congratulated the troops in words that hinted at some personal lassitude in all their satisfaction and confidence.

Winter was approaching, the holidays drew towards a close.

During the month of September, Gambetta, re-seeking the theatre of his former oratorical triumphs, entered on a campaign of activity by word and deed in a series of speeches in Le Dauphiné. On the 17th and 18th he went to Valence and to Romans, meeting with enthusiastic welcome amid flags and flowers and flourishes. Local deputies and senators flocked round him—MM. Loubet, Madier de Montjau, Richard,-also prefects, sub-prefects and officials. The old Madier de Montjau, a survivor of 1848, chief of the Radicals of the district, was himself surprised by this enthusiasm. At Valence he proposed the toast of "The Republic," and gave a warning to his young friend. The opening words of this speech constitute a definite picture of the period:

During the short but moving journey of the day, while the warm-hearted generous people that you all know as I do, crowded around us with ardent acclamations to the exclusive honour of the eminent guest we honour here to-night, our honourable colleague, in his acknowledgments, never ceased to tell them in a voice—moved but firm—to acclaim the Republic. He would, I am convinced, be the first to be surprised were the sympathy we bear towards him, the impulse of the joyful hospitality we offer him, to induce us to propose, in the first instance, any other toast but that which is in his heart as in yours and mine—the toast of the Republic!

M. Gambetta remarked in his reply:-

One must beware of the prestige of personalities. There is nothing more dangerous than to idolize a man.

Enemies were however, watching the movement in which the people seemed to make advances, and also observing the gulf which at the slightest shock threatened to appear between enthusiasm and distrust. The direction of things was awaited from Gambetta. How did the Republic intend to manage the bourgeoisie without which she could not live and the people without whom she could not exist? The speeches of this period abound in wisdom and prudence—eminently "opportunist." "The heroic days are over," said Gambetta, "Violence must be replaced by Reason. . . . In order to found anything, one must be of the opinion of the nation, not of that of a school. . . ." He addressed not only the faces before him, but the audience scattered through the country—the senatorial electors.

At Romans—famous in the history of Gambetta—he was at home, his path was strewn with flowers. It was an "ebullition of joy." He spoke there at a large public meeting in a circus capable of holding 6,000 people. He appeared ill in health, and his intimate correspondence reveals these increasing attacks of weariness. On this occasion he expounded the "programme": The maintenance of the Marshal, the assurance of true government stability, "that is only accomplished through the devolution of the law," the prolongation of the Ministry: "I am resolutely and decidedly on the side of the Ministry." Nothing should be modified too abruptly: "I am an enemy of the cleared table. . . . Problems must be dealt with in their right order."

At Grenoble (October 9th-11th) there were not only

general ideas, but the special programme for the forthcoming senatorial elections. Things were still very vague. The peasants had formerly been told that the Republic meant division of property—that it menaced property-owners and the family; such lies and calumnies had been abandoned. A Senate was needed—"but it should be a controlling, not a conflicting assembly."

I should wish the Senate transformed by the mere penetration of the democratic spirit, and should like it to become, in a permanent manner, the true citadel of the Republic.

These perpetual concessions, these appeals to prudence and patience, began to perplex the "old Republicans." In Paris and some of the large towns the elections assumed an *anti-opportunist* character. Gambetta pulled himself up short; he bewailed the bitterness of political life.

I well know what there is behind your acclamations . . . It is right that at certain times the people should overflow in generosity and good-will towards their representatives . . . It is from this I gain my necessary strength. . . . With such reasons for consolation one can hear the shouts without undue emotion. Never have I flinched from my principles, never will I do so; but I am not of those who compromise the success of their cause for the satisfaction of writing a vain formula.

A tactless person interrupted: "Long live the opportunist policy!" Gambetta protested against "these vague appellations." All he desired was to meet real difficulties face to face. On leaving Grenoble he described himself as "encouraged." He had therefore had need of encouragement.

His health was undermined. He sought out a retreat near Paris where he could sometimes find rest near the woman who from then became indis-

pensable to his life. Women and Nature—our supreme consolers!

He wrote, on July 28th, to his well-loved confi-

dante:-

How much I love these delights of solitude, so new to me,—the great and soothing silence, the pleasant woodland glades, the sleeping brook at the foot of perfumed broom; above all, the delight of being able to think and meditate at ease with no interruption or mockery from without. It is not to my body but to my spirit that I am giving liberty and calm and healing rest.

And, on November 3rd, on his return from the campaign in the Dauphiné:

I kept M. Testelin to dinner. He occupied your place. He crowned the repast with a little friendly toast that touched my heart. He emptied a glass of Cape wine to the glory of the lovely dryad, who beneath the groves of Ville d'Avray has given me back to health and work.

On Monday, October 21, Marshal Mac-Mahon, surrounded by the eminent men of the Marshal the country, and by King Francis d'Assissi, the Prince of Wales, the Crown Prince of Denmark, the Crown Prince of Sweden and Norway, and the Duke of Aosta, closed the Universal Exhibition by the distribution of awards. This was the last occasion on which the Marshal spoke in public:—

The solidity of our credit, the abundance of our resources, the quiet of our people, the good discipline of our army, has become well known. Our national ambition will not stop at this. If we have become more provident and more industrious, we still owe it to the memory of our trials to maintain and develop amongst us the spirit of concord, the absolute respect of our institutions and our laws, the ardent and disinterested love of country.

The Chamber reassembled October 28th. The

Senate had lost several notable men—General Chareton, M. Renouard, Mgr. Dupanloup. On November 15th three permanent elections were made to replace them—all three from amongst the Right: MM. Oscar de Vallée, Count d'Haussonville and M. Baragnon.

The Left candidates were defeated by about ten votes:—General Gresley, M. Alfred André, Count de Montalivet. This, however, was the swan-song. The Union of the Rights published a manifesto unsigned, addressed to the senatorial electors—a union against the Republic was advised, but nothing more. It was well known that no harmony existed in this quarter.

Within the Chamber this short session was devoted alternately to initiating debates upon the validations and to the discussion of the Budget. M. de Cassagnac defended himself in his attack. M. Floquet rose to the front rank of Left orators in explaining the tactics of invalidation:—

You say that you defend your ten thousand electors; well then!—we defend millions of electors whom for five months you have practically outlawed.

M. de Cassagnac was invalidated; then M. de Mun was brought to trial, while M. Allain-Targé gave an unfavourable report. M. de Mun defended himself, his system and his principles. He claimed his title of Apostle of the Catholic Clubs,—a new theme, for the first time, rose to the tribune:—

There is, gentlemen, in the work of the Workmen's Catholic Clubs, a fundamental idea that I will not disavow . . . I mean . . . the Counter-Revolution . . . When eighty-four years ago the nation assembled to find a remedy for her evils—if at that solemn hour, remembering that she was the eldest daughter of the Church, she had frankly turned towards the Christian vocation, she might have redeemed herself through the reform of our customs and

our institutions. Instead of this she denied her birthright in order to cast herself into the arms of the Revolution, and it is this fatal error on her part that has influenced the whole course of this century.

The Comte de Mun was invalidated, but he received a letter from Frohsdorf, dated November 20th, which in its explicit adhesion to the political and social doctrines defined by the Deputy for Pontivy, broke finally with the Liberals of the school of M. Falloux. Royalty refused to leave the heights of faith and doctrine:—

I must thank you for having insisted so strongly and so frankly on the fundamental basis, on the eternal truths and on the principles necessary for all society that wishes to endure in peace and provide for its future. . . . Amongst these labouring classes—the constant object of our thoughts—amongst those beloved artisans surrounded by so many flatterers and so few true friends, you, better than any one else, can serve as my interpreter.

The Moniteur Universel, expressing the opinion of the Moderates, wrote that this language, on the eve of the senatorial elections, went too far and was spoiled by "a regretable exaggeration." But the Count de Chambord had taken his stand; he summarised his policy in the expression:—

France to be saved needs God reigning in her as her Lord, without this I cannot rule her as her king.

Within the Chamber the Sixteenth of May came again to trial in the person of M. de Fourtou.

The former Minister of the Interior defended himself with vigour and ability. His speech was practically an inquiry as to the general course of the Government. M. Dufaure found himself forced to account for his principles, his party and himself.

When a political party represents nothing, directs nothing,

governs nothing, public uneasiness must be increased, anarchy must reign, revolutionary dictature must approach.

Such a tone roused the wrath of M. Dufaure, who rose and replied. The old warrior gained fresh laurels in his speech. It was then that he thus vigorously addressed the representative of May the Sixteenth:—

You who ask me what I represent,—will you kindly tell me what it is you stand for? Yes, gentlemen! in our Chamber as in our press, there is indeed a nameless party, for which it is impossible to discover either name or programme—which is powerful through its talents, which can offer serious obstacles to any government, which would do so against an Imperial government, against a Monarchical government, which is doing so against the Republican government. Of this party, this honourable gentleman, M. de Fourtou, is a representative. As to ourselves, what we represent is the Liberal principle that has dwelt in this land since 1814. To these principles, transmitted to us by our fathers, we adapt that form of Republican government established by the Constitution of 1875. We are Liberal Republicans.

M. Dufaure was much applauded. The whole Left rose around the old man—still ardent, but exhausted on this bench. The sitting was reminiscent of that in which 'the "Liberator of the Land" had been acclaimed. M. de Fourtou had the art of unloosing enthusiastic ovations. He was, of course, invalidated. A violent interruption from Gambetta caused an encounter between himself and de Fourtou. "Two bullets with no results": symbolical of the famous oratorical jousts which make so much ado and yet come to nothing.

The Duc Decazes, elected at Puget-Théniers, was invalidated; also Baron Reille, former Under-Secretary of State. There was no single member of the Broglie Cabinet who was not subjected to this disagreeable formality.

The month of November was devoted to the discussion of the Budget for 1879. M. Léon Say defended the system of the terminable loan, that was being depreciated and making but slow progress. M. Etienne Lamy had brought out his famous report on the Navy Budget, his chief point being the renewal of the French Navy, which had been rather neglected since the war; despite their undeniable justice, his arguments did not suffice to give the country a line of conduct in naval matters that its many military responsibilities make difficult to trace.

M. Fallières produced the Public Worship Budget. A credit of 200,000 francs, once suppressed by the Chamber as unnecessary, was re-established by the Senate. In the Senate, too, there was an active debate as to the Republican finances. M. Chesnelong was bitter, M. Bocher predicted the worst financial catastrophes. The enormous increase of expense was deplored, and disorder and extravagance implied. M. Léon Say replied to the Opposition with a florid, witty and over-optimistic speech. There were, as usual, a few thrusts between the two Chambers on the subject of certain credits re-established by the Senate, but an agreement was arrived at without too much delay.

Both Chambers were following, with adequate activity, the work of national reorganisation; in both debates were held as to local railways. The Devès proposition as to the protection of French vineyards against the phylloxera was also first brought before the Chamber. A vote for the Universal Postal Convention was passed in the Chamber, November 21st; in the Senate, December 13th.

The question of sectarian instruction began to be propounded. The Cabinet, through prefectorial ap-

pointments, favoured the substitution of lay teachers for sectarian men and women. The Chamber also considered (December 9th) M. Camille Sée's proposal as to the Secondary Instruction of Girls.

The session closed on December 21st.

III

Now came the Senatorial Elections, which meant so much for everyone. It was a question as to whether the Senate would enter the normal framework of democratic republican institutions, whether it would work in the tendency of these, or whether, according to the hope of those by whom it was established, it would act as a brake—a centre of resistance.

It was necessary to know whether the old ruling classes had maintained such a hold upon the nation that they could, if not keep the power, at least hold their own in the new conditions as a privileged body with its own rights and weapons. Such was the question that was offered to the electors.

On January 5th, amid the most complete order and with an authority all the stronger in that it was more measured, the senatorial electors pronounced in favour of republican and democratic institutions.

All the work of the National Assembly had been done in view of this day. The reply was clear; in accepting the appointment under the conditions and the form that the monarchical parties had imposed upon her, France made a fresh and definite declaration in favour of the Republic.

The election affected seventy-five senatorial seats of the B Series, and seven seats of the other series—

eighty-two in all—consequent upon resignation or death.

47 "Conservative" Senators were represented; 14 simply re-elected; 2 new Conservatives elected; in all, 16 conservatives, and 16 Republicans. All were re-elected. 13 deputies became senators. 37 other Republican candidates were nominated. Altogether, 66 Republican senators entered the High Assembly, thus giving to the re-united Lefts a majority of 90 to 50. Of 37 departments that gave in their votes, only 7 had a monarchical majority.

The Bonapartists were overwhelmed; only two of their members had succeeded. The Legitimists—strongly supported by clerical influence—were comparatively favoured. The character of the election, for both Left and Right, was extremely moderate. It was the fight of the rearguard after May the Sixteenth, and proves the risk and clumsiness of the manœuvre.

The large departments of the Gironde, the Nord, the Manche, the Haute-Garonne, all of whose representation in the Senate had been hostile, were conquered. Three former Ministers of May 24th and May 16th—MM. Daru, de Meaux, Depeyre, remained on the scene. In the Loire, M. de Meaux, and M. de Montgolfier were beaten; in the Lot, Marshal Canrobert and M. Depeyre; in the Nièvre, Count de Bouvillé and the Marquis d'Espeuilles. In the Haute-Garonne, the Republicans, MM. de Rémusat, Hebrard and Camparon, were elected against MM. Niel, Lacase and de Belcastel. The verification of the powers passed without incident,—the fact was accomplished,—the High Chamber was Republican.

The failure of the "Conservatives" was mainly due to their divisions; the three monarchical parties

were at strife with one another. They had no common programme, no definite demands, no banner. Had they been successful, what would they have assured the country? It was the last card.

Just before the elections a vague Bonapartist intrigue had tried to close round Marshal MacMahon. The "Prince Imperial" was taking the leadership of the party more definitely into his hands. He wrote to one of his agents, December 26th, 1878: "I have organised a system of inquiry by means of which I shall receive exact particulars as to the military, administrative, judicial and political officials in France. . . . " "There, again, the question of "officials" was of the chief importance. And hope lay in but a few old generals, ripe for the retired list. Cardinal de Bonnechose, authorised leader of the enterprise, had gone to Arenberg, on September 26th, to see the Empress Eugénie and the Prince Imperial. "He worked with the Prince several times; the Prince went over with him our whole plan of constitution . . . Other questions, of the utmost Cardinal importance, also arose1: 'All very well,'

the Cardinal is reported to have said, 'but Bonnechose and the have you the men?'" Always the same Marshal question. The Marshal was known to be troubled and uneasy; it was decided to address him. On December 19th, Cardinal de Bonnechose went to the President and had an interview with him in which he tried to push him forward. But his reply was:

¹ Journal of Fidus, vol. ii. p. 209. See also the Vie du Cardinal de Bonnechose, by Mgr. Besson. The Cardinal had taken a note to serve as text in his interview with the Prince. This note begins thus: "If the Prince asks me what the clergy will do for him, my reply is easy: 'we shall do for him what he will do for religion, Church and Pope'" (vol. ii. p. 278).

"There is nothing to be done." The elections dealt the coup de grâce.

However loyal was again the conduct of the Marshal, he was none the less affected. All that he loved, all that he had defended, the world for which he had left the soldier's life to ascend the cross of the Presidency—all this was failing him,—what was he to do? It may be taken for granted that from this day his decision was made. As long as one of the two parliamentary "powers" was with him, he had held his ground; the Senate failed him—all then was over. He was vanquished, for the second time in his life, by reason of faults that others had committed.

The real question for him was whether he should govern with the new majority—in both Chambers—that is to say, should he call Gambetta to the presidency of the Council? These was no other logical procedure.

Gambetta had not once been received at nor invited to the Elysée. He was waiting, not without both ill and good humour; drawn, despite himself, to the honesty and soldier-like qualities of the Marshal, he often felt that the soldier and the patriot should have enough in common for agreement not to be impossible, let once the ice be broken.

Friends still attempted a rapprochement which might perhaps have spared much sorrow. An interview was arranged; "other friends" intervened, and at the last moment the Marshal excused himself. Everything was hard for him.

Gambetta did not insist, though doubtless hurt,

Attacks as this path closed before him, while

against he stood surrounded by pitfalls. While

the world beyond echoed his merits and
his fame, in France—in his own land—he began

to suffer criticism. Public opinion was obviously tampered with. The statesman was attacked: it was the man who suffered. He strongly realised that he could now but defend himself by deeds, standing as he did in the perilous position where words no longer suffice, when only action counts,—yet while called upon to act, his hands were being tied. The bourgeois in his buttoned coat, the man of coldness and correctness, with wooden face and impassive eyes, stood watching every movement.

Both he himself and his followers were attacked. In the first week of January, 1879, he had to appear in the case brought by his friend, Challemel-Lacour, against an obscure paper, La France Nouvelle, which had accused the eminent senator of having cheated at cards. For the first time since 1869, Gambetta resumed his legal robes, and what he defended was his friend, his party, and, to some extent, himself.

"Calumny," he said on the tribunal, "is manufactured by a species of company: in Paris, Lyons and Marseilles and other towns there are modern Basils distilling venomous poison. Gentlemen, it is not of him who produced the calumny that we complain, but of those who hide behind him." ¹

Everything about him was found fault with: his open hand, his Rabelaisian manner, his easy life. He had much wit, and winged words flew from his lips and pecked cruelly at men's hearts. Men took revenge for his superiority, his independence and his influence. His private life became the subject of conversation and of head-shaking. It belongs to history through the publication of a private correspondence in which the outpourings of a true and

¹ The chief editor of *La France Nouvelle*, M. Maggiolo, was sentenced to a fine of ten thousand francs and costs.

generous soul alternate with the perpetual cares of a difficult position. His genius did not pale, although his star was darkened; silently, secretly, the first shadows of his evening fell upon him in the full noontide of his day.

Carried on by his destiny, urged forward by his party, Gambetta was no more free than was Marshal MacMahon. The Ministry was but a temporary barrier between two opposing forces—a fragile and half-broken barrier. Everyone knew it, except, perhaps, the Cabinet itself. The Republic had triumphed in the senatorial elections; the Ministers claimed the triumph for themselves.

The first hint at less assurance was given in the resignation of General Borel, Minister for War. He pleaded reasons of health: what he really felt was annoyance at the difficulties of his part. He had to be replaced. Delicate questions at once came to the fore,—the army, the Ministry for War, was the Marshal's "business."

Now Gambetta had his own views upon the military staff; he considered that any danger towards the Republic must only be in the disloyalty of some great leader. He therefore desired to see a thoroughly devoted man in the War-Office; his personal preferences were for General Farre, who was, during the war, the distinguished lieutenant of Faidherbe, a good officer—nothing more. But Gambetta had made of this choice a matter of political importance. Marshal MacMahon would not have General Farre spoken of. The name of General Gresley—an old Minister under M. Thiers—was brought forward, but appealed to no one.1

¹ Gambetta wrote on January 13th: "We draw towards the close of clandestine negotiations, things must be done now in

Even before the reassembly of the Chambers, Marshal MacMahon began to drain his cup of bitterness to the dregs. The nominations that he had to sign, as a joyous earnest of the new régime, were probably what he felt most keenly. With politics there can be compromise, but the personal question is always painful and irritating. Admiral Jaurès had been made Ambassador to the King of Spain on December 11th, in place of the Count de Chaudordy. who had retired. On January 14th, M. Challemel-Lacour, whose name had just been made so public, was made Ambassador to Switzerland in place of the Count d'Harcourt, retired. On January 18th, M. Dénormandie, senator, was made director of the Bank of France as successor to M. Rouland, who had died. There was fresh annovance as to the War Office, for General de Miribel, chief of the General Staff, whose relations with General Ducrot during the period of May the Sixteenth were well-known, was relieved of his functions and placed on the retired list. He was succeeded by General Davoust, Duc d'Auerstadt. Throughout army, magistracy, administration, the movements tended in the same direction. The Ministry threw down ballast, but would it suffice?

The Under the influence of the general exciteAmnesty ment, there was also much agitation in Paris
on the subject of those condemned to imprisonment after the Commune. After a lapse of eight
years could not the touch of oblivion be evoked?
The Left demanded amnesty. The Ministry thought
it advisable to take the initiative. A notice in the

broad daylight. Be it so—we are ready. The Minister for War has retired and is replaced by General Gresley; my candidate, General Farre, is overlooked. This means war—well, they shall have it, and we shall see what follows."—Revue de Paris, p. 62.

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Journal Officiel of January 17th, gave the exact situation for the benefit of the public. The number of those delivered up to military justice after the Commune had been 51,107. The sentences amounted to 10,522. 4,023 men had been transported to New Caledonia. On December 31st, 1878, there were still in New Caledonia 2,647 convicts; adding to this number that of those still serving their sentences in France, there were still 3,147 prisoners of the Commune.

The Ministry proposed to give a general pardon to all such prisoners who had not, during the insurrection, committed crimes against the general safety (assassination, arson and pillage). 2,245 prisoners were pardoned by a decree dated January 15th. After this there remained but 1,067 prisoners, of whom 891 were in New Caledonia and 176 detained as dangerous for the present, but whose return could soon be authorised.

These signatures followed each other from the hand that had written the letter of May the Sixteenth.

Here is the account, slightly emphasised, but true in the main, of an eye-witness:—

May the Sixteenth had miscarried; the Marshal had submitted. The Minister for the Interior had presented for his signature an urgent and important paper concerning the department of M. D—— which the Marshal put off signing from day to day. "Go to see the Marshal," said the Minister to the deputy, "we are at a time when he will receive you." The interview accorded, the deputy was received with a geniality that surprised him. The Marshal asked him if he were not related to a Captain D—— whom he had known at Autun. The deputy racked his memory in vain. The Marshal insisted, it was hard to bring him from the subject. At length the deputy arrived at the object of his visit, saying that he had come for the signature of an im-

portant paper. The Marshal's face darkened at once. The deputy returned to the charge. Then came an explosion: "Ask me anything but that! Papers, always papers!" cried the Marshal, "I get nothing else. And then this everlasting signing! I detest signing! I tell you in good earnest that I will not sign anything more!"

The Chambers reassembled January 14th. The two senior leaders—MM. Gauthier de Rumilly in the Senate and Despeaux in the Chamber, were Republicans and celebrated the victory of the Republic.

The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, in spite of his known liberalism and his services during the great crisis, was replaced in the presidency of the Senate by M. Martel with 234 votes against 72. This was the figure of the new majority.

It was frankly Republican, yet very moderate— Left Central—and advertised the name of M. Thiers. But from the first there was demanded of the executive power "the firmness of direction and action which should belong to a consolidated and responsible Cabinet."

The ministerial declaration was read by M. Dufaure in the Senate, by M. de Marcère in the Chamber, on January 16th. There was warm applause in the Senate, a cold reception in the Chamber.

The programme seemed long, diffuse and nerveless to an assembly that was all nerves. Had the Cabinet, so proud of the senatorial majority, come to believe that this would "be enough"? Gambetta resolved to let his hand be felt.² A veteran of 1848,

¹ Quand j'étais Ministre.

² "I am quite determined. I shall vote for the death of the Cabinet, and with no need of further words I shall consider it defunct."

M. Senart, announced his intention of questioning the Ministry.

The debate took place on the 20th. M. Dufaure defended his ground step by step, but was driven backward. His voice was full of emotion:—

Had I to give proof of my deeply-felt attachment to the republican institutions, I would recall to you the fact that eight years ago the name of Republic was for the first time officially proclaimed when some friends and myself proposed that the Assembly should declare M. Thiers as chief of the executive power of the French Republic. . . . I have also taken part in the recent events, which have been a further progress. I do not know whether I shall witness the last trial of the Republican institution in 1880 by the renewal of the executive power, but I pray Heaven that it may pass as calmly and as resolutely as did the test of January 5th.

M. Madier de Montjau spoke in the name of the Extreme Left. He frankly demanded the resignation of the Cabinet: "You are at the end of your lease," he said, "you must give up your holding. France wishes to be rid of those who have tyrannised over her." This was aimed at the Marshal.

M. Floquet, more mild, was no less explicit: "The Cabinet, such as it is constituted, is not in harmony with the new situation produced by the elections of January 5th."

Between the Moderate Left and the Extreme Left what would the Republicans do with the Government? Gambetta again hesitated. Why was this? Perhaps he had not quite renounced his momentary hope of governing with the Marshal:—

I am reflecting on the little speech I may be called upon to make to the *old soldier*, should the fancy take him to summon me. I beg you to think about it too, and to give me your instructions. I cannot and I will not agree to govern under orders; from this standpoint write me what you think.

M. Jules Ferry proposed:

That the Chamber of Deputies, confiding in the declaration of the Government and convinced that the Cabinet, from henceforth in possession of full liberty of action, will not hesitate, after the great national action of January 5th, to give the Republican majority the satisfaction long claimed in the name of the country, particularly in what concerns the administrative and judicial staff, passes to the order of the day.

The Government accepted the resolution, which accorded it a confidence also bargained for.

The resolution of Jules Ferry was adopted by 208 votes against 116. After some reflection, Gambetta, followed by some friends, had abstained.¹

It was for the Ministry a victory à la Pyrrhus; it tried in vain to defend the presidency, having all it could do to defend itself.

The Marshal was exasperated—still signatures! and what signatures! M. Hérold, a Protestant and well-known freemason, was made Prefect of La Seine in place of M. Ferdinand Duval (January 24th). M. Laferrière, controller of petitions in the Council of State, was made General Director of Cults. An ardent campaign in the *Lanterne* conducted by M. Yves Guyot against the Prefecture of Police, with the signature of "the little old workman," required the payment of political police agents for services rendered to the cause of May the Sixteenth.

Gambetta wrote, on January 20th: "We are beaten—the Ministry is defeated, the majority divided, the programme scattered to the winds—and I am glad, for I had not touched the matter with the tips of my fingers, not deeming the hour propitious for striking the decisive blow. My silence has allowed old Dufaure not to sink, he and his skiff, but he has swallowed plenty of salt water. He will continue as long as I suffer him to do so, which will not be for long. . . . I have not overpassed the limit I had set myself—of overthrowing the Cabinet and of not replacing it."

A Ministerial Order authorised an inquiry as to the police of Paris (January 27th). Abomination of desolation! And soon hands were laid on the *gen-darmerie*. A decree of January 28th constituted a mixed commission authorised to study an organisation of this body, on which the provinces depend for public order.

And, on the other hand, the opening of the prisons to the condemned of the Commune was soon to be accomplished. M. Dufaure brought forward a Bill extending, even to the contumacious, the benefit of pardon to all concerned in the insurrection. This was the amnesty without its name. Thereupon M. Louis Blanc brought forward a general proposal of amnesty signed by himself and a large number of his colleagues. M. Louis Blanc said: "The amnesty is the pardon of the peoples."

At the same time the Chambers claimed an immediate return to Paris. The winter was exceptionally severe; the journeys between Paris and Versailles very trying. The Senate decided that the committees should sit in Paris.

And, lest there should be any illusion as to the outlook for the future, the moderate M. Bardoux brought a Bill before the Chamber, making primary instruction obligatory for all children between the ages of six and thirteen. They were in all haste to fashion a soul for the populace! The Marshal signed everything—nominations, measures, bills. But he was at the end of his patience.

There was much mention of the trial hanging over the heads of the Ministers of May the Sixteenth. M. Brisson prepared an overwhelming charge, and the Ministry, held in bonds by Jules Ferry's resolution, was obliged to follow where it led.

At the Cabinet Council of January 28th,

General Gresley presented for the Marshal's
signature a decree relieving of their functions as army corps commanders, Generals
de Lartique, Bataille, Bourbaki, de Montaudon, and
du Barail.

As the decree was being read, the Marshal became agitated, his face grew purple, he flung down his pen. "No!" he exclaimed.—

I cannot consent to strike brave officers, valiant soldiers, my companions in arms! If they are unworthy, let this be proved to me. But if it is a question of satisfying party spirit I will not sacrifice them. Let another do it—I would rather retire. has Bourbaki done? What has Bataille done? And du Barail. —one of our best cavalry generals—What have you to reproach him with? I will yield you Lartique and Montaudon; they are ill and ask to retire, but as to the others—why hasten their hour? In the way in which things are going you may soon have need of the army at home. You must therefore not wound its leaders. Pull down magistrates, prefects, if you will—but generals—no! I will sooner leave my post than consent. If, for the last year, I have consented to swallow so much bitterness, it was only that I might defend the army. If I abandon it to-day, if I do a thing that I consider injurious to its interests, to the interests of the country. I should feel myself dishonoured. I should not even dare to embrace my children any more!

This last trait came from the heart, revealing all the sorrow of the Marshal, so closely bound by sacred ties. 1

In point of fact, there was no question of wounding these distinguished men, but only of curtailing a favour by which their command was extended beyond the legal limits. But all discussion was superfluous.

The Marshal allowed two days to pass.

On January 30th he went to the Council at

Wersailles: "Well, gentlemen," he said,

¹ General du Barail's Mes Souvenirs (vol. ii.).

as soon as the sitting commenced, "have you any communication to make to me? Have you considered things? do you persist in your decision?"

The Ministers kept silence; the Marshal understood. "Your silence proves to me that you persist," he said. "On my part, my former declarations remain unchanged; I bring you my resignation. Here is the letter I have prepared for the president of the Senate and for the president of the House of Deputies."

The letter read, the Marshal requested M. Dufaure to countersign it. M. Dufaure observed that this was a personal action that had no need of countersigning; he would undertake to have the letter delivered. On leaving the Council Hall M. Dufaure remarked: "He is a worthy man and a great citizen."

It was nearly noon. The news, expected for the past two days, spread quickly through the corridors of the palace, which were full of people, curious rather than moved.

Everything seemed arranged for in advance—yet a latent drama was still on the stage of men's minds. What was to be the tendency of the Republic in this sudden crisis? Was it to be parliamentary, bourgeois, or democratic? Three names replied to these different tendencies: Dufaure, Grévy, Gambetta. Since the death of Thiers, Gambetta had been obstinately overlooked; surprised and disillusioned he had not pushed himself. It is thought that he would have preferred Dufaure to succeed, but things were so well prepared in favour of Jules Grévy that little doubt was left upon the subject.

In both Houses the sitting began at a quarter-past three. Both presidents read aloud the Marshal's letter. M. Grévy was pale, his voice at first betrayed

emotion, but he soon resumed his usual cold impassive demeanour. At thirty-five minutes past three both Houses rose. Everyone stood talking in the corridors.

The meeting of the delegates of the Republican groups took place at four o'clock, presided over by M. Feray, senator for Seine-et-Oise. He announced that the Republican senators, united in general assembly, had unanimously decided to raise M. Jules Grévy to the presidency of the Republic. It was therefore the Senate, this newly reinforced Senate, that took the initiative. The name of Jules Grévy was adopted without debate and unanimously by the delegates.

The National Assembly, immediately convoked, met at half-past four in the Hall of the Chamber of Deputies, presided over by M. Martel. The presidential message was read, then the constitutional provisions. The nominal appeal made by one of the secretaries of the Senate, M. Scheurer-Kestner, began at five minutes past five with the letter T. M. Tailhaud, former keeper of the Seals, was the first to vote. As M. Dufaure quickly mounted the platform a double salvo of applause rose from the Centre and the Left.

Election of At five minutes to seven the voting Jules Grévy closed. Exactly one hour later the president announced the results:—

Number of voters				713
White or blanc bulletins				43
Votes expressed				670
Complete majority				336
Votes obtained were:-				
M. Jules Grévy				563
General Chanzy				99

Gambetta				5
General de Ladmirault				I
The Duc d'Aumale				I
General de Gallifet				1

M. Martel added: "M. Jules Grévy having obtained the majority of votes, in the terms of the Constitution I proclaim him President of the Republic for seven years."

Loud applause and cries of "Vive la République!" rose from the Left and in the tribunes. "At last the Republic is founded! At last the era of Liberty begins!" The Right protested ironically.

The name of General Chanzy had been selected by the Right without any understanding with him personally. It would have been a good name, but the tide was not with him—the General himself voted for Jules Grévy. At five minutes to eight the Assembly rose. The Chamber met to hear the reading of Jules Grévy's letter of resignation as its leader.

Jules Grévy had withdrawn. The Cabinet Council, led by M. Dufaure, went to acquaint him with the result of the poll and to offer congratulations. It is said that M. Dufaure was moved; the veteran parliamentarian had tears in his eyes, his voice trembled. M. Jules Grévy listened with his usual calmness to the man who might have been his rival.

As soon as Marshal MacMahon heard the decision of the National Assembly, he went to call on Jules Grévy, attended by an aide-de-camp and dressed in plain clothes.

The Marshal entered with the words: "Monsieur le Président, I wish to be the first to salute you." Then with much cordiality he expressed his hopes for the welfare of the nation.

After an exchange of courtesies, he returned to

Paris, pleased and relieved. His step was generally approved, and his retirement was surrounded by a halo of esteem and respect.

Gambetta also presented himself to do homage to the President of the Republic—whom, it is said, "he embraced with effusion."

The news of the Marshal's resignation and of the election of Jules Grévy became known that same evening, and simultaneously, in many parts of France and abroad. Next day in Paris the funds rose by nearly a franc. Many towns were decorated and illuminated. The foreign press was favourable; it was known that Jules Grévy would be a prudent and pacific president. Apologists compared him with Washington and repeated the words of Chateaubriand: "This man, who does not draw attention in that his proportions are normal, has merged his being into that of his country; his is the patrimony of civilisation; his name is like to a wayside sanctuary, whence flows a full and limpid stream."

IV

Jules Grévy was seventy-six years of age, having been born at Mont-sous-Vaudrey (Jura), August 15th, 1813. His grandfather had been a magistrate for the Canton under the Revolution. In 1792 his father had voluntarily responded to the appeal of "the country in danger"; the biographers of M. J. Grévy affirm that he was elected leader of a battalion by his comrades in arms, that he served six years and retired as Infantry Captain. He lived at Mont-sous-Vaudrey in a comfortable house such as

is called a château in that district. The family was therefore bourgeois and Republican.

Having finished his classical studies at Poligny, Dôle and Paris, he was a university student in 1830. In 1839 he entered the Bar. He was soon engaged in the Barbe's case, for Philippot, one of the accused. He made his way with no special notability, yet very thoroughly and rapidly, according to the characteristic of his province. In 1848 he was reckoned among the Republican advocates. He preferred the bureau to the Bar; he was "law" personified. In the group around the National he made the acquaintance of M. Thiers. Ledru-Rollin dispatched him to the Jura, on a Government commission.

In that his Republican opinions were well known they allowed him to be moderate. His sang-froid and his tact smoothed his way; his was the conciliatory method. "I do not desire the Republic to be a source of fear," he said on entering his department. He understood, however, the art of "ruling with his party," thereby manifesting political ability, for it is the politician who sacrifices to his "group." That the day of democracy had come was his sure conviction.

He soon stood for the Assemblée Constituante. Even those who were against the Republic were drawn towards him. The *Echo du Jura* declared that his compatriots appreciated "his great capacity, his activity, his sincere Republican opinions, and the exquisite urbanity of his manner." This phrase is worthy of remembrance. He was then thirty-five years of age. The man was fulfilling himself. At the Assemblée Constituante his rôle of weighing and considering would have been rather obscure if he

had not brought forward the famous amendment on the presidential function in the course of the debate on the Constitution, October 7th, 1848.

The text of the amendment is as follows:-

The head of the executive power is chosen by the Assembly. He takes the title of President of the Ministerial Council. He is elected for an indefinite period by secret ballot and by the absolute majority. He is always subject to recall. He appoints and recalls the Ministry.

The proposed régime meant nothing else but the rule of a single assembly—in short—the Convention; the executive power had no vitality of its own. Nothing better characterises M. Jules Grévy than this initiative. His whole career tended to the political effacement of the individual by merging it into a group, a party, a class. The old revolutionary Past with its general mistrust and its cry for equality lurked behind this quiet exterior.

It was Jules Grevy who first suspected and denounced the danger in Prince Louis Napoleon's candidature. The speech in which he defended his amendment is animated by strong feeling:—

Till now every Republic has lost itself in despotism, despotism is the danger against which the Republic must be fortified . . . All power is resident in the people—consequently in those elected by the people, in the Assemblies.

The amendment was thrown out and the Presidency established on the lines of Lamartine's famous speech: Alea jacta est. Lamartine exclaimed to Grévy the Conventionalist: "You invoke the Reign of Terror!" To which Jules Grévy had already answered: "You would bring back the Empire!"

The poet and the lawyer were the two poles of the French axis. Grévy's whole political career tended

towards the anonymous, in striking contrast to that of other famous men of his day. It was thus that he stood during the Empire amid the fame of Barrger, Jules Favre and Allon. He is hardly noticeable, and yet by imperceptible movements he was mounting to the front. A colleague of his in 1869 writes of him:—

He speaks with astonishing simplicity, with no ornament and very quietly, as if intent upon his argument and nothing else. His voice is clear, distinct, perhaps a little soft—in striking contrast to his dialectic. . . . He pleases, nevertheless, despite himself, through a kind of humour which is both genial and dry; there is something in him which savours of Phocion with a taste of Franklin as well.

There was a touch of Béranger in him, and at a time when France was at the feet of Victor Hugo it is hardly necessary to state that M. Grévy cared for Hugo no more than he did for Lamartine. His tastes were strictly classical. His library was small—"well-chosen," he read Horace and recited Boileau. His house at number 8, Rue Saint Armand was "richly and severely furnished," says a visitor, "bookshelves in black wood; drawing-room in red satin; piles of documents upon the chairs; a few masterpieces on the walls." Of an evening he played chess at the Café de la Régence with Maubant, the comedian.

Behind this steady bourgeois, this silent barrister, there lurked the crafty peasant spirit, which emerged at its ease when in the retirement of Mont-sous-Vaudrey. In his country home, Grévy would don the peasant's blouse, the large straw hat, the sabots; gun in hand, he would tramp the fields, talking crops and cattle with the farmer; he was genial, popular, though always a little distant.

Towards the end of the Empire this moderate and prudent politician had become *Bâtonnier* of the Order of Advocates, and deputy for the Jura, for which he was elected in 1868 and 1869. The high destiny awaiting him found him prepared.

Like Thiers, he stood aloof from the incident of September 4th. As a member of the National Assembly he presided there from February 16th, 1871, to April 2nd, 1873. With M. Dufaure and several eminent members he signed the proposal to make Thiers the head of the executive power of the Republic.

For rather a slight reason he resigned on April 2nd, 1873, and through the advent of M. Buffet, prepared the way for May 24th. In the ordinary business of the Assembly he spoke little and showed small activity. His reserve is now explained, his character necessitated his advancement.

During November, 1873, he published a brochure on the Necessary Government. It was a defence of the Republic, the government of democracy—a strong piece of writing. His rare speeches were excellent—well-balanced and adjusted to the moment. His slightest words carried weight—from that face of marble, those thin lips, came nothing but the oracular. Thiers tried to bring him forward, and offered him the leadership of the party, but Grévy shook his head—the presidency of the Chamber sufficed him for the time. It was to oppose Gambetta's tactics that he broke his usual silence, when Gambetta tried to bring in the constitution and the Republic through a voluntary misunderstanding.

On May the Sixteenth Grévy was with the Left, but the effort was not his affair; he stood as the impartial judge, cooling something of Gambetta's heat by his calm and critical smile. In the clash of

temperament between these two it was the older man who triumphed. He had steady judgment, the sense of proportion and of circumstance. When Thiers died, Grévy was the necessary man—and on January 30th, 1879, he stepped into the place that Marshal MacMahon had quitted.

For fifty years he had stood upon the breach. This crowning of a long career was the triumph of reserve and self-effacement. To him might the words of Tacitus be applied: Magna auctoritas eloquentiâ, sententiâ et nutu.

The choice can be best appreciated if he and Gambetta are compared. In 1848 Grévy had Lamartine as antagonist; in 1875 he stood against Gambetta; the two natures were diametrically opposed—action and reserve, expenditure and economy. Was the selection of Grévy justifiable?

Jules Grévy carried with himself to power the Republican bourgeoisie, The Tiers-état was no longer filled with the descendants of the old parliamentary stock, yet the new element had not yet appeared; between the two were men of law and men of business, prudent and hesitating people who in the long suspenses of the nineteenth century had lived quietly in the shelter of principles and doctrines—sobered sons of the great revolutionists. Jules Grévy was the Jacobin steadied, softened and humanised.

A colleague has described him as he appeared at the first sitting of the Council: "He was just as I had always found him, calm, impenetrable, through the most animated debate. He then said quietly: Do you know, gentlemen, what I would do in your place?" Everyone, with bated breath, bent forward: "Well! I should do nothing at all."

If a Government does nothing, someone usurps its

authority—if not a leader, then the followers—a côterie. For Grévy politics was "une affaire," and became so for his colleagues. If governing means sparing and continuing—well and good; but if it means directing, leading, raising, the programme is rather short.

The irresponsibility of the President is a fiction; he is responsible before the country and before history.

The President of the Republic can and must reign through personal influence, through assiduous vigilance, through the help and counsel that inspires confidence and harmony, also—since silence has been vaunted—through silence, et nutu.

The President of the Republic being the most independent leader—the most sheltered from detail, competition and cabal, should be the most useful servant of the country. His office has the twofold advantage of being definite in its length and in its functions. Seven years is a long day in the life of a public man; let him then fill his day! For a man to be chosen to represent that mysterious force—the essence of general agreement—the State; to obtain from his peers acknowledgment, submission—must it not demand from him in exchange an unparalleled zeal, a limitless expenditure of self?

The Republican system with this force refuses heredity and demands capacity. It claims to oppose reason to the defects or errors of Nature. Should its choice be wrong, the system suffers. The man worthy of being the head of a Republic can give proof of his activity without having the soul of a usurper. The example of a Corsican family in which the demands of personality stifled loyalty, wisdom and honour is not an abiding proof against this. France

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offers adequate examples without need of invoking those of another continent; a man of power can be placed at the helm without endangering the Republic.

The French nation, if not supported, excited, animated, by the hand that guides it, becomes bewildered, dissatisfied. In 1878 the young Republic had many needs and claims. The election of Jules Grévy was therefore a mistake.

The country in general was surprised and disappointed, and uneasily led towards new experiments.

There is no need to doubt the good qualities of President Grévy—his sang-froid, his knowledge of men, his critical subtlety, his strong legal instinct, his influence, his uprightness,—so much vaunted and used, of course, with reserve. These qualities were praiseworthy and desirable at a time when France, still weak from her defeat and the crises she had experienced, needed soothing and repose. But were they adequate? Surely more was needed,—the soul of the French people has always been and will always be subject to emotions that such a nature could not satisfy.

All Government is a delegate to the Ideal, that of France stood lower than was right.

The provincial bourgeoisie, remaining in the dream realised by a bourgeois, was, even after the terrible agitation of the war, still very behind the times, too absorbed in the narrow interests, the small excitements of its daily life; the bourgeois had no knowledge of the great world that was being opened out to men, he knew nothing of international life, nothing of the big things of existence.

He had forgotten nothing, learned nothing; at his own fireside with slippered feet, his only point of

contact with the future lay in the merely mechanical precaution of thrift. The folk from whom he springs have no interest in the Future but the fear that it inspires; they have no understanding of what the Future means—it does not enter into their horizon. Of the generous movement of souls, of illustrious works, of the influence of Art, of the vibration and emotion of thought—but the faintest echo reaches him. He loves France, without knowing what is held in the name. Read Bêrênice to such a man! Beyle says much of the mediocrity of his class; he desired that Milanese should be written on his tomb.

The palpitating and dramatic beauty of the French soul, the joy of research and of creation, the terrors of the achieved and of the perfect, the charm, the sparkle, the subtlety and delicacy of spirit by which taste and mode are made to flourish, all this the provincial bourgeois ignores. Poetry in its romanticism is for him but "des phrases." Could he but work his will upon it, the radiant wings of the butterfly would be transfixed by him against a wall.

In no way is government a mere "business." It is by its best tendencies that a people is directed, by its noblest aims. The repression of these leads to its ruin, the responsibility thereof before the ages very great. If the representative of France does not know his France, does not know his Paris, let him at least open his windows very widely when he enters the Elysée.

At the time when the democratic Republic came to birth a true representative was needed by the people; when the Republic had its place to make in Europe an Athenian guiding spirit was required, when France had more warmth and sympathy to spare for herself and for abroad, a warm and generous

heart was needed in her counsels. Jules Grévy as candidate for the presidency spoiled the chances of Gambetta, and this had long been intended. character, temperament and race the two men were opponents. Those who knew them both consider Grévy the bitterer of the two towards his rival; Gambetta was an object of strong dislike to him. More than once an understanding was attempted; their views on politics should have facilitated thingsconversation appeared cordial; yet no sooner did they part than the old bitterness returned. see," said Gambetta in his disappointment, "there is nothing to be done with him." Knowing his own strength, Gambetta would have preferred an open fight, but his thrusts would not have affected his invulnerable rival. Jules Grévy nursed his illfeeling,—as an intimate acquaintance said of him— "Grévy never altered his mind." Gambetta's character, his actions, even his eloquence, found no favour in his eyes. "Is this intended to be French?" he scoffed on reading a speech by the great tribune, "It is more like the language of the horse."

Gambetta's popularity offended him as a want of tact, and the tact was really sometimes lacking. Such an instance, one of those things that wound so deeply, occurred during the well-known journey to Cherbourg, when the President of the Republic was accompanied by M. Léon Say, president of the Senate, and M. Gambetta, president of the Chamber. A banquet of 1,800 covers had been prepared. M. Grévy spoke briefly amidst much respect; M. Gambetta, more lengthily, met with much enthusiasm and applause. On leaving the banquet they found a large and well-disposed crowd in the street. M. Grévy, tired after the dinner, preferred to walk;

he was accompanied only by an officer, and for some time remained unrecognised. Presently, however, he was saluted and surrounded. Gambetta had taken a landau and drove past smoking a cigar. Instantly the crowd turned towards him with enthusiastic cheers. The two men met. Without rising and descending, Gambetta asked the President if he would like to enter the carriage. "No," replied M. Grévy simply, "drive on, I prefer to be on foot."

Another statesman not in sympathy with M. Grévy was Jules Ferry. Many times, on returning from the ministerial council he flung down his portfolio exclaiming—"This man undoes all my work!" Sometimes, however, this indolent and moody wisdom was a valuable asset. It was this same Jules Ferry who remarked of him: "What a critic! His words are stamped as if on a die." And in the Schnoebelé affair it was the penetrating intellect of the man of law that mastered the imprudence and the calculation by which the peace had been endangered. Up to the very last and on the fall that so many faults and errors—gravest of all, the acceptance of a re-election -made inevitable, Jules Grévy maintained the selfpossession, the gravity of speech and manner that had brought him to the fore.

At the close of the Wilson scandal, the Chamber deciding to make the President resign, "established itself permanently while awaiting the proposals of the Government." M. Rouvier, president of the Council, went with his colleagues to take this resolution to the Elysée. It was offering the bowstring to the old President, but he fought bravely to the last. He gave an exposition of the respective rights of the executive and the legislative; at this supreme moment he gave a

"consultation" as he had done through all his life. M. Spüller, Minister for Education, returning home that evening breathless from a day that had been almost tragic in its import, threw himself into a chair exclaiming: "He has been prodigious—incomparable—stronger than Gambetta!"

CHAPTER VII

THE WADDINGTON-FERRY CABINET—ARTICLE SEVEN—THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

- I.—Jules Grévy at the Elysée—Formation of the Waddington Cabinet—Gambetta, President of the Chamber—The Amnesty—Scholastic reform—M. Lepère Minister for the Interior—Vote of censure against May the Sixteenth.
- II.—The sifting of the administrative staff—Continuation of the Session—The Senate votes the return of the Chambers to Paris—Death of the Prince Imperial—The Law on Secondary Instruction—The Law on Écoles Normales—First celebration of July 14th—The Budget of 1880—Execution of the Plan Freycinet.
- III.—The results of the Berlin Congress—Bulgaria, Greece, Egypt—The genesis of the Triple Alliance—The interview of Alexandrovo and the meeting at Gastein—The Austro-German treaty of alliance—Leo XIII and Prince Bismarck.
- IV.—Papal instructions to the bishops in France—Mgr. Czacki Nuncio in Paris—The Republican party and religious policy —Jules Simon and Article Seven—General political situation—Fall of the Waddington Cabinet.

Ι

February, 1879. Message from the new President

O'N Monday, February 3rd, M. Jules Grévy entered the Palace of the Elysée. On February 6, he addressed a message to Parliament, which, read in the Senate by M. Waddington, in the Chamber by M. de

Marcère, was received with warm acclamation by the Left. "Sincerely subject to the great law of parliamentary rule, I shall never offer opposition to the national will as expressed by its constitutional

organs. . . ." He declared himself for a "liberal and truly conservative policy." On Saturday, February 8th, the President gave formal audience to the diplomatic corps. All the formalities were carried out. The Parliamentary Republic was established.

M. Dufaure, had informed M. Grévy, on January 30th, that he intended to resign his office. He was fatigued—and rather surprised at the turn things had taken. "For a new situation new men are required," he maintained, and he indicated Gambetta, who had, it is said, placed himself at M. Grévy's disposal.

The new President declared, however, that "the hour had not yet come," and advised Gambetta to stand for the presidency of the Chamber.

The Waddington should be left to business with as little modi-Cabinet fication as possible (February 4).

M. Waddington became president of the Council and retained his office for Foreign Affairs. MM. de Marcère for the Interior, Léon Say for Finance, de Freycinet for Public Works, General Gresley for War—retained their posts. The seals were entrusted to M. Le Royer, Senator; Vice-Admiral Jauréguiberry replaced Admiral Pothuau in the Admiralty Office; M. Jules Ferry was appointed Minister for Education; M. Lepère for Agriculture and Commerce. The supervision of Public Worship was detached from the Ministry for Education, and M. de Marcère undertook

¹ Léon Say writes: "Good M. Dufaure is like a fish returned to water now that he is no longer in the Cabinet. I thought he was going to embrace me 'in the eyes of our fellow-citizens,' as Joseph Prudhomme says, when we met just now in the Senate. Yesterday evening he asked his daughter and Sauzay to play him a Sonata, and said to Sauzay, 'There are but two desirable professions—those of a lawyer and of an artist.'"

it for the time being. M. Bardoux was requested to represent the Ministry that was to be created, but declined the office. A ministry for Post and Telegraphs was instituted in favour of M. Cochéry, who was on intimate terms with the President. M. Sadi Carnot remained Under-Secretary in the Public Works Department, M. Goblet in that of Justice, M. Edmond Turquet in that of Fine Arts, M. Guillaume having resigned; M. Cyprien Guerd represented Agriculture, and M. Jules Develle the Interior.

If the Ministry had not much to borrow from its leader, it was remarkable for the merits of many of its members. Energetic Republicans were there, pronouncedly anti-clerical, the leaders, more or less, of the "Republican Left" that had so perseveringly worked on between Jules Simon and Gambetta The latter had amongst these men many rivals, if not peers. M. de Freycinet was no longer a subordinate; M. Jules Ferry had all a leader's spirit and was influential in the combination. Amongst these Protestants-Waddington, de Freycinet, Le Royerhe felt at ease: he, the free-thinker, determined to impress upon the clericals the force of the legalist and the Positivist. By giving him the Ministry of Education he was entrusted with the Soul Department. and though he was not allowed that of Public Worship yet his arm was long enough, his hand powerful enough for that it did not escape his influence.

M. Waddington, the leader of the Cabinet, had enjoyed an honourable reputation in Europe since the Congress of Berlin. He was an excellent man—broad and plump of face, with fair whiskers silvered here and there, and kind blue eyes. He had good sense, sang-froid, and individuality; the most accommodating of men as a general rule, very quiet and very

good-natured. His archaeological knowledge and his fine treatises on Asia Minor and the Greek coins assured him some favour in University circles. He was certainly no innovator, no initiator, still less a retrograde; armed with British stolidity and sincerely Liberal, he was respectability personified, and without brilliancy was also without shadow, calm, in the midst of noise and passion, a leader of repose—fully after the heart of President Grévy.

Gambetta had been raised, in fact rather relegated, to the Presidency of the Chamber by 338 out of 407 votes on January 31st. He gave a short speech which echoed with all that had been said and done of late, since his words were warm and breathed of action.

Before beginning the work of the Session there was a shifting of officials. Some thirty prefects and sub-prefects were moved. M. Bertauld, Senator, was made Procureur-General at the Cour de Cassation. The parquets were placed in other hands. The Justices of the Peace were the object of a long work of adaptation to the new order of things. Four treasuries and a number of financial administrations were done away with. M. Albert Grévy, Deputy, was made Governor-General of Algeria—it was the inauguration of the Civil Government.

The Marquis de Vogüé in Vienna, General Le Flô in St. Petersburg, the Marquis d'Harcourt in London, were replaced by M. Teisserenc de Bort, General Chanzy and Admiral Pothuau. Four Commanders of Army Corps—Generals Montaudon, Bataille, du Barail, Bourbaki, were placed on the Reserve list, General de Lartigue attached to the Second Section of the Staff. Three Commanders of Army Corps—MM. the Duc d'Aumale, Deligny, and Douai, were made military Inspectors. These eight posts were

intrusted to Generals Cornat, Clinchant, de Gallifet, Schmitz, Farre, etc. Major Labordère was recalled.

However, as Charles Floquet soon remarked in a speech that was to serve as standpoint for the Radical party, "it is not sufficient for the Republicans to enter into office—great principles must enter into the laws."

What were these great principles? The question necessitates a further classification of parties. The Republic from its foundation seeks its two government parties—so far, however, there have been nothing but experiments. The necessity of defending its institutions and the spirit of discipline surviving May the Sixteenth must often efface such distinctions—vague as they still are, and cause re-amalgamation. Two tendencies are, however, prominent. Some men maintain the principle of M. Thiers: "The Republic must be conservative or it will not continue "—others demand in a republic of universal suffrage, democratic institutions and consequently profound changes. Between these two systems a policy of prudence endeavours to progress by degrees, and this is the "opportunist" method, the method of Gambetta. He defined it again a few days after becoming leader of the Chamber in an address to an elected deputation from the XX Arrondissement, which had come to congratulate him at the Palais Bourbon.

We shall be able to resist any movement of reaction, but we must not allow ourselves to be carried away by the spirit of impatience and over-boldness. . . . We must continue to be prudent, practical and ready to use our opportunities; nothing can serve us as well as this policy.

Republicans more advanced, whether by reason of temperament or through the influence of political clubs and electoral circumscriptions, reproached

Gambetta with these hesitations. The prudent were accused of "moderantism." The reproach is formulated in a speech by M. Floquet:—

Up to the present, nearly every Republican government after its installation, has apparently been overcome by timidity, and shown hesitation and lack of confidence. Each has tried to conciliate the adversary against whom it had been giving battle.

The "advanced" or "Radical" party was represented in the Assembly by a group led by eminent Republicans—H. party Brisson, Ch. Floquet, Madier de Montjau, and Clémenceau; in Paris by the Municipal Council, by the numerous organisations which then existed, and by papers such as Le Rappel, La Lanterne, etc. Its programme urgently demanded certain reforms: the amnesty, the return of the Chambers to Paris, and what Thiers had called "the necessary liberties": freedom of the press, freedom of meetings, freedom of association (this being the first and only indication in the political programme of Socialistic ideas. "Give us the full and free right of associations, and we ourselves will solve the social problems," said the artisans to M. Floquet.)

Besides all this the "necessary demolitions" were also demanded, and this meant the removal of clerical influence from instruction, the abolition of remaining privilege in the army, such as the one year volontariat, etc.; the removal of hostile influence from the magistracy; in short, to deprive that "privileged race" of power, which alone profits by all the advantages of government: "it is the race that we intend to dispossess." ¹

¹ See Ch. Floquet's *Discours et Opinions*, vol. i. p. 198. Also the criticism of the Radical programme, by Littré, in the *Révue Positiviste* of May, 1879.

More than this was not intended for the time being. There was no mention of Church disestablishment, nor of other subjects which were, on the whole, inherent in the system. In spite of all, men were led of necessity to "take the questions separately."

The age itself was, as usual, to speak the last word; very slowly the word revolution was losing its first letter and achieving evolution.

It was with the amnesty that matters were begun.

The On February 20th Louis Blanc introduced Amnesty the question in an eloquent and heated speech that influenced the Assembly. M. Andrieux, ex-procureur of Lyons, who reported the commission, a clever and ingenious pioneer of a profession not yet established, defended the text of the commission, viz., the limited amnesty. M. Le Royer, Keeper of the Seals—also from Lyons—a grey-haired, rather unobtrusive-looking man, but a militant freemason, and a very acute reasoner, successfully replied to MM. Naquet and Lockroy, who defended the Amnesty full and complete.

Two men who were often to oppose each other in the future met now for the first time—M. Clémenceau and M. Ribot. M. Clémenceau urged with great emphasis the *plenum*. M. Ribot, who had been chairman of the Pardon Commission, still fresh from his contact with Dufaure, was against any amnesty whatever. "Liberal and conservative policy is as necessary in the government of the Republic as it was in its defence."

The counter-project of M. Louis Blanc was thrown out by 363 votes against 105. That of the Government—the Commission—was passed by 345 votes to 104. The Government, therefore, had a moderate majority.

It was also, however, strongly anti-clerical. The Sixteenth of May could not be laid to rest; clerical a very bitter feeling still prevailed. The Bishops resented this extremely. As sons of the seminaries of the Restoration they could not view the change in the times with equanimity.

Mgr. Pie, in a Pastoral Letter of February 18, 1879, attacked the enemy and the very principle of the Republican theme:—

The axiom of Caesarian tyranny, now the dogma of our democracy, implying that human law recognises nothing higher than itself, has it not been stated in the highest political circles as the *sine quâ non* of religious pacification? There can be no compromise with such a teaching. The progress of the passions, in accordance with the just judgments of God, will bring our generation to its ruin.

Cardinal Lavigerie, still more tragic, prepared himself for martyrdom. He wrote to Mgr. Bourret on February 6th:—

I have always found you an excellent friend and a man of faith. Let us continue in these sentiments, if, as everything foretells, we must soon finish our course. The devotion of the moment seems to mean that of the beheading of John the Baptist. There is no lack of Herods to place our heads on trenchers nor of Herodiases to ask for them. . . . By sword or bullet we shall give witness for our Lord. What an opportunity for redeeming the weaknesses of our lives!

He exaggerates. Yet a change had come. Amongst the men in office there were those who could be neither seduced nor intimidated.

Educational On Saturday, March 15th, Jules Ferry reform produced two bills, the first on the Higher Board for Public Education, and for Academical Boards; the second on the freedom of Higher Education. This was the beginning of educational reform.



Jules Ferry

In order to found a system of instruction in conformity with Republican ideas, there was much to be done. Higher education, secondary education, primary education, were all stamped by religious influence which in France meant that of Roman Catholicism.

The Republican party held that, in a system founded on universal suffrage, instruction should be a State duty, that it pertained to the State, and to the State alone, to mould the mind of childhood.

This was the natural sequence of ideas, since the democratic system alone recognises that power belongs to the social body and emanates from the collectivity of citizens.

Two active and powerful institutions—Free-masonry and the Educational League, had paved the way for most strong and energetic solutions. The representative of these doctrines in the Government was Jules Ferry. He brought to the work of realising them all his vigour, bluntness, and practical ability; hence his power, and the hatred that he roused. He began the matter according to a preconceived plan, and in less than three months he brought forward the series of projects which laid the axe at the root of the three educational divisions. These are the famous Educational laws—the "lois scélérates"—the "wicked laws." 1

During the National Assembly parliament had considered a proposition as to Primary Instruction which was to make it gratuitous, compulsory and secular. It emanated from M. Barodet and a large

¹ Under Jules Ferry M. Zévort was made General Director for Secondary Instruction; M. Ferdinand Buisson for Primary Instruction, and M. Gréard became Head of the University of Paris.

number of his colleagues, and was a veritable code of Public Instruction in 109 articles. To have delayed the hearing of this bill until the other questions were settled would have been postponing it indefinitely—Jules Ferry preferred more heroic and more expeditious methods.

The first of the bills, brought forward on March 15th, related to the Higher Board for Public Instruction and to the Academic Boards; it eliminated from the Higher Board all ecclesiastics and the representatives of certain social interests, replacing them by technical men and practical teachers. It introduced upon the Board delegates chosen by their own peers side by side with those officially selected.

The second bill applied generally to Higher Education. It gave back to the State the collation of university degrees, suppressed the mixed juries, obliged the students of free establishments for Higher Education to enter the State faculties, deprived those establishments founded by private bounty of the right of calling themselves faculty or university, terming them "free schools." It was an emendation of the law passed by the National Assembly. The Seventh Article, however, was rather unexpected and did not apply merely to Higher Education. It "forbade the members of non-authorised communities to take part in public instruction or to direct any sort of establishment."

It was observed that this article had no proper place in a project bearing upon the organisation of Higher Education, that it was of irritating character and anti-Catholic in particular, striking, with no preliminary warning, a number of institutions that had arisen under the shelter of former tolerance and by service rendered to families.

It was complained that it aimed in particular at a powerful educational organisation, that of the Society of Jesus, of which the colleges, numerous and remarkably well-administered, offered formidable rivalry to the State. "Professional jealousy," it was remarked. That the Jesuits were threatened could not be denied.

"Article Seven," said the explanation, "is one of the most important features of the new Law. It is after careful deliberation and ripe reflection that the Government brings it forward at a time when it is endeavouring to reconstitute the domain of the State in educational matters. . . There could be no manner of doubt as to the legal position of religious congregations not authorised in the country—they are in a state of continual and unprescriptive contravention. Foreigners have no right to teach here, why, therefore, should those be recognised who are affiliated to an order essentially foreign in the character of its doctrines, the nature and object of its laws, and the authority of its leaders? What was true fifty years ago has not ceased to be so now, for it is the right."

The whole Church, the whole Roman Catholic world, was moved at this blow. The Bishops organised a petition against Article VII; some of them raised the cross; the Archbishop of Aix was prosecuted for this appeal by means of a rather obsolete procedure.

Yet M. Ferry had not finished all he meant to do; he had by no means lost sight of Primary Instruction. A Bill brought forward May 19th, 1879, formulated the qualifications necessary for authority to teach. A certificate of ability, elementary or advanced, as also in the case of women, was required.

It was the suppression, through pretermission, of "the letter of obedience." This Bill, based on the proposition of M. Paul Bert, and aiming at the establishment of an École Normale for men and

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women teachers in every department in which none yet existed (out of 37,000 women teachers only 5,700 were certificated); the measures for secularisation taken, in Paris especially, which caused an inquiry from M. Chesnelong; the general tone of the parliamentary debates upon these measures; the movement aroused through the country—all this left no manner of doubt, the campaign was regularly begun. The enterprise of May the Sixteenth, into which the clergy had flung themselves with so much zeal, had this speedy and harsh reaction.

The Count de Mun, who had not been validated by the Chamber, at once started a counter-campaign by a speech on May 3rd at the close of the seventh General Assembly of the Roman Catholic Clubs. On July 10th, at a meeting in the Winter Circus, presided over by the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Bisaccia, he expounded the outlines of the Roman Catholic objection to be opposed to the Republican scheme. This appealed against the abuse of Government authority, claimed the freedom of action for heads of families with regard to their own children, reproached the "Satanic" spirit of the campaign of the Educational League and Freemasonry, and declared that a "priestless school would be a Godless school," a school without high ideals, principles, or patriotism.

M. Lamy, who now broke with the Republican party, being unable to sacrifice his creed, said that "they were arousing French generosity and piety against themselves." The Church did not recognise the great hostility and distrust that the action of its leaders had aroused against herself.

The spring parliamentary session pursued its usual course of work, intrigue and noise.

There was some excitement caused by an

indiscretion of M. Léon Say, who, on February 27th, had acquainted an influential banking house with a Ministerial resolution against the urgency of conversion of the Five per Cents.

The campaign of La Lanterne against the Prefecture of Police created some amusement. Cabinet was so weak that it could be affected by the merest trifle. M. Gigot, Prefect of Police, having resigned, M. Clémenceau reproached M. de Marcère with "weakness and shortsightedness." De Marcère did not even defend himself, and next day left the Ministry. He had done little to replace the Dufaure Cabinet. M. Lepère succeeded him for the Interior, and was himself replaced by M. Tirard for Commerce. The advent of M. Tirard was something of an event; he was henceforth to be a valuable resource for the Presidents of the Republic during Cabinet difficulties. M. Andrieux, who had read the bill on the Amnesty, was appointed Prefect of Police.

At the beginning of March the Amnesty Bill was debated by the Senate; it had been proposed by the Government and accepted by the Chamber. The Bill was passed as it stood in spite of the intervention of Victor Hugo, who demanded the Amnesty complete.

On March 8th, M. Henri Brisson produced the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Elections of October 14th and 28th, 1877—referring, therefore, to May the Sixteenth. The report concluded with the censure of the members of the Broglie and Rochebouët Cabinets.

This, indeed, was something to arouse excitement, The Chamber debated on March 13th. M. Léon Renault combated the project. M. Henri Brisson

desired "energetic measures." The details he supplied as to this political and military enterprise strongly aroused the Chamber.

M. Waddington replied good-humouredly, and said that the verdict against the Cabinet of May the Sixteenth resulted from the publicity given to these facts, assuredly exaggerated, but at the most an impulse of "conjurations." The public would have to judge, or rather it had already done so. The leader of the Council opposed the policy of appeasement and of work to that of continued strife. He pronounced against the impeachment and proposed that confidence should be established.

The Extreme Left was annoyed. M. Floquet and M. Madier de Montjau adjured the ministry. "Take care! 'exclaimed the latter, "This means the division of the Republican party." And, indeed, the decisive separation, which was for many years to determine the character of political struggles under the Republic, was made at this moment.

The conclusions of M. Henri Brisson's report put to the vote were rejected by 317 votes to 159. A resolution moved by M. Rameau, a much honoured veteran, gave the delinquents of May the Sixteenth "to the judgment of the national conscience"; it was passed by 217 votes against 135. The Chamber gave orders that this resolution should be posted up in every commune in France. The ex-members of the Broglie and Rochebouët Cabinets published a counter-protestation. The "Seize Mai" had become historical.

The Chambers in Paris the Chamber, which also excited much discussion, as to whether the Parliament should return to Paris. The "fear of Paris" was

still in the hearts of the timid people who see but the secondary causes in events, and who think that the advance of the tide can be stopped by straws. "Without Paris," they said, "France would have enough of revolutions." Such people do not realise that Paris, despite the provocative or piquant audacity of its polemics, is relatively conservative, in that, on the whole, its revolutions already are accomplished; whereas the provinces, especially as they still bear the weight of feudal times, are aspiring for change. The provincial nerves are still rasped by all that they have so lately undergone. It is not here that the Republic can find rest; such a hope would mean sure disillusion.

M. Méline was reporter of the Commission charged with examining the motions brought forward by M. Spüller, March 29th, 1878, and by M. Laroche-Joubert, February 27th, 1879. He proposed that the Congress should be called to consider the suppression of Article IX in the law of February 25th, 1875, appointing Versailles as the seat of parliament. The Chamber, supported by the Government, passed the resolution of the Commission by 315 votes to 128.

There remained the Senate, which was not "Parisian." The project was communicated to the High Assembly on March 24th, when the same proposal was made by M. Peyrat. The inquiry was submitted to M. Laboulaye, who was hostile to the plan. He was trembling for his fragile work, being one of those who deemed that things were being done too quickly. The project was in danger. M. Léon Say, in the name of the Government, asked for adjournment, which was arranged for a month from Saturday, April 5th.

During this short vacation elections took elections. place in some score of districts; they were held in order to replace those of the deputies who had become senators, and were, in general, favourable to the Republicans, bringing into parliament some distinguished men who formed the vanguard of the new generation, Among these were M. Raynal, elected at Bordeaux with 12,893 votes and no opposition; M. Audiffret, at Roanne, with 8,465 votes; M. Deluns-Montaud, at Marmande, with 14,576 votes; M. Waldeck-Rousseau, at Rennes, to replace M. Roger-Marvaise, by 8,703 votes, with no opposi-These men, young for the most part, were followers of Gambetta, and belonged to the bourgeoisie and the law. They were ardent, cultured and ambitious. The "new strata" had not yet appeared—these were, at most, its first flowers.

The Extreme Left, the "advanced," the "old Republicans," the "vieilles barbes," were surprised by the arrival of these conscripts of opportunism. Between the Centre, that never loses its prey, and these already ambitious recruits, they found no standing-room, and broke with their recent comrades in arms. The question of the Amnesty restored them to their old relations with the men of the Commune—they encouraged the growing Socialism.

Blanqui at Clairvaux. He was opposed by M. André Lavertujon, a personal and tried friend of Gambetta, and editor of La Gironde, which had been,

in the South-West, the centre of resistance against May the Sixteenth.

Lavertujon—Blanqui: as rivals the two names were most significant. "The Republic of September the Fourth was formed to the advantage again of the bourgeoisie," said one of Blanqui's supporters, "it is time for the people to arrive upon the scenes." Another said: "You are of Versailles—and we are of the Commune," The "Conservatives," faithful to their tactics of supporting the worst, gave their votes to Blanqui—and the prisoner, "l'enfermé," was elected on April 21st.

"Down with Opportunism!" was the triumphal cry of the excited Opposition. Papers such as the *Révolution Française* and the *Prolétaire* addressed the electors of Bordeaux with the words: "You have had the courage to support the cause that we defended in 1871. The election of Blanqui is its revindication."

Such expressions and such events were not calculated to reassure M. Laboulave.

In Paris the Municipal Council was secularising the schools. In the country the processions of the Fête-Dieu were being interdicted. M. Jules Grévy broke his silence for the first time in order to reassure the representatives of the Clergy; investing two bishops, Mgr. Pie and Mgr. Desprey, newly appointed as Cardinals, with their insignia, he affirmed "that the rights of the Church were in no danger, being

M. Gambetta, as president of the Chamber, took possession of the Palais-Bourbon in Paris. This in itself was something of an event. The luxurious tastes of the new leader became the subject of comment; his furniture, his luncheons, Trompette his

under the protection of the Law" (May 26).

cook, and the famous "silver bath," were greatly talked about. With his usual optimism Gambetta wrote just after his election—January 31st, 1879—to his clear-sighted and dissatisfied friend:—

It seems to me that at a distance you judge things too severely; your tenderness blurs your sight; I want you to understand the reason for rejoicing and for proving that I have chosen the good part. . . . It is all so clear. The terrible campaign of eight long years is over, we have gained the position. I shall now be able to attempt the second programme, outward action, and holding myself aloof from party faction, choose my own time and means. I write all this designedly abridged in the sincerity of my heart and judgment.

Nothing could better reveal the mind of the patriot. "To stand aloof from party faction," "to pass to outward action" is the dream of every statesman worthy of the name, but a dream too seldom realised. Even with such a past and such an influence as had Gambetta, he was not allowed to tempt Fate to such a point—it was the storming of the gates of heaven. How many times would he vainly appeal for "the union of all Frenchmen in the common love of country!" The suspicion of the Radicals was watching every impulse of his heart, every evidence of his impartiality.

In his elevated but silent semi-retirement, Gambetta started his campaign of personal conquest and reduction of factions and of individuals for the good of the Republic. It was the first attempt at a rally. Whatever their origin, useful men, distinguished men, ambitious men, began to cross the threshold of his hospitable dwelling. Frenchmen and foreigners, diplomatists and soldiers, journalists and artists, found a welcoming hand and an attentive ear. Gambetta received and expended; he returned

in fiery enthusiasm all that was offered him by devotion and practical ability. He was a born helper, but his most valuable help consisted in the generous sacrifice he offered of himself. His brilliant conversational powers, the vivid imagery and power of expression, the gift he possessed of reading another's mind and flashing back his thought with added light, all contributed to the personal fascination which was the dominant characteristic of Gambetta, whose brilliancy of intellect was ignited by the warmth of his heart.

Already an object of censure, his influence still was powerful; his strength was undermined, yet he still stood unflinching. He availed himself of every encouragement to enter more fully into his ambi tions; his parliamentary labours were deep-searching and direct. Of all the business that he touched upon that which concerned the army was what appealed to him most strongly. His vigilance and activity were herein incomparable; nothing escaped him. The memories of Tours and of Bordeaux were deeply graven on his mind; his military experiences had given him knowledge of men-the recognition of merit, character and face. During the war a note had been handed him by a Zouave wearing coloured spectacles; ten years later at a political meeting he met this man again and said: "I have seen vour face before somewhere. You are the Zouave with the green glasses."

Above all he sought out good soldiers, young, vigorous and enterprising officers. For General Gallifet his friendship is well known. Both of these strong warm natures craved for action. The phrase went round that "Gambetta desired war," but the charge in itself was quite unfounded. What he felt

was that without an army the nation could not be strong and independent. "It takes twenty years of strong and careful ruling to reorganise an army," he continually repeated, "patience and method are therefore absolutely necessary."

Gambetta had not quite broken off his indirect relations with Prince Bismarck. Although he had lunched with the Prince of Wales, he always left his communications open towards the great European statesman. Friends travelling or residing in Germany, diplomatists—even commercial men—were more than once his intermediaries. No doubt he had not quite abandoned the idea of a "conversation."

His political conceptions may be briefly summarised in the reorganisation and raising of France through the Republic. One of the happiest days of his so busy life was certainly July 14th, 1879, when the first "Republican" review of the reconstituted army was held. Of this he wrote:—

My most ambitious and most sacred hopes were stirred by this, also the great designs I cannot forget when in the presence of our young regiments. I returned home full of encouragement . . . to find my great people of Paris offering me enthusiastic acclamation, which I accept only as a means of attaining my patriotic objects, never as a merely personal flattery. I came back better, stronger, richer and more confident.

II

The new Staff became now, more than ever, a matter of the first importance. An entirely new administrative France was substituted for the old. Long years

were needed to heal the wounds inflicted by the Republic at this painful time. Among those thrown out of office were many men well stricken in years, who supported the old régime and who had had their day, but the old dread retirement and inactivity as the precursor of Death.

It was the Council of State that attracted most attention first. M. Andral had to give up the vice-presidency of this on February 10th, and was replaced by M. Faustin-Hélie. Among several new councillors were MM. Laferrière, Blondeau, Flourens, Courcelle-Seneuil, Victor Chauffour, Clamageran, Captain Gougeard, Berger (Prefect for the Rhône), Decrais (for the Gironde).

General Berthaut, ex-Minister for War, was relieved of the command of the XVIII Army Corps at Bordeaux, and succeeded by General Dumont; General Saussier was appointed to the XX Corps at Algiers; M. Le Myre de Villers to the governorship of Cochin China—to the great agitation of M. Germain Casse, who suspected him of Bonapartist tendencies.

In the Higher Council of the Légion d'Honneur were Generals Frébault and de Chazal, MM. Mignet, Wurtz, Faustin-Hélie and Havet of the Institute. As for movements in the administration, the prefectorial councils, the inferior departments of Finance and Public Works, wherever a career could be made, an ambition satisfied, there was a general inrush. These necessary alterations, most delicate and sometimes most difficult of undertakings, received the ugly name of épuration.

The Chambers reassembled quietly. The session from May 15th to August 2nd was one of hard work. Had it not been for the increasing religious difficulties which offered France the necessary food

for her love of emotion and excitement, the new Republic, under the half-closed eyes of M. Grévy and M. Waddington, would have slept under a paternal guidance.

However, Roman Catholics and Freethinkers occupied the front of the stage with much intensity of action. M. Chesnelong, on May 15th, questioned the Senate as to the State help to be obtained by sectarian teachers deprived of office. This led to a lively debate in which Jules Ferry and Le Royer tested the anti-clerical majority within the Senate.

Blanqui On June 3rd the validation of Blanqui's invalidated election was brought forward. Legally, he was ineligible. M. Clémenceau demanded that special measures should be taken by means of the Amnesty Bill. By 354 votes to 33, Blanqui was invalidated. On June 7th he was pardoned and released. He founded the paper called Ni Dieu ni Maître, and died shortly afterwards in 1881.

M. Clémenceau, by his talent, activity Clémenceau and boldness, was coming rapidly forward as the leader of the extreme party, and particularly distinguishing himself as a tactician. In a public meeting of May 12th, he drew up a much bolder programme than that of Ch. Floquet, viz., the revision of the Constitution, the suppression of the Senate, complete liberty of meeting and association, the extension of the military service to all classes, to the Seminarists in particular, the expulsion of non-recognised communities, and the direct incometax.

The consideration by the Chamber of M. Naquet's bill for re-establishing divorce (May 27th) was another sign of the times.

The platform violence of M. Paul de Cassagnac

was aimed against Gambetta, who was urged to break his silence, but remained quietly surveying the movement.

The return There was a lively discussion in the of the Senate as to the return to Paris of the Paris voted Chambers. The Government declared itself satisfied that there would be no danger in the removal. M. Léon Say, very popular in the Senate, spoke first upon the subject, and was followed by M. de Freycinet, who, with all the charm of his insinuating eloquence, pronounced his first really political speech and obtained the rarest of successes, that of convincing his hearers. After a brilliant passage of arms between MM. Laboulaye, Wallon, the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, on the one side, and Jules Simon on the other, the Senate passed the resolution by 149 votes to 130. A revision of the Constitution was in question.

Congress was convoked for June 19th. By 526 votes against 249, the National Assembly decided that the clause appointing the sitting of the Chambers to be held in Versailles should be erased from the Constitution.

It then remained to obtain the legislative measures for installing the Chambers and the executive powers in Paris. M. Buffet desperately opposed the measure, but Fate was against him; the law was passed and promulgated for July 22nd.

Death of the Prince Paris that the Prince Imperial was dead.

A special telegram received in London at midnight, June 20th, announced that he had been killed by Zulus on the first of June. The news arrived in Paris by twenty minutes past one. Special editions of the papers appearing next day circu-

lated the tidings by the afternoon. Gambetta is stated to have been the first informed.¹

On the 25th of the preceding February, the Prince Imperial had addressed to M. Rouher a letter intended for publication, and in which he announced his departure for South Africa. This decision had been made some time previously, just as Cardinal de Bonnechose had failed in his scheme with regard to Marshal MacMahon.

The young man of twenty-two, who had been the hope of a dynasty, of a cause and of a country, had started "without a single Frenchman to fight with him," entrusted to the English general as "a distinguished foreigner." ²

He started from Campden Place for Southampton on February 27th, and took passage on the *Danube*, which performed the voyage between February 27th and April 9th by way of St. Helena. Landing on April 9th, the Prince was attacked by fever, but very soon recovered.

Attached to the staff of Lord Chelmsford, and then under the orders of General Marshall, on June 1st he joined a reconnoitring expedition led by Lieutenant Carey of the 98th, and composed of six horsemen with a "friendly" Zulu. The party having pushed on ahead of the army to a distance

¹ Fidus affirms that Cardinal de Bonnechose had a telegram in Rouen on the twentieth, at half-past one o'clock; probably this was at night.

² See the Duke of Cambridge's letters to Lord Chelmsford in Hérisson's *Le Prince Impérial* (p. 246). "The Prince has expressed a desire to enlist in our army, but the Government considers it impossible to satisfy his request. However, I am authorised to write to you and to Sir Bartle Frere to ask you to do what you can for him and to assist him to follow the expedition as far as is possible."

of about ten miles halted to rest their horses. They were in a district covered by tall grasses, on the ruins of a kraal near Blood River. The Prince's charger bore the name of *Fate*. And, in truth, Fate had prepared her blow.

Stealthily through the tall grasses a party of Zulus crept close towards the little group and fired. The horses of the reconnoitrers were saddled in hot haste. The "friendly" Zulu disappeared. The six horsemen, led by Carey, took to flight, each man shifting for himself as best he could.

As soon as Carey was out of gunshot he stopped and looked behind him. The Prince had not been able to mount, his saddle being twisted; he had, therefore, stood alone on foot surrounded by the Zulus, who attacked him with their assegais. For some time he managed to defend himself, then at last he fell, with eighteen wounds in front, on his face and his left arm, with which he had tried to shield himself. Lieutenant Carey stated later, as the only explanation of his conduct: "In Zululand every man unhorsed is a dead man. In a war with savages each must look to himself." The descendant of the man who had commanded the finest battles of history met his death in an obscure skirmish.

The body was found next day, completely despoiled except for a scapulary. After being embalmed, the Prince's mortal remains were brought back to England by the *Danube*. The obsequies were performed in the little chapel of St. Mary at Chislehurst on July 12th. Queen Victoria and the Prince of Wales were present at the ceremony, as also several well-known Bonapartists who had come over from Paris. Prince Napoleon, on leaving

the chapel, returned at once to the station without

visiting the Empress.

The Empress Eugénie, once more overwhelmed by Destiny, had learned the terrible news from Lord Sydney, despatched by the Queen, and from the Duc de Bassano, on June 21st. On the day of the last ceremony she said to her companions in exile: "Mesdames, do not endeavour to prepare me. I shall be strong."

She reached the vestibule just as the English officers were carrying the coffin into the chapel. Rushing up to the bier on which her son was sleeping, she flung her arms around the coffin, covering it with kisses and exclaiming amid her sobs: "This, then, is all that remains to me of my son!"

This woman who had been so powerful and so lovely,—so lovely and imposing still,—wanders through the world carrying her cross beneath her crape,—sole survivor of all that she had loved.

The Prince Imperial much resembled his mother in appearance. He was fair and slender, but his manner was constrained and his features inexpressive,—a handsome young man on the whole, and a bold horseman. He had been greatly attached to his father, Napoleon III. Brought up as a strict Roman Catholic, his nature had developed rather slowly amid the peculiar circumstances of his position: Prince, yet private individual; Frenchman in an English habit.

He had done well at Woolwich, and had then remained with his mother, much supervised and rather tied. The political ideas instilled into him by the Empress and M. Rouher had been eminently Conservative, dynastic and hierarchical, non-revolutionary, non-democratic. His death caused a

schism in the party he had represented. According to the constitutions of the Empire, the direct heir of the Prince Imperial was Prince Jerome; but there had long been a division between the two cousins.

Prince Jerome, fifty-seven years of age, Jerome tall, broad and dark, with his aquiline nose, round face, and dark eyes gleaming under shaggy brows, was a Bonaparte of Corsica; while the young Prince, fair-skinned and blue-eyed, was of the North, probably through his maternal grandparents, the Kirkpatricks. Two races, two natures. Prince Jerome, not forgetful of the revolutionary origin of his family, had inherited the ideas of the Republic.

His claim was opposed by a codicil in the Prince Imperial's will, dated February 26th, 1879, which, by intentional omission, tended to change the order of succession:—

I have no need to remind my mother to neglect nothing that can preserve the memory of my grand-uncle and of my father. I beg her to remember that as long as a Bonaparte exists the Imperial cause will be represented. The duties of our house towards the country will not lapse with my life; when I am dead, the task of continuing the work of Napoleon I and of Napoleon III will fall upon the eldest son of Prince Napoleon, and I hope that my well-loved mother, in supporting him with all her power, will afford this last and supreme proof of affection to us who are no more.

It is affirmed that M. Rouher drew up the form of this document with his own hand. Whether this was the case or not, it was certainly inspired by him.

On July 1st a meeting was held of senators and deputies from the groups of the Appeal to the People. M. Rouher read out the will of the dead Prince.

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It was decided to send a delegation to Prince Jerome in order to acquaint him with its terms. M. Rouher declared that he could not join the delegation, "the affair being beyond his strength."

Prince Jerome received the delegation and heard the reading of the will with his feelings well under control, merely remarking that "he would accept no discussion as to his rights." The rupture was accomplished. M. Paul de Cassagnac declared in Le Pays: "Sooner no Empire at all than a certain empire—the empire of Prince Jerome." It was the religious question that was the chief trouble. "The Prince calls himself a Republican," writes Paul de Cassagnac again, "he has allowed it to be believed that he is an enemy of religion. Let him reassure us, let him renounce the Republic, let him promise us freedom of instruction, respect for forms of worship, and he will, as a matter of course, resume his position."

The death of the young Prince aroused general regret throughout the country, which was, however, soon dissipated by noisy polemics. The Prince Imperial had been "a child of France." He had died under the English flag, the hero of a romance rudely broken off by the hand of Fate. As to Bonapartism, rampant as it had been some few months previously, it grew suddenly diminished. Some few officials, grown old in harness, some chamberlains, some retired generals, some subsidised journalists, some adventurers, as well as some sincere loyalists, constituted an "old guard," divided against itself in foolish quarrels; and such was, in the main, all that was left of the party.

Hardly were the funeral tapers extinguished than the name of this other Duc de Reichstadt

became but a touching memory connected with a vanished cause.

Quarrels were hot in Paris. On July 1st M. E. Bouchet questioned the Government on the seizing of La Lanterne. There ensued a trying debate between the Prefect of Police, M. Andrieux, M. Lepère, Minister for the Interior, and M. Christophle, Director of the Credit Foncier. There was a slight lull in political and even financial activity.

The battle, however, still raged fiercely round the school laws, the religious question was at its crisis. Pope Leo XIII had, through his Nuncio, Cardinal Czacki (reproached by some with being too favourably disposed towards the Government), given the prelates a counsel of prudence and moderation.

"If the Nuncio speaks thus," said Cardinal Guibert, "it is from his point of view; he is a diplomatist, whereas we are bishops; our duty is to defend the people, and, since speaking is necessary in this defence, we shall speak."

And indeed, from nearly every ecclesiastical district came letters from the bishops protesting against the Ferry innovations. Mgr. Lavigérie arrived from Algeria, determined to seize the bull by the horns.

"He saw M. Jules Ferry," relates his biographer, "it was the first time he had met the executive Minister.... The archbishop addressed himself to his incontestible business ability, interested him in his schools, and gave him an impression of high principles and genius which attracted the man the while it did not convert the statesman. M. Ferry gave the prelate some valuable help in his numerous enterprises. As to the Church question

Mgr. Lavigérie said to his friends: 'They mean to go as far as they can; our eyes already turn to the distant stations of the society as towards a sanctuary from the oppressors.'"

The Bill on Higher Education was brought forward by M. Spüller on May 29th, and the debate opened on June 16th. M. de Cassagnac caused a violent altercation which nearly brought about the scission of the Republican deputies, who complained of being insufficiently supported by Gambetta. During several weeks speech followed speech, only varied by the talent and the character of the speakers.

M. Paul Bert, chairman of the commission, expounded the system; M. Gaslonde spoke in the name of the Right:—

If you desire patriotic unity, you are right; but if you want moral unity, you want to bring men's souls under the yoke. The formula has been given of *Liberty in Unity*, by M. Jules Ferry, but there can be no liberty in unity. It has been in the name of unity that the most dreadful tyrannies have been done in this world. . . . A Republican Government, that represents the will of the nation and not its own will, must stop as soon as it sees the country divided and agitated on this point.

M. Emile Deschaud responded. He sketched the argument that M. Waldeck-Rousseau was later to defend, the antagonism of men and women's education:—

Can there be a deeper cause of our divisions than the contradictory education given to our men in the lycées and to our women in the convents? This must necessarily mean some intellectual divorce in the family.

M. de Mackau said: "The law will cost 150 millions in buildings and 10 millions yearly in up-keep and fresh expenses. It is Catholicism that

is aimed at, to-day the Jesuits and to-morrow the Catholics!"

The Left protested. M. Spüller recognised that the act was the most important produced since the foundation of the Republic. There was, however, no attack upon Catholicism, and his party defended itself against this charge. He refuted the Liberal thesis, usurped by the enemies of all liberty:—

The liberty of instruction that you claim is but a mask in order to assault the rights of modern life.

The State alone is strong enough to resist clerical pretensions and the enterprise of Rome. . . . The representatives of democracy cannot do less than monastic governments have done. . . . You and the Count de Mun have put the word Counter-Revolution on your banner; we, on our side, mean to defend the Revolution.

M. Etienne Lamy, on June 26th, said: -

The religious communities are to be dispersed just as the culprits of the Commune are restored to activity. . . . Take heed; under pretext of civil education you will make a generation that believes in nothing, not even in you yourselves.

Then came the speech of Jules Ferry. His argument was well sustained, full of facts and statistics, and, after a rather lengthy dissertation, he laid stress on the nature of the education given by the Jesuits, an education clearly anti-modern, anti-revolutionary:—

We attack the Jesuits because the Jesuits and their adherents are the soul of the organisation which we have been combating for the past seven years,—which has been dominant in the National Assembly, which, through the Catholic Committees, spreads through the whole of France, which has a political representation, which is a party, I should rather say a faction!

• . . As to the charge of making war upon Catholicism, I am indeed surprised, painfully surprised, to hear such a charge from the lips of M. Lamy who knows what we are. . . . To attack

Catholicism will be to declare war on the faith of the majority of our compatriots, it would be a great and criminal folly. . . . We have no need of a Kulturkampf; we have but to stand by our agreement."

The speaker added that the State schools were ready to receive the pupils from the schools that had been closed. Conscience difficulties were mentioned:—

There will be no troubles of conscience; rather perhaps will many consciences be relieved and sustained. The Jesuit dominion only weighs on the freethinkers.

The question had been publicly propounded. In addressing the majority whose support he claimed, he exhorted them strongly:—

Have you been sent here by the Republican people of France that you may idly fold your arms? Have you not been commissioned not only to strengthen the Republic and to bring it to the seat of government, but to establish it upon a sure foundation? Political questions are propounded by circumstances, by Governments. But there are questions that, once propounded, call for immediate solution. If you do not pass Article Seven, gentlemen, what will you have done? You will have accorded for all time to this country free instruction by the Jesuits. Is there one among you who desires to take responsibility for this?

Jules Ferry did not hesitate to shut himself within a circle without egress, but he also drew the majority in with him. The battle was begun, it was necessary to win it. The struggle centred round the fate of this citadel, the Company of Jesus.

A counter-movement—Lenglé, Robert Mitchell (the friends of Prince Jerome, the Neo-Bonapartists, the Republican Bonapartists), was thrown out; also that of Bardoux, the predecessor of Jules Ferry on the Board of Education, who wished to allow

religious communities the privilege of teaching and to replace Article Seven by a system of inspection.

On July 3rd the first Article was passed after the refusal of an amendment from M. Keller and Baron Reille maintaining the mixed jury for the conferring of degrees. Eventually the first six articles were voted. Round Article Seven, however, the fight raged fiercely. During the debate on July 4th, M. Keller declared that "the chief means of avoiding social reform lay in the attack on clericalism." M. Paul Bert spoke again most strongly against the Jesuits, not hesitating to touch on the ethical question.

The Extreme Left opposed the Article as inadequate. M. Madier de Montjau proposed that no member of a religious community or of the secular clergy should be allowed to teach. A fierce debate ensued over a series of amendments. At length, by 333 votes to 164, the Article was passed, also the whole of the Bill by 347 votes against 143, on July 9th.

The Senate was, meanwhile, discussing the bill voted by the Chamber on March 20th, as to the establishment of primary normal schools in the departments. M. Chesnelong and M. Jules Ferry opposed each other strenuously. M. Chesnelong with deep conviction made a very fine speech, while the Right hailed him as their O'Connell. However, after much violent altercation, the bill was passed by 158 votes to 109 and promulgated August 9th.

July 14th, 1879, was a great day for 1879 the young Republic. She already felt herself mistress of her fate. The Constitution was working easily, the public powers were in harmony, universal suffrage proved a powerful factor

in the new social organisation. The nation was proud of its unexpected triumph after such long struggles, and rejoiced in its renewed peace and prosperity. Class hatred was not so strong as in 1848.

It is not natural to the French spirit to seek out trouble in advance. The joy of life shone on every face, and this Fourteenth of July proved a day of spontaneous national triumph, with no shadow to dim its lustre. On the preceding day a review was held at Longchamps; Gambetta was enthusiastically greeted; Paris was decorated and illuminated, there was dancing in the streets. Army, people, public powers, were alike animated by patriotic spirit. Such hours are all too rare in the history of nations, and they cannot be forgotten. Twenty years were needed to accomplish the orbit then entered on, and to close with other fêtes and popular enthusiasm the peaceful cycle that the parliamentary Republic was to traverse.

Between July 10th and August 1st the Budget of Budget was discussed. M. Henri Brisson acted as chairman of the Commission, M. Wilson as "Reporter," and the debate was led by Gambetta. There was nothing essentially new in the Budget. M. Léon Say's exposition was as devoid of any superfluous details as is a bank-note. Never was a prosperous financial situation more briefly introduced. The redemption was assured: financial policy favoured the plus-values. The Chamber endeavoured to encourage the commercial spirit of the nation, since a slight lull in its activity had become apparent.

The Plan At the beginning of the session, the Freycinet Chamber had devoted several sittings to

the organisation of the *Etat-Major*. The programme of de Freycinet also attracted much attention. M. Bocher, in the Senate, severely criticised this project, which was assuming very large proportions. An outlay of from five to six milliards had at first been spoken of, and it had now risen to eight milliards. New railway lines were constantly called for and supplied. The Higher Board for Highways and Bridges had estimated at 4,500 the number of kilometres to be constructed, and the Chamber now saw this raised to 8,848, not including 4,151 kilometres still to be constructed, which made a total of 13,000 kilometres in all.

Carried away by the enterprise, a fourth system was inaugurated, which became known ironically as the "electoral railways." It was the same with the canals and ports; the programme extended indefinitely, and undertook much that was only theoretically necessary, with, however, the full authorisation of the Government.

M. Bocher, speaking for the Opposition, criticised the programme fairly and urgently:—

What I reproach in the scheme is that it raises illusions and establishes a classification which in itself is not a true one. I feel that the project will prove illusory and unsatisfactory, and greatly fear that it will cause serious embarrassment in the future.

M. de Freycinet replied with his usual persuasiveness and carried all before him:—

What is the difference between the projects of the Government and the lines considered necessary by the parliamentary commissions? According to the latter, 5,000 kilometres of new lines are required, we propose 7,000 kilometres—a difference, therefore, of only 2,000. [A much larger estimate was eventually made.] Under the Empire a yearly sum of 430 millions

was devoted to the railways, all that we ask for is 300, or 350 millions, annually; we are, therefore, far below the expenditure undertaken by the Empire.

Nothing could stop de Freycinet, as Minister for Public Works he was always foremost in the fray. The activity of France was by no means limited to home affairs; she took her share in the great enterprises that were to change the face of the world. On May 29th, the International Congress, assembled in Paris for the purpose of considering the projected canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, concluded its sittings and decided, under M. Brousse, on a level canal between the Bay of Limon (Colon) and Panama, such as MM. Wyse and Reclus had proposed. The plan was passed by 74 votes out of 98. There were 8 oppositions and 16 abstentions. On August 6th and 7th, 800,000 shares of 500 francs each were disposed of.

On July 13th a Commission was arranged, under the presidency of the Minister for Public Works, in order to consider railway communication between Algeria and Senegal and the interior of the Soudan. It was hoped to reach the Niger, and so assert the supremacy of France over Western Africa. Another line between Biskra and Ouargla, and beyond Ouargla, was also to be considered, and exploring parties were promptly sent out for the purpose of opening up the country.

Seven or eight milliards for the railways, canals and harbours for the mother-country, the Panama canal, the trans-Sahara project—all this opened

¹ This, however, was during the construction of the main lines.

out vast fields for the employment of French enterprise.

III

After the Berlin had been signed, Europe had been living in perplexity.

Prince Bismarck, well aware of the possible consequences of his attitude in the Congress, was endeavouring to prepare for developments in the alliances that he foresaw.

As the Eastern war had modified international relations, a new Europe was secretly developing. First the "Triple Alliance," then the "Franco-Russian Alliance," such were the stages of the new order. It implied, on the whole, peace and mutual respect assured by the equilibrium of the reorganised forces. The written principles were not sufficient, these had now to be incorporated. The Powers, rather astonished at what they had accomplished, endeavoured to maintain peace amid all the difficulties aroused by their decisions.

During February, 1879, a convention was held by Russia and Turkey in order to settle certain points not adequately met by the Treaty of Berlin. The war indemnity was fixed at 802 millions and a half in francs, and this debt might ultimately become a formidable weapon in the hands of Russia.

An independent Bulgaria had been created; slowly, under the ægis of the Russian generals, it was being organised. This meant a new European state, numbering more than

two million inhabitants. The Bulgarians, as yet hardly awakened from the slumber of their servitude, found difficulty in assuming the position of a nation. As to those of their brothers who remained still attached to Turkey, whether in the "privileged province," Eastern Roumelia, of 700,000 to 800,000 inhabitants, or, as in Macedonia, under the direct rule of the Sultan, they had, since the preliminaries of San Stefano, breathed the air of independence, and could not resign themselves to the yoke laid upon them by the Congress.

Russian influence in Bulgaria, supported by the military occupation, was anxiously watching the first actions of the new people. Prince of Prince Dondoukoff elaborated a constitution Alexander modelled on that of Servia. A Sobrania, composed of the notables of the country, modified this in a democratic sense: Prince Alexander of Battenberg, of German nationality, son of the reigning prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, was elected on April 20th, 1879. The choice seemed to conciliate all interests. A certain shade of Germanic policy was introduced into the East. On the nomination of Prince Carol to Roumania, Bismarck had remarked to Prince Alexander: "Go without hesitation—it will at least give you something to remember." The Czar thought himself sure of his nephew; he could not depend even on his agents, who were leading the Bulgarians à la Russe. The Bulgarians, however, had no notion of being Russianised; the "liberated" already felt the hand of the Czar Deliverer overheavy.

The date of evacuation was arranged for nine months after the signing of the Treaty of Berlin. The Sultan having—with Eastern Roumelia—pre-

served the right of establishing garrisons in the Balkans, Turkish troops were to reoccupy the country. The Bulgarians, however, and the Russian agents were strongly inclined to treat this prescriptive arrangement as a dead letter, and when the Russian troops began to retire, in May, 1879, the Bulgarians opposed the occupation by Ottoman garrisons. Russia took up the cause of the Christians and demanded, rather imperiously, the revision of the clause in question. Public feeling was strongly aroused in Germany, Austria-Hungary and England: matters seemed compromised: Russia showed herself irritated and exacting; there was ground for believing that Gortschakoff wanted his revenge. Germany was forced to state her attitude. Bismarck writes in his Memoirs :-

The logic of History is far more exacting than that of our Court of Accounts. For the execution of the decisions of the Congress Russia had hoped that the German Commissioners would favour, in general, the interests of Russia when, during the negotiations attendant on the Eastern problem, divergences arose between the ideas of Russia and those of the other Powers. The Empress Marie said to one of our representatives: "Your friendship is too platonic."

Now that the Treaty was to be practically applied, Germany found herself obliged either to support or to combat the Russian action. Facts are not quite so easy to deal with as on the parchment of the Protocol.

Before replying, the Prince looked round on Europe. Towards the South an alarming agitation was being made by Montenegro. This was the smallest and least satisfied of all the Balkan states, but also the dearest to the heart of Russia. The Porte having accorded her the towns

of Pouz and Podgoritza without difficulties, delayed over the concession of the districts in the villayet of Scutari of Albania. Turkey was by no means absolute mistress among these mountaineers, who had no desire to remain in her hands, but who also declined to submit to their hereditary foes the Montenegrians. The Turkish General, the illustrious Mouktar Pacha, is said to have been secretly fomenting the resistance of the Albanian League. The matter was soon to become of European importance; what had been originally an insignificant thing developed into a very serious affair. The diplomatists endeavoured to pacify the two opponents, but hostilities became imminent more than once. The Powers found a solution in Dulcigno, but this required time and protocols.

Austria-Hungary installed herself in Dissatisfac-Bosnia and Herzegovina; a military occupation suppressed in advance all inclination to resist. This policy of dissimulated conquest did not satisfy everyone, not even in the empire itself. Hungary was alarmed by such a tremendous annexation of the Slav element. Count Andrassy paid for the service he had rendered to the Germanic cause among the Balkans with his popularity and his position. The obscurity of the little-known documents authorising this action gave rise to many interpretations. Certain publicists began to foresee the time when a railway through Novi-Bazar should connect Vienna with Salonica and make of Salonica "the largest seaport of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy." 1

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¹ See Ratzenhoffer's Sur l'Occupation de la Bosnie et Herzegovina—Choubher; also Baron von Stieglitz's L'Italie et le Triple Alliance (p. 144).

The Jews in France had taken two matters in hand:
Roumania the abolition of the laws against the Jews in Roumania and the rectification of the Ottoman frontier with a view to a cession of territory to Greece.

Another "exchange of views and drawing up of protocols" was hereby necessitated. Roumania, sacrificed to the Congress of Berlin, complained of high-handed dealing on the part of Europe in thrusting upon her a population unassimilated and unassimilable. On the other hand, the Western Powers did not wish to assist in prolonging the reign of the "outlaws," or—to speak more exactly—of the Ghetto. Germany and Great Britain both supported France, and made the introduction of the measure into the Roumanian constitution a condition of their recognising Roumania's independence and status as a kingdom. It was impossible to do anything but yield.

The Greek The rectification of frontier between frontier Greece and Turkey was a larger and more complex matter. Turkey did not feel herself obliged by the text of the Treaty to make serious concessions to Greece; she was supported by Great Britain, who under the Beaconsfield administration and despite the convention of June 4th, continued to defend "the integrity of the Turkish empire."

Russia, on the contrary, as well as France, supported Greece, who claimed the annexation of Epirus, Thessaly, and a large part of Macedonia, with Crete into the bargain. A Turko-Greek commission, appointed according to the rules of the Treaty of Berlin, came to nothing. Several solutions were tried without success. Greece began to arm, to buy guns, to seek instructors. The different Governments were exhausting every possible means of reconcilia-

tion when a complete transformation of English politics, through the rise of the Radicals, modified the whole aspect of affairs. France was finally induced to modify her propositions, and the cause of Hellenism gained but very incomplete satisfaction.

These matters gave Europe much unnation of the East threatens from behind some unforeseen complication. The Great Powers, despite the sincerest professions of disinterest, are drawn into the quarrels of the different districts by their engagements, their traditions, their affinities; there is always a struggle for the balance of power. Their intervention, contradictory as it often is, follows the continuous development of interests and events; an autumn sky is not more changeable—there is but too great reason to apprehend a storm. The East will always fascinate the mind of Christian Europe, drawn irresistibly towards the cradle of her infancy.

The Romanticism of the nineteenth century induced the capricious imagination of her orators and writers to brood over the enigma of the brilliant East. The problem has much to interest literature, while the vague and troubled aspirations of the period offered to practical statesmen a vast field for their activity.

Egypt, in particular, is the land of greatest fascination. Her modern history begins with the expedition of Napoleon Bonaparte. The story of Ismail might well come from the pages of the *Arabian Nights*, though as the age of inexhaustible treasures is no more, the legend ends in pitiable fashion. European financiers had to put their inkstained fingers on the stelas of the Pharaohs. Ismail came to the end of his resources. Showing a marked

preference for England, from whom he hoped some sort of occult help, he solicited the appointment of a commission of inquiry. The matter was conducted by English agents in relation with titled men, influential on the London Exchange. "I soon saw," said Baron des Michels, then French Agent at Cairo, "that the principle of the inquiry being accepted in London, it would be so in Paris even if it meant the ruin of what we had accomplished."

The commission was arranged. M. Ferdinand de Lesseps stood at its head—the founder of the canal offering the Khedive "the guarantee of his financial incompetence," as Baron des Michels remarks. Sir Rivers Wilson acted as vice-president; Riaz Pacha represented the Khedive, M. de Blignières was Commissary of the Debt for France; Captain E. Baring stood for England, a man whose strong personality was to find in this matter a stepping-stone to political success.

Austria and Russia were represented by M. de Kremer and M. Baravelli. A Frenchman, M. Liron d'Ayrolles, financial inspector, was secretary. M. de Lesseps being often absent, Sir Rivers Wilson undertook the direction of the Commission, which became a form of government.

The rumour soon spread that Egypt could only be wisely administered by a foreign statesman. Sir Rivers Wilson was the man marked out for the work. The British Government associated itself very skilfully with the native interests, while leaving to the French-agents the harder task of defending the financial interests.

On October 14th Nubar Pacha was asked to constitute a so-called responsible ministry. Sir Rivers Wilson was Minister for Finance, and M. de Blignières vol. IV. 481 1 I

that for Public Works. The "Dual Control" was suppressed. The Government of Egypt was in the hands of the two Powers, or rather in those of the bondholders, an arrangement which made it hard to distinguish between political and financial interests.

The first action of the new Ministry was to negotiate a loan of 212 millions of francs with the house of Rothschild, which received as sureties the properties of the Khedive and his family, that is to say, 250,000 hectares of land, with the houses and installations of the *fellahs*. M. de Freycinet says: "The administration of this property was controlled by the French and English Governments. The financial conquest did not subordinate to itself the political action to this extent," and he adds, in his subtle manner: "The partnership was carried on under the eyes of a powerful banking-house which was henceforth to be a factor in our Egyptian policy."

The Khedive saw the mistake he had made in asking for the commission of inquiry, and desired to resume the reins of government, but it was now too late. Nevertheless, he thought he might profit from the discontent aroused in the country by the "reforms" of the commission. In February, 1879, a number of Egyptian officers having been pensioned off through the reductions imposed by the commission, a rebellion suddenly broke out. Sir Rivers Wilson and Nubar Pacha were insulted; the latter

Fall of was actually wounded, and Ismail Pacha, Nubar Pacha depending on the "native" interest, broke with Europe by dismissing him.

It was at first endeavoured not to let things come to the worst, but every kind of mediation failed. Ismail was weary of control and his controllers were only anxious to be rid of him. The crisis was at

hand. What was to become of Egypt? France and England were in a difficult position; Europe was uncertain as to her own outlook, and Prince Bismarck was seeking a base for his future combinations. France was awkwardly placed; her Government was weak and over-easily influenced by its environment; her agents were weak and divided, enervated by the vagueness of their instructions, and succeeding each other with startling rapidity.¹ The general feeling in the country was rather over-strained; her President was sceptical and indifferent.

The two Powers, in an official note to the Khedive, with which he was bound to comply, exacted that "the two European members of the Cabinet should have, conjointly, the right of vetoing any measure of which they disapproved." This meant fetters for Ismail. An immediate and effective measure was further taken: the reduction of the interest on the Debt.

To this brusque demand Ismail gave a brusque reply. He dismissed Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignières. Cherif Pacha was asked to form a Cabinet composed of natives alone. Egypt for the Egyptians!

France and England were perplexed. They hesitated to take recourse to stronger measures.

An unforeseen intervention occurred. Austria-Hungary—and then Germany—protested. They demanded security for their subjects, and desired that Ismail should be made to resign. It was, therefore,

¹ In two years and a half, at the height of the crisis—between November, 1876, and June, 1879, the French Legation had been occupied by four representatives.—MM. des Michels, Raindre, Godeaux and Tricou. The English interests, on the other hand, were vested in the same staff for over twenty years.

the Germanic Powers, passive spectators up till now, that took the initiative at this crisis. Prince Bismarck, with his usual clearsightedness, well realised the advantage to be gained by acting as arbitrator over Anglo-French affairs in Egypt, just as he had done with Anglo-Russian difficulties in the Balkans. Vast schemes were already surging in his mind, the opportunity was unexpected and not to be allowed to slip—it afforded him much influence in European affairs for several years to come.

Throughout the whole of Europe the different Governments were loudly clamoured at. Rarely has a campaign been more skilfully pleaded before the public. Ismail was practically outlawed. The man who had offered Europe such splendid festivities at the inauguration of the Suez Canal appeared now as but a poor squire, a victim of the Machiavelism of the financiers and their rigour.

In Constantinople other wires were of Ismail being pulled. The French and English Pacha Governments, influenced by Berlin, requested the Sultan to recall the Khedive. Within two months, by the end of June, the Porte issued a berat by which Ismail was deposed and the power given to his son Tewfik, encumbered once again with all the details of European intervention and control. The Sultan on being consulted made some reservations as to his suzerainty over Egypt. There was no dispute over formulas, and the condominium, more direct, more responsible, less united, and more subordinate than ever to financial interests, continued its course.

In all this there was an unknown quantity to be considered—the extent of the harmony between France and England, the

two directing Powers. This was a matter of serious importance. Europe listened attentively to the slightest whisper from the condominium, ready to profit from the slightest difficulty and to make her intervention a necessity. From thenceforward every action of importance was done in "the name of the six great Powers," a singularly echoing chord of the prelude that Prince Bismarck was playing-vet with no very certain hand, on the European piano. He was soon obliged to change the tune. That of the "alliance of Three Emperors" had already wearied both audience and performers. The strong tenor prepared to give his deepest note—that of the "Triple Alliance." Prince Bismarck in his Memoirs, which must always be taken cum grano salis, but which constitute a breviary for modern politics and a psychological romance of this very complex period, shifts all the responsibility on to the Russian Government, and on to Gortschakoff in particular. He cannot deny, however, that Russia, both then and later, had earnestly sought alliance with Germany. The Prince did not entirely discourage this attempt; he held back in order to use the facilities he always found in Russia for one of the complicated combinations so attractive to his prodigious mechanical genius. For the moment, however, a definite attitude was required of him.

Russia, face to face with practical difficulties in the East, desired to know on what she could depend. Bismarck was therefore compelled to give some sort of answer to the urgent question directed to him by Russia. This is shown, to some extent, by Bismarck's letter to the King of Bavaria at a time when it seemed necessary to obtain the consent of the confederated states to the new policy on which Germany was to embark.

Under these circumstances Russia has requested us to choose definitely between herself and Austria by giving instructions to our representatives in the East to vote for Russia in any doubtful matter. In our opinion, this is not the true interpretation of the actions of the Congress; the right balance seems to be on the side of Austria, Great Britain and France; Germany has always tended to this direction.

This is very definite. Germany had always been working against Russia; no wonder Russia should seek to know exactly what she could expect.

Bismarck was dominated by an apprehension which kept him on the rack; he feared alliance between St. Petersburg and Vienna, he feared lest the Slav element in the two nations should make common cause against the Teuton. Constantly he denounced "the mysteries of the Reichstadt Convention," which meant that he could brook no tête-à-tête of Austria and Russia; and dreaded the beginnings of a coalition between Russia, Austria and France—the "Kaunitz coalition" as he called it—the nightmare of his life. The coalition might be brought about at any moment; it was to the interests of the three nations to do so. In public, Bismarck affected to treat the matter very lightly, and the best proof that can be given of his dreading it was the trouble taken to ward against it.

In August, 1879, he went to Gastein for the waters. He was tortured by facial neuralgia, yet he took little heed as to his cure. Never was recovery more impeded by the torment of responsibilities and cares. All through the treatment his mind was engaged in deep consideration: "After reflecting on all these considerations, after the menacing letter of the Czar Alexander, I feel obliged to take defensive precautions against Russia in order to safeguard our independence."

It is necessary to have the whole European Concert in one's mind in order to understand the complex management of the conductor. France was to be held in check by England, hence Egypt was to loom large in German policy. Russia should be left as long as possible to the mirage of the personal relations of the Emperors. Italy should be turned aside from her Russian tendencies by the carefully measured support given to Austria on the Adriatic Sea, and by the fear of seeing Germany, lately so inimical to the Papacy, take up the cause of temporal power. And if it were necessary to pay court to the France of M. Waddington in order to avoid her alliance with the Czar, it would be as easy to inaugurate a series of civilities as it had been to accomplish the reverse.

All this complex policy, with its ramifications extending into Poland, Hungary, Turkey, the Mediterranean—the whole world,—rested chiefly on the possibility of blinding England as well as Europe to the risk of danger from the Germanic element. For this object the Egyptian affair was providential; the financiers who had taken it in hand were men who could be dealt with.

In Paris, St. Petersburg and London the political men who succeeded to power were long to be in ignorance of their own cards, which were being conjured with by a most skilful necromancer. Even in Vienna the matter was not thoroughly understood, otherwise a higher price might have been exacted for the Austrian help, in that it was indispensable.

Had Hungary known of the disdain with which Bismarck treated "messieurs les avocats hussards" from Hungary, she would not have played into his hands so easily.

The House of Savoy, divided between the glory of such illustrious partnership and the terrors of mysterious menaces as to Rome, had not embarked quite so unsuspiciously upon the unknown voyage. Bismarck, however, knew how to influence both enemies and partners even more through their passions than through their interests.

It was in Vienna that the game began.¹ The German Chancellor took his text from a letter addressed to the Emperor William by the Czar, during the end of August, 1879. He desired to read in it a threat of war which was certainly far from the intention of the writer; Russia had every reason for not provoking Germany. Prince Bismarck, who is careful not to give the exact text of this letter, summarises it as follows: "The contents are to this purport: Should Germany persist in her refusal to adopt Russian views (as to the Balkan affairs), there can be no peace between us." The Czar asks to meet the Emperor William at Alexandrovo.

Prince Bismarck at once took counter-precautions.

"When the Emperor William went to Alexandrovo
(September 3rd), I had already arranged for an interview at Gastein with Count Gastein Andrassy, which took place on August 27th and August 28th."

Action was most urgent,2 for Count Andrassy had

¹ Directly after the Berlin Congress, Prince Bismarck began to arrange with Count Andrassy for the abolition of Article V of the Treaty of Prague, thus effacing the last memory of the war of 1866.

² It is said also that the suggestion of this interview came from the Emperor William. Prince Bismarck greatly complained of the expressions used by Gortschakoff in an interview at Baden. M. de Blowitz, in the *Times* of November 1st, was allowed to

tendered his resignation on August 14th in consequence of the difficulties aroused by his policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the rampart of the German alliances in Austria was being broken down. Things had to be arranged before his resignation was accepted.

Prince Bismarck decided to make with Austria-Hungary a formal alliance against Russia, and this as soon as possible. He took the preliminary steps, for his mind was set on the arrangement; and his tactics were to make the alliance asked for by the Austro-Hungarian Minister himself.

After I had explained the situation to Count Andrassy, he drew from it the following conclusion: "A Franco-Russian alliance (of which the Russian papers were already talking), must be parried by an Austro-German alliance." I replied that he was giving a formula to the question which was, in my opinion, the reason of our interview and the subject of our deliberation. We had no difficulty in agreeing on the subject of a purely defensive alliance against a Russian attack on one or other of the two contracting parties; a proposal to extend our alliance against attacks from other nations but Russia was not so favourably received by the Count. After having obtained, with some difficulty, His Majesty's authorisation to engage in official negotiations, I stopped at Vienna on my journey home.

Prince Bismarck, at the same time, assured himself of the support of the Confederated States, of Bavaria in particular, by bringing out the bogey of an attack by Russia. King Ludwig, alarmed at such a prospect, advanced the Chancellor's plans. And while the Emperor William in the interview at Alexandrovo gave the Czar, "with the greatest sincerity

say that at Alexandrovo the Czar complained to the Emperor William of the attitude of Germany, and that he had written: "Your Majesty's Chancellor has forgotten the promise of 1870." Nothing could be more wounding to Germany than the publication of such a reminder.

and with tears, the assurance of a friendship based on old traditions," Prince Bismarck was in Vienna.

During the long railway journey from Gastein to Vienna, by way of Salzburg and Linz, the attitude of the people at the stations made me feel that I was indeed on purely German soil amidst a German people.

Arrived in Vienna a still warmer welcome awaited the statesman who had triumphed at Sadowa. The Emperor Franz-Joseph visited the German Chancellor in person, and the Bismarck-Andrassy agreement was concluded.

Such was the origin of the Triple Alliance. The German-Austrian-Hungarian treaty is thus analysed by its leading author:—

The treaty we have signed with Austria, as a defensive arrangement against Russia, is *publici juris*. An analogous defensive alliance between the two Powers against France is not known.¹ The Austro-German treaty does not afford Germany, if directly threatened, the same protection against France that it gives Austria in case of war with Russia.²

¹ This probably means that its text had not been published, but the alliance in itself was a well-known fact.

² The act was signed at Vienna, October 7th, 1879, by Henry VII, Prince of Reuss, German Ambassador, and by Count Andrassy. It was renewed in 1887, and published in Berlin and in Vienna February 3rd, 1888. Russia, indeed, is alone mentioned in the document, which thus takes a character more specially favourable to Austria. According to Article I, if one of the Powers be attacked by Russia, the contracting parties will afford each other mutual help by their armies and will only conclude peace simutaneously. Should one of the contracting parties be attacked by another Power, the other undertakes not only not to help the aggressor but to observe a benevolent neutrality. But should Russia in any way support the attacking nation, the treaty will then enter into vigour. The two Powers count on the peaceful sentiments of Russia, but agree to warn the Czar Alexander, were it but confidentially, "that they must consider any attack against

Prince Bismarck, according to his own expression, had made his "choice" between Austria and Russia. He relates that he went so far as to ask whether there were no means of attaching Austria-Hungary to Germany through "organic bonds," but this overbold Pan-Germanism he abandoned as premature.

The treaty concluded, Prince Bismarck brought it forward to his master as a Cabinet question. He did not go himself to Baden-Baden, but entrusted the cause of the alliance to a colleague, Count Stolberg. The Count succeeded, despite "the energetic opposition of the Emperor," who only yielded "through fear of a change of Ministry" and on condition that the Czar of Russia should be notified.

Alexander II, therefore, learned officially that "should he attack one or other of the two Powers he should have them both against him." It is not difficult to imagine that this information must have been a bitter pill for him to swallow, coming, as it did, so soon after the interview at Alexandrovo. All the responsibility for it was shifted on to the rancour and provocation of Gortschakoff.

Some precautions had to be taken in order to induce Europe to accept a change of front of such importance. Prince Bismarck, in the middle of the session, went to the French Ambassador in Vienna—M. Teisserenc de Bort—who was much amazed at such careful courtesy, and addressed him in most reassuring language:—

I eagerly seize this opportunity in order to give your Excellency the most formal and complete assurance that the intimate relations between Germany and Austria need in no way

one of the two as if directed against both." The character of the treaty is quite in conformity with Bismarck's appreciation in his *Memoirs*. The agreement gave rise to a commercial treaty.

rouse the uneasiness of France . . . I believe, on the contrary, that our intercourse, in the near future, will be much extended, and that we shall become most cordial friends Nations, like individual men, have but a short memory. . . . I have never made use of language in order to disguise my thoughts. I am always sincere, and M. Waddington, with whom I had continued dealings in Berlin, has had proof as to this. Besides this, Germany does not pursue an aggressive policy. She desires to live henceforth in peace, and I will proceed to quote the words of one of your own ministers, who once said that France sought no quarrel against anyone, because she was satisfied. Well, I can assure your Excellency that Germany is satisfied!

It was difficult to extend the irony of such confidential outbursts. As to Austria, she soon received the guarantees of the bargain. On September 8th the Austrian troops occupied the *Sandjak* of Novi-Bazar, in accordance with a special arrangement made with Turkey. It was a new and decisive step forward for the Teuton in the Balkans.

The rapprochement of Germany and Prince Austria had another consequence no less Bismarck important for Europe as a whole. It necessarily put an end to the Kulturkampf. Austria represented, for Germany, the Roman Catholic interest. It would be hard to be on good terms with her while waging war to the death against the Papacy. The new development of the Bismarckian policy depended, at home, upon the South, and upon the people represented in Parliament by the deputies of the Centre. Prince Bismarck was therefore forced to shift his gun to the other shoulder, and this he did most gallantly. And his new partner, Pope Leo XIII, showed a conciliatory spirit. The two greatest and most subtle diplomatists of the day were fitting co-workers, but, worthy of each other as they were,

¹ From Le Temps, September 27th, 1879.

they proceeded according to the strictest rules of fencing.

On March 31st, 1879, Prince Bismarck had had an interview with Herr Windthorst. This was to mean a rapprochement with the Centre, also Rome, or at least Canossa. On August 1st, 1879 (a few weeks before the interview of Gastein—the synchronism is worthy of remark,) Mgr. Aloisi-Masella, Nuncio in Munich, who had been intermediary for the first overtures between the Prince and the Papacy, received a letter, intended for transmission to Rome, in which Prince Bismarck informed Cardinal Nina that he was ready to negotiate with the Nuncio in Vienna, Mgr. Jacobini, with regard to an understanding between the Holy See and Berlin.

Vienna was selected as the place for the negotiation, and Bismarck's sudden sympathy for Roman Catholics in general and for those of the South in particular, is now well understood.¹

The circumstances by which the arrangement was delayed between Rome and the Empire belong to another story. Leo XIII firmly maintained the principles on which Pius IX had based his policy. His adroit patience made it impossible for Bismarck to do otherwise than sacrifice on the altar of the Reichstag where he had worshipped other gods. He therefore introduced and carried the Bill "of discretionary powers" which by special arrangement ended this "combat for civilisation," which had roused such considerable and such vain ardour.

¹ I felt it advisable to add to the considerations of race, the good-feeling expressed towards myself throughout the German Empire, but in the South more so than in the North, among the Conservatives more than in the Opposition, in the Catholic West more than in the Protestant East." *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 289.

IV

Leo XIII Leo XIII, so skilful in his dealings with and France Germany, was not less prudent in his relations with the French Republic. Never, though, was there a more difficult and dangerous position. To a situation for which there seemed no remedy, Pius IX had opposed a constant warfare against the "errors of the age," all the vehemence of sermons and all the thunders of the Church.

Leo XIII resorted to different tactics. Though several public actions gave proof of his unshakable adherence to the principles defended by his predecessor, upon the rights of the Church, both as spiritual and as temporal power, he would not yield by an inch.²

But, these principles well established, his method was such that the theologian charged with expounding it to the world does not hesitate to contrast it with that of Pius IX.

Pius IX, with all the ardour of a holy indignation, had been forced to combat those who sought to dispossess him of his tem-

¹ As to the miserable position to which at the accession of Leo XIII the Roman Catholic cause was reduced in Europe, see the preliminary speeches in the *Recueil des Discours du Pope Léo XIII*, by the Rev. Father Don Pasquale de Franciscis (Plon, 1884). See also, on the other hand, the work by the Abbé Barbier—Le Progrès du Liberalisme Catholique sous le Pope Léo XIII, Le Pope du possumus, vol. i. p. 101.

² See, in particular, the Eulogy of Pius IX in the Allocution du Pope Léo XIII aux Cardinaux, when the Cardinals came in a body to congratulate him on March 28th, 1878, also the important Allocution to the representatives of the Roman Catholic press, February 22nd, 1879. "We also, following the example of our predecessors, do not cease to declare and claim these rights, and we will never cease to do so." But it is also worthy of remark that it is to journalists that this speech is addressed.

poral and spiritual power, who loaded the Church with fetters and brought her leader under the yoke, Leo XIII, with a more peaceful spirit, but with equally strong courage, fought for the same cause, while pleading that the yoke should be removed. . . . Such was the work transmitted by Pius to his successor. Leo XIII took another view of it: he gave himself entirely to works of peace, he preached peace unto the world. Hence comes it that his voice is known to us as the voice pacificatrix.

The success obtained in Germany encouraged the new Pope to pursue his method, and it was in this spirit that he turned to France.

The greater number of the bishops who had acquired, through their services, their titles or their age, a special influence over the French clergy, were called *ad limina*; there they listened to the "counsels" of the Pope, and things were so expressed as to exact obedience. The most fiery of all, Mgr. Pie, Bishop of Poitiers, heard from the lips of the Holy Father himself that a cardinal's hat awaited him. Leo XIII required his assistance. Now, what were the first words pronounced by the distinguished prelate on his return to his diocese?

It is the special feature of a new pontificate, as also of a change in any Government, to afford new openings and facilities for negotiations abandoned or suspended during the preceding rule. The march of time having ripened many questions, the evils attendant on any opposition to the Church being manifested and increased, while on the other hand personal friction having ceased, a defeated diplomacy is able to resume with success those relations of which the interruption had been necessary.

It is evident from the pastoral letter in which the Bishop acquaints the faithful with his valuable interviews with the new Pope, that Mgr. Pie considered the time ripe for negotiations; as had been done with Germany, so would it be with France.

Cardinal de Bonnechose heard the same advice

during the early hours of the new Papacy. "The Pope remarked to me that it were well for the Papacy to pull cardinal de itself together," and the Cardinal adds: Bonnechose "Leo XIII expounded to me this significant idea, which was certainly caused by the excessive expansion, the over-excitement, and the turmoil and strife of the preceding pontificate."

During the month of September, 1879, in the full heat of the conflict over Article VII, the Cardinal went to Rome, where he was received by the Pope and was made to hear pacific expressions which slightly astonished the recent abettor of a Bonapartist plot:—

I left the presence of His Holiness feeling less saddened and discouraged than I had been before. I felt I saw better days arising for the Church in Italy and Germany. Alas! could I but see the same for France!

He had, however, to yield to the papal injunctions. "Despite his repugnance," he sought to influence the President of the Republic and the members of the Cabinet, and when the question arose of encouraging Jules Simon in his opposition towards the Article, it was Cardinal de Bonnechose who approached the eminent Republican; it was he also, who, together with Cardinal Guibert, advised the non-authorised communities to bow before necessity, and who transmitted the Papal orders.

As to Mgr. Lavigerie, whose rather turbulent activity had many outlets, he also was influenced for peace by the Pope in his visit to him that same September.

"The Holy Father," he writes, "has his own ideas on philosophy, politics, the questions of the day. On everything he brings to bear great strength of mind and principle." And the biographer adds: "His mind led him towards a new policy—that of recon-

ciliation with the Republic. Such were the views of the Pope. Mgr. Lavigerie conformed his own to these, and this soon became evident."

Leo XIII

and Count de Chambord endeavoured to induce the Count de Chambord bord and the Legitimist party to lay down their arms "in the interests of Faith and Religion."

The Count remarked to MM. de Blacas and de Dreux-Brezé, who were charged with the commission, that as the Church had decreed against suicide, she could hardly advise him to do away with his own reason for existence by asking his friends to abandon it.

The Nuncio in Paris, Mgr. Meglia, was made a Cardinal, and after receiving the biretta from the hands of M. Jules Grévy, "the noble leader of the State," was replaced by an intimate friend of the Pope—Mgr. Czacki, a man of great mental activity and of very little prejudice. The Marquis de Gabriac, Ambassador to the Vatican, wrote on September 23rd:—

It is a true gift to France that the Holy Father has made in thus parting with a man in whom he rests such entire confidence, and giving him to us. . . . The Holy Father has good hopes that the present difficulties may be smoothed away by a spirit of moderation and of equity. The new-comer has the broadest possible instructions; he will be ready to receive any one who approaches him, whosoever he may be.

And, indeed, the Cardinal—a man of the world, a brilliant talker, alert and watchful—was seen at official receptions, with the Cabinet Ministers and men of note, and with Gambetta in particular. It is said that through Baron des Michels he sent a letter to Gambetta in which the conditions were set forth under which the Pope—and consequently the French clergy—would agree to give public acknow-

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ledgment of the Republic. M. Rauc relates that he was selected to hand the letter to Gambetta, who after reading it, remarked that it was "too dear at the price."

Amongst the Right there were certain men who grew uneasy at the attitude adopted by the Pope; though many, on the contrary, tired of futile strife, were inclined to compromise, if not to resignation. Bonapartism became a source of family dissension. The Count de Chambord had, through a letter of July 26th, 1879, endeavoured to galvanise what remained of the Royalists; a large banquet in which all degrees of Royalist sentiment were to be united, was prepared at Marseilles for September 29, the anniversary of the prince's birth. The Orleanists, however, failed to put in an appearance. The banquet took place, M. Baragnon spoke, also M. de Baudry d'Asson. There was a question as to prosecution on this matter. Jules Grevy, however, remarked, with his customary restraint and directness: "Let them say what they like, as long as we do not let them come to deeds."

It was rather among the ranks of the Republicans that the suddenness of the offensive attitude taken by the Government against the Church began to cause disunion. During the parliamentary vacation this scruple, joined to the feeling aroused by the agitation on the subject of the Amnesty, tormented many a conscience, timid, prudent, or simply liberal; the Government policy, that to some seemed too slow and half-hearted, was, to others, over-bold and over-hasty. Many manifestations were made on the part of the most careful and respected men; M. Vivenot, M. Henri Germain, M. Casimir Perier, senators and deputies of the Left, advised moderation to the

Jules Government. The man who came most prominently forward was Jules Simon.

Since May the Sixteenth he had been standing in the background. The old rancour of the delegation of Bordeaux was still strong; he had not been forgiven for his action against Gambetta. His failure of May the Sixteenth was still a matter of triumph. He stood aside, without commiseration for his fall, for if his faults were blamed still more were his talents a cause of enmity against him.

Through the good offices of M. Thiers and of the friends of M. Thiers, he had been enabled to enter the Academy. The courtly customs of the Forty softened something of the strife of party; even the opponents of the Duc de Broglie were inscribed, willy-nilly, on the "side of the Dukes."

Jules Simon, politic philosopher as he was, was yet no philosophic politician. He had had his hour, though a short one. On reviewing his life as polemist, orator and author, he could find it equal at least to that of the most illustrious of the men who were pushing him aside.

His speech was suave, his mind was quick, his nature obstinate. He and Renan, his compatriot, were like the rocks of their native land of Brittany, of hardest granite beneath a panoply of flowers. The merits of Jules Simon were chiefly eminent in their universality. Even his courage, his incontestable moral courage, savoured of the literary sense. A follower of Victor Cousin, he clung with supple wrist to the last promontory of Eclecticism, well knowing that should he lose his hold, the freethinker in him would sink him to the abyss.

In the region of politics he clung still more desperately to another doctrine, that of Liberalism. With

this he found his thoughts and tendencies in harmony. A man of studious temperament, yet anxious for debate, more influenced by his brain than by either heart or character, gaining through opposition and losing through power, his whole life may be summarised and justified by the one word: Liberty.

On the death of Thiers, Jules Simon had seen the rôle played by Dufaure that he had doubtless desired for himself; he had seen, too, how Jules Grévy had climbed towards the Presidency.

Gambetta became President of the Chamber, M. Challemel-Lacour became Ambassador, and these magnificent titles have strong attraction for the oratorical ambition; and then Jules Ferry had fought his way into that Ministry for Education in which he himself had passed such pleasant hours and left such haunting memories.

These conquerors confirmed their victories by many threats, and made assault of strongholds; their anti-clerical violence lost them the goodwill that the sturdy Senator discovered within the wall of the Luxembourg and the Palais Mazarin. The daily gossip found many a quavering voice as chorus, and the burden of the theme was always "Ah, if one could only act, how easy things would be!" What was it that all these good people were desiring, these nuns, these priests, against whom such loud outcries were being uttered? Merely to be allowed to continue to do good—nothing but peace and liberty.

Was there no one to take up their cause? no one to plead its justice, dignity, and human interest? What a part for the right man to play! and how much could there be made of it!

All things combined to urge Jules Simon to the cause.

Cardinal de Bonnechose called upon him, as an unexpected ambassador of Liberalism, at the request of the Superior of the Jesuits. Had not Mgr. Dupanloup remarked of Jules Simon: "He will be a Cardinal before I shall!" The bishops, Rome, an ardent vow and appeal, all were directed towards him. As an experienced leader about to play for his highest stake, he measured the ground before him and devoted his most considerable weapon, his eloquence, to the service of such a cause at such a serious time, throwing himself into the fray with all the ardour of the old athlete.

The Bill upon Higher Education, containing the famous Article VII, which forbade non-authorised communities to direct schools in France, had been sent back to the Senate. The special committee, appointed as usual in the bureaux, was divided into three distinct groups. M. Jules Simon agreed to the Bill with the exception of Article III and Article VII. He was chosen as "reporter," for, having an intermediary position, he could attack Article VII with the greater vigour in that he agreed to the rest of the Bill.

This report would not be given until December 8th, but the matter greatly occupied the attention of the press and the public, and aroused a feeling which would determine the general attitude at the reopening of parliament. What with the process of selection and the question of the Amnesty and that of Article VII, the Government found itself in a very difficult position. The rôle of Jules Simon at this critical period was considerable. For the first time the Centre held aloof from the party, and it was an "Old Republican" who was responsible for this schism. His reasons for this need to be stated: Has a repre-

sentative Government the right to impose its own desires and projects on national Education by means of State authority? Has the State the mission of creating "moral unity" in the nation? Is the Republican Government following in the footsteps of those Governments that believed themselves charged with the care of souls? Everything depends upon this point. Swaying from violence to weakness, and from weakness to revolution, will it abandon the watchword of Liberty which brought it to its present standing?

"We desire to make the Republic beloved," said M. Jules Simon. "You think only of making it feared. We wish to make it desired; you want to make of it a yoke. Our aim is to assure security and stability to private interests, to give independence to the citizen, to inspire him with the love of independence, to facilitate it for him; to favour and develop individual enterprise and the spirit of association; whereas you, on the contrary, preoccupied with what you call the rights of the State, the moral unity of the State, become intimidated by diversity of creeds, without perceiving that under this name it is Liberty itself that frightens you."

This criticism, this argument, strong and seductive, had gained the soul of M. Simon. It is to his credit that he used it on behalf of people who had never spared him himself. The more difficult became the subject, the more resource he showed.

The Liberal theme is of all others the simplest, quietest, easiest and most honourable. But by the mere fact of there being a Government, Liberty has its limitations. There is a point at which political organism says to individual action: "Thus far and no further." Whether it be a question of conscience or of children's education, there is infallibly a relapse into the eternal discussion of the rights of the magnate and the rights of the people. M. Jules Simon

propounds the question in these terms: "Has the State any right to exclude from giving instruction those whose doctrines it considers dangerous? If the State has this right, there exists no liberty of instruction. . . ." It may be observed that the expression dangerous doctrines is dangerous in itself. How and by whom can the imprudence, even the folly, of certain instructors be restrained? Jules Simon continues: "Has the State any right to debar those whose doctrines it considers dangerous from the privilege of writing their opinions? If the State has this right, there can be no liberty of the Press. Why should it exercise an authority on the spoken word which it cannot exercise upon the written word?"

This is but sophistry. Any statement of doctrine by means of writing, and through the Press in particular, can be immediately and directly refuted by the same means; whereas for the spoken doctrine in class instruction refutation and even discussion is impossible. "Magister dixit." And when M. Simon concludes: "These are the two forms of freedom of thought," one has the right to add: "For men perhaps—but not for children." There can be no "freedom of thought" in the schoolroom; there can be there nothing but impregnation of thought.

Such a question can in no wise be solved by the one word—Liberty. Other and broader considerations must come into play, and these are prudence, tolerance and humanity

Situation of the Waddington administic Cabinet tration became daily more difficult. Both at home and abroad it was inactive and inadequate. Its weakness, however, lay neither in its constitution nor in its actions, but in its rivalries of principles

and persons. The majority was too large to remain united, and not strong enough in face of the monarchical minority to divide itself with impunity. Every Republican Government has since found the same difficulty. With the support of the Right there is almost always a majority of circumstance for the overthrow of a Ministry, while the constituted Ministry is always at the mercy of the defection of part of the Republican majority.

Three speeches, one pronounced at Margramme of seilles, September 21st, 1879, another at the Extreme Left Perpignan, October 15th, a third at Saint-Fargeau, October 26th, expounded the programme of the Advanced Left. The first of these stated principles, viz: War against Clericalism, with Article VII but as an expedient, what was necessary being separation of Church and State: war against Bonapartism, through reform of the administration; the democratic organisation of the Republic, revision of the Constitution, suppression of the Senate, suppression of the Presidency of the Republic. liberty of the Press, Communal autonomy, a three years' military service, the transformation of the territorial army into a national militia, reform of the magistracy, the inscription of every citizen upon the jury list, primary instruction made obligatory, gratuitous and unsectarian, the representation of minorities, one system of proportionate taxation, the suppression of privileged monopolies and concessions, the abolition of the death penalty, the civil emancipation of women, the equality of the two sexes with regard to marriage and divorce.

"Social reform" was the subject of the speech made at Saint-Fargeau, Belleville—that is to say, in the territory of Gambetta:—

Society owes to each one of its members both the instruction without which the human mind cannot develop, and the means of work without which human activity can find no outlet. Hence workmen's associations must be encouraged by State loans, (which is the project of the Commission at Luxemburg,) the railways must be bought over, the Bank of France must be made into a national bank, the right of union and association must be developed, the system of insurance must be centralized and extended, creating close solidarity between all citizens.

The *bourgeoisie* was to be overwhelmed, still mistress as it was, if not of the suffrage, at least of the power.

In order to support the Reform party, the first and most urgent measure was made "that of full and complete Amnesty for all the condemned of the Commune" (speech at Perpignan, October 15th, 1879); a certain apology was made for the Commune,—it had been born of patriotic feeling, fanned by systematic provocation on the part of the Assembly, the insurgents of March 18th had taken up arms in the defence of the Republic, as Thiers had attested,—the manner of the repression was therefore strongly criticised. The speech concluded with a superb passage from Victor Hugo: "There is no sight more grand than that of the figure of the returning outlaw clear against the horizon, while France, the Motherland, holds out her arms in welcome."

The proscribed on their return to France abstained from much oration. M. Alphonse Humbert, former editor of the *Père Duchêne*, led an ardent campaign in the *Marseillaise*; at Pêre-Lachaise, beside the tomb of a pardoned Communist, he sang the praise of those "returning from the prisons of New Caledonia, those who in 1871 had been branded in the forehead by the harlot who dared to call herself by the name of Justice." He pleaded in his own defence when

prosecuted; after being sentenced to a six months' imprisonment, he was elected member of the Municipal Council of Paris, in the *quartier* of Javel. At Lyons, another Communist was elected on the Municipal Council; at Lille, another on the General Council.

The reassembly of the Chambers on November 27th, after four months' vacation, gave rise to fresh excitement. The Chambers met in Paris, the Senate occupying the Palace of the Luxembourg, the Chamber of Deputies the Palais-Bourbon. There was no difficulty in Paris, the pessimistic saw their prophecies unfulfilled.

Events were watched by Gambetta with attention and uneasiness. He deplored those dissensions which by destroying the unity of the Republicans deprived the leaders of that strength and influence which can only come of union. He well knew that the work of destruction and division was aimed against him personally. The attack of the papers against him and the "dictatorship" grew more fiery than ever now that his hour was approaching. Even his oldest, most trusty friends began to search out causes for complaint. M. Allain-Targé, one of the most thoughtful, most acute, explains this state of mind with regard to the new deputies from the provinces:—

I had some influence in the Republican Union, in which Floquet, Brisson and myself endeavoured to work against Gambetta's new followers—young deputies from the country, anxious to obtain position through Gambetta's help—ministerial candidates, under-secretaries and all the host of the second-rate ambitious and intriguing, expectant of rapid fortune through the President of the Chamber's occult influence. Installed in the Palais Bourbon, in the Morny apartments, Gambetta allowed himself too easily to be besieged and circumvented by this band of flatterers and parasites, who sought to make him able to defy us

—the "marshals," as they called us, Gambetta being known to them as the "patron" or "Dictator." It is not accurate to say that he allowed himself to be despoiled by these people; certainly, however, he let himself be amused and compromised, and his enemies profited by this to lose him something of his prestige amongst the people, to deprive him of his reputation as a devoted democrat, generous and poor.

Such dissensions brought indecision in the ranks. Gambetta began to see cold looks around him; Jules Grévy, Jules Simon, Jules Ferry, had long since turned aside from him, then followed Brisson, Clémenceau and Louis Blanc. Though the general feeling still remained upon his side, yet symptoms of disaffection were not lacking. And how was he to deal with the two camps that claimed his help exclusively? Was he among the Moderates? could he be claimed by the Advanced? His position was most difficult and unassured.

In order to safeguard the union, Gambetta declared himself for the re-establishment of the scrutin de liste. M. Bardoux prepared a proposal to this effect and discussed it with several people. President Grévy, to whom it was submitted, appeared favourable to the project, though it seems that his interest diminished on learning that Gambetta had given it his warm support.

On November 26th a Government Report of the Am-was published accounting to Parliament for the Am-was published accounting to Parliament for the application of the Amnesty Bill of March 3rd, 1879. The Bill had been broadly interpreted, only certain actual criminals adjudged particularly dangerous to the community at large being set aside from pardon. The number of non-liberated prisoners of the Commune was reduced to 830. Amongst these 65 had been members of the Commune, 39 had committed personal offences, 104 had

infringed the laws of property, 521 had older records against them, 51 came under the category of those to be excluded from the amnesty.

The Government appeared resolved not to commit itself; M. Waddington, however, introduced a question. The breach was stormed, M. Brisson leading the attack. The Cabinet was accused of having but "half-formed resolutions," of lacking programme, principle and action; it was weak in that it was divided.

Our principal complaint is that the Ministry is hesitating and that the majority is resolute. Our return to Paris must mean definite rupture with the day of vacillation, it must inaugurate an era of resolution and reform.

M. Waddington replied by enumerating what had been accomplished in the last ten months—a quite considerable amount. There was the Amnesty, the return to Paris of the Chambers, educational measures, the reorganisation of the Council of State, Public Works, regulations as to Customs, order maintained at home, peace and dignity abroad. As to functionaries, much had been done and much would still be done. As to the magistracy, individual cases would be carefully examined, and the Cabinet would not refuse to consider general measures.

The present Cabinet has been reproached with its want of homogeneity. In the literal sense of the word there can be no homogeneous Cabinet but that which executes the will of a Dictator. . . . Should we give place to M. Brisson and his friends, they, no more than ourselves, will be able to form such a Cabinet. Should M. Brisson desire to preside over the elections of 1881 he must depend on those of his friends who demand the revision of the Constitution, the suppression of the Senate, the abrogation of the Concordat, the nomination of mayors by all the municipal councils, even in Lyons and in Paris, and the absolute freedom of the Press.

M. Allain-Targé brought forward a resolution in the name of the Republican Left, M. Devès a vote of confidence in the name of the Republican Union. It was a division in the ranks even of Gambetta's adherents. Gambetta held aloof, replying neither to the attack of M. Waddington nor to that of M. Brisson,—his hour, he deemed, was not yet come.

The resolution of the Republican Union was passed by 224 votes against 97, from among 318. The Right had not voted, the Ministry was saved. Yet no! so precarious and so tolerated an existence was no real life.

On November 11th M. Le Royer, Minister for Justice, resigned, being unable to agree to the Chamber's injunctions as to the reform of the magistracy. M. Goblet, Under-Secretary of State, followed his example.

While seeking to regain its balance the Cabinet was much harassed. M. Lockroy inquired upon the subject of the Amnesty. It was M. Le Royer, although resigning, who replied: "You reproach us with vacillation, beware on your part of rashness." Then followed some violent speeches and a vote of censure from M. Clémenceau. The vote of confidence was passed with difficulty. M. Achard then questioned the Minister for War as to how officers of the Territorial Army should be dealt with who took part in political demonstrations. This was in allusion to a speech from M. de Carayon-Latour at a Legitimist banquet. A new deputy, M. Raynal, continued the inquiry with much talent. General Gresley replied that he could not acknowledge the opinion of the committee of inquiry, and thereupon descending from the platform left the hall. Raynal proposed a vote of censure. The Govern-

ment had to content itself with a simple resolution voted by 244 voices against 163. The majority was swelled by several from the Right.

close of the Session of but some few weeks' duration the extraordinary session of 1879 was concluded by a decree from the President of the Republic. The Budget for 1880, voted by the Senate without serious difficulty, was announced in the Journal Official of December 21st. The Ministry appeared inactive. On December 27th, the Journal Official published the following notice:—

The Ministers and Under-Secretaries of State have placed their resignations in the hands of the President of the Republic, by whom they have been accepted. The President of the Republic has summoned M. de Freycinet, and charged him with the formation of a new Cabinet.

The Waddington Cabinet died from the effects of the leadership it had usurped, from constitutional weakness, and from the dissensions it had aroused amidst the Republican majority.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST FREYCINET ADMINISTRATION. THE DECREES

- I.--Formation of the Freycinet Administration—Its position with regard to the Chambers—The integral amnesty opposed
 —Rejection of Article VII by the Senate—Promulgation of the law on higher education.
- II.—The "decrees" (March 20th-30th, 1880)—The summer session—M. Constans as Minister for the Interior—The tariff policy of France—M. Léon Say in London.
- III.—Difficult position of the Cabinet—Debate upon the decrees in the Senate—Expulsion of the Jesuits—Gambetta against the Ministry—Passing of the Amnesty Bill—Parliamentary work—The festivities at Cherbourg—Resignation of de Freycinet.

I

Formation of the deFreycinet David Lawrence Toward I are inquired whether it were Administra-possible to redeem his mistake in not calling Gambetta, the real leader of the majority, to the helm. After his failure with M. Waddington, the President of the Republic continued his system—or rather, inaugurated the method—of piecing new Ministries together with what remained of the old. Hence one mistake led to another; ministerial power became seriously undermined, rivalries and intrigues increased the ambiguity and instability of the Government. Most of M. Waddington's colleagues remained in office, though their chief retired. M. de Freycinet, the Minister for Public Works, whose talent and eloquence had lately been so much in evidence, undertook the charge of Foreign Affairs as well as the Presidency of the

Council. In his sincere desire to make his Cabinet a bond of union for all shades of Republicans he met with slight encouragement, and was at length reduced to an extremely limited form of "concentration," a concentration not of progress nor of parties, but of persons. MM. Lepère, Jules Ferry, Jauréguiberry, Tirard and Cochéry kept their portfolios. As new Ministers were: M. Cayot for Justice, General Farre for War, M. Magnin for Finance, M. Varroy for Public Works, with M. Alfred Picard as head of the department. As Under-Secretaries were: For Justice, M. Martin-Feuillée; for the Interior, M. Constans; for Public Works, M. Sadi Carnot; for Commerce and Agriculture, M. Girard.

New men figured on this list; even before the old leaders took their places a younger generation acquired a position. Things became falsified in the mechanism of a rule that was to show a narrow conformity of action between the legislature and the executive.

The Waddington Cabinet had been but a reflection, the de Freycinet Cabinet mirrored this again. In the paper known as La Justice, founded by M. Clémenceau, with MM. Camille Pelletan, J. Laguerre, A. Milleraud and J. Pichon as collaborators it was termed the "re-plastering of a plaster." It was not that either talent or merit was wanting in the leader and his colleagues, but that the Ministry was inevitably bound to work on the lines of the preceding Cabinet. The policy of balance being its one resource, all its strength had to be expended on manœuvring between the different parties.

M. de M. de Freycinet was, properly speaking, freycinet no parliamentarian; he was a technician, an administrator. His career can only be fully

appreciated when considered from this point of view. An eminent quality of his, his admirable eloquence, has somewhat overshadowed his other powers; he was, however, mainly skilled in the adroit disentangling of difficulties, in the slow elaboration of a project. De Freycinet, of the Polytechnic, was a savant, no believer; an adapter, no creator. Were subtlety, perspicacity, firmness, penetration and political understanding needed in a matter, therein did de Freycinet gain renown. And he always succeeded, however it may have been, through his good grace, his charm of manner, his easy and penetrating forcefulness.

His intellect was clear and pure as crystal; a prismatic power of reflection, a greatly varied fund of knowledge, a keen consciousness of the relation of the world and its activities constituted his philosophy. He never grew heated over anything, not even his own actions. The scepticism with which he is reproached was but a form of modesty. The works of this admirable writer are but little read, the merits of the notable statesman are insufficiently appreciated, and the cause of this lies doubtless in his subtle delicacy of handling. More than once did he save his country from the mistakes that echo down the halls of history. He did much good with small parade, perhaps not all that his full and, on the whole, rounded life, might lead one to expect. And this, too, can be explained by his natural reserve, by the circumspection that sees all too clearly, even to the obstacles. He bent himself to all the numerous tasks imposed upon him by his aptitude and competence. If he did not in every case succeed, neither did he ever completely fail, being of those generals who prepare for retreat

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as well as for a victory. Always sought after, always ready, always active and disinterested, prompt attack as to retire, he shared with ease ever kind of political activity, never refusing his se vices, though never offering them, never insisting on himself. Such a man, of such rare mould, we long to shine amid the Republican constellations

While forming his administration, he found tin to complete a detailed exposition of what he ha done for public works. A report in the Journ Officiel for December 31st, 1879, gives full accoun of the execution of the plan proposed in Januar 1878, and definitely sanctioned by the Chambe in July, 1879. On the complete accomplishmer of this, the country would have increased her rai ways to the extent of 18,000 kilometres—a total (42,000 kilometres altogether. Some 18,000 kilo metres of navigable waterways would be constructe or improved, while almost every seaport woul be enlarged or altered. These projects would be executed towards the middle of the year 1880. Th total expense would amount to about six milliards of which three milliards would be expended o the railways, one milliard on the waterways, 80 millions for the railway concessions, 500 million for the seaports. After the year 1882 redemption of the programme could be looked upon as in fu activity, while for the next few years the working expenses would average about 500 millions.

Ministerial The plus values were depended on fron declaration the budget of receipts, despite the disaster of the terrible winter of 1878, despite the agri

¹ A special fund of three millions had to be allowed or December 27th for the reconstruction of the high-roads that had been destroyed.

cultural crisis in the north, which began to attract the attention of the Government, and despite the terrible ravages of the phylloxera. In face of all this, the young Republic was still optimistic, leaving much to the care of the future and a little to imagination. The Chambers reassembled January 13th. The Cabinet had had time to elaborate its declaration, and assumed an air of determination. Three questions were most prominent, three stones of offence—educational reform, with Article VII; the reform of the personal staff, that of the magistracy included; and then the Amnesty. The new Cabinet announced that it would support Article VII before the Senate—it had already been passed by the Chamber. The magistracy was "to be reorganised."

As to the Amnesty, there was no utterance of the word, the Ministry would take no initiative; the technical laws, particularly those as to finance, the army and the customs, would allow time to be gained.

The Chambers, however, with little faith in these peaceful prognostics, resumed their questions and their irritating debates; M. de Freycinet found himself as harassed as M. Waddington had been. Uncertainty was abroad, the majority felt it had no one to depend upon. Gambetta was elected President of the Chamber, but by only 259 votes out of 308, there being forty white bulletins, whereas in his earlier election he had had 314 votes. "This is checkmate against Opportunism!" remarked M. Haentjens. Rumour had it that Gambetta would decline the position. For the presidency in the Senate M. Martel was elected, but his health did not allow him to occupy the chair.

The Changes in the personal staff we Reorganisa-continued even in those administration of the Which had most vigorously resisted. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was reorganised in its central administration by decree of January 23rd.

M. Desprey, director of political matters, who h survived the Empire and the fall of the Duc Decaz was appointed ambassador to the Papal See in pla of the Marquis de Gabriac, retired; Baron de Coursucceeded him in the direction of political matter M. Jules Herbette became responsible for the offic staff; M. Bourée was made minister in China; a decree of February 1st, M. Camille Barrère, t publicist, was made delegate for France in t European Commission for the Danube.

At the War Office, in consequence of the incider at Bordeaux and M. Raynal's inquiry, numero changes were made in the Territorial Army; colonels, 61 leaders of battalions, 14 leaders squadrons, were degraded.

A new Bill on Customs tariffs was discussed in the Chamber at the urgent instance of Gambetta, as brought forward, December 2nd, by M. Maléyieu The different parties were coming into contact. proposal from M. Camille Sée for establishing Lyce for Girls was discussed in the Chamber. Mu ardour and eloquence were expended on the Bill to the right of meeting, brought on by M. Naqua A counter-project from M. Louis Blanc demand full liberty for meetings and associations. The was the thesis absolute, and was supported by the Right in the name of Liberty.

The question of religious associations was all posed, that is to say, of religious communiti-

M. Madier de Montjau and M. Henri Brisson spoke against the plan of M. Louis Blanc, whose countermeasure was thrown out.

As to the conditions of the right of meeting, the Commission was more liberal than the Government, which was defeated upon Article IV, but obtained a disputed victory on Article VII, by which "clubs" were interdicted. Memories of the first Revolution and of 1848 aroused a hesitating support of 257 votes against 180. This was, however, only a first reading, it was obvious that the Ministry did not command the Chamber.

And was it surer of the Senate? The debate on the Bill reforming the Higher Board of Public Instruction proved that a hard fight was needed. The Duc de Broglie, with marked emphasis and bitterness, touched on the religious question:—

Do you not understand this power, feeble at first but now so much increased? . . . you thought to satisfy it by sacrificing the schools of the communities, and now it asks of you the churches. Do not deceive yourselves, it will not stop at this. And it is more consistent than are you: it has all the implacable force of passion and of hatred, while you have but the uncertainty and incoherence of half-measures and half-courage.

M. Jules Ferry pleaded in the name of the State, and defended the independence of society against the claims of the Church. There was a sharp debate. For the first time, the dissidents of the Left Centre separated from the majority. However, the Government measure was voted by 147 against 129. On Monday, February 23rd, the Chamber adopted the measure as modified by the Senate. M. Paul Bert described this as a first victory; it had been, however, sharply contested. The position of the Government was hardly well assured. The Left

began the attack on January 22nd. M. Louis Blar produced a motion demanding full and comple amnesty. The motion was sent to the bureau M. Jean Casimir-Perier was appointed "reporter" the commission, and, on February 7th, decided 1 reject it. A debate followed, February 12th, it was the first "political" engagement; the Cabinet ha had a month's respite. M. Louis Blanc sustaine the attack. Why this continued silence on tl part of the administration? of what was it afraid An end must be made of prolonged suffering, dangerous agitation must be cut short withou delay. M. Casimir-Perier replied. A close frier of Gambetta, M. Antonin Proust, supported the proposal and asked the Government to take stell towards the amnesty. "Let us look no more to wards the Past, but towards the Future; what the country desires are reforms." At this point M. (Freycinet was expected. He showed much fines in dealing with the difficulties.

Have you really imagined that within the space of a we we should reconsider our decision? The country is at prese not prepared to receive the Amnesty. Whether it ever will I am unable to say. But I do know that if ever the Amnes becomes a possibility, it can only be so under two condition firstly, a calm attitude towards the question: secondly, longer any appearance of its being a means of opposition to t Government. I use the word "appearance" for I hope at believe that many who have signed the proposition are no advisaries of the Government. (From several benches of the Leg "No! No! you are right!")

Could anything have been more skilful, both to the treatment of dissentients and for gaining time?

After a speech by M. Madier de Montjau, M. Lov

Blanc's motion was thrown out by 316 votes against 114.

The Government was consolidated.

Now, however, came attack from the Right, and this within the Senate. The majority here was certainly Republican, and this had been proved by the election of certain permanent senators, Dr. Paul Broca, M. John Lemoinne, the brilliant editor of the *Débats*, M. Albert Grévy, brother of the President of the Republic. Yet, however firm this was, the factor of conscience, or, as Jules Simon puts it, the cry of Liberty, had to be taken into account.

After gaining a victory over the Amnesty in the Chamber, would the Government triumph in the Senate over Article VII? The measure was discussed on Monday, February 23rd. After a general debate, centred mainly round the Jesuits, the different articles and amendments were passed under review. Speeches were made by MM. Lucien Brun and Buffet in support of the "mixed jury." All the articles were adopted up to Article VI inclusive. Then came Article VII—this was the centre of the fray. M. Berenger declared against it, accusing the Government of casting discord into the Republican ranks. M. Buffet spoke with his customary vigour and insistance:—

If the Roman Catholics constitute a political party, this is your own doing. If you had not attacked the Catholic Faith, the liberty of Catholics, they would never have thought of forming such a party. If you stigmatise as *clerical* every man who fights for his convictions then every cause has its clericals. If every cause has zealous adherents, why not that of Catholicism too?

Speech by M. Jules Ferry replied by a long and Jules Ferry powerful harangue laden with quotations

and with proofs. It was a history of secondary and higher education in France since the Revolution; it was the continuous and unsolvable debate going back beyond the decrees of Valimesnil, the enumeration and analysis of all the measures that had so often tried to stem the ultramontane tide and failed. Non-authorised communities—what did they represent in a lay state if not the influence of Rome? Why this passive resistance to the State in which they found themselves? Why did some refuse while others accepted? What was the mystery in this? And what confidence could be reposed in those instructors of the rising generation, who grouped together in order to evade the laws of the State?

The educational methods practised by the Jesuits, the historical, political and social aspects of the problem were passed under review:—

If one is indifferent to these things, if one thinks that the doctrines taught by so powerful a community with such extensive influence over the growing generation of France, that the establishment of these doctrines in our midst, is a thing of little consequence with no bearing on the State, one must then follow the conclusion to its end and decide on the separation of the Church from the State. But if Church and State are still to hold together, we must follow the traditions of our predecessors and acquaint ourselves with what is being daily preached in the 40,000 churches that there are within our land. . . . Yes, since the expression has been used, it is indeed the conflict of Revolution and of Counter-Revolution. We accept the conflict, but we must use the arms transmitted to us by tradition. . . . It is for this that in this conflict, which is the work of the present time and which is a worthy cause, we call on all to join it who have received the inheritance of the French Revolution, who revere its principles and devote themselves to its service, who believe that we owe as much duty to our predecessors as towards our descendants, and that our first duty is to save the soul of

the new generation from the influence of those who disdain the political and social order of the world.

This admirable speech, the powerful effort of a man fighting for a great cause, aroused no slight emotion. As he resumed his seat, the great speaker met with a tumult of applause and contradiction. He was answered by Jules Simon, whose thesis is well known—the Liberal thesis. His quiet voice, his persuasive eloquence rising above itself, held the attention of his hearers and gained conviction. The Left grew irritated at the moral violence done to it and attacked him, but the speaker continued, attacking in his turn:—

Indeed, I find you most imprudent. . . . It might be said that the Republicans, on attaining power, use nothing but the oppression they have taken from their adversaries. . . . No, indeed! France has nothing to fear from these independent schools. Has not England, have not the United States, also a soul to save? Yet neither Great Britain nor the Republic of the United States has any institution analogous with our University. . . . Do not forge arms against the liberty of instruction, any one of which could serve to injure the liberty of meeting and the liberty of the Press. Do not allow it to be said that you can do nothing but proscribe and that you suppress Liberty as soon as you find her inconvenient. Liberty must be loved, even when she stands on the side of one's opponents. He who loves Liberty for what she does for him alone does not love her aright, he is not worthy of loving her, he cannot even understand her.

The Senate was uncertain, no one could say what the fate of the project was to be; everything depended on the last debate. Should the Senate risk itself at the bidding of Jules Simon? Should it decide to checkmate the Government? Should it break with the majority in the Chamber? M. de Freycinet implored the Senate not to abandon the main army. "It is impolitic," said Jules Simon. "It is most politic," replied de Freycinet. And the

President of the Council uttered words apparently conciliatory, but threatening in effect. Article VII was the work of an extremely moderate Cabinet, that of M. Waddington. After the strife of May the Sixteenth it presented the minimum of precautions against a campaign begun and continued by all the foes of the Republic with the help of the more active of the clericals.

I declare for my own part that had I been able to prevent the bringing of Article VII before the Parliament, I should have been only too relieved. But you may be assured that no Cabinet, having rejected Article VII, could have held out for twenty-four hours against the other Chamber. It was voted by a majority of 340 . . . Would it not be puerile to imagine that a Cabinet which had offended such a number could count upon their help?

Baron de Lareintz exclaimed:-

We are not here to execute the Jacobin desires of the Chamber of Deputies!

M. de Freycinet, however, rose beneath the blow:—

If this measure is not passed, the executive power will, in any case, be forced to apply much harsher laws than these. Vote for Article VII, it is the most moderate you can obtain. Despite its inconveniences do not doubt its being a measure of prudence.

One man rose—it was Dufaure. It may be said that all the spirit of Thiers rose with him. Dufaure was the very personification of the "Conservative Republic," which had tried to tutor the young Republic now deliberately breaking from her rule. No kind of reproach can fall upon Dufaure; he had no bitterness, no jealousy, he seemed a returning figure of the Past:—

Whatever you may say, Article VII raises the gravest of

all questions—the religious question . . . This measure has as precedents, the law of sacrilege, the September laws, the law of general safety. It is a reactionary measure. You desire moral unity? There is no middle course—you must then adopt the system of the Empire. I refuse to judge the Jesuits. Must then the Senate always yield? It has done so on the question of the partial amnesty. Will it do so on the subject of the magistracy, will it do so to-day? M. de Freycinet appeals to the conciliatory feelings of the Senate. He has declared his own sentiments in terms that undoubtedly express his real thoughts: then let an effort be made before the next reading of the Bill to produce an acceptable measure for the Chambers. As to the Senate, let it continue faithfully to defend high principles and liberty—let it reject Article VII of the measure!

Then came the voting. The Article was rejected by 148 votes against 129. Twenty-eight senators of the Left Centre voted with the Right, among these, besides the above-mentioned speakers, were MM. Dauphin, Denormandie, Gouin, Krantz, Laboulaye, Malleville, Rampon, de Rozières. Eight abstained from voting, amongst these were MM. Faye, Admiral Fourichon, Littré, etc. The Republic of Jules Simon, Dufaure and Thiers cried Halt! to the Republic of Ferry, Brisson and Gambetta. Was this the great division? Was the Senate alone to lead the country on to moderate ideas? The President of the Republic held his peace.

Monday, March 15th, saw the second deliberation. Would the President of the Council—a man of eloquence, ideas and skilful tact—find the measure that Dufaure had desired him to bring? He mounted the tribunal and drily remarked that Article VII was still the point at issue:—

If this measure be thrown out we see no other alternative but the application of the laws: and the Government is forced to accept the situation resulting from the voting in the Senate.

Evidently it was the Chamber that would have the last word, and it energetically supported the Ministry that held with it. On March 16th the leaders of the four groups of the Left, MM. Devès, Philippoteaux, Spüller and Georges Périn, questioned the Cabinet: "All the groups affirm that the special legislation with regard to the communities is still in force." Even the Left Centre agreed with this view. M. de Freycinet could only acknowledge the agreement of the Government and the majority:—

We shall apply the laws. . . . For this delicate task both prudence and firmness are required: we ask you to support us by the expression of your confidence.

M. Devès' resolution was thus expressed:—

The Chamber, confiding in the Government and depending on its firmness in the application of the laws relating to nonauthorised associations, passes a resolution to this effect.

The Extreme Left found this inadequate, and twenty-two of its members abstained from the vote, as did also thirteen members of the Centre, five of the Republican Union, four of the Left. The majority was 324 to 125.

The Chamber then passed without debate the Bill on Higher Education (with the exception of Article VII) in so far as it had been accepted by the Senate. The law was brought into force on March 18th.

On March 22nd the Chambers adjourned for the Easter holidays.

II

The The Cabinet did not allow matters to "Decrees" drag. Hardly had the Chambers adjourned than, on the day after the Easter festival, the famous decrees of March 29th and 30th appeared in the Journal Officiel.

The first of these allowed the Jesuits three months for dispersing and evacuating the establishments they occupied. The second announced that all non-authorised communities should become regulated within the next three months under penalty of incurring the application of the laws.¹

These measures were based upon Article II of the Concordat law of 18th Germinal, Year X:—

Archbishops and bishops may, with the authorisation of the Government, establish in their dioceses orthodox chapters and seminaries. All other ecclesiastical establishments are suppressed.

Also upon Article IV of the law of 3rd Messidor, Year XII:—

No community or association of men or women may be formed from henceforth under pretext of religion, unless formally authorised by an Imperial decree on the basis of the statutes and regulations. . . .

For many years these laws had not been enforced. An inquiry made in 1877 discovered the existence of five hundred non-authorised communities, numbering nearly twenty-two thousand brethren and sisters. The vast amount of effort and interest, the diversity of opinions and activities, represented

¹ See the text of this in L'Année Politique 1880, page 440.

by these institutions and attacked by the decrees, needs to be appreciated. The Republic, with many tasks to perform, early declared war against the religious activities of an extremely numerous and zealous portion of the nation.

The campaign was incontestably determined by political reasons. Nearly everywhere, and for many years, the *curé* had been the stronghold of Conservatism. What is worth while in case of victory may be useful in defeat.

The measure had also other determining causes. The Protestant spirit, so long allied with Liberal teaching, was by no means absent from the councils headed first by Waddington and then by de Freycinet and Le Royer. Free-thought and Freemasonry intervened no less energetically, convinced that nothing could be done in France until she was released from Roman Catholic influence. Michelet, Quinet, were the guiding spirits of this generation. With energy and resolution the statesmen of the Republic advanced towards the goal they had set themselves according to their lights and consciences. Strong convictions were at work, and the debates they kindled were aflame.

President Grévy is said to have hesitated before signing the decrees, but they were received with calmness, if not with favour. The Jesuits were tolerated rather than accepted, and, with the exception of the upper middle classes, who confided their children to their care, the mass of the people distrusted them, retaining the unfavourable opinion spread by means of books and popular plays.

The development of non-authorised communities was astonishing in its extent. In every quarter of the towns and even in the villages, stately edi-

fices enclosed by walls and mysteries, attracted attention to the progress of clericalism. Yet even these gave no adequate idea of all it meant. The services rendered by the communities was, of course, appreciated—their hospitals, their schools, their dispensaries, their religious and moral teaching, even their technical work. But beneath all this something of design was felt, combined effort towards a hidden goal. The indifferent majority shared the apprehension of the violent as to "the government of priests."

In how many communes, with the help of reactionary municipalities, had there not been attempted in the time of the National Assembly a sort of Inquisition, a White Terror! The provocations of the Catholic press—L'Univers, Le Pays repeated and exaggerated by local papers, had nearly everywhere embittered the feeling on this subject. Among more fiery races this would have led to bloodshed. This feeling of irritation culminated in Article VII, which might perhaps have satisfied general opinion. M. de Freycinet had introduced it as a "transaction," and this was quite the character of the measure. It was desired to make the bridle felt by controlling to some extent the sphere of education. M. de Freycinet had indeed threatened the "application of the existing laws," yet so mildly as not to have been taken quite seriously. There had been a refusal to yield. Well then! the time had come for action, the laws should certainly be applied, so much the worse for those who had not understood, for those who did not wish to understand, and those who had again allowed themselves to be led by the imprudent, the extremists, the matamores of the press or of the

sacristy! ¹ There was division on this subject even amongst the members of the Right. Prince Napoleon, acting as a claimant, approved of the decrees, breaking once for all with Imperial Catholicism and taking rank amongst the *Blues* (Letter of April 5th).

But what was still more important—while the Roman Catholic press was fulminating against the decrees, the highest authority of all, the Pope himself, kept silence. On receiving M. Desprey, the Ambassador, on April 6th, the Pope alluded sadly to the decrees of March 29th, but with reserve; he had no reproaches, only sorrow: "We are grieved to hear that certain measures are contemplated against the religious communities. In our eyes all the communities are of equal value. . . ."

Leo XIII did not intend to renounce, at the first difficulty, his system of temporisation and pacification. The Church had already been through much, especially in Germany, and yet notwithstanding matters seemed about to be arranged.

The Chambers reassembled on April Reassembly 20th. M. Martel, by reason of age and inchambers firmity, was retiring from the presidency of the Senate; he was re-elected, however, though only temporarily. There were rather sharp discussions in the Senate over the reconstruction of the Cabinet Council and on the measure which required the holding of a State diploma for those

¹ Cardinal de Bonnechose wrote, on March 26th, 1880, to Pope Leo XIII: "I can but acknowledge that the thoughtless imprudence of many Catholic laymen has given occasion for this violent reaction against religious communities and against the Church."

desiring to enter public professions: the Government obtained but a qualified success.

Within the Chamber M. Godelle inquired as to Algeria; M. Albert Grévy was brought to book, and the administration of the colony since the arrival of the Civil Governor was depicted as being given over to pillage. The Algerian question was to prove for many years a serious difficulty for the central Government.

M. de Freycinet had profited by the short vacation in order to arrange things in his Ministry for Foreign Affairs. During the first weeks of his office, after having modified the framework of the central administration. he had taken a measure which was to have great influence on the study of French history; he decided that the archives of the department, till then guarded by absolute secrecy, should be communicated to students, supervised by a special committee of competent men. History is the only true mistress of democracies.

Important changes were made in the embassies. M. Léon Say, ex-Minister for Finance, accepted the embassy in London in place of Admiral Pothuau (April 30th). M. Decrais was appointed to Brussels in place of M. John Lemoinne who had been designed for this post to replace M. Duchétil, now appointed to Vienna.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs judged it expedient to explain his foreign policy in a Note addressed to the ambassadors (April 16th). Relations with the Powers were cordial. The execution of the Treaty of Berlin was being accomplished by means of an exchange of views between the Cabinets. The question of the Jews in Roumania had been arranged by mutual concessions; that of the new VOL. IV.

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frontier of Greece was still undecided, but Montenegro and Turkey were negotiating on the subject of a line that could be approved of by the Powers.

In Egypt, after the departure of Ismaïl, the two Powers were endeavouring to settle the financial difficulties:—

It would, however, be misunderstanding the character of our policy in the country to look for its guiding principle in the desire to guarantee the situation for the holders of the Debt. The liquidation of the financial embarrassments of Egypt appears to us the indispensable preliminary for a thorough reorganisation in the administration, and it is to this matter that we attach the most importance.

The circular also touches on a matter that for some time had been injuring the relations between France and Russia just as some hope of a rapprochement was being entertained—this was the Hartmann affair.¹ It closed with an important declaration which was probably the reason of its existence:—

It has been supposed by some that the decrees relating to religious communities might bring about the abandonment of our secular policy in the East and the Far East, and that we might cease to protect the missionaries who contribute to the extension of our influence and renown. This is a complete mistake. . . . The measures taken in no way affect the conditions of our protection of missionaries abroad.

Gambetta's expression can be called to mind: "Anti-clericalism is not an article of export."

¹ The Russian Government demanded the extradition of Hartmann, a Russian Nihilist who had helped in an attempt on the life of Alexander II. The French Government did not know whether to deliver up Hartmann or to refuse the extradition. He was finally banished from the country. See Andrieux's Mémoires d'un préfet de police.

There was in this, therefore, a system the application of which would lead to many difficulties. French traditions, French establishments, French influence in the East form part of the national inheritance. Despite the too evident contradiction that had to be done away with in the establishments supported and developed abroad, the Republican Governments long made it a matter of duty not to allow an incomparable and irreplaceable work to perish. It was thought at that time that home quarrels would die out in presence of the foreigner, and that men would work together for the good of the Mother Country.

The decrees necessarily occasioned a parliamentary debate. M. Lamy, of the Left, an earnest Catholic and an eminent orator, brought forward an inquiry on May 3rd. This meant a duel between himself and M. Cazot, the Keeper of the Seals. The argument of M. Lamy was as follows: The Imperial decrees invoked by the decrees of March 29th had been really abrogated by the Penal Code, which was of later date; they had been overruled either by more recent measures or by time and non-application, therefore they were "superannuated."

"Superannuated!" replied M. Cazot, "They

"Superannuated!" replied M. Cazot, "They are permanent, under the Monarchy as under the Republic . . . unless it be claimed that the Republic is the only Government which has no right to defend itself." The resolution pure and simple demanded by the Government was voted by 347 voices against 133. Alone of all the Left M. Lamy voted against it.

This was one step gained—the easiest step. Opposition was reserved for the Senate. Other obstacles were rising against the endeavours of

the Cabinet. Were secret forces at work against it?

The Chamber was discussing the measure as to the magistracy, on which it was divided into two equal parties, and it was only passed by 199 votes against 195 after the Army Administration Bill had been dealt with.

Then followed the Bill on the right of meeting, already voted on the first reading. M. Louis Blanc was vehemently combated; he desired in the name of general principles to legislate at the same time on the right of association, whereas a large number objected to this second point, on the ground that it would benefit the religious communities. The counter-project of M. Louis Blanc having been thrown out, the Bill, amended by agreement between the commission and the Government, was passed on the second reading, May 15th. M. Lepère, however, Minister for the Interior, who had taken up one of the articles of the measure rejected M. Constans by the Chamber, thought it necessary to resign office. By a decree of May 17th, for the Interior M. Constans, Under-Secretary of State, took his place and was himself replaced by M. Fallières. Both were coming men, and both belonged to that portion of the Republican Union which had

¹ See in the Vie du Cardinal de Bonnechose, vol. ii, (p. 635) the letter from the Cardinal to Pope Leo XIII, dated March 26th, 1880! "Before leaving Paris I went to see M. de Freycinet, the President of the Council. I laid stress on the political reasons which should prevent the Government from making such a mistake. M. de Freycinet did not combat my arguments, but he repeatedly mentioned the terrible difficulty in which he was placed. This originated in the imprudent engagements he had undertaken out of fear of the formidable majority, and of his leader, who was leaning heavily upon the Ministry.

voted against the Government; contradictions, however, could no longer be reckoned.

M. Constans soon had occasion to show his mettle with regard to a manifestation announced for May 23rd at Père-Lachaise in memory of the "Bloodstained Week." This was the first of such manifestations since the Commune, but also the first manifestation of vigour on the part of the Republic in the maintenance of order—both the evil and its remedy! So overwhelming a force was opposed to the mob that the demonstration came to nothing. M. Clémenceau questioned the Government on the subject of Republican principles. M. Constans replied:—

We have the charge of the public peace, and you may rest assured, gentlemen, that we shall keep order in the streets. You maintain that we violate public liberty. On the contrary, it is as much to us as it is to you. . . . and it is precisely because we respect this liberty that we endeavour to assure it against those who try to trouble our minds and our streets. . . .

This was language that would be handed down to all Republican Governments, of whatever their degree.

The Municipal Council of Paris had passed a vote of censure against the measures taken by the Prefect of Police; this vote was annulled by decree.

The embassy of M. Léon Say in England Embassy of was to be of short duration. He had M. Léon Say been sent to London in order to examine, together with the English Ministers, the future conditions of commercial relations between France and England. For over a year past, the greater number of the commercial treaties then lapsing had only been provisionally renewed. During July, 1878, Italy had begun an economic rupture; the productions of both France and Italy would have been subjected to

the application of general tariffs had not an agreement been concluded between the two Governments with the object of applying provisionally the régime of "the more favoured nation" while awaiting the settlement of new tariffs. The right of extending these commercial treaties of which the time-limit had expired was only accorded to the Government by the Chamber up to June 30th, 1880.

M. Tirard, Minister of Commerce, had stood before the Chamber as the champion of moderate policy, that which remained attached to the principles of Free Trade, agreeing to a general tariff in so far only as it meant a "means of negotiation" and defence against those Powers raising barriers against French productions.

Since it came into being in 1791, this was the first time that the general tariff had been generally reconsidered. In spite of the great commercial expansion that had marked the early years of the Republic France had to see most of the markets barred to her productions. Her surplus production, further increased by prosperity, was accumulating manufactured goods in all her warehouses. An agricultural crisis was beginning to be intensely felt. The phylloxera plague was at its height. The uneasiness was general, and there had been considerable suffering since the hard winter of 1878.

The cotton industry, that since the treaties of 1860 had never ceased to protest against the rivalry of England, having the good fortune to number men like Jules Ferry and Méline amongst its champions, had headed a Protectionist campaign, and combining with its own interests those of industry and agriculture, was now endeavouring to obtain the help of the vine-growing departments.

M. Tirard refused to sound an alarm. The exports of France, he maintained, were in advance of the imports by 1,200 to 1,300 millions. The suffering originated in certain special causes, and required but a little careful treatment:—

In order to reckon with this depression, we ask you to maintain the *status quo*, that is to say, to take the present conventional tariff, increased to 24 per cent. on certain articles, as a general tariff and as basis of negotiation with foreign Powers, and we thereby undertake not to go below the prices relating to this conventional tariff.

This was still on the lines of the commercial treaties but with rather stronger defences and more careful supervision on the part of Parliament. M. Méline proved a redoubtable adversary for M. Tirard. Since Jules Ferry had ceased to superintend the Customs, being succeeded by the venerable M. Maléyieux, M. Méline had been the leading spirit on the Board. He became the champion of the cotton industry, as also of agricultural interests. His expert knowledge on these matters, his practical influence and eloquence, had made him a recognised authority. With theories he dealt but little. He explained the grievances, showed the root of the evil to lie in the indifference of French traders, and pleaded for more energetic dealings. The commercial treaties, those of 1860 in particular, had not afforded what the Empire had expected. Such a trade as that of France could not be lightly overcome by foreign competition when this is indemnified by a taxation that, in consequence of regrettable events, burdens national production.

The present crisis could only be dealt with by a break in the close relations between French and

English trade. Protection was indispensable for the welfare of native industries.

The discussion on this subject extended throughout the month of February. MM. Keller, des Rotours, Richard Waddington, Rouvier, Allain-Targé, took active part in it. Gambetta and his friends were still for Free Trade. These debates, remarkable for the talent and competency they brought forward, belong to technical history. At the same time they have much influence on general history. The Republic was entering the economic phase of modern thought; the search for "outlets" prepares the way for colonial policy and world policy; the relations of the peoples will be soon subordinated to the balance of commerce.

The month of March saw much hot interest on either side. The Board desired to gain time, whereas Gambetta was for speedy settlement. The Chamber was, on the whole, more for the Government than for the Board. Urgency was voted by 276 against 160. On the motion of M. Lebaudy, the Chamber decided to divide the Bill in four sections, which should be successively discussed, each being the subject of a special measure which, in order to gain time, should be sent to the Senate.

Section I should deal with animal and vegetable substances;

Section II with mineral matters;

Section III with manufactured articles:

Section IV with out-going tariffs, special taxes on products imported from other but the lands of production, special taxes on products coming from the colonies and possessions of France.

The first section was passed on March 22nd, just as the Chamber was rising for the Easter holidays. At

its reassembly, on April 24th, the second section also was passed—in conformity with the liberal tendency of the Government.

Did the Government, on the strength of its victories, desire to bring the goodwill of England to bear upon its system? Did it desire to give the Protectionists a proof of its firmness? Did it not yield to a certain amount of financial pressure, always perceptible in the relations between France and England, which it was not strong enough to resist? Whatever may have been the reason, as soon as so much had been determined, and the Senate acquainted with the measure as a whole, M. Léon Say was dispatched to London in order to communicate with the British Government.

He remained a month in England. What he sought was an agreement that would satisfy the French Protectionists and, at the same time, maintain commercial harmony on broad principles between the two countries. On June 5th he wrote to Gambetta that he thought he had traced the outlines of a future understanding with the English. A scheme for the protocol had been already signed.

On June 4th the debate on the tariffs was concluded in the Chamber. The four sections of the Bill had been sent up to the Senate, but the Senate, on the whole, was far more Protectionist than was the Chamber, and was also in no hurry. On June 15th M. Feray interrogated the Government on the subject of M. Léon Say's mission in London. M. Pouyer-Guertier supported M. Feray. The Government was reproached with having begun negotiations before obtaining the consent of the Senate. M. de Freycinet declared that nothing had been concluded, and that the document exchanged with the English

Cabinet had been nothing more than a mere exchange of views. Matters remained undecided.

M. Léon Say had no desire to insist. He had just been elected to the presidency of the Senate in place of M. Martel, who could no longer perform his functions, and was succeeded in London by M. Challemel-Lacour (June 11th). A rather pointed question from Mr. O'Donnell as to the part played at Lyons during the war by M. Challemel-Lacour proved that home differences often find echoes abroad; however, the House of Commons paid no attention to O'Donnell's motion.

M. Challemel-Lacour was replaced in Berne by M. Emmanuel Arago. M. Tissot became ambassador at Constantinople, succeeding M. Henri Fournier, who was placed on the retired list (June 15th).

General Aymard, Governor of Paris, being dead, was succeeded by General Clinchant, and General Clinchant was replaced at the head of the VI Army Corps by General Saussier.

Gambetta's influence was noticed everywhere. It was his party, his men, who were occupying the roads to power. Yet not without resistance. On June 19th, the quartier of Père-Lachaise (XX Arrondissement) elected M. Trinquet, who had been transported after the Commune, against M. Letalle by 2,353 votes. Letalle was the candidate of the République Française. Gambetta had personally supported him in a public meeting of June 19th. And yet, on that very day, Gambetta had announced the most serious concession that could be made to the Advanced party—he had declared his agreement, and that of the Government, with the cause of the full Amnesty.

It was one of the most trying moments of a

difficult time. Gambetta, himself much harassed, harassed the Cabinet in his turn. He still hoped to prevent what he most feared, a premature schism in the Republican party. De Freycinet, on the other hand, who, a few months previously, had declared so definitely against the full Amnesty, was not prepared to shift his ground, and Jules Grévy supported him in this.

Gambetta wished to try his power. On June 16th he wrote in a private letter:—

We are in much uncertainty; this Cabinet does not know what it wants or does not want; at one moment it is prepared imperiously to exact the Amnesty from the Head of the State, and the next moment it affirms itself unable to impose a strong policy either on the President or on the Senate.

I have been trying to strengthen all this indecision; the general feeling is growing irritated, the Chamber is uneasy; it is time to make an end of all this, which will only lead to disaster.

For nine o'clock this evening, at the Foreign Office (de Freycinet's), I have arranged to meet the opponents from the Left Centre, both of the Senate and the Chamber, and I shall make a desperate attempt to rally them to a speedy settlement of the Amnesty. Should they resist, much will devolve upon me; should they consent, even half-heartedly, the future can be considered as assured.

From the moment he began to take this tone, Gambetta was the master. The meeting took place. The president of the Chamber, supported by M. Hêbrard, editor of Le Temps, dictated his desires, The "political reason," as it was termed, carried all before it. Gambetta feared to lose Paris in the forthcoming elections; while the Right fought desperately around the religious question, he wished to avoid breaking with the Advanced Left, even at the price of greater concessions. Were there to be any scission before the elections, any Government would be impossible; it would be disaster.

Hence, Gambetta declared in favour of the Amnesty, and gained the day. A favourable circumstance was in the measure that appointed July 14th as the Fête Day of the Republic and for the presentation of the new flags to the army.

What date more propitious for obliterating the traces of the Civil War! M. de Freycinet abandoned his scruples, and the Bill was passed June 19th.

III

The Decrees of March 29 in the Senate the Cabinet had to turn towards the Senate in order to settle the fight waged around the Decrees. Petitions signed by thousands of names, more or less authentic, at all events easily gained in the large Catholic districts, gave a pretext for the protestations of the Right.

M. Rousse, ex-bâtonnier of the Law, one of the cleverest, warmest-hearted and most strong-minded men of his day, had made researches proving the illegality of the decrees. Throughout official circles, among the upper middle classes, through secret agents and through women, a lively campaign had been begun. The members of the Cabinet found life extremely difficult, assailed as they were at every time and place. Cardinals and bishops appealed to the conscience of the President of the Republic. The chapel in the Elysée, like the cathedrals in the towns and the churches in the country, was full of tears and prayers. Persecution and martyrdom were spoken of. The dread of being obliged to carry out the decrees with but wavering assistance from the magistracy and the army, decided the President of the Council to take precautions and prepare his

ground. It was the reproach of tyranny and violence that must have been most painful to the kindly soul of de Freycinet; many were the accusations launched against the Cabinet, and many reasons, also, no doubt, the parliamentary reason, for he had his ears open to all whispers, decided de Freycinet to prudence. He had received at his office "half the bishops of France." To every one alike he "declared his conciliatory spirit, his benevolent intentions, and his desire to see a more liberal rule for associations and the mitigation of some of the conditions."

It was said that M. Lepère had announced that the decrees would not apply to female communities. Mgr. Lavigerie had obtained formal assurance from the president of the Council "that the religious communities established in Algeria should not be disturbed." The Archbishop of Algiers had believed that an understanding with Rome would be quite welcome. On leaving the presence of the Minister this assurance gave rise to further hopes. With a little more determination, and suppleness, who knows what satisfactory concessions might not have been obtained!

Delay and indiscretion proved, however, injurious to the Catholic cause; the more violent spirits plunged into the fray, and the debate was held in the Senate before anything had been arranged.

The two most eminent orators of the party, the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier—most moderate and liberal of parliamentarians, one of the founders of the Republic—and the Duc de Broglie, most astute and redoubtable of the foes of this régime, championed the cause of the communities.

It was a fine show of oratory. The Duc d'Audiffret-

Pasquier proved himself, as always, full of ardour and enthusiasm. He fought with conviction and determination for his "altars," for religion, for liberty. His speech tended to stir the hesitating, but it was singularly embarrassing for the Cabinet, especially in the passages in which de Freycinet was flattered, amid discreet allusions to his semi-confidences:—

In this policy, Monsieur le président du Conseil, you are not your true self. Why have you not realised the promises of the Constitution of 1848, why have you not accorded liberty of association? Why not await the fate of the measure brought before the Chamber by M. Marcel Barthe, of that brought before the Senate by M. Dufaure?

The law on association was precisely the road that M. de Freycinet himself had indicated. Everywhere the name was used—in it lay the hope of salvation. But there was to be much disillusionment.

The Duc de Broglie did not refuse some acknowledgment of the good intentions of M. de Freycinet. He believed that in the mind of the President of the Council "there was still a secret desire not to urge to the utmost the execution of the decrees." But he was aggressive in his manner of dealing with the man he already looked on as his prisoner. The Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier had made the thrust, but it was de Broglie who drove it home:—

You have used the strange expression of "transaction" as applied to Article VII; this is the first time that the word has been used in Parliament with regard to the execution of a law. The Government offered—what? The non-execution of a law! Is then the law the personal property of the Government?

There was again a mention of transaction, of milder and more measured schemes:—

Do not let us deceive ourselves, neither you nor we. You can do nothing; you are not free. Let us keep nothing back, there is no mystery about it now, you are subject to the commands of a master who is no longer concealed in any way, and who no longer takes the trouble to spare the feelings and the dignity of his servants. This master, whose name is known to all, is he who has proclaimed Clericalism as an enemy.

M. de Freycinet, treated in such peremptory fashion, counted on the help of more prudent members of the Right. He defended the attitude of the Government, but with much tact and moderation. He spoke but of "precautions," "guarantees," of "preventive measures," and did not spare "his good intentions."

The Communities have been ill advised. It has been attempted to place the Government in a false position. . . . Now that the end of the time-limit given to the Communities is at hand, I adjure you not to adopt what has been proposed against it. You may once more be convinced that you would be giving imprudent counsel to the Communities; they would see in it an encouragement for the attitude they have assumed and a new motive for perseverance in the same. And besides this, you would be making it impossible for the Government to realise towards them the intentions that I affirm to be good, whatever you may say to the contrary.

The "transaction," therefore, was offered once again. The Moderate Right seized the outstretched hand. M. Bocher, who replied to de Freycinet, said, after criticising the decrees:—

It is no enemy who speaks to you. Keep back from the perilous descent that will inevitably lead you to violence and persecution.

All this was fairly peaceful in tone. The bishops had advised moderation, and the Pope was behind them.

By 143 votes against 127, the return of the petitions to the Ministers was rejected. The Govern-

ment again won the day, yet at how high a price, if the soft words of de Freycinet were no more than such, and if his advance to the Right had no real meaning! For, on the other hand, the Right was exacting; the Left was impatient. There was a dread of wounding honourable sentiments, yet the impulse of reaction clamoured for obedience. Gambetta's hand lay heavy on the Government, and, with all its protection, gave a grip of menace.

Five days after the debate within the Senate (June 29th)? the Jesuits were expelled from the 31 departments in which their provincial establishments were situated. An extension of grace up to August 31st was accorded to those houses in which the education of the young was carried on.

It was not the path of justice that was being followed, but the voice of the administrative power. The Prefects acting in the name of the Government, the tribunals would only intervene in cases where violence was committed. Instructions to this effect were sent to the *Procureurs-Généraux*. Two hundred magistrates des parquets gave in their resignation, in obedience, it is said, to the advice of the committees of the Right. They were immediately replaced.

There was some attempt at resistance. In Paris, Rue de Sèvres, where the Jesuits had their chief establishment, they only yielded to force. M. Andrieux, Prefect of Police, arrived on the scene at the dawn of June 30th, wearing "pearl grey gloves." The Jesuits retired, chanting psalms and solemnly blessing the prostrate Catholic crowd.

¹ See M. Andrieux's Souvenirs d'un Préfet de Police, vol. i. p. 229: "The clearing of the house lasted a long time; it was a

Mgr. Freppel interrogated the Minister for the Interior on the carrying out of the decrees. M. Constans replied that no one in France stood above the laws. The next day there was a discussion on the retirement of the magistrates. Naturally these debates were of an extremely heated nature; it is not with impunity that matters of conscience can be attacked.

However, as the Republic was preparing to celebrate the triumph of the Fourteenth of July, and to distribute the flags to the new regiments, it seemed evident that the full Amnesty was necessary in order to forget all civil strife.

Monday, June 21st, saw a debate on the measure, which was reported on favourably by M. Joyon. M. Casimir-Perier was against it. M. de Freycinet briefly explained the reasons that had led the Government to a new opinion on the subject of a measure that, a few months previously, it had deemed should be delayed. "We have decided that amnesties are above all works of 'opportunity,'" said he. Loud comments arose on every side—the measure was thus baptized. Gambetta's influence was seen. He had announced his intention of speaking, so left the presidential chair and sat down near the Ministry. The Amnesty was his "affair." It was M. Paul de Cassagnac who undertook to pave his way:—

"As we have often said, the Government has never been below the platform on which I speak; it has been above it—at the

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painful matter for those responsible for its accomplishment. The police met with passive resistance, and had to turn defenceless priests into the street; their prayerful attitude, their calm, resigned expression contrasted painfully with the use of public force."

present moment it is at my side." (The speaker designated successively the Ministerial bench, the President's chair, and the front bench on the Left, on which Gambetta was then seated.)

Gambetta replied. The hard part he had to play in an already compromised position began from this moment. Caught between the Right and Left, he no longer could escape. With no other weapon but his eloquence, he flung himself into the fray. His exordium was worthy of a Roman orator:—

Gentlemen, I yield to the imperious call of Duty in asking the attention of the Chamber on the matter that is now in hand; in no wise is it, as the preceding speaker implied, because the great measure now before the Government is the work of any individual. As President of the Chamber, as representing the majority—for this reason and no other have I been consulted. I am not above the Government any more than I am beside the honourable gentleman, M. de Cassagnac, who has just spoken. I stand in my own place, the post to which your confidence has raised me. But I should be wanting in the appreciation of its responsibility, if, now that the hour has come to examine, seriously and deeply, the utility, the need, the gravity, of a State measure, I were to stand aside, selfish and indifferent, from what others are doing in the matter.

The whole tone and spirit of this opening did much to gain the hesitating hearers. The argument was developed with strong conviction and increasing warmth:—

I believe that I have studied carefully the general trend of thought. Therefore, after having listened and inquired, I have come to this conclusion: France is not anxious for the Amnesty; too well does she know what this series of crimes has cost her, too well does she know the price of this stupendous folly. In no wise is France in general desirous of this Amnesty; had she to pronounce but one decision, it would be quickly written in characters that cannot be effaced. But, gentlemen, though France has no enthusiasm in this matter, one deep-lying sentiment, that of lassitude, is hers. She is weary, exasperated, at hearing these never-ceasing arguments upon the question; she

pleads to her rulers and to you to be delivered from the tattered memories of the Civil War!

Gambetta's speech had an immense success. The Bill was passed by 312 votes against 116.

Before separating, the Chambers discussed the Budget for 1881. The session had been extremely full. Besides important debates on education, the "Decrees," the Amnesty, the Customs Tariffs, Public Works, the Budget, had all been pushed forward through Gambetta and his colleagues. M. de Freycinet, through his eloquence and ability, had done good work, but Gambetta, none the less, was felt to be the leading spirit in all that had been accomplished. And opposition swelled against him. Jealousy was rife, the Elysée took alarm, the word "dictatorship" was continually spoken.

On July 15th the session closed, after the celebration of the National Fête on the preceding day. The new flags had been presented to the army, and Gambetta gave a magnificent banquet within the Palais-Bourbon, drinking in honour of the reconstituted army, and singling out the aged Marshal Canrobert for a special token of esteem.

The vacations of 1880 were a curious combination of unrest and confidence; the public men standing aloft on the watch see storms arising which the nation below still happily ignores.

The elections on the Conseils Généraux and the Conseils d'Arrondissements confirmed the previous successes. Whereas the former had numbered 1,607 Republicans and 1,393 Conservatives, this was now altered to 1,906 Republicans and 1,000 Conservatives. The departments in which the Republicans had the majority now numbered 66 instead of 55; 300 seats were gained by them, 95 of which were

in the 31 departments where the Decrees had been enforced.

The Right no longer demanded anything but "Liberty," and no longer openly attacking Republican institutions, fought only for "revision."

The Extreme Left, however, accentuated their programme; they also clamoured for revision, but in quite a different sense; they wished for the suppression of the Senate and the Presidential office. MM. Felix Guyot and Cluseret founded the organ of *La Commune*, ready, as they declared, to recommence the fight where they had left it off. Paris and her representatives loudly demanded "municipal autonomy," a fruitless demand—Paris assuredly belongs to France even more than she does to herself.

The Right was forced to acknowledge its defeat. The *Soleil* commented:—

Neither the Monarchy nor the Empire will be able, as yet, to succeed the Republic. The provinces have no desire to risk the upsetting of a Government without knowing how it can be replaced.

The two Royalist groups were more divided than ever; between the princes there was no sign of cordiality. The Comte de Chambord appeared ready to act, and had entrusted to an "illustrious general" (probably General Ducrot) the task of making preparations.

There was said to be a regular army corps only waiting for a signal, and a million, in gold, ready for the first campaign. An avenging sword was prepared at any moment to fall on the Republic.

The Comte de Chambord published an appeal to the Imperialists, offering to merge "new services"

with "ancient fidelity." The appeal was not heard, and the sword was never raised.

The Comte de Paris continued his studies and social activities, satisfied with the homage and the pleasing prophecies that were offered him.

The Bonapartists were so violently torn asunder that the party was practically dissolved.

The Visit to On the whole, therefore, there was a Cherbourg strong impulse to rally round the flag of the Republic, and the visit to Cherbourg was the culminating episode of the period. The Army had received its flags on July 14th, it was decided that those of the Navy should be presented on August 16th by the President of the Republic, and that the captains of the Senate and the Chamber, M. Léon Say and M. Gambetta, should be present at the ceremony. The public connexion of two men so essentially different in nature was one of the psychological studies worthy of Machiavelli or St. Simon.

M. Grévy appeared calm and tranquil—perfection personified: Gambetta, on the contrary, seemed nervous and uneasy, while M. Léon Say, smiling and sceptical, divided his time between them both. The President was accompanied by M. Wilson and General Pittié. The ceremony was extremely fine. The crowd saluted M. Grévy and acclaimed Gambetta—the contrast in this was but too strongly marked; and the meeting, after the banquet, between President Grévy on foot and Gambetta in a landau, which has been already noticed, was strongly characteristic of the strained relations between them. During the banquet at the Hôtel de Ville, Gambetta proposed the health of the President of the Republic, "whose name is graven on the heart of every Frenchman, and whose great services are known as they

deserve." The toast met with a warm reception, but the speaker was more applauded than the speech.

During the evening, after the President had retired, Gambetta attended a punch supper in his honour at the "Circle" of Commerce and Speech at Industry. Through some misunderstand-Cherbourg ing there was not a large attendance. Gambetta, rather surprised at this, hesitated at first, but soon warmed to his subject. His speech was a real "re-hoisting of the flag." Here are some extracts:—

I have never forgotten who I am, whence I come and whither I am going. I know that I have risen from obscurity, that I belong to the working class. Never during the dark hours that you remember, any more than I do now, have I desired the dictatorship; my aim is to be a servant of democracy and to serve in my own rank and place. . . . There are moments in the history of nations when the right suffers eclipse, but in such dark hours it falls to the people to be masters of themselves without too much dependence on any individual; they must then accept all disinterested help, but not dominators. . . . Great reparation may come to us—to us or to our children—the Future lies open to us all.

I must briefly reply to a charge as to this subject. It has sometimes been maintained that we show too much devotion towards our Army, that army which represents to-day all our national strength—which is no longer recruited by professionals but by the purest blood of all the land; we are reproached with devoting too much time to the study of that art of war which shelters our land from danger; yet surely it is no merely bellicose spirit that inspires this devotion, surely it is needful, when we have seen our country lie so low, to raise her to her rightful place among the nations!

The speech was much commented on, and met with both blame and approval.

On the following day he stood beside the President of the Republic to watch some torpedo practice. Gambetta overflowed with witty sallies, to which

the President made no reply. A quantity of fish, killed during the experiments, was brought on board. Gambetta exclaimed at the beauty of the sight. Presently, pointing to an enormous fish that in its struggles had rolled to the feet of the President: "This," he exclaimed, "is the fish of Polycrates; you should have it opened, Monsieur le Président, perhaps it has brought you the ring." M. Grévy, as silent as the fish, grew pale, while those present were laughing in their sleeves.

A week later, M. Grévy made one of his telling speeches at Dijon, on his way to Mont-sous-Vaudrey, and gave a warning against "personal ambitions." "To-day," he said, "it is not any single man, whatever his position, his intentions and his efforts, that deserves our praise—it is France herself, her good sense, her moderation, that call for acclamation. . . . Let us not be led astray to impatience, violence and exaggeration."

Once again did the department of Jura show its attachment to the President's family by electing General Grévy as a Senator.

On August 31st the educational community of the Jesuits was expelled from the country, and this without incident except at Poitiers.

The Religious Comgave in his resignation. The Cabinet fell as unexpectedly as that of Waddington had done.

Neither de Freycinet nor the bishops had forgotten what had been said on the non-authorised communities (except as to the Jesuits), before the discussion in the Senate. Rome, at all events, was still considering thereon. It appears that during some negotiations between the embassy and the Holy

See the Minister had made one of those confidences that are meant to be repeated: "By sacrificing the Jesuits, he had done all that he could do in yielding to opinion, but that he would go no further. He would ask the Chambers to pass a law as to associations as soon as might be possible." Rome, in return, had offered a concession: the non-authorised communities should sign a declaration which should practically be an acknowledgment of the Republic. A statement of vague phrasing was finally agreed upon:—

In order to put an end to misunderstandings, the communities offer no difficulty in protesting their respect and submission to the present institutions of the country. The dependence that they profess towards the Church, from whom they owe their existence, does not constitute for them a state of independence with regard to the secular authority.

For the theologian or the diplomatist this Freycinet at was not entirely convincing, but M. de Montauban. Freycinet deemed that it sufficed. Having to make a speech at Montauban, August 18th, he felt himself strong enough to play this part and take a different line from that of Gambetta. Some modification of Gambetta's declarations at Cherbourg with regard to foreign policy was implied. On the religious question the agreement with Rome was hinted at:—

As to the other communities, the special decree against them has not fixed the date of their dissolution, and has left us free to choose our time. We shall act as their attitude may render it advisable, and without abandoning the rights of the State. It will be their own doing if they deprive themselves of the benefit of the new measure now being prepared, and which will determine, in a general way, the conditions of all lay associations, as well as the religious ones.

This was postponing the question indefinitely.

That an agreement was made with Rome was very obvious. To Cardinal de Bonnechose the Pope wrote that "he saw no objection to the signing of the proposed declaration of adhesion to the established form of Government by religious communities," in that it would assure them the goodwill of the French Government.

The Roman Catholic organ La Guyenne of M. de (inspired by a Legitimist prelate, Mgr. de Freycinet la Bouillerie) published the declaration. Thereupon arose a violent anti-clerical campaign, with M. Cazot, M. Constans, and Jules Ferry—known to be attached to Gambetta—at its head.

Jules Grévy was obliged to return from Montsous-Vaudrey, a convocation of the Chambers was spoken of.

M. de Freycinet endeavoured to still the storm. The Journal Officiel of September 5th published a formal denial of any engagement with the Pope. On September 15th de Freycinet returned to Paris. Through Cardinal Guibert, M. Constans had received the declaration of the communities. But other currents were below the surface. By the 18th, MM. Constans, Cazot and General Farre had resigned. Things seemed about to be peaceably arranged when, on the morning of September 19th, M. Constans allowed the letter to appear in the Journal Officiel which was addressed to the superiors of the communities in reply to the famous "declaration." The letter takes note of the disposition therein expressed, and adds:—

As to the hope that they express of seeing the Government exert its power to allow them to continue in their work, I can only inform you that the second of the decrees of March 29th puts

an end to the toleration of which you ask the maintenance, and substitutes for this the return to legality.

M. de Freycinet had nothing left but to resign. His letter to the President of the Republic, dated September 19th, says that "between himself and his colleagues divergences of views prevail which give no hope of accord, even at the price of mutual concessions."

M. Grévy accepted his resignation, not without "lively regret."

CHAPTER IX

FIRST MINISTRY OF JULES FERRY—THE SCHOOL LAWS—THE CAMPAIGN IN TUNIS

- I.—Jules Ferry and Gambetta—The Ferry administration— The Cissey "scandals"—Defeat of the Government over the Magistrates' Bill and its reinstallation.
- II.—School Reforms—Gratuitous instruction—Compulsory and undenominational instruction—M. Paul Bert—Some results of the "Lois Ferry"—The Budget of 1881.
- III.—The position of Gambetta—The situation in the Balkans—England and Germany—Gladstone in office—Montenegro—Naval demonstration off Dulcignos—Difficulties of the Government—Tunis.
- IV.—The Church and the Royalist—Secularisation of Hospitals —The Scrutin del iste—Gambetta at Cahors—Trade Syndicates—Tours.
- V.—Difficulties in Tunis and Algeria—Bou Amama—The Campaign—Taking of Sfax and Gabes—The new Radical Party—Capture of Khairouan.

Ι

September, 1880 SURELY now came the hour of Gambetta? Not yet! M. Grévy did not wish it. "I reserve M. Gambetta for the present," was his distinct reply to all expostulation.

Between these two men there had been, since the visit to Cherbourg, open opposition. Gambetta now also found himself confronted by Jules Ferry. There had been real cordiality between them. Jules Ferry Jules Ferry was quite prepared for collaboration with Gambetta, even for a subordinate position. He had said "that the President of the Council should have a name that echoed to the remotest hamlet of France." The bearer of such a

name was assuredly Gambetta. Later, at Nancy, Ferry spoke of himself as his possible lieutenant. Yet the two were divided by strong antagonism of temperament, the man from Lorraine, from the blue shadows of the Vosges, had little naturally in common with the Latin of Genoa and Gascony. Jules Ferry was a tall athletic man, cold and constrained in manner. His reserve was a source of wonderment even to himself. Gambetta was short and stout and lively, and with hair tossed back from his expressive Southern face, with his hot volubility and the music of his voice, the charm of his personality—no two men could be more different.

Whereas Jules Ferry made his decisions with slow deliberation, Gambetta acted on impulse, intuition—proceeding on his way by leaps and bounds. Both were equally disinterested patriots, Republicans; both, before Sedan, had long had the conviction that the Empire's days were numbered. In the dark days of the siege of Paris they had at first laboured side by side, but to Gambetta fell the deeds of splendour, while Jules Ferry took the more ungrateful tasks of keeping order in the city and controlling the provisions. Ferry Famine! was the murmur, while Gambetta soared in a balloon out into the provinces as bringer of encouragement and hope.

It was September the Fourth that had torn the two asunder; Ferry had opposed the nomination of Gambetta to the Ministry for the Interior. A sharp altercation arose between the former friends, and Jules Ferry, remaining amongst the besieged, had his share in the anathemas hurled from Bordeaux on the Government.

Jules Ferry was a Moderate—of the Republican Left. He was a lawyer's son, of the old provincial

bourgeoisie de robe, and had inherited his views. He had much in common with the other famous Jules—Jules Simon, Jules Favre, Jules Grévy—and like them, was also a Moderate by deep conviction and declared himself hostile to the Jacobins. He was also a Freethinker, this also by deep conviction. It was not by chance, but on principle, that he gave himself to educational reform, and if he dictated to his colleagues of three successive Cabinets, it was because he was the most energetic man among them. It was soon obvious that Ferry was the necessary man in the new Government, strong in its desire to do battle with the Clericals, and his election to the leadership of the Cabinet barred the way for Gambetta.

Gambetta, as president of the Chamber, if losing something of his parliamentary activity, had gained in influence, in France as abroad. He had formed relations with European notabilities, had lunched with the Prince of Wales, corresponded with Prince Bismarck, received ambassadors and men of mark. Europe had grown used to him by now. And, though weakening in health, his personality had grown more calm, more poised. He had matured, was now the statesman rather than the leader of a party.

The Ferry
Administration
The Works department, and Admiral Jauréguiberry were the only members of the Cabinet who followed their leader into retirement.

Jules Ferry was requested by the President of the Republic to lead the Government while remaining at the head of the Board of Education. There were three vacant posts, the Foreign Office, the Public

Works Department and the Navy Office. A Foreign Secretary was hard to choose, for few of the Republicans had the necessary qualifications. M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was finally selected, with Baron de Courcel and M. René Millet as his subordinates.

M. Sadi Carnot succeeded M. Varroy as Minister for Public Works. His was one of the best names of the Republic; and he was son of that Hippolyte Carnot who had stood out prominently in 1848.

The Navy Ministry was filled by Admiral Cloué; M. Horace de Choiseul became Under-Secretary for the Foreign Office, M. Raynal for Public Works.

The first cares of the new administration policy arose through foreign policy. Since Gambetta's speech at Cherbourg, France had been represented as cherishing ill feelings towards Germany. The speech at Montauban had led *Le Temps* to see in M. de Freycinet "a resolute defender of pacific policy." Now that he had retired, what was to be expected? The Eastern problem was still unsatisfactory. There were complications in Tunis which aroused the suspicions of Italy. Rumours ran riot; to say the least, the outlook was uneasy.

M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire judged it expedient to address a reassuring circular to the diplomatic agents, and this appearing in the *Journal Officiel* was echoed in the speech of Sadi Carnot at the unveiling of Joan of Arc's statue at Compiègne. *

The Cabinet began its work under unscandal favourable auspices. Violent attacks were being made against General de Cissey, ex-Minister for War, who was accused of betraying certain secrets as to national defence to a Baronin von Kaulla. The virulence of *Le Petit Parisien* and of *L'Intransigeant* ended in the prosecution of the editors, but the force

of general opinion led to the retirement of the General, though nothing definite was proved against him. The French public began to delight in such "affaires," which often led to serious complications.

Opening of Changes had been made in the embassies the session abroad. Baron Boissy d'Anglas was made French Minister in Turkey; M. Patenôtre was sent to Norway and Sweden; Count de Moüy replaced Baron des Michels at Athens. At the Cour des Comptes, M. Bethmont, vice-President of the Chamber, replaced M. Petitjean—and this appointment led to the resignation of a person destined later to a certain notoriety—M. Humbert.

The different groups, however, were forming into line. The Right was much weakened; Bonapartists had been formally disunited by letters exchanged between Prince Napoleon and the partisans of his son, Prince Victor, and several influential members of the party, M. Raoul Daval and M. Dugné de la Fauconnerie, began to make a movement towards the Republic. The Comte de Chambord tried in vain to collect what was left of the Bonapartists round himself. The religious question remained the only bond of union amongst so many withered hopes.

In the Left feelings ran higher than ever. In vain did M. Floquet endeavoured to maintain harmony; violent campaign began against both Gambetta and the Cabinet—which were to be played off one against the other.

The one resource of the Cabinet, placed cution of as it was in so difficult a position, lay in the Decrees active effort. The execution of the Decrees offered an occasion; between October 30th and November 6th, they were to be applied. A great effort and been made by Rome and the bishops towards

the gaining of some respite. In point of fact it was only the male communities that suffered, and the foreign communities, supported by the ambassadors, were also spared; but 261 communities were dispersed and with them 5,643 brethren. The dispersion was accomplished without serious incident except at Montpellier and Poitiers, where the bishops, in full vestments, solemnly excommunicated the agents of the Government; and at Frigolet, Solesmes, and Tarascon, where troops were required to force the doors.

The Ministry suffered a defeat over the Defeat of the Ministry and its reinstallation resign, but before the next sitting matters had been arranged. No one desired to go to extremes. Despite a fiery remonstrance on the part of M. Clémenceau, a resolution signed by leading members of the Left and by friends of Gambetta maintained the Cabinet by 280 votes against 149. Within the Senate a resolution was passed on the motion of Jules Simon regretting that a more conciliatory spirit had not been shown with regard to the Decrees.

Another long discussion was held in the Chamber on the subject of the magistracy, and M. Waldeck-Rousseau, M. Ribot and M. Goblet showed great eloquence. The new measure was finally adopted, November 22nd.

On the whole, the position of the Ministry was now more secure. An attack on Admiral Cloué had been successfully resisted; it was the Foreign policy that next had to be explained, and this also was satisfactorily accomplished.

The two Chambers now could set themselves to the organisation of primary instruction and to the preparation of the Budget for 1881.

II

school The three leading principles of school Reform reform—viz.: that education should be gratuitous, compulsory and secular—were the subject of two bills carefully discussed in both Chambers towards the close of 1880.

M. Jules Ferry had two collaborators, one parliamentary, M. Paul Bert—the other administrative, M. Ferdinand Buisson, Director in the Ministry for Public Instruction.

On April 10th, 1870, speaking in the Salle Molière, M. Jules Ferry had made a solemn vow to keep the education of the people close at heart. This vow was now to be accomplished.

The necessity of educational reform was enforced by universal suffrage and the development of democracy. The high ideal of harmony between the priest and the teacher was but all too seldom realised. Yet M. Jules Ferry endeavoured in all honesty to avoid religious conflict—as he said himself: "There is no conscience more worthy of respect than that of the child." His sincerity cannot be doubted, but the enterprise was full of dangers. The measures he proposed were inspired by eighteenth century philosophy, optimistic philosophy.

"We believe in the natural uprightness of the human mind," he said to his opponents of the Right, "we believe in the ultimate triumph of good over evil, we believe in reason and the power of the people. It is you who do not do so. . . . The book and the power to assimilate its teachings are regarded by you and by us from very different points of view. For us, the book, whatever it may be, is the fundamental and irresistible means of developing the intellect."

He opposes books to one book, he pleads for the vol. iv. 561 oo

liberation of learning from the yoke of tradition. In his speech of 1870, Jules Ferry recalls that he owes his ideas to Condorcet's "magnificent system of Republicanin struction, a system of three stages permeated by one principle, that of making men and citizens from the lowest grades of society up to the highest." The system is both social and civic in its character. The city has a right over the child. She represents the permanent, whereas the family symbolises what is transient. Not without a violent effort can the bonds of the civic state be broken; those of the family dissolve of themselves. The theory was carefully expounded by Paul Bert:—

It is a grave matter and worthy of all consideration, this entrance of the law into the family, between the parent and the child. . . . But I would ask those who regret this, to regard not only the interests of the parent, his personal inclinations, his more or less excusable caprice, but the interests of society in general. Does not public instruction influence the material and moral prosperity of the country? . . . Does not crime diminish with education? is it not a fact that an ignorant man is not merely stamped with personal inferiority, but that he becomes a source of danger to the community in general? . . .

M. Barodet had drawn up a measure which ultimately became a sort of code on primary instruction in 109 articles, and this was reported on by M. Paul Bert.

By the suppression of religious teaching in the school, liberty of conscience for the child, the parent and the teacher, is assured. . . . By putting the teaching in the hands of laymen, public education is intrusted to those who owe obedience only to the State.

In 1876, the number of children attending the national schools was 2,337,193—both boys and girls, besides 311,369 who attended private undenomina-

tional schools; the pupils of the schools conducted by religious communities numbered 1,628,289, while 440,084 children attended private religious schools. There were, therefore, two million children in sectarian schools against 2,600,000 in undenominational schools.

Since the object of the new measures was to modify this state of things, and to obtain, as Paul Bert expressed it, "the right to supervise the education of the children of France," it is easy to understand the zeal with which they were opposed by the Roman Catholic Right, who looked upon them as atheistical and tyrannous.

The measure for making instruction gratuitous was adopted November 29th. An objection raised against it had been that the communes were not rich enough to bear the extra burden. To this M. de Cassagnac replied that the extra expense should be added to the next State Budget. Gratuitous instruction is but a trick, said others; the ratepayer will have to pay more than ever, and if the Catholics desire to support their schools, they will pay twice over.

The most skilful and influential opponent in the Mgr. Chamber was M. Freppel, Bishop of Angers, Freppel, who soon acquired eminence as a speaker on the subject. He came of Alsatian stock, and had played an honourable part during the war. Testis describes him as "of vigorous eloquence—the trumpet blasts in his red handkerchief heralding an attack like that which laid low the walls of Jericho."

Jules Ferry and Paul Bert replied to Mgr. Freppel, M. Beaussire and M. Ferdinand Boyer bearing witness to the tendency that had long been influencing the country in favour of gratuitous instruction.

The principal objection against school fees was that in country districts the children became thereby classified as rich or poor, and this told against the principle of natural equality. As to the expense, valued at forty millions, it could be covered by extra centimes on the rates, various local resources, and subvention from the State, which could henceforth reckon this upon the Budget. This section of the Bill was ultimately passed by November 29th.

The measures making school instruction obligatory and undenominational had been attendance brought forward by the Ferry Cabinet, January 20th, 1880. Primary instruction was made compulsory for children of both sexes between the ages of six and thirteen; private instruction, however, was not interdicted:—

Instruction may be given at home by the parent himself or by any other person that he may select for the purpose.

The secular character of public instruction of Public instruction of the subjects to be taught:—

Primary Instruction comprehends: Moral and Civic instruction; Reading; Writing; the French Language; the Elements of French Literature; Geography, that of France in particular; History, that of France in particular up to the present time; general notions as to Law and Political Economy; Elementary Natural Science; Elementary Physics and Mathematics, with their application to Agriculture, Hygiene and Industry; manual work, with the use of the tools belonging to the principal trades; the elements of Drawing, Modelling and Music; Gymnastics; Military Exercises for boys, Needlework for girls.

Perhaps a rather heavy programme, its "encyclopedic" aspect recalling the origin of the reform.

The law allowed no religious instruction to be given in the school; it deprived the clergy of the right of

school inspection which had been recognised in the law of March 15th, 1880. But it authorised and favoured the simultaneity of religious and lay instruction by declaring:—

That the primary schools should close on one day every week, besides Sunday, in order to allow parents to give their children, if they so desire, religious instruction without the school buildings.

M. Paul Bert introduced the measure. M. Paul Bert He was a Burgundian—stout, lively, and eloquent. Born amongst the vineyards of Auxerre. he showed all the alertness characteristic of the province. He had studied medicine and science. had taught at the Sorbonne, and had been successful in all he undertook: His watchword was Science: at no time of his career did Man mean more for him than what he could recognise of man in the nature of the gorilla; he was frankly a materialist. the Rue Guy de la Brosse he had his home, near that of Paul Bourget's Disciple. Can he not be reckoned among the masters of the Paul Boutheiller who taught, after Hegel, that the world is wax and our minds the die? Proud of his vigour, his courage and his skill he leapt forward on his way like some young lion, ready and eager to help France forward through democratic institutions.

His chief speech on School Reform claimed the superiority of universal morality over that gained by dogmatic religious instruction, and tried to solve far-reaching problems in very cheerful fashion.

The Right fought desperately for what it deemed the soul of France. M. de la Bassetière, Mgr. Freppel, M. Ferdinand Boyer, M. Keller, entered successively into the arena. The "rights of the parent"

and the "part of God" founded an argument that affected only those convinced of its strength. They spoke of Liberty, of Tolerance—but too late. Tolerance, after the abuses of past ages, was now on the side of the authors of the Bill, could they be moderate. M. Jules Ferry, in defending compulsory instruction, said: "Our law means constraint, but moral constraint"; in defending secularisation: "Confessional neutrality is important for the safety of the State and for the future of coming generations. It is of general interest."

The measure was passed in the Chamber, December 24th, by 329 votes to 134. During the following June it was discussed by the Senate. An amendment of M. Ravignan and the Duc de Broglie demanded the expression in the educational programme of moral and religious teaching. Jules Ferry again defined his views:—

We are called, as I believe, to defend the rights of the State against a certain Catholicism which is not religious Catholicism, but which I will term political. . . . We have indeed desired the Anti-clerical movement—never, though, a movement aimed against Religion!

Jules Simon intervened—he also offered an amendment. With the shade of Victor Cousin hovering near him, he desired:—

That masters should teach their pupils their duty towards God and towards the nation.

"To which God?" was Jules Ferry's one reply. "There is no question of voting here for or against God."

But Jules Simon's amendment was passed by 139 votes to 126. The Bill was sent back to the Chamber,

where it could not be discussed before the elections of 1881.

These "Ferry Laws" were later completed by a series of legislative and administrative measures, that of October 30th, 1886, in particular, under the Goblet Ministry. Only a statesman of Jules Ferry's stamp could have conceived such a work and carried it to its fulfilment. Many other schemes for the help of the masses were later set on foot: infant schools, technical schools, classes for adults, secondary instruction for girls, improved conditions for teachers, as well as great developments in the art of teaching—and all this carefully supervised by parliamentary efforts. Tules Ferry considered "that the teacher is no substitute for either priest or parent; he unites his efforts to theirs to make of each child an upright member of the State." His ideal, however, is still far from attainment. But what has been the practical result of his laws?

As regards expense—in 1870 the budget for primary instruction was 61 millions of francs. In 1877 it reached 94,297,000 (without counting the special contributions from the communes). In 1902, it reached 236,598,000 francs (for Algeria included) without reckoning the cost of constructing new buildings, which rose to a milliard.

Within a period of twenty-five years, 851,000 pupils had been added to the State schools; over 96 per cent. of conscripts were able to write their own names, against 85 per cent. in 1877.

In Brittany, however, and in the centre of France, there are still 12 and even 17 per cent. of men of twenty years who cannot read or write. Education is still far from being properly enforced; and in mountainous districts, such as La Lozère,

school attendance often sinks to 51'I per cent. The Republic, however, has done its duty in offering systematised instruction to the growing generations. The work has been conceived and carried out in all sincerity of purpose, and, on the whole, has been appreciated, despite many difficulties.

In the discussion of the Budget for 1881,

The Budget the anti-clerical feeling was very strongly

Anti-clerical evident. M. Brisson had prepared an amendfeeling ment to the Budget, a fiscal system which,
known as the Right of Increase, desired to submit
the wealth of religious communities, whether recognised or not, to the control of the Treasury and to levy
a tax equal in proportion to that paid by citizens
in general. This measure tended to control some
abuses. The fiscal administration was empowered
to make full inquiries into the exact situation of
religious societies. The amendment, passed by the
Chamber and slightly modified by the Senate, was
finally adopted and included in the Budget.

On the motion of M. Hérold, all religious emblems were removed from the State schools.

The Budget was voted; the Ministry stood firm. The Chambers separated, December 29th, at the death of the year 1880, that had seen so much accomplished by the young Republic.

III

Position of On the meeting of the Chambers, January Gambetta 11th, 1881, there was decidedly a "Question Gambetta." Gambetta's position was not clear; incontestably he had influence, yet no means of using it. The Government was annoyed at being reproached with following him too much.

It was I. I. Weiss who, in an article entitled M. Gambetta et le Gouvernement, while acknowledging this influence, denied its being underhand or dangerous. Far from blaming Gambetta on its exercise, he congratulated his party on having such able help. is not certain that this sort of praise was quite agreeable to Gambetta, but his adversaries did not leave the article unanswered. M. Scherer, in the Revue Politique et Littéraire, strongly hinted that an administration headed by Gambetta would be a source of public danger; and M. Schérer was a Moderate, a Senator of the Left. A fierce coalition arose against the man who had so nearly reached the helm. The Figaro issued 100,000 copies of a pamphlet called Gambetta, c'est la Guerre; and other pamphlets against him were scattered through the land. Gambetta found himself impeded by excessive adulation on the one hand and bitter reviling on the other. On January 20th he was elected president of the Chamber by 262 votes only, out of 307. M. Brisson, who had not offered himself for election, obtained 30 votes.

Gambetta thenceforward concentrated his efforts on the organisation of a strong Government. He hoped to obtain, if not the support of all the Left, at least the confidence of the people. The "Moderates" were strongly opposed to his democratic feelings, and these "virtuous men of the Centre," with their versatility and their combination, are very dangerous opponents. A long speech from Gambetta, in which, to some extent, a programme of action was also set forth, explained what had lately been accomplished and what still remained to do. It was a call to rally round the Republic, and aroused many comments.

M. Haentjens and M. Rouher started a discussion

on the second liquidation account, also on the special Budget for 1881.

The "extravagant" policy, for which Gambetta was made responsible, was denounced; and it cannot be denied that finance had been dealt with in very optimistic fashion.

On January 27th and 28th, M. Gavardie questioned the Government with painful persistence on the "hidden influences" at work in its foreign policy.

A sort of panic was abroad. The cry of War! was loud and insistent. Gambetta in his presidential speech was obliged to explain that France had no "secret designs or enterprises." M. Spüller protested at Vitry-le-François; M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire declared that the French policy during the Greek question was not one to be continued; M. Devès decided to give Gambetta an opportunity for explanation. And all this was occasioned by the speech made at Cherbourg and the campaign then prepared against the speaker.

The situation in the Balkans was still tion in the unsatisfactory. Turkey, having regained her strength, was once more to be reckoned with. The Powers did not exactly know what it was they wanted, but they wanted something with great acerbity, and complications were much dreaded. The frontiers of Greece and Montenegro were still being negotiated. There was much uncertainty in every quarter, and the only really definite policy was that of Prince Bismarck, who had bound himself, once for all, to the fortunes of Austria. At the same time he desired not to disquiet Russia or Great Britain over much, and to keep France in isolation.

As Montenegro had not been able to enter into quiet possession of the Albanian districts assigned

to her by the Congress, various compensations were being proposed by the Powers. The Porte was making objections to these, and Montenegro, supported by Russia, again appealed to Europe.

The Greek frontier, too, required much attention. Athens demanded an extension of frontier into Macedonia, which would have given unexpected strength to Hellenism, and probably influenced the destiny of the peninsula. Russia, although opposed to a large Greek empire, supported this demand; France, while also pleading before Europe in the cause of Greece, prudently refrained from compromising herself. Austria and Germany, fairly indifferent to the Greek question, were still anxious to consolidate what had been done in Berlin, and defended the Ottoman dominion, though with great precaution. All these negotiations were extremely complicated; no one wished to be bound to very much, and, before all things, an open door of exit was necessary for each.

The rôle of Great Britain became thus preponderant, and this rôle depended on her general attitude to European affairs.

It seemed possible that she might ally herself with Bismarck, especially now that his policy was so definitely on the side of Austria-Hungary and against that of Russia. Lord Salisbury had hailed the Austro-German alliance as a thing most desirable. England still clung to the principle of the integrity of Turkey, and viewed the Greek demands with coldness, and this fact encouraged the Turks in their resistance to the claims of Montenegro.

Gladstone However, in the April of 1880, the Engin office lish Conservatives lost office, and Mr. Gladstone arrived upon the scene. No one had been

more anti-Turk than he, no one more severe upon the Austrian policy, no one less prejudiced against the Slav. His advent, therefore, meant a decided change in the political outlook, and he declared before the House of Commons "that England had no special interest" in the maintenance of the Turkish empire. The cause of Armenia he espoused with great warmth, and the British ambassador in Vienna received orders "to exact the accomplishment of the reforms imposed on Turkey by the Congress of Berlin." Lord Granville, the new Foreign Secretary, proposed general effort on the part of the Powers to weigh upon Turkey.

The other Powers now took another stand. France, who had been so ardent in her support of Greece, now declared that she had no desire to urge things to extremes; Austria refused to follow Mr. Gladstone, and Germany, more slowly, agreed with Austria's decision. There remained only Russia.

In order, therefore, to make a way out of the difficulties, a conference of the Powers was held in Berlin during June, 1880, as Protocol 13 of the Treaty of Berlin had arranged for mediation should Greece and Turkey not agree.

The Conference began on June 18th, neither Turkey, Greece nor Montenegro being invited to attend.

Mr. Gladstone had at first proposed a semiautonomy for Albania, under the suzerainty of the Sultan.

Turkey was arming, Greece was mobilised—serious complications were feared. France proposed a modification in the claims of Greece, which would leave Turkey Crete and Macedonia.

As to Montenegro, England advised that Prince Nicolas should take the maritime district of Dulcigno,

instead of any part of Albania; and this plan had the two-fold advantage of securing a good port for the principality and of allowing it to be taken over under the eyes of the Powers.

The Porte acquiesced "in general" as to Dulcigno, but occupied the town with so-called independent Albanian contingents and also despatched some troops into those provinces threatened by Greece.

This placed France in a difficult position, for Greece now claimed her help. It is said that the French Government had promised the Greeks 30,000 guns from French arsenals. At all events, a general conflagration seemed imminent.

Since the famous speech at Cherbourg, there had been a change in Prince Bismarck's attitude towards Gambetta. Perhaps the non-accomplishment of the projected meeting in 1877 rankled in his mind. At all events, Gambetta had shown no desire to enter into relations with Germany, and was seeking to gain England for united action in Egypt, while, at the same time, rumours of a Franco-Russian agreement had been whispered.

At all events, the vigorous expressions of Gambetta had caused some surprise in Berlin—"Gambetta, c'est la Guerre!" Bismarck, who also had the art of metaphor, declared that "Gambetta in power over France would be as annoying in Europe as would a man beating a drum be in a sick-room." The plans of Henckel von Donnersmarck had certainly miscarried.

The new Foreign Secretary for France, Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, not liking Gambetta, who seemed favourably disposed towards Greece and the England of the Liberals,—a change was made in the direction of French foreign policy.

With regard to Montenegro, since Dul-Naval de-monstration cigno had not yet been handed over, Engat Dulcigno land proposed that the fleets of the united Powers should see that this was done. Neither Austria nor Germany desired such an action, and France had had enough of acting the part of Don Ouixote. M. de Freycinet, just before his resignation, intimated to the British Government that France could only join in "a naval demonstration, in order to exert moral pressure, and on condition that no single shot were fired." The other Powers, too, finally answered to the same effect, and for two months the combined fleets sailed outside the town which was defended by Albanian bands-without obtaining the slightest results. Happily for the prestige of Europe, Turkey yielded to a stronger threat on the part of England, and Montenegro took possession of Dulcigno, November 26th.

The same thing happened with regard to Greece. The Sublime Porte yielded just as war seemed on the point of declaration, and Greece was given Epirus and Thessaly, to the great relief of Europe.

Gambetta In Paris, at this moment, the hostile and Greece feeling towards Gambetta was extremely bitter and the Ministry was reproached for allowing itself to be led by the President of the Chamber into such dangerous positions. M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, a man of much merit, but many singularities, was full of explanations as to his own policy of prudence and reserve, which, perhaps, was excessive. The friends of Gambetta blamed it as "pusillanimous," Gambetta himself followed the Ministry, but, as he said later, "with closed eyes."

Suddenly a Blue Book published, on February 20th, some letters from the English chargé d'affaires in

Athens, which affirmed that the French engagements towards Greece were more far-reaching than had been supposed, and that the non-fulfilment of certain promises on the part of the Republic had given rise to disappointment in the country.

Who then had caused such hopes to be entertained? If not the Ministry, then certainly Gambetta! Gambetta seized the opportunity for gaining a clear hearing, which he had long been desiring. M. Devès, a friend of his, questioned the Ministry on the allegations of the Blue Book. M. Jules Ferry explained what the rôle of the Government had really been, and then Gambetta himself rose to reply to the attack, which was directed against him not only as the leader of a party but as the eventual leader of a Government. He showed that his attitude had been always most reserved, most correct. In the Greek question he had offered neither promises nor counsels. As to the mission of General Thomassin. he had not met the general until after it had failed. As to French policy in Berlin and the sending of the fleet to Dulcigno, it had not been for him to decide. had he done so it would not have been sent. In the matter of Tunis he had kept silence. As to the speech at Cherbourg, it had not been any more inflammatory than that pronounced at the same time and under the same circumstances by the head of the Senate. As to his attitude towards the present Government—

I give it my confidence, but allow me to say that I do so with closed eyes. Whether I have a policy of my own, I am not required now to tell you. . . . I have my own opinions upon foreign matters. . . I can wait.

This was certainly defiance! Rupture with the Cabinet, with the President of the Republic! Gam-

betta would henceforth depend on the electors. The Opposition well knew what they were doing in separating Gambetta and Jules Ferry—the unity of the party was not easy to maintain, and the attack by the Duc de Broglie in the Senate gave a further evidence of bitterness. Gambetta had now burned his boats, and was seeking the first opportunity for standing clear of the Government.

The position of the Cabinet grew more false every day; not trusted but tolerated, it continued to exist merely because there was nothing ready to replace it. M. Jules Ferry maintained a brave front, but he fought under difficulties, against blows that were not only meant for him.

On the murder of the Czar of Russia, Alexander II, March 3rd, L'Intransigeant and Le Citoyen wrote in defence of regicide. Prosecutions were begun, and on an inquiry from Madier de Montjau, Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was taken to task for some articles published in the Revue des Deux Mondes half a century ago.

The relations of the Government with the citizens of Paris were extremely strained. The return of the Communists gave much help to the Opposition, and Communal Autonomy became a watchword that covered many unexpected things. M. Andrieux, Prefect of Police, was at constant feud with the Municipal Council of Paris. Questioned by M. Pascal in the name of the deputies of Paris, M. Constans, not without a certain "detachment," covered the Prefect and promised to arrange things.

Tunis The question of Tunis was beginning to claim attention. Bismarck says that, in his first interview with Lord Beaconsfield on the eve of the Congress of Berlin, he had remarked to him:

"You ought to come to an agreement with Russia, and leaving her in Constantinople, take Egypt for yourselves. France could receive Tunis or Syria by way of compensation."

And this was only what had already been proposed by the Czar Nicolas in his conversation with Lord Seymour. France might have been expected to be anxious to obtain her dues, but she was by no means ready to risk difficulty. Gambetta was unfavourable to what he called "expansion à l'outrance," and neither de Freycinet nor Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire were at all warlike in their aims. The general desire of France was for peace, and her one preoccupation her frontier on the east. The possible coalition of certain Powers, Turkey and Italy for instance, was much dreaded, and it seemed most inadvisable to stir up trouble of any kind. The claims of France over Tunis seemed, therefore, likely to remain in obscurity were it not for the force of circumstances—always so much stronger than human inclinations.

The problem of "colonial expansion" cannot be said to have been considered to any practical effect. Jules Ferry, the most bold and far-sighted of the French statesmen who had thought upon the question, looked upon any enterprise in Tunis as of merely local interest with regard to the security of Algeria. Had the consequences of such a step been foreseen, the hesitation would doubtless have been even greater. Sallust tells of the same feeling in the Roman Senate touching the projected enterprise in Africa.

The lessons of 1870 had been by no one forgotten. The expedition to Mexico, even the wars in Algeria, were considered direct or indirect causes of French disasters

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Those at the helm of France were now put to the test. Men of energy were needed, resolute action required.

The destiny of Tunis claimed the thoughts of France even before Algeria was conquered; the land that faced Marseilles was never indifferent to the Power that had undertaken Mediterranean interests. But after Algiers and Constantine were occupied, Tunis seemed destined to follow the fate of the neighbouring provinces. The difficulties of the Algerian occupation, the opposition of certain Powers—of Turkey in particular—the incoherence of the imperial policy, all hindered what was ultimately to develop. And since then, a new Mediterranean Power had been born—this was Italy.

England Italian imperialism demanded that all and Tunis which had belonged to Rome along the Mediterranean shores should belong to her again. The proximity of the shores of Sicily and Tunis helped to strengthen this ambition, but it was precisely this close proximity that led to disappointment. The Mediterranean highway between Cape Bon and Marsala was jealously watched by England from the heights of Malta, and England regarded this business as her own; if she were unable to assure herself of both Tunis and Palermo, she would at least see to it that the two did not fall into one hand.

During January, 1871, a serious insurrection broke out in Algeria, and the Italian Consul at Tunis profited by an incident in this to see that a squadron was armed at Spezzia. England and Turkey, however, opposed the sailing of this fleet, having no desire that the independence of Tunis should be compromised. At the Congress of Berlin it was England who made advances to France in the matter, and it was

Beaconsfield who was responsible for the "colonial policy" that gave his successors so much trouble.

An error on the part of Italy hastened matters on, and forced France to an action that she would have preferred to delay. Rumours were circulated—not, apparently, without intention—that Prince Bismarck had offered Tunis to Count Corti during the Berlin Congress. Perhaps the Italian Government did not regret what might possibly cover the check they had suffered in the Adriatic. Tunis, at all events, began to excite much discussion.

For fear of a misunderstanding, M. Waddington charged the French ambassador in Rome—the Marquis de Noailles—to warn the Italian Government as to the danger of any illusion on the subject.

France has long regarded Tunis as necessary to her interests. . . . Italy must learn to see that she can cherish no dreams of conquest in Tunis without risking the open enmity of France.

No one could say that Italy was unprepared, nor had she reason to deceive herself as to the sentiments of England. But there was some one in Europe to whose interest it was to let misunderstandings develop, Prince Bismarck was already planning the Triple Alliance. He remarked to Count Andrassy, who was anxious for Austria to regain what she had lost in the peninsula: "We should make no opposition, Italy is not our friend." And playing a card that had often proved successful, Bismarck also conversed with the Vatican as to a possible restoration of the Pope's temporal power. Italy, as always, stood between Guelph and Ghibelline.

Secondary considerations tended to precipitate events. Cairoli was then responsible Minister, an old and faithful servant of the cause of independ-

ence. Severe judgment has been passed on him, but Posterity will give him justice; he did much and suffered much to spare his country and Europe unnecessary evils. But the real difficulty lay beyond his power of control. The Regency of Tunis had reached a serious crisis, inevitable for all peoples incapable of self-government—that of financial catastrophe. The danger of this is great in oriental lands, since their financial administration is unsatisfactory, and since the gulf is deep between ancient usages and modern civilisation. Turkey, Egypt, Tunis, Morocco, tremble for their safety each time that bankers and money-agents make their demands. When Metternich told the men of Constantinople to remain Turks, he gave them the only advice that could save their independence.

The chief agent of the disaster in Tunis was a man who had been in power for over thirty years—under

The three successive reigns—from 1837 to 1873
Kasnadar —Mustapha Kasnadar, who had been a
Greek slave.

To three Beys in succession had he taught the art of squandering money—to Achmed, who visited France under Louis-Philippe; to Mohammed Bey, a prince of magnificence and buildings, and to Mohammed Saddock, who had to pay the costs for all three. This third Bey succeeded his brother in 1859.

From 1859 to 1867 Tunis had been exploited and plundered; the Government was deeply in debt, and nothing could be paid; famine and revolt were incessant. Official rivalry further complicated the difficulties. Between Mustapha Kasnadar and Khereddin, between Khereddin and Mustapha ben Ismaïl, fierce jealousy prevailed, and foreign influence found an easy inlet.

The Sultan of Constantinople claimed, as its Caliph, to influence the Regency. An English agent, Mr. Wood, who had lived three-and-twenty years in Tunis, endeavoured to create English interests there, despite the indifference of his compatriots. The creditors of the State added their own private rivalries to the general chaos. During the July of 1869, an European financial commission was appointed to see what could be done, and it rendered real service between 1870 and 1875. It was discovered that more than 160 millions had been borrowed, of which the annual interest reached 20 million francs. Liquidation of this was arranged for. The total debt was brought out to 125 million francs, with the interest reduced to 6,250,000 francs. Tunis, however, still remained in great disorder. Kasnadar was succeeded by Khereddin in 1873; then followed Mustapha ben Ismaïl, a handsome boy influenced by the aged Mohammed Saddock. "We shall soon be obliged to occupy the Regency-this cannot long be deferred," wrote the French Consul, M. Botmilan, several times.

In 1874, M. Roustan, formerly Consul-General M. Roustan at Beyrout, was appointed to represent France in Tunis. Born at Aix, 1834, he was what is termed in diplomatic circles an "agent d'Orient," surprised by nothing, self-restrained, yet full of enterprise. Coming as he did from a land dominated by a Catholic Protectorate, he still had the ambition that France should stand first on the Mediterranean shores. With Khereddin he came to an understanding, and in opposition to claimants supported by Mr. Wood, gained him concessions for the principal railway which was to unite Tunis with Algiers. He also connected this with a French company, that of Bôna,

at Guelma. General Chanzy, the Governor-General, assisted the Consul by all means in his power.

Khereddin fell; M. Roustan made overtures to Mustapha ben Ismaïl, who was not difficult to gain, and who visited the French Exhibition of 1878. The efforts of Mr. Wood came to nothing, and he was finally recalled.

A new Italian Consul, M. Maccio, continued the anti-French endeavours. Italy was acting aggressively, and M. Roustan encountered many difficulties. There was still a feeling in the Italian Ministry that Italy might hope for support from the Powers, from England [in particular, and the warnings of the Marquis] de Noailles were overlooked. M. Damiani, the Radicals, and M. Crispi in the background, were encouraging the plans of M. Maccio.

A paper in the Arabic type, but published in Sardinia—the *Mostakel*—tended to excite the native population against France. There were difficulties between France and Italy over a submarine cable between Sicily and Tunis, as also over the concession of the port of Tunis; while a lawsuit over the Enfida district between a French company and a Jew under British protection brought the influence of England again to bear upon the question.

Things were brought to a crisis by a Rubattino dispute over the line from La Goulette to Company Tunis. The Rubattino Company endeavoured to annul the concession obtained by the Bôna-Guelma Company.

M. Roustan, by energetic pressure on the Bey, obtained indeed a concession for the railway lines from Tunis to Bizerta, from Tunis to Sousse, and that of the port of Tunis, which was eventually to reduce the value of the line from La Goulette.

Besides this, the Bey undertook to make no further railway concessions without first agreeing with the French Government on the matter, but the friction between France and Italy was now more than evident.

The difficulty required speedy arrangement, but over a year passed in diplomatic hesitation, though in Algeria the French were eager for decisive action. The Government was divided. M. Roustan had found in Baron de Courcel an active collaborator; M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was gradually weaned from his coldness; Jules Ferry, however, was decidedly against the idea of any activity in Tunis during the election year; M. Wilson also shared his opinion; finally, Gambetta was resorted to, and after some hesitation was gained over to the views of de Courcel.

On March 31st it was heard that some Tunisian tribes from Khroumirie had raided the province of Constantine. An engagement had taken place, in which five French soldiers had been killed and five wounded. A few days afterwards the raiders increased in numbers to several thousand men, and it was affirmed that their guns had been landed from Italian vessels. M. Roustan demanded military support from the Bey upon the frontier; the Bey, advised by M. Maccio, retreated behind "his dignity" and refused to co-operate in "what would lower him in the eyes of his subjects." It was now necessary to know whether it was France or the Bey that should be "lowered." The Flatters expedition had just been massacred by the Touregs; the Ouled Sidi Cheiks were making a strong effort against the French; Bou-Amama was fomenting the insurrection of the southern Oranais. If the

Khroumirs were not vigorously driven back, the Regency, at the very gates of Algeria, would become the centre of resistance.

On April 4th the French Government declared its resolve to establish order on the frontier of Tunis by vigorous action, and a few days later asked and obtained the necessary funds—six million francs for sending out a military expedition. Did this mean "war"? The Powers interested, astonished at so brusque a decision, pondered as to what line to take towards it. The most active of alldiplomatically speaking—was Turkey. Since she had reoccupied Tripoli in 1835, Turkey had claimed a sort of suzerainty over Tunis. In point of fact, the "kingdom of Tunis" had been independent from time immemorial, and had treated on its own account with the European Powers. In 1705, Hassein ben Ali, a Corsican renegade, founded the dynasty of the Hassinites, and his descendants had succeeded to the power without troubling at all about the Porte. except as regarded the dispatch of rich presents to the Sultan, in his quality as Caliph, at the opening of each new reign.

The efforts of Turkey against French rule in Tunis had varied according to the strength of the French Government. At different intervals—during the July Monarchy, under the Second Empire—it had been necessary to remind the Porte of the respect due to the French position. In 1863 M. Drouyn de Lhuys had threatened to sink the Turkish fleet, then stationed off La Goulette. In 1871, profiting by French disasters, and in response to the appeal of the Bey, advised by Mr. Wood, the Porte had formally declared suzerainty over Tunis. The *firman* was read at the Bardo, November 18th, 1871. France had

protested and declared it null and void, yet it had not been revoked. The Sublime Porte therefore appealed to this *firman* as soon as the French troops received orders to invade Tunis.

The troops in Tripoli were reinforced, Turkish men-of-war prepared to set sail for La Goulette; the ambassador Essad Pacha multiplied his complaints at the Quai d'Orsay; there were rumours of a Congress. M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire cut short all this by notifying at Constantinople that no Turkish man-of-war would be allowed to pass, and that any intervention on the part of Turkey would be attended with the gravest consequences. The Powers, anxious that the peace should not be disturbed, paid small respect to the Turkish overtures.

Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg left France free to act as she desired. Prince Bismarck informed the Count de Saint-Vallier "that no opposition would be made to any action on the part of France, even if she decided to annex." This benign attitude aroused some suspicion in Paris; it was thought that the Prince desired to embroil France with Italy or to absorb her for many years in colonial enterprise. Bismarck, no doubt, was aware of the advantages thereby to be gained. The further France pushed towards the Mediterranean, the greater pleasure would she afford Germany. The hour had not yet come for Germany to think about the great sea highways.

England and Italy remained to be considered. England had made formal engagements in the matter, she was not disposed to see Italian influence in the Regency; yet the rapid march of events might re-awaken the old jealousy at any increase of French naval power. The British Government had been

already informed of the situation by a skilful confidence from Baron de Courcel towards Sir Charles Dilke. Lord Granville, after offering mediation, did not insist. He discouraged the Sultan, and merely exchanged courtesies with Italy. England limited her diplomatic action to exacting the confirmation of treaties favouring her commerce which had been concluded through the influence of Mr. Wood; and to obtaining guarantees as to the eventual transformation of Bizerta to a military port.

There remained, therefore, Italy.

the July of 1880, General Cialdini had approached M. de Freycinet on the subject of the compensation that, in such a case, Italy might be entitled to. As M. Francis Charmes very justly remarked: "All Europe knew what France could or could not accept. The nature of things spoke for But in view of the plans of Italy we have been obliged to speak for ourselves. Italy has been in no wise deceived as to our attitude." **Tules Ferry** also summarised the situation when he said: "In the month of May, 1881, Cairoli was surprised, but he was not deceived." The position of the Italian Government was, however, untenable. The Ministry resigned, but the impossibility of forming a new Cabinet forced M. Cairoli to resume office after an interim of a fortnight. M. Maccio, in Tunis, ceased to go to the Bardo.

The military operations proposed by Jules operations Ferry were the first that France had undertaken since 1870,—the new army was put to the test. War funds had been voted April 8th. Despite bad weather the French army was before Tunis by May 11th. The short delay of six weeks had seemed interminable.

The Government had been wise enough to send out an imposing force. 23,000 men came from France, 8,000 were drawn from Algerian regiments, five battalions of which were native tirailleurs. By land as by sea, these forces were concentrated in the region of Soukharas, on the frontier of Tunis, and were commanded by General Forgemol de Bostguenard, Commander of the Constantine division. The northern attacking column was led by General Delabecque, that of the south by General Logerot. The former had to march against the Khroumirs towards Tunis, while Logerot had to deal with the southern tribes, drive back the Bey, and surround the rebels. The march was accomplished in perfect order.

However, as is usual in Paris, there was much indignation over the delay and "the excessive fatigue imposed upon the soldiers," as also over the lack of brilliant feats of arms.

Yet in spite of the weather and the difficulties natural in a hostile land, with no resources and no communications, General Logerot managed to occupy the Kef by May 26th, thanks to the energy of the French Consular-Agent, M. Roy, who had remained at his post and persuaded Si Rachid, the new Governor of the town, to make no resistance. It was a decisive step.

In the north, the Khroumirs had been driven to take refuge in their mountains or their marshes. The fort of Tabarka was occupied by land and sea.

At Souk-el-Arba, General Logerot had overcome much resistance, and had gained an interview with Ali, brother of the Bey, who commanded his army. M. Roustan had obtained a promise that the Bey's troops should retire before the French, and this Ali obeyed with bad grace.

5⁸7

There was no other obstacle on the road to Tunis. The French squadron, commanded by Admiral Conrard, had entered the port of Bizerta, and a body of 8,000 men were landed under the command of Generals Bréart and Maurant, without having to strike a blow. This new contingent marched forward upon Tunis, starting May 8th. Till this moment the Bey and his followers had had some illusions, the counsellors who had deceived him were playing their last card. The arrival of some foreign war-ships in the port of La Goulette sustained the hope of intervention from the Powers. Mr. Broadley, the Times correspondent, the historian of the "last Punic war," witnessed the Bev's last struggle between anger and despair. Up to the last he reckoned on the Great Powers, but was finally reduced to exclaim: "What have they done for us!"

M. Roustan, calm and firm as usual, made ready for the arrival of the French, and great praise is due to him for all he managed to perform. He caused M. Lequeux, supplementary Consul, to meet General Bréart and give him the text of a treaty which instructions telegraphed from Paris enabled him to impose, if necessary, upon the Bey. General Bréart reached Djedeidah by May 11th, where an audience had been requested for him with the Bey by M. Roustan. Should the Bey refuse the audience or the treaty, M. Roustan had a successor ready to replace him—Taïeb Bey.

Early on the morning of the 12th, the French troops, headed by their band, entered the Manouba. M. Roustan was already with the Bey, who, after some hesitation, consented to see the General. The interview took place at Ksar Saïd, near the Bardo; the Bey rose to receive the General, who was pre-

ceded by M. Roustan. General Bréart drew the treaty from his pocket, read it to the Bey, and offered him a day for its consideration.

The Bey saw himself in a difficult posiof the tion; flight was impossible, and abdication
Treaty would make room for a detested rival.
Mustapha, his minister, advised submission. Finally,
towards seven in the evening, amidst tears and
lamentations from the women of the seraglio and the
entreaties of his followers, Sidi Saddock, powerless
and vanquished, without having struck a single blow,
affixed his seal to the two copies of the treaty.

Before doing this, however, his Oriental cunning suggested a request, and this was that the French troops should not occupy Tunis, in order that his prestige should be preserved. The granting of this request led to fresh complications.

The French Chambers reassembled after the Easter vacation on the very day on which the treaty was signed by the Bey.

The general tension had been such that Jules Ferry read out the declaration of the Government with regard to Tunis without waiting for the news of the signing of the treaty.

We need durable guarantees from the Bey of Tunis. It is not his territory, not his throne, that we desire. From the outset of this campaign the French Republic solemnly repudiated all idea of conquest, all idea of annexation. . . . But the Government of the Bey must allow us sureties upon the territory of Tunis that he is manifestly unable to give of his own strength. Our legitimate influence in the Regency must be assured by definite agreement against hostile enterprises.

On the following day M. Jules Ferry acquainted the Senate with the Treaty of Ksar Saïd, or The Bardo, concluded the previous day between the

French Republic and the Bey—the institution of the Protectorate. It had been very carefully drawn up by Baron de Courcel on the model of agreements framed by the British Government in India—it was not only an agreement between two nations, but a charter.

To protect is to defend, and consequently to organise—and this was the drift of the chief clauses in the treaty.

Clauses of the Treaty gency (for there can be no authority without force to support it) (Article II). France should support the Bey against any danger that threatened his person and his dynasty (Article III). With regard to relations with the Powers, and in order to avoid any plausible intervention on their part, France would guarantee the treaties between her and the Regency (Article IV), but she would henceforth assume the control and diplomatic representation of Tunis abroad (Articles VI and VII). As to the future government of the Regency, Article V enacted that:—

The Government of the French Republic should be represented with His Highness the Bey of Tunis by a Resident Minister, who should watch over the fulfilment of this agreement, and who should act as intermediary for the relations of the French Government with the authorities of Tunis in all matters common to both countries.

Article VII declared:-

That the two Governments should arrange by mutual agreement the basis of a financial organisation for the Regency, which should be of a nature to assure the service of the public debt and to guarantee the rights of the creditors of Tunis.

The Cabinet thus explained the advantages gained by the Treaty:—

We shall gain the absolute security of our great African colony without future uneasiness as to the frontiers. . . . Tunis will benefit by all the advantages of our civilisation. . . . For the Bey of Tunis our sentiments are of the most friendly nature, and we are quite disposed to prove this to him according to the terms of the treaty should His Highness suffer menace to his legitimate authority and to his independence.

The treaty was approved of by the parliament, and the resolution of approval was passed in the Chamber by 430 votes to I, and unanimously in the Senate.

The rapidity of the action was regarded with some surprise abroad, but speedily recognised. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Spain, approved and congratulated. The Sublime Porte sent round numerous circulars, which no one troubled to read. Great Britain, rather astonished at so decisive a step, was disposed to criticise until Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, explained the declaration of Lord Salisbury. In Rome, the Cairoli administration succumbed, after many troubles, to the Depretis-Mancini combination.

The success was indubitable. Gambetta wrote a letter of congratulation to Jules Ferry.

IV

General Yet such was the state of political unceropinion tainty in Paris that this most satisfactory
operation was received by a certain coterie as, at
least, a fiasco, and for some time it was a common
joke upon the boulevards to "chercher le Khroumir."

Jules Ferry's administration gained no help from it whatever, and General Farre, the Minister for War, was overwhelmed with attacks and absurd reproaches.

But the elections were close at hand; haste was made to change the subject.

Never had the Republic had a better position. Beneath her banner France was "resuming her place among the Great Powers," as Gambetta had written to Jules Ferry, and at home opposition had become much diminished.

The Royalist party, weakened by the rupture between Orleanists and Legitimists, was losing what was left to it of vigour by the desertion of the Church. Leo XIII had cut the cable.

Count de Mun, in a speech made at Vannes, had boldly tried to keep the two causes united, and had made a strong appeal to the Comte de Chambord, who wrote him an appreciative letter.

At the instigation of the Nuncio, the Bishop of Vannes forbade the priests of the diocese to go to the meeting held by de Mun, and the Aurora, official organ of the Papal Court, had approved of this attitude—that of the Bishop of Vannes, the Bishop of Poitiers, Mgr. Bellot des Minières, and all those prelates who were separating the cause of Royalty from that of the Church.

General The Orleanists had withdrawn under situation cover, and M. Hervé, of the *Soleil*, was reduced to join chorus with the Count de Mun on social reform.

The Bonapartists were still more badly off. The activities of the clerical section—that which had rallied round Prince Victor, was exhausting itself in invective against the Republic. The followers of Prince Napoleon had tried to gain ground by issuing a proposal for constitutional revision which was not unlike that of the Extreme Left.

On the whole, therefore, the only danger left for the Republican party lay in its own divisions.

The opposition between the Left and the Extreme Left was stronger than ever. Both Gambetta and Jules Ferry were accused of having tendencies towards the Right, which was very far from being the case.

Life is inevitably a differentiation. In politics as in nature, unsatisfied energies seek their development by attacking the source of vitality in others. Hence the importance of the educational laws, which, however, was not fully realised even by those who had engaged in the struggle over these.

The fight against Clericalism, which had become almost a party question, greatly embarassed the Republican leaders, who had abandoned the old idea of separating Church and State, in the hope of achieving a more peaceful transition.

The first demands as to modification of the military laws voted after the war, were also looked on as a source of danger by the statesmen who had given their best energies to the restoration of their country.

During May, 1881, the Chamber, after much hesitation, passed the Bill produced by M. Labuye, which enforced military service on teachers and seminarists. Jules Ferry, even Paul Bert, had to fight against the Extreme Left, which desired amendments particularly rigorous towards aspirants for Holy Orders and which aroused great indignation among the bishops.

The process of secularisation was carried on with particular relentlessness by the Municipal Council of Paris. The medical body in the hospitals was, on the whole, Republican and Free-thinking in its tendencies. Certain incivol. IV.

dents in the daily contact with the Sisters had given rise to some ill-feeling, despite the admirable work done by the Sisters. Dissensions even among the communities themselves had caused the State to intervene. At the Hospital of La Pitié. the Sisters of the Order of St. Marthe broke with the other communities and asked to be replaced. They were succeeded by lay nurses, who were also introduced into the hospitals of Les Ménages, La Roche-In reply to a question put in the foucauld, etc. Senate by M. Lambert de Sainte-Croix, M. Constans affirmed that lay nurses were introduced because the system of Assistance Publique did not wish to be at the mercy of the religious communities. M. Lambert de Sainte-Croix's motion against this secularisation was passed by the Senate. M. Magran exclaimed: "Then there is still a Senate!"

The revision of the Constitution formed part of the programme of the Extreme Left. Constitution M. Barodet's proposal desired to assure the elections to the Senate by a different method of voting, also to do away with the permanence of election and to provide for the predominance of the Lower House in the constitutional organisation.

The proposed revision was aimed chiefly at the Senate and its independence with regard to the general suffrage. This weapon, if skilfully manipulated, could serve not only as a means of pressure on the Senate, but also on the Presidency of the Republic.

Another burning question was that of the deliste Scrutin de liste.

Much importance was attached to this by Gambetta, who saw in it a means of obtaining unity of action in the Government, which would give the leader

of a party much greater confidence. It was just this view that had aroused so much hostility against him from those that dreaded "the dictatorship."

The subject was fully discussed, May 16th. Gambetta left his presidential seat and took what had been his bench under the Empire—fully aware that the issue of the battle would decide his future destiny. His speech was long and powerful, the personal element quickly brushed aside. He considered the "Scrutin de liste" to be a traditional necessity of the Republic, that to it did the Republic owe its foundation,—by it had the events of May the Sixteenth been decided. The Scrutin d'arrondissement, re-established by the Right, was a means of intimidation and corruption; only by consulting the country in the fullest, broadest sense could the true ideal of the Republic be achieved.

The speech created great excitement. Finally, however, the *Scrutin de liste* was voted for by 267 votes against 202. This was the triumph that Gambetta had desired. Henceforward his path seemed clear of obstacles.

Gambetta at Cahors at It was ten years since he had visited his native town of Cahors, the town where he had studied, where his father still resided. The unveiling of a monument to those of the neighbourhood who had fallen in the war was the occasion of a visit long promised, long deferred.

His reception was enthusiastic. Though the district was not altogether Republican in tendency, yet local pride in the neighbour who had risen so high made the three days of his sojourn one long acclamation.

Gambetta's speech was an appeal to unity, with skilful parentheses in honour of President

Grévy,—an appeal also for the final adoption of the Scrutin de liste. But he was mistaken in allowing his own individuality to come so much to the fore, in allowing himself to become an idol for the populace,—and on returning to Paris it was to find jealousy and hatred more bitter against him than before.

The Senate viewed the *Scrutin de liste* with strong disfavour. At the same time the revision of the Constitution was discussed in the Chamber.

The fate of the scrutin de liste was de-Rejection of cided in the Senate on June 9th. Two de liste by friends of Gambetta, M. Edouard Millaud and M. Dauphin, defended it; the debate was without special brilliance. By 148 votes to 114 the measure was rejected—Gambetta was wrecked in sight of land.

The effect of this was that the greater part of the Republican press, both in Paris and in the provinces, was gained over to the cause of the revision. Henceforward Gambetta was in open rupture with both the Elysée and the Senate. In the course of his electoral campaign he now made use of the weapon he had at first hesitated to take, and, in his speech at Tours, he repudiated his words at Cahors and declared himself for constitutional revision.

The session was drawing to a close. Several bills were rushed through the Chambers, the most im-

Trade portant of these being on the legal recogsyndicates nition of trade syndicates. This meant an open door for social reform. M. Ch. Floquet and M. Allain Targé were leaders of the commission which proposed to allow civic recognition to trade syndicates, whether for masters or for men. An amendment suggested by M. Tariaux and vigorously

supported by M. Ribot, desired to submit this recognition to the prefects, and the Government favoured this proposal. However, M. Ch. Floquet and M. Antonin Davoust fought the Bill as it stood through the Chamber, with civic recognition granted to the syndicates on the sole condition that their directors should be of French nationality. The Bill had long to wait before getting through the Senate.

A Bill on the freedom of the press had on the Press long been before Parliament. In a free country the Government can only be controlled through free knowledge of events, and this can only be achieved by a press in which even error and falsehood are allowed free play under the shelter of the law. There can be no half-measures, no half-liberty. Such was the general doctrine adopted by the commission that undertook to make a certain code of laws on the Press. There was much brilliance in the debates upon the question; and MM. Allain-Targé, Ch. Floquet, Ribot, Goblet, Clémenceau, Cayot and Lisbonne were the leaders in the battle as to how the Republic, the Chambers and the President were to be protected from newspaper outrages, and how false reports and the encouragement of crime should be dealt with. M. Clémenceau maintained-

That the liberty we ask for is not only the liberty of the party now in power, not only the liberty of the Republicans, but that of others: of our adversaries, of every one. . . . Except in liberty, there is no true security. Let all be attacked—as M. Jules Simon has expressed it—on condition that all may be defended; I can even say, let all be attacked in order that all may be defended, for only that can be honourably defended which can be freely attacked.

The Bill was passed on the second reading in the Chamber by 444 votes against 4. Within the Senate

certain modifications were made, of generally very liberal tendency, and the measure was finally promulgated on July 29th, being one of the most important of this very fertile period.

There was further discussion in both Houses on the measure for making primary instruction compulsory and gratuitous, and then came the consideration of the Budget for 1882.

The financial situation at this era was Financial situation: not satisfactory. Expenses had increased Budget of with great rapidity, while profits were coming in but slowly. On March 17th the Minister for Finance authorised the loan of a milliard in Terminable Three per Cents. The loan was covered nearly fifteen times, as the subscriptions generally rose to 15 francs, which proves the democratic nature of the interest. The country, rich and thrifty, gave the Government unhesitating credit, which was rather too readily accepted. The Budget was the work of M. Magnin, with M. Rouvier as its "reporter." The expenses rose to 3,389,305,000 francs, and the revenues to only 2,789,486,000 francs, a deficit of nearly 600 millions, which may be explained by nearly 200 millions of redemptions, by the cost of the war in Tunis—34 millions; by the organisation of free instruction, the increase in teachers' salaries and in military pensions, in the grants to the merchant service, and in the increase of dotation for the National Debt in order to facilitate the loans.1

¹ A report of M. Sadi Carnot proves that in the space of three years 850 millions were spent on railways, canals and ports. For 1881 the expenses mounted to a figure of 400 millions. This was a striking contrast to the 80 millions spent between 1850 and 1870.

This enormous deficit was dissimulated in the Budget and covered, either by the "exceptional resources," or by "the floating debt." The Budget was finally voted by July 29th.

Political The general elections were already in outlook view. In a speech at Epinal M. Jules Ferry had already outlined the programme of the Government, that of the Moderate Republicans. On the delicate subject of Revision he was as hostile as Gambetta had been at Cahors: "A tree is never pulled up to see whether it has taken root."

The Government, however, still hesitated as to the date of the elections; the Cabinet, in spite of so much labour, having gained neither the favour of the public nor the complete confidence of parliament.

Several difficulties had induced M. Andrieux, the Prefect of Police, to resign his post, and he was succeeded by M. Camescasse on July 18th.

Complications in Tunis and Algeria caused much uneasiness, and led to a rumour that the Government desired to hasten on the elections in order to escape the control of the Chambers, but the date was arranged for August 21st, the Ministry being conscious of much work undertaken that needed to be brought to completion.

The aspect of things had changed very suddenly. M. Jules Ferry and his friends of the Moderate Left remaining in power, it was Gambetta who was in a false position as leader of a dismembered party, finding it as difficult to attack as to defend itself: at war with the Right, the Centre, the Extreme Left, half vanquished by the failure of the scrutin de liste, and breaking in advance with the new Chamber on which his future depended.

Gambetta Irritated and anxious, he decided to use at Tours the weapon left him, and in a speech at Tours at the beginning of the electoral campaign he veered round unexpectedly to the cause of the Revision.

In thus declaring himself against the Senate, Gambetta affirmed that a more energetically Republican majority was to be found on the Left. His attitude was extremely prudent and measured—what he asked for was merely the "partial revision"—revision "with the help of the Senate."

The rest of the speech was a programme, an appeal, as usual, for unity among the Republicans in the support of a strong Government. He upheld the necessary organs of this strong government: Administration "as the steward of democracy," the Army, the State—the co-ordination of all the public forces "for reforms worthy of the Republic and of democracy." He pleaded further for the income tax, the development of insurances, for social and economic improvements.

His speech brought fresh champions to the cause of Revision—all the Republican party became henceforth revisionists. M. Jules Ferry, speaking at Nancy, August 10th, found himself obliged to withdraw what he had said at Epinal and to uphold the revision "proposed by a great orator at Tours."

The situation, however, did not hereby grow more clear.

Gambetta's position was none the more assured, as all he had to depend on was his own incontestable popularity and the very real desire of the nation in general to choose him as its leader. The Government ventured neither to agree nor to break with the great Tribune, and the country, understanding

nothing of these manœuvres and divisions, was more prepared to use strength than skill.

In the Elysée, however, there was a subtle triumph—there was much that would be gained by the fall of Gambetta.

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M. Jules Ferry was meanwhile fighting Ferry valiantly against the unpopularity that had sapped all his career. The complications in Africa aroused the accusation of his having hastened on the elections in order to distract the attention of the country. And the elections being arranged for August 21st, and the powers of the Chamber only lapsing in October, the ministerial decision brought about the irregular situation of neither one nor the other of the two existing Chambers being able to be convoked.

But M. Jules Ferry knew when to risk a little in order to save much. He remained firm and unshaken by criticism and abuse—the Chamber was in no position to act, one of those hours had come when some one man must assume responsibility.

Difficulties There had been mistakes made in Tunis. in Tunis The French had too soon considered themselves masters of the situation, they had been misled by the apparent submission of the Bey and his minister. The troops from Algeria under the command of General Forgemol had, it is true, occupied all the northern part of the Regency, and Kroumiria in particular; also, by means of flying columns, pacified the country as far as the town of Tunis, and taken up positions at Kef, Beja, Mateur, etc. The operation had seemed completed by June 1st, but its very ease had compromised results.

The Paris press decided that far too large a number of troops was being employed in the Regency, and clamoured for some to be recalled. Fever and disease had tried the strength of the young soldiers who had been exposed to all the dangers of a rainy spring and a torrid summer. Orders were therefore given that ten thousand men should be sent back to France, while eight thousand of the Algerian troops should return to their garrisons. On July 3rd General Forgemol's staff was disbanded; only fifteen thousand men remained in Tunis.

The result of this decision was a renewal of all the former difficulties. By yielding to the Bey's request in not occupying the capital the French were suspected of hesitation, and profiting by this, the Bey telegraphed to the Sultan a protest against the treaty of the Bardo. Discord was rife between the diplomatists and generals of France, deeds of violence were enacted outside the very gates of Tunis, added to this came the excitement of Ramadan, the anti-Christian agitation of the Marabouts, the intrigues of foreign agents, and the French forces, far too small in numbers, found themselves suddenly hemmed in. Telegraph wires were cut, the springs were poisoned, the railways forming the only means of communication with Algeria were threatened; these facts—with much exaggeration from the Opposition—speedily gave rise to the impression that the campaign and the Treaty had been but mystification.

In point of fact, the work had been only just begun, the interruption had come far too soon. Not a single French soldier had been seen in the southern part of Tunis, which was in a state of insurrection, or, rather, of anarchy. Kairouan, the holy city,

formed the centre of resistance, with Sfax and Gabes on the sea-coast as its outposts.

The situation was all the more disquietions in ing in that similar complications were taking place in Algeria.

Ever since General Chanzy had been succeeded by M. Albert Grévy, Algerian affairs had been in an unsatisfactory condition. The first civil Governor-General had been unable to grasp the reins with a strong hand, being a man of weak nature and medium ability, while his nomination coincided with a phase of agitation general throughout the Mohammedan world.

Colonel Flatters, who had been sent into the Sahara at the head of a strong expedition in order to study the future track of the railway line towards the Soudan, had been murdered by the Touaregs at Birel-Gharama on February 16th; the survivors of the expedition, with no Frenchman left among them, had not regained the frontier until April.

Bou Just as the war began in Tunis, the power-Amama ful confederation of the Ouled-Sidi-Cheik had risen in revolt, while at the instigation of Bou Amama the Southern Oranais was aflame. Leaving the region, still uncolonised, of Tiaret and Géryville, Bou Amama had advanced on the Tell, defeated Colonel Innocenti in an engagement in which 34 Frenchmen were killed, 20 wounded, and 26 made prisoners, and then, meeting with no serious resistance, he had advanced to Saïda, massacred the Spanish workmen there employed, and escaped from the forces of Colonel Mallaret, who was unable to cope with the rebel.

The deputies from Algeria, M. Jacques and M. Gastu, had questioned the Government on these

events, and blamed the Governor-General for incapacity and negligence. Neither the reply of General Farre nor that of Jules Ferry had seemed satisfactory. M. Henri Brisson had closed the debate by a vehement philippic against the Algerian administration and its leaders. The Government was only saved by a vote of confidence mitigée proposed by M. Méline. This incident had the fortunate result of causing General Saussier to be reappointed to the command of the 19th Army Corps, while an administrative commission was formed to study the Algerian difficulties; but the work of this commission brought about the deplorable system of rattachements.

General Saussier's arrival in Algeria, with the mission of averting the twofold danger from the Oranais and Tunis, gave a more satisfactory aspect to the military situation, and there was adequate harmony of views and influence in the staff. The celebrated march of Colonel de Négrier on the Khouba of the Ouled-Sidi-Cheik, and the complete destruction of this religious centre, struck a severe blow at fanaticism; the construction of the railway from Saïda to Mecheria undid the hopes of Bou Amama, who was soon forced to seek refuge in the territory of Morocco.

In Tunis much was achieved before the separation of the Chambers by vigorous operations in the south and by the occupation of Sfax, which was speedily followed by that of Gabes.

Serious incidents had occurred at Sfax.

The insurgents, raising the standard of the Prophet, had driven out the authorities of Morocco, attacked the French Consular-Agent, pillaged the Frank quarter and put the European colony

to flight. Ali-ben-Kalifa had been proclaimed leader of the insurgents on July 2nd.

The white walls of Sfax offer a more apparent than real defence against the sea. The smallest French war-ship, the *Chacal*, with the gunboat *Pique*, speedily arrived as heralds of a squadron under Admiral Garnault and composed of the Colbert, the Trident, the Galissonnière, the Marengo, the Surveillante, the Revanche, the Friedland, and the Desaix, with several gunboats and transports. Troops belonging to the 92nd and the 136th of the Line were under the command of Colonel Jamais. Even the smallest vessels could only approach the shore to a distance of about two hundred metres. The town seemed ready to defend itself. After careful preparations which, much to the annoyance of the Paris newspapers, delayed operations for some days, three bodies of troops managed to achieve a landing. The insurgents had placed several batteries along the shore. but these were soon reduced to silence; soldiers and sailors dashed towards the closed portals of the town. A sailor from the *Alma* managed to blow up the gate, the town was quickly occupied despite strong resistance, and a hand-to-hand fight raged along the streets until, before the approach of evening, the French colours floated out above the Casbah (July 15th).

The taking Bold and rapid operations at Gabes of Gabes directed by Commander Marcq de Saint-Hilaire, who had already distinguished himself at Sfax, assured the possession of the town and of the neighbouring strongholds.

The squadron, regaining the north, appeared at Mahedin, Monastir and Sousse, where the Tunisian governors acknowledged French authority. Admiral

Conrad, further to the south, invested the island of Djerba and also Zarzis on the frontier of Tripoli. The sea-coast was assured. There remained but the vast field of the interior and the mysterious region extending from the heights of Zaghouan to the Algerian frontier, where amidst wild solitudes stands the holy city of Khairouan. But the heat of the summer and the insufficiency of men enforced delay.

The electoral campaign Watters had reached this point when M.

Jules Ferry cut short the session and convoked the electors for August 21st.

It is hardly a matter for astonishment that the questions of Algeria and Tunis should have been a strong bone of contention for party politics.

M. Jules Ferry was not the only one to suffer from the strange bewilderment of opinions. Gambetta was treated as if directly responsible for mistakes, and obliged to offer good countenance to a favour ready to forsake him. Rarely has there been greater danger under more brilliant auspices.

The political parties stood ready for the fray. The Monarchical and Imperialistic Right retained its position. The Centres, exhausted by the slow decease of the Dufaure and Waddington administrations, were merging into the Moderate Republican groups, and through hostility towards Gambetta placing their hopes on Jules Ferry, despite his anticlerical vehemence.

The Ministry stood its ground by sheer force of will and perseverance, but Jules Ferry was not liked even by those who made most use of him. His relations with Gambetta were still difficult to read. At Nancy, August 10th, he had declared his intention of serving as "lieutenant" to Gambetta on the sub-

ject of the Revision. The *National*, commenting on this discourse, observed that "the only man who could have barred the road to Gambetta has now paid him submission." Yet this *rapprochement* was neither absolute nor cordial; reserve and suspicion still divided the two men.

Gambetta was torn between the desire for power and many reasons, public and private, which made it seem unachievable. Looked upon already as the leader of the future Cabinet, he had not yet succeeded in determining his tactics between the power and the opposition. As well as for the revision of the Constitution he was fighting for the income tax, the abolition of the Volontariat, the reduction of military service, the liquidation of the property of religious communities; and these demands, which separated his policy from that of the Cabinet, excited the suspicion of the middle classes, while the Extreme Left, on the other hand, did not welcome his advances. The people of Paris began even to mistrust him, after a long newspaper campaign. Gambetta was a deputy for Paris. The XX Arrondissement (of Belleville and Charonne) had now, through increase of population, grown into two electoral divisions, and Gambetta decided to stand for both of these at one and the same time, renouncing the numerous candidacies that were offered him by the provinces. A Republican Committee, formed in Paris under his direction, worked towards the union of all opinions in the party, from those of M. Tirard to those of M. Clémenceau. At a meeting at L'Elysée-Menilmontant, August 12th, at which two thousand constituents were present, Gambetta made a speech which repeated his continual appeal for unity, formulated, perhaps more definitely than before, his

political method, and insisted on the importance he attached to the scrutin de liste. His political programme was, in general, what he had proposed at Tours, while the foreign policy of his speech at Cherbourg was equally maintained. The speech was much applauded.

Four days later, at a public meeting in the hall of Saint-Blaise, of the Charonne division, Gambetta undertook to speak of social reform.

The place was ill-chosen, the crowd unmanageable —Gambetta was unable to obtain a hearing. This incident made a deeply unfavourable impression: his enemies took courage.

The Radical Meanwhile a new party was arising, party formed by men of talent, some of them old friends of Gambetta, who sought a middle road between Opportunism and the Extreme Left. Among them were Allain-Targé, Charles Floquet, E. Lockroy, and Henri Brisson, and the group was to become the Radical party of the future.

M. Clémenceau headed the *intransigeants* of the Left, and with him were the brilliant editors of La Justice—M. Camille Pelletan, M. Laguerré, M. Pichon, M. Millerand. The Radical was founded in 1881 by M. Henry Maret. The programme of M. Clémenceau included many things: The revision of the Constitution, suppression of the Senate and of the Presidency of the Republic, separation of Church and State, suppression of the Public Worship budget, the right of the child to general education, military service made compulsory for all, progressive substitution of a national militia for a permanent army, free and equal justice for all, elective and temporary magistracy, scrutin de liste, decentralisation, communal autonomy, a sliding scale of dues on change of

property, divorce, homes for the aged and infirm, workmen's syndicates, etc.

The Except for incidents in Paris, the elecelections tions went off very quietly and quickly, between August 21st and September 4th.
What seemed difficult to understand upon the
stage itself appeared very simple to the audience.

The Monarchists and "Conservatives" of all shades were much opposed. The Right lost about sixty representatives; the Left Centre maintained some forty; the Republican majority under the combined banners of Gambetta and Jules Ferry rose to a representation of 400, while of this the Left Republican (under Ferry) had 168, and the Union Republican (under Gambetta) had 204, including the Radical group properly so called, the Extreme Left obtained 46 seats. All things considered, the only chance of permanency for any Cabinet lay in the close union of the Lefts. The adversary's art consisted, therefore, in dividing the two captains and their crews.

Gambetta was elected for Belleville by a small majority, but withdrew from the second division of Charonne with an announcement that proclaimed his break with the Extreme Left.

By September 4th the new Chamber was elected, though the powers of the old one had not yet expired. The singularity of the situation gave some latitude to the Ministry, which used it accordingly. The result of the African campaign still being uncertain, the Government announced its intention of taking its time and of delaying the meeting of the Chambers until the end of October.

This naturally aroused much criticism, also a vol. iv. 600 RR

fiery manifesto from the deputies of Paris under M. Delattre and M. Louis Blanc, declaring—

That the fatal expedition into Tunis had not only set Africa aflame, but had broken the bonds that united us to Italy . . . had presented us to Europe as continually tormented by the desire for conquest, and that herein lay the secret of the artificial eagerness encouraged by Prince Bismarck.

All this, however, did not touch a public that was confidently and quietly awaiting the advent of Gambetta.

And Gambetta was preparing the foundations of his government, both at home and abroad. In a visit paid to Normandy at the beginning of September, he pronounced at Neubourg a singularly strong and thoughtful speech, which seemed to indicate a desire to detach the scrutin de liste and the revision from his programme and to reassure the Senate. Further, he paid a flying visit to Germany, where it is said that he went to the residence of Prince Bismarck at Friedrichsruh. On his return, he called on President Grévy; it was for him now to take the initiative, in spite of certain moments of hesitation and depression as recorded by J. J. Weiss—now his friend and champion.

Re-commencement his labours with imperturbable calm. The campaign in Tunis settle things in Tunis, a strong and formidable occupation would be necessary, and it was decided to raise the strength of the force to 50,000 men. Before the elections not a man was moved—a course that was justified by the season. Early in September, however, all was in motion. General Saussier had had time to make his plans. The reinforcements

arrived in the Regency by the end of September. was full time. On the 11th the aqueduct Zaghouan, which supplies Tunis, had been cut by the insurgents. Towards the end of the month the trains of the line between Tunis and Algiers did not arrive. General Saussier had landed in the Regency on the 3rd, and, amidst the clamour of excited journalists, directed his march on Kairouan. was to sweep the country in a fan-shaped movement. The southern column, under General Forgemol, was to start from Tebessa in Algeria; a second, under General Logerot, should leave Tunis; a third, under Etienne, should start from Sousse, the port that was nearest to Kairouan. Meanwhile the French were to enter Tunis, which was done without incident under General Logerot on October 10th—as the first step towards a definite occupation. On the same day General Saussier was made Commander-in-Chief, and addressed a proclamation to the people of Tunis stating that the one object of the French army was to re-establish peace and order in agreement with the government of the Bey.

The order of the march was most carefully regulated, and large provision made of every sort. As Jules Ferry declared later, it was "one of the most remarkable and wise operations known to military history."

General Forgemol had a long and difficult march to make, across desert regions, with constant pushing of the insurgents towards the south. In eleven days he stood before Kairouan. General Etienne, after several engagements, in one of which Bou Amama was slain, reached the town early on the 26th. The gates were all shut. Kairouan stood like an island raised above an empty plain.

The troops rode round the city; an interpreter, accompanied by several officers on horseback approached the gateway and struck it with the handle of his sword. Thereupon a white flag was hoisted, the gate was opened, and the governor of the town appeared offering unconditional submission. The Casbah was immediately occupied. General Saussier arrived the same evening, and on the following day the third army reached the city. The French troops then made a solemn entry into the sacred town—flags flying and music playing.

The news of such success made a great impression on the Arabs. The southern regions were quieted without much difficulty, and most of the more isolated tribes came to terms. The wisdom of the plan adopted in leaving the native caids in office responsible for the public peace did much to assure what the military triumphs had accomplished.

On November 19th General Forgemol occupied Gafsa on his way back to Algeria. General Logerot took Gabes and installed there as governor Allegno—a most faithful adherent of the French cause.

The still insurgent tribes were pushed back on to Turkish territory, where they long caused annoyance to the southern frontiers. General Logerot, by a series of operations with the mobile columns, cut off all communication for the marauders with the centre, and by the end of the year the whole of the Regency was quieted.

CHAPTER X

THE GAMBETTA ADMINISTRATION

I.—Re-opening of Parliament—Inquiries on the Tunis question —Formation of the Gambetta Ministry—Difficulties—Weiss and Miribel—Gambetta's relations with the new Chamber.

II.—The situation abroad—The Triple Alliance—Egyptian affairs—The revolt of Arabi Pacha and the Anglo-French

Condominium-Gambetta and Great Britain.

III.—Activity of the Ministry—Projected reforms—Public opinion—Triennial renewal of the Senate—The revision of the Constitution and the Scrutin de liste—Defeat of the Government—Resignation of the Gambetta Ministry—The second Freycinet Administration—Death of Gambetta—Conclusion.

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Re-opening of October 28th. On this same day arrived the telegram from General Saussier announcing the occupation of Kairouan. The communication was at once made to the parliament, M. Guichard, as senior member, reading out the dispatch. It was received with shouts of laughter. The Ministry, though victorious, was made to look completely ridiculous; evidently no belief was to be attached to anything relating to Tunis. M. Jules Ferry, however, was resolved to fight to the last, and before leaving office he desired to be heard as to Tunis.

The new Chamber had other plans in view, and was seeking the man who was henceforth to be either its master or its victim—Gambetta. As temporary

president he was elected by 317 votes out of 364, but declined to stand for the regular office. He was still hesitating at the cross-roads of Destiny. Writing to his friend on November 8th, he exclaimed:—

Yes, it would be better at Zarpat, better still at Sorrente. There is yet time; will you start, and leave all these wretched people to devour each other at their ease? I am ready to save both you and myself—one word, a single "yes," and we shall be free for always.

M. Henri Brisson was made President of the Chamber by 347 votes to 33. In the Senate M. Léon Say was re-elected.

On November 5th inquiries were made as to Tunis by MM. Naquet, Amagat and de Roys. M. Jules Ferry announced that whatever were the issue of the debate the Ministry intended to resign. He spoke with sternness and dignity, dealing with each criticism in turn and shaking off both it and the critics. It was asserted that France had been hurled into the war without due warning, without time for the Chambers to discuss the question properly; that it had cost France friends in Europe, disorganised her army, and led to little more than had the disastrous expedition of Mexico. To this Jules Ferry pointed out that the character of the campaign had been. before all things, one of pacification; that the real enemy of France in Tunis was not the native population but the uncertainty prevailing as to the views of the French Government. He appealed to the patriotism of Frenchmen.

M. Clémenceau repeated his charges. The war had not been desired by the nation, it had been undertaken to satisfy financial interests, to please the shareholders. From an international point of

view it was a serious mistake to occupy Tunis, since it placed France in too close proximity with the Ottoman Empire—since it had embroiled her with Italy. In case of a European war the military dispositions were seriously modified.

M. Ferry replied as before. The implication as to Italy was, however, better founded than were the other charges. Italy was now inclined to yield to the advances of Prince Bismarck, and the Triple Alliance was attracting her. M. Ferry considered, though, that if the military dispositions had been modified it was to the advantage of France, since a door had been closed by which entrance could have been forced into her property.

During the course of the discussion, which had taken some four days, the Comte de Mun remarked with much severity that the Government was incapable of protecting the honour of the nation. Then Gambetta, who had hitherto kept silence, intervened. After long and anxious self-communing, he asked to speak "on the position of the question," and "without entering into personal disputes," he proposed a vote of confidence in what had been performed as to Tunis. The tension was relaxed, the situation saved. By 355 votes against 68 the resolution was passed. Gambetta was now pledged to play the title-rôle.

The following day, November 10th, the Gambetta Ferry Administration resigned, and Gambetta was requested to form a new Cabinet.

M. Grévy gave him a free hand; there was much excitement as to whom he would choose as his colleagues, and the combination of the five "presidents"—Gambetta, de Freycinet, Jules Ferry, Léon Say and Henri Brisson—was taken almost for granted. Much,

however, as Gambetta desired to group the most influential men of the party, he had met with serious difficulties. Between himself and Jules Ferry there was strong difference of opinion on the *Scrutin de liste*. Gambetta on this point was intractable. Jules Ferry, justly irritated at the unfairness of the parties, was not disposed to yield to everything, and Gambetta had perhaps waited overlong in making the first overtures. With no actual hostility between the two statesmen, the difficulties were too great to be lightly brushed aside.

To M. de Freycinet Gambetta had early addressed himself. There had been some coldness between them after the leadership of the former, but an understanding had been brought about through M. Challemel-Lacour. Gambetta represented that his health would not long allow him to bear the burden of the power. "We will share it between us," he explained, "I desire only a few months of office, and then propose to travel and to rest. You will undertake the Ministry for War and be my chief collaborator." A list was drawn up embracing "all who had been or who could be leaders of the Cabinet." To M. Léon Say was assigned the portfolio of Finance, to Jules Ferry that of Education, the Interior was to fall to M. Challemel-Lacour, Justice to M. Brisson, the Foreign Office to M. Tissot. Gambetta reserved no portfolio for himself, thus sparing himself extra fatigue, and with a view to enlarging the sphere of the Premier. Later on, however, a new list was drawn up, in which neither Jules Ferry, Léon Say, nor Henri Brisson were to figure, while M. de Frevcinet was to undertake the Foreign Office instead of that of War. After some reflection de Freycinet refused to take office, "unable to fulfil the task

required of him and requesting permission to remain as a senator, while assuring Gambetta of his continued friendship." M. Léon Say also declined the Ministry for Finance.

Gambetta felt that the Elysée had some influence in these refusals, and realised that if he wished to be master in his own Cabinet he would have to abandon the idea of the "Great Ministry," It was, therefore, on "comrades" that he finally depended. The crew was easily embarked—

For Foreign Affairs, and as President of the Council stood Gambetta;

- , Justice: M. Cazot;
- " Interior: M. Waldeck-Rousseau;
- " War: General Campenon;
- ,, Navy: Captain Gougeard;
- " Education and Public Worship: M. Paul Bert;
- ,, Finance: M. Allain-Targé;
- ,, Public Works: M. Raynal;
- " Commerce and the Colonies: M. Rouvier;
 - ,, Agriculture: M. Devès;
- ,, Fine Arts: M. Antonin Proust.

As Under-Secretaries of State were: M. Spüller in the Foreign Office; M. Blandin in the War Office; M. Cochéry for Post and Telegraph; M. Felix Faure in the Colonial Office; M. Chalamel for Education; M. Margue for the Interior; M. Lelièvre in the Treasury; M. Caye for Agriculture; M. Lesguillier for Public Works.

A "Ministry of clerks," commented some; "of the Dictatorship," said others. These were indeed mostly unknown men, a simple captain head of the Navy! Gambetta had some trouble in finding a Minister for the Interior, and had had to insist on the help of the very young M. Waldeck-Rousseau,

who was already known as a good speaker and careful parliamentarian. M. Cazot was the only member of the Cabinet who belonged to the Senate. Two new ministries had been created. According to his promise, Gambetta had paid small attention to subdivisions of party, though in obtaining the support of M. Allain-Targé and of M. Paul Bert for leading positions he had obviously inclined towards the Left.

The ministerial declaration was read before both houses on November 15th. A "gradual but resolute policy of reform" was announced—a carefully limited revision—magisterial reforms, diminution of military charges and of taxes weighing on agriculture; commercial treaties, State assistance, strict application of the Concordataire régime.

It was this last point, perhaps, that from the pen of M. Paul Bert seemed most striking. The new Cabinet was rather rapidly abandoning the old principle of the Republican party on the separation of Church and State, at least by unilateral means.

The declaration met with a cold reception, and the plan for "limited revision" was speedily a subject of contention. It bore, indeed, the hall-mark of Gambetta, and included the vexed question of the *Scrutin de liste*. M. Barodet met it with a proposition that exacted "indeterminate revision," and thereby came into personal friction with Gambetta. The proposition was thrown out, but the skirmish showed what the new administration could expect.

A few days later there was another difficult discussion on the supplementary funds required for the two new ministries and under-secretaryships, which meant a grant of 125,000 francs. The money was voted, but the ministry was reproached for having

created new offices without the previous consent of the Chambers.

Gambetta had to suffer constant pin-pricks.

A letter written by him at this period to the woman friend who meant so much to him reveals much disillusion and suffering:—

A new year is opening for us both; we are still masters of our fate. You have drained the cup of suffering; I have learned to know, without being moved or troubled, all the happiness of power and fame, as men consider it to be; but all is valueless for me without you, your love and presence, without your compensation for the injustice of life. Let us begin this new era together.

Some unknown reason, perhaps some superhuman disinterestedness, prevented the union that he so ardently desired.

Gambetta had accepted power out of consideration for his party, but he always affirmed that it would be his object not only to govern with his friends but to group around him all true forces of the nation. Like M. Thiers and M. Challemel-Lacour, he was a strong adherent of centralisation, Another effort of his was to keep back certain financial interests that were creeping into the affairs of the Republic. Such enterprises can only be carried out with the support of a strong and resolute majority, the individual courage and perseverance of the statesman is not of itself sufficient for the task. Gambetta had no such majority, though his first actions and those of his colleagues announced a bold policy. Captain Gougeard told the admirals that they had no need to gain his confidence. M. Paul Bert explained to the staff of the Public Worship Administration that he had no desire for their secret approbation in anything that he might do.

The nation in whose name I, unworthy as I am, have the honour to speak, has given me the necessary powers for enforcing its sovereign will.

And M. Waldeck-Rousseau's circular to the prefects was still more decided:—

A system of government based on the notion that a prefect's opinion is worth nothing and that the recommendation of a deputy is everything, would be fatal to the independence of elector, deputy and ministers.

He wished to "save the elected from unnecessary contact with the elector," and begged the prefects to remain in their departments and not crowd the ministerial ante-rooms. This method was a new one, M. Allain-Targé also alarmed the Bourse by his first financial measures.

The series of nominations following on the constitution of the Cabinet confirmed the system, but determined the explosion.

General Campenon, Minister for War. The Army had been one of the few military men to protest against the coup d'état of 1851. He had paid for his Republican opinions by a long exile in difficult outposts of Southern Algeria. He was a very capable man, and had cherished no grudges, for one of his first measures, in concert with Gambetta, was to appoint General Miribel as Commander-in-Chief. This general had been somewhat entangled, together with General Ducrot, in the intrigues of May the Sixteenth, but in view of his abilities this incident was relegated to the past. To the Chief Council for War were summoned Marshal Canrobert, Generals Chanzy, Gresley, de Gallifet, Carteret-Grécourt, and Saussier. A strange combination! "If these men had found

M. Gambetta at a street corner after the Commune, they would have had him shot!" commented M. Clovis Hugues. "Why not have Bazaine, too?" said M. Henry Maret.

The diplomatic service M. de Chaudiplomatic dordy succeeded General Chanzy, who had resigned. M. de Courcel replaced the Count de Saint-Vallier in Berlin, since the Count, embarrassed by a correspondence very hostile to Gambetta addressed from Berlin to the department, thought his resignation necessary. In place of M. de Courcel, M. J. J. Weiss became director for political affairs.

This appointment aroused great agitation. M. J. J. Weiss was a well-known publicist, one of the ablest men of the Conservative party, an apologist for May the Sixteenth—a man of letters—a journalist! M. Tiebert and other leaders of the Republican press were most indignant. M. Edmond About rallied his comrade on having entered the diplomatic career, "like a sparrow into a cathedral." Paris was much amazed.

Tunis Tunis question was still undecided; and a grant of 29 million francs was needed for expenses. Gambetta was again summoned to explain his policy, which was simply that of framing a protectorate. The Chamber accepted this large definition, which also served to "cover" the actions of his predecessors. The Senate also was prepared to thaw upon the subject; though the criticisms of the Duc de Broglie on the inconveniences of a protectorate and the dangers of colonial expansion had their value. Gambetta had the triumph of seeing the The Roughard grant voted unanimously, and was also able stan case to put a stop to an unpleasant attack upon

M. Roustan, who had so ably served his country. M. Rochefort's newspaper had accused M. Roustan of being involved in financial intrigues in Tunis. M. Roustan had thereupon prosecuted M. Rochefort for libel, and no proofs being forthcoming of the alleged shady transactions, M. Roustan emerged without a stain upon his honour. M. Rochefort was also acquitted, as he was able to plead sincerity of conviction. The hostile press expected M. Roustan to be retired, but Gambetta was in power. He sent for M. Roustan, expressed his high opinion of his services, and gave him orders to resume his post at once, as if nothing had occurred.

Gambetta felt assured of his position, stronger than he had been.

His method, therefore, was the right one—to press forward fearlessly and face the obstacles. Like M. Thiers, he was resolved to govern, to sail against the wind if need arose, without hesitation in attacking his enemies as long as parliament withheld from him the full and loyal confidence that his past services seemed to him to merit.

II

The Chambers separated on December vacations 16th to meet again on January 10th. Gambetta had a few weeks in which to take breath and to adapt himself to his double functions as Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Council. He had much to do. The France that had so long waited for his coming now rushed into his presence; his ante-rooms, his staircase, were invaded, a large staff of secretaries and confidential men could not

sufficiently protect his leisure. He saw many people, with the generosity of spirit that cannot refuse applications. He was also the subject of violent attacks, and feeling all the dull irritation caused by contrariety of circumstances and opinions, sometimes bent beneath the burden with deep fits of depression. But there was much to be done. He robbed himself of sleep to study documents and had at least the highest satisfaction of the statesman—that of action.

The *Times* had commented on his rise to power: "The advent of M. Gambetta marks a crisis in the history of Republican France, and will perhaps form an epoch in European history."

Germany The Czar Alexander II had been assasand Russia sinated March 13th, 1881, and was succeeded by his son, Alexander III. Since this event, Prince Bismarck had become uneasy as to the relations between Germany and Russia. His conviction—expressed so often in his Memoirs, was that Germany "could not break the bridges" with the Slav empire except at the risk of being at the mercy of Austria-Hungary and of being led beyond her proper interests in the matters of the Danube and the Balkans. The prudence of his attitude towards the two adjacent Powers is the most striking proof of the moderation of his powerful spirit.

Alexander III, who had married a princess of Denmark, did not offer the same guarantees as had his father for the Royal family of Prussia and the policy of Bismarck. By making Count Ignatieff his leading minister, he had shown his nationalist and absolute tendencies. Favourable indications for a Franco-Russian agreement were multiplied. Katkoff was the most favoured counseller of the new Czar.

Skobeleff, the hero of Plevna and of Géok-Tépé, an avowed foe to the German hegemony, prepared to visit Paris. Yet the Czar had a horror of Liberalism, which was in his eyes the vanguard of Nihilism—the murderer of his father. Torn between two directions, he hesitated, and Bismarck managed—as is reported, through the intermediary of the reigning family of Denmark—to arrange an interview between the two Emperors at Dantzig during September, 1881.

The Socialistic danger, and the need of fighting it, was there especially discussed. Prince Bismarck is said to have gained the confidence of the new Czar, and the unexpected intimacy of the two courts roused the mistrust of Austria. The Viennese Cabinet, in order to sow dissension, published the famous telegram from the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg: "The unexpected moderation of Prince Bismarck has produced a good effect on the Czar and his Minister, M. de Giers."

Formation of the Triple partly at ease, and in order to satisfy him-Alliance self he endeavoured to complete the dual combination that he had established in Central Europe and transform it into a threefold one. He lent himself to the advances of Italy, so long declined. "Towards the close of December, 1881, the diplomatic representatives of King Humbert in Berlin and Vienna informed the governments of the two empires that Italy would willingly contract with them a defensive treaty of alliance. Discussions were begun at once and conducted with so much secrecy that their conclusion (May 20th, 1882) coincided with the signing of a commercial treaty between France and Italy (May 15th, 1882), while France had no idea

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of the vexatious situation in which she was thereby placed."

Out of these circumstances Bismarck's tactics towards France developed—he desired to make Gambetta's new Cabinet distrusted by Europe, but not to go beyond this, and it was at this time that he compared Gambetta with a drummer in a sickroom. Still less than in 1875 would Russia allow Germany to threaten the balance of Europe; on the other hand, it would be as well to arouse jealousy in Russia by encouraging the rumour of a close understanding between France and England.

The German Gazette of Vienna remarked, under inspiration which is not hard to trace: "There is something in the atmosphere that indicates an alliance of the liberal States." At the same time, Bismarck was quite aware of a certain friction between the two Powers on the subject of Egypt, but he reckoned on gaining advantage from this difficulty and still further complicating it if need should arise.

Affairs The Anglo-French Condominium had in Egypt reached the inevitable crisis of ill-assorted unions. France was incurring all the odium of unpopular reforms, while England associated herself with the national feeling. Mistrust of the foreigner and certain other reasons ill understood had aroused a strong national spirit, particularly in the officers stationed in Cairo. The French agents were at variance as to how this attitude should be met. M. de Riag, the Consul-General, considered that it should be encouraged in that the British preponderance would thereby meet a blow. M. de Blignières, of more "European," perhaps more "financial" outlook, desired that all attempts to resist the combined

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authority of the two Powers should be repressed—
Arabi by force, if necessary. While Paris hesiPacha tated, Arabi Pacha raised a revolt (February
1st), which made him master of the town and allowed
him to overawe the Egyptian Government M. de
Riag was recalled. M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire,
depending on a real understanding with Great Britain,
affirmed the authority of the Condominium more
strenuously than ever.

Meanwhile, however, the nationalistic movement in Egypt made headway. On September 10th, during the absence of the French agents, Arabi Pacha surrounded the palace of the Khedive; the Egyptian army demanded the dismissal of all the members of Riya Pacha's Cabinet, the convocation of the Notables, the establishment of a constitution, and the increase of the army, which had been reduced by the reforms to 4,000 men, to a strength of 18,000. The only European agents at their posts who could consult with the Khedive were the two Englishmen, Mr. Colvil and Mr. Cookson. With remarkable condescension the Khedive accepted Arabi's conditions and constituted a nationalistic ministry, with Cherif Pacha at its head.

The Condominium had received its death-blow—by what should it be replaced? A "national" government—"Egypt for the Egyptians," seemed impossible—at all events unpleasing to the financiers. The insurgents themselves showed a pan-Islamic tendency to lean upon the Sultan, whose intrigues against France in Northern Africa had been lately evident. Believing the moment to be favourable, the Sultan attempted to regain his ancient heritage, but neither France nor England were disposed to help him. The Times discussed the

possibility of a third European Power, namely Spain, being called in to support the claims of Europe. France, through M. de Blignières, desired to reestablish the *Condominium*.

The autumn of 1881 was spent in attempting to solve the problem. The two Powers, both anxious to avoid the intervention of Turkey, were watching each other's movements with suspicion. Commissionaries from Turkey having been sent to Cairo by the Sultan, two gunboats, one French, the other English, were stationed off Alexandria. Never had the two Governments appeared more united. The Foreign Office of London proposed that the two Consuls-General at Cairo should make a communication to the Khedive and to Cherif Pacha:—

These agents were instructed to inform the Khedive's Government that the two Powers would help him to maintain the independence of Egypt as it had been established by the *firmans* of the Sultan; they would offer their services, in case of need, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Turkish emissaries to control the actions of the Minister.

A note addressed by Lord Granville to Sir Edward Malet, Consul-General at Cairo, contained, however, certain reservations which might have shaken the optimism of the French diplomatists, but Gambetta, in an interview with Lord Lyons, considered that joint action of the two Powers in order to prevent a further crisis should at once be considered. These views were transmitted to London by Lord Lyons, and were regarded there as a sign of a new and "enterprising" policy.

Mr. Gladstone was at this time Prime Minister. He had in a recent speech declared the relations of the two Powers to be most cordial. But Lord Granville was of hesitating nature; Sir Charles Dilke,

the Under-Secretary of State, had personal views on the Egyptian question. Many considerations, therefore, led to a cold reception of Gambetta's advances, much to his surprise.

However, he again represented that the agreement between the two countries should have some practical result, and proposed that they "should instruct their representatives in Cairo to offer Tewfik Pacha assurances of sympathy and support, and to encourage His Highness to maintain and affirm his own authority."

Even this simple manifestation was regarded as compromising, but a note from both Powers was nevertheless telegraphed to their respective Agents in Cairo, and these declared to Tewfik Pacha, on January 8th, that his maintenance on the throne was considered by both France and England as indispensable for the welfare of Egypt. But, as Lord Granville observed to M. Challemel-Lacour, "it was more important for the Anglo-French concord to be apparent than to be real." The correspondence of M. Challemel-Lacour leaves no doubt as to Lord Granville's want of enthusiasm, and an article in the Times of January 4th expressed the same sentiments.

Gambetta's "temerity" was generally regarded in Paris as a piece of unpardonable imprudence. The old cry of "Gambetta, c'est la Guerre!" was again caught up and repeated.

At this juncture, moved by some hidden Intervention impulse, Europe intervened. Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome and Vienna replied to a protest from the Porte by a joint Memorandum addressed to Constantinople, which declared that they could admit no alteration in the status quo by the individual action of the two Powers. On every

side the danger was increasing. Prince Bismarck had been consulted on the matter, and he had informed M. de Courcel that his only fear was lest a special Anglo-French agreement should lead to conflict between these two nations. Here, indeed, was disinterest!

Gambetta, therefore, with his previsions and precautions, appeared as a disturbing spirit. The financial party in Paris formulated the policy of abandonment, which was to mean so much:—

However ardently a strong foreign policy may be desired, it is yet impossible not to see that French interests in Egypt are rapidly decreasing. . . . Egypt could never be for France a centre of colonisation. . . . England will absorb Egypt by degrees; a great portion of the Debt will doubtless remain in French hands, but the financial matters of Egypt will no longer represent a national cause.

The system of resigned abstention was henceforth to be opposed to the "perilous policy" of Gambetta—perilous, in that it embarrassed England by its very moderation. Gambetta had not forgotten the dictum of M. Thiers: "Above all, never abandon Egypt!" He had to learn that one cannot in France defend French interests with impunity.

III

On the reassembly of the Chambers,

Ministerial activity

January 10th, the Gambetta administration, through the activity of its members, was able to present parliament with a scheme of legisla-

¹ On the fall of Gambetta (January 31st), Arabi Pacha imposed on the Assembly of Notables the Nationalistic Constitution, obtained the dismissal of Cherif Pacha, and took upon himself the Ministry for War—measures which put an end to all control. M. de Blignières resigned on February 5th.

tion that embraced a great many reforms, and on which the "opportunist" system was developed in a series of projects tending to unite people and bourgeoisie. The chief of these reforms touched the organisation of the social body itself. As to the administration, there was the establishment of a ministry for Agriculture and another for Fine Arts; there was the complete reform of the magisterial system not only by modifications in the staff and by making offices no longer permanent, but through the reconstruction of courts and tribunals; there was to be strict execution of the concordataire laws; a reorganisation of the naval administration, the establishment of an Under-Secretaryship of State for the Colonies, independent of the Navy Ministry, and another also for the civil state in the Ministry for War.

As to finance—the National Debt was to be converted and unified; agriculture was to be relieved of many burdens, and a Credit Mobile Agricole was established; an income-tax was to be considered; negotiations were to be made with the railway companies with a view to buying up; free-trade was to be established; commercial treaties made with the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland and active steps taken towards a renewal of the treaty with Great Britain. As to social improvements, the military service was to be reduced to three years, with a strong arrangement for noncommissioned officers; insurance offices were to come under the laws; agents appointed on the railways; there were to be sick pensions for workmen, measures favouring small land exchanges, measures safeguarding small savings-banks against loss by fraud,—above all, Waldeck-Rousseau's motion es-

tablishing freedom of association—that is to say, authorising trade syndicates on the one condition that the object of the association and the principles of its organisation should be legal; and lastly, a measure on the transportation of old offenders against the laws.

Gambetta was quite aware that most of these projects would attract much opposition, but it was a principle of government with him that such opposition should be broken down. His chief weapon—the re-establishment of the *Scrutin de liste*—was still ready to his hand in spite of his once having seemed to renounce it.

The senatorial elections took place without incident, which was a new triumph for the Republic and, on the whole, for the Ministry.

The Revision ward a project for the partial revision of the constitutional laws. Its chief points were the following:—

I.—A modification in the method of election of senators; the number of delegates from the electoral communes should be in proportion to the number of inhabitants in the district: a commune of 500 or less having the right to one delegate; over 500 and up to 1,000 two delegates—thus giving Paris the right of 855 delegates.

II.—Senators should be permanently appointed. The *Mandat Viager* should be suppressed and replaced by a mandate of nine years; but seventy-five senators should be elected by the national college of the two Chambers; every three years one hundred senators should "leave," seventy-five of whom should present themselves before the departmental college, and twenty-five before the national college.

III.—As to rights over the Budget, the Senate should have but one means of control, the Chamber representing the general suffrage having the first and last word.

IV.—The powers of the Senate as to public petitions should be abridged.

The Government requested of the Chambers that this project should be carefully considered; it was, therefore, placed before an examining committee of twenty-three members. This committee, however, proved decidedly hostile towards it. The Scrutin de liste was again the subject of contention, the "dictatorship" of Gambetta was once more cried against him.

A public debate was held on January 26th, amidst general interest and excitement. The first passage of arms was between M. Andrieux, as "reporter" of the Committee, and Gambetta, as president of the Council. M. Andrieux, ex-Prefect of Police, was a dangerous opponent, still unappeased after his recent failure,—of Machiavellian subtlety and address.

Gambetta was in good form—fighting for his life as a politician, as a statesman. With all the eloquence that was his own he explained the position adopted by the Cabinet, then, before making the great effort of the day, he passionately defended himself against the charge of personal ambition:—

I can only reply to your apprehensions by urging my sincerity, by reminding you of the projects we have prepared, by reminding you of my past career (loud applause) and I appeal to your conscience . . . I am, indeed, convinced that the Republican legion whose struggles and trials I have shared will not fail us in the day of triumph any more than it failed us on the day of battle. In any case, it will be without bitterness, without the shadow of a personal rancour, that I shall bow before your verdict. In spite of all that has been said, there is one thing that I place high above all ambitions, however lawful—and this is the confidence of Republicans, without which I cannot hope to accomplish what is—and I have indeed some right to say so—my task in this country, the honouring of the Fatherland.

This was received with enthusiastic acclamation, but for the artist, not the man and the leader. As the exhausted orator regained his seat he might have

exclaimed with the Pharaoh of the stelas: "My archers and my chariots have forsaken me!"

M. Andrieux replied; in clear-cut terms he brought back the discussion to the point at which all the adversaries of the Cabinet could join forces:—

We affirm that there is but one point under discussion—as to whether the *Scrutin de liste* shall be introduced into the constitution. It is necessary to know whether on this ground the Government insists on raising the question of confidence.

Gambetta recognised the trap. In spite of M. Andrieux, there was another question, that of "limited" or "non-limited" revision, and he requested priority upon this point, hoping thus to obtain by degrees the passing of the other articles.

A question of priority was thus once more to decide the fate of the institutions. The formula was to be: "That there is reason for the revision of the constitutional laws," and the Government considered this as favouring the non-limited revision, and therefore pleaded against it, but by 268 votes against 218 it was adopted by the Chamber, an action directly hostile to Gambetta, who with his colleagues at once left the hall.

The Journal des Débats commented next day that the dissentiment between the Ministry and the Chamber was too great for compromise. The République Française remarked that:—

The deputies desired M. Gambetta to be in power, since they did not know what else to do with him, but they expected him to be contented with the presidency of the council without trying to enforce his political ideas.

There was a dinner at the Elysée that same evening. Gambetta went to the Quai d'Orsay to write his resignation and that of his colleagues, and carried it himself to the

President of the Republic. He also wrote a private letter, in which he said:—

I feel that in a few years' time the country will be better enlightened. . . . I have left by the large gateway—those who enter will have to do so by the small one. . . .

His satisfaction at thus being freed was sincere, but wearied and wounded as he was, his energy and optimism yet were strong.

The news of his fall aroused much excitement in the press, and ironical surprise abroad: "The French exalt an idol only to abase it."

Gambetta started for Nice and thence for Italy, while M. de Freycinet rapidly arranged his second Ministry.

As President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs was M. de Freycinet; For the Interior: M. René Goblet; Under-

Secretary of State: M. J. Develle;

For Finance: M. Léon Say;

,, Justice and Public Worship: M. Humbert; Under-Secretary of State: M. Varembon;

,, Education and Fine Arts: M. Jules Ferry; Under-Secretary of State: M. Duvaux;

, War: General Billot;

Navy and the Colonies: Admiral Jauréguiberry; Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies: M. Berlet;

,, Public Works: M. Varroy; Under-Secretary of State: M. Rousseau;

,, Commerce: M. Tirard;

,, Post and Telegraph: M. Cochery;

Agriculture: M. de Malny.

It was a Cabinet after the heart of M. Grévy—dull, despite the value of many of its members, powerless

because of the diversity of policies therein represented.

M. Léon Say, who had required much persuasion to join the combination, dictated a purely negative programme: "No conversion, no buying up, no loan. Nations do not live by politics alone, they want material interests."

The revision of the constitution was still demanded, but half-heartedly. Of the *Scrutin de liste* there was no mention. The new Chamber desired but existence now that it had destroyed the reason of its being. As to the Cabinet, it was chiefly needed as a safeguard.

Conclusion

The fall of the Gambetta Cabinet was depressing in its consequences. For some years the history of party quarrels is too trivial for much record. The true work of patriotism was only revived under the Ferry Administration, and that of democracy still later.

The leadership of M. Grevy saw some revival of the bourgeois régime. This enervating influence led to the diminution of France in Egypt and the East. An expression of M. Clémenceau's, pronounced on July 29th, 1882, summarises the philosophy of the system and determines the non-intervention of France as to Egypt, the Suez Canal, and elsewhere:—

My conclusion is: Europe is covered with soldiers, every one is expectant. The Powers reserve their liberty for the future; let us do the same for France.

This was said just as a bold decision was required.

On June 11th, a military and pan-Islamic ment of movement had culminated in an insurrection in Alexandria, and several Europeans had been slain.

England, so nervous a few months previously, suddenly showed the practical energy which has so often led her to success. France was timid and hesitating—the time had come to cut the bonds between them.

On July 11th the French Admiral in command of the French fleet off Alexandria was requested by Admiral Seymour to join in operations against the town. Admiral Conrad, acting according to instructions, weighed anchor.

England, henceforward sole mistress of events, landed her troops, and, with the help of Cherif Pacha, was not long in abolishing the Dual Control.

Already, on June 1st, an article in the République Française had foretold the consequences of this policy of abstention:—

In losing Egypt we shall also lose our influence in the Mediterranean. Beyond Gabes we shall be of no account. England, who dwells so far from the Mediterranean, will possess there Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus; she will have preponderating influence over the Suez Canal until the day comes when the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire will give her more. And on that day, condemned to irreparable decadence, we shall be asking ourselves whether we should not evacuate Constantine and Oran in order to concentrate in Algeria.

Gambetta twice intervened—once to denounce this policy which was seeking to find shelter in the European concert, and again on July 18th, after the astonishing departure of Admiral Conrad.

I doubt but that you are giving up to England for ever lands and seas and rivers in which your right to live and traffic is as great as hers. . . . Be assured that the English, good politicians

as they are, esteem those allies only who can make themselves respected.

This was the last time that Gambetta spoke before the parliament. A few days later he and his friends voted against the Freycinet Administration on the subject of the necessary funds for action in concert with Great Britain. The Government was defeated (July 29th).

M. Duclerc, who succeeded de Freycinet. was a personal friend of Gambetta. The Chamber was despondent over its own impotency; perhaps those of Gambetta's followers who had not given up hope might have seen their desires fulfilled, for in full activity at the Palais-Bourbon and in the editorial office of La République Française, Gambetta resumed the life which had been his when president of the Chamber, but his health was rapidly forsaking The last efforts of his life were directed to the defence of a Bill of his on the Army and to the reali-Marriage of sation of the marriage that he had so long Gambeta: desired. A mysterious reason had long His death kept the two devoted friends apart; but the marriage was at last announced at the beginning of October, and the modest house Des Jardies at Ville d'Avray, where Balzac had resided, was taken by Gambetta and his wife. Towards the end of November Gambetta was accidentally shot in the hand. but soon recovered. Three weeks later, December 16th, he suffered from an attack of perityphlitis consequent upon appendicitis, and a few minutes before midnight, December 31st, 1882, he passed away at the age of forty-four. Paris and France honoured him with a worthy funeral ceremony. The body was enwrapped in the Republican flag before being placed in the coffin, and was removed to the Palais-Bourbon,

where it lay in state for three days, saluted by a vast number of mourners, among them Victor Hugo and his grandchildren. The funeral took place January 7th, 1883; the procession started at eight in the morning, and passing through the streets of Paris amidst deep emotion, only reached the Père-Lachaise towards nightfall. M. Grévy was represented by General Pittié, and funeral orations were pronounced by M. Brisson and M. Peyrat, the aged Henri Martin lamenting over the coffin the brevity of so brilliant a career.

The fall and death of Gambetta close the first period of the story of the Third Republic-what he himself termed "the heroic age." During the fifteen years of his public life he had witnessed much and played his part in all; The fall of the Second Empire, the war against Germany, the Commune. the failure of the Bourbons, the Constitution of 1875, May the Sixteenth, the foundation of the parliamentary Republic. His part in these great doings had been even more considerable than that of M. Thiers, for he had acted in both war and peace. the government of the National Defence and at the head of the Republican party, young as he then was, he had grown to the full stature of a statesman. The power of organisation, the faculty of command, the gift of honest eloquence, was his above the common measure. He explained his generation to itself: at the sound of his words France understood herself and her desires. It is hard to be a prophet in one's own country but such minds as his draw men on towards progress.

The work of the Third cratic side of the Republic, that sought for alliance between the bourgeoisie and the

people, and all that was accomplished was done with the exercise of patience, tact and moderation to an unparalleled extent. The element of corruption that crept later into French politics, was bravely resisted by M. Carnot; the generation of 1870 has done much to raise France from her fall of 1871. The army is reconstituted, finance reorganised, science and art encouraged. If France has not profited sufficiently from the advantages she herself had gained in the Mediterranean and the East, yet she has opened out for herself new colonial highways in Tonkin, on the Congo, in Madagascar and North Africa; she has taken a worthy place in the councils of Europe, through her alliance with Russia she has re-established the balance of power endangered by the errors of the Second Empire.

Her present position in the world is one that neither the First nor the Second Republic was able to obtain. Without undue assertion, without false shame, she has made herself respected and beloved; without being the arbitrator of political combinations, she has striven in the cause of peace.

For forty years France has lived beneath the ægis of this Republic; her troubles and anxieties will not have been endured in vain if her high ideals for the human race can be fulfilled.