THE HISTORY OF NATIONS

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AFRICA

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PREFACE

THE activities of the editor of this volume have been confined to the following lines: the excision or condensation of such passages as are, for various reasons, of less value to the general reader; the tempering of the admittedly chauvinistic attitude and bias characteristic of the book; the substitution of more recent figures, and the addition of certain details in the main body of the text, and bibliography; and finally the interpolation of a chapter (XVIII) which attempts to summarize in an impartial manner the main events which have taken place since the author printed his second edition, in 1895. The author, though cognizant of the present undertaking, is in no way responsible for such omissions or additions as have been made with a view to adapting his volume to the use of the general American public.

The once "Dark Continent" has been, in our own day, the scene of international rivalries and concessions, heartburning and complacency, successes and failures on a scale hitherto unknown in the history of the world. The conditions of African development have called into action variations of human activity, individual and governmental, of the most picturesque nature. Africa is no longer the "Dark Continent," knowledge of which is regarded as a sort of interesting specialty—it is time that every reasonably educated man should be conversant with the main facts of its history if he is to be fitted to hold an opinion regarding the status and future of one of humanity's greatest and most momentous enterprises.

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HISTORY OF AFRICA

Chapter I

NORTH AFRICA—FROM THE ANCIENTS TO THE ARABS. 2000 B. C.–1800 A. D.

THE African continent is no recent discovery; it is not a new world like America or Australia. It enters into the oldest traditions and the most ancient history. While yet Europe was the home of wandering barbarians, long before Abraham left his father's fields or the Phœnicians had settled on the Syrian coast, one of the most wonderful civilizations on record had begun to work out its destiny on the banks of the Nile. It does not enter into the scope of this work to discuss the origin or trace the history of Egypt; it is enough for us that the continent on which the oldest, or, at least, one of the oldest, civilizations was born and was developed through thousands of years is even now less known than a continent discovered four hundred years ago, and has only during the past few years been taken seriously in hand by the peoples who have the making of the world's commerce and the world's history.

Let us briefly trace the earliest efforts made to appropriate the African continent by those whose interests have extended beyond their own homes. Ages before the seed of Egyptian civilization was sown, humanity had begun to pour in from Asia, and the north coast of Africa must have been peopled by a race which formed the basis of the Berber population of the present day. But these were wandering barbarians, just as were the pigmies, the Zulus, the Hottentots, farther south. The portion of Africa on which the Egyptians flourished for ages was even to a late period regarded as a part of Arabia. The Egyptians are not generally credited with being great navigators till the time of the Ptolemies; except along the coastland of the Mediterranean, their knowledge of Africa westward was probably limited to the Nile valley. Very early in their

history, as early, probably, as 2000 B. C., they had dealings with Ethiopia (the country generally lying south of Egypt proper, including Nubia, Northern Abyssinia, and possibly Kordofan), and so their knowledge of the river may have extended as far as the site of Khartum. Let us realize how vague were the notions of both the Greeks and the Romans of central and northern Europe, and of Asia beyond India and Persia. For untold ages the Old World knew nothing of the New, and only half a century ago the map of Central Africa was for Europeans, so far as anything like even approximately accurate knowledge goes, a blank from 10° north latitude to the confines of the Cape Colony. It is about forty years since we obtained any certain knowledge of those great lakes which from an early period were rumored to exist in the center of the continent. It is only a little over twenty-five years since the course of Africa's greatest river was traced out by Stanley.

If, then, four hundred years after the discovery of a new continent, with all the intense eagerness of the modern world for increasing knowledge, with half a dozen great nations representing some 200,000,000 of the most advanced peoples of the earth keenly competing in the exploration of the world and in the acquisition of wealth and of power, we are still ignorant of great areas in Central Africa, need we be surprised that the Egyptians and other nations of antiquity, with wants insignificant compared with ours, with a total population scarcely equal to that of one of our great states, with all Europe and all Asia before them, should leave the torrid, impenetrable, unproductive continent and its savages alone, taking from it only what could be conveniently reached from trading stations on the coast or through the navigable channel of the Nile? North Africa was practically the only Africa that the ancients knew, but it should be remembered that the camel is a comparatively modern introduction into Africa, and both the ox and the horse would be but poor substitutes for it in traversing the Sahara, the most formidable barrier to the penetration of Central Africa from the north. And Egypt, especially in the height of her greatness, was, on the whole, more concerned with Asia than with her own continent.

The Phœnicians and Carthaginians did far more to extend the knowledge of Africa than did the Egyptians; and it may have been from them that Homer and Hesiod derived their knowledge of the Mediterranean coast. The Egyptians themselves, as has been

stated, were not great navigators; indeed, they seem not to have possessed a fleet of any importance till the time of the Ptolemies. But long before this the Phœnicians had appeared in the Mediterranean, and soon achieved a position as traders, navigators, and colonizers unequaled by any people of ancient times except perhaps the Arabians; for a long period the Phœnicians had almost a monopoly of the carrying trade of the Mediterranean world, and their sailors were in demand for the ships of other nations. About their connection with Africa there is no doubt. They were probably not the first of the Semitic family to settle in North Africa; Hamites, at least, there were in plenty. Possibly the Egyptians themselves were largely of this type, as was the population along the Mediterranean coast of Africa. Utica, perhaps the earliest Phœnician colony in Africa, was founded about 1100 B. C., 280 years before Carthage, a few miles distant on the same coast. Before Carthage was founded Utica had established stations or trading factories along the Mediterranean coast of Africa and down the Atlantic coast. Syrian colonies were thickly planted as far as the mouth of the river now known as the Draa, to the south of Morocco, and thence, it is believed, there were caravan routes to the country of the Blacks. Carthage also, like Utica, as it grew in power, established its stations west and south along the African coast. Many of these settlements were more than mere trading stations; cultivation of various kinds was carried on, and from the African coast of the Mediterranean corn was exported in large quantities.

We have fairly definite information as to the knowledge which the Carthaginians had of the African west coast, but considerable doubt exists as to how far the Phœnicians were in the habit of voyaging down the east coast of the continent. The story of the circumnavigation of the continent by Phœnicians in the time of King Necho, about 610 B. C., has often been told. So far as the data go, that a Phœnician expedition starting from the Red Sea sailed down the east coast, round the south coast, and north by the west coast to the Pillars of Hercules and on to Egypt, there is no difficulty in crediting the story. At that period the ships of the Phœnicians must have been quite as capable of coasting along Africa as they were of navigating the Atlantic, crossing the Bay of Biscay to the shores of Britain. They knew the west coast of the continent for a considerable distance south, and they probably knew the east coast at least to a point beyond the Red Sea. The passage

is well known in which it is stated that Solomon (about 1000 B. C.) equipped a fleet at Ezion Gebir on the Arabian coast of the Red Sea, and how, with the help of Hiram, King of Tyre, it was sent to Ophir and brought back 420 talents of gold. In another passage it is related how the united fleets of Solomon and Hiram went every three years and brought back not only gold, but silver, ivory, monkeys, and peacocks, besides sandalwood and precious stones.

Let it be remembered that the Arabians themselves were great traders and navigators; that the Phœnicians were in constant communication with them; that they must have known the east coast of Africa, which was quite within hail of their country; that there is every reason to believe they had settlements there from a remote period, and in all probability were familiar with the East African coast far to the south. Indeed, the Arabians seem to have jealously guarded the east coast of Africa, the Phœnicians acting as intermediaries between them and Egypt and the other countries on the Mediterranean. That some people, long before the Portuguese, worked the mines in the country which we now call Mashonaland is evidenced by the great ruins scattered all over the country; whether they were Arabians, Persians, Indians, or Phœnicians, remains to be discovered, but it is certain that these ruins are older than the Mohammedan period. Directly or indirectly, then, it is probable the east coast of Africa was known to the Arabians as far south as about Mozambique. If the Phœnicians knew of this they kept their knowledge to themselves, or at least did not communicate it to the Greeks, from whom our knowledge of what the Phœnicians did and knew is largely derived. Motives of trade-monopoly were doubtless at the bottom of this secrecy.

We have much fuller and more precise evidence of the extent of Phœnician, or rather Carthaginian, knowledge and enterprise on the west than on the east coast of Africa. According to one statement the Phœnician settlements on the west coast had been attacked some five hundred years before Christ by the natives of the interior and some of them destroyed. However this may have been, there is little doubt that about that date Hanno, a Carthaginian admiral, was sent out with a large fleet of vessels containing some 30,000 natives of the district round Carthage, some of them pure Carthaginians, most of them probably natives subject to the state, who had been to a certain extent civilized. Hanno settled

1000-500 B. C.


contingents of these colonists at various places along the west coast, and succeeded with his fleet in getting as far south as about Sierra Leone; some critics would even take him to the Bight of Benin.

The Phœnicians may thus fairly be regarded as the first to begin the development of Africa some 3000 years ago; though it is possible, as we have seen, that the Arabs had stations on the east coast at quite as remote a date. The Phœnicians may also be considered as the earliest of explorers, though their explorations were always with a view to trade. Much of the knowledge of Africa possessed by the Greeks, who have transmitted it to us, was obtained from the Phœnicians and their colonists on the Mediterranean coast.

It is probable enough that trading relations may have been established with these native tribes, and so from stage to stage a connection may have been formed with the Sudan region beyond the Sahara.

Before the date of the possible circumnavigation under Necho, over a century before the voyage of Hanno, we hear of the first establishment of a European power on the coast of Africa. There is evidence that long before this period Greeks had found their way to Egypt, and to the Phœnician settlements, and that there was a busy intercourse between the two shores of the Mediterranean; but it was only in 631 B. C. that the Greeks planted a settlement of their own on the continent. They chose one of the most delightful and fertile spots in all Africa—that part of Tripoli known as Barca. Here the city of Cyrene was founded and the district was known as Cyrenaica. In time other cities were founded, and a flourishing Greek settlement grew up, which carried on agriculture and trade relations with the tribes of the interior. Greeks flocked to this African settlement, many as colonists, some few out of curiosity as visitors. The intercourse between Greece and Africa became more and more constant, and before Herodotus arrived in Egypt, about the middle of the fifth century B. C., he had been preceded by others, though by no one so eager for information nor so skilled in recording it. But we do not in those early times hear of any enterprises corresponding to our modern exploring expeditions, the main object of which is the increase of knowledge. We find men like Herodotus, and others after him, going about the world of the period, but it was rather in the capacity of tourists than explorers. All this going to and fro for commerce, for conquest, for curiosity, could

not, however, fail to add to the knowledge of the world possessed by the Greeks, who, so far as we are concerned, were the center of the knowledge of the time. One of the earliest Greek geographers, if not the earliest, to make a map of the world was Hecatæus of Miletus. A map of Herodotus, which may be dated fifty years later, does not differ greatly from that of Hecatæus. We have a little more detail and a little more precision in parts. But



fortunately the text of Herodotus is preserved intact; and it is to him we are indebted for our knowledge of what the Greeks knew of the continent in the fifth century B. C. He visited Egypt and Cyrene about 448 B. C., and there set himself diligently to collect information concerning the interior of Africa. He gives a very fair picture of the social and political condition of the peoples of the Nile Valley at the date of his visit. For the first time we hear of Meroe, the capital city of the Ethiopians. Herodotus knew of the desert that extends to the westward of Egypt, and of some of its oases, and of the mountains that divide that desert from the Mediterranean in the west. The Nile, he tells us, was known to the Egyptians as far as the country of the Automolae, four months' journey beyond the confines of Egypt at Syene. Evidently he knew

nothing of the great tributaries of the Nile, and of its sources the Egyptians were entirely ignorant.

About one hundred years after Herodotus came the conquest of Egypt by Alexander; ultimately it became a Greek province. Under the Ptolemies it rose to a great height of power and prosperity; commerce and navigation were encouraged; the Red Sea coast was studded with commercial centers, and Egypt itself was explored far to the south. The Highlands of Abyssinia were known and the Abyssinian tributaries of the Nile, and probably also the White Nile, which, it was said, flowed from some lakes in the south; the great bend of the river between Syene and Meroe was correctly laid down; the coast was known as far as Cape Guardafui. Thus the knowledge of the Nile region had grown considerably during the time of the Ptolemies.

But we need not trace in detail the extension of the map of Africa from one geographer to another. Ptolemy, the famous Alexandrian astronomer, who flourished about one hundred and forty years after Christ, may be regarded as summing up all the knowledge of the continent that had accumulated since Egypt began her career, four thousand years at least before his time. About one hundred and seventy years before Ptolemy's time (35 B. C.) Egypt had become a Roman province, Carthage having succumbed to the same all-conquering power over one hundred years before. The Greeks, and after them the Romans, were therefore the first European powers to obtain an extensive footing in Africa; but, after all, it was only along its northern borders. The whole of North Africa became a part of the Roman Empire, while the Phœnician and Carthaginian settlements on the west coast appear rapidly to have decayed or lapsed into barbarism. The Punic Wars and the travels of Polybius in the early part of the second century B. C. extended the knowledge of Africa to the south of the Mediterranean. Before Ptolemy's time traders and navigators had pushed round Cape Guardafui, and there were many towns and trading centers at least as far south as the latitude of Zanzibar. It is evident that early in the Christian era traders from Egypt, starting from Red Sea ports, sailed around by Cape Guardafui, and calling at many ports on the way, went far down the east coast, possibly as far as the mouth of the Zambezi.

Let us recall the fact that in the meantime Egyptian, Carthaginian and Greek in Africa had all become subject to Roman sway.

The world had grown and civilization had extended, and with it, no doubt, trade had expanded. Along the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts of Africa and down by the shores of the Indian Ocean traders and navigators were busy; but the old settlements down the west coast seem to have been abandoned. On the north we have no record of any expeditions across the Sahara. While there was constant fighting between native princes and Roman troops, and border warfare frequently enough, effective occupation, except at certain points, hardly extended beyond the coast region and the lower slopes of the Atlas westward.

We read of an expedition in the reign of Nero, about 60 A. D., which had for its object a search for the sources of the Nile—the first of a long series which may be said to have culminated with Stanley's exploration of the Semliki. The expedition was under the charge of a military officer and was of small dimensions. From the description which these early explorers brought back of immense marshes, and of a river so choked up by vegetation as to be impassable, it has been thought by the best authorities that they may really have reached the region above the Sobat, on the White Nile, about 9° north latitude, where Baker and other explorers of our own century have had to struggle with a similar obstruction. This, then, probably gives us the limit of exploration in the African interior from the north, and of precise knowledge of that interior until the time when the proselytizing Moslems made their way across the Sahara. Down, then, to Ptolemy's time such occupation of Africa as had been effected by European powers scarcely extended beyond the coasts.

For centuries after the Roman occupation of Africa and after the division of the empire there was almost constant fighting along the Mediterranean, so that little could be done directly either for the exploration of the continent or for its development. After the decay of the Roman Empire commercial enterprise seems to have ceased, and we hear little of Central Africa. The next really great event in African history after the Roman conquest was the spread of the religion of Mohammed, bringing with it into Africa hordes of Arabian conquerors and traders, who in a comparatively short time took possession of the northern half of the continent, founded states, and developed a commercial activity more extensive than that even of the Phœnicians. This Islamic occupation of Africa has not yet ended, but now that the European powers

640-711 A. D.

have taken the continent in hand its progress is likely to receive an effective check. The Arab conquest may be said to have begun with the invasion of Egypt in 640 A. D., by Amru Ibn al Aasse, with 4000 men. This was followed by a large immigration from Arabia. By 664 Fezzan had been taken, Kairwan founded, and an advance made to the borders of the present Morocco. By 711 the whole of the North African coast lands had fallen to the Arabs and become to a large extent Moslemized. With these Arabs came new life and progress in agriculture, in commerce, and in arts. The Arabians were always great traders. Wave after wave of Arab immigrants continued to pour in, large cities were built, and the people generally raised above their condition under the decayed empire of Rome. By the end of the fourteenth century the religion of Mohammed had crossed the Sahara and taken a firm hold of the Sudan, and here and in the Niger region it has continued to spread down to our own times. Vast numbers of Arabs also migrated at an early period across the Red Sea to the Abyssinian coast and southward to Somaliland, and when the Portuguese, in the fifteenth century, sailed up the east coast, they found rich Arab cities from Sofala north to Magdoshu. Meanwhile Kordofan, Darfur, Wadai, Kanem, Sokoto, and other powerful Sudan states took shape and developed a certain kind of civilization, though it took time to bring them all under Moslem sway. With the aid of the newly-introduced camel regular caravan routes were established across the desert from Timbuktu (founded, it is believed, by the Tuareg, in the twelfth century) to Morocco, Algeria, Fezzan, and Tripoli, and there was developed that trade in ivory and slaves which is so intimately associated with the name of the Arab of the present day. This was the first opening up of Africa on a large scale, and it was at the hands of an Asiatic, not a European people. The obstacles which form so deadly a barrier to European exploration and settlement scarcely affected a people who came from a country the climate of which differed but little from that of Africa. Indeed, it is to be noted that hitherto all the peoples who had taken part in the partition of Africa—Egyptians, Phœnicians, Greeks, Romans—found but little difference between the climate of North Africa and that of the lands of their origin.

With the spread of the Arabs and the spread of Islam not only came commerce and a certain amount of civilization, but an increased knowledge of the geography of the continent. The gov-

ernors of distant provinces had to make regular reports to headquarters; the annual journey to Mecca made the pilgrims familiar with the countries along their route. Learning was nourished and promoted in North Africa, in Asia, in Spain. We meet with a long series of historical and geographical writers, and even with a succession of travelers, some of whom penetrated into the heart of Africa. The information thus obtained from traveling pilgrims, conquerors, and traders found its way into the works of Arab geographers and was rudely embodied on Arab maps. The famous map of Edrisi, constructed at the court of Count Robert of Sicily in the twelfth century, was based on information derived from such numerous and varied sources. Kano, Kanem, Darfur in the Central Sudan were known, and Berbera, Zanzibar, Sofala in the east. Timbuktu was visited, and is mentioned for the first time by Ibn Batuta in the middle of the fourteenth century; he described the Niger as far as Kuka. Still, at its best, the knowledge of the African interior thus accumulated was scanty.

Islamism in North Africa was of the most aggressive character, and swept away almost all traces of previous religions and previous civilizations. At the present day the religion of Islam is still of a fanatical character, intensely so in the Central Sudan, where there has been comparatively little contact with Europeans, but of a milder type on the east coast, where it established itself independently. In the north Islamism was established at the point of the sword; in the east it was introduced by the Arab and Indian traders. These did not exhibit any great proselytizing zeal; indeed, so far as we can learn, the Arab traders of East Africa did not, until a comparatively recent period, move far from the coast, and, except perhaps to the south of the Zambezi, had no permanent settlements in the interior.

About the middle of the eleventh century there seems to have been a fresh migration of nomad Arabs from Upper Egypt into West Africa. Between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries the religion of Mohammed made its way southward and found a home in Kanem, on the north of Lake Chad, and in the Sonrhai or Songhay country, lying between that and the Middle Niger. Probably also about the same period Islamism first reached those Fulbe, Fula, or Fellatah who have played so conspicuous a part in the checkered history of the Western Sudan.

The first settlements of Islamic Asiatics on the east coast took

place about the year 740 A. D., when political and religious dissensions broke up the unity of the faith. Among the states and towns founded by Arab and later on by Persian refugees on the east coast the more prominent were Magdoshu, Kilwa or Quiloa, Brava, Melinde, and Mombaz or Mombasa. Magdoshu was supreme in the north and Kilwa in the south. Magdoshu was founded between 909 and 951 A. D.; Kilwa between 960 and 1000. These Arabian cities and communities were prosperous, and in some degree civilized; but they were deficient in military organization. They had been founded by traders, emigrants, and exiles, who behaved peaceably to the natives. Each settlement seems to have been either an independent sultanate or republic, the inhabitants caring only for trade with the natives and making no great efforts to proselytize outside their own retainers. By the time the Portuguese reached the east coast it was studded with populous cities as far south as Sofala, and it is evident that there was regular intercourse with the gold-yielding region south of the Zambezi. It was not until the fifteenth century that Mohammedanism found its way into Somaliland and the region around Zeila and Harar.

It is probable that Nubia and Kordofan succumbed to the new religious invasion early in the fourteenth century. As late as the end of the seventeenth century the whole of the Central Sudan, and even much of the region to the west of the Niger, largely by the efforts of the fanatical Fellatah, had come under the sway of Islam. In the end of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries there was a fresh outburst of religious fanaticism on the part of the Fellatah, which spread over the Senegambian region, including Sokoto and neighboring countries of the Niger, and carried the religion of Mohammed down even to the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, in our own day, it may be said, generally speaking, that Islam has a firm hold over the whole of Africa north of 10° north latitude, and has a prevailing influence between that and 5°. Toward the east it comes even farther south, to the shores of Victoria Nyanza, and is met with on the east coast down to Cape Delgado. The Arab traders and slavers who have found their way into Central Africa from Zanzibar have carried Islam in a mild form as far as Lake Tanganyika and the Upper Congo; but south of 5° north it does not seem destined to take a permanent hold. And in the countries watered by the Niger and its tributaries, even though the Fellatah are dominant, Mohammedanism has but a

slender hold among the bulk of the people; they are to all intents and purposes pagans.

The distribution of Mohammedanism is of importance, as it is a factor to be taken into account in the attempt to spread European influence. Its extension was, however, something more than the spread of a religion; Islamism brought with it, almost without fail, political organization, a certain amount of civilization, commercial activity, and the establishment of slavery as an institution.

Chapter II

THE PORTUGUESE IN AFRICA. 1364-1580.

THE sailors of Venice and Genoa—which, with other Italian cities, were, especially from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, the dominant mercantile and maritime states of the world—were more familiar with the eastern Mediterranean and its offshoots than with its western waters.

In the fourteenth century Dieppe was one of the most prosperous seaports of Europe. Her sailing ships ventured everywhere, and books have been written to prove that as early as 1364 the merchants of Dieppe had formed a trading station, which they named Petit Dieppe, on a point of the Guinea Coast, halfway between Cape Palmas and Sierra Leone. They are said to have had their *comptoirs,* or factories, extending from Cape Verde to the Gold Coast, and to have built a church at El Mina. French patriotism naturally makes the most of the feeble evidence on which the story of these enterprises is founded. If the occupation of the West African coast by Dieppe merchant adventurers ever took place, it must have been of very brief duration and exercised no influence upon the permanent partition of the continent. There is much more probability in the statement that Italian emigrants found their way down the west coast as far, at least, as Cape Bojador about the middle of the fourteenth century. The Rio d'Oro, Madeira, and the Canaries are found on maps of about that date. It was in the first decade of the fifteenth century that the Norman, Jean de Bethencourt, began the conquest of the Canaries.

But the beginning of the modern exploration and occupation of Africa is with justice dated from the famous siege, by the Portuguese in 1415, of Ceuta on the coast of Morocco, opposite Gibraltar. After six centuries of oppression the Moors had been driven from Portugal, though they lingered in the south of Spain. When, in 1394, Prince Henry (the Infante Dom Henrique, son of the able and brave King John I. and Philippa, daughter of the English John of Gaunt), who has come to be known as "the Navigator,"

though he himself navigated very little, was born, Portugal, through many trials and struggles had reached a position respected and feared by her enemies, Christian and Saracen alike. By the time Prince Henry had reached the age of manhood, and was eager to earn his knightly spurs, King John was in a position to carry his operations beyond the shores of his own country and to strike a blow at the stronghold of the enemies of Christendom. At the storming and capture of Ceuta, Prince Henry and his two elder brothers bore themselves bravely. Probably this visit to the coast of Africa had much to do in inspiring the prince with a burning desire to trace its outline; three years thereafter he sent out the first of those expeditions which continued year after year to the time of his death, and earned for him his title of "Navigator." While in Africa he heard much from the Moors of the trade by caravan to Timbuktu and Guinea, and of the reported wealth of the interior of the continent. A man of the prince's intelligence had doubtless heard of the discoveries of the Arabs in Africa and elsewhere; nor is it an extravagant supposition that he had come to the conclusion that, by sailing around the coast of Africa to such places as Sofala, Kilwa, and Zanzibar, familiar to Arab geographers, he would be able to make his way to India. There is no doubt that India had, long before the rounding of the cape, became the goal of Portuguese navigators.

Much of the foreign trade of Europe was still in the hands of the Venetians, whose ships met the caravans which, passing through Mohammedan countries, brought to the shores of the Levant the treasures of the East. A sea-route to India would destroy this monopoly. When Portuguese activity in Africa began, Venice was at the height of her power and mercantile prosperity. The various ethnical groups which compose the population of Europe had settled down roughly within the areas they now occupy, and were being segregated into the states of modern Europe. The Moslem invasion, which threatened to swamp the infant civilization of the West, had been repulsed and lingered only in the corners of the continent. But the Turks had barely begun their European career, and it was only toward the end of the next century (the sixteenth) that they were driven back from Central Europe into the Balkan Peninsula. Henry V. reigned in England when Prince Henry the Navigator sent out his first expedition, and Henry VII. (the patron of Cabot) was on the throne when the cape was first

1433-1471

rounded. Columbus was born about twenty years before Prince Henry died, and Luther about twenty years after.

Ceuta may be said to have been the first annexation in Africa by a modern European power. Into a detailed history of the Portuguese exploration of Africa it is not of course possible to enter; a brief sketch of the successive stages must suffice. In order to be as near as possible to the contemplated scene of operations, Prince Henry established himself upon the lonely point of Sagres (near Cape Vincent), which may be said to overhang the west coast of Africa. Three years after the siege of Ceuta Prince Henry began his great enterprise, his first goal being Cape Bojador, then regarded as a veritable Cape of Storms. It was not, however, till 1434 that Gil Eannes succeeded in rounding it. After that point had been passed the outline of the West African coast was followed down by expedition after expedition. But it was not till 1441-1442 that the next prominent cape (Blanco) was doubled, and the Rio d'Oro reached by Antonio Gonsalvez and Nuno Tristam. Gonsalvez brought home with him some gold dust and ten slaves. The slaves were presented by Prince Henry to Pope Martin V., who thereupon conferred upon Portugal the right of possession and sovereignty of all the country that might be discovered between Cape Bojador and the Indies. The River Senegal was reached and Cape Verde doubled in 1446 by Dinis Dias, and two years later the neighborhood of Sierra Leone was reached. The voyages of Cadomosto in 1455 and 1456 to the Cape Verde Islands, the Senegal, and the Gambia, were remarkable for the information which he obtained concerning Timbuktu and the countries in the interior; concerning the trade in gold and ivory with the coast, and the caravan trade of the Mediterranean. It was not till 1462 that Pedro de Cintra succeeded in getting three degrees beyond Sierra Leone. Prince Henry had died two years before, but his great undertaking was continued by Alfonso V. and John II; during Henry's lifetime 1800 miles of West African coast, from Cape Nun southward, had been passed out. Before the prince's death a company had been formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade in slaves and gold dust between Portugal and Africa, this being the earliest of those companies which have formed so prominent a feature in the European connection with the continent. The first expedition dispatched by the company returned with a cargo of two hundred slaves. In 1471 the Guinea coast was doubled and followed round by the Bight of Benin as far

as the delta of the River Ogové, where the Portuguese were content to rest for thirteen years, having been the first Europeans to cross the equator.


So early as 1448 Prince Henry had begun a fort on the Bay of Arguin, south of Cape Blanco. This fort seems to have been rebuilt in 1461 and for many years afterward continued to be the headquarters of Portuguese commercial operations in West Africa. This was in the reign of John II., on whom the Pope conferred the title of "Lord of Guinea," a title attached to the crown of Portugal down to our own time. But probably the first regular European settlement or colony established on the Continent of Africa was on the Gold Coast, at a spot to which the name of St. Jorge da Mina (now generally known as El Mina) was given, and where the Portuguese flag was raised in January, 1482. But long before this traffic in gold from which the Gold Coast gets its name had begun and attempts had been made to establish relations with the interior.

In 1482 exploration was again started with renewed vigor. In that and the two following years Diogo Cam pushed his way for twelve hundred miles south of the Ogové, discovering the mouth of the Congo, up which he sailed for some distance. The year after Diogo's return Bartholomew Diaz set out, and all unknowing passed the southwest point of Africa and pushed eastward as far as Algoa Bay; it was only on his return journey that he sighted that cape which he called the Cape of Storms, but which King John rechristened the Cape of Good Hope.

Thus the turning-point in the history of Africa was reached, for Diaz had almost come to within hail of the Arab settlements on the east coast; the true contour of the continent had been gradually outlined through a series of years of indomitable effort and perseverance. The most famous of all these Portuguese navigators, the first to reach India by the cape route, Vasco da Gama, completed the work of his predecessors, not, however, until ten years after the return of Diaz. Meantime (1487) Pedro de Covilham had gone to India by the Red Sea route. On his return he visited Sofala and other Arab settlements, heard of the gold mines in the interior, and visited Abyssinia in search of the mysterious Christian potentate, Prester John. When Vasco da Gama set out on his famous voyage in 1497 he knew, from the information sent home by Covilham, that Sofala would be reached by doubling the cape, and that thence it was plain sailing to India.

1497

That same year, 1497, marked the discovery of Newfoundland by Sebastian Cabot, five years after Columbus had lighted upon the New World. This great discovery, we may be sure, had a marked effect in retarding the exploration and development of the African continent; the energy which was diverted across the Atlantic, and which was devoted with such marvelous success to the peopling of



America by Europeans and the development of its resources, would no doubt have been directed to the much less hopeful continent. At the same time the discovery of the New World enhanced the value of Africa in one respect, for the rapid destruction of the feeble natives of the West Indies rendered imported labor indispensable for the development of the islands. But an ample supply was found among the hardy and unfortunate children of Ham, and the trade in men soon exceeded in value all the other exports from the Dark

Continent. It was only when America was all but parceled out and filled up that European powers, in search of foreign possessions, seriously turned their attention to Africa.

On November 22, 1497, Vasco da Gama doubled the Cape of Good Hope. A month later he touched at and named Natal. He proceeded leisurely along the coast, calling at Sofala, Mozambique, Melinde, Mombasa, and other places, all of which he found in possession of the Arabs, prosperous and flourishing, as well they might be, for they had been there for centuries before the birth of Islam. But India was the destination of Gama, and the conquest and settlement of Africa were left to others. As we have seen, occupation had already begun on the west coast and was continued there. Diogo Cam took back with him to Lisbon in 1485 some natives from the Congo, and returned with an army of priests. In a remarkably short time the king and natives of the "Kingdom of Congo," lying to the south of the lower river, were converted. The capital was renamed San Salvador. The king and chiefs were given pompous Portuguese titles; churches were erected and an appearance of civilization prevailed. By the middle of the sixteenth century San Salvador had become a great center of Portuguese influence and the chief town of the Portuguese possessions there. Churches and houses had been built and the priests were supreme. A sudden invasion of a powerful wandering tribe, known as Jaggas, rapidly destroyed all this; but by 1560 the Jaggas were expelled, and San Salvador waxed more important than ever. By about the middle of the seventeenth century it is said to have had 40,000 inhabitants. The king's palace, of wood surrounded by a stone wall, is stated to have been spacious and luxurious. There was a cathedral and many churches and fine private houses. Jesuits, priests, and monks had imposing mansions, and there was a general appearance of peace and prosperity. The king, who, about the middle of the century, claimed sovereignty over an extensive territory, including Angola, made over to the Portuguese the country of the Sova, or chief who ruled over the region lying between San Salvador and the Lower Congo, down to the sea. The Sova objected to this and opposed the Portuguese domination by force of arms. The result was not only the exclusion of the Portuguese from the territory ceded to them, but also the hostility of the King of Congo, who renounced the domination of Portugal. From this time until the date of the Berlin Congress San Salvador and the kingdom of Congo were

really independent. The town itself fell into decay, and its churches and other buildings went to ruin, so that now San Salvador is simply a native town of mud huts, and it is difficult for the traveler to detect amid the wreck any remains of its former greatness. Still among the natives, in their language and customs, may be detected some remnant of the old ecclesiastical influence; the king still bears a Portuguese name. St. Paul de Loanda, the capital of the west coast colonies, was founded in 1578, and other settlements were planted along the west coast. The neighboring territories, Angola, Benguela, and Mossamedes, were gradually taken in and stations planted in the interior; occupation here was comparatively effective.

On the opposite coast, Sofala was taken in 1505 by Pedro de Anhaya, who made the king tributary to Portugal. Tristan da Cunha captured Sokotra and Lamu in 1507, and in the same year Duarte de Mello founded the fort of Mozambique. Quiloa had been taken in 1506 and the Portuguese established themselves there in 1508. Other cities along the coast—Melinde, Mombasa, Zanzibar Island, Magdoshu—succumbed in time, as did Sena and other settlements on the Lower Zambezi. Though she used it as a place of call for Portuguese and other vessels, Portugal never established herself at the cape. At all these places, and indeed all along the east coast, the Moors, as the Portuguese called them—that is to say, Moslem Arabs—had established themselves, had built up a flourishing commerce, and erected handsome and well-fortified cities. But there seems to have been no sort of union or confederation among these Arab settlements; each city was under its own sheik, who exercised more or less jurisdiction over the neighboring territory. It was not always an easy task for the Portuguese to overcome the sheiks or sultans of these Arab cities or states; and the cruelties which were characteristic of the adventurers of the period had free play. Mombasa and Melinde were burned down more than once, and little tenderness was shown even to women and children.

The whole of the east coast, from Lourenço Marquez to Cape Guardafui, was thus virtually in the power of the Portuguese by the year 1520. As the result of all the operations referred to, by the close of the sixteenth century the contour of the African coast was at last laid down with surprising accuracy. The subsequent degeneration of the Portuguese should not blind the student to the glory of this great achievement.

In the early years of the Portuguese occupation there seems

to have been more activity on the west coast than on the east, and there existed but little rivalry with other powers. The influence of Portugal in the Congo region and in Angola continued to extend, both on the coast and toward the interior, as also on the Guinea coast and north to the Bay of Arguin. On the east coast the Arab and Indian traders continued their commercial operations under Portuguese auspices and to the profit of Portuguese officials and Portuguese traders. Attention was very soon directed to the gold mines of Manika, and the powerful "empire of Monomotapa" in the interior. That at the time when the Portuguese first established themselves on the east coast there was on the south of the Zambezi a king or chief, whose official title was Monomotapa, who lorded it over a number of smaller chiefs, there can be little doubt. According to Pigafetta and other authorities there was a similar potentate who ruled on the north of the Zambezi, as far as the confines of the kingdom of Prester John (Abyssinia). Along the coast were smaller chiefships—Sofala, Mozambique, Quiloa, Mombasa, Melinde; these, of course, were Arab settlements. Portuguese writers describe the coast chiefs or kings and their wives as having been almost white, and richly dressed and adorned. These were, no doubt, Asiatics settled on the coast. Of the great interior kingdoms, and especially that of the Monomotapa, the most wonderful descriptions are given. Tales are told of the Monomotapa's capital: his palace, with is innumerable halls and chambers richly adorned with tapestry, of the army of Amazons, of the rich dresses of the king and his daughters, of the ceremonies of his court, of the tribute brought to him by outlying chiefs, and many other details, as if the African chief had been a great semi-civilized potentate of Central Asia. We have no reason to believe that these descriptions are founded on the direct observations of trustworthy Portuguese travelers; they seem to have been obtained from the Arab settlers on the coast, or to have filtered down through native channels from the interior. Judging from the description given of the kings and princes of the kingdom of Congo, the glowing accounts of the glories of the Monomotapa may simply be the old chroniclers' way of describing what might have been seen in our own days at the "court" of the King of Dahomey or of the potentate of Uganda.

"Kingdoms" like that of the Monomotapa have been common enough in Africa. Some powerful chief established his sway over his neighbors, as the Muato Yanvo did in Lunda for some three

1566

centuries, or as Chaka did some sixty years ago in the Zulu countries, as Lobengula's father did in the Matabele region. It is very doubtful if the Monomotapa was more advanced, more civilized, than any of these; certainly not more than was the late King Mtesa of Uganda, who after all was but a barbarous potentate living in a big hut, surrounded by a great kraal. With regard to these African "empires" the words of Andrade Corvo in his valuable work, "*As Provincias Ultramarinas,*" are well worth quoting; referring to the state of affairs in Eastern Africa at the period when the Philips of Spain held Portugal, he says: "There is no part of the world which offers a better example of the weakness of power than among the savage rulers of the interior of Africa, where, at a moment's notice, a potentate is overthrown and a new empire founded, where before only existed wandering and dispersed tribes. And this new empire increases, strengthens, and grows with wonderful rapidity, and extends and spreads itself through vast regions, subjugating extensive provinces and incorporating in itself various powers, until it finally becomes so great as to be wholly unmanageable, and then, with the same rapidity with which it came into existence, it dwindles down to insignificance and crumbles away."

One of the most famous and earliest of Portuguese expeditions into the interior was that made by Francisco Barreto in 1566. Barreto seems to have had a distinguished career in India before he was shifted to the government of Monomotapa; for at this time, and until the seventeenth century, East Africa was included in the government of India. Barreto's force is said to have consisted of a thousand men of arms, besides a large number of Portuguese cavaliers, eager to distinguish themselves. With this force he ascended the Zambezi as far as Sena, and then marched along the south bank of the river to a place named Mengos, the chief of which had revolted against the Monomotapa. Barreto had agreed to chastise the chief on condition that the Monomotapa would permit him to proceed through his territory to the gold mines of Manika. But, according to the latest authoritative version of the story, Barreto went down to Mozambique and died two days after his return to Sena, at which place and at Tete he had founded forts. Vasco Fernandez Homem started a few years later from Sofala and succeeded in reaching the mines of Manika, where he witnessed the primitive process of extracting gold, but his expedition also ended in disaster. Even before Barreto, a missionary priest, Gonsalvo da Silveira, in

1560 succeeded in reaching the territory of the Monomotapa; at first well received, he was put to death a year after at the instigation of the Arabs as a spy; this seems to show that the latter had considerable influence with the native chiefs. The result of the really disastrous expeditions of Barreto and Homem was that the Portuguese government of the Monomotapa was abolished as quickly as it had been erected. We read in the pages of later Portuguese writers of various other expeditions into the interior, of missionaries building churches in Manika, in the region we now call Mashonaland, westward as far as Tati, northward along the Zambezi, and in the country between Manika and the coast. Fairs, as they were called, *i. e.*, factories or trading centers, were established, and forts were built; this went on through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was only disasters in India, and the discovery of gold and diamonds in Brazil, that led to the practical abandonment of the mines and fairs and churches in the Monomotapa's empire. That, however, the Portuguese had stations or establishments of some kind as far in the interior as what is now known as the Mashonaland plateau, in the early days of their occupation, must be admitted, unless we are prepared to treat the historians and chroniclers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries as writers of fiction.

According to the authority of Boccaro, who was keeper of the archives at Goa, in the early part of the seventeenth century, the Emperor of Monomotapa (as he was called) in 1607 ceded to the Portuguese all the mining rights of his territories by a treaty, the original of which still exists in the Goa archives. But the celebrated Treaty of Monomotapa, which was adduced in connection with the Delagoa Bay arbitration, and given more recently as a proof that Portugal had a claim to Mashonaland, is dated 1630; it has the "emperor's" mark (X) and a host of signatures of Portuguese officials. It would be against the weight of evidence to deny the genuineness of those two treaties. It must be admitted, we fear, that had Portugal been a strong power like Germany or France the treaties would have had much more weight with the British Government in adjusting the claims to Mashonaland. But it is equally certain that if either of these powers had obtained such a claim it would not have neglected and abandoned the territory as Portugal had done. Throughout his work Corvo writes in the most despairing tone of the criminal mismanagement which prevailed from the

beginning in these east coast possessions. But little real effort was made to develop the gold mines, while all other commercial resources were neglected, the traffic in slaves being the one thing that flourished and prospered. Portuguese writers tell us that at one time the chiefs of Sofala rendered as rent for their lands eighty bars of gold (said to be equal to $12,500,000). That this quantity of gold was obtained annually in early times from the Manika gold mines is possible; but no available statistics back to the beginning of the present century show a tithe of the above sum of gold among the exports. Summing up the history of the Portuguese possessions in East Africa during the seventeenth century, Corvo says: "It was one full of woes for our colonies in the east, and particularly in East Africa. The Kaffirs in the south and the Arabs in the north attacked our dominions and punished us most cruelly for our frankness. At times victors, and at others beaten on all sides, we dragged out a sad existence in Mozambique, without progressing in colonization, without developing commerce or industries, and without the famous gold and silver mines giving the marvelous results which were expected from them, and which the government wished zealously to guard for itself. Moreover, in proportion as the colony goes on decaying, the pomp and luxury of the governors continue to increase; and corruption has likewise increased more and more."

Of the condition of things at the end of the last century Corvo gives an equally lamentable account. Even such places as Inhambane, Sofala, Sena, and Tete, he speaks of as abandoned; the ancient commerce of the former two, so flourishing in the days of the Arab, was actually extinguished. The real nature of the connection of Portugal with East Africa, and of what she has done for the commercial development of the country during the centuries she has been planted on the coast, is well summed up in the words of the same author: "The early Portuguese did no more than substitute themselves for the Moors, as they called them, in the parts that they occupied on the coast; and their influence extended to the interior very little, unless, indeed, through some ephemeral alliances of no value whatever, or through missionaries, or without any practical or lasting results. The true conquest is still (1885) to be made." It is clear from the work of this authoritative Portuguese writer that, in his opinion, Portugal never possessed actual dominion in any of the territories north and south of the Zambezi, except

perhaps in a few coast towns. Even when due allowance is made for Corvo's partisanship, we cannot believe that he deliberately misrepresented facts.

Corvo's conclusion is confirmed by the course of events in Zambezi itself. The native tribes carried on their wars as before. The Monomotapa's empire was not broken up until some time in the eighteenth century, though it must have been tottering long before. Probably by that time the irresistible Zulu had made his way south of the Zambezi, and was sweeping all before him as he did on the north. The Portuguese were helpless to prevent this, as they were helpless some seventy years ago to prevent Lobengula's father from taking possession of Matabeleland, the old "empire" of Monomotapa.

The importance of the subject in view of recent events must be the excuse for following the connection of Portugal with East Africa down practically to the present time. By the end of the sixteenth century of all her East African conquests she possessed only Sofala, Mozambique, and Mombana. It is but just to recall the fact that in 1580 Portugal became united to Spain. During the sixty years till 1640 that the union lasted, it was peculiarly humiliating to Portugal, and left the little country, that had before shown such phenomenal energy, spiritless and apparently exhausted. Up to the date of this subjection it may be fairly said that Portugal had in her power all the coasts of Africa, excepting those of the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

Chapter III

THE BEGINNING OF RIVALRY. 1520-1769

BEFORE the close of the fifteenth century the Portuguese had erected forts at Arguin and El Mina, had established trading factories on the Senegal, the Gambia, the Rio Grande, on the Gold Coast and the Gulf of Benin, and on the Congo. Colonies had been planted on Madeira, the Cape Verde Islands, and the Island of St. Thomas. By about 1520, as we have seen, Portugal had made herself mistress of all the coasts of Africa, excepting those of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and even in the latter, a few years later, attempts were made to obtain possession of Massawa and other ports, and to establish Portuguese influence over Abyssinia. While Africa was valued by Portugal for its own sake, for its gold, and ultimately for its slaves, it was, no doubt (especially the east coast stations), regarded mainly as a halfway house to India and the East; for it was the conquest of the latter which absorbed the energies of Portugal during the first half of the sixteenth century. The triumphs of the *conquistadores* in Asia far excelled all that was accomplished in Africa, both in brilliancy, extent, and value of commercial results. But the glory of Portugal was even more shortlived in Asia than in Africa. During much of the sixteenth century she had no rivals in the latter continent; for England, Spain, and France were absorbed with the conquest of the New World. Not until our own times was there any activity on the African continent to be compared with that which, within a century after its discovery, made America an appanage of Europe. Rivals were slow to enter the African field, and when they did they were kept at bay by ships of Portugal. After referring to the forts established at a few places on the west coast, Postlethwayte says: "By virtue of the possession of these they not only claimed, and for many years enjoyed, the right in and to all the said land, but likewise seized and confiscated the ships of all other nations as often as they found any of these traders in any parts of the said coast."

But this monopoly was shortlived, at least on the west coast. Bosman tells us that "formerly the Portuguese served for setting dogs to spring the game, which, as soon as they had done, was seized by others." Long before Barreto's disastrous expedition into the country of the Monomotapa the export of slaves, not only to America, but to Europe, had become one of the most lucrative branches of Portuguese trade in Africa. By the middle of the fifteenth century, 700 or 800 slaves were exported annually to Portugal alone; and in 1517 Charles V. granted a patent to a Flemish trader, authorizing him to import 4000 slaves annually to the West Indies. In virtue of a bull from the Pope a market was opened in Lisbon; and as early as 1537, it is said, 10,000 to 12,000 slaves were brought to that city, and transported thence to the West Indies. This "carrying trade," as it was called, rapidly increased, for Portugal was in time joined by other powers. Gold, no doubt, was obtained from the Gold Coast and from Manika, but the exportation of natives soon became the staple trade of Africa.

As early as the last year of the reign of Edward VI. (1553) the first English ships were fitted out for Guinea by some London merchants. Captain Thomas Windham made a voyage "for the trade of Barbary." "He sailed," says Astley, "to Marokko; this was the first voyage we meet with to the western coast of Africa." "Here, by the way," Windham tells us in Hakluyt, "it is to be observed that the Portuguese were much offended with this our new trade into Barbary; and both in our voyage the year before, and also in this, gave out in England, through the merchants, that if they took us in these parts they would use us as their mortal enemies." In 1552 Windham made a second voyage, and this time succeeded in reaching the Gold Coast; his great quest, as was the case with all other adventurers at this period, was gold. He returned with 150 pounds of the precious metal. One of the most interesting of these early English trading voyages to Guinea was that of John Lok in 1554. He had three small vessels and a pinnace or two, and took over two months to get to the Gold Coast. He and his companions traded along the coast near Cape Three Points and Elmina, bartering cloth for Guinea pepper, elephant tusks, and gold. Lok brought home with him 400 pounds of gold, 36 cwts. of Guinea pepper, and about 250 tusks of ivory, some of them weighing 90 pounds each.

In the following year William Towrson made a similar trading voyage to the Gold Coast, stopping every few miles to trade with the natives, who evidently had learned to drive hard bargains. The favorite articles of exchange were brass vases, or bowls, besides beads, cork, and other things; for these Towrson obtained a good supply of pepper, ivory, and gold. On several occasions the Portuguese fired upon the boats, but did no harm. He went out again in the following year, and when near the Guinea Coast fell in with a small fleet of French traders, who joined themselves to him, so that they might combine to resist the attacks of the Portuguese ships that were cruising about the coast to drive off intruders. French vessels were also met with by other English traders, which shows that at this early date France had her eye on West Africa. Indeed, some French writers tell us that she had never entirely ceased her connection with Africa since the old days of the Dieppe adventurers in the fourteenth century, and that one of the old forts was still occupied on the River Senegal; but there is no satisfactory evidence that such was the case. Towrson did good business again on this voyage, though he was attacked by the Portuguese and deserted by the French. In the third voyage in 1558 he again met with several French vessels, but treated them as rivals, and put them to flight. Thus, by the middle of the sixteenth century, a busy traffic was carried on by various nationalities with West Africa, though the Portuguese lorded it over all the coast. Old Richard Eden speaks of the "arbitrary monopoly of the Portuguese on this coast, of such who, on account of conquering forty or fifty miles here and there, certain fortresses or block-houses among naked people, think themselves worthy to be lords of half the world, and angry that others should enjoy the commodities which they themselves cannot wholly possess."

These English private ventures to the coast of Guinea went on during the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth. Sir John Hawkins has the credit (or discredit) of having been the first Englishman to engage in the slave-trade; in 1562 he fitted out three ships, sailed to Guinea, obtained 300 negroes, conveyed them to Hispaniola, sold them, and returned to England with the proceeds. Commercial and political relations were also being established between England and Barbary, and in 1585 Queen Elizabeth granted a patent or charter to the Earl of Warwick, the Earl of Leicester, and others, for exclusive trading with Morocco for twelve

years. But the first real English chartered African Company was that for which Elizabeth granted a patent in 1588. Three voyages were made under this company (1589, 1590, and 1591). It was found that the Portuguese had been expelled from the Senegal by the natives, though they still had stations on the Gambia, while they did their best, with small success, to ruin the English expeditions. It was also found that the French had been trading to the Senegal and the Gambia since 1560.

The Dutch had thrown off the yoke of Spain in 1581, and though they had yet a struggle before them ere they established their freedom on a firm footing, they too began to look abroad for new fields of enterprise. As Spain was now virtually the possessor of all the acquisitions of Portugal, Holland considered the Portuguese African settlements as legitimate spoil. The first Dutch trading voyage to Guinea seems to have been made about the year 1595. Holland rapidly gained supremacy all along the coast, and swept from these seas not only the ships of Spain and Portugal, but also those of France and England. By the time the Dutch West India Company was founded in 1621, Holland had obtained a commanding footing in West Africa. Goree had been purchased from the king of that country, and various other points on the coast had been occupied by the Dutch. The Gold Coast was studded with forts, for in those times it was considered absolutely essential that, whenever a coast was taken possession of, forts should be built to keep off intruders. The charter of the Dutch Company gave it the monopoly of trade from the Tropic of Cancer to the Cape of Good Hope. While gold and ivory and pepper were regarded as important articles of trade, the name of the company is indication enough of its great purpose—the supply of the Dutch and other colonies of the West Indies with negro slaves. By the beginning of the seventeenth century slaves had come to be regarded as the staple commodity of the African soil; and the great rivalry that grew up between the various European powers for colonies in West Africa was mainly due to the desire to have the monopoly of the slave-market. British traders were making continual complaints to Parliament of the difficulty, owing mainly to the monopoly of the Dutch, of getting a supply of negroes "of the best sort" for the sugar colonies in the West Indies.

The first British African Company seems to have accomplished little; and the companies chartered in 1618 by James I., and in 1631

by Charles I., were not much better. The first company, though its special object was to trade with the Gambia, does not seem to have obtained any permanent footing there. A company chartered in 1618 made strenuous efforts to push its way up the Gambia in the hope of reaching Timbuktu, which was then regarded as the great trade emporium of the interior. Both the Senegal and the Gambia were at the time conjectured to have a connection with the Niger, on which Timbuktu was known to be situated. It was intended to build a series of forts on the river, but it soon became evident that the gold which it was hoped would be found in abundance was practically non-existent; and so the English quest for Timbuktu was abandoned. At the time of the Restoration the only forts possessed by Englishmen were on the Gambia, and at Cormantine, near Anamabo, on the Gold Coast.

The company chartered by Charles II. in 1662 was more successful, and a fort was built on James Island in the Gambia. This company was formed for the purpose of trying to checkmate the Dutch, who were constantly harassing English traders, seizing their ships, and destroying the stations they attempted to establish. The conduct of the Dutch became so intolerable that Charles II. declared war against them in 1665, and the English captured forts at Seconda, Cape Coast Castle, and other places, and built new ones for themselves. But the British Company continued to be unfortunate, and in 1672 its rights and properties were made over to a new Royal African Company, to which was given the monopoly of trade for a thousand years from the coast of Barbary to the Cape of Good Hope. Forts and factories were built at various points along this stretch. By this time Denmark also had joined in the occupation of Africa, and had a fort near Cape Coast Castle, shortly after taken over by England, and renamed Fort Royal; other Danish forts were built here and there along the coast.

Still another European power had joined in this scramble which may be said to have reached its height in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Germany's recent enormous annexations in Africa are not her first efforts to obtain a share in the partition of the continent. Under the auspices of the Great Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William I., trading connections were formed with the west coast of Africa, and the Brandenburg African Company was founded in 1681. Frederick was the Bismarck of his day, and he had ambitions not only in the direction of Africa, but

India as well; and, like Bismarck, one great object which he had in view was the improvement of the navy. Gross-Friedrichsburg was built in 1683, near Cape Three Points, and treaties were made with the chiefs of the coast and the interior. Expeditions for trade and exploration were sent inland, and for some years there was busy traffic between Prussia and West Africa as far south as Angola. Not only on the Gold Coast, but in Arguin Bay, on the south of Cape Blanco, these Brandenburgers established themselves and carried on a trade with the interior. But events at home were too much for the Elector and his son and successor, and about 1720 Prussia disappeared from the African arena, not to reappear till about twenty years ago.

It must be said that the French were from the first more persevering and determined than any other power in their attempts to push their way into the interior. A settlement (St. Louis) was formed at the mouth of the Senegal by a company which had been chartered in France, just as similar companies had been chartered in England and Holland, the great object of all being the export of slaves to America. As with England, so with France; the first companies failed, but others were formed in rapid succession, and French influence spread in this part of the west coast. Under Brue and other explorers stations were established far up the Senegal, the great object being to reach Timbuktu, as the English had endeavored to do by way of the Gambia. Arguin and Goree were taken from the Dutch, and many difficulties placed in the way of English operations. It may fairly be said that France has never relaxed her efforts to secure the domination of the Senegambian region and the countries watered by the Niger. The operations which are being carried on now on the Upper Niger are but the latest stages of those so successfully begun by Sieur Brue in the latter part of the seventeenth century. In 1695 the French took the Gambia, and when it was restored to England French influence was in the ascendant, and has remained so since. Indeed, toward the end of the century, the French Senegal Company harassed the settlements and the ships of all other nationalities; in 1683-1685 we find them confiscating vessels belonging to the Portuguese, Dutch, and Brandenburgers, and they persistently advanced claims against the Royal African Company until at last a war broke out between the two nations.

In 1698 the monopoly of the English Company was abolished

1690

for fourteen years, and at the end of that period it was not restored. In consideration of the expense which the company had been put to in erecting and maintaining forts, a ten per cent. *ad valorem* duty was allowed for administrative purposes. It seems to have been quite insufficient to cover expenses; and that too, in spite of the monopoly which they obtained by the Treaty of Nimeguen of the importation of slaves into the Spanish West Indies. It is highly instructive to read some of the pamphlet literature of the latter half of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth centuries, and learn of the hot controversies which then raged over the company and its monopoly. Here is an extract from a pamphlet, published in 1690, entitled "A Treatise Discussing the Intrigues and Arbitrary Proceedings of the Governing Company, by William Wilkinson, Mariner." It affords an idea of the articles which constituted the trade of West Africa at this period, and also of the bitter feeling which prevailed in certain quarters against the company:

"Let us now look toward Africa, and take a view of the riches of that place which is undiscovered to the merchant, and particularly, the boundless woods of Cam, which is a red wood fit for dyeing, the prodigious quantities of dry hides of all sorts, of wild and tame cattle, useful in the making of shoes, boots, trunks, saddles, and furniture, etc.; the inexhaustible treasure of gold, the vast quantities of elephants' teeth, beeswax, and honey, and the inestimable riches of gums, ostriches' feathers, and amber-grease, which commodities are all purchased for the goods of the growth and manufacture of England, and are brought directly home, which is a double advantage, as well to the kingdom as to the royal revenue.

"Or, if we consider the trade of negro servants, which proves so advantageous to the western plantations in the several islands of America, as well as that continent whose chief commerce is sugar, tobacco, indigo, ginger, cotton, and dyeing stuffs, which are the natural product of the New World, whose penury or plenty lies indispensably upon the trade of negro servants from Africa, which the Royal company manage with more than an ordinary slight for their own advantage, taking care that the planters shall never be furnished with negroes sufficient to follow their business with satisfaction, and imposing what prices they please, and do trust but for six months; for which they exact such an interest, that they, in a manner, sweep away the profit of their labors, so

that although he the planter's industry never so great, yet he shall not be able to effect his designs, because his hands are thus bound by the company: yet I am sure that if the planters were furnished with negroes from Africa, answerable to their industry, that four times the sugar, indigo, cotton, etc., would be imported every year; then let every rational man judge, if this would not be infinitely more advantageous to the kingdom in general.

"And to such a height is the feuds of this company grown, that they presume not only to oppress the subjects abroad, but likewise to lord it over them here in England, by imposing forty per cent. upon such as with their license trade to Africa, as Samuel Sherring, and others, now in London, can witness, who paid them the value aforesaid, for a permission to trade at Angola, a place in Africa, and remote from any of their castles and factories, and in the Portugueses territories, which is both hurtful to traffic, and prejudicial to the king's prerogative and revenue, it being a point of religion to pay tribute to Cesar: but I never heard of any law, or gospel, to oblige men to pay tribute to the African Company."

It should be noticed that the Dutch had established themselves at the Cape in 1652, their main if not sole object being to secure a halfway house between Europe and India. The Dutch Government later encouraged the settlement of Dutch emigrants, but the white population increased but slowly, and the tyrannical restrictions of the Dutch East India Company did not encourage colonization. Thus for many years effective occupation was confined to Cape Town and a few miles around it.

It may also be noted that England held Tangier, in Morocco, from 1662 to 1684. Portugal, after many struggles, had obtained possession of this important position in 1471. When, in 1662, Catharine of Braganza was married to Charles II. of England, Tangier formed part of her dowry. But England found the position so troublesome and expensive that she abandoned it in 1684, after having destroyed the fortifications. Portugal had a footing in Morocco till 1769, when she evacuated Mazagan, while Spain still holds the old fortress of Ceuta.

Chapter IV

STAGNATION AND SLAVERY. 1700-1815

THUS, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, we find in the African field all the chief European factors which have played so prominent a part in recent years in the partition of the continent, in addition to that Moslem or so-called Arab element which was then dominant over half of Africa. Far stronger then than now was the hold which Turkey had over the northern regions; her power extended from Egypt (conquered in 1517) to Algeria; while the influence of Morocco was felt as far as Timbuktu and Guinea.

During the whole of the eighteenth century there was comparatively little change in the relative positions of the European powers. Holland gave a king to England in 1688, but that had little influence in promoting friendly relations between the two sets of colonies in West Africa. Portugal continued to reign in the region south of the Congo, and, with varied fortunes, subject constantly to the attacks of the natives, occupied a few fortified places between Delagoa Bay and Mozambique. The Dutch held their own at the Cape, and French and Dutch and English struggled for supremacy on the west coast, which, during the eighteenth century, continued to be the chief field of contention among the European powers in Africa. Let us see what was the position in West Africa in the first half of the century.

Between Cape Blanco and St. Paul de Loanda there were in all forty-three forts or stations. The first European settlement on the mainland was at Arguin, on the Gum Coast, as it was called, in about 20° north latitude. This had originally belonged to Portugal, then to the Dutch, then to the French, then to the King of Prussia, who offered it to England for $500,000, but from whom it was ultimately bought by the Dutch for $150,000. It was, however, taken by the French in 1721. France may be said to have been supreme from here to the Gambia, having a fort on the Sene-

gal, and settlements and plantations for a long distance up the river.

England's west coast possessions then as now began at the Gambia, where the Royal African Company had a good fort on James Island, with sundry factories higher up on each side of the river. Farther round, on the Guinea Coast, we find English forts at Dixcove, Secondee, Commenda, Cape Coast Castle, Fort Royal, Queen Anne's Point (these three close together), Annishan, Anamabo, Agga, Tantumquerry, Winneba, Shidaoe, Accra, Allampo, Quetta, Whyda, Jacquin, and Cabinda. All were within a few miles of each other, except the last, which was near the mouth of the Congo. Some of them had been abandoned by 1740, though they may have been reoccupied, and in nearly every case they were flanked by Dutch forts. Cabinda had been taken, plundered, and destroyed by the Portuguese in 1723.

The only forts possessed by the Portuguese on all this coast, which they had discovered, and which gave a title to their king, were at Cuchoo and Bissao, where they have a patch at the present day. Then as now they held possession of St. Paul de Loanda, where we are told they had several forts and a large city, and where they carried on "a very great and advantageous inland trade for some hundreds of miles." Their great stronghold on the Gold Coast, St. George da Mina, had long ago been taken and occupied by the Dutch, who possessed sixteen out of the forty-three forts on the coast.

Although in 1740 Denmark had only one fort on the coast, at Accra, she had later on three others, at Fingo, Adda, and Quetta; all of which she sold to England in 1850 for $50,000.

Cape Coast Castle and some of the other forts, Dutch and English, were at the time formidable buildings; most of them had "negro houses," in which the natives were stored in readiness to be shipped across the Atlantic to the plantations. The maintenance of these forts and the establishments connected therewith was a perpetual source of expense, and, according to contemporary statements, the British Company was in a continual state of embarrassment, and in need of subsidies from the government. There was much controversy during the first half of the century as to what should be done with the African Company: whether its monopoly should be maintained, or whether it should be abolished, and the African trade thrown open to all comers. Finally, the old company

was succeeded in 1750 by the African Company of Merchants, constituted by Act of Parliament, with liberty to trade and to form establishments on the west coast between 20° north and 20° south latitude.

Let us recall the fact that the eighteenth century and the first fifteen years of the nineteenth constituted a period of almost chronic war in Europe. There were the War of the Spanish Succession (1700), the English rebellions, the Quadruple Alliance against Spain (1718), the Polish troubles, the War of the Austrian Succession (1741-1748), the Seven Years' War (1758), and the almost continuous war between France and England ending in Waterloo, and during which England annexed Canada, established her supremacy in India, and obtained a firm footing in other parts of the world, while she lost, in America, the greatest of all her colonies. During this period, with the exception of Egypt and the Cape, Africa did not receive a large share of attention, though the forts on the west coast were continually changing hands. The Dutch lost the supreme place they occupied during the latter part of the seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth century.

The French continued to advance steadily in the Senegal region. Toward the end of the century British traders began to establish themselves on the Oil Rivers, though at that time oil was of little or no account. In 1787 England resumed her old connection with Sierra Leone, where a private company obtained land on which to establish a settlement for freed slaves; great things were expected to come of this. The first negroes sent out were four hundred gathered from the streets of London, together with sixty whites, mostly women of bad character. A considerable number of Europeans, chiefly English and Dutch, were also sent out to Sierra Leone apparently under the belief that it was quite possible for Europeans to colonize West Africa. It need hardly be said that the sufferings were great and the deaths appalling. A similar attempt at the same time on the part of a number of Swedes ended in disaster.

At the Cape, meanwhile, French Protestants found a refuge, and the Dutch burghers, dissatisfied with the rule of the company, trekked inland to the Karroo to carry on their farming free from molestation. But the company's rule followed them, and magistracies were established at Swellendam in 1745, and at Graaf Reinet in 1784. In 1788 the boundary of the colony was extended to the

Great Fish River. In 1795 the Cape was captured by the English, and with the exception of the three years from 1803 to 1806, has remained English ever since. At the date of its capture the whole white population of South Africa was probably under 10,000. During the Dutch period, notwithstanding the hard rule of the East India Company, something had been done to develop the colony: the vine was introduced at an early date, and has been cultivated ever since; cattle and sheep rearing was encouraged, experiments were made with various cultures, and wheat was successfully grown and even exported. Occasional expeditions were sent into the interior.

It is generally believed that the Orange River was not crossed before 1800. By this time cattle-runs had been extended to Olifant's River, and the Copper Mountains of little Namaqualand were visited by Europeans as far back as 1685. Again, in 1791-1792, another expedition crossed the Orange River, this time in the belief that gold was to be found in the country beyond; but nothing came of it except some information concerning the Damaras. A year later an expedition by sea took possession of Possession Island, Angra Pequeña, Walfish Bay, and other places, in the name of the company—a fact of some interest in connection with recent events. Still, when the colony was taken over by England, it can hardly be said that effective possession extended more than 200 miles from the south coast, while the total annual revenue was only $150,000—a sum quite insufficient to cover the expenditure.

Let us for a moment turn to the slave-trade. There seems little doubt that the African Company, which was dissolved in 1750, was ruined by the famous "Assiento" contract with Spain of 1713; the conditions on which the company was permitted to export slaves from Africa to the Spanish-American colonies were such that one wonders how it ever consented to this treaty. Still the trade went on. Macpherson, in his "History of Commerce," calculates that in 1748 the number of Africans shipped to America and the West Indies by all nations amounted to 97,000; the number of Africans in America at that date was probably considerably over a million. It would be difficult to estimate the number of Africans deported from the continent from the time of the first European connection with it; but during the eighteenth century alone it was probably not less than six millions. Moreover, the old

trade from Central Africa to the Mediterranean, Egypt, and Asia, which had been carried on from time immemorial, was still continued. Take it all in all, the profit from the slave-trade during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was equal to that arising from gold, ivory, gum, and all other products combined.

In the eighteenth century the power of the Portuguese in East Africa rapidly declined, and that of the Arabs, under new auspices, rose on its ruins. As early as 1584 there had been an insurrection all along the coast against the Portuguese, who were at this time under the domination of Spain; it was promoted by Ali Bey, who suddenly appeared in these waters and claimed the sovereignty for the Turkish sultan. Many of the towns on the coast fell into his hands. The rebellion, however, was of brief duration; Ali Bey was captured, and most of the cities retaken. But the Portuguese dominion in Africa was doomed. Portugal, to quote Krapf, "ruled the East Africans with a rod of iron, and her pride and cruelty had their reward in the bitter hatred of the natives. In East Africa the Portuguese have left nothing behind them but ruined fortresses, palaces, and ecclesiastical buildings. Nowhere is there to be seen a single trace of any real improvement effected by them." Sef ben Sultan, the Imaum of Oman, at the request of the people of Mombasa, sent a fleet to East Africa and captured Mombasa, Zanzibar, and Kilwa, and laid siege to Mozambique in 1698. Although the Portuguese reoccupied the coast fort of Mombasa, which they held up to 1730, their sovereignty between Cape Guardafui and Cape Delgado came practically to an end at this time. After this the Imaum of Muscat held a nominal sovereignty over the east coast of Africa; Mombasa was the center of the government, the rulership becoming to some extent hereditary. In the end, as will be seen, this led to the supremacy of the Imaums of Oman over the east coast from Magdoshu to Cape Delgado, and to the establishment of Zanzibar as an independent state in 1861.

Thus by the beginning of the eighteenth century the power of Portugal in East Africa was at the lowest possible ebb; she had only a precarious footing at one of the ports on the coast; and her main trade was the export of slaves. She had even abandoned Delagoa Bay, and the Dutch from the Cape had built a fort and a factory there.

Fifty years later it is curious to find that even Austria dreamed

of acquiring African possessions. In the hope of securing the trade of the east to the Austrian dominions in Flanders, Tuscany, and the Adriatic, Maria Theresa granted a charter in 1775 to William Bolts, an Englishman who had been in the service of the British East India Company. Bolts gathered together a somewhat disreputable band of emigrants from various Mediterranean countries and sailed from Leghorn in 1776. He proceeded to Delagoa Bay, and made terms with the chiefs on both sides of the river, who declared they were independent of the Portuguese and of every other power. The Austrian flag was raised, forts were built, various buildings erected, and a considerable trade with India began. Bolts, who seems to have had some practical sense, sent a Mohammedan priest from India to convert the natives, to whom he thought Islamism was better adapted than Christianity. The settlement, however, lasted only three years. The Europeans died off rapidly, and the Portuguese, awaking to what they regarded as their rights, addressed representations and protests to the Austrian Government, and so ended the only attempt on the part of Austria to share in the partition of Africa.

Toward the end of the century public opinion in England was rapidly taking a strong trend against the slave-trade. From the first here and there a voice had been lifted up against this traffic. It was in 1772 that Granville Sharp succeeded in getting the famous judicial decision, that as soon as any slave set his foot upon English territory he was free, and could not be taken back to be a slave. In 1787 Clarkson, Wilberforce, and others formed themselves into an association to secure the abolition of the slave-trade. In 1788 a bill was passed in the British Parliament to regulate it. At this time the annual export of slaves from Africa amounted to 200,000. Half of them were exported from the west coast to America and the West Indies; the other half partly from the east coast to Persia and the East Indies, and partly from the interior to Egypt and the Mediterranean states. Denmark had the honor to be the first European state to prohibit its subjects from engaging in the slave-trade. This was in 1792. In 1807 the slave-trade was declared illegal for all British subjects. In the same year the United States passed a law forbidding the importation of slaves into the Union. Between 1807 and 1815 most of the other great powers assumed the same position as England, and by 1815 the slave-trade was chiefly carried on under the flags of Spain and Portugal. In that year, at the Congress of

1815

Vienna, a declaration was signed by the powers that the trade was repugnant to humanity, and that its abolition was highly desirable.

During the long Napoleonic wars the possessions of England, France, and Holland on the west coast frequently changed hands; but except in the case of Egypt, the struggle for colonial possessions did not greatly affect Africa. Let us now see how the partition of the continent stood in the memorable year 1815.

Chapter V

THE POSITION IN 1815

WHEN Napoleon was finally crushed in 1815 Great Britain remained supreme at home and abroad. With the exception of some patches in India, the deadly colony of Cayenne in South America, a few West India Islands, and the islets of St. Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland, the only foreign possessions remaining to France when the struggle was ended were the islands of Réunion and Sainte Marie in the neighborhood of Madagascar, and the colony of Senegal on the west coast of Africa. England remained mistress of nearly all the lands of the globe most available for European settlement—Canada, Australia, and the Cape. She was supreme in India, her influence was paramount in Egypt, she retained some of the best of the West India Islands, she possessed patches on the west coast of Africa, while the British flag was planted on the islands of every ocean. It is worth while to recall the position of the various European powers on the African continent when, in 1815, the world was left to begin a long period of peaceful expansion.

Turkey was the only European power which had a footing in North Africa; she was nominally the suzerain of Egypt, Tunis, and Tripoli, but her power was even then on the wane. Algeria with her corsairs was still the terror of the Mediterranean traders; Morocco was then, as she is now, independent but tottering. To the Saharan "Hinterland" of these Mediterranean states no power laid claim. The Central Sudan was powerful and independent, occupied, or at least ruled, by semi-civilized Mohammedan fanatics. Indeed, the whole of the Niger region was divided up into somewhat small states among which Mohammedanism was rapidly spreading. Mungo Park, who in 1796 had been the first European to reach the banks of the Niger and who returned for a new expedition in 1805, had perished on the river he longed to explore, while René Caillié had not yet visited Timbuktu. France was left in possession of the west coast from Cape Blanco to the

1807

mouth of the Gambia, but, except for a short distance along the Senegal, her power extended but a little way inland. Portugal had then, as she has now, the Cape Verde Islands and a patch on the coast to the south of the Casamansa. England retained her old station on the Gambia; her Sierra Leone possession was but



a patch; her stations on the Gold Coast were suffering from the abolition of the slave-trade in 1807, while the colony of Lagos was not founded till long after. Denmark and Holland and Portugal had still several forts along the coast, though the Brandenburg settlement had long ago been abandoned. Liberia was not founded until five years after the date with which we are concerned. The course of the Niger was unknown; trading stations or factories, mainly British, were dotted here and there on the Oil Rivers, the Cam-

eroons, and the Congo estuary, while the whole coast was the haunt of slavers of every nationality. Spain had Fernando Po, and Portugal one of the smaller islands to the south, but the whole coast down to the Congo was virtually no-man's-land, ready to be annexed by any nation in search of colonies. Portugal, indeed, claimed that her great West African possessions began at 5° south, to the north of the Congo, and this claim was for a moment conceded by England in 1884, though Portuguese writers admitted there had never been effectual occupation.

At the mouth of the Congo itself there were a few stations—Portuguese, French, English, Dutch; but these were mainly for slave-trading purposes, though the slave-trade was declared illegal in 1807, and was made piracy in 1817. From Ambrizette to Cape Frio, in 18° south, no one denied the claims of Portugal; indeed, European indifference to Central Africa at this period was almost absolute, and continued to be so, except from the geographical standpoint, until within the past few years. Had Portugal then claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Africa lying between her east and her west coast possessions, it is doubtful if any European power would have troubled about it any more than if she had claimed jurisdiction over the North Pole. As a matter of fact, no evidence exists that any such claim was ever made until within the last few years. No doubt one or two isolated expeditions were sent into the interior, and half-castes and natives with Portuguese names and titles may even have crossed between Angola and Mozambique; but neither legitimate trade nor knowledge of the country was promoted by such excursions, and they can hardly be regarded as an evidence of effective occupation. This effective occupation was really confined to a few points on the coast. The immense stretch of coast between Cape Frio and Buffels River was unclaimed; although, as we have seen, Walfish Bay and Angra Pequeña were occupied by the Dutch Cape colonists in the previous century. The Cape Colony, only finally made over to England in 1815, though it had been occupied continuously since 1806, did not extend beyond Buffels River on the west, and its limit northward was confined within an irregular line drawn from Buffels River southeast to the Great Fish River. All beyond this, all the region where now are Cape farmers was as unknown and as untamed as the wildest parts of Central Africa. The total area of Cape Colony was only 120,000 square miles, and the total population 61,000, of

whom 15,000 were in Cape Town, two-thirds slaves—negroes and Malays—the latter introduced at an early period by the Dutch. Elephants and other big game were still accessible within a few miles from the coast, beyond which few settlers were to be found. The first British settlement on the Natal coast was not made for some years after this; and it was not until twenty years later that the first Dutch trek or migration was begun, which culminated in the founding of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. England objected to the Boers settling in Natal, but her statesmen and her colonists at the Cape did not see far enough ahead to extend her claims beyond the Orange River.

At Delagoa Bay we once more come upon ground claimed by Portugal, whose territory stretched as far north as Cape Delgado, though the precise limits north and south remained to be settled at a later perior. At this date, 1815, and for many years after, no serious claim of dominion was advanced by the Portuguese beyond a strip of the coast, varying in width, and along the River Zambezi as far as Zumbo. Considerably more than a hundred years before, Portugal was compelled to abandon all her conquests to the north of Cape Delgado; the whole coast from thence to Magdoshu, if not farther north, was under the sway of the Imaums of Muscat, who had gradually extended their influence between 1698 and 1807, partly by conquest from the Portuguese, and partly from native chiefs. France had been toying with Madagascar for 170 years, and had actually established a small colony at Fort Dauphin on the southeast coast in the seventeenth century; but in 1815 the island was practically independent. Mauritius had been made over to England, while France retained Bourbon (Réunion). The interior of the continent was, broadly speaking, unknown. The Somali and Galla countries were in practically undisputed possession of native tribes. Neither England, France, nor Italy seems to have dreamed of possessions on the Red Sea. Abyssinia was uncoveted, and Egypt had not yet cut her off from the coast. Not for five years after 1815 did Egypt begin to stretch her malign hand southward over Nubia and the Sudan; the Upper Nile was unknown, Khartum had not been founded; Kordofan, Darfur, and their neighbors were still independent, while the great lakes existed only on the half-mythical maps of Ptolemy and the medieval geographers.

Thus, then, in 1815, when Europe was at liberty to start on

1815

that career of progress in all directions, which has had undreamed-of results, her African possessions consisted of only a few factories and stations and towns on the coasts. Effective occupation hardly existed beyond the seaboard; the heart of Africa was an unknown blank. Serious occupation of the continent as a whole, as America and Australia were being occupied, was probably unthought of. Germany, in the modern sense, did not exist; Holland was satisfied with her great colonies of culture; France had hardly bethought herself of fresh colonial expansion; England had quite enough occupation for the energies of her surplus population, and for her commercial adventurers, in Canada, Australia, India, and the East. Africa she valued mainly as affording stations to guard her route to her great Asiatic empire. The total value of the commerce of the African continent for that year (including slaves) probably did not exceed $150,000,000. The total exports could hardly have been over $75,000,000, more than half coming from Egypt and the countries on the Mediterranean. So, except for explorers, for sixty years Africa was left in comparative peace.

Chapter VI

SIXTY YEARS OF PREPARATION. 1815-1875

ALTHOUGH during the sixty years after 1815 the most important annexation made in Africa by a European power was that of Algeria by France, activity in another direction was quietly going on which has led to important results within the past few years. During the latter part of the period especially we were enabled, through the exertions of adventurous explorers, to form some idea of the character of the African interior. Even before the conquest of Algeria in 1830, Caillié had reached Timbuktu, and other explorers had crossed the desert, or entered from the west coast, and made known the Lake Chad region, the Niger, and the Central Sudan states. It was in this region and in Abyssinia and the Upper Nile countries that the greatest exploring activity was manifested until Livingstone began his wanderings. Tuckey's failure to ascend the Congo farther than the first rapids left that great river to sweep its broad way unutilized across the continent for another sixty years. It can hardly be said that the interesting discoveries made in North Africa and the Niger region up to 1860 had much effect in arousing the covetousness of Europe.

The French conquest of Algeria, begun in 1830 and completed only after long years of sanguinary struggle, was a benefit to the civilized world, but probably no other power envied France the possession of that haunt of corsairs and home of Moslem fanaticism. The truth is that France, for many years, was more eager than any other European power for dominion in Africa. She was, indeed, the only power that sought to rival England in the creation of a colonial empire; she has striven hard to make up by annexations elsewhere for all that she lost to England through the wars of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately for her, there remained nothing to be annexed that could be compared to the territories she had lost. Neither in Asia nor the Pacific has she been able to find anything that can be put in

comparison with India and Australia. As a colony of settlement Algeria can never rival Canada, nor even, except perhaps for southern Europeans, British South Africa. It has a desert for its "Hinterland." Algeria has, no doubt, prospered greatly under French rule, though it will be long ere France is able to recoup herself for the outlay of the $750,000,000 which its conquest has cost her.

While France was consolidating her position in Algeria, she was steadily extending her influence in the Senegambian interior. So long as sixty years ago she made attempts to open communications between Senegambia and Algeria, but without success. The Senegambians, like the Cape Colonists, were continually on their defense against the natives of the interior, who, under their Mohammedan leaders, such as El-Haj Omar, did their best to drive the French into the sea. But there could be little doubt of the ultimate result. When Colonel Faidherbe retired from his long governorship of the colony in 1865, the French occupation extended to the Upper Senegal; French influence was recognized by treaty from Cape Blanco to British Gambia; the coast region from St. Louis to the British frontier, and even at Casamansa on the south, and for a considerable distance into the interior, had been brought under subjection; an administration had been established; and attempts had been made to introduce the cultivation of cotton, indigo, and other products, not, however, with much success. In the whole interior of the Senegambian region, France, during these fifty years, had entire command of the situation, England not conceiving that her interests demanded interference on her part. In 1865 a strong committee of the House of Commons came unanimously to the resolution "that all further extension of territory or assumption of government, or new treaty offering any protection to native tribes, would be inexpedient." Though not rigorously adhered to, the policy has, in the main, been carried out with respect to the West African colonies ever since, thus leaving France a free hand to extend her possessions between the Senegal and the Gulf of Guinea.

Till 1816 Gambia had been all but abandoned, owing to the abolition of the slave-trade in 1807. A few British merchants from Senegal then settled on the island of St. Mary at the mouth of the river. From 1821 to 1843 it was subject to the government of Sierra Leone; then after twenty-three years of independence it became in 1866 part of the government of the West African settle-

ments. During the whole period of French activity on both sides of the Gambia no attempt was made to extend British influence in any direction, and by a late Anglo-French arrangement that influence has been restricted practically to the banks of the river. A little more activity was shown in Sierra Leone, which acquired various islands and tracts of country by treaty before 1865, though no attempt was made to push British influence into the interior or along the coast toward Portuguese Guinea. Portuguese Guinea remained virtually as it had been from the time when Portugal was freed from Spanish domination; its precise limits have only recently been defined.

In 1820 the Washington Colonization Society made the first settlement of freed negroes at Cape Mesurado, and so laid the foundation of the republic of Liberia, recognized by the European powers as an independent state in 1847. The republic extended its domain along the coast to the borders of Sierra Leone, and southeast to the negro settlement of Maryland, which was absorbed in 1857; while it pushed its influence for an indefinite distance into the interior.

Meantime the British settlements on the Gold Coast had a very checkered career; now they were under government jurisdiction, and again they were abandoned to the merchants. Troubles with Ashanti complicated matters, while the Dutch and Danish settlements hampered trade operations. In 1850, however, Denmark made over her settlements to England for $50,000. By a convention which came into force in 1868, the Dutch were confined to the west of the Sweet River, their extensive possessions of the previous century having now dwindled down to Dixcove, Apollonia, Secondee, and Commenda, with a protectorate over the two Wassaws, Denkera, and the country of Apollonia. In 1871 Holland transferred all her right on the Gold Coast to Great Britain. Although France claims to have acquired portions of the coast (Grand Bassam and Assinie) to the west of the British Colony in 1838 and 1842, and a station on the east, Porto Novo, in 1868, these were really unoccupied till 1884, and at any time up to within the past few years there would have been no obstacle to declaring the whole of the coast from the Liberian boundary to the Gaboon under British protection. Had this been done it would have prevented much of the international bitterness of late years.

In 1861 Lagos was acquired by England from the native king;

since which time the colony has been extended east and west, until now it stretches from the Benin River to the Denham Waters at Kotonu, and includes the Yoruba country in the interior as a protectorate. British traders have been settled on the Oil Rivers for a century, at first mainly for the purpose of carrying on the slave-trade. British missionaries have been at work in the Calabar region for more than half a century, and over a long stretch of coast British influence was actually, if not nominally, supreme; but no active steps seem to have been even thought of to secure the whole region from any risk of foreign interference. The period, however, between 1815 and 1875 was marked by extensive exploring enterprise in the Niger region, mainly conducted by British subjects or at British cost. Lander had traced the river from Bussa to its mouth. Expedition after expedition, at a fearful expenditure of suffering and life, endeavored to explore the great river and its tributary the Benué, and establish British influence and trade. Baikie founded a station at Lokoja, at the confluence of the two rivers; model farms were established elsewhere, and efforts made to suppress the slave-trade. The great expedition of Barth from the north contributed a wealth of information on the whole Niger region. Seventy years ago the far-sighted and shrewd geographer M'Queen urged in the strongest terms the duty of England to establish herself in the Niger region and create a great "Central African Empire"; the dread of extending imperial responsibilities still possessed those charged with the interests of the empire. After much expenditure of life and money the Niger was virtually abandoned—given over to the unsupported enterprise of private traders. All the time France was steadily pursuing her way inland to the great river.

An English mission station was founded at Victoria, on the Cameroons coast, in 1858, and British traders virtually dominated the coast. In 1842 France established herself on the fine estuary of the Gaboon, and twenty years after took possession of the Ogové. It was not, however, till fifteen years later that, under the leadership of De Brazza, French dominion was extended into the interior, and the foundations were laid for the immense acquisitions of France between the coast and the Congo in 1884. The coast down to the Cape boundary remained much as it was in 1815. Private trading firms of various nationalities had stations at the mouth of the Congo and along the coast to the north, but


no one had the curiosity to seek to discover what lay beyond Tuckey's farthest point at Yellala Falls. Portugal was undisturbed in her West African possessions. Her traders had stations in the interior, from which caravans went to and from the coast, mainly for slaves and ivory. To Portugal ought naturally to have fallen the exploration of the Congo, but such enterprise as that had long been beyond the range of her energies. Missionaries, explorers, and traders had ventured into Damaraland and Namaqualand. Although a number of islands off Angra Pequeña were declared British in 1867, and Walfish Bay in 1878, the latter was not actually annexed to the Cape till 1884.

Meanwhile, Cape Colony itself had its hands full of trouble. War after war with the Kaffirs kept up for years a feeling of insecurity, and compelled the colony to push its boundaries farther and farther north. Kaffraria was annexed in 1865; in 1871 Basutoland came under British rule. A constitution was established in 1853, and responsible government in 1872. By opening up the country by roads and railways, and encouraging immigration, the colony steadily developed. The Orange River had been reached; the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had been founded and recognized, the former in 1854 and the latter in 1852; Natal had been created an independent colony in 1856; and, though patches of native territory still here and there awaited formal annexation, by 1875 all the country up to the Orange River and the Orange Free State was virtually under British influence, though the extension of this influence was carried on slowly and with reluctance on the part of the home government. Beyond Natal there remained the Zululand gap between the British and Portuguese spheres, the latter having undergone little or no change during the long interval. Movements were taking place among the native tribes both to the north and the south of the Zambezi; about 1845 the Matabele had crossed the Limpopo and established themselves by force in the country of the Mashonas and kindred tribes. In 1823 Captain Owen, while carrying out his surveys on the east coast, obtained from native chiefs a cession of Delagoa Bay, which was, moreover, claimed for England in virtue of the Dutch settlement there in 1820. England went so far as to found a station named Bombay opposite Lourenço Marquez, and there were continual disputes for possession between her and Portugal up to 1875, the Transvaal also putting in a claim for a section of coast. At last the rival

claims were referred for arbitration to the President of the French Republic, Marshal MacMahon, who decided in favor of Portugal, even going to the extreme of giving Portugal more territory than she had claimed in her statement. The chief ground of Portugal's claim was the "Treaty of Monomotapa," which had lapsed long before. The present town of Lourenço Marquez was only founded in 1807 on the site of an old village of the same name.

But a new era for the continent had begun. Livingstone had entered Africa, and had initiated those explorations which opened up the heart of the continent, and led to that scramble which is now all but completed. Before his death in 1873 he had been to Lake Ngami, had completed that journey across the continent which revealed the course of the Zambezi, had reported the first authentic information as to the character of the country watered by it and its tributaries, and had carried the British name and influence into regions which only the other day became appanages of the imperial crown. Others had followed in Livingstone's footsteps—Galton and Andersson in Damaraland, Baines in the same region and east to Matabeleland (whose riches he revealed to the modern world) and the Zambezi; while others—missionaries, explorers, hunters, and traders—were penetrating into every corner of the country to the south of the Zambezi. Livingstone had concluded his great Zambezi expedition in 1863, which, disastrous as it was in some respects, opened up what was practically a new country to the world, and led to the foundation of those trading and missionary stations in Nyasaland which were destined to form the basis of British influence in one of the most promising regions of Central Africa. In 1865 Livingstone began his final wanderings, that led him through the heart of Africa to Tanganyika and the Lualaba, which he would fain have followed to its outflow at the sea; but instead death overtook him in 1873 on the swampy shores of Bangweolo, one of the great lake-feeders of the mysterious river. Meantime, in January, 1871, Stanley had already entered the threshold of that continent which he was destined within the next few years, directly or indirectly, to transform.

In the Zanzibar coast region, which, since the beginning of the seventeenth century, had been nominally at least under the Imaums of Muscat, there were constant attempts of the local sultans to establish their independence; and on the change of dy-



DAVID LIVINGSTONE

(Born 1813. Died 1873)

Photograph from life

nasty in Oman, which took place on the accession of the Al bin Saidi to power, several of the lieutenant governors on the coast refused to accept allegiance. The Imaum Sey'id Said, however, had made himself master of Patta, Brava, Lamu, Zanzibar, Pemba, and Kilwa, and threatened to attack Mombasa, where the aged Soliman Ben Ali, as representing the governor under the older rulers of Oman, was in power. Soliman appealed to Captain Owen, whose squadron was then surveying the coast, and he, in 1824, took under the protection of Great Britain Mombasa and its dependency, Pemba, and all the coast between Melinde and Pangani; Brava also was placed under protection, and many advantageous concessions were made to the British. But Captain Owen was more than half a century before his time; in 1828 the British Government, after Mombasa had been occupied for four years, yielding to the jealousy of the East India Company, abandoned the concession, and all the region was left to its fate for another sixty years.

When the Imaum Sey'id Said had built a palace at Zanzibar, and had finally chosen this city as his residence, Captain Hammerton was sent there in December, 1841, as England's first consul, and as the political agent for India. The struggles of Mombasa with Muscat were renewed, but the latter in the end prevailed, so that when, in 1861, Sey'id Majid (who succeeded Sey'id Said in 1856) was confirmed by Lord Canning in the territories of Zanzibar, the Sultan's rule extended over the whole coast and the islands from Cape Delgado to Magdoshu. Moreover, the sultan's influence, if not jurisdiction, had extended far into the interior, and his orders were obeyed even on Lake Tanganyika. But before Livingstone set eyes on that lake, discoveries had been made which changed the whole aspect of the interior, and led to further enterprises, which culminated in the scramble of the last few years. The Arabs, returning from their journeys in the interior, had told of great lakes which they themselves had navigated. In 1848 Rebmann caught sight of the snows of Kilimanjaro. Ten years later Burton and Speke went into the interior to find those great lakes, already known to the Arabs, and they were able to place Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza on the map. Speke, who first saw the latter, had thus discovered the great source of the Nile, and, with his companion, Grant, a year or two later, he was able to add still further to our knowledge of Egypt's historical river, and to tell

of the great kingdom of Uganda and its ruler Mtesa, who subsequently played so important a part in unwittingly promoting British interests. In 1864 Baker discovered the Albert Nyanza, and made further additions to knowledge of a region which is now virtually within the British sphere. Burton and Speke came upon stations far in the interior, founded by Arabs, through whose enterprise the slave-trade had reached gigantic dimensions.

While to British explorers is due the credit of the bulk of the important work done in Central Africa up to 1875, travelers of other nationalities contributed their share to the opening up of the continent to knowledge and enterprise. One of the most prominent names connected with the exploration of East Africa is that of Von der Decken. Between 1860 and 1865 he undertook extensive explorations in the Kilimanjaro region, and visited several parts of the coast between Cape Delgado and the River Jub. While exploring this river he lost his life, but not before he had conceived the idea of a German occupation of these districts of Africa. From the Jub River on August 14, 1864, he writes: "I am persuaded that in a short time a colony established here would be most successful, and after two or three years would be self-supporting. It would become of special importance after the opening of the Suez Canal. It is unfortunate that we Germans allow such opportunities of acquiring colonies to slip, especially at a time when it would be of importance to the navy." As a German writer has said, had it not been for Von der Decken's death, Germany might have had colonies twenty years sooner than she did. Two years later Otto Kersten, one of Von der Decken's companions, published an article on the colonization of East Africa, in which he wrote: "Von der Decken on many occasions said that he would not hesitate, if Sey'id Majid agreed to it, to buy Mombasa from the sultan in order to found an establishment and place the commerce of the interior in the hands of Europeans, and especially of Germans. After two or three years' stay at Chagga, on the eastern shore of Victoria Nyanza, the colonists would obtain more results than emigrants who wander far across the seas. I recommend to my country an enterprise as advantageous as it is glorious for individuals and for the nation." Though Von der Decken held exaggerated views as to the value of this part of Africa for colonizing purposes, Germany was at the time too much occupied with her position in Europe to be able to take meas-

ures to improve her position beyond the seas. But these two utterances are noteworthy as being probably the first hint that Germany might in the future enter the field as a colonizing power in Africa. At the time that Von der Decken wrote, and for twenty years after, British influence was supreme at Zanzibar; the succession of British representatives at the court of the sultan were virtually political residents, and guided the sultan's policy as absolutely as do similar functionaries at the feudatory courts of India. Sir John Kirk, who was connected with Zanzibar from 1866 to 1887, was undoubtedly more powerful than the sultan himself; and twenty-five years ago, and indeed down to 1884, British supremacy at Zanzibar was deemed almost as indispensable to British interests in India and in East Africa as is the possession of Aden itself. British Indian merchants were settled all along the coast from Cape Delgado to Mombasa, and all but a fraction of the trade was in their hands.

There was one episode of this period to which brief allusion must be made. As the result of an inquiry by a Parliamentary committee into the slave trade in East Africa, Sir Bartle Frere was, in November, 1872, appointed special envoy to the sultans of Zanzibar and Muscat to induce them to sign a treaty rendering the export of slaves from Africa illegal. Frere spent some three months in Zanzibar and in visiting the coast of the mainland. The sultan was, however, extremely obstinate, and could not be induced to comply with the wishes of the British Government, though these were supported by the representatives of Germany and the United States. In the meantime France took advantage of the position to advise the sultan to hold out, promising to support him in the maintenance of the export of slaves, and to lend him the aid of a squadron of her fleet. The sultan was so intensely irritated at the demands of the British envoy, that he actually offered the protection of the whole of his dominion to France. France, however, had not yet recovered from her defeat by Germany, and by the time her squadron was ready to sail for Zanzibar, Dr. John Kirk, in whom the sultan and the Arabs had the utmost confidence, by his tact and firmness, his thorough knowledge of the sultan's character and of local conditions, succeeded in completing the work begun by Sir Bartle Frere; and the treaty was signed on June 5, 1873. The French representative made himself so obnoxious that he had to be withdrawn, and all idea of French protection was

banished from the sultan's mind. It should be remembered that France, in 1842, had joined with England in guaranteeing the sultan's independence.

Proceeding northward, we find but little alteration in the position between 1815 and 1875. Massawa had been occupied by the Turks early in the seventeenth century, and from that date the whole of the Red Sea coast may be regarded as Egyptian, attempts on the part of Abyssinia to obtain a port always ending in failure. Early in the century France began to seek for a footing on the Red Sea. The port of Ait, to the north of the Straits of Babelmandeb, was purchased by a French merchant in 1835 in the hope of attracting the trade of Abyssinia. Various other attempts were made to obtain a footing near Massawa, and to intrigue against Abyssinia, with no permanent result, except that Obock, on Tajura Bay opposite Aden, was bought in 1862. Egypt had taken possession of Berbera and aimed at extending her influence through Harrar to Shoa, but her purpose was defeated. Abyssinia was much as it had been, notwithstanding the attempts of France in the first half of the last century, its invasion by a British army, and its troubles with Egypt. This latter power, whose connection with Turkey had become more and more slender, had by 1875 advanced southward along the Nile, and had virtually annexed Kordofan and Darfur, and the whole of the country up to the Albert Nyanza. Gordon was already in her service, and Emin Pasha joined him in the year following.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 is a notable event bearing upon the destiny of Africa. As a new highway to India it greatly enhanced the value of Egypt, and led to a more intense rivalry than before between England and France for paramount influence in that country. Moreover, it greatly increased the strategical value not only of Aden, but of the ports on the opposite coast of Africa, and of the island of Sokotra, which was taken under the wing of England in 1876, having been looked upon as under British influence long before that. The greater island of Madagascar, farther south, continued to receive attentions from France at intervals during the whole of the period under notice. The various attempts at establishing a footing on the main island failed, though the island of Sainte Marie on the east coast was reoccupied in 1819, Nossi-Bé on the west coast taken possession of in 1840, and Mayotte in 1841.

Thus, then, the progress of partition among the European powers had been comparatively slow and insignificant during the sixty years that had elapsed since 1815. Germany as a colonizing power had not yet set foot upon the continent. Great Britain had certainly pushed her influence and jurisdiction northward from the Cape as it stood in 1815, but it was reluctantly and slowly. Her west coast colonies were mere patches. Her influence was felt extensively in the Niger region and in the Zanzibar dominions, but it was unofficial and unsecured by treaties. Her supremacy in Egypt had become more and more marked. France was the only power that showed any eagerness for steady annexation and any foresight as to future contingencies. In short, the great struggle had not yet begun; but it was imminent. Stanley's memorable journey across the continent, and especially his discovery of the great Congo waterway, may be regarded as the initiatory episode.

Chapter VII

PRELIMINARIES TO PARTITION. 1875-1883

FROM about 1850 the interest in Africa grew more and more intense and widespread. Even after that date cargoes of slaves were shipped from the west coast to America, but as a result of the American Civil War and the increased activity of British anti-slavery cruisers, the horrors of the transatlantic traffic in humanity were at last put an end to. The traffic may have lingered in the Portuguese parts of Angola, for there were still Brazil and Cuba to be supplied; when, many years before, all other civilized nations agreed to suppress the traffic, Portugal had begged for, and obtained, the insertion of a clause excepting her African ports from the operation of the treaty. But if there were those who flattered themselves that the African slave-trade was dead, they were soon undeceived. Livingstone, and other travelers and missionaries, awoke the world to the fact that the transatlantic slave-trade was really only a very small portion of the traffic which harrowed the Dark Continent. The whole of Africa between the tropics was a hunting-ground for the so-called Arabs, who had for long past been making their way from the north and from the eastern coast. When Livingstone reached the heart of the continent at Nyangwé he found their malign influence everywhere present. The various stages in the spread of Islam in Africa, and the continual growth of the traffic in slaves and ivory carried on by the Arabs and half-breeds from the east, is a subject of vast interest. Formerly these Arabs were content to remain on the coast and purchase from the natives what the latter brought down; but owing to various causes they themselves, in recent years, have led or sent their own caravans into the interior, with what results every reader of Livingstone and Stanley knows. Great regions have been devastated, and whole towns, and even tribes, almost exterminated for the sake of the ivory which they possessed. For every slave brought to the coast to be shipped across to Arabia or Madagascar, or sent north to Morocco, Tripoli, and Egypt by

caravan route, probably half a dozen natives had been slaughtered. As this feature in the life of Central Africa became more and more keenly recognized, the philanthropists of the world combined to suppress it, and in this way the interest in Central Africa was intensified.

Another considerable section of civilized mankind became fascinated with the discoveries which were gradually revealing to us the wonderful character of a continent whose periphery was first correctly mapped in the schooldays of many now living. Rebmann and Krapf; Burton, Speke, and Grant; Baker, Schweinfurth, and Nachtigal; Livingstone above all, besides many men of minor note, had aroused an interest in Africa unparalleled in the annals of geography even in the days when Arctic exploration was at its height. Stanley's story of how he found Livingstone served to intensify this interest, keen and widespread as it was, while Livingstone's death turned African exploration into a kind of crusade. Cameron's remarkable journey across Africa from east to west in 1873-1875 helped us still further to realize the conditions of the interior. Missionary effort was greatly increased and strengthened, especially in East Africa, as far inland as Lake Nyasa, with which the name of Livingstone is so intimately associated. Thus it might be said that when Stanley started on his memorable journey across the Dark Continent in 1875 the whole civilized world had an interest in the results of his expedition. Letter after letter from the great explorer, and telegram after telegram from the heart of Africa, as to the fortunes of the expedition, served to fan this interest and kindle it into a world-wide enthusiasm.

To the work accomplished by Stanley more than to that of any other explorer it is due that this somewhat abstract enthusiasm for Africa was, in the space of a comparatively few years, precipitated into action on the part of the states of Europe. But that action did not come for some time after the explorer had emerged from the Congo. There is little need to recount the story of an expedition in many respects among the most remarkable which ever entered Africa. Stanley himself was a man of action, prepared to carry out his purpose at all hazards; he was no mere abstract geographer or general philanthropist. As with all great men of action, his deeds will beget deeds on the part of others. No man knew better than he how to nerve his fellowmen to action. His letters from Uganda, describing with dramatic realism his long

interviews with the clever if somewhat artful M'tesa, roused Christendom to enthusiasm. At once an army of missionaries, English first, followed by French, was sent out to take possession, in the name of their Master, of one of the most powerful kingdoms in Central Africa. This may indeed be said to have been the first tangible result of Stanley's journey—a result which was not without its influence in the final scramble.

Stanley was still in the heart of Africa when a movement was initiated which may be regarded as the beginning of the ultimate partition of the continent among the powers of Europe. The colonial aspirations of Germany were being awakened. She was still flushed with the fruits of her great victory over France. She was now a united empire, bent on achieving what Germans would call world-greatness, and new energy had been infused into her commercial life. Her merchants were on the lookout for fresh fields; their eyes were eagerly turned to the East and to Africa. But at present the only action was that taken by private adventurers; Bismarck had more important matters demanding his energies. It remained for another potentate to inaugurate a movement which, within fifteen years, was to make Africa little more than a political appendage to Europe.

When Stanley's first letter came home, Leopold, King of the Belgians, was in his prime. He was just forty years old and had been on the throne of Belgium for ten years. The king was then, as he is now, a man of restless energy, ambitious of distinction for himself and his little kingdom, greatly interested in the promotion of commerce and the arts, and with a special love for geography. The field for his energies as the sovereign of a small, neutral, and comparatively poor kingdom was limited. He had no great army, no great fleet, no ever-recurring political complications to engage his attention outside of his own domain. It was natural that a man of his energies and ambitions should wish for a sphere of more cosmopolitan action than he could find within his own borders, or even in Europe. Possibly also he desired that as his kingdom could not, by any chance, be great politically, it might at least expand commercially; if it could not stretch its limits in Europe, there was a whole continent, almost unoccupied and untouched, in which he and his people might find abundant room for their surplus energies. There is no need to attempt to fathom all the motives of the King of the Belgians in summoning to Brussels on September 12, 1876,

1876

a select conference to discuss the question of the exploration and the civilization of Africa, and the means of opening up the interior of the continent to the commerce, industry, and scientific enterprise of the civilized world. But in summoning the conference the king indicated his desire that it should consider what measures might be adopted to extinguish the terrible scourge of slavery, which, though broken up on the west coast, was known still to continue its desolating influence over wide and populous tracts in the interior of the continent.

It is hard to realize all that has happened during the years that have passed since this memorable meeting in Brussels. Have we any warrant in concluding that the King of the Belgians had in view from the first the ultimate creation of a great African empire, of which he himself should be the head, and which might place Belgium on a level with Holland as a colonizing power? It is hard to say; probably Leopold had not formulated to himself any very precise scheme.[1] It must be remembered that in September, 1876, Stanley was on his march from Lake Tanganyika to Nyangwé, and that as yet he had not looked upon the wide Lualaba, which he was destined to trace down to the Atlantic as the Congo. The King of the Belgians, when he convened the meeting of geographers and philanthropists, knew no more about the Lualaba and its ultimate destination than did anyone else who took an interest in Africa; and, indeed, his attention was not directed to West Africa at all, but to the east coast and to East Central Africa. In the initiation and direction of an organization for opening up the long-neglected continent to science, industry, and civilization, there seemed ample scope for the king's energies and philanthropic aspirations, and for that craving for distinction which kings share with other mortals. It must be admitted that had Leopold's design been carried out as he planned it we should have learned more about the heart of Africa in a few years than our ancestors had during the four centuries which had elapsed since the Portuguese began to creep down and around its coasts. But human nature and national jealousies were, as might have been expected, too strong for combined and disinterested international action and for the philanthropical aims put forward by the king.

[1] But it is of interest to remember that long before this and before he came to the throne, Leopold while traveling in the east, seriously contemplated the acquisition of part of Borneo, or of some other island in the eastern archipelago.

At the Brussels Conference of September 12, 1876, the nationalities represented were Great Britain, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. These national representatives consisted of the presidents of the various geographical societies, African explorers, and others interested in the continent; they were in no sense delegates from their governments. The King of the Belgians himself was really acting in his private capacity and in no way as involving any responsibility on the part of his kingdom. The conference sat for three days, and as a result of their deliberations it was agreed that an International Commission, or International African Association, should be founded, having its seat at Brussels, for the exploration and civilization of Central Africa; and that each nation willing to coöperate should form a National Committee to collect subscriptions for the common object and send delegates to the commission.

The international character of the movement was not long maintained. In England the subject was discussed at the Council of the Royal Geographical Society, to which body naturally fell the task of organizing the National Committee in that country. Difficulties of an obvious kind were foreseen, which rendered it desirable that such a committee, while maintaining friendly relations of correspondence with the Belgian and other committees, should not trammel itself with engagements of an international nature, or with objects other than those of geography. No British delegates were therefore appointed to the International Commission at Brussels. Instead, the African Exploration Fund of the Royal Geographical Society was established in March, 1877.

National Committees as branches of the International Association were formed in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Portugal, France, Netherlands, Italy, Russia, Switzerland, and the United States, as well as in Belgium. At the meeting of the Central Committee, held in Brussels on June 20 and 21, 1877, it was found that the Belgian Committee had already subscribed $57,400, besides $8800 annual contribution. By June, 1879, Belgium's contribution had exceeded $120,000, while small contributions had been sent by the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Dutch, and Swiss Committees. No time was lost in beginning operations. By 1877 the first expedition was under way, the object being to establish between the east coast and Lake Tanganyika a series of stations for the purpose of helping explorers and spreading civilization. From the

beginning misfortunes followed the footsteps of this and subsequent expeditions. The Belgian officers chosen as leaders were totally unacquainted with the conditions of life in tropical Africa, and were apparently almost entirely ignorant of the geography of the continent, even so far as it was known. Into the details of these international expeditions from the east coast it is not necessary to enter. The first which left Zanzibar in 1878 set out with a train of ox-wagons, but had to return shortly after it started, owing to the death of the oxen from the sting of the *tsetse* fly, which, though usually harmless to man, is poisonous to cattle. One or two intermediate stations of a temporary kind were subsequently established in the interior, but the first permanent one was founded only in 1880 at Karema, on the southeast shore of Lake Tanganyika. It was in connection with this station that experiments were made, at the expense of the King of the Belgians, with Indian elephants. All of these, unfortunately, died, probably from want of intelligent treatment; the question as to the possibility of acclimatizing Indian elephants in Africa has yet to be settled. Notwithstanding the great sacrifice of human life and the enormous expenditure of money, these attempts at founding oases of civilization in Central Africa were failures, so far as the objects of the association were concerned. Karema was really the only station that survived, and explorers have on more than one occasion obtained succor there. Results as to exploration have been almost *nil,* and it is a matter of regret that the intentions of the royal founder of the Association were so sadly marred by ignorance and inefficiency.

The truth is that, so far as the exploration of Africa goes, much more was done by the National Committees than by the International Commission. This is also true of the opening up of the continent to commerce and civilization, so that the committees, rather than the commission, must be credited with having brought about that scramble among the European powers which, in a very brief period, resulted in the partition of Africa. To the work of the English African Committee, independently of the association, reference has already been made. Their work was purely one of exploration. The French and Italian National Committees seem to have contributed little or nothing to the central funds; they, too, were of opinion that they could best carry out the work which the King of the Belgians had in view by sending out expeditions of their own to those parts of Africa in which they were most inter-

ested—Italy in the Abyssinian and Shoan regions, and France in the regions to which her Gaboon colony gave access. Even the Swiss Committee reserved a portion of their funds for specific Swiss undertakings, while the only other committee that seems to have done any real work was that of Germany. But the association soon ceased to be really international. While meager subscriptions may, for a short time, have come in from individuals and societies, the International African Association was to all intents and purposes the King of the Belgians, without whose ample private means it would have collapsed long before M. Cambier reached Karema. To the work of the leading National Committees reference will again be made further on.

Meantime the International Association entered upon an entirely new phase, a phase which made it even more Belgian in character, and which undoubtedly did much to precipitate the parceling out of the continent. Stanley landed at Marseilles in January, 1878, from that journey across the Dark Continent, during which he had traced its greatest river down to the sea. Even before he had emerged from Africa, as we have seen, his stirring letters had roused Europe to action. Contingent after contingent of missionaries was sent out, Protestant and Catholic, and stations were being established not only in Uganda, but along the route to Tanganyika. On Tanganyika itself mission stations of both creeds were planted. One result of Stanley's great expedition in East Africa was the increase of British mission stations and the spread of British influence at Zanzibar and in the interior, where, every traveler testified, the sultan was regarded as paramount.

It was, however, on the other side of the continent that Stanley's journey produced the most immediate results. No sooner, he tells us, had he stepped out of the train at Marseilles than he was accosted by commissioners from the King of the Belgians, who was naturally intensely interested in the great waterway into the heart of the continent which Stanley had revealed. It was not, however, until June that the explorer was able to visit Leopold, and not until November did the farther extension of the king's great purpose take definite shape. On the 25th of that month Stanley met the king and several representative gentlemen of various countries, presumably members of the International African Association. At the decisive meeting of January 2, 1879, there were present representatives of Belgium, Holland, England, France, and

1879

America; at this meeting the final plans were adopted and the necessary sums voted. At the November meeting it had been resolved that a fund should be subscribed, the subscribers to the fund forming themselves into a "*Comité des Etudes du Haut Congo*"—a Committee for the Investigation of the Upper Congo. What the original purpose of this committee was may be learned from Stanley's own brief account of the proceedings: "After a few minutes it transpired that the object of the meeting was to consider the best way of promoting the very modest enterprise of studying what might be made of the Congo River and its basin. This body of gentlemen desired to know how much of the Congo River was actually navigable by light-draught vessels? What protection could friendly native chiefs give to commercial enterprises? Were the tribes along the Congo sufficiently intelligent to understand that it would be better for their interests to maintain a friendly intercourse with the whites than to restrict it? What tributes, taxes, or imposts, if any, would be levied by the native chiefs for right-of-way through their country? What was the character of the produce which the natives would be able to exchange for European fabrics? Provided that in future a railway should be created to Stanley Pool from some point on the Lower Congo, to what amount could this produce be furnished? Some of the above questions were answerable even then, others were not. It was, therefore, resolved that a fund should be subscribed to equip an expedition to obtain accurate information, the subscribers to the fund assuming the name and title of '*Comité des Etudes du Haut Congo*.' A portion of the capital, amounting to $100,000, was there and then subscribed for immediate use." At first the committee was certainly regarded as a special committee of the International African Association, whose flag—a white star on a blue ground—it adopted. But while there were no Englishmen on the International Association, two well-known Englishmen, both of them connected with Africa, formed part of the committee, and we believe, subscribed to it. The king was president of both, and both associations had the same secretary, Colonel Strauch. It is not clear that this special committee, possibly not even the royal president, realized what their real aims were; probably the committee, as a whole, thought something good was sure to come out of an expedition of which Stanley was leader.

It was publicly announced that the Belgian steamer *Barga*,

carrying three undecked steam-launches, one other steamer, three flat-bottom boats, a number of galvanized-tin houses, and a great quantity of other material, was really intended to send aid up the Congo to the Belgian expeditions from the east coast. Stanley himself went first to Zanzibar, and his connection with the expedition was kept a secret as far as was possible. While Stanley was at Zanzibar, collecting a force of natives there, the agents of a Dutch house on the Lower Congo were busy collecting Krooboys as porters. But all this was done as quietly as possible. The truth is, annexation was in the air. The French, under De Brazza, had already been pushing inward from the Gaboon, while the Portuguese were excited by Stanley's great discovery to advance claims to the Congo, founded upon what they maintained was old conquest and possession. Moreover, that the aims of the so-called International Association had developed, that something more than the mere foundation of civilizing and exploring stations was intended, seems evident from a letter written to Stanley by the secretary, Colonel Strauch, while the leader of the novel expedition was yet on his way out to the river. The cost of these East Central African operations, many of which were failures, must have been enormous; the bulk of it came out of the king's own pocket.

Stanley admits that from the outset the Congo Committee had separate and distinct objects in view from the International Association, "with the ultimate intention of embarking on a grander enterprise if the reports from the Congo region were favorable." As originally constituted, the committee included several merchants of various nationalities, or at least had received considerable subscriptions from various mercantile firms, who no doubt hoped to profit by the undertaking which Stanley was to lead. But even before Stanley reached the Congo it was resolved by the Committee to "return every subscription to the merchants of all nationalities who had previously expressed by their various subscriptions their sympathy with the project." Thus the new Congo undertaking was gradually becoming an almost purely Belgian enterprise. There remained connected with it only those who managed the affairs of the International African Commission; and later on, in 1882, Stanley tells us, the committee, "having satisfied itself that progress and stability were secured, assumed the title of '*Association Internationale du Congo*,' which, be it remembered," he continues, "was originally started with the philan-

thropic motive of opening up the Congo basin, and of exploring and developing, according to the extent of its means, the resources of the country around each station as soon as it was founded." We presume that the "grander enterprise" referred to above went beyond this admirable scheme—a scheme the success of which would depend almost entirely upon the leader and certainly, to a considerable extent, on the caliber of the men who served under him.

That the king, the moving spirit, the life and soul of all this stupendous enterprise, whatever may have been his original motives, had by this time something more in view than the mere promotion of geographical knowledge and the development of Africa's resources, seems evident; it may be that Stanley's discovery of the great waterway had opened up to Leopold vistas of dominion not dreamed of when he called the Brussels meeting of 1876. As for the Strauch letter, extracts from it occur in Stanley's reply, in which the experienced explorer, in mild and courtly language, informed the colonel that he did not know what he was writing about. After one or two impracticable suggestions, the colonel writes: "It would be wise to extend the influence of the stations over the chiefs and tribes dwelling near them, of whom a republican confederation of free negroes might be formed, such confederation to be independent, except that the king, to whom its conception and formation was due, reserved the right to appoint the president, who should reside in Europe." "You say, also," Stanley writes, "'that a confederation thus formed might grant concessions (with power to make good what they granted) to societies for the construction of works of public utility, or perhaps might be able to raise loans like Liberia and Sarawak, and construct their own public works.'" To this Stanley replies by endeavoring to make the colonel realize what manner of people really occupied the Congo. Only absolute ignorance of Central Africa could have permitted any man of intelligence to suggest the foundation of a republic like Liberia. "This project," he says further on, "is not to create a Belgian colony, but to establish a powerful negro state." Had Colonel Strauch read Stanley's "Through the Dark Continent" with attention, surely he would have realized the complete impracticability of his proposal. But this is only a sample of the ignorance which, it is to be feared, still prevails in many quarters as to the real conditions of Central Africa and the true character of its inhab-

itants. At the same time it indicates that the king, if not the Committee, had aims of high ambition; that he cherished the hope of founding a great African state, of which he should be the sovereign, in reality if not in name. From our present point of view this enterprise of 1879, under Stanley's leadership, was the first overt step toward the European partition of Africa on a large scale.

"On the 12th of August, 1877," Stanley writes, "I arrived at Banana Point after crossing Africa, and descending its greatest river. On the 14th of August, 1879, I arrived before the mouth of this river to ascend it, with the novel mission of sowing along its banks civilized settlements, to peacefully conquer and subdue it, to remold it in harmony with modern ideas into national states, within whose limits the European merchant shall go hand in hand with the dark African trader, and justice and law and order shall prevail, and murder and lawlessness and the cruel barter of slaves shall be overcome."

It is right to set the highest aims before us; the higher is likely to be our accomplishment. The laudable objects which the King of the Belgians and his loyal lieutenant, Stanley, professed to have had in view may, we believe will, in time be accomplished, though probably after a fashion different from that which they expected and hoped for. Now that energetic men of the great nations of the world, and powerful and wealthy organizations have taken the task in hand, now that dark doings can no longer be concealed, we may be sure that in time the face of the continent will be changed. But let us remember that Africa is very different from America and Australia, and that we cannot hope in a decade to overcome the results of thousands of years of savagery.

Stanley found the *Barga* waiting for him at Banana Point, and without loss of time the ascent of the river was begun. Evidently his staff—English, American, Danish, Belgian, French—were as ignorant of African conditions as Colonel Strauch; they had expected to be furnished with all the luxuries of British India, and to be treated with the deference due to imperial officers. It is to be feared that too many of the Congo officials have gone out with equally foolish ideas, few of them certainly prepared to undergo the hardships absolutely required if they wished to promote the welfare of the natives. Such men as Stanley himself, as Rhodes and Jameson, as Haggard and Johnston, are rare; but it was only with the assistance of men of their caliber that the development of

the Congo along the lines laid down by the king could be accomplished. Stanley, with his usual success in managing men, soothed the ruffled tempers of his staff, and after a few days' delay proceeded up the river to Boma, where, as at Banana, he found the factories of English, French, Dutch, and Portuguese firms, who had been carrying on trade on the Lower Congo for over a century. Vivi, the limit of navigation on the lower river, was reached on September 26, and preparations were at once made to establish the first station of the Congo Committee here; by January 24, 1880, it was finished, and Stanley was free to proceed up the river to select sites for other stations. Leopoldville had been founded on Stanley Pool, treaties concluded with native chiefs, explorations of the southern tributaries made and other work done, when Stanley returned to Europe to make the position clear to the committee, and urge the construction of a railroad from the lower river past the cataracts to the Pool.

By this time the "*Comité des Etudes*" had developed into the committee of the "*Association Internationale du Congo.*" Before Stanley had been long with the committee he had convinced them not only that a railroad was absolutely necessary, but that the final step in the evolution of the so-called International Association must be taken if success were to attend the king's enterprise on the Congo. Many treaties had been made with native chiefs, and many more would be made on his return. But it was now time that the powers of Europe should be asked to acknowledge the work as valid and to recognize the association not simply as a civilizing and exploring company, but as a governing body. In short, it was seen that the time had come for constituting the Congo territory into a state with recognized status, of which the committee should be the governors and their royal president the sovereign. Stanley, whose health was shattered, had returned to Europe with the intention of staying, but he was persuaded to go back to the Congo and complete the work of organization.

It is unnecessary here to tell the story of Stanley's many troubles—troubles mainly due to inefficient and discontented subordinates. Nor need we describe in detail the vast work he accomplished while on the Congo as its first organizer and administrator. Suffice it to say that, within a year after his second arrival at Vivi, he had established a series of stations along the river as far up as Stanley Falls (December, 1883); had made hundreds of treaties

1883

with chiefs from Banana to the Falls; had been saddened with the sight of devastation over thousands of miles on the upper river by the Nyangwé Arabs, who had followed in his footsteps down the river; had been able to welcome and instruct his successor, Sir Francis de Winton; and had shown by advice and example how the work of organization and development ought to be carried on—all this, be it remembered, in five years after first setting foot in Vivi. Never was a state founded in so brief a period. But meanwhile other events were taking place, other African enterprises were rapidly developing, which, as if by magic, suddenly roused the continent from its lethargy of ages.

Chapter VIII

ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND PORTUGAL IN AFRICA 1875-1884

WHILE Stanley was pushing his way up the Congo and beginning the work which issued in the founding of the Free State, events were taking place which threatened at one time to checkmate him, and render abortive the aims of the King of the Belgians. In the years 1875-1878 Count Pierre Savergnan de Brazza [1] carried out a successful exploration of the Ogové River to the south of Gaboon, in the hope that it would turn out to be a great waterway into the interior. This hope was disappointed, for after a certain distance the stream became broken by cataracts, and rapidly declined in volume. De Brazza crossed over the hills at the head of the Ogové and soon found that these formed the water-parting between that river and another which flowed in an easterly direction. This he found to be the Alima, and when he reached it Stanley had just arrived in Europe from his momentous voyage down the Congo. Had De Brazza followed the Alima he would also have found himself on the great river, far above its cataracts, and would almost surely have been tempted to see whither the magnificent waterway led. But at the time he had not heard of Stanley's great discovery, and as his health was shattered and his means exhausted he returned to Europe.


Like Stanley, De Brazza did not rest long in Europe. Stanley had almost a year's start of his French rival; the former left Europe in January, 1879, the latter in December of the same year. De Brazza by this time knew that the Alima and the Licona, which he also touched on his previous journey, must enter the Congo. As the agent then of the French Committee of the International African Association, and with funds provided by them, he went out to the Ogové to found stations. Indeed, it was announced at a meeting of the Paris Geographical Society before De Brazza started

[1] De Brazza was Italian by birth and parentage, and was born in 1852. He received his education in France, and entered the French naval service in 1870.

that his object was to explore the region between the Gaboon and Lake Chad; though there can be little doubt that his aim from the first was to reach the Congo. That he lost no time in carrying it out is evident from the fact that on November 7, 1880, on his way down the river, he came upon Stanley pushing in the opposite direction. Stanley at the time knew little about De Brazza. The latter had founded an "international" station on the Ogové, and rapidly crossing over to the Lefini (the Luvu of Stanley), found no difficulty in following that river down to the Congo. He seems to have been able to establish friendly relations with the chiefs and people around, and succeeded in discovering one chief who, according to De Brazza's own report, claimed to be suzerain of all the country around, even to the south bank of the Congo. Thereupon, on October 1, 1880, the representative of the International Association made a solemn treaty with the chief, whereby the latter placed himself under the protection of France, and accepted the French flag. De Brazza lost no time in crossing over to the south side of Stanley Pool, and there founded a station, near where Leopoldville now stands, and which his admirers in France named after him Brazzaville. The station on the Ogové he himself named Franceville.

It will thus be seen that De Brazza had cast aside all pretense of carrying out the designs of the International Association: he was simply the emissary of France, doing his utmost to steal a march on Stanley, and secure the mastery of this magnificent trade-route into Africa for his adopted country. During his two days' sojourn with Stanley near Ndombi Mbongo, De Brazza seems to have said not a word about the annexations he had attempted to make on behalf of France. It was only when Stanley reached Stanley Pool, and met the Sengalese sergeant whom De Brazza had left behind as the representative of France, that he learned what had been done. It is easy to imagine the vexation of the discoverer of the Congo and the agent of the King of the Belgians at his being outwitted in this fashion. But that did not prevent him from proceeding at once to found Leopoldville almost alongside of Brazzaville. Moreover, he discovered on making inquiries that the chief with whom De Brazza treated had no suzerainty except in his own tribe, and certainly not on the south side of the river. In a few months, indeed, the French station was removed to the north side of the Pool, the south side being left entirely to Stanley and the International Association.

Meantime De Brazza made his way down the river and back to the Gaboon, where he expected to find a staff for the stations he had founded. But no such support was forthcoming; so that, exhausted as he was, De Brazza had once more to start for the interior, with mechanics, gardeners, and other equipment for his stations. Roads were made in other directions to the Alima, on which a station was established, and down which it was intended to take the expected steamer. After seeing everything in order, De Brazza started for the coast in the beginning of 1882, and partly



explored the Kwilu-Niari River, on which meanwhile Stanley was purposing to establish a series of stations. This river, it was thought, would furnish an easy and rapid access to Stanley Pool, a short line of railroad sufficing to connect the two, and so the long series of cataracts would be overcome. De Brazza followed the river for some distance, when he had to return directly to the coast owing to the hostility of the natives. He reached Paris in June, 1882, about three months before Stanley.

So far as France was concerned, it was evident that by this time the international features of the enterprise, initiated by the King of the Belgians, were entirely abandoned; and so it was in

the case of all the nationalities which took any active part in the work. Indeed, the international character of the association can hardly be said to have existed beyond the first Brussels meeting; it rapidly degenerated into a national scramble. Clearly the achievements of Stanley and De Brazza on the Congo were bringing African affairs to a crisis and intensifying the political character of the expeditions which were now entering the continent on all sides.

While Stanley was pushing toward the upper river, making treaties and founding stations, and De Brazza and his companions were moving about along the right bank, endeavoring to turn Stanley's flank, another power had entered the Congo field and threatened to paralyze the efforts both of France and of the King of the Belgians. Portugal had at last been aroused from her long lethargy. She had sat for centuries within hail of this great river and had never manifested any curiosity to discover whence it came or to what uses it might be put. It was only when more energetic powers began to do the work she ought to have done long before that she interfered.

It was the flittings hither and thither of De Brazza, and his indiscriminate distribution of tri-colors, that rearoused the apprehensions of Portugal—rearoused because the claim she insisted on bringing to the attention of the British Government in 1882 had been the subject of correspondence and negotiation since the beginning of the century. A Blue Book, published in 1883, covering ninety pages, is entirely occupied with correspondence concerning the claim of Portugal to the West African coast between 5° 12′ and 8° south latitude. In all this long correspondence, extending down to 1877, Portugal never let an opportunity pass of claiming sovereignty over the region in question. British vessels were constantly hovering about these coasts on the watch for slavers, and Portugal constantly protested against their presence. It even seemed at one time as if Great Britain would take possession of part of this coast, a procedure which, according to the voluminous correspondence on the subject, the native chiefs would have welcomed. Portugal was particularly jealous of any attempt to dispute her right to the territories of Molemba and Cabinda, lying immediately to the north of the Congo mouth—territories which figured among the titles of the Portuguese monarch, and which she maintained had been in her possession since 1484; but England

never once admitted Portugal's claim to this stretch of coast. Her Angola territories were held to end on the north at Ambriz, well south of the mouth of the Congo; no effective possession could be proved anywhere to the north of this.

After 1877 there seems to have been a lull in the reiteration of these claims. About that time there had been some inhuman cruelties perpetrated by traders upon the unfortunate natives around the factories on the lower river—cruelties which formed the subject of investigation on the part of the British Government. Portugal, as her statesmen assured the British representative at Lisbon, was filled with horror and indignation at these cruelties, and begged that her right to the Lower Congo, and the coast north and south, might be recognized, in order that she might feel herself empowered to establish and maintain good government. But British statesmen at the time were obdurate, and the matter seems to have remained in abeyance until 1882, when De Brazza's activity convinced the Portuguese Government that one more desperate effort must be made to obtain a hold over a coast-line whose value had been greatly enhanced by Stanley's discovery. Orders had been issued to Her Majesty's cruisers in 1856 to prevent by force any attempt on the part of the Portuguese authorities "to extend the dominion of Portugal north of Ambriz," and in 1876 the late Lord Derby reminded the Duke of Saldanha that these orders were still in force. They continued in force down to 1882, when, in a long communication, dated November 8, of that year, the Portuguese Government approached Earl Granville, the Foreign Minister of that time, with a renewal of Portugal's claim to the coast between 5° 12′ and 8° south latitude.

Lord Granville, unlike his predecessor, expressed without hesitation the willingness of Her Majesty's Government, not to consider the historic claims of Portugal over this coast, but to endeavor to come to some arrangement for mutual advantage to the African interests of both countries. It was pointed out, on behalf of Portugal, how desirable it would be for a power so well known to have the interests of civilization at heart, to have jurisdiction, not only over the coast-line in question, but for an indefinite distance up the Congo. She would give pledges that only the most moderate tariffs would be imposed; that traders of all nations would have equal privileges with those of Portugal; that the navigation of the river would be absolutely free to all flags; and that every means would

be taken to suppress slavery in every form. Lord Granville, with all his pliant urbanity and his apparent indifference to the extension of the empire, was astute enough to doubt the zeal of Portugal for the suppression of slavery, and to demand substantial concessions on behalf of the interests of British trade and British missions. He saw insuperable objections to permitting Portugal to claim the right of indefinite extension in the interior, for she more than hinted at her ambition to unite her East and West African colonies. More stringent stipulations as to tariffs were demanded; a definite limit to Portugal's claim to the Congo; respect for the interests of the Congo Association, and for the treaties which Britain had made with the chiefs on the coast. On the other side of Africa the free navigation of the Zambezi was insisted upon; the limit of the claims of Portugal on the Shiré was to be drawn at the Ruo; the claims of Portugal in the interior were to be recognized only as far as she had effectively occupied stations. After much interchange of letters and draft treaties, a "Congo Treaty" was at last agreed upon, and signed on February 26, 1884, by which Great Britain acknowledged the claim of Portugal to the line of coast in question, with an interior limit at Nokki, on the south bank of the Congo, below Vivi. Other stipulations with reference to the Congo and Zambezi were agreed to, similar in character to those already mentioned. In the original draft Lord Granville proposed that the navigation of the Congo should be under an International Commission, but owing to the resistance of Portugal this was finally changed to an Anglo-Portuguese Commission.

It must be stated in excuse for Lord Granville's apparently ready assent to an arrangement which seemed to make over the Congo to Portugal—and the statement is made on very high authority—that he was under the impression that the King of the Belgians, after organizing an administration on the Congo, intended to make over all his claims to England, which would thus have command of the whole river above its mouth. On the same authority, there is reason to believe that Stanley himself was under this impression during all the time he was pushing the interests of the king on the river. Whether it was that the king had been misunderstood, or that in the end he changed his mind—for his scheme seems to have developed in magnitude in spite of himself—we know that he stuck to the river. At all events, it is only right to refer to these conditions in justice to Lord Granville, on whose motives and action

as Foreign Minister it has been the fashion to place the worst construction.

During the progress of the negotiations in 1883, Portugal, feeling uneasy as to what might be the attitude of other powers, especially of France, approached the government of the republic with a view to inducing it to recognize her claims in the same sense as the British Government proposed to do; but as France would not commit herself as to the mouth of the Congo, the negotiations were allowed to drop. Lord Granville, in a communication of January 7, 1884, declared that he abandoned the mixed commission with the greatest reluctance. Had that been allowed to stand there might have been but little opposition to the treaty on the part of other powers, and certainly the difficulties which followed with Portugal in the Zambezi region and Nyasaland would have been avoided. As it was, what with Great Britain's and Portugal's absolute control over the mouth of the Congo, and France's designs on the Niari-Kwilu, the Congo Association, which was soon to become the Congo Free State, would be barred all access to the state except through foreign territory. Lord Granville himself expressed doubts as to whether the other powers would permit the treaty to stand; and his doubts were soon confirmed.

There was a universal protest from all the powers of Europe, which was joined in by the English press, against allowing a power like Portugal, which had been in Africa for four centuries and had done nothing for its development, to have the virtual command of one of the finest rivers on the continent. Prince Bismarck appealed with success to France to join Germany in endeavoring to attain a solution of the difficulty, entering a protest at the same time at Lisbon and at London. The proposal for an International Conference came, however, in the first instance from Portugal, who could hardly expect to gain much by it. Meantime, even when the conference was sitting in Berlin, she took possession of certain points to the north of the Congo, and stationed a squadron on the Congo itself. Lord Granville endeavored to compromise matters by proposing to revert to the idea of an International Commission; but on June 26, 1884, he was compelled, under pressure of public opinion, to announce that he had abandoned the Congo Treaty. An International Conference became inevitable, and the programme was virtually arranged between Germany and France—a programme accepted by England, and having in view, among other

things, the foundation of a Free State on the Congo, without absolutely fixing its limits. The other powers soon declared their adhesion, and the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 was agreed to.

Prince Bismarck's estimate of Portugal as a colonial power was clearly expressed in a communication through Count Münster to Earl Granville with reference to the conference, dated June 7, 1884:

"We are not in a position to admit that the Portuguese or any other nation have a previous right there (on the Congo). We share the fear which, as Lord Granville admits, has been expressed by merchants of all nations, that the action of Portuguese officials would be prejudicial to trade, and . . . we cannot take part in any scheme for handing over the administration, or even the direction, of these arrangements to Portuguese officials. Even the provision for limiting the dues to a maximum of ten per cent.—the basis of the Mozambique tariff—would not be a sufficient protection against the disadvantages which the commercial world rightly anticipates would ensue from an extension of the Portuguese colonial system over territories which have hitherto been free."

Meantime, let us see the vantage-ground which was being taken up by the powers elsewhere before the final scramble began. The struggle for the great region watered by the Niger will be treated at length in a subsequent chapter. Here it may be useful to indicate the position just before the meeting of the Berlin Conference.

It has already been pointed out how much England did for the exploration of the Niger and the development of its trade. In time traders of other nationalities, chiefly French and German, were attracted to the river, while among the English firms there was no unity, each house trying to outbid the other for native products. This fierce competition was in the end detrimental to the interests of all concerned. At length this became so evident that several of the more important English houses were induced to form themselves into a United African Company, which in a short time was able to command most of the markets and to regulate the prices of native commodities. But still there was trouble on the Niger and cause for much anxiety as to the fate of British interests. The British Company naturally endeavored to strengthen its hold and extend its operations on the river, among other means by making treaties with the chiefs on its banks. It was only natural that the

French should not look upon these operations on the part of the British with complacency. They had been steadily moving on to the Upper Niger; and in 1880-1881 Colonel Gallieni advanced as far as Sego, where he succeeded in planting the French flag. The ultimate goal of the French was Timbuktu, and their aim was to tap the Niger trade by connecting the upper river with the navigable part of the Senegal by means of a railroad.

Meantime, France was doing her utmost elsewhere to make this section of West Africa untenable for the British. The Gambia colony was closed in until it was almost confined to the river. Sierra Leone was shut out from the "Hinterland," and latterly some attempts have been made to ruin the Gold Coast colonies and Lagos, with but partial success. Even so late as 1884 there were two French houses on the Niger besides a number of small English houses. But the United African Company, by throwing its shares open to the public, greatly increased its capital and swept the French houses entirely out of the river. The company succeeded in 1884 in getting the treaties it had made with all the chiefs from the mouth of the Niger to the Benué recognized by the British Government, and a protectorate proclaimed over that part of the river, though the upper course was still left insecure. The French, on the one side, were casting longing eyes from the vantage-ground they had gained on the Upper Niger, while the Germans had not abandoned the hope of securing a footing outside the British protectorate. It was inevitable that this fine waterway should come under the cognizance of any African conference, though the actual crisis did not occur till after the Berlin meeting. When the Berlin Conference met, the company had virtually no rivals on the lower river, except the merchants who maintained houses on the coast and the so-called Oil Rivers. These remained aloof from the United Company.

At the same time it must be said that German traders also, chiefly Hamburg houses, had their stations on the coast; their trade was largely in cheap spirits, with which they flooded the country. At the Berlin Conference they exercised a powerful influence on the attitude of Bismarck, and afforded the prince some excuse for the annexations upon which he entered in 1884.

Two notable events in connection with French extension took place in 1881. France had long dreamed of establishing a route from her Senegambian provinces to her Mediterranean possession,

Algeria. If she could succeed in constructing a railroad across the Sahara, it would, in her estimation, draw down to the Mediterranean the whole of the trade of the Central Sudan, and so greatly discount the value of the Niger as a trade-route. In order to investigate the practicability of a railroad, Colonel Flatters was sent out from Algeria in 1881 to survey a route; but he had not gone far into the desert before he and his party were attacked and massacred by the fierce and independent Tuaregs. This unfortunate disaster gave the death blow for the time to all Trans-Saharan railroad schemes. In the same year that the Flatters expedition came to so untimely an end France obtained some compensation in the annexation of Tunis, on which she had long cast covetous eyes. France had made up her mind that Tunis was necessary for her expansion in North Africa, and she took it, with the tacit consent of the other European powers, whose approval she considered it advisable to obtain, and with no scruples as to the "integrity" of the Turkish empire, which in 1894 she professed herself so anxious to maintain. In this way at one swoop she added 45,000 square miles to her African empire. Italy, which had also developed colonial aspirations, would have treated Tripoli as France did Tunis, but the powers disapproved, and she had to be content with a small beginning at the Bay of Assab, on the Red Sea coast, opposite Aden. This she took over in 1880 from a private shipping firm that had had a station there since 1865; in this way she became a near neighbor to the French territory at Obock. The latter was not actually occupied till 1883, though it had been nominally a French possession since 1862; it forms a fairly convenient coaling-station, and the French hope that it may be a door to Abyssinia and Shoa.

Between 1875 and 1884 Great Britain had practically the whole of South and East Africa before her; but she did not realize the value of her opportunities. Responsible government had been granted to the Cape in 1872, but her statesmen were somewhat timid; and even more timid were the statesmen of the mother country, who did not greatly encourage advances toward the north. Still, during the years in question, some progress was made. Griqualand West, to the north of the Upper Orange River, which had existed as a separate province since 1871, was annexed to the Cape in 1877, though its actual occupation did not take place till 1880. On the other side of the Orange Free State the whole of the terri-

tories beyond the Kei River were included in the colony between 1877 and 1885. Basutoland, annexed in 1871, was placed under direct imperial rule in 1883. Here European settlement is prohibited, and much attention is devoted to it as affording a sort of native reserve. Bit by bit all the country between the Kei River, Natal, and the Orange Free State was taken in, so that in 1884 British dominion, direct or indirect, extended, including Natal and Zululand (not actually annexed till 1887), up to St. Lucia Bay, with the exception of a section of Pondoland, which was not annexed until 1894. It was in 1875 that Marshal MacMahon, through a partial arbitrament of claims, made over Delagoa Bay to the Portuguese. It was only in 1887 that, by the Tonga Treaty, British suzerainty was established up to the Portuguese boundary. A premature attempt to incorporate the Transvaal into the British Empire proved a failure. One noteworthy event in the history of that republic, and as affecting British interests in this part of Africa, is the convention between it and Portugal whereby, among other things, facilities were afforded for the construction of a railroad from Delagoa Bay, by which it was hoped, so far as communications are concerned, the Transvaal would be independent of British South Africa. After the Boer War some Transvaal districts were added to Natal (1903); in 1901, 626 miles of railroad were open in the latter colony, and were connected with the Johannesburg and Pretoria lines.

In 1884, roused by the attempts at extension on the part of the Transvaal, and latterly stimulated by the activity of Germany, Great Britain took her first long step toward stretching her empire up to and beyond the Zambezi. By the labors of Moffat, Livingstone, and their successors, and by many years' intercourse with hunters and traders, the Bechuanas had long been familiar with the British; Kuruman, Mafeking, Kolobeng, and Shoshong, taking us into the heart of the Bechuana country, have been familiar to readers of the records of missionary enterprises for nearly half a century. What with the Germans on the west, and the restless Boers on the east, there was great danger of this extensive territory, British in everything but the name, slipping out of British hands. With more than usual promptitude and daring, treaties were made in May, 1884, with the native chiefs, whereby the whole of the country north of Cape Colony, west of the Transvaal, south of 22° south latitude and east of 20° east longitude, was surrendered to Great

Britain, though a British protectorate was not actually proclaimed till March, 1885. Later in the same year the southern portion was erected into the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland. In this protectorate native chiefs continue to exercise authority under a resident commissioner. The northern and larger portion, in which Khama, an exceptionally intelligent chief, was paramount, remained a protectorate, with Khama's consent so proclaimed in May, 1885. All this was not brought about without much tact and firmness on the part of Sir Charles Warren, who entered the territory with an armed force to carry out the annexation. It was not without many reservations and doubts that Khama at last agreed to the proposals brought before him by Sir Charles, but in the end he gave in his adherence to the queen and remained consistently loyal thereafter. And well he might, for it bound England as his suzerain to protect him against the raids of his old enemy, Lobengula of Matabeleland. Sechele and other chiefs followed Khama's example, and so some 160,000 square miles were added to the British Empire. This, however, was not accomplished without much hesitation and vacillation on the part of Gladstone's government, in power from 1880 to 1885, and under whose régime Great Britain lost much that she might have kept had there been more promptitude on the part of the Colonial Office and Cape government. Events later led to the annexation of the Transvaal under Lord Beaconsfield's government, and then to its retrocession under his successor. The action of Germany in 1884 roused both the home and the Cape governments from their lethargy, and compelled them to make haste to prevent Germany from entirely blocking the way to the Zambezi.

It is difficult to understand why the Cape did not formally annex Damaraland and Namaqualand in 1876. This extensive region seems, indeed, even before Palgrave's mission, to have been regarded informally as an appendage to the Cape, which had had relations with it ever since the end of the eighteenth century. Palgrave represented to the natives the great advantage of their being under the protection of the colony, and to this it would seem they had no objection. But all that was accomplished at the time was the formal annexation of Walfish Bay and the surrounding district, the establishment of a magistracy there, and a residency at the kraal of the chief of the Kamahereros. Magistrates and their staffs were supported by the Cape, which then went to sleep until

rudely awakened by the raising of the German flag at Angra Pequeña in 1884.

Meantime, in 1885, the home government brought the subject of South African confederation before the Cape Government in a dispatch from the Earl of Carnarvon to the governor. The idea was to incorporate under the suzerainty of the British Crown the whole of British South Africa, along with the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Mr. Froude was sent out as the representative of the Colonial Office to take part in the proposed conference. But the opposition to confederation was so strong that no conference was held, and Mr. Froude had to content himself with lecturing on the subject at a series of public meetings. Conferences were afterward held in London on the subject, but no progress was made. Confederation is still talked of, and talked of hopefully; and under the new conditions, arising from the enormous extension of British South Africa, some form of federation is apparently becoming inevitable.

As early as 1870 the gold fields of Matabeleland had attracted diggers and settlers; Mohr, on his journey to the Zambezi about that date, found Sir John Swinburne and other Englishmen settled at Tati and working the quartz reefs. Baines had already been in Matabeleland, and later still Selous and other hunters traversed the country between the Limpopo and Zambezi; English missionaries were at work, and in other ways British influence was being spread in a region which has now become part of the empire and promises to be one of the most important acquisitions in Africa.

North of the Zambezi the spread of British influence, which had been begun by Livingstone in 1859, was continued, with one or two breaks, by the establishment of various English and Scotch missions on the Upper Shiré and on Lake Nyasa; by the placing of steamers on the lake; the establishment of trading stations by the African Lakes Company which was founded in 1878; and by exploring journeys in various directions. A road was constructed by a British engineer, James Stewart, between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. Plantations were established on the Blantyre Highlands; schools were opened at various points over Nyasaland; industries were introduced, and natives trained in their practice; doctors worked hand in hand with the missionaries; strenuous efforts were made to put a stop to the slave-trade. Thus, in spite

of the somewhat feeble action of the Lakes Company, British influence was firmly established over all the Lake Nyasa region by the critical year of 1884, while Portugal had made no attempt to take effective possession of the country.

Farther north, at Zanzibar and on all the extensive strip of coast under the sultan's jurisdiction, British influence was supreme from 1875 to 1884. Sir John Kirk, who had been attached to the British agency at Zanzibar since 1866, had, since 1868, been in actual charge of the post, with ever-growing influence and increasing power. He carried out effectually the policy of his predecessors, and under him British influence became more and more dominant. The whole policy of the sultanate was framed to suit the wishes of the British Government. It was under pressure from England, as has been seen, that the sultan, nominally, at least, abolished the slave-trade. Almost the entire commerce of East Africa was in the hands of British firms and British subjects from India. It was to promote the abolition of the slave-trade and to encourage legitimate commerce that some sixty miles of road into the interior from Dar-es-Salaam were constructed. So long ago as 1878 the then Sultan Sey'id Burghash actually offered to make over the commercial exploitation of the whole of his dominions to the late Sir William Mackinnon, the chairman of the British India Steam Navigation Company, whose firm had long had intimate trade relations with Zanzibar. Mackinnon urged the government of the day (Lord Beaconsfield's) to authorize the acceptance of this offer and to support him by declaring Zanzibar a British protectorate, a proceeding which would have been in accordance with the sultan's wishes. But even Lord Beaconsfield, with all his imperial "instincts," shrank from assuming the responsibility. Even he had no suspicion of the colonial aspirations of Germany, which had already taken deep root; or if he had, he did not foresee to what they would lead. At all events, the opportunity was let slip here as it was in Damaraland: British influence, it may have been thought, was real enough without saddling England with a protectorate. And the loss has probably not been so great as at first sight appears; what precisely that loss has been will be seen later on.

In the Upper Nile regions—the Egyptian Sudan, which between 1875 and 1884 had been extended as far south as Albert Nyanza—the struggle with the forces of the Mahdi was at its hottest in the latter year; but it was not until 1885 that the Egyp-



THE MURDER OF GENERAL GORDON BY THE MAHDI REBELS AFTER THEIR CAPTURE OF KHARTUM

Painting by W. G. Joy

1885-1886

tian Government abandoned, after the death of Gordon, the region south of Wady Halfa. This was done by the advice of England, who continued to hold Suakin, and established herself at Zeila and Berbera, on the Somali coast. The Island of Sokotra was placed within the British sphere in 1875, though it was not till 1886 that it was actually annexed. Italy had been hovering around it in the former year and it was rumored that she desired to annex it as a convict station.

Chapter IX

GERMANY ENTERS THE FIELD. 1884

LET us briefly resume the position in 1884. Up to that year the great European powers in Africa were England, France and Portugal. This last power claimed enormous territories, but her influence was feeble, and her actual occupation of the most limited character. The idea of joining her east and west coast possessions by a broad band across the continent had only been hinted at. England had virtually agreed to consent to her taking possession of the strip of country from 5° 12′ to 8° south, including the mouth of the Congo. The Congo Free State did not exist, and the King of the Belgians could only be regarded as the chief of a semi-private enterprise of a pseudo-international character. France was firmly established in Algeria and Tunis. She was rapidly extending her conquests from the west coast toward the Upper Niger, and had carried her Gaboon territories over an immense area down to the Congo. She had latent claims to one or two points on the Gold Coast, and was struggling to bring Madagascar under her sway. At Obock, on the Red Sea, she had a *locus standi*, but not much more. Great Britain was practically supreme in South Africa up to the Orange River and Delagoa Bay. She believed no power would dream of questioning her claims to Damaraland and Namaqualand as her sphere of influence—a phrase, however, which can hardly be said to have existed then. At the same time it must be said that there were serious thoughts at the Cape of abandoning Walfish Bay entirely; and that was the only position actually occupied by the Cape authorities. The Damaras were in a chronic state of war, and the few whites in their territories in constant dread of attack. Preparations were already on foot to include the whole of Bechuanaland, for the commission to Sir Hercules Robinson to look after British interests in that region was issued in February, 1884.

On the west coast England held on half-hesitatingly to her four colonies, while the Niger Company was extending its influence

1884

on the river and buying out all rivalry. In Nyasaland missionaries and traders were fairly at work extending and consolidating British influence. Many settlements had been planted on the borders of Matabeleland and British travelers were opening up a country about which little or nothing could be learned from Portuguese sources. At Zanzibar British influence was supreme, though German traders were doing their best to supplant English goods by cheap continental wares. The Transvaal was still in a state of irritation against the British Government; her borders were unsettled, and even so far back as 1874 and 1878 she had toyed with the idea of a German protectorate, and in 1883 Boer commissioners went to Berlin ostensibly to raise a loan, actually to endeavor to get rid of the still remaining results of 1877-1879. Egypt was fast losing hold of the Sudan; Italy was casting covetous eyes on Tripoli, while her travelers were exploring Abyssinia and Shoa. Spain can hardly be said to have established her footing on the Western Sudan coast, though she claimed rights on the River Muni.

Such was the position of affairs in Africa when Germany entered the field and precipitated the comparatively leisurely partition of the continent into a hasty scramble. Prince Bismarck was still the *de facto* ruler of an empire which had grown in unity and strength and wealth since its birth at Versailles in 1871, whose merchants were finding new markets all over the world, whose people were emigrating in thousands every year to strengthen the British colonies. Germany was fretting under the conviction that without foreign possessions she could never be considered a great world-power; she was tired of a stay-at-home policy.

Cataclysms do not occur in the history of humanity any more than they do in the physical world. Those who are competent to look beneath the surface have no difficulty in discovering that what seems an unaccountably sudden event or catastrophe is simply the natural and inevitable result of forces that have been accumulating and growing in intensity over a long period of time. The world at large was astonished at the apparently inexplicable outburst of colonizing zeal on the part of Germany in the early part of 1884; and none were apparently more surprised than the British Foreign Office and the government of the Cape, though both might well have been prepared for what occurred. As has already been pointed out, the desire to possess colonies is no impulse of recent birth in Germany. In Germany, as in other European countries, after the con-

tinent had had time to recover from the Napoleonic incubus, population increased and competition became more and more intense; and as discontent with their condition spread among the lower strata of society the fever for emigration laid hold of the country. There was really no Germany then, no united and powerful empire with surplus wealth and surplus energy to acquire colonies for itself. Moreover, even fifty years ago, when the migrating spirit began to increase in strength, all the new fields of settlement most suited to Europeans were occupied by other powers. The United States, Canada, South America, Australia, and the Cape were crying out for colonists; there was room for millions of fresh incomers, with an almost perfect climate, a soil that had only to be scratched to yield the richest harvests, and rumors of boundless stores of gold. It is no wonder, then, that the discontented surplus population of Germany flocked for the most part to the temperate regions of the Americas, and a small proportion both to Australia and the Cape. But even sixty years ago there was a feeling in Germany that Germans ought to have some place of their own beyond the seas to which they might go; that it was a pity for her sturdy sons and lusty daughters to be utilized simply to infuse fresh vigor and enterprise into colonies in which the Anglo-Saxon race was dominant. We find, then, those Germans interested in colonization trying experiments on various parts of the earth, including lands already occupied by their English cousins. It is not surprising that Africa does not seem to have been thought of, for Africa was all but unknown beyond its seaboard. There was at that date, not only in Germany, but even in England, considerable attention given to Brazil as a field for colonization. Certainly it was to this enormous country that the efforts of what we may call independent German colonization were first directed. As early as 1843 a society was founded in Dusseldorf for the purpose of promoting emigration to Brazil. This was rapidly followed by other colonization societies, some directing their attention to Texas, others to the Mosquito Coast, to Nicaragua, to Chile. In 1849 a society for the centralization of German colonization was founded at Berlin, but southern Brazil was the favorite sphere, and a considerable share of emigration was directed to that region, where, as a matter of fact, there are at the present day numerous flourishing German colonies, or, as they should perhaps be called, settlements, since the territory on which they are planted belongs to the Brazilian Government. Most

of these societies, however, expired without producing permanent results.

The events of 1866 gave an impulse to the colonial movement in Germany; but far more so the results of the war with France and the reconstitution of the German Empire, under the hegemony of Prussia, in 1871. Into the various causes which contributed to give this intensely forward impulse to Germany it is unnecessary to enter; all the scattered energies of Germany in the direction of colonization, as in other directions, were united in one strong current. But even before 1871 one of the most important societies for the promotion of German interests abroad had been founded —the "*Centralverein für Handels-geographie und Forderung deutscher Interesse im Auslande.*" This society had its headquarters in Berlin, with branches in all the leading cities of the empire, and even in Brazil, Argentina, and New South Wales. The professed objects of the society were: "The study of those lands in which organized German settlements already exist; the social and commercial conditions and the spread of information thereon; the promotion of emigration to regions where settlers of German origin are already established, under conditions favorable to the genius of the German people; the promotion of intellectual and material intercourse between the German colonial settlements and the German fatherland; and lastly, furthering the establishment of trade and navigation and the acquisition of colonies." The programme is certainly ambitious and comprehensive enough, and no doubt the society in its meetings and those of its branches, and through its ably conducted weekly organ, *Export,* has done much, not only to promote German commerce, but also to foster the colonial spirit.

But so far as Africa was concerned the great instrument in nourishing the growth of the spirit for acquiring colonies was the German African Society of Berlin, which combined with the scientific exploration of the continent the opening up of unknown regions of Africa to trade and industry. The society was formed in 1878, from the union of the German Society for the Scientific Exploration of Equatorial Africa, founded five years before, and the German African Society, founded in 1876, as a branch of the International African Association, with more practical if somewhat vague objects in view. German explorers had already done much for Africa, but the action of King Leopold in founding the Interna-

tional Association, with its numerous national branches, attracted more attention than ever to Central Africa, from the utilitarian point of view. German stations were founded at Kakoma and other centers in the East African interior, from which much good exploring work was carried on toward Lake Tanganyika and the upper waters of the Lualaba. The German African Association showed even more enterprise in West Africa than in East Africa. Shortly after its promotion, Dr. Büchner and Dr. Pogge penetrated from Angola into the interior of the Muata Yanvo's kingdom of Lunda, while Wissmann's first work in Africa was carried out in the same region in 1881-1884. Others followed in the same direction, and there is no doubt that about this period Bismarck entertained serious ideas of acquiring a footing in the Congo basin. During 1882-1884 Flegel was extremely active on the Niger and Benué, and undoubtedly did much to add to our knowledge of the geography of the region. At the same time, after-events proved that he kept commercial interests keenly in view.

All this activity turned the attention of Germany more and more to Africa, and helped to foster the rapidly growing colonial spirit which was still further strengthened by the doings of other powers between 1876 and 1884. Thus, by the beginning of the latter year, this pent-up energy was ready to burst forth into action whenever Bismarck chose to open the sluice gate. The activity of all the associations referred to, the increasing flow of emigration which went to swell the prosperity of other countries, the growth of commerce, shipping and manufacturing industry, the increase of the Prussian navy—all helped to foster the longing of Germany for colonies of her own.

It was no wonder, then, that when the German Colonial Society was founded at Frankfort, on December 6, 1882, it received widespread and enthusiastic support. By the end of 1883 it had 3200 members belonging to all parts of the empire. Still another impulse was given to the colonial movement by a manifesto issued by the German African Society in the same year. In this it was stated that the activity of the society would be concentrated in certain districts, especially the basins of the Niger and Congo, and it was urged that the German Government should take steps to prevent these regions from being annexed by any European power, and to provide that they should be open to the traders of all nations. Another powerful influence, was at the same time brought to

bear upon Bismarck, one which perhaps more than any other determined him to take the final action. He had asked the Chambers of Commerce of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, to express their views as to what would be the most effective means to protect and encourage German trade, especially in Africa. The replies all pointed, more or less directly, to annexation; that of the Hamburg Chamber especially, which went into the whole subject in detail, urged with incisive clearness the annexation of independent coast regions, the acquisition of a naval station on Fernando Po, and the conclusion of treaties with native chiefs. It was this manifesto from Hamburg, probably, which determined Bismarck to bring the British Foreign Office to book without delay with reference to the question he had already laid before it as to the protection of German interests in Southwest Africa.

At first it must be said, the colonial movement did not find much favor in the eyes of German officialdom. Bismarck himself, it need hardly be said, was always open-minded, watching the moment when it would be safe for him to intervene. Long before 1884 feelers were put out by him to ascertain how the pulse of Prussia beat with regard to foreign possessions. Even as far back as the sixties a Prussian squadron returned from a prospecting voyage in eastern Asiatic waters, and in an apparently harmless description of the voyage in the public press a suggestion was made that Formosa would form an excellent naval station for Prussian ships, and might even be utilized as a colony. Later on, Delagoa Bay, the Sulu Archipelago, a part of North Borneo, and other places were referred to in the same tone. But though these feelers attracted attention and drew forth protests from foreign countries, they met with no popular response in Germany. It was only after Germany became a united empire under Prussia in 1871, possessed of a navy growing in strength which took the sons of the Fatherland in greater and greater numbers over the seas, that the interest in trans-oceanic matters and in colonial questions began to grow in breadth and depth. Not only the articles which appeared in the periodical press, but various books which were published on the subject of colonization, all tended to help forward the movement.

Two of the most important, certainly two of the most influential, of these publications, were Dr. Emil Jung's "*Deutsche Kolonien*" (1879), and Friedrich Fabri's "*Bedarf Deutschland*

der Kolonien?" (1883).[1] The latter, especially, had a marked influence in intensifying the colonial spirit in Germany, so much so that when Fabri died, in 1891, he was referred to in the German press as the father of German colonization.

It was about the year 1840 that Hamburg houses began to have intimate trading relations with the west coast of Africa. At first they had great difficulties in getting their goods into the African market, the traders of other nationalities stigmatizing them as "German trash"; it was indeed only by giving their wares good English and French trade-marks that they succeeded in securing a footing at all. But the Hamburg traders managed to make headway, and in 1852 the well-known Hamburg firm of Woermann entered into successful trading relations with Liberia, and by 1859 had factories at various points of the coast, between the Cameroons and the Gaboon, and even as far south as Angola. The Woermanns were soon followed by the O'Swalds and Hansings of Hamburg, who in the fifth decade of the past century secured a footing at Zanzibar. In 1854 the O'Swalds established a factory at Lagos, before it became a British colony, and soon did a flourishing business by importing from Zanzibar enormous quantities of cowrie shells, the local currency, which they exchanged for native products. These were followed in their African ventures by other Hamburg and Bremen firms, and in 1859 the three Hanse towns concluded a commercial treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar by which certain trade privileges were accorded to them. Ten years later this treaty was made to cover the whole of the North German Confederation. After the formation of the confederation, and especially after the conversion into one United Empire, the trade of Germany increased with giant strides, and the factories on the west coast of Africa became more and more numerous, while commercial intercourse with Zanzibar grew steadily. In the beginning of 1884 there were some fifteen German firms, mostly of Hamburg and Bremen, which had among them about sixty factories on the west coast of Africa, extending from Portuguese Guinea down through Liberia, the Guinea Coast, the Cameroons, the Gaboon, the Ogowé, and the Congo mouth, to Damaraland. In addition the North German and the Basel Missionary Societies had some hundred stations all along the west coast, and a considerable num-

[1] To these should be added E. von Weber, "Die Erweiterung des deutschen Wirtschaftsgebietes," etc. Leipzig, 1879.—Ed.

ber in the interior of Damaraland and Namaqualand. Thus when in 1884 Bismarck took the decisive step in the creation of a "Colonial Empire," it was not the remains of the old Brandenburg Fort of Gross-Friedrichsburg alone and the scientific work which had been done by German explorers, that suggested Africa as an inviting field; there were substantial German interests all along the west coast clamoring for the protection of the German flag. It was, moreover, natural that German traders should desire to have fields for their energies independent of the competition of foreign rivals, in which they could impose their own tariffs, and have it all their own way. It is probably known to few that as long ago as 1874 the Sultan of Zanzibar made overtures for the purpose of having his territory placed under German protection; but Bismarck, whatever his personal inclinations, knew that at that time there was no chance of obtaining a hearing for such a proposal in the German Parliament, and therefore declined it. Ten years later the position had entirely changed.

There can be little doubt that the long and irritating correspondence which took place between the Foreign Offices of Germany and Great Britain with regard to the claims of German subjects in the Fiji Islands had much to do in fostering the colonial spirit in Germany and precipitating action in Africa as well as elsewhere. The whole tone of the communications of the British Foreign Office on the subject reveals the fact that the colonial aspirations of Germany were either unknown in that quarter or were not taken seriously. But when the first step was taken in Africa no time was lost in coming to an understanding with Germany with reference to her claims.

Here let us once more recall the fact that in her new departure Germany's choice was practically restricted to tropical Africa and the tropical Pacific. It was only in Central Africa that any European power desirous of acquiring foreign possessions, and not caring to go to war for them, had a free hand. At the same time, it will be seen, an effort was made on behalf of Germany to obtain a footing on the south of the Zambezi. It was natural, moreover, that a beginning should be made in West Africa, where German interests were so widespread and so important.

From the beginning of the last century missionaries from South Africa had penetrated into Namaqualand and Damaraland to carry on their work among the natives in a region much of which is

not very far removed from the desert stage. Some of these missionaries were of German nationality, but they were in the service of the London Missionary Society. As has been seen in a previous chapter, however, expeditions were sent from the Cape in the last century, when it was a Dutch colony, to report upon this part of the country, and, as a matter of fact, part at least of the coast region had been annexed to the colony. This annexation was allowed to lapse, or was forgotten; at any rate no reference was made to it when the Cape Government protested against the recent German occupation. Seventy years ago, when the only route to India was by St. Helena and the Cape, Walfish Bay was utilized for the purpose of exporting cattle to supply the ships calling at St. Helena; for the country can support considerable herds. But no step was then taken toward actual annexation to the Cape, and in time the cattle export fell off, though in more recent years it has been revived from the Cape. In 1842 the Rhenish Mission established its first station at Bethanien in Namaqualand. Other stations in the interior were founded, and the German missionaries made numerous converts and acquired considerable influence; at the same time they did not deem it inconsistent with their spiritual functions to carry on trade with the natives in a small way. Walfish Bay still continued to be of importance as the chief harbor on the whole extent of coast-line. In time, the disputes and wars which arose among the natives endangered the lives and property of the Rhenish missionaries, and they appealed, in 1868, to their government for protection. The Prussian Government at once communicated with the British Government and suggested a joint demonstration of English and German warships. England did not approve of this, but expressed herself ready to extend the same protection to German subjects as she would to her own; of course this implied on the part of England that she claimed Damaraland and Namaqualand as within her sphere, a claim tacitly acknowledged by Germany. As a matter of fact, England neither directly nor through the Cape Government exercised any real influence in the country.

It was at this period that the Germans actually acquired, for the first time, territory in this country which they could call their own. In 1864 the missionaries bought the ground and buildings of the Walfish Bay Copper Company at Otyimbingue, some distance to the northeast of the bay; and here they took

every opportunity to hoist the flag of their country. Trade, moreover, went on expanding, and a missionary trading society was actually founded in Barmen. This trade had, however, to be carried on through the Cape, the tariffs of which somewhat hampered it, and latterly these tariffs were also applied to Walfish Bay, when the Germans sought to have direct communication with Europe, and Boers from the Transvaal began to break into the country. Sir Bartle Frere, who was governor of the Cape from 1877 to 1881, was shrewd enough to see what might be the end of these aspirations on the part of German missionary traders, but his expressed fears of German designs were ridiculed, and it was only to please the "old man," as he was called, that Walfish Bay and fifteen miles round it were declared British territory in March, 1878. Previous to this Mr. Palgrave had visited and reported on the country, and had made treaties with the most powerful chiefs. The governor of the Cape had urged that the whole country should be formally annexed, but the government of the period (Beaconsfield's) would not go beyond Walfish Bay, where a feeble show of administration not extending beyond the station was established.

Frequent complaints were made by the German missionaries of their treatment by the natives, and at last Mr. Palgrave was compelled to formally intimate that Great Britain had no power over the native chiefs. Evasive answers were returned to the memorials from the missionaries asking definitely whether they could reckon on the protection of England. At last an appeal was made to the German consul at the Cape and to the imperial government, with the result that in 1880 all British officials were withdrawn from Damaraland, and only Walfish Bay remained under the British flag. During 1880 fresh representations continued to be made by the German missionaries—who claimed 5000 converts, and substantial commercial interests in the country—as to the uncertainty of their position. Again Bismarck begged the British Foreign Office to say whether the government were prepared to protect both English and German interests in Damaraland and Namaqualand in view of the fact that war was raging in the country. Lord Granville, who was at the head of the Foreign Office at the time, followed the example set by his predecessor, Beaconsfield, and repudiated all responsibility outside of Walfish Bay; and to make the position quite clear, in the instructions given to Sir Hercules Robinson as governor of Cape Colony, under date

December 30, 1880, it was distinctly stated that the British Government regarded the Orange River as the northwestern boundary of Cape Colony, and would lend no encouragement to the establishment of British jurisdiction in Damaraland and Namaqualand outside of Walfish Bay. The arrangement with regard to the latter would not be disturbed so long as the Cape Parliament continued to be responsible for the expenses of its maintenance. This was clear enough, and Cape Colony was apparently quite willing to acquiesce in the practical abandonment of the territory.

Still, the German missionaries were not satisfied, and the German Government showed itself quite ready to sympathize with their position and to support their complaints. In August, 1881, they again approached the German Government, and begged that a German war-ship should be sent to protect their interests. In October of the same year, in reply to a further communication from Berlin, the British Foreign Office once more repudiated all responsibility outside of the narrow circle around Walfish Bay.

Such, then, was the position between Great Britain and Germany in the end of 1882, with reference to a great stretch of territory on the border of Cape Colony. Neither at home nor in the Cape Colony was there any suspicion, apparently, that Germany was in the least likely to settle down as a colonial power at the threshold of the Cape. It should be remembered that a very strong feeling existed among all parties at home, at that date, against the extension of imperial responsibility. As a matter of fact, however, whatever may have been the conception which prevailed in London, there is no doubt that at the Cape, Damaraland and Namaqualand were somewhat vaguely regarded as within the colonial "sphere of influence." But the events with which we are dealing occurred before the date of the Berlin Congress, and the principle of "spheres of influence" had not been laid down as one of the rules in the great game of colonial aggrandizement. It is, moreover, difficult to realize the vast change which has taken place since 1883 in the prevailing conception of the relation between the mother country and her colonies. The idea of the solidarity of the empire may by comparison be said to have scarcely existed at that time; imperialism has now a totally different meaning from what it then had. At that time neither the one party nor the other foresaw what the near future had in store; Beaconsfield was as indifferent, or as blind, as Granville. The truth is that no one took

Germany's colonial aspirations seriously; no one seems to have dreamed that she would ever be likely to make large annexations, either on the Pacific or in Africa. It was hardly realized that in the short space of twelve years, after the union of the empire, Germany was ready to become a great world-power. We have seen how strong the colonial movement had become in Germany, and how carefully Bismarck was feeling the pulse of the country. It seems surprising that after all the correspondence which had taken place between the two governments, the suspicion of the British Foreign Office was not aroused; for it can scarcely be doubted that had Bismarck been taken seriously, something would have been done to retain Damaraland and Namaqualand within the British sphere, if for no other reason, with a view to a united British Africa south of the Zambezi. Apparently up to the final moment, when the German flag was raised on the coast of Namaqualand, neither in London nor at the Cape was it believed that the correspondence which had been going on for twenty-five years would result in action by Germany.

"*Ohne Hast, ohne Rast,*" has been the motto of Germany in her colonial enterprises, as it has been in other spheres—at least, until she has actually entered into possession. She proceeded deliberately and openly, she conducted her game with the admirable foresight of a consummate chess-player, who sees, far ahead, what will be the effect of any particular move. The step taken by the Bremen merchant Lüderitz in the summer of 1882 had certainly something more in view than the acquisition of a private trading station on the coast of Africa. The inner circle of the colonial party in Germany, we cannot but think, intended the action of Herr Lüderitz as the first delicate step toward the accomplishment of their colonial aspirations, a sort of test case, that would bring the British Government to book, and force the hand of Prince Bismarck. At the date mentioned Herr Lüderitz (who may be regarded as the representative of that section of the German colonial party interested in Africa) had matured his plan and fixed upon the scene of his operations. Under date of November 16, 1882, he communicated his projects to the German Foreign Office, and asked whether he might reckon upon the protection of the German Government for any rights which he might secure. Bismarck was in no hurry. It was not till February 7, 1883, that he sent, through his son, the following cautious communication to

the British Foreign Office, a communication which in the light of events that followed seems suggestive enough, but which at the time apparently excited little suspicion at the Foreign Office. The communication may be regarded as indicating that Bismarck had at last made up his mind to act, and to carry out as far as practicable the designs of the German colonial party. And yet the reservation contained in the final words is noteworthy:—was it only intended to lull any lurking suspicions of the not too wide-awake British Ministers? The following is the minute made by Sir Julian Pauncefote of a conversation with Count Herbert Bismarck, under date February 7, 1883:

"Count Bismarck says that a Bremen merchant is about to establish a factory near the coast, between the Orange River and the Little Fish River, and has asked protection of the German Government in case of need. The latter desire to know whether Her Majesty's Government exercise any authority in that locality. If so, they would be glad if they would extend British protection to the German factory. If not, they will do their best to extend to it the same measure of protection which they give to their subjects in remote parts of the world, but without having the least design to establish any footing in South Africa."

To this the following reply was returned under date February 23, 1883, signed by Lord Granville, with the concurrence of Lord Derby:

"I have the honor to acquaint your Excellency that, having consulted the Colonial Office upon the subject, I am informed by that department that the government of the Cape Colony have certain establishments along the coast, but that, without more precise information as to the spot where the German factory will be established, it is not possible to form any opinion as to whether the British authorities would have it in their power to give it any protection in case of need. If, however, the German Government would be good enough to furnish the required information, it would be forwarded to the government of Cape Colony, with instructions to report whether and to what extent their wishes could be met."

It was, however, clearly not the intention either of Prince Bismarck or of Herr Lüderitz to await the leisure of the Cape Government nor to submit to the procrastinating policy of the British Foreign Office. The lesson taught in connection with the delay in

1883

settling the German claims in Fiji had been taken to heart. By the beginning of 1883 Lüderitz had collected very full information with regard to the coast of Namaqualand, and had definitely arranged all his plans. He was, therefore, in a position to ask the German Foreign Office whether he might reckon upon imperial protection for any territory which he might acquire in Southwest Africa. The reply was that if he succeeded in acquiring any harbor to which no other nation could establish any just claim, he might reckon upon imperial protection for his undertaking. Lüderitz at once intrusted the execution of his plans to an energetic agent, who went out to the Cape to collect further information concerning the country in which the operations were to take place. He was followed by a vessel, the *Tilly,* supplied with every requisite for the important enterprise, except an ox-wagon, a tent, and a few other things which were obtained at the Cape. Here several Germans familiar with South African conditions were taken on board, and the *Tilly* left Cape Town on April 5, arriving on April 9 at the Bay of Angra Pequeña, about 150 miles to the north of the Orange River, the declared boundary of Cape Colony, and 280 to the south of Walfish Bay, of which England still claimed possession. With the help of some English seal-fishermen on the islands that protect the bay, the ship was brought to anchor opposite a safe landing-place; the actual landing was effected on the 12th. Word was sent to the mission station at Bethany, about 100 miles in the interior, the residence of the chief, Joseph Frederick. It was not, however, until April 30 that the Germans reached Bethany across the almost waterless desert that intervened. On the 1st of May, in a conference with the chief, at which the German missionaries and the chief men of the tribe were present, the object of his mission was explained, and without much difficulty a contract was signed by the chief and others interested, by which the former sold to Lüderitz some 215 square miles of land on the Bay of Angra Pequeña, including all rights of supremacy. This included about ten miles of coast, and an extension inland of some twenty-four miles. On the day after the conference these pioneers of German colonization returned to the coast, where with jubilation the German flag was raised in front of the storehouse which had been erected, and floated on the breeze over the first German colony. The news of what had taken place was received with enthusiasm by the colonial party in Germany, and contributed greatly to in-

crease its numbers, and enlist the enthusiasm of the empire on behalf of its aims.

In England the rumor that an "irresponsible German adventurer" or "filibuster" had dared to raise a foreign flag on the confines of Cape Colony, on a coast that had always been regarded as within the "British sphere," was received with incredulity and ridicule. Bismarck, it was asserted, would never lend his countenance to such an unfriendly, if not actually hostile, act. And the Foreign Office had grown so used to Germany's representations and remonstrances, not only with reference to South Africa, but in connection with Fiji, that it was fondly believed this fresh episode would vanish with another interchange of communications. In the Cape, as might have been expected, the news of Lüderitz's enterprise was received with indignation and incredulity. An English war-ship, the *Boadicea*, sailed from Cape Town to Angra Pequeña, apparently to assert British rights; but she was met there by the German corvette *Carola*, whose commander informed the English captain that he was in German waters, where he could exercise no authority whatever. The *Boadicea* returned to the Cape on November 3 with the news that Herr Lüderitz had acquired rights over the coast down to the Orange River. The Cape Government was at last awakened to the true position of affairs, though the home government still apparently cherished the hope that the action of Lüderitz was unsupported by his government, and that all could yet be arranged to the satisfaction of the colony. Every scrap of evidence that could prove British rights over the coast was sought for and put forward, but when it came to be coolly weighed, there was no shadow of documentary proof that any step had ever been taken to annex any part of the region except Walfish Bay, and one or two guano islands off Angra Pequeña; the evidence was all the other way. British Ministers had repeatedly, during the past twenty-five years, positively declined to undertake the responsibility of annexing Damaraland and Namaqualand. So recently as 1881 the governor of the Cape was informed that the Orange River was the boundary of the colony. The Cape Government would occasionally express the opinion that this northern territory ought really to be annexed; but when the home government asked if the colony were willing to undertake the necessary expense, the latter always shrank from the burden. Even now its ministers, instead of acting, spent their energies in

vain protests. It was only after the country had been irrevocably lost that any real desire for its possession seems to have found expression in Cape Colony; otherwise it is difficult to understand why on the first news of Herr Lüderitz's enterprise steps were not taken to annex at least the great stretch of coast which he had left untouched. Everyone knew that much of the country was only one stage removed from desert, and as to the copper and silver mines, even if they proved productive it would never pay to work them. But sentiment, natural enough, obscured the judgment of Cape statesmen and colonists and led them to aggravate the situation by irritating the imperial pride of Germany. And yet all this was mingled with a strange indifference that led to the loss of time, when every day was of importance.

On August 18, 1883, the imperial government informed the German consul at the Cape that they were prepared to take Lüderitz's acquisitions under their protection if the rights of others were not interfered with thereby; and on October 15 the gunboat *Nautilus* was ordered to Angra Pequeña to protect German interests. On November 12 the German Minister in London was instructed to inquire whether or not there were any British claims over the Angra Pequeña district, and if so, on what titles were they based. Ten days later Lord Granville replied that England exercised sovereignty only over certain parts on the coast, as Walfish Bay and some islands opposite Angra Pequeña; but that at the same time, any claim of sovereignty or jurisdiction on the part of a foreign power over any part of the coast between the Portuguese boundary and the Orange River would be regarded as an encroachment on the legitimate rights of the colony. The British Government, Lord Granville stated, to prevent disputes between the Germans and the English who believed they had old rights at Angra Pequeña, had sent a war-ship, and the report of its mission was awaited. The vessel was the *Boadicea*, the result of whose visit we have already seen. At the same time Lord Granville hoped that arrangements might be made by which the Germans could take part in the settlement of Angra Pequeña. It is evident that in November, 1883, Lord Granville did not in the least realize the seriousness of the situation. This evasive answer failed to satisfy Prince Bismarck, who repeated his question on December 31, through the German Ambassador, Count Münster, recalling previous correspondence with reference to the German missionaries

and the repeated declarations of the British Government that they had no jurisdiction over any part of the region in question outside Walfish Bay. Moreover, Bismarck pointed out that England herself (as in the case of Spain in the Caroline, Pelew, and Sulu Islands) had asserted a right to interfere directly for the protection of her own subjects where no adequate political administration had been established by the power claiming the territory. This Germany was entitled to do for her subjects at Angra Pequeña, and therefore Bismarck begged to be informed as to the title on which England's professed claims were based, and as to what means she had taken to protect German subjects so as to relieve Germany from the necessity of protecting them herself. In the light of subsequent events one cannot but admire the skill with which the communication was worded; Lord Derby subsequently admitted that it lulled all his suspicions. The home government communicated with the Cape Government on the subject, but no notice was taken of this communication and no answer vouchsafed until May 29, 1884, when the Cape Government intimated that they would recommend Parliament to undertake the control of the whole coast to Walfish Bay, Angra Pequeña included.

While the Cape Government were treating the civil inquiries of Germany with contemptuous neglect, steps were being taken to tighten more and more firmly Germany's hold on her first transoceanic possession. The Bremen merchants were actively opening up the territory and with German thoroughness promoting its exploration and instituting observations on its climate. On April 24, 1884, the German consul at the Cape was instructed to remove all doubts entertained by the Cape Government by informing it officially that Lüderitz and his possessions were placed under the protection of the empire; and to enforce the information a German war-ship was ordered to Angra Pequeña. Still Bismarck can hardly have been taken seriously either at home or at the Cape. In reply to a question in the Upper House on May 12, Lord Granville stated that, so far as he knew, Germany had never claimed sovereignty over any part of the territory in question, and that the matter was still the subject of discussion between the two governments. Two days later Lord Derby informed a deputation who waited upon him, that although England herself never directly annexed Angra Pequeña, she nevertheless claimed the right to exclude all other powers from the coast north of the Orange River;

Germany had been asking some questions on the subject, but appeared to have no intention of establishing a colony at Angra Pequeña. He himself did not share the fears with which some persons regarded the professed projects of the German Government to establish colonies in different parts of the world, for colonization did not enter into the programme of the German Empire. Germany believed that the secret of her power lay in concentration, and she would never weaken herself by taking possession of lands in distant parts of the world. Cape Colony was ready to annex Angra Pequeña, and if the British Government saw that it would be done honorably and with the prospect of good results, it would give its consent, but in that case, Cape Colony must be prepared to bear all the burdens. In a subsequent memorandum, October 7, 1884, on the subject Lord Derby tried hard to prove that the German Government had all along given him reason to believe that territorial acquisition was not at all in their thoughts; and it must be said that with all their apparent openness and frankness, Bismarck's earlier communications were devised with an amount of skill, sufficient, as it proved, to quiet any suspicions on the part of the British Colonial and Foreign Ministers.

Bismarck was losing patience. He sent very explicit instructions on June 10 to Count Münster on the subject, and at the same time Count Herbert Bismarck went to London on a special mission to bring matters to a final issue. The result was inevitable; on June 21 the British Cabinet decided to recognize the German protectorate over Angra Pequeña; as a matter of fact the actual protectorate had by this time been extended over a considerable part of the coast, and the eminent explorer, Dr. Nachtigal, was on his way as German consul-general to formally proclaim the imperial sovereignty over the whole stretch of unoccupied coast. And yet the Cape Parliament, encouraged no doubt by Lord Derby's attitude, ignoring all that had passed during the previous six months, voted unanimously so late at July 16 for the annexation of the territory between the Orange River and the Portuguese boundary. Even at that date, apparently, they had not realized that Bismarck was in earnest; and so late as August 25 the Cape Ministers presented a minute to the governor hoping it was not yet too late to secure the whole coast-line for Great Britain.

All that followed was simply the filling-in of details; the great lines had been drawn. Germany was recognized as a colonial

power. She had made up her mind to have a share of unoccupied Africa; she had initiated the scramble by which the long-neglected continent, within the space of a few years, it might almost be said months, became parceled out among the powers of Europe. The British Government and the Cape Government cannot afford to cast stones at each other for their conduct in connection with Angra Pe queña; the contemptuous dog-in-the-manger policy of the Cape authorities did much to arouse the wrath of Prince Bismarck and the German people and to strengthen the resolve of the former to throw himself heart and soul into the colonial movement. The government fortunately yielded at last with a good grace and welcomed Germany as a neighbor in Africa, promising to do all that was friendly in promoting her colonial views. There was of course a great outcry among certain sections of the British public at what had taken place: as if the mere fact of Germany desiring to possess colonies were an insult to the British flag. As a matter of fact, Great Britain emerged from an utterly unequal contest in statesmanship with considerably less of loss and humiliation than might have been expected.

The final scene in what may be regarded as the first act in the great drama of German colonial enterprise may be said to have been concluded on August 7, 1884, when Captain Schering, of His Imperial Majesty's ship *Elizabeth,* hoisted the imperial flag over Angra Pequeña in token of the annexation of the coast and twenty geographical miles inland, from the Orange River to 26° south latitude. This was followed, within the next few days, by the annexation in a similar fashion of all the coast between 26° south and the Portuguese boundary, with the exception of Walfish Bay.

Chapter X

GERMANY IN THE CAMEROONS AND THE GULF OF GUINEA. 1884

IT has been thought important to dwell at some length on the first act in the great drama of German colonization, because the method adopted by Bismarck with respect to Angra Pequeña was similar to that followed in connection with German colonial enterprises in other parts of Africa; and it will therefore be unnecessary to deal with them in so much detail. The *Möwe*, with Dr. Nachtigal as imperial commissioner and consul-general on board, visited the coast in the end of September, 1884, and supplemented the work of the *Elizabeth* by raising more flags and making fresh additions to the German protectorate. Lüderitz lost no time in sending out well-equipped expeditions to explore the country, open up routes to the interior, discover the value of its mining resources, and make further treaties with chiefs. Several English firms asserted claims to the copper mines, and other concessions said to have been made by chiefs, but these did not affect the German supremacy; a Joint Commission was appointed to settle the claims. Nachtigal spent some time in visiting various chiefs in the interior and concluding treaties, confirming the German claims to their country. In a dispatch to the Cape Government on November 11 Lord Derby found it necessary to snub one more hopeless attempt on the part of the colony to annex territory outside of Walfish Bay. The Germans were not to be interfered with; but, on the other hand, the government were inclined to consider the advisability of annexing the Kalahari Desert, and also to maintain the route from the Cape to the interior. At the same time, on December 24, Prince Bismarck was officially informed that the British Government had no wish to make any annexations west of 20° east longitude, which might thus be regarded as the eastern limit of German Southwest Africa. While in England itself these arrangements met with general approval,

and even sympathy, they naturally excited dissatisfaction at the Cape; a dissatisfaction all the more bitter that the Cape Government felt that it had mainly itself to blame for what had happened. Meantime it may be stated that it was only in 1884 that Walfish Bay was formally annexed to Cape Colony. In the spring of 1885 Lüderitz made over all his claims to a German Southwest African Association; and shortly thereafter an imperial commissioner was appointed to the new colony.

Herr Lüderitz, flushed, no doubt, with his success on the west coast, made, toward the end of 1884, a strenuous attempt through his representative to flank British South Africa with a German colony and harbor on the east coast. The relations between the Transvaal Government and Germany were at this time particularly friendly, and the possession of a port by Germany from which a railway could run to the Transvaal seemed in the highest degree desirable. As early as September, 1884, propositions were made to obtain possession of St. Lucia Bay on the coast of Zululand. Bismarck being notified of the intention Lüderitz's agent entered Zululand in November, and succeeded in obtaining some concessions from Dinizulu. But by this time both the home and the Cape Governments were thoroughly awake. News of these doings leaked out, and, on December 18, H. M. S. *Goshawk* proceeded to St. Lucia Bay and hoisted the British flag in virtue of a treaty with Panda as far back as 1843. There was, of course, the inevitable correspondence between the two governments, questions in Parliament, and excitement in the press, ending June 25, 1885, by a declaration on the part of Germany that she would make no annexations in East Africa south of Delagoa Bay.


It has been pointed out in a previous chapter that during the seventeenth and eighteenth, and even well on into the nineteenth, centuries, the commercial activity of Europe in Africa was mainly devoted to the Guinea Coast, to the region extending from the Senegal to the Congo; and that the staple export during that period consisted of slaves. After the cessation of slave export the European powers lost interest in the region. The Danes and Dutch quitted it altogether and the English carried on their four colonies in a half-hearted way; though the French, after the middle of the century, continued steadily to advance their interests along the coast and into the interior. Still, those commercial houses which continued to engage in the trade of the Guinea Coast realized

profits. In return for a few yards of cheap cottons, a few trinkets, obsolete guns, or the vilest and cheapest of spirits, enormous returns were obtained in oil and oil nuts, ivory, gold-dust, and other native products. German traders will grow rich where an Englishman would starve; after the re-formation of the empire they developed increasing activity abroad and did not overlook the neglected west coast. Fifty years ago German and Swiss missions established themselves on the Guinea Coast, and German commercial houses had agencies in the British Gold Coast Colony. After 1880, however, when the colonial spirit was gaining in strength and German foreign trade was increasing by leaps and bounds, the relations of Germany with the coast became more and more intimate. Between the district on the west coast, known as Portuguese Guinea, and the British colony of Sierra Leone, lies a strip of coast now known as French Guinea. On this coast several German factories had been established and a considerable trade developed by 1884. One patch of this coast lying between the Dembra and Dubreka Rivers was supposed not to have been actually occupied by France, and there German operations were concentrated and German influence established. On the Lower Guinea Coast extending from the boundary of Liberia to the colony of Lagos were several regions which were regarded as no-man's-land; France had ancient claims to a part of the coast on the west of the British Gold Coast Colony, and two other patches, somewhat ill-defined, between that colony and the colony of Lagos. At various points on this stretch of coast, both in British and French spheres, German factories and German missions had been established.

There was one small district of some thirty miles on the east of the Gold Coast Colony, where German stations had been established since 1880, and trade treaties made with the native chiefs. On the east of these, at Agoue and Great Popo, similar enterprises had been carried out; for although the French had some old claims to the coast it was practically unoccupied. When, in 1883, German colonial enterprise began to take a distinctly practical turn, German factories and commercial agents, as well as trade consuls, had been established, not only on the British Gold Coast, but on the unannexed portions to the east. Here, and in other parts of Africa, England had only to put out her hand and take what territory she wanted; her colonial officials were being

constantly besieged by petitions from native chiefs for annexation. But it was only when the Germans entered the field and the proffered gifts seemed likely to be snatched by others that British eyes were opened to their value, and British hands made unseemly haste to snatch them.

Again, between the eastern boundary of the colony of Lagos and the French colony of the Gaboon (the Rio Campo), including the extensive Niger delta (the Oil Rivers) and the Cameroons,



German houses had been establishing factories and drawing to themselves a fair share of trade. The British connection with the region had been growing in closeness and importance for a century. British explorers had done more than those of any other nation to open up the coast region and the whole of the country watered by the Niger and Benué. In the Oil Rivers and the Cameroons British missionaries and traders had held supreme influence for many years, and over forty years ago Burton raised the British flag on the magnificent Cameroons Mountains. For years the chiefs along the coast had been petitioning British consuls, ministers, and even the queen herself, to take them under protection; but, as a rule, these petitions were unanswered. So long ago as August,

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1879, five of the Cameroons "kings" wrote as follows to Queen Victoria:

"We, your servants, have joined together and thought it better to write you a nice long letter which will tell you about all our wishes. We wish to have your laws in our territories. We want to have every fashion altered; also we will do according to your consul's word. Plenty wars here in our country. Plenty murder, and plenty idol-worshipers. Perhaps these lines of our writing will look to you as an idle tale. We have spoken to the English consul plenty of times about having an English Government here. We never have answer from you, so we wish to write to you ourselves. When we knew about Calabar River, how they have all English laws in their towns, and how they have put away all their superstitions, oh, we shall be very glad to be like Calabar River."

Communications of similar import and tone continued to be sent home; and from the English residents in the Cameroons, backed by the British consul, urgent requests were sent to the home government advising annexation. But until the information reached the Foreign Office in July, 1883, that a French vessel had been in the Kwa Kwa River and the Malimba River cajoling the native chiefs into signing treaties, the policy of the government was one of procrastination. Even then no haste was manifested in securing one of the most desirable regions on the west coast. It was only in the end of 1883 that the Foreign and Colonial Offices concluded between them that it would be desirable to place the Oil Rivers and the Cameroons, including the Baptist mission that had been established there for many years, under British protection. It was not until May 16, 1884, that Consul Hewett was instructed to return to his post in West Africa and make preparations for declaring a British protectorate over part of it, for the Cameroons chiefs were to be "asked to undertake that they will, if required, cede such portions of their territories as it may be thought desirable to acquire." On July 6 Consul Hewett was in the Bonny River. He purposed visiting the Benin and other rivers, as well as the Cameroons, but could not give the commander of the British vessel in which he was to sail any exact date for his visit.

Meanwhile the Germans were losing no time. The recommendations of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in the end of 1883 have been already referred to. The annexation of a part of

the coast opposite Fernando Po was part of the programme which they recommended to Bismarck. On April 20, 1884, about one month before Consul Hewett received his instructions, Lord Granville at the Foreign Office received the following communication from the German chargé d'affaires in London:

"I have the honor to state to your Lordship that the imperial consul-general, Dr. Nachtigal, has been commissioned by my government to visit the west coast of Africa in the course of the next few months in order to complete the information now in the possession of the Foreign Office at Berlin on the state of German commerce on that coast. With this object Dr. Nachtigal will shortly embark at Lisbon on board the gunboat *Möwe*. He will put himself into communication with the authorities in the English possessions on the said coast, and is authorized to conduct, on behalf of the imperial government, negotiations connected with certain questions. I venture, in accordance with my instructions, to beg your excellency to be so good as to cause the authorities in the British possessions in West Africa to be furnished with suitable recommendations." The chargé d'affaires was assured that the British colonial authorities should be enjoined to give all possible assistance to the eminent German consul-general.

On June 1, 1884, the *Möwe*, with Dr. Nachtigal on board, accompanied by the *Elizabeth*, anchored off the Los Islands (British), and two days later the German consul-general went in a steam pinnace to the Dubreka River, where German factories had been established. Palavers were held with the chiefs, but nothing definite was done, as there was a suspicion of French claims. Other German expeditions were, however, in the following months sent to the coast, and the German flag was even hoisted over the station. But on the representations of the French Government Prince Bismarck gracefully gave way here, as he did elsewhere, averring that he would never seek to encroach on any territory to which France might show the slightest claim, or even preference. Bismarck's delicacy toward French susceptibilities was in all these doings and negotiations in marked contrast to his bluff and uncompromising treatment of the British Government.

Nachtigal proceeded southward to the little district east of the Gold Coast, already referred to, and now known as Togoland. At eight different places on this coast there were German factories. In January, 1884, a German gunboat had touched at the coast and

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taught the natives that Germans as well as the English had big ships to look after their interests; some of the natives, indeed, were deported to Berlin and were brought back, doubtless, greatly impressed with the power of Germany. On July 2 the *Möwe,* with Dr. Nachtigal on board, drew up in front of the settlement of Little Popo. Other places were visited, and after arranging matters with the king of Togoland, the German flag was raised at Bagida on July 5 and Togoland declared a German protectorate. Other sections of the coast were annexed at later dates. Serious differences threatened to arise between Germany and France, the latter claiming sovereignty over certain parts within the sphere annexed by Germany; but the two governments, however, did not find much difficulty in coming to an agreement.

After placing Togoland under the protection of the German flag, Dr. Nachtigal steamed onward in the *Möwe* toward the Cameroons. Here the ground had been prepared for him. At midnight-meetings with King Bell and other potentates in the Cameroons River, the four German traders settled in the place succeeded in winning their way to the heart of these thirsty chiefs by lavish promises of rum, guns, and money. As these chiefs had received no replies from the British Government to their repeated requests for annexation, and as the Germans appealed to their weakest side, it is no wonder that they concluded that a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. Commander Moore, in the *Goshawk,* visited the Cameroons River on July 10 and had a palaver with King Bell and some of the other chiefs. He found that the German negotiations were far advanced, but that no treaty had been actually signed. Had Consul Hewett been on board and then and there concluded treaties with the chiefs, the Cameroons might have fallen to England. All Commander Moore could do was to beg the chiefs to sign nothing till the consul arrived. King Bell promised, but hoped the consul would come soon—"within a week." It was not, however, till the 19th that the consul arrived, to find that treaties had been completed with the chiefs by Nachtigal, and that the German flag had been floating conspicuously over the place for five days. All he could do was to place the mission station of Victoria in Ambas Bay under British protection. Nachtigal proceeded southward, raising the German flag over various points of the coast, even beyond the Rio Campo, and so intruding upon the French sphere. As Bismarck, however, was

always inclined in his search for colonies to be particularly complacent toward France, the difficulty was easily settled; and the Rio Campo was recognized as the southern limit of German annexation.

Meantime Consul Hewett had been thoroughly roused to the seriousness of the situation, and lost no time in making treaties along the coast between Victoria and the colony of Lagos. His action was supplemented by that of the Niger Company, and thus the Oil Rivers and the mouths of the Niger were secured to Great Britain. There was, of course, great excitement both in England and Germany. There was naturally jubilation in Germany over the success of the smart policy of Bismarck, while in England reproaches were freely heaped upon the Ministry of the time for their blindness, prevarication, and indifference to British interests. Lord Granville naïvely reproached Prince Bismarck for intentionally misleading him as to the real purpose of Dr. Nachtigal's mission, while Bismarck taunted Granville for his want of penetration, and maintained that his little ruse was perfectly justifiable. Had he frankly informed the British Government as to his designs, they would of course have done their best to forestall him.

As to the part played by Prince Bismarck, his attitude with respect to the Cameroons was in marked contrast to his seemingly forbearing, patient, and courteous conduct in the Angra Pequeña affair. Possibly that affair may have worn out his patience, or it may be that he valued the Cameroons more highly, and did not want to run any risk. Further, the prince considered that in his colonial aspirations in Africa and the South Seas he had received great provocation from England. The courtesy between France and Germany in connection with these operations was that of enemy to enemy; the bitterness which sprang up between England and Germany was probably due to the mutual feeling that the one side could not afford to make an enemy of the other.

Though England had to give up the whole coast at the base of the Cameroons Mountains as far as the Rio del Rey—Bismarck accused her of trying to shut out the new German colony from the interior—she was able to secure the whole of the Niger Delta and all the coast from the Rio del Rey to the boundary of Lagos. Germany had some trouble with King Bell and his friends before they became reconciled to the new state of things; and, as has been the case in most of Germany's colonial enterprises, one of her first tasks

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was to give the chiefs and people a "sharp lesson." By the time the Berlin Conference met she was fairly in possession at the Cameroons, as well as in Togoland and Southwest Africa. She had thus begun the "scramble for Africa," had entered upon that game, some rules for which it was partly the design of the Congress to lay down.

Chapter XI

THE BERLIN CONFERENCE AND THE CONGO FREE STATE. 1884-1910

FOLLOWING the example of Germany, the other great European powers made a rush upon Africa. Inextricable difficulties were sure to arise unless some rules were laid down on which the great game of appropriation was to be conducted. Germany had already made important acquisitions on the west coast, and England and France had made haste to snatch up the remainder. France and Portugal were struggling with the King of the Belgians on the Congo, while Portugal was beginning to be alarmed as to her claims on other parts of the continent. Great Britain had received a severe lesson at Angra Pequeña, and had at last been aroused to take measures for securing to herself the region which lies on the north of Cape Colony. Already there were agitations as to German interests in Zanzibar. The great struggle, however, it was seen, would be round the center of the continent, and it would be for the advantage of all concerned that an understanding should be reached as to whether it was to be divided up into exclusive sections, or whether it was to be open to all nationalities, whatever might be their share of the rest of the continent after the scramble was over.

Curiously enough the proposal for an International Conference to consider the whole question of the Congo came from Portugal herself. France indorsed the proposal, which was cordially taken up by Bismarck on behalf of Germany. This was in June, 1884, and a month later Lord Granville gave in his adhesion on behalf of Great Britain. These three powers agreed in principle to the creation of a Free State in the basin of the Congo, the precise limitations of which were, however, to be left to separate agreements between the powers directly interested. The great purpose then of the Berlin Conference was to come to an understanding with reference to the Congo basin. It was also agreed to make some arrangement with reference to the Niger, and to fix

the conditions under which new annexations would be recognized as valid by other powers.

Into the details of the Conference it is unnecessary to enter. Its discussions and protocols occupy a voluminous Blue Book. It began its meetings in Berlin on November 15, 1884, and concluded them on January 30, 1885. Every state of Europe, except Switzerland, sent one or more representatives, as did the United States of America. The General Act of the Conference was signed by the representatives of all the powers except the United States on February 24, 1885. Stanley was present, nominally as a geographical expert on behalf of the United States, but in reality to look after the interests of his patron, the King of the Belgians.

The General Act of the Conference enacted freedom of trade to all nations within the region watered by the Congo and its affluents, including the coast of the Atlantic from 2° 30′ north latitude to 8° south latitude. The Free Trade Line was further prolonged to the east coast at 5° north latitude, and down that coast to the mouth of the Zambezi; up the Zambezi to five miles about the mouth of the Shiré, and onward along the water-parting between the Zambezi and Lake Nyasa to the water-parting between the Zambezi and the Congo. This eastern extension, however, was only to be effective if agreed to by the sovereign states having jurisdiction in the regions included therein. Only such dues were to be levied as would compensate expenditure in the interests of trade; no diffential duties were permitted, and all rivers were to be free to the flags of all nations. After a lapse of twenty years the subject of import duties could be reconsidered. The powers were to combine to suppress the slave-trade and slavery. An International Navigation Commission was instituted to ensure facilities of navigation on the Congo, and to carry out the provisions of the Conference with reference to the river and its affluents. This conventional basin of the Congo was to remain neutral under all circumstances. Only certain fixed navigation dues were to be charged, and these could be revised at the end of five years. These then were the principal provisions with regard to the Congo.

Essentially the same conditions as regards navigation were applied to the Niger and its tributaries, although these regions were outside the operation of the rules affecting the free trade zone. Instead of an International Commission being appointed to carry out the conditions, their execution was intrusted to Great Britain

and France in respect to those sections of the river which might come under their sovereignty or protection. There was to be perfect freedom of navigation to the trading ships (not the warships) of all nations; "No exclusive privilege of navigation will be conceded to companies, corporations, or private persons." The navigation of the Niger was not to be "exposed to any obligation in regard to landing-stage or depot, or for breaking bulk or for compulsory entry into any port." At the same time it was to be understood "that nothing in these obligations shall be interpreted as hindering Great Britain from making any rules of navigation whatever which shall not be contrary to the spirit of their engagements."

Other declarations were included in the work of this remarkable congress; it laid down the following important rule which was to guide the powers in the great game of the partition of Africa: occupations on the coast of Africa in order to be valid must be effective, and any new occupation on the coast must be formally notified to the Signatory Powers for the purpose of enabling them, if need be, to make good any claim of their own. In Article 6 there is also notice made for the first time in any International Act of the obligation attaching to spheres of influence—a mode of tenure soon destined to play such an important part. This obligation, however, refers only to the region dealt with in the General Act of the Conference.

These, then, were the chief provisions of the famous "General Act of the Conference of Berlin." To what extent they have been carried out will be seen in the sequel. But while the main drama, if we may so speak, was being enacted in the conference hall, Prince Bismarck's palace, there was a complicated side-play going on, which, though not formally acknowledged, had very intimate bearings on the main subject, and was indeed pregnant with even greater results. This was, in fact, the creation of the Congo Free State. We have seen how the magnificent projects initiated by the King of the Belgians at the Brussels Conference of 1876 had rapidly developed. There was the International African Association for scientific and benevolent purposes; this was followed by the Comité d'Etudes, which became the International Congo Association. Although not actually recognized as such, it really assumed the form of a loosely-organized state, and as early as April, 1884, Sir Francis de Winton (failing General Gordon) went out as gov-

ernor. On April 22, 1884, the United States Government recognized the flag of the Association (a blue flag with a golden star) "as that of a friendly government." On the day after the recognition, in a moment of irritation against the British Government, Colonel Strauch, the president of the Association, intimated to the French Government that if the Association were ever compelled to part with its possessions, France should have the right of preëmption. On April 22, 1887, the foreign minister of the Congo Free State, writing to the French Minister at Brussels, pointed out that His Majesty reserved his right to make Belgium his heir so far as the Free State was concerned, though in that case Belgium would take over the obligation to give France the right of preëmption should she ever decide to part with the territories of the Free State. As to the contention that such an arrangement is invalid without the consent of the signatory powers to the Berlin Act, it should be pointed out that the various international arrangements recognizing the Congo Free State were made after the King of the Belgians accorded the right of preëmption to France. This right of preëmption was notified to the various powers by the French Government, through its representative, in a dispatch dated May 31, 1884. There is no evidence that this right was ever explicitly recognized by the powers, and therefore its validity is a question to be settled by international law.

A week before the Berlin Conference met Germany followed the example of the United States, and recognized the flag of the Association as that of a friendly state, and intimated her readiness to recognize the frontiers of the new state to be created as laid down in a map joined to the declaration. The map indicated the boundaries of the state in the main as they were subsequently accepted by France and Portugal. This declaration was followed by similar declarations on the part of the other powers, the last to give its adhesion being Belgium (February 23, 1885). The Association itself signed the General Act as an independent power. The various agreements in which the Association had been recognized and the delimitations embodied therein were included in the protocols of the final sitting, and so received the sanction of the Conference itself.

It was not till two months after the conclusion of the Conference (April 30, 1885) that the Belgian legislature authorized King Leopold to be the chief of the state founded in Africa by the Congo

International Association. "The union between Belgium and the new state will be exclusively personal." On August 1 following, King Leopold addressed a notification to all of the powers, intimating that the possessions of the International Association of the Congo were henceforth to form the Congo Free State, of which



he would be chief under the title of sovereign. At the same time the neutrality of the state was declared. It may be appropriate here to state that King Leopold in his will, dated August 2, 1889, made Belgium heir to the sovereign rights of the Congo Free State; by a codicil to the will, dated July 21, 1890, it is declared that the Free State cannot be alienated.

Here, then, we have what may be regarded as the first substantial result of the scramble for Africa. It was not, however,

until many conferences, negotiations, and compromises had taken place that the precise limits of the Free State claimed in 1885 were recognized by neighboring powers. Portugal still clung to 5° 12′ south latitude as her northern limit, but was compelled to abandon it and content herself with Molemba, Cabinda, and Massabi north of the Congo mouth. On the other hand, her Angola colony was pushed northward to the south bank of the Congo, which she was allowed to appropriate as far as Nokki, 130 miles from the mouth. The precise boundary of the Congo State with British territory was at length settled in the agreement between King Leopold and Great Britain on May 12, 1894; and it was only after the solution of many difficult geographical points that the northern limit was settled with France. These agreements give the Congo Free State the enormous area of 900,000 square miles, with a population which at a guess may amount to 30,000,000 of savages.

Recently the sovereign of the Free State has shown dissatisfaction with the 4° limit on the north, maintaining that this state, like any other state, is at liberty to extend its dominions. Both France and England at first strenuously objected to this where it affected them. But expeditions from the Congo were sent with a view to secure a block on the west of the Albert Nyanza and the Nile. These attempts on the part of the sovereign of this Free State to push beyond the 4° north led to serious complications. As will be shown in the chapter on British East Africa, circumstances compelled the British Government to accept the situation, and an agreement was concluded in May, 1894, by which the old Sudan province of Bahr-el-Ghazal, up to 10° north latitude, and the whole of the left bank of the Nile down to Mahagi on the northwest shore of Albert Nyanza, were leased to the Congo Free State and the King of the Belgians, who in turn leased to Great Britain a strip between Lakes Tanganyika and Albert Edward, and consented to certain readjustments on the northwest frontier of British Central Africa. As might have been expected, the arrangements did not commend themselves to either France or Germany. On the demand of the latter, Great Britain resigned the lease of the strip on the eastern frontier of the Free State; and in August, 1894, the astute King Leopold made an arrangement with France by which he acquired all he really wanted, free access to the Nile and the rounding off of his northern frontier by a natural boundary.

Great things were expected from the foundation of the Free

State, which was referred to at the time as one of the most remarkable events of the century. At the concluding sitting of the Conference the new organization was greeted as one of the great civilizing and humanitarian agencies of the nineteenth century, as the chief medium through which the work for which the Conference had been summoned would be carried out. The Free State was to be the model boy in the new African school. He was never to go beyond bounds; he was never to interfere with his neighbors; never to bully the weaker boys under him.

The great object for which professedly the International Congo Association had been founded was the opening up of the interior region included in its operations to civilization and commerce, as well as the exploration of its geography. As has been already said, we cannot doubt that the motives which actuated the King of the Belgians in entering upon this enterprise in Africa were to a certain extent disinterested. If to these motives in time there came to be added an ambition to be the ruler of a million square miles of a continent previously given over to savagery and anarchy, this ambition was legitimate, for he could only reap glory and lasting reputation by ruling well. He it was who until quite recently supplied the funds with which the enterprise was carried on, and notwithstanding the increase from other sources, his private purse is still opened to the extent of $200,000 annually. It is not, therefore, surprising that the king should wish to rule his own state in his own way, even though its international character should thus disappear, and Belgium be accorded favors not granted to other nationalities. As a matter of fact, when King Leopold assumed the sovereignty of the Free State it ceased to be international, and rapidly became an almost exclusively Belgian undertaking. The officials of other nationalities gave place with few exceptions to the Belgians. In this King Leopold was compelled to yield to the wishes and remonstrances of his European subjects. It was found, moreover, that the absolute freedom of trade insisted on in the Berlin Act could not be maintained; even His Majesty's large resources were not equal to the necessary expenses of administration, and duties and taxes have had to be imposed which can hardly be said to be consistent with the spirit or the letter of the act. Of the heavy duty which has been placed on spirits none but those interested in their sale will complain. But, however it is to be accounted for, there can be little doubt that the manner in which the imposition

of duties and taxes was carried out, and the keen competition on the part of the Belgian officials, and even of the state, with traders of other nationalities, had the effect of compelling many of the latter to leave the territory of the state, either quitting the Congo entirely or settling upon French or Portuguese territory. It is chiefly Germany that has made complaints against the state for the alleged violation of the free-trade provisions under which the state was constituted. It would be unjust to blame the king personally for these results; he is in the hands of his officials, and it is hardly to be expected that these are all imbued with the same motives which actuate him.[1] Besides a company for constructing a railway for the Lower Congo, past the cataracts to Stanley Pool, there were, in 1895, five trading companies on the Congo, all Belgian, with a nominal capital of about $1,800,000; at the end of 1899 there were sixty-five Belgian Colonial Societies, with a capital of over $49,000,000. These Belgian companies were for a time dealt with in much the same way as traders of foreign nationality. The restrictions placed on the trade of private companies, and the monopolies claimed by the "State," were such as to render private enterprise almost impossible. Some relaxation was found to be necessary, and a *modus vivendi* was devised which gave the companies a certain amount of liberty. Hitherto, however, their operations have been of a very limited character, partly due to the difficulties placed in the way by the Arab traders.

More recently the conduct of the Free State officers roused some of the powerful Arab traders to rebellion. The expedition under Van der Kerckhoven dealt summarily with the Arab slavers met with on its route. This alarmed the Arabs on the Upper Congo and Lake Tanganyika, who evidently feared that unless they made a stand their nefarious traffic would be seriously checked. The result was an attempt of the Arabs to rise against the whites. No doubt they thought they had as much right to seize the natives and their wives as the Europeans had to take possession of the land. At all events, in 1892-1893 there was a general rising of the Arabs, and although at first the Free State forces and those of the Belgian Anti-Slavery Society met with some disasters, by the end of 1893 the Arabs on the middle and upper Congo, and as far as Lake Tanganyika, were thoroughly defeated and their strongholds captured. Some of the chief Arabs gave in their submission, though it is feared

[1] Compare the views upon this subject rehearsed in ch. xvii.

that another attempt will be made to re-establish their position. Some African authorities, thoroughly acquainted with the Arabs and their ways and sentiments, maintain that the methods adopted by the Free State are bad policy; and that it would be wiser and more conducive to the end in view to make friends of them and convince them that they would gain far more in the end by legitimate trade than by raiding for slaves and ivory. However, so far as the Free State is concerned, this method has not been adopted. And indeed it is difficult to see how, with European powers on every side of them, the Free State in the west, Germany in the east, England, France, and the Free State in the north, and England in the south, the slave-traders have any chance of continuing their occupation for long, if only these powers coöperate in carrying out the Brussels Act. The trade is without doubt ruined; but the areas claimed by the various powers are so enormous, the officials so few, and means of communication so primitive, that it is not possible, at present, to cover more than a fraction of the ground, or block all of the many routes from the interior to the coast. In these campaigns against the slavers, up to 1895, some seventy thousand Arabs and their followers were slain. Arab strongholds have been swept away and other centers established, from which European influence will emanate.

There has been no lack of zeal on the part of the king to carry out his own aims and part at least of the object which the Berlin Act had in view. The amount of exploring work accomplished under the auspices of the state is creditable. The whole of the Congo, at least as far as the Lukuga, has been laid down with a fair approach to accuracy. North and south all the great tributaries have been explored, and in the ten years succeeding 1885 nearly seven thousand miles of waterway were opened up to navigation. A fair knowledge has been obtained of the countries watered by the magnificent rivers and of the various tribes which inhabit them.

Again, a regular administration has been established, and it must be admitted that there has been a certain amount of success. The administrative headquarters are in Brussels, where there are a variety of functionaries. The State is divided into fourteen districts or provinces, with a governor-general, and a sub-governor or commissioner for each district. There are numerous stations not only on the Congo itself, but on the great tributaries north and south, the administrative staff numbering some 1115 officials. A

system of justice, criminal and civil, has been devised, with courts of first and second instance. On the Upper Congo martial law prevails.

The finances of the State reached a critical position in 1894. Notwithstanding the subsidy of the sovereign and the annual contribution of Belgium, the deficit in the finances threatened to be enormous. The revenue from customs and taxation is insignificant, and the expenses connected with the action against the Arabs, the Kerckhoven and other aggressive expeditions, are very great. Now, however, that there remains little to withdraw the energies of the State from the industrial development of the resources of the territories, it is to be hoped that the tide will turn and that substantial results will begin to be reaped from this royal enterprise. Its effective forces, in the year 1905, numbered 16,183 natives, under 164 European officers and 194 sergeants.

That, in the hands of inexperienced young officers, poorly paid, dealing with savages, under the influence of a tropical climate, far from the controlling influence of public opinion and the restraining hand of their superior officers, there should be abuses of the power intrusted to them is not to be wondered at. That there have been abuses, that the natives have been at least occasionally, if not frequently, treated with great cruelty, and dealt with as slaves, there is only too much evidence to prove; of this more will be seen in a later chapter. We do not require to go to the Congo State for instances of the demoralizing effect which savage surroundings have on even highly civilized men. Nor must it be forgotten that we can hardly deal with Africans as we do with civilized Europeans, and that if any progress is to be made at all a certain amount of compulsion must be used. But if this be so, it imposes the duty of exercising all the more care in selecting officers who will not be tempted to make this compulsion assume the form of cruelty and slavery, and so risk that breaking-up of the Free State which not a few consider to be inevitable.

Among the civilizing influences at work in the new state we must reckon that of Christian missions—Catholic and Protestant, English, American, French, and Belgian. There are many stations in various parts of the territory, and among the missionaries are men of insight and tact, who aid in rousing the native from his low estate. In all there are 475 missionaries, their number being about equally divided between Catholic and Protestant.

A more or less active trade has of course been carried on, and trading centers have been established at various points besides those occupied by the State stations. Altogether there were, in January, 1904, about 2500 whites (there were only 254 in 1886). Of these, 1442 were Belgians, of whom there were only 46 in 1886, and 40 Americans. Practically all the nations of Europe are represented, but returns give only one native of the white race. It may be said that all the white population of the Congo are more or less directly engaged in trade, not even excluding the officials themselves, either on their own behalf or on behalf of the State. Private traders, as has been stated, complain of the increasing competition which they must submit to from the State officials, who, naturally, have great advantages over their rivals. Practically the free-trade clauses of the Berlin Act are a dead letter; the Congo Free State is virtually, and will some time be in reality, a Belgian colony. Whether such a monopolizing policy is a wise one, even from a purely business point of view, is, however, doubtful. But be that as it may, the exports from the State territories increased from about $400,000 in 1887 to about $1,600,000 in 1890, though it was only a little over $1,000,000 in 1891; figures for later years show a steady increase in exports of original produce up to over $10,000,000 for 1901. Belgium gets the lion's share of the special export and import trade; the chief imports, in the order of their importance, are: tissues, foods, drinks, machinery, arms, clothing, metals and their manufactures.

As yet the exports from the Congo are almost exclusively the natural products of Central Africa, viz., ivory, caoutchouc, palm nuts, palm oil, and coffee. Ivory once contributed quite one-half of the total exports from the Free State territories. It counted for only $800,000 in 1901. The export of palm nuts and oil in 1890 amounted to $750,000, and fell to $650,000 in 1893, more than one-half obtained from outside the Free State limits. It again fell, in 1901, to about $450,000. Of caoutchouc, $200,000 worth came from the Free State in 1893, while nearly double the amount is the produce of French and Portuguese Congo; but the exports of this article for 1901 were valued at $8,800,000. So with coffee; of the $340,000 worth exported by the Congo in 1890, only $17,500 worth can be credited to the Free State, while in 1893, of the coffee exported, none came from the Free State proper at all; the exports for 1901 were valued at $12,000.

Thus far only the natural products of tropical Africa have been dealt with; practically nothing has been done to develop the capabilities of the soil, except perhaps on a small scale around the various stations. Such mineral resources as may exist in the Congo region —and though much secrecy is maintained they are believed to be considerable—have not been touched. It is only those who fancy that Africa can be transformed into a Europe or an India in a decade that would have expected more. The natural resources of the basin are plentiful enough to yield valuable returns to modest commercial enterprises for many years; but to keep up the expensive machinery of a state, and support an endless series of exploring and fighting expeditions, these natural resources will have to be worked on a much larger scale than has hitherto been done. For 1894 the estimated expenditure of the Free State was about $1,450,000, leaving a deficit, when all sums are taken into account, of $350,000. The estimated revenue for 1902 and 1903 was about $5,600,000; the expenditures, $6,500,000 and $6,000,000 respectively. The estimate for the defensive forces of the State in 1894 was $750,000; in 1892 it was only $200,000; the estimated expenditure for "Public Force" for 1903 (exclusive of marine, etc.) was $1,540,000. Even were the profits accruing from the whole of the Free State trade the perquisite of the king, they would hardly suffice to meet the outlay; as a matter of fact, but a small proportion of them go to the credit of the State. The King of the Belgians professed to have entered upon his great enterprise from other than purely commercial motives, but it is obvious that there is a limit even to the royal finances. It is impossible, therefore, to blame him for endeavoring, through the Brussels Congress of 1890, to so far modify the Berlin Act as to be permitted to levy duties on imports as well as exports, nor for adopting other means—house-taxes, trading-licenses, etc.—of raising a revenue. If the organization of a state is to be carried out, it of course involves expenditure; and the profits on Central African trade are so enormous that they can well afford to yield a percentage in return for the security which a state is supposed to afford. It might conceivably have been more profitable for all concerned had the development of the Free State been intrusted to a great chartered company similar to the Royal Niger Company. But this would have defeated the great object which the king had in view in entering upon African enterprise; he reaps a subjective reward, at any rate, in realizing that he is the

active head and moving spirit of a gigantic undertaking which he believes is destined to form a great civilized state in Central Africa. Already the Congo Railway Company has completed a line from the lower to the upper river, though progress was lamentably slow and attended by enormous loss of life among the victims of the compulsory labor system. Upon the upper river thirty government steamers supply a public transport service. That such a railway would be beneficial in many ways can hardly be doubted, but although the rates are very high, it can hardly be expected to pay without a great increase in the present trade. The difficulty in obtaining adequate native labor for this railway was so great that in November, 1892, the company was compelled to import over six hundred Chinese coolies. There are a few isolated Chinamen in South Africa; but the Congo Free State has the distinction of being the first to try the experiment of substituting Chinese for native labor. The effort was unsuccessful, for within a few months nearly five hundred died, and sometime after most of those that were left suddenly decamped, and subsequently a few were seen far in the interior trying to walk overland to China.

While, then, the dreams of the Berlin Congress have vanished, and the Great International Free State has almost lapsed into a Belgian colony, while many mistakes have been made and crimes against humanity have been committed, while the expenditure has been lavish and the returns insignificant, while slave-trading still flourishes to some extent even within the boundaries of the Free State, while cannibalism is widely prevalent, and civilization can hardly be said to have taken root; yet it must be admitted that on the whole there has been some progress, or at least change. The Free State may not continue to exist under its present organization. It may be broken up into several states, or may be divided among several powers; but, whatever may be its fate in this respect, it cannot stand still, and it cannot go back. The more it is opened up to the view of civilized humanity the better it will be for the conduct of its affairs and for the interests of the natives. It will certainly be looked back to in the future as one of the most remarkable outcomes of the modern contact between Europe and Africa; while its royal founder will be reckoned among the most enterprising, ambitious and astute kings of the century.

Chapter XII

GERMAN EAST AFRICA. 1865-1910

THE fact that the Conference had been convened at Berlin to settle the rules of the game of partition was not regarded by those taking part in it as a sufficient reason for holding their hands. Even while it was sitting Germany was making inroads into a region which Great Britain regarded as peculiarly her own. The successful result of the operations in West Africa intensified the colonial feeling in Germany, and filled the more active spirits with impatience for further annexations. It has already been seen that, as far back as 1865, Kersten strongly urged the annexation by Germany of the region lying to the south of the River Jub in East Africa. Years before that Hamburg trade had found a footing in Zanzibar, and, according to German authorities, it exceeded that of all other European powers, and was second only to the trade carried on by British Indians. Again, in 1875, Vice-Admiral Livonius, in a communication to the German Admiralty, urged that Zanzibar should be taken under German protection. Three years later, as has been seen, the sultan was persuaded by Mackinnon to offer to cede the fiscal administration of his territories to England; but although the treaty was actually drawn up, the British Government threw difficulties in the way, and eventually the scheme was thwarted. The sultan's influence, if not rule, extended from Warsheikh on the north to Cape Delgado on the south, and included all the islands on the coast. There can be no doubt also that through the Arab traders his influence extended far into the interior, though probably no native chief beyond the coast region acknowledged the sultan's suzerainty. Meantime trade was increasing steadily at Zanzibar, where British influence was still predominant, and the British Indian traders, both Hindu and Mohammedan, of whom thousands were settled on the island and on the coasts, were a powerful factor in the sultanate. Again, in 1879, Ernst von Weber, one of the most strenuous of German colonial pioneers, in an address to the *Central Verein für Handelsgeogra-*

phic, drew attention to the River Jub and the desirability of Germany acquiring a territorial footing in the Zanzibar region; in this respect reiterating the views enunciated by Gerhard Rohlfs about the same time. In 1882 Count Joachim Pfeil wrote an essay strongly urging Germany to occupy the very districts which were afterward acquired. He pointed out that the region east of the lakes must offer a field for profitable trade and cultivation, and that the claims of the Sultan were of a very shadowy kind.

Thus it will be seen that the attention of the German colonial party was directed to East Africa at a much earlier period than to West Africa, though it was in the latter that active operations began. Suspicion was aroused at the British Foreign Office in the autumn of 1884, and on November 24 the British Minister at Berlin obtained an assurance from Prince Bismarck that "Germany was not endeavoring to obtain a protectorate over Zanzibar." But an uneasy feeling was again aroused when, toward the end of the year, it was known that the African explorer, Rohlfs, was making his way to Zanzibar, to which he had been appointed German consul-general. On January 14, 1885, Earl Granville communicated with Berlin, somewhat timidly, drawing attention to this circumstance, at the same time expressing a confident belief that Germany did not mean to annex Zanzibar. The British Minister pointed out briefly the long and intimate relations of England with Zanzibar, over which she had acted as a sort of guardian and tutelary deity. Prince Bismarck's reply showed that he, or those by whom he was inspired, had mastered the history of the Zanzibar dominions and knew how to apply it to their own ends. He knew the part which had been played by England, and was able to correct Lord Granville on some of the dates which the latter had been rash enough to cite. No direct statement was made as to what was the real object of Rohlfs's mission, but on February 25 Granville was informed that the consul-general was "commissioned to exert his influence" to secure freedom of commerce in the sultan's dominions. In short, the tone of the communication from Berlin was evidently intended to induce the belief in London that Rohlfs had no other object in view than to conclude commercial treaties with the Sultan; Prince Bismarck did not see that the relations between England and Zanzibar were such as to prevent this. Such treaties had been made as far back as 1835 by America, 1839 by England, 1844 by France, and 1859 by the Hanse towns. As England had declared herself

warmly on behalf of the independence of Zanzibar, and had in 1864 joined France in a declaration to this effect, she could not object to the sultan making treaties with whomsoever he pleased.

But the uneasy feeling was not allayed. This is clear even from the correspondence in the Blue Books which are published on the subject; but these contain a mere selection from a vast mass of correspondence, the bulk of which is supposed, though printed, never to be seen except by the official eye. From this private and confidential correspondence it is, however, still more plainly evident that both at Zanzibar and in London it was felt that some new German enterprise was in the air. But the British Foreign Office professed itself satisfied with the vague assurances from Berlin.

Karl Peters, who was destined to become the chief disturbing agent in East African affairs, was in 1884 only twenty-eight years of age. He had been educated at German universities, and had resided for a time in England. On his return to Germany he was ignorant of colonial matters, and had apparently no interest in the colonial movement. He was, however, drawn into the movement mainly through the influence of his friend, Dr. Lange, who himself did so much to promote it. Peters was a man of somewhat imperious temper, and from the first seems to have been filled with a feeling of bitterness toward England. The German Colonial Society founded by Prince Hohenlohe Langenburg, with its thousands of members, was not practical enough for the more advanced colonial party. Early in 1884 another, the Society for German Colonization, was formed by the late Count Banddin, who was the first president. He was soon succeeded by Lange, who in a short time was followed by Peters. This new society, inspired by Count Joachim Pfeil and Dr. Peters, lost no time in maturing a plan of operations for further wholesale annexations. Some proposed to enter Africa by Sofala. But the favorite scheme was to annex the lofty region east of Mossamedes, in Portuguese West Africa; evidently the claims of Portugal were not held of much account. Everything was prepared in the summer of 1884 for an expedition to Mossamedes, when the German Government intervened and told the enterprising young men that whatever they did was at their own risk, and that no annexations in that region would be sanctioned by the government. This turned the attention of the society again to East Africa. St. Lucia Bay was proposed, but in the end the scheme all along advocated by Count Pfeil was adopted, and it was decided to make Zan-

zibar the basis of operations. Many practical men, including a number of capitalists, gathered round the new society, which was not, however, very liberally provided with means; $10,000 comprised all the available funds.

The greatest secrecy was observed. It was arranged that Peters, in company with Count Pfeil and Dr. Jühlke, a devoted friend of Peters, should proceed quietly to Zanzibar. Of the three, Pfeil was the only one who had been in Africa and who had any practical knowledge to guide the undertaking. They gave out that they were bound for Liverpool, but unobserved, and in the disguise of mechanics, they made their way to Trieste, and, as deck passengers, thence to Zanzibar, which they reached on November 4, 1884. Quite against the advice of the German consul, who had received instructions from Berlin to discourage the project, but supported by other German residents in Zanzibar, they left the coast on November 12. Seven days later the first "treaty" was signed with a native chief, and the German flag was hoisted at Mbuzini. Following the Wami River, the three German pioneers went on to the high land of Usagara, and treaties were rapidly negotiated with ten chiefs. On December 17 Peters was back at the coast with "treaties" which gave his society all rights over the countries of Useguha, Nguru, Usagara, Ukami, Unyomero, and Mukondokwa, a solid block of 60,000 square miles, lying almost direct west from Bagamoyo. Peters hastened back to Berlin, where, on February 12, 1885, he founded the German East Africa Company, to which the rights he and his colleagues had acquired were ceded. On the 27th, almost coincident with the signing of the Berlin Act, the German Emperor issued a "*Schutzbrief*," in which he extended his protection to the territory acquired, or which might be acquired, by the Society for German Colonization. This is noteworthy as the first document of the kind issued by the imperial government; it was, in fact, a charter. It is no secret that the unsuspecting chiefs were cajoled into appending their signatures or marks to documents which they were assured were perfectly innocent; the three Germans simply wanted the autographs of their African friends to carry back with them to Europe. But, when all is said, these "treaties" were probably as valid and as valuable as most of those that have been made with native chiefs by "pioneers" of all nationalities.

After the events which had taken place on the west coast, it can hardly be said that the British Government were taken by sur-

prise. Sir John Kirk had been for many years British representative at Zanzibar, and his tact, experience, firmness, and thorough knowledge of Africa and Africans had rendered his influence with the Sultan so effective that he had become virtual ruler of Zanzibar. Only six years before, these very territories which the Germans had quietly pocketed had been virtually offered to England; at any moment Kirk had but to say the word, and the sultan would have placed himself under British protection. After the many years during which Kirk had been riveting British influence at Zanzibar, it was a cruel task which was forced upon him by the British Foreign Office—to use all his exertions to undo what he had done, and induce the Sultan to cede to Germany not only the whole of the interior, but the greater part of the coast. The orders from London were of the most peremptory character, and Kirk's anguished remonstrances were of no avail. It was not till April 28, 1885, that the annexation was formally announced to the sultan. The latter immediately sent a strong protest to Berlin against the appropriation of what he regarded as his territories, and later on sent similar protests to the British and American governments. Prince Bismarck accused Kirk of instigating these protests, but the latter replied that on the contrary he had exerted his influence to prevent the sultan from going to Berlin himself to remonstrate. The British representative was instructed to co-operate immediately with the German consul-general in forwarding German interests.

It was not of course the business of Bismarck to inform the British Government beforehand what were his real designs on East Africa. With regard to the sultan's claims, he pointed out that as a matter of fact the sultan exercised no jurisdiction whatever away from the coast, and that on the latter he occupied only a few points. The Berlin Act (to which, however, Zanzibar at this time was not a party) had established the doctrine that no annexation on the coast would be recognized which was not evidenced by effective occupation and the establishment of some kind of jurisdiction. The sultan, it was maintained, had a few trading posts in the interior, but that was all; and Germany applied the same treatment to him as England a year or two later did to Portugal in the Zambezi region. That the sultan had real dominion all along the coast from Cape Delgado as far as Lamu, the evidence was ample; further north his power was confined to a few coast towns, which included the only landing places where goods could be shipped. At

Arab stations in the interior, even as far as Lake Tanganyika, his sovereignty was recognized, but beyond a certain distance from the coast there can be little doubt that Central Africa, between the coast and Lake Tanganyika, was in reality a no-man's-land. The worst that can be said of Germany's action in the matter is that she stole a march upon England, which, according to accepted standards, can hardly be regarded as immoral, either in business or diplomacy, for in neither of these is chivalry supposed to hold a place.

On May 25, 1885, Lord Granville assured Prince Bismarck that the British Government had no intention of offering any obstruction to German projects, but welcomed Germany's coöperation in developing the resources of East Africa and in endeavoring to suppress slavery. At the same time he informed the German Chancellor that a number of English capitalists intended to undertake an important enterprise in the region between the East Coast and the Nile Lakes, which they proposed to unite by means of a railway; but the project would only receive the support of the government if the latter were assured that it would in no way interfere with German designs. In these somewhat humble terms was the initiation of the Imperial British East Africa Company announced to Germany, and it is worthy of note that a railway to the lake was one of the first projects thought of.

The sultan, however, was not inclined to resign himself to the situation so readily as the British. He sent his troops into Usagara to raise his flag over a region which he considered his own, and where the Germans had stolen a march upon him, and dispatched his commander-in-chief, General Mathews, an English naval lieutenant, to Mount Kilimanjaro, to obtain from the chiefs their adhesion to his sovereignty, thus anticipating the Germans in this region. Various agents of the German East Africa Society (to which the Colonization Society made over its rights) were traveling about the interior making additional treaties. They had long tried to reach Mount Kilimanjaro to promote German interests, in spite of the sultan's mission, and notwithstanding the fact that in 1884 H. H. Johnston obtained a concession of territory there. The sultan continued obstinate and would not listen to the proposal made by the German Government for a recognition of German territorial rights in Usagara and Witu. The good offices of Kirk were of no avail, and it was only when a formidable German squadron appeared before his palace on August 7, 1885, and an ultimatum was pre-

sented by the commander, that the sultan intimated his recognition of certain of the German territorial claims, including Witu. Thus the crisis was safely passed. Various difficulties and protests occurred before everything was settled, but the development of German suzerainty in East Africa promised now to be steady and sure.

Meantime German annexation, thus recognized, was proceeding apace on the coast north of Zanzibar. According to German statements there was a question as to Richard Brenner having concluded a treaty on behalf of Prussia with the Sultan of Witu, a small district north of the mouth of the Tana River. The Sultan Simba had been compelled some years previously to leave Patta Island and take refuge on the mainland; there he had established himself among the Gallas and Somalis, and according to Consul Haggard, who visited him in August, 1884, Witu was the refuge for all the "malcontents, felons, and bankrupts of the surrounding country," who lived by slave-raiding and cattle-stealing, and were a terror to the whole region. Mr. Haggard narrowly escaped being made prisoner because he declined to send the Sultan Simba guns and ammunition. Simba found the Germans more complaisant, and they in turn formed a high opinion of the old man, whose little kingdom seemed to them a center of civilization. At any rate the brothers Denhardt, on April 8, 1885, obtained a concession from the sultan of his kingdom (500 square miles) for the Witu Company and on May 27 it was placed under imperial protection. When, in June, 1885, Lord Salisbury succeeded Earl Granville at the Foreign Office, a satisfactory understanding had been arrived at between the two governments on the position generally in East Africa, and the Conservative Premier was quite as disposed as the Liberal Foreign Minister to adopt a thoroughly conciliatory attitude toward Germany's colonial schemes. The British representative was coöperating with the German consul-general in getting the sultan to agree to a commercial treaty which would regulate the trade between his dominions and the newly acquired German territories; if this were accomplished, Germany would join the acknowledgment, made in 1862 by England and France, of the sultan's independence. But first, however, it would be necessary to decide what precisely were the sultan's dominions, and it was finally agreed to appoint a joint commission, with representatives of England, France, Germany, and Zanzibar, to carry out on the spot the work of delimitation.

So far as British interests are concerned, the most important part of the work of this international commission would be the delimitation of the region in the neighborhood of Mount Kilimanjaro, where, with the consent of Great Britain, the Sultan of Zanzibar had secured treaties which placed the whole district under his authority. In September, 1884, Johnston had obtained concessions of territory in the district of Taveta and on the slopes of Kilimanjaro. This Johnston made over to the president of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, and it was on such a basis apparently that an association of British merchants were projecting a company for obtaining territory between the coast and the Victoria Nyanza, through which they purposed to construct a railway. A communication on the subject was sent to Berlin by Lord Salisbury in November, 1885, and it was pointed out that the concession was several months earlier than the treaties made with General Mathews for the sultan or subsequently with Dr. Jühlke and his colleagues in favor of the German company. However, it was agreed to allow all claims to lie in abeyance until the commission was on the spot and was in a position to decide between the parties; it being understood that neither side should seek to steal a march upon the other. But the German agents were impatient, and were pushing their way into the Kilimanjaro region. This produced a protest from the Earl of Rosebery, who had charge of foreign affairs during a few months in 1886. This protest is noteworthy for a tone of firmness and a determination to support British interests, which was somewhat wanting in the correspondence of the previous eighteen months. The commission, however, did not go very speedily to work, though by the middle of 1886 they had collected much information which was of service in enabling the German and British Governments to come to an understanding. And meanwhile a commercial treaty was arranged in August of that year between Zanzibar, Germany, England, France, and other powers, by which definite tariffs were substituted for the somewhat arbitrary levies that previously existed, and an agreement reached that, as regards at least Great Britain and Germany, all products of the interior should pay to the sultan the fixed tariff duty on reaching his coast.

At last on October 29 and November 1, the British and German Governments came to a definite agreement as to the territory which would be recognized as under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and to this agreement the sultan gave his assent

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on December 4. He could not choose but assent, his only condition being that since the two powers were taking this part of his kingdom from him and giving it to Germany, "they would protect our kingdom from being divided among them by other nations." The Earl of Iddesleigh, who had succeeded Lord Rosebery at the Foreign Office in August, carried out the negotiations with a delicate tact and firmness that kept Prince Bismarck in the best of tempers and yet retained for England a substantial share of East Central Africa.

From the center of Tungi Bay on the south of Cape Delgado to Kipini at the mouth of the Tana River, a strip of the mainland ten nautical miles in width, was recognized by Great Britain, Germany, and France as the sultan's domain; as were also the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, the smaller islands within a radius of ten miles, and the islands of Lamu and Mafia. To the north of Kipini the towns of Kismayu, Brava, Meurka, and Magdoshu, with a radius of ten nautical miles round each, and Warsheikh, with a radius of five nautical miles, were left to the sultan. The intervening strips of coast were regarded as independent, an arrangement which threatened to be disastrous to British enterprise. The sultan gave up all claims to Kilimanjaro. Although Johnston's Kilimanjaro concessions had not been of much avail, the aspirations of the embryo British East Africa Company were to some extent satisfied by the definition of a boundary to the north of which Germany would not interfere with their "sphere of influence." This was a phrase which, like "Hinterland," came into vogue at the time of the Berlin Conference, and designated an arrangement of great convenience in the unprecedented conditions under which a whole continent was being parceled out. It was obvious that the enormous areas which were being allotted to the various powers could not be occupied and developed all at once; but it was reasonable and for the benefit of all concerned that each nation should be left untrammeled within certain limits agreed upon, and that her communications in the rear should not be cut off. Unfortunately, in some cases, as will be seen, the delimitations left a loophole for serious misunderstandings; nor was it clear that an arrangement between two powers was binding on other powers not parties to it.

In the case of East Africa it was agreed that the northern limit of German influence and the southern limit of British influence should be defined by a line from the mouth of the River Umba or

Wanga, which left practically the whole of the magnificent Kilimanjaro region, with its fertile slopes and foothills, to Germany. Still further restrictions were, moreover, placed on British operations, restrictions which very shortly gave rise to much bitterness and threatened to shut out the British company from the interior altogether. With Witu as a base of operations, Germany was left free to do to the British sphere what she herself protested against England doing in the Cameroons and in Southwest Africa. But the course of events induced Germany ere long to leave England free to develop northward. Another important arrangement, the thin end of the wedge, indeed, for further developments on the part of Germany, permitted Zanzibar to lease to the German African Company the customs duties at the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Pangani, in return for an annual payment to the sultan by the company, calculated on a percentage of returns collected, on a sliding scale.

The strip of coast line thus left to the sultan measured some six hundred miles, though when Germany first appeared on the field he claimed about three hundred miles more. His "independence" was recognized by Germany in accordance with the declaration of 1862 signed by France and England; poor Burghash, had he been free to speak his mind, might have said this provision was adding insult to injury. It is not to be wondered at that Sir John Kirk did not care to retain longer a post which must have become humiliating. After serving his country's interests for years with zeal and success, so much so that Zanzibar had in reality become an appendage of England, it was grievous for him to see his life work apparently fall into the lap of a foreign power. However, things have not turned out quite so badly as they seemed at first likely to do. It cannot be said that the revenues of the sultan were diminished under the new arrangements. The German East Africa Company set itself with energy, intelligence, and determination to develop its extensive territories. A committee of five members, appointed for fifteen years, undertook the administration.

By an agreement between Germany and Portugal in December, 1886, the southern boundary of the German sphere was marked by the course of the River Rovuma to the confluence of the River M'sinje, and thence west to the shore of Lake Nyasa. This agreement gave rise to an incident which might have had more serious consequences but for the remonstrances of England and Germany.

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The Rovuma debouches into the Indian Ocean some distance to the north of Tungi Bay, recognized in the Anglo-German arrangement as part of the southern boundary of the Zanzibar dominions. The sultan, still sore no doubt at the treatment to which he had been subjected by the two great powers, at once protested that he would not submit to be deprived by a power like Portugal of the northern half of Tungi Bay, which had belonged to Zanzibar for generations, where he had a station and custom-house, and which had just been recognized by the three great powers as his. Portugal, equally irritated at the way her claims had been ignored by the great powers and humiliated by the refusal of France, Germany, and England to permit her to be represented on equal terms in the joint commission of delimitation, informed the sultan that if he did not retire from Tungi Bay and give up all claim to it, he might look for the consequences. The Portuguese flag was hauled down at Zanzibar, and nothing less than the bombardment of the town was expected. However, the Portuguese contented themselves with sending a squadron to Tungi Bay, seizing one of the sultan's vessels, and bombarding for several days a couple of villages which a dozen sailors might have captured in a few minutes. This barbarous proceeding it is impossible to justify. The little difficulty could easily have been arranged by Germany and England, but this did not apparently suit the mood of the Portuguese at the time. Portugal had to vent her wrath on some power, and she did it by shelling a couple of unprotected villages claimed by the much-bullied Sultan of Zanzibar. The result of this insignificant affair, in which not a single Portuguese was wounded, was announced in a series of magniloquent dispatches as if it had been Portsmouth and not Tungi Bay which had been the scene of operations. As those who suffered most were British Indian subjects settled on the Bay for trade, intense indignation was aroused by this act on the part of Portugal. For damage done to British subjects by the bombardment the British Government asked that some compensation might be paid. This was curtly refused, and British and Portuguese relations on the east coast became strained. To the attitude which Portugal assumed on this occasion may to a considerable extent be attributed the uncompromising stand made by England at a later date on the Zambezi. Portugal insisted on retaining possession of Tungi Bay, and claimed all north as far as the River Rovuma, the boundary named in defining the spheres

of influence of Germany and Portugal. Finally, in September, 1894, an agreement was reached between these two powers by which, while Tungi Bay is left to Portugal, the coast north, including the mouth of the River Rovuma, is regarded as German territory.

In the midst of these negotiations a difficulty arose between Germany and England which showed that the Anglo-German arrangement of 1886 had not settled everything. In the beginning of 1887 Stanley set out on his expedition for the "relief" of Emin Pasha, governor of the equatorial provinces and supposed to be beleaguered by the Mahdi in Wadelai on the Nile, to the north of the Albert Nyanza. Stanley selected the Congo route, and it was believed would return by the east coast. The German East Africa Company took alarm, mainly because the chief mover in the relief expedition was Mr. William Mackinnon, and the committee was mainly composed of men who in conjunction with Mackinnon had about the same time formed themselves into the British East Africa Company, to develop the sphere retained for British influence to the north of the Kilimanjaro line. The German company became apprehensive that Stanley might on his return make treaties that would impinge upon the German "Hinterland," and possibly cut that company off from Lake Tanganyika. In July a representation was made to that effect to Lord Salisbury, then in charge of the foreign interests of England. Lord Salisbury assured Prince Bismarck that he would conclude no annexations in the rear of the German sphere, and that Germany should be allowed a free hand to the south of the Victoria Nyanza. He still left the question of the precise boundary between the English and German spheres on the west of Victoria Nyanza unsettled, and, as will be seen, this gave occasion for difficulties in the future.

The German East Africa Company, of which Dr. Peters was still the head and moving spirit, lost no time in endeavoring to reap the fruits of its treaties and of the enormous concessions which the German Government had obtained on its behalf. And here it may be noted that the German Colonization Society, which Peters had founded as a sort of rival to the German Colonial Society, united with the latter, in the end of 1887, into one association under the latter title. Some months before this the German East Africa Association had been incorporated by imperial charter, and was

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now in a position to combine the administration of its domains with territorial supremacy. During 1885 several expeditions were sent out partly to explore in various directions, and to collect precise information—not only on topography, but on geology, on climate, soil, and vegetation—such as would be of essential service to the intelligent development of the country. Branch or subordinate companies were formed, such as the East Africa Plantation Company and the German Planters' Company, for the special objects indicated by their names. On the Pangani and Umba Rivers, and in other districts near the coast, plantations were established, and by 1888 there were some thirty stations of the kind. Houses were built, the ground cleared, coffee, tobacco, maize, and a variety of other products were cultivated, and a fair beginning of industry and trade initiated. The tobacco was actually exported to Germany and met with a favorable reception. There was no lack of labor for wages, and when a bargain was made with the natives the German planters kept the latter stringently to it. At the same time it was admitted by the Germans themselves that slave labor was largely employed by them. But the English missionaries, nevertheless, felt themselves at liberty to advise the natives to deal confidently with the Germans. The English mission stations were carried on as before, while the missionary societies of Germany, both Catholic and Protestant, zealously joined in the work.

By this time, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, the British East Africa Company had begun operations and had leased from the sultan the strip of coast over which his authority was recognized between the German territory and the Tana. The German company decided to follow the example, and succeeded in making the Sultan Khalifa, who in March, 1888, had succeeded on the death of his brother Burghash, lease to them for fifty years the whole of the coast territory from the Rovuma to the Umba, thus giving them the command of seven ports and three roadsteads. The German company were to have the sole administration of the district and the collection of the customs, which under certain conditions were to be paid over to the sultan. Dr. Peters had by this time ceased to direct the company's affairs at Zanzibar, and under the new régime there was a much closer connection between the company's officials and the German consulate. A school for the study of the Swahili language was at once established at Berlin,

and energetic measures taken for the Germanizing of the whole of the coast towns. A staff of some sixty officials was sent out to carry on the new administration. The stations established in the interior by Peters were to be abandoned or given over to the missionaries; to the company they were a source of great loss and weakness. A military force was to be trained and distributed on the coast region, and additional customs stations were to be established. Herr Vohsen, the new administrator, informed the British consul-general, Colonel C. Euan Smith, who had succeeded Sir John Kirk, that the German company would follow very closely the example of the British company, and would not move into the interior unless the latter sought to do so. Stringent measures were to be taken to discourage the slave-trade carried on by the Arabs in Central Africa, and for this purpose it was intended to regulate or stop the importation of arms.

It must be said that the British consul-general expressed to the directors of the German company his fear that, unless great caution were exercised in effecting the transfer from the sultan's to the German administration, the consequences might be serious, as the powerful Arab traders and chiefs could not but regard the new régime with suspicion; for they imagined that it might seriously interfere with their peculiar trade. Smith's fears were only too speedily justified. The German officials took over administration on August 16, 1888; and on the 21st the British consul-general telegraphed to London that disturbances were reported from Bagamoyo and Pangani; induced in the first instance by indiscreet conduct with reference to the sultan's flag. Other indiscretions followed on the part of German officials, evidence of inexperience and want of tact in dealing with the natives. By the end of September the whole coast population was up in arms, against not only the Germans, but the English; by the end of the year they made no distinction between Germans and English; white men were "all robbers alike."

Unfortunately the German officials did not care to take any steps to conciliate the natives; their policy, to judge from their conduct, was to treat the latter as a conquered people, whose feelings it would be absurd to consider. A leader among the discontented natives arose in the person of the half-caste chief Bushiri, who showed an intelligence, determination, and resource that could not but compel respect. Germany was glad, in her need, to seek

the co-operation of England, and a blockade was established all along the German and the British sections of coast by the united fleets in Zanzibar waters. The hatred of the Germans grew more and more intense and some of the native tribes took an oath that they would eat a portion of the bodies of any Germans that might be killed; though, as a matter of fact, the Arabs were the instigators of the whole movement. Of course the company was quite unable to cope with the "insurrection" which it had deliberately incited, and the direct interference of the imperial government was necessary. In the beginning of 1889 Captain Hermann von Wissmann, who had twice crossed Africa, and done eminent service for the Congo Free State, was appointed Imperial Commissioner in East Africa. On the outbreak of the "insurrection" all the German plantations which had been established on the Pangani and elsewere were abandoned, and everything reduced to chaos; the hundreds of British Indians, in whose hands was the principal trade on the coast, had also to quit their houses and take refuge in Zanzibar. In a "White Book," published in January, 1889, the conduct of the German company was severely censured; and on the 30th of the month the Reichstag passed a vote of $500,000 "for the suppression of the slave-trade and the protection of German interests in East Africa." The officials of the company were placed under the command of Wissmann, who, moreover, had at his disposal about a thousand native troops, trained and armed with the newest weapons. The commissioner had sixty German officers and soldiers also, and the co-operation of about two hundred sailors from the German navy. Town after town on the coast was destroyed. Bushiri was relentlessly pursued, and his adherents defeated in fight after fight. It was not, however, until December, 1889, that Bushiri himself was run to earth and executed according to martial law. This practically put an end to the "insurrection" in the northern part of the German sphere, and the sultan was constrained to proclaim that all slaves who had entered his territories after November 1 were free. But it was the middle of 1890 before the southern coast was subdued, and the rebel chiefs of Ukami and other districts in the interior defeated, and German sovereignty established over the whole sphere from Cape Delgado to the River Wami.

There was, of course, no longer any question of the administration being left entirely in the hands of the company, which in

May, 1888, had been incorporated by imperial charter as a purely commercial association. After the suppression of the "insurrection," the sultan's rights over the coast were bought for a sum of $1,000,000, which, however, under various pretexts, was considerably reduced. The purchase was made in the name of the German East Africa Society, to which the government by agreement, November, 1890, advanced a loan of some $2,600,000, partly to pay the sultan and partly to expend in the improvement and development of the territory.

The administration is now entirely in the hands of an Imperial Civil Commissioner appointed by the German Government, his headquarters being at Dar-es-Salaam. Under him are district officers settled in the ports on the coast, and responsible for the traffic to and from the interior. The total area thus taken over is now estimated at about 384,000 square miles, with a population of about seven millions. Large grants are annually made by the imperial government, not only for administration, but for the construction of railways into the interior and steamers for Victoria Nyanza. In 1893 a steamer was placed on Lake Nyasa by the German Anti-Slavery Society, though it is doubtful how far it has conduced to the suppression of slavery. In the meantime, with remarkable rapidity, all the leading coast towns have been occupied and fortified. Each has its little garrison of Sudanese or East Africans, under European officers, and every precaution is taken to render their immediate environment as sanitary as possible. The garrisons of the various stations do not spend their time in idleness. Road-making, house-building, and other useful work is being continually carried on. Large herds of cattle and other domestic animals are being accumulated, gardens and plantations cultivated, buoys laid down, lighthouses erected, and these ancient towns on the East African coast will no doubt in time reach a condition of prosperity quite equal, if not superior, to that which the Portuguese found to exist when, over four hundred years ago, they began their conquest of the coast.

The example of the Germans and the people in their service has hitherto had fairly satisfactory results. Their uncompromising military methods may or may not in the long run be those best adapted for dealing with the natives of Central Africa. The utter want of tact exhibited by the officials of the company was no doubt deplorable. But once the mistake was made it is difficult to see

that any other course than that followed by the German Government could have been adopted to cope with the unfortunate consequences; unless, indeed, the coast had been abandoned indefinitely. It should be remembered that it was the Arabs and slave-dealing half-castes that were the real instigators of the "insurrection," and if Germany resolved once for all to read these personages a sharp lesson, it is difficult to see how the policy can be blamed, except on the untenable ground that Europe has no right in Africa at all. Once the strife was over, Arabs and Indians gathered round the old towns which had now become the centers of German power, and built solid houses and settled down to trade and to plant with more confidence than ever. In this way the coast population is steadily increasing, so that Bagamoyo, which was destroyed during the war, has now some 13,000 inhabitants, Dar-es-Salaam 13,000, and other towns in proportion. Even the streets are lighted at night, and covered market-places have been erected. Certainly the rapidity with which the Germans have established themselves in the country, and the wonderful progress already achieved, have made a deep impression upon the natives—Africans, Arabs, and Indians alike—who contrast what the Germans have done in five years with the little accomplished by the English during the fifty years they were supreme at Zanzibar, forgetting that the position of the latter in the Sultan's dominions was very different from that of the former.

Germany has not, however, contented herself with squatting on the coast. Expeditions have been sent out in various directions, partly for the purpose of prospecting, partly to found stations, and partly to establish German supremacy in the interior. Emin Pasha, who, when brought to the coast by his "rescuer" Stanley, entered the service of Germany, was the leader of one of these expeditions. He made his way to the Victoria Nyanza, on the west coast of which he established a station. Another expedition on its way into the interior encountered a horde of raiding Wahehe, whose country lies in the south of the German sphere, and in the fight which ensued the Germans met with serious losses. Incidents like these are to be expected if Germany continues to pursue her military method of occupation. It is premature to pronounce the method a failure. Hitherto it has been successful in so far as the establishment of German authority in the coast regions is concerned. The conditions of the interior are of course entirely

different, and no doubt the German Government will take care that its methods of occupation are adapted to these conditions. The great objects should be to induce the scanty population of the interior to settle down peacefully to the development of whatever resources the country possesses; to secure the safety of trading caravans; and in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels Congress to suppress slave-raiding, and the traffic in arms and spirits. In the carrying out of these objects mistakes may be made, a too rigid application of German military methods may defeat the purpose in view; but if these are adapted to the peculiar conditions of tropical Africa and the lessons of experience laid to heart, there seems no reason why German commerce should not be a great gainer, and German East Africa even pay its own way. Up to the present it has simply been a drain on the resources of the mother country. The imperial government, by direct contributions, by advancing loans to the company, by subvention to German steam companies, by arrangements with other powers, has done everything it could to promote the interests of German East Africa.

At Tanga, on the Pangani, and in other favorable positions, plantation work has again been resumed with considerable success, while experimental stations are being established for the benefit both of the whites and natives. Certainly the most promising part of the German sphere is on the north in Usambara and on the slopes of Kilimanjaro and the plateau on the south. During 1893-1894 experiments in coffee plantations met with great success, and the culture is spreading. Indeed in the year 1903, of the total sixteen thousand acres under actual cultivation, one-half were devoted to coffee. Experiments in tea, tobacco, and other cultures are also being made by the German East Africa Society and others. Now that the rebellious chiefs on Kilimanjaro have been subdued, attempts have been made to plant German settlers on its slopes. The southern district is much more backward. The soil is not so promising, the country not so wholesome, and the natives have proved very troublesome. This latter difficulty is being rapidly removed, and both in the north and the south Germany is establishing her authority over the natives as well as the Arab traders. The total value of the exports of German East Africa, in the year 1901, was about $1,150,000, while imports amounted to about $2,400,000.

One good result of the disturbances in German East Africa

1886-1903

was a satisfactory arrangement between Germany and Great Britain as to their respective spheres in that part of the continent. While by the arrangement of 1886 a boundary had been drawn between the coast and Victoria Nyanza, the region to the west of the lake was regarded by enterprising Germans as open to all comers in spite of the proviso that Germany would not seek to make acquisitions on the south of the lake. As will be seen when we come to deal with British East Africa, determined attempts had been made by Peters and his friends to get behind the British sphere and secure all the lake regions for Germany. Had matters proceeded smoothly and peacefully in East Africa, there is reason to believe that the German Government might have lent itself to the support of Peters's schemes. But the coöperation of England in the suppression of the "insurrection" was so necessary and was so freely given that it was felt in Berlin that Germany's policy was to come to a friendly understanding with her neighbor in East Africa as to the limits of their respective spheres. England fortunately had an islet, Heligoland, on the German coast, which could never really be of much use to her unless she incurred an enormous expenditure for fortifications and harbors; this islet was naturally coveted by Germany, to which it belonged geographically. By yielding to German sentiment in this matter probably England secured better terms in Africa than she could otherwise have done. Witu at the mouth of the Tana, with all the stretch of coast-line to the north, which it was maintained had been acquired by German subjects, was left within the British sphere. This freed the British company from a constant cause of menace and trouble, and did away with a fruitful source of misunderstanding between the two powers. On the south, England was not quite so fortunate. The German boundary line was drawn along the River Rovuma to Lake Nyasa, which so far affected Portugal alone. On the west side of the lake, however, while the line between the German and the British spheres was drawn so as to include the Stevenson road, which runs from Lake Nyasa to Lake Tanganyika, with the British sphere, the rich country to the northwest of the former lake, on which British missionaries had been at work for years, was placed in the German sphere. But with such enormous areas at the disposal of each nation, a little lake paradise of this description cannot make much difference either way. The western limit of Germany was of course the eastern boundary of the Congo Free State.

This—followed as it shortly was by the acceptance of a British protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, all that was left unallotted of the Sultan's domains—put an end to any risk of serious misunderstanding between Germany and England as to their respective spheres in East Africa. It left the mercantile companies of the two nations to the development by fair competition of the resources of their respective spheres, in which there is room enough for rivalry. Germany, it must be said, is somewhat handicapped by her neighbors. Several old trade-routes pass through her sphere; but with the facilities for transit which exist by means of Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, the Shiré and the Zambezi, much of the trade of the center of the continent may be diverted into the British sphere. Dating from April 1, 1891, a civil governor has been placed at the head of the administration of German East Africa, and to him the military power is subordinate. It is certainly a step in the right direction. The total number of native troops employed for the defense of German East Africa is 1700, trained by a large number of European officers and non-commissioned officers. Considerably over one-half of the annual expenditure in this possession is contributed by the imperial government.


Chapter XIII

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE NIGER. 1817-1910

IT has already been seen that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European, and it may be said, American, activity was mainly confined to the west coast, between Cape Blanco and St. Paul de Loanda; that this activity was centered in the slave-trade; that on the abolition of the latter the British west coast colonies were neglected and despised, and all advance to the interior discouraged; while the French, on the other hand, never lost sight of the Niger and Timbuktu as their goal. British traders had been settled on the Oil Rivers since the old slave-trade days, and British enterprise forty years ago attempted, amid much disaster, to open up the Lower Niger from the Gulf of Guinea. It was also through British money and initiative, making use of German skill and perseverance, that the northern and eastern regions of the Niger basin were explored by Dr. Barth in 1850-1853. About the middle of the century, as we have seen, fresh impulse was given to French operations from the Senegal coast toward the Upper Niger. Expeditions pushed on toward the interior, subduing tribes, and making treaties of protection with them one after another. Up to 1880, however, French influence in the interior may be said to have been assured at only a few isolated posts.

After the death, in 1817, of the great Moslem missionary conqueror Othman, a sheik of the remarkable peoples known as Fulah, the extensive "empire" which he had established, extending from near Lake Chad on the east to the borders of the Atlantic on the west, was broken up into a number of independent but still powerful states. Sokoto and Gando fell to his two sons, while the countries to the west of the Niger became still further broken up. When, therefore, France resumed with determined vigor her task of obtaining supremacy from the Atlantic to the Niger, she had to overcome the resistance of a series of detached and independent native states, extending from the north of the Senegal to the source of the Niger, most of them either completely Moslem, or at least with

fanatic Moslems as their rulers. The Fulah were and are the paramount people in the hilly country of the Futa Jallon, on the left bank of the Senegal, and the country of Massina, though as a matter of fact they are found all over the Niger basin. In their purest state they are not negro, but are immigrants from the East. The bulk of the natives, however, are Mandingoes (negroes), who under various names, as Bambarras, Mahinkis, Senufs, etc., are spread over the whole region, merging to the north into the races which people the Sahara. One of the most formidable of the



THE NIGER REGION

native chiefs whom the French had to encounter was Ahmadu, son of El-Haj-Omar, who in the fifties and sixties extended his fanatical sway over most of the country from Dingueray, on the east of Futa Jallon, to Kaarta, on the north of the Upper Senegal. After the father's death his "empire" was broken up, and Ahmadu reigned over that portion which lay between the middle of the Upper Niger and the Upper Senegal. Still more formidable was the powerful Samory (or Samadu), who had risen from a humble origin to be lord of all the region on the Upper Niger. The Futa Jallon country still protested against French domination, and coquetted with England. East of the Niger were states of more or

less importance, like Wasulu, Kong, Massina, Mossi, and others, some of them Mohammedan, some of them pagan. Most of them possessed armies more or less organized, and more or less animated by Moslem fanaticism, and a determination to prevent France from securing a permanent footing on the Niger. As for Timbuktu, it was, as it had been for many years, practically independent, an *entrepôt* for trade between the Sudan and the Mediterranean, but far from holding the important place which is ascribed to it in the early days of Mohammedan domination in the Sudan.

In 1880 a great series of military campaigns by the French, combined with political and scientific missions, resulted in conquests on a much larger scale than before. Captain Gallieni, for the purpose of laying down an interior railway route, traversed the country between Medina and the Upper Niger. It was only, however, after long negotiations and the taking of Kita that Gallieni succeeded in signing at Nango, with King Ahmadu, a treaty (March 21, 1881) which, it was maintained, gave to France the protectorate of the left bank of the Upper Niger. Notwithstanding the attacks of the powerful Samory, the French maintained their position. In 1885-1886 Colonel Frey renewed hostilities with Samory, with whom a treaty of peace was signed in 1886, and at the same time this officer had to suppress a fanatical Mussulman insurrection. He was succeeded by Gallieni, who in 1887 induced King Ahmadu to sign a treaty which placed the territories of that chief under French protection. It was under Gallieni that the railway from Kayes to Balfoulabé on the Upper Senegal was completed—a railway intended to join that river with the Upper Niger. It receives a yearly subsidy to prevent its being buried beneath the sands of the Sudan. Under Gallieni, also, a treaty in the same year was concluded with Samory modifying that of 1886 and making over to French protection the left bank of the Tankisso (a western tributary of the Upper Niger) from its source, and the left bank of the Upper Niger itself from the junction of the Tankisso down to Bammako (130 miles). Also under the same commander, Lieutenant Caron, on board the gunboat *Niger,* navigated the river for some miles below Bammako to Kabara, the port of Timbuktu, but was compelled, owing to the hostility of the population, to return without accomplishing anything. Timbuktu, which better knowledge has reduced from an immense city of 200,000 inhabitants to a comparatively insignificant town of 10,000, still dazzled the French

imagination as the center of the Moslem civilization and the riches of the Sudan.

In 1888 exploring expeditions were sent out in all directions by Gallieni, and a mass of information thus collected was of the greatest use in carrying out further annexations. Captain Gallieni was specially anxious to obtain a firm footing in the Futa Jallon, which, to the northeast of Sierra Leone, formed for France the connecting link between her posts on the Upper Niger and her establishments on the Atlantic coast. This mountainous region, from the commercial, the military, and the sanitary point of view, was justly regarded as a desirable possession.

A treaty was made in 1881 with Dr. Bayol by the Almamy of Futa Jallon, though the tribe did not take kindly to French protection, and even made overtures to England; but the success of Gallieni decided the Almamy to take the prudent course of submission. In 1887 he signed a treaty placing all his country under the exclusive protection of France. On the other side of the Upper Niger the work of treaty-making, as well as of exploration, was carried out in 1888-1890 by Captain Binger, who traversed much of the region within the great bend of the Niger, starting from Bammako and zigzagging until he reached the Guinea coast. Captain Binger made treaties by which the countries of Tieba, Kong, Jimini, Anno, and Bondoko are placed under French protection. These, with other treaties made about the same time, unite the colony of Grand Bassam on the Guinea coast with the French possessions on the Upper Niger. In 1891 France declared her annexation of the strip of coast between Liberia and Grand Bassam. There is thus a solid block of French territory all the way from the coast of Senegal to the Gulf of Guinea, shutting out from the interior the colonies of England and Portugal and the state of Liberia. French Guinea has advanced with considerable rapidity of late years, and its capital, Conakry, already vies with Free-Town. Railroad building on an ambitious plan commenced in 1900. The eastern boundary of Binger's acquisitions is the Black Volta, which, joining the Red and the White Volta farther east, forms part of the boundary between Ashanti and the Gold Coast colony on the one hand, and German Togoland on the other. Captain Binger, moreover, entered into relations with Salaga, about two-thirds of the distance between the Guinea Coast and Timbuktu. By the Anglo-French agreement of August, 1889, France has no right to

come south of the 9th degree of north latitude in the rear of the Gold Coast colony. She has the whole of the Upper Niger and the great bend that sweeps round by Timbuktu, with more than one-half of the area embraced within the bend.

The French hold on the Upper Niger was still further tightened by the campaigns of 1890-1891, under Colonel Archinard, who captured Sego, on the right bank of the river below Bammako, and in January, 1891, Nioro, the capital of Kaarta, thus partially destroying the power of Ahmadu, who, notwithstanding former treaties, was unwilling to resign his independence. He was the great obstruction on the way to Timbuktu and Lake Chad on the one side, and to Futa Jallon on the other. Colonel Archinard, in April, 1891, sent the troublesome Samory flying toward the south and occupied his capital. But the trouble with this chief did not end until late in 1898, when his capture, with all his army, completed, according to Fallot, "the conquest and final pacification of the Sudan."


By an arrangement concluded in August, 1894, the boundaries between Liberia and the territory claimed by France were agreed upon. This difficulty having been settled, vigorous measures were taken to bring the troublesome Samory into complete subjection. In 1894 Colonel Monteil entered upon a campaign from the Guinea Coast; but his progress was so hampered by the natives, and his conduct of the expedition so unsatisfactory, that in February, 1895, he was recalled. No doubt the French operations will be facilitated by the telegraph which has been constructed to the Upper Niger. It is not France alone whose advances in West Africa have been thwarted by this chief; he has proved troublesome also to the British colony of Sierra Leone. The necessity for repelling his hostile incursions led in the end of December, 1893, to a collision, through mistake, between an English and a French expedition, which resulted in serious losses on both sides. A few weeks later a similar collision took place, happily without such disastrous results. These unfortunate occurrences seem to have been mainly due to the fact that uncertainty existed as to the frontier between English and French territory in this region.

French expeditions, partly exploratory, partly military and political, continue to traverse the country between the coast and the Upper Niger, one of them being for the survey of a railway route between the Upper Niger and the coast; as the railway in-

tended to connect the Senegal and the Niger is practically useless. Other expeditions followed in the footsteps of Binger; one, under Captain Monteil, having for its object to push on to Say on the Middle Niger, and thence to Lake Chad, succeeded in accomplishing its object and crossed the desert to Tripoli. Others will be referred to later on. The evident object of them all has been to sweep into the French sphere the whole of the Niger and Chad regions.

Perhaps the most striking event in recent years has been the entry of the French into Timbuktu in the last days of December, 1893. This was accomplished by a column under Colonel Bonnier. But the occupation was not unattended with disaster. While the inhabitants of Timbuktu were apparently resigned to the position, the Tuaregs in the country around were fiercely hostile. One party of French troops was surprised at some distance from Timbuktu and almost annihilated. Other hostile manifestations were made, but there is no doubt that the French will hold their place, and retain possession of the city which has been their goal for so long. The Tuaregs have been severely punished for their successful surprises, several tribes having been almost destroyed.

This French dream of a great empire in Africa, stretching without interruption from the Mediterranean to the Congo, received a severe check, though it was by no means absolutely defeated, by a few British merchants inspired and led by one clear-sighted, determined, public-spirited man, Sir George Taubman Goldie, an ex-officer of the Royal Engineers, who had first visited the Niger in 1877. The old relations of England with the Oil Rivers, an intricate network of streams partly forming the Niger delta and partly independent creeks, have already been referred to. It has also been shown that after the discovery of the course of the Lower Niger in 1829, the British Government, as well as private individuals, from 1840 to 1860, endeavored to develop the navigation and trade of the river, but that these attempts ended only in disaster and failure. Traders belonging, for the most part, to Liverpool and Glasgow still continued their factories on the Oil Rivers, on some of which British missions have been settled for over half a century. These traders had no direct connection with the interior, their business being conducted on the coast-line through native middlemen who barred the way inland. After the abolition of the slave-trade it took some time to induce the natives to settle down to legitimate traffic. Gradually the trade in palm oil and latterly palm



IN THE COUNTRY OF THE TUAREGS

A Caravan is halted by one of the Veiled Outposts who has just to report on their mission to his Chief

Painting by Albert Richter

kernels developed, and as the articles given in exchange—spirits, guns and powder, cotton, and other goods—were of the cheapest character, great profits were made. Still the great river, the finest navigable highway into the interior of Africa, which comes out to the Atlantic in the center of the Oil Rivers, remained neglected as a commercial route, the native chiefs themselves putting every obstacle in the way of its utilization. After the British Government ceased to send out or subsidize expeditions, over a quarter of a century ago, several enterprising firms established permanent trading stations on the Niger at their own cost and risk. Macgregor Laird was the pioneer in this new enterprise. As far back as 1852 he entered the region determined to secure it for British trade, and though his station was destroyed by the natives and death terminated his work, he had paved the way for others. The most successful of these pioneers was Mr. James Alexander Croft, known as the "Father of the Niger," whose efforts during fifteen years had much to do in opening up the great river to traders. But no solid basis for wide extension or for the protection of British interests could be expected from the isolated and conflicting efforts of individual traders and firms with very limited capital, in a region where all was chaos, arising from generations of intertribal wars and continuous slave-raids. On the lower Niger the natives are all pagans and barbarians, though the river is the key to the semi-civilized and populous states of the Central Sudan. While the visits of the one or two white agents to these barbarians had some good influence, the constant rivalry between the various firms and the intrigues and counter-intrigues among their colored agents made all progress impossible.

Even at the three or four points where alone Europeans ventured to establish stations, frequent outrages occurred on the part of turbulent and indolent natives, who overawed their more industrious and peaceful tribesmen; while directly any tribe with commercial instincts acquired a modicum of wealth, this became the motive for attack by more warlike neighbors, so that the only result of their prudence and industry was the loss of such property as they had acquired. They were fortunate, too, if they were not carried off as slaves into the bargain. At rare intervals a British gunboat would ascend the main river a short distance during the high Niger, bombard the stick or clay houses on the banks, and then hurry back to the sea with half the crew down with fever;

then the natives, who had retired to a safe distance from the river, would return, rebuild their houses, and recommence their previous conduct, knowing that their houses were safe for another twelve months.

In 1879, however, all the British interests on the Niger River were amalgamated into the United African Company. There were at that time no other Europeans on the river. From that time, under the influence of Sir George Goldie, it was resolved to try to keep the peace among the hundreds of heterogeneous tribes by welding them into a homogeneous state, and to obtain a charter for the administration of the district. On applying to the government in 1881, the first difficulty raised was that the capital of the company was too small. To meet this, the capital was increased from $625,000 to $5,000,000; the company was thrown open to the public, and the name changed to the National African Company. Even then (1882) the prospectus of the company announced as their aim the establishing of direct relations with the great and powerful kingdoms of Sokoto and Gando and the states of the Chad basin. The company at once experienced an immense development. New stations were established, steamers and launches were sent out, operations were pushed farther and farther up both the Niger and its great tributary, the Benué, and preparations made for the expected charter.

Meanwhile, under the inspiration of Gambetta, French traders began to creep into the Lower Niger, and two French companies were formed, their patent intention being to secure the Lower and Middle Niger and the Benué for France, whose military agents by different tactics were rapidly making their way to absorb the upper river. One of these companies had a capital of $800,000 and the other of $3,000,000. Station after station was established, until there were something like thirty of these planted on the lower river. All this had proved a complete barrier to the issue of a British charter, as France would have justly and effectually protested against such a course. If this state of things had continued the entire region would have been lost to England, which had done so much for its exploration and its commercial development. The situation was certainly critical and trying, but the ever-watchful Goldie was equal to the emergency. The British company greatly increased their staff, multiplied their stations, and lavished their goods in presents, in order to prevent the native tribes making

treaties with the French; moreover, by intense competition they greatly enhanced the cost of the native products which formed the commodities of trade. In this way, after a costly struggle, the losses of the French companies became so serious that, after the fall of Gambetta, both of them were induced to retire from the Niger, being partly bought out in cash or shares by the British company, who have still French shareholders on their list with holdings amounting to $300,000. The final deeds of transfer were signed only a few days before the meeting of the Berlin Conference, when the British plenipotentiary was able to announce that no nation but England had any interests on the Lower Niger.

No sooner had this danger been gotten rid of than another, quite as serious, threatened the company. The events at the Cameroons associated with the name of Dr. Nachtigal will be remembered, and how it was only under the incitement of panic that England kept her hold on the Oil Rivers region, which was declared a British protectorate in July, 1884. But the Central Sudan was still unsecured by any treaty or declaration of protection, and Germany was not slow to take advantage of this. The feeling against England at the time was intensely bitter in Germany, and every possible means was adopted to hamper British operations in Africa. In April, 1885, Flegel, under the auspices of the German African Society and the German Colonial Society, left Berlin for the Niger with intentions that were obvious. But the National African Company, having become aware in time of the German intentions and of the projected scheme, had already taken steps to secure its position on the upper river. Mr. Joseph Thomson had returned in 1884, much shattered in health, from his successful expedition into the Masai Land. Before the meeting of the Berlin Conference, Sir George Goldie engaged him to proceed up the Niger and secure all the country on its banks by treaty. His departure was delayed by illness, but as soon as he was able he set out on his all-important mission, and even before Flegel left Berlin, he, in March, 1885, was entering the mouth of the Niger. With a speed that was marvelous but characteristic, Thomson made his way up the Niger to Sokoto and Gando, concluded treaties with the sultans, and secured the allegiance to the company of their great empires. As Thomson returned to the coast triumphant, he met Flegel on his way up on a fruitless errand.

The company could now show some three hundred treaties

with native chiefs, securing to them the whole of the river-territory up to, and they believed including, Burrum at the northeast angle of the Niger bend. Immediately on the withdrawal of the French flag the company had urgently renewed their appeals for a royal charter which would not only leave them unobstructed in the development of their immense territory, but secure the splendid highway and the region to which it gave access for England; but the issue of a charter was again delayed until July, 1886, chiefly owing to scruples in high quarters as to the possibility of granting a charter over territories which, owing to the Berlin Conference, had to be placed under British protection. At last, however, the whole of the navigable part of this great commercial highway, and its almost equally great tributary, the Benué, were definitely secured for England, and the National African Company became the Royal Niger Company, of which Sir George Goldie (the real creator of the company) was vice-governor. In 1895 the company had about forty settlements. An elaborate system of justice and administration had been established, while there was as little interference as possible with the internal affairs of the native states. There was a military force of about 1000 men, with headquarters at Lokoja, and of course scattered over the territories a considerable staff of white officials with great numbers of colored assistants, who are educated natives of the West Coast colonies, and to whose hearty coöperation and excellent work the company have acknowledged that much of their success is due. By January 1, 1900, the time seemed ripe for imperial assumption of the company's territories; on this date the latter surrendered its charter, and its possessions became what is now known as Nigeria. The development of the country is proceeding apace, though the trade is so far entirely in fibers, gums, ivory, kernels, palm oil, peppers, rubber, and other natural products. But, as far as the deadly climate admits, experiments are being made on a considerable scale with coffee, cocoa, and other introduced cultures, and measures are meanwhile being taken to make the most of the natural forest and other products, without exhausting them.

Of course the brief career of the Royal Niger Company was not without troubles and difficulties. It could not, as a government, expend more than it raised by taxation, and as it was not practicable to tax the natives, the administrative revenue depended on customs duties; while the volume of trade, though growing rapidly,

was insignificant compared with the area occupied. The company had, moreover, to contend with vigorous and state-supported foreign aggression, and could only obtain the money for the struggle by a high customs tariff. Unfortunately for imperial interests, this policy raised a great outcry, not only in Germany and France, which naturally desired to cripple the resources of their most active rival in West Africa, but also in Liverpool. A powerfully organized agitation against the company was carried on for some years both at home and abroad. Prince Bismarck, after dispatching his nephew, Herr von Puttkamer, to the Niger as an imperial commissioner, fulminated in a White Book against the company's taxation, while admitting that its administration was "admirably organized."

All this resulted in its being compelled, after four years' negotiations, to limit its administrative expenditure; so that it had not only to abandon its plans for extension eastward to the valley of the Nile, but also to slacken in its efforts to establish in its acquired territory the peace and order which it had declared an essential preliminary to the development of commerce. It was in vain that the company pleaded that nearly all taxation fell on its own commercial operations as the chief traders in the Niger. Under a parliamentary régime votes are more important than arguments, while the company could not put its objects before the public without divulging them to France and Germany. As a last resource the company suggested that an imperial subsidy of $250,000 a year might be granted. This was not conceded, and the strange spectacle was presented of a company willing and even anxious to tax its own commercial operations heavily for imperial purposes, yet denied permission to do so, because similar taxation would have to be borne by other traders, who would be enabled to enter the Niger in safety, thanks to the order established there by the expenditure of the revenue.

It seems to be a prevailing error that the Berlin Act imposed free trade on the Niger region as it did on the basin of the Congo; this is quite erroneous. The waters of the British Niger were freed at the Berlin Conference for transit of merchant ships to regions beyond British influence, following the principle which, since the Congress of Vienna in 1815, has been adopted for nearly all the rivers in Europe and America which flow through two or more states; but the company were at liberty to impose what

customs regulations they deem necessary as to landing on their own territories. There are numerous ports of entry, and the company were entitled to insist that these and these alone should be used by vessels; just as all maritime nations have ports where alone vessels may load or discharge. Both Germany and France have endeavored to break through these regulations, and to avoid the dues which have been imposed, and especially the almost prohibitive duties on spirits, but these attempts have invariably proved unsuccessful.

The Royal Niger Company was the first English company in modern times to which a charter was granted for territories under British protection. It was, indeed, preceded for some years by the British North Borneo Company, but their territories were not placed under British protection until the grant of charters to the British East Africa and British South Africa Companies, some time after the granting of the Niger charter. It has been seen in previous chapters that such instruments were common in past times, from the days of Elizabeth downward. There can be little question that such a method is well adapted for initiating the development of a distant tropical country, the inhabitants of which are to a large extent barbarous, the climate of which is not favorable for permanent European settlement, and which is not ripe for the elaborate and expensive machinery of a Crown colony. It secures the region for the power which grants the charter at a minimum of outlay, and the rule of the company may at any time, should the necessity arise, be superseded by a more direct imperial administration. A charter is an admirable compromise, a useful first step to something more advanced. The protection which Great Britain affords is limited to securing the chartered regions from external aggression on the part of civilized powers; and the maintenance of internal peace and security lies upon the chartered companies. While the government that grants it is thus freed from all expenditure, it can impose whatever conditions it chooses in order to secure satisfactory administration, and can at any time withdraw the charter if these conditions are not adhered to. Of the three great African companies which have received royal charters, the Royal Niger Company was the one which came least before the public, but up to its supercession it was the most steadily progressive. Without taking the public into its confidence, the company quietly advanced from one post to another, and made

one treaty after another, until its sphere embraced an area of about 400,000 square miles. It took precautions, among other things, to forestall attempts on the part of other powers to come between itself and that portion of the Central Sudan which it believed with some justice ought to be within its sphere.

At first sight it seems anomalous and to be regretted that the region known as the Oil Rivers, extending from the boundary of the colony of Lagos to the Forcados River, and from the Brass River to the Rio del Rey, which may be in part regarded as the delta of the Niger, should have been quite detached from the jurisdiction to which the river itself is subjected: but there were reasons for it. As has been seen, British traders had been settled here for many years, long before the great river was itself known in its lower course. As we have seen, they narrowly escaped annexation by Germany; for there can be little doubt that had Hewett not forestalled Nachtigal, the latter would have had no hesitation in dealing with them as he did with the Cameroons; had he done so he would have secured the greater part of the seaboard between the colony and Lagos. After the Oil Rivers were declared a British protectorate in 1884, they were subject to a consular jurisdiction until 1891, when an imperial administrator and consul-general was appointed, with a staff of vice-consuls, one to be stationed on each river. Taxes were of necessity imposed; the rough system of justice administered by Courts of Equity, composed of the merchants themselves under consular supervision, was superseded by more regular methods, and the Oil Rivers were virtually converted into a Crown colony.

The Oil Rivers march, on their north side, with the colony of Lagos, of all the British colonies in West Africa, the most prosperous and promising, mainly because it has a reasonable Hinterland behind it. The rich and thickly populated Yoruba country has been annexed as a protectorate, a country capable of great agricultural development, with large cities populated by an eager trading population. With regard to the other British West African colonies, the enterprise of the French, combined with the British policy of abstention already referred to, has practically restricted the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone to strips of the seaboard, while the Gambia colony is confined to the banks of the river. Both banks of the Gambia, however, have been British since 1901, and in that same year Ashanti was definitely annexed. A protectorate

proclaimed in 1806 has also added considerably to the extent of Sierra Leone. More recently the colony of Nigeria has been formed, for the most part (about nine-tenths) out of the domains of the Royal Niger Company, which surrendered its rights January 1, 1900. There strenuous and irresistible pressure has been brought to bear against the two horrors of the district, slavery and cannibalism. All children born after April 1, 1901, are free. Similar operations favoring civilization and the growth of trade have been pushed forward steadily along the Gold Coast, Lagos, the Gambia, and Sierra Leone. Harbor works have been constructed along this coast.

Before briefly referring to the international treaties by which the powers concerned have attempted to delimit the spheres within which their influence is acknowledged, let us realize the fact that the goal of all the three great nations concerned lies in the region around Lake Chad. Timbuktu, it has already been pointed out, has always dazzled the dreamers of France as the central point of the future great "African Empire," and the key to the Central Sudan, which with some justice has been regarded as one of the richest regions of Central Africa. Although Timbuktu has been reduced to a comparatively commonplace town, still the Central Sudan—Sokoto, Bornu, Bagirmi, Kanem, Wadai, Darfur, to name the principal states—is a region which any commercial people might well desire to monopolize. While there is a large substratum of pagan population, negroes and mixed breeds, the ruling people are Mohammedan, comparatively civilized, using enormous quantities of textile and other commodities which Europe can supply. The ruling race, the Fellatah or Fulah, are of a superior type, totally distinct from the true negro, and coming from the east. Here we have the old semi-barbarous Mohammedan pageantry in its ancient glory, combined with intense hatred of the infidel European. The French have had many difficulties with such Mohammedan potentates as Samory and Ahmadu. King M'tesa of Uganda was not to be dealt with so easily as a wretched Congo chief, or even as Lobengula; but these Central Sudan potentates may give more trouble to the power or powers that undertake to reduce them to subjection than all the rest of Africa combined, not even excepting Morocco. But notwithstanding this, or in ignorance of it, Great Britain, France, and Germany tried to outrace each other in reaching the Chad regions. France has sent

expedition after expedition from the Senegal Coast and the Guinea Coast, with Lake Chad—little better than a huge marsh—as their goal. Most of these expeditions are undertaken at government expense. Perhaps the most determined attempt which has been made was the expedition which in 1890 started from the Mobangi tributary of the Congo under M. Paul Crampel. It ascended the Mobangi and struck northward to the Bagirmi country, the southern limit of which is only about three hundred miles from the Mobangi. Disaster overtook the expedition on the threshold of Bagirmi, and M. Crampel and all but one of his white companions were massacred. Another expedition under a young naval officer, Lieutenant Mizon, actually entered the river itself in 1890 for the purpose of getting behind the Niger Company's territories in order to secure the Hinterland for France. Notwithstanding the avowed object of the expedition, the company did all they could possibly be expected to do to help Mizon, even going so far as to lend him money and to tow boats up the Niger and Benué. Foiled in his attempt to cut the company off from the Lake Chad region, Mizon entered into relations with the King of Adamawa, from whose country he marched south behind the German Cameroons to the French Congo. In the summer of 1892 he again set out for the Niger with the avowed object of furthering French commercial interests in Adamawa, and of extending French influence as far in the direction of Lake Chad as possible. He asserted that he succeeded in concluding a treaty with a chief on the Upper Benué, but a German officer in the same region maintained that he also had concluded a treaty with the same chief some days before. M. Dubowski and M. Maistre, starting from the Mobangi River, and following in the footsteps of Crampel, in 1892-1893 made their way north through Adamawa, reaching the River Shari, where, according to their reports, they made treaties with several chiefs. All this activity on the part of France prepared the way for fresh arrangements for the partition of the region to the south of Lake Chad. The French finally reached the lake, and thus effected a union between their Sudanese possessions and those of the Congo, during the years 1899 and 1900.

Both French and German expeditions had not only the sympathy, but the active support of their governments, who supplied considerable sums annually from the treasuries for the development of their African possessions; while the Niger Company, as a purely

private undertaking, did not cost the British Government a penny. Yet this remarkable fact remains, that the private enterprise yielded a fair profit to those engaged in it, while both the French and German spheres have involved an expenditure far in excess of any revenue which has been derived from them. Here, as in other portions of the British Empire, the flag has followed the trade; the reverse policy has been that of France and of Germany in Africa. Indeed there is a strong colonial party in France who are tired of all these expeditions, military and exploratory, who maintain that French annexation has gone far enough, and that the time has come to develop what has already been acquired, which, so far, has only been a source of outlay without return.

As was to be expected, the various stages of advance in the direction of the Niger and Lake Chad have been marked by international arrangements, not always so clear and well defined as to prevent ambiguity and to obviate disputes between those who were parties to them. Between France and England there have been several arrangements regulating the position of their colonies on the coast, and their respective spheres in the interior. On the Gambia, by the agreement of August 10, 1889, the British sphere is virtually confined to about six miles on each side of the river as far as Yarbutendi. The exports from the Gambia are on an average (1898-1901) about $1,200,000, and the trade is almost entirely in French hands. Until we reach Sierra Leone, French territory is uninterrupted except for a block of 4500 square miles to the south of the Gambia, which is all that remains of Portuguese Guinea. It is to be feared that France is now in actual occupation of the whole region from which Sierra Leone could derive its trade.

Much the same might be said of Liberia, though so far as the wants of its population go,—even with all the encroachments of France,—the country itself possesses resources enough if they were properly developed. But what with the presence of a British colony on the north, and the French in the Hinterland and on the south coast, Liberia has been gradually reduced both in length and breadth. So far as the prosperity of the country and the welfare of the population are concerned, annexation by some strong power might not be a calamity: the experiment of an independent civilized African state can hardly be said to have been a success. It is a fair example of how far the native of Central Africa, even

when comparatively civilized, is, if left to himself, capable of developing the resources of his continent.

By the Anglo-French agreement already referred to, the British Gold Coast colony is permitted to stretch inland to 9° north latitude; and if the treaties which the French are reported to have made with the natives in the interior are admitted to be valid, the Gold Coast will be in much the same position as Sierra Leone, while on the other side, as was shown in a previous chapter, the Germans have been attempting to creep round from Togoland in spite of the neutral zone that was established by the Anglo-German agreement of 1888. In their attempts to press into the interior the Germans are more likely to come into contact with the French than with the British. The small wedge of French territory between Togoland and Lagos has the fierce Dahomans behind it; with these France had a severe struggle in 1892-1894, resulting in the practical subjugation of one of the most troublesome native states in Africa, and the establishment of French supremacy. But Dahomey is completely insulated by the treaties of the Royal Niger Company. Thus it is evident that until we approach the former sphere of the Royal Niger Company, France practically claims to be dominant in the interior. From the point of view of *haute politique* British statesmen may or may not be justified in merely "watching" (as their expression is) these French advances. But, undoubtedly, British trade in the West African colonies has been severely hampered by these wholesale annexations. England has not sought to enter into competition with France in the advance of the latter into interior regions, at first, because British statesmen shirked incurring further responsibility, and latterly, to all appearance, for no other reason than to please France, England has held her hands. It may be that those whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the British Empire believe that they have had compensation for this abnegation elsewhere. It is usual to reproach the West African colonists with never having done much to develop the trade of the interior; they have simply squatted on the coast and taken what was brought them; but the difficulty has been that any more enterprising policy has been discouraged by the home government.

So far as British interests in this region of Central Africa are concerned, the Anglo-French agreement of August 5, 1890, is of the utmost importance. Let us briefly consider its purport. The

clause which relates to the Niger region is as follows: "The Government of Her Britannic Majesty recognizes the sphere of influence of France to the south of the Mediterranean possessions, up to a line from Say on the Niger to Barrua on Lake Chad, drawn in such a manner as to comprise in the sphere of action of the Niger Company all that fairly belongs to the kingdom of Sokoto; the line to be determined by the commission to be appointed." Commissioners from the two powers were to meet in Paris to determine the boundaries of the respective spheres, including the region to the west and the south of the Middle Niger, the region in which the agents of France have been so busy making treaties without waiting for the decision of a commission which has never met. The line between Say and Barrua is traced very differently by French and English cartographers. The former make it almost straight, with a tendency to bend southward, the latter, recognizing that the country of Air or Asben is subject to Sokoto, make it take a sharp bend northward, to about 18° north latitude before it sweeps down to Say. The French cartographers make the western boundary line drop directly southward from Say to the Guinea Coast, ignoring Gurma, which is a province of the Sokoto-Gandu empire, and Borgu, with which kingdom the Niger Company has treaties.

Again, it is maintained on the British side that, in accordance with the spirit of the arrangement, France should abstain from making any annexations to the immediate south of Lake Chad, or to the east of the lake south of the continuation of the Say-Barrua line. But as we have seen, this is not the French interpretation, and precipitate and, to a certain extent, successful, efforts have been made to get behind the former Niger Company's sphere, and if possible create a French sphere on the south and east of Lake Chad. Bornu, which lies between Sokoto and Lake Chad, is, though somewhat decayed, still a powerful Mohammedan state, with five million people, the trade of which is worth cultivating; it is within the British sphere. Bagirmi, which lies southeast from Lake Chad, is not so advanced in civilization as the great kingdom of Wadai, to which it is subject. Wadai, the most powerful Mohammedan state in the Central Sudan, occupies the space between Lake Chad and Darfur, 170,000 square miles in area, with a population of two millions. The negro Mabas, who are the ruling people, are fanatical Mohammedans, and Wadai will prove one of the most

difficult of all the African states to deal with. Kanem, which lies round the north and east shores of the lake, is also tributary to Wadai. To the east of Wadai all except the western section of Darfur is, according to the Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890, within the sphere of influence of Great Britain.

It is these Central Sudan states the suzerainty of which has been coveted by France and Germany; the lake around which they are grouped is the goal to which so many French expeditions have been concentrating along half a dozen lines. No doubt the Royal Niger Company had a position of advantage over all the others, being, so to speak, within measurable distance of the lake; and it cannot be accused of any lack of enterprise. Those who directed its affairs knew their own interests, and might have been trusted to secure a footing in the Lake Chad states if they had been permitted to tax themselves and others to secure the necessary means. If the company had succeeded in overcoming the Mohammedan fanaticism of the Chad states so far as to induce them by peaceful means to enter into friendly relations, it is to be hoped it would have obtained prompt support from the imperial government, though in view of recent events in East Africa this is doubtful. In this way the British sphere might have extended across the heart of the Sudan from the Nile to the Niger, and included one of the most desirable sections of the continent. The Lake Chad region is one of the great centers of the traffic in slaves, thousands of whom, captured in the pagan countries to the south, are sent across the Sahara every year; and it will probably be found more difficult to suppress this trade here than in any other part of Africa.

Here, as elsewhere in Central Africa, the course of events compelled a compromise. While French agents were forcing their way from the west and the south behind the British sphere, with Lake Chad as their goal, well-equipped expeditions from the Cameroons made their way to the Upper Benué with a similar object. This activity on the part of France and Germany rendered inaction on the part of England impossible. The Niger Company, however willing, had not the means to proceed eastward from Sokoto and take possession of the states on the south and east of Lake Chad; while on the other side the advance from British East Africa had stopped at Uganda, the Congo Free State forces had planted themselves on the Upper Nile, and Darfur seemed as far out of the range of practical enterprise as Khartum. It was clear, then, that

an understanding with regard to the extensive area lying between the Cameroons and the Mobangi on the one side and the Central Sudan on the other, was inevitable. England's business was to safeguard the sphere of the Royal Niger Company on the one side, and the extension of British East Africa to the region watered by the Western Nile tributaries on the other. This latter region was secured to Great Britain so far as Germany was concerned by the Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890. Naturally, therefore, it seemed as if she was a much safer neighbor than France to have between the West and East African British spheres. It was considered, then, an excellent stroke of policy to hand over the whole of this intervening region to Germany and leave her to deal with the French agents who were making their way through the British sphere on the west and behind the German sphere on the south. This policy was given effect in the agreement between Great Britain and Germany, signed at Berlin November 15, 1893.

This, then, seemed definitely to settle the difficulty which the Royal Niger Company had continually to face through the enterprise of French agents, so far at least as the eastern limits of its territories were concerned. The enormous concession to Germany confirmed the friendship which England had sought to maintain from the beginning of the African activities of the former. Naturally France was indignant at the march which had been stolen upon her, and at the apparently successful attempt which had been made by Great Britain to checkmate her designs upon the Central Sudan states. But she was not prepared quietly to accept the new arrangement. In Africa, it will have been seen, France and Germany have always been most accommodating to each other, and in the present instance Germany was as generous as she had been on previous occasions. Germany and France, like Germany and England, had their unsettled frontier questions. No satisfactory arrangement had ever been come to with respect to the eastern boundary of the Cameroons. The advantage gained by Germany in the arrangement with Great Britain placed the former in a position to induce France to come to terms; she had no hesitation in bribing France with a large block of the territory secured to her by the agreement of November, 1893, preferring her own interests to those of England, even though in so doing she did the latter a most unfriendly turn. By a convention signed at Berlin on February 4, 1894, the block of territory acquired by Germany in

accordance with the arrangement above referred to was divided into two parts; the western section was retained by Germany, while the eastern section was made over to France. Thus France becomes the neighbor of England on the extreme western borders of the latter's East African sphere, all along the line, from Darfur on the north to Bahr-el-Ghazal on the south. No other power is likely to seek a footing in the enormous area which Germany has left to France. According to the Convention of February, 1894, Germany retains a considerable stretch on the south shore of Lake Chad.

To all appearance by the arrangement referred to, France has realized her dream of uninterrupted territory from the Congo to the Mediterranean. The most powerful and most important of all the Central Sudan states, Wadai, was not expressly mentioned in these agreements; nor can it be fairly held to lie east of the line of the Shari. France could not have complained if another power had forestalled her in this desirable state; but, in consequence of later French movements, Wadai is generally recognized as within the French sphere of operations. If we may judge from what France has done in West Africa during her many years of occupancy, it will be a long time before she does anything to develop the resources of the vast area in Central Africa on which she has set her seal. So far as the Central Sudan is concerned, the outlet of its trade has till recently been mainly across the desert to the Mediterranean. One of the main services of the French in their African operations has been the establishment of peace and order in the Senegal and Niger region, the scene of unending petty warfares before the French conquest.

This seems the appropriate place to refer to certain facts which complicate the problem of the introduction of European influence into these Central Sudan states. On the defeat of the forces of Suleiman in the Egyptian Sudan, by Gordon's lieutenant, Gessi Pasha, in 1879, Rabah, one of Suleiman's officers, fled to the Niam-Niam country, accompanied by a considerable force of men trained to fighting in the Sudan. With these Rabah seems to have made his way northwestward to Bagirmi, which, according to very trustworthy reports, he succeeded in conquering. Rabah, indeed, seemed at that time to have become the dominant power in the Central Sudan, greatly increasing his forces by additions from among the natives whose country he conquered. So powerful,

indeed, did he become that, according to report, he defeated the Sultan of Wadai himself, and even conquered Bornu. He was defeated and slain by a French force in 1900; this ended all opposition to the French power in this region.

As a sequel to the agreement of 1890, France had no hesitation in including on her maps of Africa the bulk of the Sahara desert as within her sphere. Later agreements have confirmed this procedure: by 1899 Bagirmi, Wadai, Kanem, Borku, and Tibesti were acknowledgedly French. From the southwest corner of Algeria her cartographers drew a straight line southwest to Cape Blanco, thereby ignoring the Spanish claims over Adrar. When this line is deflected so as not to interfere with these claims settled by a Franco-Spanish agreement of 1901, we have between that line and the eastern boundary—which on French maps extends from Tunis in a zigzag direction southward so as to include the whole of Kanem—a total area of something like a million square miles. It should also be noted that in drawing the western line the comparatively fine region of Tuat was included, a district which was claimed by Morocco. France regards her conquest of her West African sphere as now complete; and that of Central Africa as far advanced.

What is France to do with this enormous area largely of desert? For though recent explorations have corrected prevailing notions of the nature of the Sahara, there is no doubt that, with the exception of an oasis here and there, the million square miles claimed by France is mostly sand, stone, and scrub. It is true that underneath the Sahara, as under all other deserts, there is a vast store of water. On the south of Algeria this water has been tapped, oases have been created, and hundreds of thousands of date-palms planted. This, however, simply shows that when the earth is so full of people that all the other lands have been utilized for the purposes of humanity, we shall still have the Sahara to fall back upon as a last resource. Meanwhile the Sahara is regarded by France merely as a connecting link between her provinces on the Mediterranean and the interior region claimed by her in the basins of the Senegal, the Niger, and Lake Chad. Reference has already been made to the unfortunate expedition under Colonel Flatters, with the view of surveying for a railway route. That disaster suspended all thoughts of a railway for some years. But after the Anglo-French agreement the scheme of a Trans-Saharan Rail-

way was taken up again with renewed vigor. There were various preliminary surveys to the south of Algeria, and three main schemes were advanced, starting from the three provinces of Algeria; one having St. Louis as its southern terminus, another Timbuktu, and a third Lake Chad. The total length in any case was to be about 2000 miles, and the cost fifty to one hundred million dollars, including the defenses at each station against the attacks of the Tuaregs. The difficulties of a railway across a waterless desert are obvious, but, as the Central Asian Railway proves, not at all insuperable. At present occasional caravans of camels bear commerce of the whole of the Central Sudan, and it is difficult to see how a railway could pay until after many years. Each caravan carries goods to the value of about $50,000 (not including slaves), and probably a million and a half of dollars would represent the total annual traffic between the Central Sudan and the Mediterranean countries west of Egypt. Ostrich feathers and gum are the main exports; gold has long ago disappeared. As to slaves the authentic figures, and they are very old, were for Tripoli alone, about 400,000. A railway might in time succeed in increasing the demand for European goods, encouraging the development of the resources of the Sudan, and suppressing slavery. At any rate, part of the dream of France has been realized; now she can march over French territory from the Mediterranean to the Congo.

But French dreams are not confined to the construction of railways for the purpose of drawing the commerce of the Sudan down to the French ports on the Mediterranean. Africa is the great central continent of the globe, and by an extension of the projected Sudan lines to the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, say to Mozambique on the east and to St. Louis on the west, what more easy than to draw the bulk of the world's traffic into the lap of France, and so forever destroy the commercial supremacy of England? On the one side the ocean lines from India, Australia, and the east would converge toward Mozambique, while all the traffic of South America would inevitably find an *entrepôt* at St. Louis. This is a fair sample of the brilliant visions with which the eyes of the French public are dazzled; though it must be said that Frenchmen familiar with the real conditions simply laugh at them.

Another scheme, equally chimerical, so far as our present knowledge goes, is that of establishing colonies of thousands of

French peasants and small farmers in the great bend of the Niger, in Mossi, and other "kingdoms," as also in other portions of the Sudan within the sphere of France. When one remembers the French aversion to emigration, the stationary conditions of the French population, and the nature of the climate which prevails over the whole of the Niger region, it is difficult to believe that any man of sanity and ordinary knowledge could broach such a scheme.

France's occupation of the immense territory claimed by her is so far almost purely military, involving an annual expenditure on the part of the mother country of about two million and a half of dollars. At the same time it should be said that French influence is felt beneficially at interior posts. At several places on the Upper Senegal and its feeders, forts have been built, European houses have been erected, the natives have gathered round in increasing numbers, and "villages of liberty" for freed slaves and captives have been established. As these spread, French influence will become more and more dominant, and it is to be hoped peace will be established among the native chiefs, and the rich resources of the interior region be developed to the profit of all. M. Leroy-Beaulieu calculates that by 1950 probably French West and Central Africa and Madagascar will be able to pay all their military expenses.

Such, then, is the present position of the struggle between the three great powers for supremacy in the region watered by the Niger and the countries grouped around Lake Chad. England possesses the whole of the navigable portion of the lower river and most of its great tributary, the Benué. Some of the richest countries, covering about half a million square miles, fell within the Niger Company's sphere; while Captain Lugard, who has done so much for British interests in East Africa, was sent out by the Niger Company in the summer of 1894 to look after its interests in the large region still left untouched by French treaties. He succeeded, among other things, in making fresh treaties confirming those which had already been concluded by the Niger Company with [illegible]. Germany, as has been seen, has extended her sphere from the Cameroons to Lake Chad, and her boundaries in this direction, being finally settled, she may, without distraction, devote her energies and resources to the development of her compact block of territories. Hitherto France has done little but add to her already extensive territories in Senegambia, and that is still her chief oc-

cupation. Whether when she has reached the limits of her enterprise in this direction she will ever succeed in developing a great commerce in Senegal and the Sudan it is impossible to say; at present, after being at work for three centuries, she has not succeeded in getting results at all proportionate to her enormous outlay of lives, labor, and capital.

Chapter XIV

GERMAN PROGRESS IN WEST AFRICA. 1865-1910

FOR various reasons German progress in East Africa has been dealt with at greater length than will be necessary in the case of the other spheres of German influence in Africa. East Africa is the most extensive and commercially the most influential of all the German annexations; its short history has been a busy and stirring one; and the methods adopted in East Africa, and referred to in some detail in a preceding chapter, may be taken as typical of the Germans. It will, therefore, be unnecessary to deal at such length with the course of events in German West Africa since the meeting of the Berlin Congress. At the date of this Congress Germany had planted her flag on the Gold Coast (Togoland), in the Cameroons, and on the coast lying between the Orange River and the River Cunene. The last-named district is known as German Southwest Africa, and with that we shall deal before going farther north. It has already been seen that both the home government and the Cape had to give way at almost every point in face of the unyielding persistence of Prince Bismarck, who would not consent to leave any portion of this coast except Walfish Bay under the British flag. By the beginning of 1885 the inevitable had been recognized both in London and at Cape Town, and a joint commission was appointed to settle details as to frontiers and individual rights. The commission completed its work in September, 1885. By the British memorandum of December 24, 1884, it had virtually been conceded that no objection could be raised to Germany extending her sphere in Southwest Africa as far east as 20° east longitude up to 22° of south latitude. In the meantime attempts were made to influence the Damara chiefs to join the German protectorate, and to induce them to offer allegiance to England. Private individuals and companies who had obtained concessions from the native chiefs before Germany entered the field, tried to make as much of them as possible; but such attempts met with little encouragement from the home

government. Certain of the islands off the coast were recognized by Germany as under British suzerainty, though the claims of British subjects to mining rights on the mainland were cut down to somewhat narrow limits. An attempt was even made to establish a republic under the name of Upingtonia in Ovampoland, but without success. The German agents continued to acquire rights over the territories of various chiefs in the interior. By agreement with Portugal of December 20, 1886, the River Cunene was fixed upon as the boundary between Portuguese West Africa and German Southwest Africa. In this arrangement with Portugal, as in the Franco-Portuguese arrangement of May, 1886, it was admitted that Portugal was at liberty to extend her dominion right across the continent from her West to her East African possessions. Even before this the British Minister at Lisbon had drawn attention to the fixed idea that had taken possession of the Portuguese Government that "anything likely to interfere with a free expansion eastward of Portuguese territory into the heart of the South Africa continent traverses a fixed purpose of Portuguese colonial policy." It was an easy concession for France and Germany to make, as it did not in any way interfere with their respective spheres of influence, but this claim was one that was never conceded by Great Britain.

It was only in the Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890, that the final delimitation between German Southwest Africa and British South Africa was arranged, events meantime having taken place which will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter, and which quite ignored the "fixed purpose of Portuguese colonial policy" above alluded to. By this agreement the Orange River is recognized as the southern limit of German territory as far as 20° east longitude. This gave to German Southwest Africa a total area of some 240,000 square miles, with a scanty population of 200,000 natives.

Though none of the serious military operations which have so materially retarded progress in East Africa have been necessary in Southwest Africa, the first of Germany's colonial ventures has been a constant source of trouble. It was only in October, 1885, that the great Damara chief, Kamaherero, was induced to accept German protection, and since then he has on more than one occasion endeavored to cancel his consent. One powerful chief, Hendrik Wittboi, has proved specially refractory, and the acting commis-

sioner had several serious engagements with him. So difficult, indeed, was it found to subdue the chief, that in the end of 1893 Von François was superseded by another commissioner, who in the summer of 1894 succeeded in inducing Wittboi to surrender. Thus one great obstacle to progress has been removed. Petty wars between the various tribes of Damaras and Namaquas are almost constantly going on, and are embittered by religious fanaticism. But with the strong military force at the command of the Germans, all these disturbing influences must be suppressed. The claims of British *concessionnaires* caused considerable trouble for a time, and in 1892 were declared invalid by the German Government.

Herr Luderitz, of course, soon found that without assistance he himself could never do much to develop the resources of so vast a region. In the spring of 1885, therefore, he made over his rights, for the sum of $75,000, to a German Colonial Society for Southwest Africa, which was incorporated by the imperial government, with a capital of $300,000, capable of being increased. At the same time an imperial commission was appointed to administer the territory on behalf of the German Government. Courts were established, and a military force provided. Here, as in East Africa and elsewhere, the Germans set themselves with zeal and intelligence to the exploration of their territory, with a view to ascertain what were its real resources. Expeditions were sent out in various directions. They were accompanied by a thoroughly qualified scientific staff, and the result is that we have had for some time a very complete idea of the character and resources of Germany's first colony. Though not highly encouraging, at the same time, the observations of competent explorers, and the experiments made by German settlers, prove that with capital and industry the country may be made to yield a fair return to the farmers and ranchmen. Very precise observations as to rainfall, water supply, and the character of the soil have been collected, which will form a safe guide to intelligent undertakings. German farmers might find a home in the higher regions of the interior, but only in small numbers; as a field for European emigration Damaraland and Namaqualand are of limited capacity. In the southern portion agriculture, except in some favored spots, is impossible. In the north, on the [illegible] where water supply and rainfall are more plentiful, [illegible] could be grown with advantage. Over the [illegible] rainfall is deficient, but not to such an extent as

was at one time believed; precise observations show that even in the south enough falls in most years to encourage a system of storage. Cattle and sheep can be reared over nearly the whole of the colony, and a profitable trade is carried on toward Bechuanaland and other countries in South Africa. With proper means of transit the export of wool might be conducted with profit. At present there is a limited trade by sea in cattle and wool with Cape Colony, and the country lying to the north of the German territory as far as the Congo. Until recently the only harbor was the British port of Walfish Bay, which somewhat hampered German operations. But in 1893 a practicable port was discovered near to Swakop Mouth, in German territory, whence access to the interior was easier than from Walfish Bay. Here a new harbor was commenced.

But it was the much-vaunted mining resources of the country from which rich returns were expected. It was hoped that copper would be found as abundantly in the German protectorate as it has been in the northwest of Cape Colony. Copper no doubt has been found in the interior, and could it be cheaply worked on the spot, and cheaply conveyed to a convenient harbor on the coast, it might pay in a small way. To quote the words of Dr. Schinz, who has himself made a very thorough exploration of this country: "It is well known how little was realized of Lüderitz's extravagant hopes. The chief cause of the failure of the undertaking was, no doubt, the inhospitality of the country, and the sand along the coast made the connection with the better land in the interior so difficult that the mineral deposits could only be worked under exceptionally favorable circumstances. But, inasmuch as the prospecting work of the miners disclosed no deposits or veins worthy of mention, the life-thread of the whole undertaking was cut in twain. The trade with the natives also amounted to nothing from the beginning, for the natives possessed nothing to give in exchange for the goods offered." But subsequent investigations have shown that probably this estimate was somewhat too desponding. Not only has copper been found in various places, but also lead and gold, both quartz and alluvial; but the two latter in such small quantities so far that at present they are not of practical account.

At various times there have been rumors that Germany would be glad to get rid of her not very promising colony. As an appendage of a settled and progressive and comparatively populous country like Cape Colony, this region might be turned to some account, as

a source of food supply. But as an independent colony with a large administrative staff, only moderately suited for white settlement, with a scanty native population constantly engaged in inter-tribal wars, it must for long prove an expensive luxury. Negotiations were on more than one occasion on foot for making the country over to a British syndicate, and that with the approval of the German Government; but these at first met with violent protests from the extreme colonial party in Germany. A compromise was effected in the formation of an Anglo-German Company, supported to a great extent by British capital. Under the auspices of this company a well-equipped expedition was sent out from England in the autumn of 1892 for the purpose of prospecting and initiating steps for the development of what resources the country possesses. This prospecting expedition did good work, and its reports as to the minerals and ranching capacities of the country are on the whole favorable. Several companies and syndicates have been formed and are at work, so that on the whole the prospects of Germany's first colony are more promising than they were ten or a dozen years ago. There are altogether about 4670 whites in the colony, including 825 troops; the Germans number about 2600, mostly functionaries and soldiers; there are several hundred Boers, also. The value of the total exports in 1901 was about $250,000, and the imports $2,000,000. The administrative center of the colony is Gross Windhoek, some distance in the interior from Walfish Bay. Several good buildings, public and private, have been erected here. When the best is said, it must be admitted that in a country whose agricultural capabilities are limited, which has powerful competition in cattle rearing, whose mining resources are doubtful, with an administration which demands a large yearly grant from the German Parliament, and a company that with its subordinate companies has already sunk a comparatively enormous capital, progress is inevitably slow.

To turn to the much more hopeful region of the Cameroons, it was found that, by the time the Berlin Congress met, Germany had a flourishing possession here, and, following her usual method, had already taught the natives "a sharp lesson." This policy had to be repeated on several occasions, so that it was not till the first half of 1888 that all the great chiefs, and those middlemen just behind the coast who had been in the habit of tapping the interior trade, were brought to submit reconciled to the German suzerainty. But

these middlemen continued to show reluctance in giving up their profitable calling, and even at a recent date considerable firmness had to be manifested in dealing with them. It is to be regretted that the German officials have in the Cameroons occasionally exhibited great want of tact in dealing with the natives, and especially with the imported native troops. This led in 1893-1894 to some manifestations of rebellion, which were repressed by the commissioner by measures of such extreme cruelty as to lead to his recall. No European nation can in this respect afford to cast a stone at another, though it must be said that German officials have often shown an uncompromising harshness in their method of dealing with the natives.

A provisional arrangement as to the northern limit of the German Cameroons territory was come to with England in May, 1885. This arrangement was modified in August, 1886, and finally settled by the famous Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890. With France, Germany had no difficulty in making an arrangement as to the southern boundary of her newly acquired territory. On December 24, 1885, an agreement was reached regarding the limit between the German Cameroons and the French Gaboon; and by the agreement of February, 1894 (referred to in the chapter on the Niger), the Hinterland of the Cameroons was definitely fixed. As in other African arrangements, so in that relating to the Cameroons, there were assured to the subjects of the Signatory Powers freedom of trade and navigation, the exclusion of differential tariffs, and other privileges which in practice are found to have little value. Finally, to leave Germany a perfectly free hand, the British Government ignored certain treaties made in the name of England; and the station at Victoria, in Ambas Bay, which had been occupied by English missionaries for forty years, was made over to Germany for a payment of $20,000 to the missionary society.

Early in 1885 Bismarck, in spite of the continued opposition of the anti-colonial party, easily succeeded in carrying the votes necessary for establishing the Cameroons as a Crown colony. A governor, with a considerable staff of officials, was appointed, and all the machinery of government after German methods established. A series of ordinances was promulgated, imposing dues and taxes of various kinds, and especially levying very heavy duties on the import of spirits. Notwithstanding the express request of Prince Bismarck, the traders in the Cameroons shrank from form-

ing themselves into a corporation for regulating local affairs, so that the governor had to take cognizance of local as well as of more general matters of government. The total area included in the Cameroons, taking in the territory acquired up to Lake Chad, is over 100,000 square miles, with a population estimated roughly at three millions and a half, in marked contrast to the conditions which prevail farther south. Indeed here we are in one of the most thickly populated regions of Africa, especially along the coast and the creeks, and at many points in the interior.

The coast natives belong mainly to the Bantu stock, while those of the interior are Sudanese. They are keen traders, but the Germans at first found all their efforts to open up the interior barred by those tribes which inhabit the districts in the immediate interior, and act as middlemen between the people of the interior and the traders on the coast. Here, as in their other African possessions, the Germans lost no time in sending out expeditions, under tried leaders, to open up the interior. These expeditions, as is usual with such German projects, were partly military and partly exploratory. In attempting to break through the cordon of middlemen, serious disasters happened to the first expedition under Lieutenant Kund; however, Germany meant to succeed, and in a marvelously short time established stations at various points in the interior.

Germany, like France, had her eye on Lake Chad, and large sums were voted by the Reichstag for the purpose of extending German influence to that lake. An expedition under Zintgraff and Morgen, accompanied by a miltary force and representatives of the trading firms interested in the Cameroons, endeavored in 1890 to reach Bagirmi from the station of Bali as a starting-point. But the expedition met with a severe check from the natives; many of its members were killed, and Morgen had to make the best of his way down the Benué. Later expeditions have been more fortunate; that under Von Stettin penetrated to Yola and made treaties that enabled Germany to deal on advantageous terms both with England and France. Equally successful has been an expedition in the opposite direction, resulting in valuable additions to a knowledge of the capabilities of the country. Germany has succeeded in firmly securing her influence, not only on the coast, but at many important points in the interior. What can be made of that interior remains to be seen; the Germans have here the same

problem to solve that must be solved by other European powers which have undertaken the development of tropical Africa. But it may be worth noticing that besides the Cameroons Mountains there are several heights that rise above the plateau in the interior to from 8000 to 10,000 feet above sea-level, which may in future prove useful as sanatoria. Meantime on the coast the busy trade established by British subjects continues to be carried on and increased by their German successors. The German "Plantation-Company" and other associations, as well as private traders, have established plantations of coco-palms, cacao, tobacco, sugar, cotton, and other cultures, some of which have given successful results. The staple exports, however, are still the natural products of the country, including ivory, skins, and gums. The palm-oil and palm-kernel trade is so far the most lucrative, though even yet British vessels do as much trade in this as is done by German vessels. The total exports (1908) were valued at almost 14,530,074 marks, and the imports at 17,297,000 marks. Instead of the river hulks in which the old traders used to live, good houses of stone are now to be seen on the banks of the Cameroons River, in which officials and merchants are able to lead fairly comfortable lives. Macadamized roads surround all the coast settlements, while experimental stations and botanical gardens give an air of civilization to the country. The total number of whites in 1908 was 1,128, of which 971 were German. A number of these are officials, merchants, and missionaries.

Altogether, the Cameroons is one of the most prosperous and promising of German colonies, thanks partly to the energy and administrative skill of its first governor, Baron von Soden. Its revenues, which in 1890 were $72,500, and had to be supplemented by a grant from the mother country of twice that amount, were estimated for 1908-9 at 7,208,366 marks; to cover expenses, there is added a subsidy from the government of about 5,000,000 marks. Only in exceptional years has this colony been able to pay its own way. Yet, unlike France and England, Germany does not overburden her colonies with officials, nor are these paid on anything like the same scale as those who swarm in English Crown colonies.

Of all the German colonies in Africa the little block of some 33,700 square miles known as Togoland has so far been decidedly the most prosperous. Already considerable trade was established on the coast when the German flag was first raised. It forms one

of the highways to and from the thickly populated portion of the Sudan. It is of limited extent, with a population roughly estimated at 000,000. No expenditure for formidable military expeditions into the interior has been necessary, while its administration is simple and inexpensive. It is placed under an imperial governor, with some few other officials; unlike the other colonies it has had a local council consisting of representatives of the merchants. A military force of 150 negroes, officered by seven Germans, is sufficient to maintain order. The country is capable of growing almost any tropical products, while the forests abound in oil palms, caoutchouc, and other woods; though so far the commerce is almost entirely a barter trade for palm-oil and palm-kernels. According to latest statistics there are 224 Europeans, including officials, in Togoland; of these 216 are Germans. In 1901-1902, 207 vessels, of about 375,000 tons, entered the ports of the colony.

Togoland has about thirty-five miles of coast, and is wedged in between French territory on the east and the British Gold Coast on the west. The approximate limits east and west were arranged soon after the annexation. But here, as in the Cameroons, the Germans did not content themselves with squatting on the coast and waiting for any trade that might come to them. Beginning in 1885, a series of expeditions penetrated the interior, some of them reaching as far as Mossi, well within the great bend of the Niger. Some 130 miles in the interior a station, under the appropriate name of Bismarcksburg, was founded, and this is the point of departure of most of the expeditions to the interior. Only five days from the coast another station, Misa-Hoehe, has been located in what is supposed to be a particularly healthful situation. There are several trading stations on the coast, but there is no great *entrepôt* as in Lagos or Accra, each tribe having its own trade centre. The River Volta, which forms the western boundary of Togoland, has been proved to be navigable by steam for some 200 miles, a fact of great importance for the commercial development of the country. Good caravan roads have been made in various directions. The total exports of the colony (1908) were valued at 5,915,000 marks, the imports at about 6,899,684 marks. The duties levied in 1903-04 more than paid the expenses of administration. Togoland has needed less imperial aid than any other of the German colonies in Africa. The German Togoland Company, founded in 1888 with a view both to commercial operations

and to the establishment of plantations, has already been successful in both directions; experimental stations are at work in several localities. It is expected that in time coffee will become a product of great commercial importance, while the cocoa-palm is very extensively planted, so that in time cocoanuts and copra may figure among the exports. Maize is extensively cultivated, and most European vegetables can be grown.

It was only by the Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890, that the boundary between the British Gold Coast and German Togoland was definitely settled. The situation of Togoland is not all that could be desired, in a commercial way; there are no real harbors in German territory, and no navigable streams except the Volta, and as the Volta itself is in its lower course within British territory, it is doubtful how far its navigability may be of advantage to German trade. It will have been seen in a former chapter that it will scarcely be possible for either the Gold Coast or Germany to push their spheres farther inland, as the French on the one side and the Royal Niger Company on the other have by their treaties with the native chiefs practically barred the way to the interior. But should Germany be confined within her present somewhat narrow limits in Togoland, the country is populous enough and its resources abundant enough to yield a good return to modest commercial enterprise.

Chapter XV

BRITISH EAST AFRICA. 1886-1910

IN dealing with German operations in East Africa enough light has been thrown upon British designs and disillusionments in that region to render anything more than a brief reference unnecessary. Sir John Kirk, who had long labored to promote British interests in and around Zanzibar, was forced by a government which had been thoroughly bullied by Bismarck to bestow the results of his efforts upon Germany. The Chancellor's vigorous policy extorted concessions from the sultan at the cannon's mouth, and left the Germans in full possession of the choicest region of the country, that of the Kilimanjaro. The British company, which thought it could present a clear title to much of this and other East African districts, was obliged to give way and restrict its proposed field of operations.

The first Anglo-German agreement was concluded at the end of 1886. Under the presidency of Sir William Mackinnon a number of British capitalists formed themselves into the British East Africa Association, and set themselves to acquire rights over the territory which had been rescued from Germany as the British sphere. Mackinnon, the founder of steam communication with Zanzibar, had for long been a favorite with the Sultan of Zanzibar, and he had no difficulty in obtaining from the sultan, under date May 24, 1887, a concession of the ten-mile strip of coast from the Umba on the south to Pipini at the mouth of the Tana River on the north. This concession was to be for a term of fifty years. The company was to have the entire administration of the territory in the sultan's name. In consideration for this concession the sultan was to receive the whole amount of the customs dues which he received at the date of the concession, in addition to fifty per cent. of the additional net revenue which might accrue to the company from the customs dues of the ports included in the concession. Many subsidiary agreements were made with a considerable number of native chiefs in and beyond the main concession, which

1888

served to complete and extend the grant made by the sultan, giving, indeed, to the company sovereign rights for a distance of 200 miles from the coast. With these concessions in their hands the association of British capitalists had no hesitation in approaching the government praying that they might be incorporated by royal charter as the Imperial British East Africa Company. There was no difficulty in obtaining such a charter (September 3, 1888), into the details of which it is unnecessary to enter. It practically authorized the company to administer the territory which had been leased to it by the sultan, and any other territories which might be acquired in the future. No important step was to be taken without the consent of the secretary of state; everything possible was to be done to develop the territory and suppress the slave-trade. Administrators were to be appointed, provision made for the administration of justice, and for the conduct of the affairs of this new section of the empire on the system of a Crown colony, so far as that was possible under the conditions. The position thus created for the British East Africa Company, like the position of other chartered companies, was a peculiar one. The extensive area embraced in the limits indicated above, some 200,000 square miles, was virtually declared a part of the British Empire under the designation of "sphere of influence." The government spent nothing upon it, appointed no officers to administer it, undertook no direct control of its affairs. The company, by its charter, represented the British Government, and carried on all the functions delegated by government to a Colonial administration. Out of its own resources the company had to carry on its trade, develop the commercial resources of the country, and endeavor to reap dividends for its shareholders. At the same time it was bound to establish an administration in its various branches, pay a governor and many officials, maintain a small army, and try to push its way into the interior. This it had to do also under the restrictions of the Berlin Act, as regarded the interior, but not the coast, which it held under concession from the sultan, thus leaving it free to levy taxes, as the sultan had done, on all goods coming from the interior irrespective of their origin or destination. This right, for which the company continued to pay the Zanzibar administration in full, was afterward arbitrarily withdrawn by the British Government; the latter, without regard to the rights of the company, placed the coast protectorate under the free zone provision of the Berlin Act.

Obviously for a company to open up and administer an extensive territory in a continent like Africa, having little or no analogies with India, a very considerable capital would be required, or the country must be of such a character as would yield a fair return on a more or less immediate outlay. In the Niger region there is plenty of trade to be done in native products likely to yield a fair return, and the Niger Company is authorized to levy considerable dues. In the sphere allotted to the British South Africa Company there is reported to be abundance of gold; those interested in its development have large capital at their command; expensive exploring expeditions and the maintenance of many stations are not demanded; and much work is done by private prospectors. In British East Africa on the contrary the whole work of development devolved on the company; and by its charter it was even prohibited from exercising any monopoly of trade. It is probable that had the founders of the company, with Mackinnon at their head, not been to some extent carried away by a patriotic spirit, they would never have cast their money into a concern out of which they could hardly expect to receive any return during their own lifetime. The founders subscribed about $1,200,000 among them; but although the nominal capital was ten million dollars, the actual capital at the command of the company never amounted even to two and one-half millions.

After it obtained its charter the company lost no time in setting to work to take possession of its field, to establish an administration, to send out pioneer expeditions, to lay down routes to the interior, and to choose positions for stations. The tract lying between the coastline allotted to the company and the great lake, which was the eastern boundary in the interior, was known only in a very general way. The coast had been to some extent surveyed, though of the exact site of the harbors we had no very precise information. The Tana River was known in a general way up to a certain distance, but its course was very inaccurately laid down. Travelers had traversed the country from the coast to Kilimanjaro, and partially to Mount Kenia. Much information as to the country had been obtained through the Arabs who traded with the interior. The knowledge of the interior then possessed did not [illegible] commercial undertakings; and it was feared that [illegible] their warlike reputation, would be a great [illegible] company's operations. But the company went to

work with promptness and business-like intelligence. The leading spirit in initiating operations on the spot was Mr. George S. Mackenzie, who had already had great experience in Persia with populations not far removed from the type to be met with in East Africa; he was appointed by the company the first administrator, with the approval of the home government. When Mackenzie arrived in Zanzibar in October, 1888, he found that Burghash had died, and that his brother Khalifa occupied the throne of the sultan of Zanzibar. Khalifa not only ratified the original concession, but by another document granted further important facilities to the company for the carrying out of the privileges which had been accorded by his predecessor. The sultan even lent the services of his commander-in-chief, General Mathews, to enable Mackenzie to inaugurate the company at Mombasa, the ancient Arabo-Portuguese port, which was to be its headquarters.


At this time the German section of East Africa broke out into open rebellion. Naturally the natives in the British sphere were excited, and it required great tact and care in order to avoid a collision. Unfortunately also the excessive anti-slavery zeal of the missionaries had complicated matters, and greatly irritated the Arab population, whose friendliness it was desirable to secure. Mackenzie had a trying task to face; many domestic slaves had fled from their masters and taken refuge with the missionaries, who refused to deliver them up. The question of domestic slavery in Africa is a difficult one, which cannot be discussed in this place. It must not, however, be confounded with slave-raiding and slave-export. It is a universal institution in Africa, and to attempt suddenly to suppress it would lead to anarchy and disorganization over the whole continent. It is an institution which will only melt away as commerce, enlightenment, and civilization advance, and for the missionaries to blindly interfere in the matter is to defeat the object which they have in view. Happily the administrator was able to deal with the particular case in a way which satisfied all parties except those who are fanatically opposed to all compromise. He was able to liberate some 1400 slaves, and to make such arrangements as would enable any slaves within the British sphere to purchase their own freedom within a few months. This course satisfied Arabs, natives, and missionaries alike, and at once established the reputation of the company for fair dealing.

The troubles in the German sphere did not then spread to that

of England. Mackenzie set about improving Mombasa, town and harbor, one of Her Majesty's ships surveyed the latter. Works were begun which greatly facilitated navigation; a light railway was constructed on the island, and suitable buildings were begun on the mainland. Mackenzie visited all the chief ports and made arrangements to facilitate the company's operations. Caravans were at once sent into the interior, in various directions, to open up relations with the natives, to obtain a better knowledge of the country, and to ascertain the best routes to the interior. One of these in a very short time established stations as far as Machako's, an important center 250 miles from the coast. Another proceeded north to the Tana River to open up relations with the chiefs in that part of the territory, and push on toward Mount Kenia. These two caravans did excellent work in exploration and in establishing the company's influence along the Tana and eventually as far as Uganda. Within six months after Mackenzie's arrival the company's officials were fairly established in the territory, and the active work of opening up the country was well begun.

It was not only in the German sphere to the south of the company's territories that the company was threatened with difficulties in carrying on its work. The position of Germany in Witu at the mouth of the Tana was shown in a previous chapter; and it was also pointed out that this piece of German territory was utilized by Dr. Peters as a starting-point from which to hamper the company on the north by attempting to obtain concessions which would shut it out entirely from the interior. Shortly after the company's expeditions were sent out toward the Yana River and the northwest, Peters succeeded in evading the British vessels which were blockading the coast, and notwithstanding the disapproval of the German authorities, he landed in Witu and organized an expedition up the River Tana. His ostensible purpose was to reach and relieve Emin Pasha, who was believed to be hemmed in by the Mahdists on the Upper Nile; Stanley had set out by way of the Congo for his relief in January, 1887. Peters and the company's expedition [illegible] and seek with each other for some time, but never [illegible] The German adventurer planted the flag of his country along [illegible] after numerous fights with the Masai and other natives succeeded in reaching Uganda early in 1890, where [illegible] Mwanga reigned. There, Catholic and Protes-

tant missionaries had been struggling for ascendency; the Mohammedan party was strong, and many of the chiefs and people adhered to their old paganism. Mwanga was nominally an adherent of the Roman Catholic faith, though in reality he cared only for the party most likely to keep him in power. The Catholics, more zealous, and perhaps more energetic, than the Protestants, had gained many followers and much influence in the country, and were naturally inclined to favor a German as opposed to an English ascendency.



When Peters arrived in Uganda in the early part of 1890, he found no difficulty in securing a friendly reception from Mwanga; he succeeded, with the aid of the Catholic missionaries, in inducing the king to make such admissions and concessions as might without difficulty have been construed into a treaty of protection. It may therefore be imagined that his chagrin was great when, in the autumn of 1890, having sailed from Uganda to the south shore of the lake, he encountered Emin Pasha, and found not only that the pasha was "relieved," but that the British and German Governments had come to an understanding as to their respective spheres in East Africa, which rendered all his efforts to extend German influence of no avail.

By the Anglo-German agreement of July, 1890, Germany retired completely from the north of the line extending from the Umba to the east shore of the lake, leaving Witu and all the coast north to the river Jub (over which she had declared a protectorate) to the operations of the British company. The line of delimitation was then carried across Victoria Nyanza, and from its west shore to the boundary of the Congo Free State. The sphere of Great Britain was recognized in this agreement as extending along the Jub River and far away to the sources of the western tributaries of the Nile; the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba were regarded as under British protection, such protection being accepted by the sultan. These islands were outside of the company's concession and charter; but there can be no doubt that the company was expected to operate and establish British influence in the sphere allotted to England under the agreement of 1890, which virtually included a large section of Victoria Nyanza, the whole of Uganda and Unyoro, and part of Karagwe, Lake Albert and part of Albert Edward, and the countries on their shores, as well as the Egyptian Equatorial Province, and part of Darfur and Kordofan. Of course this enormous sphere must be regarded as to some extent the product of fancy.

Shortly after Peters left Uganda it was entered on behalf of the company, April 14, 1890, by two of its officials. These efficient pioneers, by name Jackson and Gedge, had made their way from Mombasa northwest by Machako's, through the Masai country, and entered Uganda through Usogo. With most of the chiefs on their route they had little difficulty in coming to terms, and inducing them to accept the company's flag. Owing to the representations made by the French Government when the Emin relief expedition was organized, setting forth the danger that might befall the mission if Stanley sought to enter Uganda (it being stated that his expedition might be viewed as a punitive one to avenge the murder of the Bishop Hannington), Jackson's expedition when starting from the coast was specially instructed *not* to enter Uganda. He did so only on the appeal of the king and the missionaries, Roman Catholic and Protestant alike, to help them against the Mohammedan party. Jackson actually declined the invitation, and it was only after the strongest pressure of the king, the missionaries, and the chiefs, and the display by Mwanga of the company's flag, that he decided

to enter the country. When Peters heard of Jackson's approach he was greatly irritated, and beat a precipitate retreat to the south end of the lake, notwithstanding Jackson's request by letter that he would await the arrival of the company's expedition.

The reports by these early expeditions were of great service in showing the advantages and difficulties of the country through which they passed. They confirmed the statements of previous explorers that, while there were great stretches along the magnificent plateau country of Lykipia and in Usogo suitable for industrial development and for the settlement of Indian and Persian colonists, the region nearer the coast suffered greatly from want of water. Much of the country was well adapted for cattle and agriculture: some of the natural products might be turned to account, and of course a certain amount of ivory was obtainable. Stations were established at intervals, partly as trading centers and partly as stages for the caravans which were to be sent for traffic and exploration into the interior.

The great problem forced upon the company was that of communications. It was evident that so long as the only means of transport was the African native, commerce could not advance beyond the lowest stage. Camels, donkeys, and mules were experimented with, but all of them demand practicable roads and an adequate supply of water and food. Everything seemed to point to the desirability of constructing a light railway from the coast to the lake, a distance of some 500 miles. For more than half this distance the ground was so level as to render construction extremely easy. Beyond that was the enormous Mau escarpment, making a descent and corresponding ascent of some 3000 or 4000 feet, but reported as presenting no difficulty to the engineer. As a matter of fact, though the first mention of the company in the official correspondence between England and Germany was in connection with a railway, the company declared its resources unequal to more than a few miles of tramway beyond Mombasa. The Act of the Brussels Congress of 1891 afforded the company a lever wherewith to move the government in the matter, for it imposed upon the governments which signed it the obligation of taking effective means, among other things, of suppressing slave-raiding and slave-export. With respect to British East Africa, it was represented that the most effective means was the construction of a railway from the coast to the lake, which would render pack-

animals unprofitable and unnecessary. The result was that Lord Salisbury's government made a grant of $100,000 in 1891 for a railway survey, the company to pay any expenses incurred in excess of that sum. Under an experienced Indian engineer officer, Captain Macdonald, the survey expedition did excellent work. It traced a practicable route at moderate cost as far as the lake, and added greatly to our knowledge of the country in its vicinity. It was understood that the grant for the survey was to be followed by a grant for the railway, and a grant at the rate of three per cent. on a fixed sum for the construction of such a railway was agreed upon. As might have been expected, the construction of a railway at imperial expense was strongly objected to in several quarters, on the ground mainly that it was the company's business, and entirely for its benefit. Political events at home, however, led, as will be seen, to a certain change of policy in East Africa; the railway is still incomplete. Nile steamers now run from Khartum to Gondokoro. But let us return to Uganda.

When Jackson and Gedge entered the country they found it in a state bordering on anarchy under the weak and cruel Mwanga. Catholics, Protestants, and Mohammedans were plotting and counter-plotting; Mwanga was found to be almost entirely in the power of the "French party," as the Catholic missionaries called themselves, and they were openly inimical to British domination. Eventually Jackson returned from the interior in the summer of the same year with envoys from the chiefs of Uganda and Usogo, who came to see for themselves whether the English were supreme at the coast. Meanwhile Gedge was reduced to despair by the conduct of Mwanga and his party, and, retiring to the south shore of the lake, counseled on at least temporary abandonment of Uganda.

While at the south end of the lake Gedge learned that Emin Pasha was at Bukumbi, the French mission station, with a large force on his way to Uganda. A letter from Emin informed him that he had Peters's treaty in his possession, and was proceeding to Uganda "as representative of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, Commissioner for East Africa, to watch over any infringement of the treaty." Nine days later, on October 11, the pasha informed Gedge of the conclusion of the Anglo-German agreement of July 1, 1890, which definitely assigned Uganda to the British sphere of influence.

Before the conclusion of the July agreement public opinion in

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England became greatly excited over Uganda. Partly owing to the efforts of the Germans to get hold of it, partly to the critical position of British missionaries, and the danger of the triumph of the "French" party, partly to the strong representations made by Stanley on his return from the Emin Pasha expedition as to the great industrial and strategical value of the country, partly to a feeling that no other power but England should have control of the Nile sources, the country was almost unanimous in urging the company to press forward and take possession of Uganda. The British agent and consul-general at Zanzibar, Sir C. Euan Smith, telegraphed on February 15, 1890, strongly recommending, as soon as possible, the dispatch of a thoroughly equipped expedition to Uganda; the cost, though heavy, would be partly recovered; any delay would enable the Arabs to recover their position. In the following month Sir William Mackinnon was advised by the Foreign Office of the dispatch of two envoys to the court of King Mwanga, by whom the British Government intended to send back presents to the king. It was intimated that "the cultivation of a cordial understanding with the King of Uganda is of the greatest importance to the future interests and prosperity of the Imperial British East Africa Company." A further communication from the Foreign Office on April 2 took for granted that "the principal object which the East Africa Company has in view, after establishing its position on the coast, is to secure permanent influence in Uganda, and that steps have been taken for that object by the dispatch of caravans." It was asked what these steps were, in order that they might be communicated to the agent "in anticipation of the arrival at Zanzibar of a mission from Uganda, said to be now on its way to the coast." It is only fair to the company, in view of subsequent events, to give these details, and to point out that it would be somewhat difficult to place upon the charter the construction embodied in this last communication. Under the circumstances it was practically impossible for the company to hold back from Uganda. It was universally regarded as the agent of the government, and there can be no doubt that its directors cherished the belief that support in some form would be accorded to this great and expensive enterprise, an enterprise to which the company's own means were inadequate. Looking back to the many articles which appeared in the press at the time, it is evident that the belief was shared by the British public. No doubt the company

hoped that it would reap some return for its outlay in a great increase in its trading operations, and it had some grounds for believing that a railway from the coast to the lake would be constructed under the guarantee of the British Government. But even when all this is taken into consideration, it must be admitted had the imperial sentiment not been to some extent mingled with purely commercial considerations, the company, with the means at its command, might have hesitated to take a step so full of risk and involving so large an outlay. By whatever motive the directors were actuated, they yielded to the pressure of public opinion and the representations of the government. At the same time, it must be pointed out, that the latter did not in so many words commit itself to lend the company substantial support, or indemnify it for any outlay in safeguarding imperial interests.

But the strong man whom the situation required was already at hand. Captain F. D. Lugard, who had previously shown his aptitude for dealing with refractory Arabs and native chiefs in Nyasaland, entered the service of the company early in 1890. He had shown his capacity for organization, and his high quality as a pioneer explorer in the expedition which he conducted from Mombasa to Machako's shortly after his arrival in East Africa. He was ordered to proceed to Uganda, with the small force at his command, to carry out the forward policy which the company had resolved to adopt in deference to the pressure brought to bear upon it, and to which at the time it was not unwilling to yield. Soldiers, porters, and camp-followers, all told, Lugard had only 300 men at his command. With these he made forced marches through Kikuyu, and on December 18, 1890, he entered Mengo, the capital of Uganda, much to the surprise of Mwanga and all his chiefs. Within a few days after his arrival, with Cromwellian promptness and determination, he induced Mwanga to sign a treaty establishing the supremacy of the company, but only for two years. Mwanga declared that if a greater white man than Lugard arrived he would transfer his allegiance; evidently his mind had been poisoned by Peters. Lugard and his two or three white colleagues had a trying part to play. They established their camp in a commanding position, and proceeded quietly and unostentatiously to fortify it; they had the advantage of a Maxim gun. The natives at first in constant apprehension of attack; but in a few days they came to admit that the British officer was his

best friend. Lugard gave it to be clearly understood that he would favor neither one party nor the other, but that he would maintain the authority of the British company against all parties. His perfect fairness was in time recognized; and the effectiveness of his measures to abolish anarchy and establish trade and peace was so evident that both Catholics and Protestants were compelled to admit it. This state of feeling was no doubt in part induced by the fact that the Mohammedans were hovering on the outskirts of the country, ready to rush in and take advantage of the dissensions among the Christians.

By the spring of 1891 the English position was so strong that Lugard felt at liberty to leave Uganda in charge of one of his officers, Captain Williams, and undertake a pioneer journey to the westward. But the position of the Mohammedans on the outskirts of the country was so menacing that he felt it desirable first of all to deal with them. He did not consider it advisable to take any direct part in the conflict himself, but under his guidance both Christian parties united, and their forces were so well organized that the Mohammedans were completely routed on May 7. This naturally greatly increased Lugard's influence, and he was able without returning to Mengo to set out on an expedition to the west shores of the Victoria Nyanza and westward to Lake Albert Edward and Mount Ruwenzori. He had no difficulty anywhere in winning the confidence of the chiefs and natives, and in inducing them to accept the authority of the company. He was able to form a comparatively high opinion of the country and of its suitability for industrial development under a stable administration. At Lake Albert Edward he discovered some valuable salt mines, and erected a fort to guard them. On the slopes of Mount Ruwenzori he built another fort, and proceeded northward to Lake Albert. Here at Kavalli's he found some thousands of Emin Pasha's followers who had been left behind by Stanley when the explorer proceeded to the coast with Emin, and were evidently living in comfort and peace. Lugard had little difficulty in inducing Emin's old followers to go with him; and many of them took service in Uganda under the company. He succeeded in defeating the notorious Kaba Rega, King of Unyoro, and erected a number of forts to secure the footing he had gained in this interesting region. Lugard found that Emin had preceded him at Ruwenzori and on Lake Albert; but the pasha could not induce his former followers to

threw in their lot with him and the Germans. When in the end of 1891 Lugard returned to Uganda, he had firmly laid the foundation of British supremacy in all the region between Lake Victoria on the one side and Lakes Albert and Albert Edward on the other. He had rid the region from the cruelty and oppression of Kaba Rega's domination, and established confidence among the natives, and loyalty to the name of England. Nothing was wanted but that the garrisons in the forts should be strengthened, and Lugard's policy continued, in order to render this region a center of civilization for all Central Africa.

When, on December 31, 1891, the captain returned to Uganda, he found the condition of things not so favorable as when he had left. There had been incessant intrigues on the part of the Catholic or French party; the Protestants had not been so discreet as they might have been; while the weak and inconstant Mwanga had been induced to try to free himself from his allegiance to the company. It has been clearly proved that the French missionaries had been importing arms and ammunition; some French priests arrived from Europe on January 12, 1892, and the bishop had gone out to meet them, and returned with them. With them came the information that the company had intimated its intention of withdrawing from Uganda, failing any support from the government. The French were in many ways the stronger party, and there is little doubt that the bishop, with a certainty of success, resolved to try conclusions with the Protestants. British supremacy was at stake, and Captain Lugard promptly distributed what arms he could spare to the weak but loyal Protestants. At the same time he begged the bishop to moderate or to restrain his co-religionists, but without success. A trifling incident in the Bazaar seems to have led to what was virtually an attack of the Catholic upon the Protestant party on January 24, 1892. Lugard felt bound in the interests of the company [illegible] England to espouse the cause of the latter. Many reports reached England in the early half of 1892 as to the "cruelties" committed by Lugard and his party against the Catholics; but [illegible] of all the facts proved that he acted with justice [illegible] while maintaining the supremacy of the company [illegible] Great Britain. King Mwanga and many of the [illegible] Catholics fled; others were succored by Lugard [illegible] the latter returned to England in the autumn of [illegible] restored peace; the Catholics were settled

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on the northwest of Lake Victoria, the Protestants in Uganda, and the Mohammedans in a province of their own. King Mwanga was restored, a new treaty was concluded in March and Uganda made over in perpetuity to British protection.

Meanwhile the directors of the company in England had become somewhat appalled at the vast responsibility thus forced upon them. Their comparatively insignificant capital of two and a half million dollars could not maintain the administration of a million of square miles; and in the absence of powers to raise taxes they did not consider themselves justified in spending the money of the shareholders on enterprises so far distant from their base of operations. In August, 1891, after its hopes that the government would sanction a subsidy for a railway were defeated, the company gave it to be understood that it would be compelled to withdraw from Uganda. At this the missionary public took alarm, and subscribed a very considerable sum of money to enable the company to maintain Lugard at his post for a time; but the company undertook only to hold on there till the end of 1892. When the news of the revolution in Uganda reached England there was an outcry against the company for threatening to abandon the country under such conditions, leaving the Protestants at the mercy of the Catholics—moreover, it was said it was in the hope that the company would remain in Uganda and extend its operations that Lord Salisbury had asked the House of Commons to incur the expense of a survey for a railway. With this, however, the company maintained it had nothing to do; the railway was the affair of the government, whose duty it was to construct it, in order, by so doing, to carry out the obligations undertaken by Great Britain as a signatory of the act of the Brussels Conference. As a matter of fact the original intention of Lord Salisbury to obtain a vote for the construction of a railway was departed from, and Parliament was merely asked to vote money for a preliminary survey. The company by this time had spent all but about $1,000,000 of its capital. It became evident that with this not much could be done to meet the expenses which would be absolutely necessary to continue the occupation of Uganda and maintain the position secured by Lugard to the westward. Besides, the company was primarily a trading organization; the power to raise taxes, though promised by the imperial government, was still withheld; and the revenue from customs did not amount to much. The crisis in the company's affairs, and in the

occupation of the immense sphere allotted to England by the Anglo-German and Anglo-Italian agreements, was reached in the summer of 1892, when Lord Salisbury's government was succeeded by that of Gladstone. A Cabinet Council was held in the end of September, and on the 30th a letter from the Foreign Office was sent to the company accepting "the principle of evacuation," but offering assistance to the company to prolong the occupation to the end of March, 1893.

The attempt to make the abandonment of Uganda a party question failed; for it was seen that "abandonment" of all that had been gained in East Africa, and not temporary retirement, was what certain extreme partisans had in view. There were so many and varied interests at stake that public opinion ranged itself very emphatically against abandonment. Lugard, who returned to England at the critical moment, addressed crowded audiences all over the country, and so intensified public opinion on behalf of retention that the government became convinced that even temporary evacuation would not be tolerated. Happily their communication to the company was so ingeniously worded that it afforded them a loophole for escape; "abandonment," we are assured, was never in their thoughts. The simple and obvious course would have been to send Lugard back as soon as possible to continue his beneficent work either directly under the imperial government or through the agency of the company. This, however, it was felt, would be too sudden a right about-face for certain influential members of the Cabinet; so that, in deference to them, a middle course was adopted. Captain Macdonald, who had gone out to survey the railway route from the coast to the lake, was ordered, while on his way to the coast, to return to Uganda, and report on the events connected with the civil war there. But this was not enough; it was resolved also to send a commission to Uganda to inquire into the position and to furnish information to the government to enable them to decide as to the course to be ultimately adopted. The most reasonable section of the Cabinet wanted to act through the company, which had [illegible] on the spot; but the ruling spirit in the Cabinet [illegible] to such a proposal. Sir Gerald Portal, the [illegible] at Zanzibar, was appointed as commissioner [illegible] best means of dealing with the country, whether [illegible] Zanzibar or otherwise," and with him were associated [illegible] other British officers and other Englishmen experi-

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enced in East African affairs. The expedition, accompanied by 200 of the Sultan of Zanzibar's soldiers and an army of porters, left the coast early in January, 1893. The few Englishmen in Uganda who were holding the position on behalf of the company and of their country were notified by the speediest possible means of what had taken place, so that when Portal and his expedition arrived all was undisturbed. Portal arrived in Uganda on March 17, 1893, and on the 31st of the month the company's flag was hauled down from Kampala, and the Union Jack raised in its place. The commissioner spent two months in the country investigating matters and trying to readjust the relations between the different parties, mainly to give satisfaction to the Catholics for the treatment they complained of receiving from the British officials.

Portal found that in reality the three so-called religious parties, Catholics, Protestants, and Mohammedans, were hostile political factions, ready at any moment to fly at each other's throats. By the arrangement which Lugard had made the country was so divided between the parties that each was confined to a sphere of its own. Portal modified this arrangement so far as to give to the French or Catholic party territory taken from the Mohammedan sphere. This irritated the Mohammedans, whose remonstrances were interpreted by Captain Macdonald, who had been left in charge by Portal on his return to the coast, as a threat of rebellion. The consequence was that in the summer of 1893 the Mohammedans were attacked by the combined Catholics and Protestants, large numbers driven from the country, and the rest forced to remain quietly in one of the districts assigned to them by Lugard. The result has been mainly to the advantage of the Catholic party. In addition to the districts assigned to the Catholics for occupation, they were allotted exclusive rights for their missionary operations over the whole country between Buddu and Lake Albert Edward as well as Southern Unyoro up to the shores of Lake Albert. The Protestant operations were confined to Northern Uganda and the country of Usoga on the east. When it is borne in mind that the Catholics regard themselves as the representatives of France, the wisdom of this arrangement is doubtful, in view of the operations of the French in the region to the west of the Upper Nile.

Under date May 29, 1893, Portal made a fresh treaty with King Mwanga, by which Uganda virtually became a protectorate

of Great Britain. When he took his departure from Uganda he left behind him several British officers under Macdonald, the acting administrator. Among these were Major Owen, who was sent west to Lake Albert Edward to withdraw the garrisons from the two remotest forts established by Lugard, a proceeding for which it would be difficult to find any adequate reason. To make amends for the abandonment of the strongholds farther south a series of forts was erected between Lake Albert and the Kafu River, the boundary of Unyoro, with the intention of preventing any further incursions southward by Kabba Rega of Unyoro. Early in 1894 Major Owen, acting under instructions, for the protection of British interests in the Nile valley, made his way down the Nile as far as Wadelai, where he planted the British flag. By these and other measures the good work begun by Captain Lugard was in a measure confirmed and continued; for although, to save appearances, Portal considered it advisable to make a few modifications in his arrangements, the virtual result of his mission was to confirm the high opinion formed by impartial judges of the ability, tact, and humanity with which that officer had carried out his most trying mission to Uganda.

As the result of Portal's mission the British Government was compelled to come to a definite decision with reference to Uganda and the whole region between that and the coast. The abandonment of Uganda had ceased to be a practical question, if indeed it was ever seriously contemplated except by a few extreme politicians whose views on imperial questions find but slender support in the country. Lord Rosebery as Foreign Minister, and later as Prime Minister, had a difficult part to play. It is recognized that had he been free to follow his own inclinations there could have been no doubt that he, like Lord Salisbury, would have proceeded not only to occupy Uganda, but to secure against the aggressions of France and the Congo Free State the whole of the sphere accorded to British influence by the Anglo-German and Anglo-Italian agreements. In this there cannot be any doubt that he would have been supported by the majority of his own party as well as by the whole of the Opposition. But it is notorious that the few extreme anti-imperialists in the House of Commons were represented in the Cabinet by colleagues whose influence compelled the Prime Minister to accept a policy which could neither satisfy himself nor the country at large. In June, 1893, it was announced in Parliament that

the government had resolved to retain Uganda, and to administer it as a protectorate under a commissioner. But this applied only to Uganda proper, which was a territory of comparatively limited area; the relations of the commissioner to the countries beyond, to Unyoro, Toro, and the other native states between Uganda and Lakes Albert and Albert Edward, were of a very vague character. He was to maintain friendly relations with the chiefs, to discourage the slave-trade, and generally maintain peace. Not only Uganda, but practically the whole region between Lake Victoria and Lakes Albert and Albert Edward is within the jurisdiction of the Uganda Commissioner; the British here, then, are bound by the terms of the Anglo-German agreement to give effect to the rules of the Berlin Conference. Considering the peculiar geographical position of Uganda this is inevitable, especially if the slave-trade is to be controlled and the frontiers of the protectorate proper defended from attack.

With regard to the region lying between Uganda and the coast it was nominally to be under a different régime. It was to be placed under a sub-commissioner, in turn responsible to the British agent in Uganda. "His first and main duty," to quote the words of the Under Foreign Secretary, "will be to take charge of the communications between Lake Victoria and the coast. His duty, of course, will extend to establishing such friendly relations with the natives as will enable these communications to be maintained, and also to establishing such relations as shall make it possible for British capital and enterprise to enter that country, and the intervening country between Lake Victoria and the coast if disposed to do so." Combined with the fact that the British East Africa Company had already made treaties with most of the chiefs in this region, treaties approved of and accepted by the British Government, and virtually placing the region under British protection, it is evident that the sub-commissioner's duties were not to be very different from those of the Commissioner of Uganda. At present the total annual sum allotted as a grant in aid for the administration of Uganda and the intervening country is about $650,000; this is increased from local resources by about $195,000.

There still remained to be dealt with the ten-mile strip of coast which had been leased by the Sultan of Zanzibar to the British East Africa Company. The company, when it retired from Uganda in March, 1893, retained posts in Kikuyu, at Machako's and one or

two places in the interior, thus practically confining its operations within these limits. The government hesitated to make up its mind what course to take; it could not, without the consent of the company, deal with the coast strip held under concession, or attach it to the sub commissionership; nor could it withdraw the company's charter without reason assigned. In the beginning of 1895 the government offered the company, on behalf of Zanzibar, $1,000,000 in satisfaction of all its claims, including its assets, with a sum of $250,000 for the cession of its charter. Thus ended the career of a company from which so much was expected; and that, had it not been for the exigencies of party politics in England, might still have been continuing the work so well begun by Captain Lugard. It is only fair to remember that the founders of the company stepped into the breach at a critical moment.

The government, on the retiring of the company from Witu, felt compelled to take a step which led to a distinct retrogression of British policy in Africa. When, in accordance with the Anglo-German agreement of 1890, the Witu country was made over to Great Britain, it was (May, 1891) placed under the control of the company, the legal status of slavery abolished, and the India Civil and Criminal Code established throughout the country. The company became dissatisfied with the treatment of the government, and in 1893 intimated that it would not be responsible for the administration of Witu after July 31 of that year. The result was that Witu was placed by the government under the sultanate of Zanzibar, Mohammedan law established, and the legal status of slavery restored, a retrograde and wholly unnecessary step for which the British Government has not yet been able to offer any excuse. The East African Company itself surrendered its charter two years later.

Such then was the position of affairs in that portion of British East Africa lying between the coast and the eastern shores of Lakes Albert and Albert Edward. Meanwhile important arrangements were being made with respect to a portion at least of the extensive British sphere lying beyond that limit, the claims to which Lord Salisbury's government repeatedly declared it had no intention of [illegible]. In the chapter dealing with the Congo Free State [illegible] to the fact that in 1891 a formidable expedition was sent from the Congo toward the Upper Nile. It is not clear that the expedition ever succeeded in establishing a footing

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at Lado, which was believed to be its objective point; and it is known that in the early part of 1894 it received a severe check from the natives of the Niam-Niam country. Still there is no doubt that if the force from the Congo Free State had not actually established itself on the Nile within the British sphere, it was making every effort to do so. As has been pointed out, King Leopold, as sovereign of the Congo Free State, maintained that in thus pushing on to the Upper Nile, he was within his right in accordance with an agreement made with the late Sir William Mackinnon. But both Salisbury and Rosebery declined to recognize any such right, and repeatedly warned King Leopold that he was trespassing. But the movements of the French on the Upper Mobangi introduced complications. It was known that a strong French expedition, fully equipped with boats and well armed, had been on the Mobangi during 1893-1894. It was stated that the expedition was only waiting for the arrival of Colonel Monteil to proceed westward toward the Nile. Rumors of other French expeditions from west and east were also afloat. It was known that apart from the acquisition of territory in Africa, France was anxious to obtain such a footing on the Upper Nile as would give her a controlling voice in Egyptian affairs. She never was a party to the Anglo-German and Anglo-Italian agreements, and considered herself unfettered by their conditions, at least to the extent of being at liberty to take possession of any part of the British sphere which had not been actually occupied. Between France and the Congo Free State on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist section of the Radical party on the other, the hold of England on the extensive and valuable territories conceded to her beyond the great lakes seemed precarious. The position of Lord Rosebery, then Foreign Minister in a Cabinet an influential section of whose members was either indifferent or positively hostile to extension of the empire, was a difficult one. He had many interests to consider. Had he taken the bold and most effective course of following up Major Owen's expedition, to come to terms with the people on the Upper Nile, and plant the British flag on its banks, he would have had the support of the country and of Parliament, but he might have wrecked his party. He adopted what seemed at first sight a strange compromise. It was impracticable in the immediate future to send a British expedition to take possession of the region beyond the Upper Nile, toward which, on the Bahr-el-Ghazal, it was believed

the French were advancing. As the forces of the Congo Free State were on the spot, why not make the best of the situation and utilize them as a buffer between French ambition and the Upper Nile? Such seems to have been the train of reasoning which led to the agreement of May 12, 1894, between Great Britain and King Leopold as sovereign of the Congo Free State. By this agreement Leopold recognized the right of Great Britain to the territories assigned to her by the Anglo-German and Anglo-Italian agreements, and any subsequent modifications could not affect this recognition. He agreed to accept from the British Government a lease of a considerable area of this territory, extending from Lake Albert to beyond Fashoda, and stretching westward to the twenty-fifth degree of east longitude and the water-parting between the basins of the Nile and the Congo, so as to bar the further advance of French claims. He bound himself not to acquire political rights in these territories, and as a return granted to Great Britain a lease of a strip sixteen miles in breadth from the most northerly port on Lake Tanganyika to the most southerly port on Lake Albert Edward, a strip, be it noted, bordering on the western frontier of German East Africa; he agreed, moreover, to an adjustment of the western frontier of British Central Africa to the advantage of British interests. This arrangement seemed at first sight a triumph of diplomacy. It settled definitely the irritating question of the frontier between the Congo Free States and the British sphere in the region of Lakes Mweru and Bangweolo. It gratified the aspirations of those who were ambitious to see an uninterrupted British line extend from the Cape to the Nile, if not to Cairo. Above all, it imposed a broad buffer between the French sphere and the Nile, for the route to the north of the tenth parallel was supposed to be effectually barred by the Mahdists. And finally, it turned to the advantage of British claims the position which had been obtained by the forces of the Congo Free State on the Upper Nile.

It might have been expected that France would quietly submit to [illegible] in the game of grab which she was playing [illegible] European powers in Africa, England being her most [illegible]. The new agreement took place just at the time when [illegible] ministry; and the first act of the new ministry [illegible] to protest against the perfidy and illegality [illegible]. The French press would be satisfied with [illegible] advance of the French force. It was maintained

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that according to the Berlin Act, the Congo Free State had no right to go beyond the fourth parallel north; that the right of pre-emption which had been accorded to France precluded the Free State making any arrangement with another power without her consent; that this attempt to annex the former Egyptian province of Bahr-el-Ghazal was a direct violation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which France for the moment felt it her duty to champion. But it is doubtful if even in France the contentions put forward were taken seriously; France herself has had no hesitation in ignoring the "rights" of Turkey in Africa when it suited her purpose. She had for the moment been defeated in the game she was playing, and it was not in her nature to take her defeat with composure.

England and the King of the Belgians were equally involved in French indignation. Colonel Monteil was ordered at once to proceed to the Mobangi and take command of the forces there awaiting his arrival. He was not to hesitate to take extreme measures to expel the officials of the Congo Free State from the stations on the Mbomu tributary of the Mobangi, considerably to the north of the fourth parallel, which had been established there for some time. Moreover, it was understood he was to push on Nile-ward and plant the French flag, if necessary by force, in the face of any opposition that might be offered by the forces of England's royal lessee. But the astute king had no intention of surrendering the advantages he had secured. Before the arrangement with Great Britain he had been negotiating with France with reference to the stations of the Congo Free State in the Mbomu country to the north of the fourth degree. The negotiations were promptly broken off by France when the agreement came to light, not without a suspicion in some quarters that the game had been prearranged; for after the storm of indignation had somewhat died down the king easily succeeded in persuading the French Government to renew them. Evidently he had an eye solely to his own interests in obtaining access to the Albert Nyanza and the Nile; in that respect he was neither better nor worse than the other powers. He treated England in East Africa precisely as Germany did in West Africa. He gave up all claim as lessee to a considerable portion of the territory acquired under the agreement of the previous May. By an agreement signed at Paris, August 14, 1894, Leopold renounced all right of occupation or influence in the territory leased to him

by Great Britain north of 5° 30′ north latitude. This line, it will be seen, touches the Nile a short distance north of Lado. In return for this renunciation on the part of Leopold, France agreed to move the boundary of the Congo Free State considerably to the north of the fourth parallel. The northern boundary of the Free State in the east was moved to about the fifth degree, thus violating the limit which France a few weeks before maintained according to the Berlin Act was inviolable.

Germany, with less bluster than France, but with more firmness and directness, protested against the cession to Great Britain as lessee of the strip of territory along her East African frontier between Lakes Tanganyika and Albert Edward. This was regarded by her as a violation of the understanding which had been reached in 1890 as to the western boundary of German East Africa, which Germany insisted should march with the Congo Free State. There was, however, little hesitation on the part of Great Britain in assenting to the cancellation of the lease of the strip objected to, and the resumption in full by Leopold of the one concession he had made.

Such then in brief is the story of the most exciting transaction in the partition of Africa which took place in 1894. In England the views expressed at the outset were mostly colored by political prejudices. On the one side the arrangement with Leopold was unreservedly condemned as weak and humiliating; on the other it was regarded as a clever compromise; it has certainly not succeeded in securing the object ostensibly aimed at. But, at the time, immediate action was necessary; it was impracticable to send a sufficient force to take possession of the British sphere on the Upper Nile; the course adopted seemed to secure the end in view, and no doubt would have done so had King Leopold adhered to his original undertaking; but this would have implied the active hostility of France.

Notwithstanding its troubles in connection with Uganda, the British East Africa Company was not idle elsewhere. Ernest Berkeley, who had had considerable experience in the East African consular service, assumed the office of administrator in 1891, and under him the enterprises of the company were conducted energetically and economically. The Tana was carefully explored, and found to be an uncertain waterway; the troublesome Sultan of Witu was induced to settle down quietly; friendly relations were

entered into with the chiefs along the coast as far as the River Jub, the boundary between the British and Italian spheres, and the capabilities of the river as a trade route were investigated, with the result that it was found to be navigable for 400 miles of its course. Specialists were employed to examine and report upon the planting and agricultural capacities of the coast regions, with results very favorable to the prosecution of industries. By an agreement with the sultan in 1891 the lease for fifty years of the strip of coast claimed by him was converted into a grant in perpetuity in consideration of an annual payment of about $80,000. The whole length of the coast-line thus acquired measured 400 miles. The customs dues rose steadily from $35,000 in 1889 to $80,000 in 1892. Under Dr. Stewart of Lovedale an industrial institution for training natives was established near Machako's, and at the expense of Sir William Mackinnon a good road was made from the coast. A greater sense of security began to prevail in the interior, and several of the most troublesome tribes, including the Masai, sent large numbers of the people down to the coast to make friends with the company. Small experiments had been made with Indian immigrants; these were successful, but there were difficulties in the way of obtaining such immigrants in numbers sufficient to colonize on a large scale. Notwithstanding mistakes and misfortunes, the company during the years of its existence must be admitted to have done much for the effective occupation and development of the regions between the Victoria Nyanza and the coast. It withdrew from Uganda and Witu in 1893, and in June, 1895, a British protectorate was proclaimed over the regions in question. This was divided for administrative purposes into the East Africa and the Uganda protectorates.

Although it did not directly affect the operations of the company, the declaration in the summer of 1890 of a British protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba tended to give it a greater feeling of security and permanence. A regular administration under British auspices was formed by agreement, October, 1891, in the sultan's restricted dominions, which must therefore be regarded as distinctly within the British sphere. It is deserving of note that when Sir Gerald Portal was appointed Commissioner, he was authorized to exercise, under an Order in Council, a general supervision over the territories immediately under British influence in Eastern Africa. This was in reality an acknowledgment of im-

perial responsibility for the administration of the entire British sphere in East Africa.

The Sultan of Zanzibar now receives a fixed sum and retains his private estates, the public revenues being wholly administered by British officers under the direction of the consul-general. But the revenues of the state have shrunk much since the time when Zanzibar was independent under the late Sultan Burghash, whose revenue amounted to about $1,150,000 yearly. This is due in part to the loss of the German coast, and so of the chief ivory caravan route, partly also to the creation of Zanzibar as a free port in 1892, and to the working of the free system of the Berlin Act; the restoration of import duties in 1899 for Zanzibar, though only five per cent. *ad valorem*, will tend toward a substantial increase of revenue.



THE TROOPS OF THE SIRDAR, SIR HERBERT KITCHENER, ON A NILE BOAT IN BATTLE WITH THE ADHERENTS OF THE MAHDI OFF OMDURMAN

Painting by W. H. Overend

Chapter XVI

THE ITALIAN SPHERE AND THE ISLANDS. 1875-1910

AS was the case with Germany, Italy very soon after it became a united kingdom sought to obtain possessions abroad. So long ago as 1875 Italian vessels were hovering around Sokotra, and compelled England to place her imperial stamp upon the island. Tripoli was for a time a sore temptation also to the young kingdom on the other side of the Mediterranean, but fear of complications with France and Turkey induced her to keep her hands off. We have seen that, although in 1870 a spot in Assab Bay, just inside the Red Sea, was purchased as a coaling station, it was not till 1880 that the Italian Government even nominally took it over. From this as a starting-point the Italian possessions in the Red Sea spread northward. Southward they could go no farther than Raheita, as the French station of Obock barred the way. Italian explorers and missionaries had been active in this part of Africa for years; but it was not until July, 1882, that the Italian Government took actual possession of the territory and Bay of Assab. Until 1885 Italy's footing in the Red Sea hardly extended beyond Assab; but in that year, taking advantage of Egypt's difficulties with the Mahdists, she took possession of the Beilul and of the important port of Massawa, the Egyptian garrison of the latter being compelled to quit. These advances were taken with the connivance if not the approval of England. Had Italy not taken and held Massawa, it might have fallen into the hands of the Mahdists. Italian domination rapidly extended all along the coast, so that by 1888 it reached from Cape Kasar on the north to the French colony of Obock in the south, some 650 miles.

These advances on the part of Italy were not regarded, as may be believed, with anything like complacency by King John of Abyssinia. The hostile action of the latter led to what was really a war between the Italian garrison and the Abyssinian army; at Dogali, in January, 1887, an Italian force was almost annihilated. But this did not prevent Italy from adhering to what she had

gained, and attempting to push her influence into the interior. After the death of King John the interior posts of Keren and Asmara were occupied, as well as other places not far from the coast, but giving command of the routes to the lofty tableland. King John was succeeded by Menelek, King of Shoa, who showed some inclination to establish friendly relations with the Italians. By an agreement of May, 1889, confirmed and renewed in October of the same year, a treaty of "mutual protection" was entered into between Menelek and the King of Italy. This was naturally regarded as in effect placing Abysinnia under the protection of Italy, though on more than one occasion thereafter Menelek formally repudiated any such interpretation, the protection, he maintained, being as much on his side as on that of Italy. By various decrees in 1890 and 1891 the Italian possessions on the Red Sea have been constituted into the colony of Eritrea, with an autonomous administration and the management of its own finances. These, however, have to be subsidized by Italy, which spent about twenty-five million dollars on her Red Sea colonies between 1887 and 1892. The area of the territory is about 88,500 square miles, with a population of some 450,000, largely nomadic, while that of the former so-called protectorate of Abyssinia was about 195,000 square miles, including Shoa, Kaffa, Harrar, and other places claimed by King Menelek.

In July, 1894, owing to the threatening attitude of the Dervish forces at Kassala on the northwest frontier of Abyssinia, a large Italian force proceeded from the post at Keren, thoroughly defeated the Dervishes and captured Kassala. By an arrangement with England in March, 1891, Italy was permitted to occupy Kassala if necessary for military purposes, only, however, on condition that it should be temporary, and that she should give it up whenever Egypt was in a position to take it over. The immense advantages to Italy of occupying the frontier post are evident; it naturally provoked the hostility of the Dervishes, but the success of the Italians excited the active hostility of King Menelek of Abyssinia, so that between the Dervishes on the one side and the Abyssinians on the other, the resources of Italy in money and men were severely strained.

But Italy was not content with securing a position on the Red Sea. Since she could not obtain Sokotra, she turned her attention to the barren coast opposite on the African mainland, inhabited by

the fiercely independent nomads, the Somalis and Gallas. In February, 1889, the Sultan of Obbia, on the Somali coast, placed his sultanate under the protection of Italy. In April of the same year the Italian sphere was extended to the country between 5° 33′ and 8° 3′ north latitude by treaty with the Sultan of the Mijertine Somalis, who at the same time bound himself to make no treaty with any other power regarding the rest of his territory. A treaty of 1901 confirms this arrangement. On the other side, in November, 1889, the Somali coast from the sultanate of Obbia to the mouth of the Jub River was declared to be within the sphere of Italy.

Here was a stretch of some 800 miles of coast, with vague extension inward, added with wonderful rapidity to Italy's "foreign possessions." It apparently did not concern her that the coast was little better than a sandy waste; she had a vague idea that somehow it might be a convenient back door to Abyssinia and Shoa, all the more if the Jub River were found to be a practicable waterway. At the mouth of the river the Italian sphere and the British overlapped. As the Sultan of Zanzibar had ceded to the British company his territory as far north as Warsheikh, Italy obviously claimed what already belonged to another power. However, there was no difficulty in coming to an understanding. The British company very readily conceded all its claims on the coast to the north of the Jub, on the understanding that Italy would not be too exacting as to the delimitation between the spheres of the two powers in the interior. When, however, it came to actual negotiations, Italy showed but little disposition to minimize her claims. The boundary between the spheres of the two countries was settled by agreement in March, 1891. In Somaliland and Gallaland this gave to Italy an area of 355,000 square miles, on which there was a scanty population of some one and a half million. The whole area claimed by Italy in Africa was over 600,000 square miles.


A further delimitation between the British and Italian spheres in Somaliland was made by agreement between the two countries May 5, 1894. The British protectorate in Somaliland dates from 1884, in which year Great Britain occupied Berbera, Bulhar, and Zaila. By an Order in Council dated September 10, 1889, a protectorate was proclaimed over the whole coast from Ras Jibuti to Bandar Ziyada. By an agreement concluded with France in 1888

the boundary between the British and French protectorates ran from the Gulf of Tajura toward Harrar. This important town, since 1887 occupied by King Menelek, was not to be seized by either power, each retaining the right to prevent any other nation from taking possession. By the agreement of 1894 Great Britain waived her right in favor of Italy, if the latter cared or dared to take possession. This definitely settled the limits of British Somaliland, which covered an area of 75,000 square miles, but in 1897 by a cession in favor of Abyssinia the territory was reduced to 68,000. France, as usual, protested against this arrangement, maintaining that it was a violation of that of 1888. Less progress has been made in Somaliland than elsewhere in the British colonies, owing to the fierce and intractable population. This protectorate was subject to the Indian Government till 1898.

Italy then, like other great powers of Europe, acquired a fair portion of the continent in the scramble for Africa. A small and prudent minority in the Italian Parliament attempted in vain to oppose the craving for an "African Empire" which had seized regenerated Italy. Italy's African territory, with its numerous officials and its African corps of over 6000 officers and men, was a drain on the resources of a country whose financial difficulties are notorious. Massawa is no doubt an important port, and its trade, as the leading gate from the sea to Abyssinia, is capable of considerable development. The monopoly of the trade of Massawa may be worth having. But the advantage of most of the other territory claimed by Italy is doubtful. Unless her resources and her power increase immensely, she can never expect to have any real hold over the most inaccessible and most mountainous country of Africa, with a population fiercely independent. As for the country in the Somali interior, its commercial value can never be great. Both north and south, Italy has England to compete with. On the northern coast of Somaliland England is supreme from Tajura Bay to near Cape Guardafui; her port at Berbera draws to it most of the commerce of the interior. Meantime it is to Italy's credit that her explorers are doing much for a knowledge of her sphere, especially in the Somaliland interior, which they assure us is better populated and better watered than has been generally believed in the past. It should be noted that travelers in Somaliland in 1894-1895 found it overrun by the troops of King Menelek, who were ravishing the land, and laying or carrying off as slaves the bulk of the

population; this appears to be but the beginning of activity on the part of Abyssinia, which is designed finally to wrest the region from its nominal possessors.

For the sake of completeness reference may be briefly made to the destiny of the principal African islands. Sokotra and the Zan-



MAP SHOWING THE ITALIAN SPHERE AND THE ISLANDS (FRENCH)

zibar islands have already been dealt with. The great island of Madagascar is virtually a French protectorate. The connection of France with Madagascar is of ancient date. The island was known to Marco Polo and the Arabs, and was discovered, so far as Europe is concerned, by the Portuguese navigator Diego Diaz in 1500. Both Portuguese and Dutch, in the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, tried in vain to establish themselves on the island. In the early part of the latter century the French es-

tablished themselves in Madagascar, to which they gave the name of Ile Dauphin or France Orientale. Fort Dauphin, at the south end of the island, was founded in 1644; it was destroyed in 1672, and many of the colonists who had settled in the island were massacred. By various decrees in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries French rights to Madagascar were asserted. In 1750 the little island of Sainte Marie, off Madagascar, was ceded to France, though the French were expelled eleven years after; but the island has remained French ever since. Fort Dauphin was reconstructed in 1768. From 1773 to 1786 the Hungarian Count Benyovski tried to establish French influence, but without success: equally unsuccessful was another attempt in the first year of the nineteenth century. The island was taken possession of by Great Britain in 1811. In the Treaty of Paris, Madagascar is not mentioned among the colonies which were not to be restored to France, and although the English governor of Mauritius attempted to maintain that Madagascar was a dependency of the latter, he did not succeed. At the same time British influence has become strong in the island through the labors of missionaries. The London Missionary Society, as well as other British societies, have secured the adhesion of thousands of the Hovas, the ruling people in Madagascar, but the British Government has never seriously attempted to assert any claims to domination, though early in the century there were treaties of friendship between England and the Madagascar rulers. The small islands of Nossi-Bé, Nossi-Mitsiou, and Nossi-Cumba were taken possession of in 1845 by the French, who had been attempting in preceding years to make their influence felt on the main island. Other efforts were made in succeeding years to establish French influence, but without success. Under various pretexts France made war upon the Malagasy from 1883 until a treaty was concluded in October, 1885, literally establishing a French protectorate over the island, with the cession of the Bay of Diego Suarez near its northern extremity. By the Anglo-French agreement of August, 1890, the French protectorate over Madagascar was recognized by Great Britain, in return for the acknowledgment by France of a British protectorate over Zanzibar. It cannot be said that the Malagasy have ever thoroughly submitted to French influence, though all the foreign relations of the island are supposed to be in the hands of France. In 1894-1895 France made a determined effort to strengthen her hold

and secure complete control of the island's interests. In 1897, after the crushing of an insurrection by General Gallieni, it was declared a French colony, and the Hova monarchy was suppressed. The resources have never been developed to any extent. Roads are almost non-existent. Commercial advance since the conquest has been seen chiefly in the increase of imports. France tried in 1897, with some success, to gain for herself a larger share of the Madagascar trade by the imposition upon the colony of the general French tariff. Though it is doubtful if ever it could be colonized by Europeans in the true sense, the highlands of the interior are healthful, and are capable of being turned to good account, both for cattle-rearing and agriculture. The people themselves, especially the Hovas, are Malays, a higher type than the Africans, and under good guidance might do much to render their island of great commercial value.

The neighboring island of Mayotte was ceded to France in 1840, while the Comoros, halfway between Madagascar and the African coast, were taken possession of in 1886. The island of Bourbon, afterward named Réunion, has belonged to France since 1764. Mauritius was occupied by France in 1715, but was taken by England in 1810, and at the Treaty of Paris, in 1815, it remained British, with, as satellites, Rodriguez, the Amirantes, the Seychelles, and various scattered small islands, while Réunion was restored.

On the other side of Africa it may be said that the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape Verde Islands have been Portuguese since the fifteenth century, as the Canaries have been Spanish. Various islands off the West Coast are attached to the territories on the mainland opposite which they lie. Fernando Po was ceded to Spain by Portugal in 1778, as was the Island of Annobon. Principé and San Thomé have been Portuguese since the fifteenth century. St. Helena, usually regarded as an African island, was taken from the Dutch by the English in 1650. Ascension was occupied by Great Britain in 1815, and in the year following the distant islets of Tristan D'Acunha were occupied by the same powers.

Thus all these fragmentary appendages of the great continent have been picked up by various powers of Europe and no African island now remains to be occupied.

Chapter XVII

BRITISH CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA
1877-1895

THE extension of the British sphere in South Africa and in the region watered by the Zambezi and its affluents has, since 1885, been rapid and immense. Up to 1884, British South Africa, with the exception of the colony of Griqualand West, did not extend beyond the Orange River. The impulse given to farther extension has been seen in connection with German annexations in Southwest Africa. But the attention both of the imperial government and of the Cape Government was directed to the region vaguely known as Bechuanaland even before this period. During the four years of British occupation of the Transvaal from 1877 to 1881 comparative peace was maintained on its borders. But no sooner had the Transvaal reassumed its independence than it became involved in disputes with the tribes on its western borders. The result was intertribal wars and a struggle for supremacy among the rival chiefs. This afforded an opportunity for Boer intervention, with the result that enormous areas of the neighboring Bechuanaland were acquired, and two Boer states founded, Stellaland and Goshenland. This condition of things compelled the British Government to consider what measures should be adopted to protect the interests of the empire and of Cape Colony in this part of South Africa. The convention of February, 1884, fixed the western limits of the Transvaal, and as a consequence it was decided to proclaim a British protectorate in Bechuanaland. John Mackenzie, who had labored as a missionary for many years in this part of Africa, was in 1884 appointed Deputy Commissioner to Bechuanaland, and in this capacity concluded treaties with several of the chiefs. But this did not prevent the Transvaal Boers from intervening and endeavoring to secure a large piece of the Bechuanaland territory. Later, when Cecil J. Rhodes succeeded Mackenzie as Deputy Commissioner, he refused to recognize the claims set up by the Boers; and in order to put an end to all

disputes and to secure the whole territory for Great Britain, Sir Charles Warren was commissioned, at the end of 1884, to proceed to Bechuanaland with a strong force. He accomplished his mission with complete success. The boundaries of the Transvaal were restricted to those laid down in the convention of February, 1884; and the British sphere was extended northward to 22° south latitude. All this was accomplished by August, 1885, and in the following month the southern portion of the territory (south of the Molopo River) was erected into a Crown colony under the name of British Bechuanaland. The colony, including later extensions, covering some 51,000 square miles, was incorporated in 1895 with Cape Colony; the region to the north as far as the Zambezi, covering 213,000 square miles, being constituted the British protectorate of Bechuanaland, with British residents and a strong police force to patrol the country. In the northern part of this area the remarkable chief Khama was supreme, and it was only after long conferences with Warren that this chief at last agreed to accept protection. In this district the only rights to be considered were those of the natives; there was little difficulty in coming to an understanding as to the claims of Germany. It was a question of annexation either by Great Britain or by the Transvaal, and in this case the stronger power had no scruples in using its strength.

The wide region between the Orange River and the Zambezi is one in which British missionary effort (we need only mention the names of Moffat and Livingstone) had been long active and fairly successful, and with which English traders had had dealings for many years. Whatever views may be held as to mission work in the abstract, there can be no doubt of the practical benefits secured by the conversion of such chiefs as Sechele and Khama from the ways of their forefathers, and, in the case of Khama, the change is generally admitted to have been a vast improvement. At present, however, we are only concerned to show that British influence was already paramount here, and that it was therefore natural for the British Government to prevent a Boer annexation. But the truth is, as will have been seen from previous chapters, that by 1885 all considerations for what are called "native rights" had disappeared before the blind scramble. It was in the nature of things that Great Britain should try to make up for the loss of Damaraland by taking all that she could lay hands upon to the north of Cape Colony. Even before 1890 she had distinctly given

it to be understood, as will be seen, that she regarded the Zambezi as the natural northern boundary of her South African possessions. This principle was, however, adopted much too late to be of avail in securing a perfectly united British South Africa. It was only in 1868 that the conception seems to have taken shape; and by that time two independent Boer republics had been established, and the idea was so slow in taking root that so late as 1884 Germany was allowed to cut off from the possibility of annexation an enormous block on the west. Basutoland, it is true, was annexed in 1868 and Griqualand West in 1877; but from that time till 1885, with the exception of the fruitless attempt to annex the Transvaal, little advance was made. We have seen the important measures taken in 1884 and 1885 on the west of the Transvaal; and on the east of that republic the Boers were as eager to make annexations as they were in the west. It was natural that the Transvaal should endeavor to obtain an independent outlet to the sea, from which she was barred by Swaziland, Tongaland, and Zululand—on all of which countries she had her eye for years. In 1884 a party of Boers took possession of the western part of Zululand, and established an independent state, the New Republic; and when Zululand was in 1887 declared British territory, this section was handed over to the Transvaal. Swaziland also, which forms an indentation on the east of the Transvaal, had long been coveted by the Boers; by the Convention of 1890 it was placed in a transition state, and as a result of the negotiations between Great Britain and the Transvaal in 1893-1895, it was made over in February, 1895, to the latter, with certain restrictions as to the rights of the natives and of British subjects.[1] But the Boer republics were effectually prevented from acquiring any section of the coast.

Though Germany had given the British Government a general assurance that she would not seek any further annexations south of Delagoa Bay, it was none the less difficult for enterprising Germans in search of fresh fields to resist temptation so long as any portion of the great area south of the Zambezi was unannexed. Moreover, the Boers, ever on the lookout for new lands into which to trek, had long since fixed their eyes on the country north of the Limpopo, known generally as Matabeleland, ruled over by Lobengula, with whom, when the Matabeles were in their old home, the British

[1] The status of the Boer Republics has not been definitely fixed. It is ruled by a Resident [illegible]

Government made a treaty of friendship in 1836. The reports of rich gold mines contained in this territory were well known, and, as has already been seen, in 1870 Sir John Swinburne formed a company for working the Tati region in the southwest of Matabeleland. Other travelers and sportsmen gave the most favorable accounts, not only of the gold of the country, but of the suitability of a large portion of the high plateau known as Mashonaland for European settlement and agricultural operations. When Sir Charles Warren was in Bechuanaland in 1885 several of his officers made journeys to Matabeleland, and their reports all tended to show the desirability of taking possession of that country; indeed Sir Charles was assured that Lobengula would welcome a British alliance as a protection against the Boers, of whose designs he was afraid. At that very time an expedition was being planned in the Transvaal for the purpose of taking possession of Mashonaland. One correspondent, writing to Sir Charles Warren, in May, 1885, described the situation as follows:

"The Boers are determined to get a footing in Mashonaland (their condition being so wretched, and Mashonaland being the finest agricultural land in South Africa), by thus taking the Matabele on the flank and gradually acquiring their territory by conquest, from thence overspreading all the independent tribes to the west and south of here. I also had good proof that the Germans and Portuguese are working quietly but slowly to acquire as much of these lands and the Transvaal under their protectorate as occasion will allow of; and believe that they as well as the Boers and other nations are only waiting to hear what action the British Government will take to settle on their own. The natives all showed the greatest desire to be under British protection, chiefs as well as their subjects, and their hatred and fear of the Boers."

In 1882 an attempt was made by the Transvaal to induce Lobengula to sign a treaty, but the chief was too wily; in 1888, however, President Krüger tried to make out that such a treaty had been concluded. But the old friendship with England was not forgotten, even after Lobengula succeeded his father in 1868. As the most powerful chief north of the Limpopo, he was extremely jealous of interference, although he had recently suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Bechuanas.

As a result of Warren's mission to Bechuanaland, and of the reports furnished by the agents he sent into Matabeleland, the

attention of adventurers and prospectors was more and more drawn toward the latter country. The Portuguese had been electrified into activity by the events of the past two years. That the attention of the British Government was directed to Matabeleland even in 1887 is evident from a protest in August of that year, on the part of Lord Salisbury, against an official Portuguese map claiming a section of that country as within the Portuguese sphere. Salisbury then clearly stated that no pretensions of Portugal to Matabeleland could be recognized, and that the Zambezi should be regarded as the natural northern limit of British South Africa. The Prime Minister reminded the Portuguese Government that according to the Berlin Act no claim to territory in Central Africa could be allowed that was not supported by effective occupation. The Portuguese Government maintained, and with justice, that this applied only to the coast, but Salisbury stood firmly to his position. Portugal appealed to her long historical connection with Central Africa, and to the evidences which still existed of previous occupation. She sent hurried expeditions up the valleys of some of the southern tributaries of the Zambezi, and pointed to what she maintained were the ruins of old forts and the existence of orange trees as evidence of her former occupation of the country. Giving the fullest weight to all that the Portuguese themselves have been able to adduce in favor of their claims to a trans-African dominion and to the possession of Mashonaland, it is impossible to admit that their occupation had ever been effective away from their ports on the coast and one or two stations on the river. Their country, moreover, was on the verge of bankruptcy, and they had not the resources wherewith to develop the enormous area claimed by them. To have allowed Portugal to acquire what she claimed in Africa was to shut out the center of the continent, including some of the most promising regions of tropical Africa, from all civilization.

Germans, Boers, Portuguese, were all ready to lay their hands on the country claimed by Lobengula, when England intervened and took it out of their hands. By the end of 1887 the attempts of the Transvaal Boers to obtain a hold over Matabeleland had reached a crisis. It became evident that no time was to be lost if England was to secure the Zambezi as the northern limit of extension of her South African possessions. Lobengula himself was harassed and alarmed by the aggressions of the Boers on the one hand, and the

1888

doings of the Portuguese on the north of his territory on the other. In the Rev. J. Smith Moffat, Assistant Commissioner in Bechuanaland, England had a trusty agent who had formerly been a missionary for many years in Matabeleland, and had great influence with Lobengula. Under the circumstances it does not seem to have been difficult for Moffat to persuade the king to put an end to his troubles by placing himself under the protection of Great Britain. On March 21, 1888, Sir Hercules Robinson, governor of Cape Colony and British High Commissioner for South Africa, was able to inform the home government that on February 11 Lobengula had appended his mark to a document securing to England supremacy in Matabeleland over all her rivals. This brief document may well be quoted here:

"The chief Lobengula, ruler of the tribe known as the Amandebele, together with the Mashona and Makalaka, tributaries of the same, hereby agrees to the following articles and conditions:

"That peace and amity shall continue forever between Her Britannic Majesty, her subjects, and the Amandebele people; and the contracting Chief Lobengula engages to use his utmost endeavors to prevent any rupture of the same, to cause the strict observance of the treaty, and so to carry out the spirit of the treaty of friendship which was entered into between his late father, the Chief Umsiligazi, with the then governor of the Cape of Good Hope, in the year of our Lord 1836.

"It is hereby further agreed by Lobengula, chief in and over the Amandebele country, with its dependencies aforesaid, on behalf of himself and people, that he will refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any foreign state or power, to sell, alienate, or cede, or permit or countenance any sale, alienation, or cession, of the whole or any part of the said Amandebele country under his chieftainship, or upon any other subject, without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa.

"In faith of which, I, Lobengula, on my part, have herewith set my hand at Gubuluwayo, Amandebeleland, the 11th day of February, and of Her Majesty's reign the fifty-first."

To this important document was appended "Lo Bengula X His Mark," with the names of two witnesses, and the signature of J. S. Moffat, as Assistant Commissioner.

Many similar so-called "treaties" have been signed by Afri-

can chiefs in favor of various powers. It is doubtful whether, as a rule, these chiefs have any idea whatever of the significance of what they are doing. Lobengula, however, like Sechele and Khama in Bechuanaland, was, though a somewhat savage heathen, a man of shrewdness and intelligence, quite alive to his own interests. Still it is doubtful if he realized the full purport of the treaty, the object of which was, of course, to sweep Matabeleland and its dependencies within the limits of the British Empire. However, for the moment it relieved him from any apprehensions of interference from Boers or Portuguese, and secured to British South Africa uninterrupted access to the Central Zambezi, and the opportunity of developing a region reported to be rich in gold and in agricultural possibilities.

The publication of the treaty was, as might be expected, followed by reclamations on the part of both the Transvaal and of Portugal. Before the British hold was firmly established over the country attempts were made by large parties of Boers to trek into Matabeleland, not, it is to be feared, without the countenance of the government of the republic. Though these attempts caused anxiety at the time, they never resulted in action. Individual Boers as well as individual Englishmen attempted to poison the mind of Lobengula against the British. But the king remained throughout faithful to his engagements. Indeed, it was not Lobengula himself who gave any cause for anxiety during the initial stage of the English occupation. He was a powerful chief, but even he was obliged to defer to the wishes of his indunas, or sub-chiefs, and his army. His regiments, composed of thousands of young men, eager to wash their spears in blood, were difficult to restrain; they were hungering to "eat up" all the white men in the country. Had it not been for the greatest tact and forbearance on the part of the British representatives who visited the country in the early days of the treaty, terrible disasters would have happened. Lobengula himself kept a firm hand over his warriors, but even he was at times apprehensive that they might burst out beyond all control. But this trying initial period passed without disaster; as a matter of fact, the treaty was thoroughly discussed in presence of the three chief indunas, and was signed by Lobengula in their presence.

Portugal was not so easy to deal with as the South African Republics. Immediately on the publication of the treaty she advanced her old pretensions, but was not bold enough to introduce any claim



LOBENGULA WARRIORS, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THEIR INDUNA, ASSEGAING AN ENGLISH TROOPER

Painting by G. Durand

1888-1889

over the territory occupied by the Matabeles. Whatever right she may have had to the country was completely annulled when Lobengula's father took possession of it by force of arms. But she maintained that Lobengula's claim to include the country on the east, occupied by the conquered Mashonas, Makalakas, and other tribes, was invalid; that these territories had of old been occupied by Portugal, and that in fact they were included in her province of Sofala; and this it would be useless to deny. From the first, however, Salisbury took up a firm position, and while admitting his readiness to adjust boundaries at a suitable time, maintained absolutely that Mashonaland was subject to Lobengula, and therefore within the British sphere of influence. It remained of course to be decided what territory could fairly be included within Mashonaland and the other districts claimed by Lobengula; but the vague claims put forward by the Portuguese could only be met with a firm assertion of the rights acquired by Great Britain under treaty. The important point was as to the eastern boundary of the territory claimed by Lobengula, and the western extension of effective occupation by Portugal. What complicated the problem was ignorance of the geography of Eastern Mashonaland, shown not only by Great Britain, but also by Portugal, though the latter, according to her own statements, had been in the occupation of the country for four centuries. Lobengula himself, inspired very possibly by the "well-informed" Englishmen who were flocking about his "court," had no doubt as to the extent of his own possessions. In a letter from him, dated November 24, 1888, he claimed the whole country eastward to beyond the Sabi River, on the north to the south bank of the Zambezi from Tete upward, and even a large tract on the north side of the river. The letter containing these claims on the part of the king was brought to England by two of his indunas, who were sent by him in the beginning of 1889, in order to see with their own eyes "The Great White Queen," who, he had been informed, no longer existed.

No sooner was the treaty signed than Lobengula was besieged for concessions of land, the main object of which was to obtain the gold with which the country was said to abound, especially in the east, in Mashonaland. The king was perplexed; hence the embassy to England. But by this time, the first half of the year 1889, important preliminary steps had been taken toward the actual occupation of the country on the part of the British.

One E. A. Maund played an important part in influencing Lobengula to place his trust in England and her queen. No sooner was the treaty made known in England than he was engaged as the agent of a syndicate of capitalists to proceed to Matabeleland and endeavor to obtain from Lobengula a concession of mining rights. It does not affect the validity or the imperial importance of the treaty that some of those who were behind it had had their eyes all along upon the desirability of procuring mining concessions in Mashonaland under the aegis of British protection. As a matter of fact, it would seem that the first person actually to make proposals to the British Government on the subject was George Cawston, member of a financial firm in the City. On May 4, 1888, Cawston wrote to the Colonial Office, "It is the intention of myself, in conjunction with others, to send a representative to Matabeleland to negotiate with Lobengula for a treaty for trading, mining, and general purposes." He asked if they could reckon upon the support of the British Government in this undertaking. Lord Knutsford replied that the British Government could not involve itself in mining concessions, and the same intimation was sent to Lobengula, with the caution that he must look out for himself in these matters. At the same time Knutsford stated that in order to be regarded as valid, any concession obtained must have the sanction of the British Commissioner for South Africa. Further correspondence took place between Cawston and his friends and Knutsford, with the result that, under the name of "The Exploring Company," a syndicate was formed for the purpose of acquiring and working the mining wealth of Mashonaland. But though Cawston seems to have been the first to approach the government with a definite scheme, and although he lost no time in sending out Maund after he had satisfied the Colonial Office as to his company, another company or syndicate, being on the spot, had the advantage of him. The moving spirit of this syndicate was Cecil J. Rhodes.

This man, whose name has been so prominent in connection with imperial schemes north and south of the Zambesi, and who in 1895 was created a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council, was born in 1853 and was the son of an English clergyman. Leaving [illegible] at the age of sixteen he was compelled to go to South Africa on account of his health, and there with his brother took to [illegible]. He was in the early rush to Kimberley,

and amassed very considerable wealth in connection with diamond-mining. Although unable to attend the university before leaving for Africa, he had determination enough to come home and take his degree at Oxford after a residence of some years in South Africa had restored his health. He was, after his return, connected with the organization of Bechuanaland as sub-commissioner, and did much to secure that territory without reduction or diminution for England. For several years he was a member of the Cape Parliament, and in 1890 became Premier of the colony. The actions and utterances of Rhodes in later years showed that he was not actuated simply by the desire to accumulate a fortune; indeed, the impression made upon those who knew him best was that he was indifferent to money for its own sake. Whatever may have been his original motives for seeking to secure a leading share in the partition of Matabeleland, his aim seems rapidly to have developed into the ambition of forming a great South African Confederation, extending far into the heart of Africa, and joining hands with the British sphere on the Upper Nile. His conduct not only with regard to Matabeleland, but also in connection with his attempt to federate all the South African states, to acquire Damaraland from Germany, and to spread British suzerainty over the wide region on the north of the Zambezi, can only be adequately explained on the supposition that he was actuated by some such political motive. The later events of his life and the conditions of his will would seem to indicate a still wider ambition, namely, that of uniting—a sort of culture-federation—the great Anglo-Saxon communities of the world. At all events, after the treaty had been ratified, Rhodes, himself keeping in the background, lost no time in acquiring rights over Lobengula's territory. By the time Maund reached Matabeleland he found that the king had, only a few days previously, granted a full concession of all mining rights to Messrs. Rudd, Maguire, and Thompson. The concession was obtained on behalf of the Gold Fields of South Africa Company and a syndicate, of which Messrs. Rhodes, Rudd, and Beit were the principal representatives. At first it seemed as if there would be some difficulty in reconciling the claims of this company with the rights which Maund maintained had been promised to him personally by Lobengula, and which had been taken over by the Exploring Company. But Rhodes, who came to England in the summer of 1889, had little difficulty in coming to an understanding

with the Exploring Company, with the result that the two interests were amalgamated. The Tati field still remained in the hands of Sir John Swinburne and his company, though little apparently had been done to develop it. There were still earlier concessions obtained from Lobengula by Baines, which had passed into other hands; these also were taken over by Rhodes.

To attempt to enter into and explain all the intricacies of the complication of companies and sub-companies, and their mutual relations, which have interests of more or less importance in Matabeleland, would be beyond the scope of this work. There were various changes and modifications; the principal companies uniting as the Central Search Association, and that again developing into the United Concessions Company. However, these interests, with the rights of the Exploring Company, were concentrated in the company which early in 1889 took measures to obtain a charter for the development and administration of the country. In April of that year the two leading companies approached Lord Knutsford with a view to obtain a charter for the territories claimed by them. After protracted negotiations, in which Rhodes was the most prominent representative of the interested companies, the charter sought for was granted by the queen on October 15, 1889.

The principal field of the operations of the British South Africa Company was defined in the charter to be "the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese dominions." The company was also empowered to acquire any further concessions, if approved of by the Secretary of State. All the usual provisions of such charters were included in the present one, and the company was virtually authorized, not only to develop, but to administer the countries for which they had obtained concessions, subject always to the approval of the above-mentioned secretary. In short, the company was empowered to act as the representative of the imperial government, without, however, obtaining any assistance from the government to bear the expense of the administration. On the contrary, the company made a handsome contribution toward the completion of the telegraph line into the Bechuanaland protectorate, and completed the railway from Kimberley to Vryburg. The Kimberley-Vryburg section was taken over by the Cape Government after its completion by the Chartered Company.

1889

The capital of the company was five million, since increased to twenty-five million, dollars. It is not easy to define the relations of the Chartered Company to the various other companies which had mining interests in the country. In itself it was not a consolidation of the interests of those companies. Its functions were to administer the country and to work the concessions on behalf of the *concessionaires,* in return for which it was to retain fifty per cent. of the profits. The *concessionaires* guaranteed $3,500,000 of the Chartered Company's capital. The position was a curious and anomalous one, leading to misunderstanding, so that it is not surprising that very soon an attempt was made really to combine the whole interests in the country in the Chartered Company. Here again it may be pointed out that the Bechuanaland section of the region included in the charter has, for the present, been placed under the administration of the governor of British Bechuanaland, so that on the south of the Zambezi the operations of the company were in the meantime confined to Matabeleland and the other countries claimed by Lobengula.

All this activity on the part of England naturally embittered Portugal more and more. In the latter part of the year 1889 Colonel Pavia d'Andrade, an able officer who had been connected with the Sofala district, and had done much good exploring work therein, was making his way up the valleys of the Mazoe and other tributaries of the Zambezi, distributing Portuguese flags among the natives, and endeavoring, too late, to establish a semblance of "effective occupation." The Portuguese Government, moreover, created a new district of Zumbo, on the south of the Zambezi, which embraced some 30,000 square miles of the territory claimed by Lobengula as within his dominions. It is only fair to Colonel d'Andrade to state that his efforts to extend Portuguese influence and develop the resources of the country claimed by Portugal on the south of the Zambezi date back quite ten years before Lobengula signed his treaty. It may enable us to understand the position of Portugal in the country to the east of Mashonaland, if it be remembered that so long ago as 1878 D'Andrade obtained what was known as the Paiva d'Andrade concession, the object of which was to exploit the resources and especially the gold of the region known as Manika. Next year this was transferred to the *Société Générale du Zambèze* of Paris, which sent out a large commission of experts under D'Andrade to report on the country. The Paris

company did not consider the reports of these experts sufficiently encouraging, and they declined to go further in the matter. D'Andrade then tried to obtain capital in London, and succeeded in forming the *Companhia Africana* and the Ophir Company. Spasmodic attempts were made under these companies to work the old mines of part of Manika.

In 1888 the rights of these companies were made over under certain conditions to the Mozambique Company, which was authorized to undertake a great variety of enterprises, and which to some extent resembled in its objects the British Chartered Company, although it does not seem to have been accorded any powers of administration. A good deal of English capital was embarked in this company, and its agents were set to find and work the gold reported to abound in the Manika interior, on the eastern slopes of what may be generally regarded as the Mashonaland plateau. The most potent chief in this region persistently refused to have anything to do with the Portuguese or any other whites. He had been succeeded by his son, with whom the Portuguese maintained they had made a treaty of protection, though as a matter of fact the vacillating chief showed himself ready to make treaties with anyone prepared to supply him with unlimited alcohol. Unfortunately for Portugal, the energetic D'Andrade was not supported as he deserved to be in his attempts to extend Portuguese influence and develop the East African possessions. All Portugal did was to grant enormous areas, under the title of "*Prazos de Corona*," or Crown farms, to persons, mainly half-castes—most of whom were independent of the government, and differed little from slave-holding, slave-trading native chiefs. In the Manika territory the most powerful of these half-castes was De Souza, known as Gouveia, from his place of residence. He could command from 7000 to 8000 native irregulars: with the assistance of these Portugal had been carrying on military operations along the Zambezi and in the Manika district. In 1888 and 1889 considerable activity was displayed in bringing out steamers and ammunition.

Thus it will be seen that when the British South Africa Company was prepared to enter into active occupation of the territories which they were authorized to exploit, they had on the one hand the bands of Lobengula eager to wash their spears in white blood, on the south the Boers of the Transvaal, embittered at being prevented from trekking to the north of the Limpopo, and on the east

and the northeast the Portuguese trying to raise a wall of claims and historical pretensions. All the time the Lisbon Foreign Office was besieging the Colonial Office with an incessant discharge of correspondence and reclamations, which it need hardly be said made but little impression.

The relation of the British Government to the Chartered Company and its sphere is very clearly stated in a communication from Lord Knutsford to the High Commissioner shortly after the charter was granted. "The queen can, of course, at any time annex or declare a protectorate over any part of the territory within which the company operates, and in the absence of any paramount necessity for such annexation or protectorate, or of the failure or misconduct of the company, security of tenure is granted to the company for the limited period of twenty-five years, which is deemed by Her Majesty's government the shortest period within which the company can be expected to develop and perfect the public part of its enterprise; while there is reserved to the government of the day, at the end of that time, and at every succeeding period of ten years, the right of considering, in the interests of the empire generally, and of South Africa in particular, how far the administrative and public power of the company should be continued."

At the same time Lord Knutsford wrote to Lobengula in the queen's name, explaining clearly the significance of the charter, and strongly urging him to deal only with the company and refrain from making grants of land to private adventurers. The total area of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, which formed the main sphere of the company, is about 144,000 square miles, with a native population estimated at 515,000. It is in the main a high tableland, rising in the Mashona country to 5000 and 6000 feet, on the whole well watered, and with a considerable area said by those familiar with it to be admirably adapted to agriculture and even to European colonization. Over much of it cattle-raising may be carried on to a practically unlimited extent. As in all parts of tropical Africa, the low-lying lands are unhealthful; but on the higher plateaus, even during the rainy season, Europeans may with reasonable care preserve their health. The general impression produced by the reports of those who have visited and lived in the country is that Matabeleland and its dependencies constitute a region exceptionally favorable, considering its latitude, to development by European effort. As to its gold resources, the most glowing accounts were given and

the most extravagant hopes entertained; inspired by such conceptions of this Land of Promise, early in the summer of 1890, the first pioneer expedition set out to take possession.


With respect to its base of operations, the British South Africa Company, it may be remarked, was much more favorably situated than either of its sister companies in East and West Africa. British East and West Africa are both tropical without mitigation. They have only the coast as a base-line, with savages and an unsubdued roadless country to deal with from the beginning. The South Africa Company, on the other hand, had a long-settled, temperate colony to start from, with half a million of white population, railways, telegraphs, and other resources of civilization to form a base of operations, and fall back upon if needful. There was no difficulty then in collecting a special police force of 500 men and a band of 200 pioneers. After the rainy season the body of 700 adventurers marched northward to take possession of the latest addition to the empire. The pioneers were men provided by contract.

Frederick Selous, who knew the country better than any other white man, took the lead in making a road from the Macloutsie River, which formed the real starting-point, northeast and north over the gradually rising plateau to Mount Hampden, 400 miles nearer the Zambezi, which it was resolved to make the objective of the expedition. Lobengula gave his consent to the expedition, the only stipulation being that a route should be chosen well to the east of Matabeleland proper, so as to avoid all risk of collision with the thousands of young warriors scattered in kraals all over the chief's dominions. It was expected that an attempt would be made by these to attack the British force as it made its way northward; but as a matter of fact no difficulties whatever were experienced in this respect. A start was made from the Macloutsie River on June 25, 1890, and by September 12 Mount Hampden was reached. A road, necessarily rough, was made in the march northward; forts were built at certain intervals, small garrisons placed in them, and every precaution taken to render the occupation effective. The headquarters were formed close to Mount Hampden, where Fort Salisbury was built, and there in a remarkably short time a town grew up, with its public buildings, churches, schools, hotels, lawyers, and land-agents, stores and [illegible] resources, and, on an elementary scale, all the

other institutions which are characteristic of the social and public life of any body of Englishmen.

Of course the pioneer expedition to occupy Mashonaland was not unattended by blunders and mistakes: but when every deduction is made, the story of the expedition deserves to be remembered as a memorable episode in connection with the expansion of the British Empire. When the goal was reached the pioneer force was disbanded, as had previously been arranged. To each man were allotted a considerable area of ground and rights over a certain portion of the gold reefs which he might be so fortunate as to discover. These disbanded pioneers immediately began prospecting in all directions in search of gold, and taking stock of the capacity of the country for settlement and agricultural development. But there was not much time before the rainy season came upon them: and the rainy season of 1890-1891 is one to be remembered in the history of Rhodesia. At any time this season is trying enough, and demands on the part of the white man rational precautions to preserve his health and avoid disaster: but this was an exceptional year, and, as usual, someone had blundered. The pioneer force had been wretchedly provided both with food and with medicines: the supplies which were to have followed the force were, through some misunderstanding, stopped. The result was widespread suffering and many deaths. Still, with indomitable pluck the majority of the men made the best of their situation. But the news of their sufferings, combined with the damaging reports sent home by Lord Randolph Churchill, who made an expedition to the country after the rainy season, the conduct of the Portuguese, and other circumstances, all tended to give the new territory a bad name which it did not deserve. But all these things did not damp the ardor either of the pioneers or of the company. The railway was carried from Kimberley to Vryburg, 150 miles. An English company was later formed by the Chartered Company to extend the line of railway north from Vryburg. Early in 1892 the telegraph was continued to Salisbury, which was then brought into direct communication with London. Since then it has been carried on to Umtali and Beira, in accordance with Rhodes' scheme to construct a telegraph line "from the Cape to Cairo," or at least to Uganda, for which an African Trans-Continental Telegraph Company was formed in December, 1893. A line from Zomba and Blantyre in the Nyasa region has been carried south to meet the line from Salisbury.

There were, in 1902, 1405 miles of line. Before the end of 1895, through the energy of Rhodes, what was only a few years ago the unknown heart of savage Africa was brought into almost instantaneous communication with Europe. Salisbury increased in size, new towns were begun elsewhere, a regular postal and telegraph service, yielding a considerable revenue to the company, was established, and Lobengula was at last induced to give the company rights over the land as well as the mines. The result was that



Cape and Transvaal farmers took up large areas of ground for agricultural and cattle farms. Other sources of revenue for the company have been mining and trading licenses, and stand-holdings. But still there has been very great outlay, and not much could be done for the real development of the country until rapid and cheap communications were established with the outside world. That this was zealously pushed forward. The railway now extends from Cape Town to Beira and will soon be extended to Lake Tanganyika. Henry M. Stanley is on record as believing that the Cape to Cairo railroad will be an accomplished fact before 1925.

As might have been expected, the action of the pioneer force was watched with jealous and resentful eyes by Portugal. An agreement was concluded between England and Portugal in August, 1890, by which the eastern limits of the South Africa Company's

claims were fixed, and the course of the unknown Sabi River, from north to south, was taken as a boundary. But this did not satisfy either Portugal or the company, and the treaty was never ratified. It was, however, taken as the basis of a *modus vivendi*, pending further negotiations. In the meantime D'Andrade, Gouveia, and one or two other Portuguese officers had returned to Manika, and made their way up to the edge of the plateau.

The abortive treaty referred to above was not actually accepted as the basis of a *modus vivendi* till November, 1890. Archibald R. Colquhoun, who had done good service in India and the East, had been appointed administrator of the British company's territory. He was succeeded by an intimate friend of Rhodes, Dr. Leander S. Jameson, who had given up a lucrative practice at Kimberley to accompany the pioneers; Selous was another on the administrative staff. In the previous September Colquhoun, with a few companions, went down to Mutassa's Kraal, in the Manika country, and without difficulty induced him to conclude a treaty making over his country to British protection. Meantime D'Andrade, Gouveia, Rezende (representing the Mozambique company) and one or two others, with an armed force of Gouveia's men, were on their way to Mutassa's. Colquhoun resolved to take decisive measures. A small force was sent over under Major Forbes, who on arriving at Mutassa's found the village occupied by the Portuguese. Notwithstanding his greatly inferior force, he made his way into the village and arrested D'Andrade, Gouveia, and Rezende. The two former were taken prisoners to Fort Salisbury, and the latter allowed to return to Massi Kessi, which was provisionally occupied by a small force of the company's police. D'Andrade and Gouveia were sent to the Cape.

This incident caused great excitement at the time, and gave rise to very bitter feelings in Portugal against England. A band of student volunteers was raised in Lisbon, and amid patriotic demonstrations was hurriedly sent out to the mouth of the Pungwe, with the apparent intention of marching up to Manika and driving out the British. Needless to say, few of them left the coast. Obviously these relations between the two countries could not long continue; they were brought to an end by the ratification of a new agreement, signed on June 11, 1891, under which Portgual can hardly be said to have fared so well as she would have done under the one repudiated by the Cortes in the previous year. The boun-

dary between the British Company's territories was drawn farther east than in the previous treaty. Although Gungunyana, King of Gazaland, sent two envoys to England in the summer of 1891, to offer his allegiance to Great Britain, Lord Salisbury was firm, and declined to take him under British protection, except as to that portion which is, according to the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, within the British sphere.

There is no doubt that by the new treaty the company added considerably to its gold-producing territory. Further, according to the terms of the arrangement, the navigation of the Zambezi and the Shiré was declared free to all nations. A maximum duty of three per cent. was all that Portugal was allowed to charge, for a period of twenty-five years, for goods in transit from the east coast to the company's territories. Other mutual privileges were granted, and Portugal agreed to undertake the construction of a railway from the mouth of the Pungwe to the plateau, but under conditions which would prevent her delaying the undertaking for an indefinite period. There were delays and difficulties in carrying out the scheme, the accomplishment of which was absolutely necessary for the development of Mashonaland, so that it was not till 1892 that the railway was actually begun, some seventy miles being finished in a short time. The railway was carried well through the country infected by the *tsetse* fly.[2] Although the gauge adopted was narrow and the construction light, and although the embankments were so low that damage is done near the coast when the country is flooded, the line was reported to be good and serviceable and likely to satisfy the needs of traffic for some time.

The main difficulties seemed thus to have been overcome, and by the summer of 1892 the company was in undoubted possession of its territory, though to a large extent paralyzed from want of a rapid and cheap means of communication with the outer world. Although care was taken from the first to avoid collisions with the Matabele, their repeated forays against the Mashonas, who are under the company's protection, culminated on July 18, 1893, in a raid such as could not be overlooked. While efforts were made to obtain a peaceful solution of the difficulty, preparation for any further hostilities which might be forced on the company was

[2] This is an insect whose bite is fatal to cattle, and injurious even to horses and dogs. Recent evidence strongly inclines to prove it the cause of a certain fatal disease of the negroes, called the sleeping sickness.

not neglected, and the High Commissioner authorized the company's administrator, Dr. Jameson, to take all necessary steps to provide for the safety of the settlers. In the beginning of October the Matabele attacked the company's police force near Victoria, and the Bechuanaland border police; and on October 6 the company's force of about 620 men advanced westward from Charter and Victoria, while other forces, consisting of the Bechuanaland border police, the company's police, and natives under Khama, advanced from the south toward Buluwayo. After a difficult march and several battles, the power of Lobengula was broken, and he fled with the remainder of his troops. On November 2 the company's forces entered Buluwayo without opposition, and since then a new town has been rapidly springing up, and Buluwayo in the west threatens to rival Salisbury in the east as a center of activity; the former, like the latter, has already its newspapers, hotels, races, churches, and other institutions indispensable to the settled Briton. In the beginning of 1894 Lobengula died, and the company entered into full possession of his territories. No doubt such a collision was inevitable sooner or later, and the company were not sorry that an excuse for action occurred so soon. All these operations were accomplished without any aid from imperial troops or imperial money. An attempt on the part of the home government to interfere too largely in the settlement of Matabeleland was resented in South Africa. The result has been that the imperial government retained but a slender hold over the company's territories, which will be ultimately absorbed in the South Africa Confederation that seems inevitable. An attempt, however, on the part of Rhodes to fix a tariff in favor of British goods, including the company's territories in the South African Customs Union, was vetoed by the home government. The success, not only of the short campaign, but of the country generally, was admitted to be largely due to the administrative capability of Rhodes' right-hand man, Dr. Jameson.

The final, or at least provisional, settlement of Matabeleland was effected in an agreement between the home government and the British South Africa Company, dated May 9, 1894. Probably such an agreement is unique in the history of the British Empire. It was a mark of the change which had taken place in the ten years since the scramble for Africa began, that instead of the home government dictating terms to a chartered company for a territory

that was not even a Crown colony, the company should be dealt with as if it were an independent power, practically insisting on its own terms. The first clause defines the territory over which the operations of the company may extend, and it will be seen that it includes much more than Matabeleland and Mashonaland. The territories referred to in the memorandum, are "those parts of South Africa bounded by British Bechuanaland, the German protectorate, the Rivers Chobe and Zambezi, the Portuguese possessions, and the South African Republic." The administration of this territory is to be conducted by the company in accordance with its charter, and under an administrator and a council of four, composed of a judge and three other members. The administrator is appointed by the company, of course with the approval of the Secretary of State, who is, nominally at least, supreme over the whole administration. The administrator holds his office for three years, but may be reappointed. The four members of the council are appointed by the company, with the approval of the Secretary of State. The judge can be removed only by the Secretary of State, while the other three members are at the mercy of the company. One of the three retires every two years, but may be reappointed. The company pays the salaries of the administrators and all other officials. Provisions are made for subordinate magistrates, for a land commission, for locating natives on land adequate for their maintenance, and various others connected with administration and the development of the territories, in all of which the company are virtually supreme, so long as nothing is done "to diminish or detract from the powers conferred by Her Majesty's Order in Council of May 9, 1891, or by the charter incorporating the company." An order made by the sovereign in Council is supreme over all. But in effect, it will be seen, the company had it all their own way. They are absolute owners of all mines, and either for mining purposes, for railways, for towns, or any other public works, they are entitled to take land from the natives, so long as they locate the latter elsewhere. Rhodes and Jameson visited England in the end of 1894 and succeeded in securing still further concessions confirming the supremacy of Rhodes and the company. Rhodes decided, among other things, to take over the direct administration of the company's extensive territories north of the Zambezi.

The company was thus unfettered in its activities. The country on the whole is one of the most favorable in South Africa for agri-

culture and cattle-raising, while the testimony as to the abundance of its gold-bearing reefs is overwhelming. Men and money alone were lacking. The former poured into the country and in 1895 over two million acres had been appropriated. The regulations of the company both with regard to land and to mining were liberal, and the man who could arrive at Salisbury or Buluwayo with only a few dollars in his pocket had a fair field before him, if he was willing to work. As to money, the company's resources were heavily taxed by its early operations; but there was no lack of capital when it became clear that it could be profitably applied. Cheap and rapid communication has been the main desideratum; and as this was supplied, the great obstacle to rapid and profitable development was removed. Many competent authorities maintain that portions at least of Mashonaland and Matabeleland are well adapted for white colonization in the special sense of that term. That is a matter that can only be tested by experience, such experience as cannot be acquired in a single generation.

It may be stated that in 1893 the company acquired a concession from the native chief of an extensive territory in the Lake Ngami region, which it was proposed to colonize by Cape farmers. At the same time the company continued to pay tribute to the king of Gazaland for certain concessions in his territory, notwithstanding the claims put forward by Portugal.

While the incidents on the south of the Zambezi were keeping all Europe in a state of excitement, equally stirring events were taking place on the north of the river, where also a great area was being included in the British sphere.

England's connection with the Lake Nyasa region, it has been seen, dates from the time of Livingstone's great Zambezi expedition (1858-1864). As the result of Livingstone's work Scotch and English missions were established near the Shiré, which joins the lake with the Zambezi, and on the shores of the lake itself. In 1878 a trading company consisting of Scotch merchants was formed under the name of "The Livingstone Central Africa Company," for opening up to navigation and trade the rivers and lakes of Central Africa to which the Zambezi is the approach. This was the company known afterward as the African Lakes Company, later the African Lakes Corporation; its capital was at first $100,000, afterward increased to $500,000. Its aims were somewhat ambitious; the acquisition of land, the formation of plantations, the in-

troduction of various cultures, the establishment of trade, the transport of goods, were among the means by which the subscribers were to carry out their objects. It was understood, moreover, that the company would act as a sort of secular adjunct to the missions established in the region. It can hardly be said that the operations of the company were, until recently, conducted with any great amount of energy. Stations were established on the Shiré and on the west shores of the lake; and a highroad, the Stevenson Road, was made between Lake Nyasa and Lake Tanganyika. Planting on a small scale was carried on and some little trade was done. The boats belonging to the company were of service in carrying the missionaries and their stores to the stations in Nyasaland; but for the development of the country much more was effected by private initiative than by the operations of the company. The Blantyre Highlands to the east of the Upper Shiré were found admirably adapted to the culture of coffee, and by 1887 promising plantations had been established. By that year, through the united efforts of the missionaries, the company, private traders, and the consul at Mozambique, British interests in the region around Lake Nyasa had become very considerable. Comparatively feeble as the efforts of the African Lakes Company had been, they certainly did more for the legitimate development of the resources of the country than did the efforts of Portugal during the long centuries she had been on the Lower Zambezi. Until Germany entered the field, Portugal does not seem to have disturbed herself greatly as to the British occupation of the country on the Shiré and Lake Nyasa. But when the scramble became general, when Germany, France, England, and the King of the Belgians were sweeping one region after another into their grasp, Portugal became alive to her critical position on the continent. In return for what she regarded as certain concessions to Germany and France, each of these powers in 1886 professed to recognize the right of the King of Portugal to those territories which lie between the Portuguese possessions of Angola and Mozambique, without prejudice, however, to the claims of other powers who might already have exercised their "sovereign and civilizing influence" in the region in question. Enough has been said already of the supposed rights of Portugal to a trans-African Empire. Portugal, it is probable, never seriously believed that her claims would be entertained by Great Britain; she no doubt imagined if she made these claims extensive

enough that it might be possible to save something out of the scramble. As in the country south of the Zambezi, so on the north of the river, Portugal made haste in her attempts to obviate the results of her long neglect by rushing in and planting her flag on the threatened territory.

In this connection a passage from a dispatch by Lord Salisbury to the British Minister at Lisbon, dated June 25, 1888, is worth quoting: "It is, as Senhor Barros Gomes admits, a disputed point whether, nearly 300 years since, a Portuguese traveler did, or did not, see the waters of Lake Nyasa; the decision of this controversy has no practical value at the present day as regards the political situation. It is, on the other hand, an undisputed point that the recent discoveries of the English traveler Livingstone were followed by organized attempts on the part of English religious and commercial bodies to open up and civilize the districts surrounding and adjoining the lake. Many British settlements have been established, the access to which by the sea is by the Rivers Zambezi and Shiré. Her Majesty's Government and the British public are much interested in the welfare of these settlements. Portugal does not occupy, and has never occupied, any portions of the lake nor of the Shiré; she has neither authority nor influence beyond the confluence of the Shiré and Zambezi, where her interior custom-house, now withdrawn, was placed by the terms of the Mozambique tariff of 1877."

During 1887 Portugal endeavored in vain to advance her claims by voluminous correspondence, intended to prove her historical rights. An attempt in 1888 to close the Zambezi to navigation by British vessels had to be abandoned in face of the persistent demands of Lord Salisbury. In other ways, through her Mozambique authorities, she did her utmost to hamper the communications of the African Lakes Company; but before Lord Salisbury's firm stand all these attempts had to give way.

During 1888 the British position in the Lake Nyasa region was complicated by the hostility of the Arab slave-dealers against the missionaries and the trading companies. The Arabs were naturally alarmed at the progress made by British influence in the region, a progress which in the end might, they feared, extinguish their occupation. Hostilities were carried on for some months in the district on the west of the Lake Nyasa, and it was in connection with these that the name of Captain Lugard first came prominently

before the British public. He rendered valuable service against the Arabs and their native allies, and probably was the means of preventing a wholesale massacre of the British in the country. The Portuguese officials at Mozambique did their utmost to hamper the British by preventing the importation of much-needed ammunition and weapons. It was not until the advent of the experienced Johnston, as the British representative in Nyasaland, that an understanding was reached between the Arabs and the Lakes Company, the sinews of war being supplied in a great measure by the British South Africa Company, to the extent of about $350,000. While slave-trading was by no means extinguished, it was to a considerable extent suppressed, though much yet remains to be done ere it is abolished entirely. Unfortunately the evidence is only too convincing that men calling themselves Portuguese subjects do quite as much as the Arabs to continue the traffic north of the Zambezi.

While in 1888 these troubles were harassing the British occupants of Nyasaland, Portugal was making a final determined effort to obtain possession of a region which she had so long neglected. So late as October, 1888, the British Minister at Lisbon was able to assure Senhor Gomes that England had no intention of establishing exclusive jurisdiction over the Lake Nyasa region; she simply desired unhampered freedom for her missionaries and traders. This neutral attitude did not long continue. Toward the end of 1888 the consul at Mozambique reported that a formidable expedition was on its way to the Shiré River and the west shore of Lake Nyasa. Though this expedition reached the south shore of the lake, its reception by the natives was so unfavorable that in the spring of 1889 it was resolved at Lisbon to send a relief expedition to its aid, under the command of the famous Serpa Pinto. About the same time a royal decree established and endowed a Roman Catholic mission on the south shore of Lake Nyasa. The intention of this was obvious. Efforts were, moreover, made by the Portuguese authorities at Mozambique to induce various chiefs in the neighborhood of the lake to declare themselves vassals of Portugal, but without success. The expedition under Serpa Pinto, however, caused more anxiety than any other effort on the part of Portugal to outdo Great Britain; and by the middle of 1889 it became apparent that no half measures would suffice, and that if Great Britain were to secure her interests on the north of the Zam-

bezi, she must do so by placing the region under her flag, and so including it within the sphere of British influence. By this time Johnston, who had done excellent service in West Africa, had reached his post as British consul at Mozambique, charged as such with the care of British interests in the interior; he was not the man to allow himself to be outwitted. Whatever may have been his secret instructions, he took with him a supply of British flags, and lost no time in making his way to the Shiré River, which, it soon become obvious, was the ultimate destination of the force under Serpa Pinto. By the latter part of 1889 this force had been increased to some five thousand. Serpa Pinto professed that the expedition was a peaceful one, his object being merely to pass through the country of the Makololo for the purpose of exploring in the region of Lake Nyasa. These Makololo were the remnants of those who had accompanied Livingstone in his first great expedition across Africa, and had settled in the country to the west of the Shiré. Here they soon became dominant, and though only a handful, made themselves masters of the whole country. The action of the Portuguese force belied the professions of its commander. The Makololo were attacked and many of them killed. They had always remained attached to the English, and Acting Consul Buchanan, who resided at Blantyre, lost no time in formally declaring the Makololo country under the British flag, at least to the north of the junction of the Ruo and the Shiré. This action was confirmed by Consul Johnston when he arrived on the scene, and subsequent treaties with native chiefs, both in the Shiré district, on the west of Lake Nyasa, and as far as Lake Tanganyika, to which Johnston proceeded, barred the way against further Portuguese aggression. Johnston's activity in securing British interests in this important region was admirable; the country is capable of considerable industrial development, not only in the Blantyre highlands, but in the lofty plateau lying between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika, and is comparatively favorable to the residence of Europeans.

Meanwhile the Portuguese officials on the Shiré continued to annoy British traders and explorers, and the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique did what they could to hamper British commerce. Commissioned by Rhodes, Joseph Thomson, the eminent African explorer, accompanied by Grant, ascended the Shiré for the purpose of proceeding westward to Lake Bangweolo. While proceed-

ing along the Shiré he was actually fired upon at the instigation of the Portuguese, but without injurious results. The real object of the expedition, as of another sent out at the same time under Sharpe, was to secure the country of Katanga, lying on the west of Lake Mweru, for the British South Africa Company. The district coveted undoubtedly lay within the cartographical limits of the Congo Free State, and not unnaturally the King of the Belgians resented this attempt to snatch from his grasp a country reputed to be rich in gold and copper. The king might easily have been induced to enter into an arrangement with Rhodes had the latter shown more diplomacy; as it was, a Belgian Katanga Company was immediately formed, and the country was speedily taken possession of in the name of the Free State.

Rhodes not only sought after Katanga, but had the ambition of sweeping under the sway of his Chartered Company the region worked by the Lakes Company and all the territory north of the Zambezi. The Lakes Company, it has been seen, was never characterized by stupendous enterprise; their operations had always been, probably from lack of funds, on a petty scale. Rhodes offered therefore to incorporate the company with the South African Company, and to allow them a handsome annual subsidy. Johnston, who had come home after securing British interests on the north of the Zambezi, returned to his post in the spring of 1891, as commissioner and consul-general for British Central Africa, and administrator of what is now officially designated the British Central Africa protectorate. To enable Johnston to carry on his work of administration and development, the British South Africa Company agreed to contribute $50,000 a year; the actual sum turned in during three years far exceeded that. The commissioner acted as agent for the company, which claimed the whole of the territory outside of Nyasaland proper, under which are included the districts in the Lake Nyasa region, in which British missionaries have been at work for many years, and which are under direct imperial administration. Johnston had with him a small staff, including an engineer officer and a practical botanist; he took up his headquarters at the consulate at Zomba, to the north of Blantyre, and on his arrival set himself at once to the establishment of an administration to the furtherance of legitimate trade, and to the encouragement of the industrial development of the extensive region placed under his care. His work was facilitated by the ratification

of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of June 11, 1891, which settled all disputes as to boundaries. By this agreement the whole of the region to the north of the Zambezi, west of the Shiré and Lake Nyasa, to the Barotse country on both sides of the Upper Zambezi is included in the British sphere; so that by this arrangement, something like 500,000 square miles were added to the British sphere, including some of the best watered and most promising portions of Central Africa.

Johnston began his work of organization with the country south of the lake. The missionaries, who had hitherto been supreme in these parts, did not take kindly to the intrusion of the civil power, and some friction was at first the result. Much more serious was the friction which took place between Johnston and the slave-trading chief Makanjila on the south shore of the lake. An encounter between a small English force and the chief resulted disastrously for the former. But the commissioner could not submit quietly to such a defeat. While dealing effectively with other hostile and slave-raiding chiefs, it was not till the beginning of 1894 that he felt himself in a position to attack Makanjila's stronghold. He had in the meantime been reinforced by additional Sikhs from India and by two new gunboats on the lake. The Makanjila had himself been murdered by a relative, and a new Makanjila reigned in his stead, having some 2000 men at his command. In the end of 1893 and beginning of 1894 the new Makanjila was completely defeated, and in March, 1894, he made his submission to the British authorities; so that one of the most formidable obstacles to the development of Nyasaland and the suppression of the slave-trade has been removed.

Though much has thus been accomplished, and although the region on the south of the lake is now under command, much remains to be done on the west of the lake and in the rest of the sphere ere slave-raiding chiefs and slave-dealing Arabs can be finally gotten rid of. In dealing with native chiefs, however, and with Arab, or so-called Arab, settlers and traders, the greatest tact and patience are needed. To attempt to sweep slavery off the face of the continent at one blow will result only in the defeat of the object aimed at. But Johnston had shown on more than one occasion that he knew how to deal both with natives and with Arabs, and there was every reason to hope that under his administration the British Central Africa protectorate would develop into a land of

peace and settled industry. This hope has been realized in no small degree. Johnston divided the protectorate on Lake Nyasa and the country beyond into provinces and districts; there are outlying posts as far as Lake Mweru, on the borders of the Congo Free State. A considerable revenue is raised by customs duties and taxation. The European population is about 450, mostly British subjects. Moreover, traders are settling in the lower region, while Arabs recognized as traders of repute have stations in various parts of the British sphere. The total native population is about 900,000, though large areas have been devastated by slave-raiding. Blantyre has a population of about 100 Europeans and 6000 natives. It has many good houses and a handsome church of brick, built entirely by native labor. The Shiré province, lying round the southern shores of Lake Nyasa, is governed much after the manner of a Crown colony. It is divided into twelve districts, each with its staff of officials. There are postoffices and custom-houses, and a newspaper, and the telegraph has been rapidly extended to the Zambezi, so that Zomba and Blantyre are in telegraphic connection with England. Good roads are being made in all directions, and steps are being taken to connect the Lower Shiré, past the rapids, by means of a railroad with the lake. Coffee-planting has been greatly extended, and the produce fetches the highest price in the foreign market. Rice and wheat are grown successfully, while experiments are also being made with sugar, tea, tobacco, and other products, which there is every reason to believe will prove successful. Oats and barley thrive in the uplands, while merino sheep and Natal ponies seem to prosper. Natives come to Blantyre from all quarters seeking work. The Shiré itself has become a highway of commerce. On this river and Lake Nyasa there are three gunboats; there is also an armed force of over 200 Sikhs, with several hundred black police, commanded by English officers and Sikh non-commissioned officers. There is besides an armament of artillery with mountain guns. At the Chinde mouth of the Zambezi, the Portuguese Government has very liberally granted a small piece of land called the British Concession, on which goods may be landed and transshipped free of duty. There are six missionary societies at work, mainly Scotch; they have shown great practical sense, and have been remarkably successful in many ways.

Thomson returned in shattered health in the end of 1891 from his expedition to Lake Bangweolo. He traversed the plateau region

between Lakes Nyasa and Bangweolo in various directions, and his report to the company speaks in glowing terms of the salubrity of the region and of its suitability for plantations and for cattle-raising. Meantime Rhodes, who visited England in the latter part of 1892, floated a scheme for the construction of a line of telegraph through the heart of Africa, joining all the lakes and bringing the Cape into communication with Cairo.

The succeeding history of Rhodesia has been, for the most part, a steady advance along the lines laid down by its founder. It is now divided into Southern, Northwestern, and Northeastern Rhodesia; of these divisions Southern Rhodesia is, of course, the region best suited for true colonization. Northwestern Rhodesia is the formerly disputed district of Barotseland. This whole region is being developed as no other part of the interior has been; the death of the moving spirit has but little affected the progress of his enterprises.

But the recent history of Rhodesia has had its dark pages also. Early in 1896, the Matabeles, a strong and warlike tribe, taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the Jameson raid and its sequel, broke out in rebellion. A prominent cause of the revolt was to be found in the shooting of seemingly healthy, but actually infected cattle by the British authorities, during the "rinderpest." This proceeding was completely beyond the comprehension of the natives, who saw in it simply an intention to ruin them by a reckless reduction of that which constituted their sole wealth. This and several other contributing causes were seized upon by the native witch-doctors, who worked the population up to a frenzy. Considerable bloodshed ensued, and several hot engagements. Finally, after some decisive successes of the British, Cecil Rhodes, with astonishing *sang-froid*, made his way unarmed into the midst of the black hordes and, partially by promises, partially by threats, reduced the chiefs to subordination. It is estimated that the total repression of the Matabele rebellion by force of arms would have cost $25,000,000 and numerous lives. This action is but one of many which marked Rhodes out as a man far beyond the ordinary, whatever one's opinion may be as to his general character and influence.

A rising in Mashonaland followed the Matabele rebellion in June, 1896, but was more easily controlled. In consequence, however, of these disorders and of the mortality among the cattle, the development of the country received a shock which might have been

more marked had it not been for the contemporary discoveries of gold. At the same time an enquiry was on foot to determine, among other assigned causes of the rebellion, the extent of asserted "compulsory labor" in Rhodesia; and the result of the investigation, which decided the question of its prevalence in the affirmative, cast a further shadow on the reputation and prospects of the country. Nevertheless, progress has been made along all lines since this period. In 1898 a degree of representative government was assured to the settlers of Southern Rhodesia; and a resident commissioner was appointed by the Secretary of State. This appears to strengthen the imperial power in this region, and is doubtless one of the preliminaries to the assumption of full imperial possession. Northwestern and Northeastern Rhodesia are administered by the British South African Company alone.

Chapter XVIII

AFRICA SINCE 1895

(By the Editor)

THE author has stated that the main lines of the final partition of Africa had already been laid down by the year 1895. Practically no African districts then existed which were not comprehended at least within one or other of those vague delimitations known as spheres of influence. The scramble had been sufficiently vigorous and protracted to lead to the appropriation of all that was as yet undivided, not only in Africa, but in the rest of the habitable (not to say uninhabitable) world. Not only this, but to all general intents and purposes the boundaries had been fixed by various international agreements, so that rivalries for this or that comparatively petty advantage were all that remained of the grand-scale collisions of previous years.

Into these latter details it is not the purpose of this supplementary chapter to enter; here it is intended rather to trace the most important of the later transfers of territory, and to give some account of the recent and characteristic development of the districts already acquired in 1895 by the several powers. In other words, the present chapter will deal with more general questions of adjustment and policy, rather than with specific matters of geographical delimitation and local administration.[1]

Before entering upon the discussion of territories, either owned or virtually owned by European nations, a word should be said of what may be called the Arabian portions of Africa. As these (together with Liberia and Abyssinia) do not come in strictness within the scope of the present volume, except as they have formed and are likely to form objects of interest to the European powers in their projects and adjustments, a short characterization will

[1] For information on these latter points not interpolated in the text, readers are referred to Mr. Keltie's work in the Statesman's Year Book, as well as to his and the editor's bibliography at the end of the present volume.

suffice. The yet independent Mohammedan states of the north of Africa (Morocco, Tripoli, Fezzan, Barca, etc.) are of an essentially unprogressive, barbaric type of civilization; but they are warlike and resist conquest with vigor. Islam here stands in the path of higher civilization, as it is ever wont to stand, inflexible, fanatic, and contemptuous. Whoever undertakes to reduce and govern these regions will have the task of the Spaniards and Americans in Sulu and Mindanao, of the Dutch in the Malay Archipelago, and of the neighboring French in Wadai and Bagirmi. Commercial advantage is the only thing offered by the Christian that the Moslem wants; and his attitude in the taking of it resembles that of a lord condescending to deal with his slave. It is worth while to form, from this brief notice, some conception of the destiny of European enterprise and expansion in their inevitable entrance into these regions.

From this group of states, in consequence of recent events, Morocco must be singled out for especial attention; for her status cannot fail to be altered within a short time. Up to several years ago it was supposed in a general way that France and Spain had about equal claims to a Moroccan protectorate, if any considerable alteration of the *status quo* were to take place. But it was also recognized that France, being next neighbor to Morocco, possessed the advantage of being on the ground, and of being able more easily to show real or ostensible cause for redressing actual or other encroachment. Some adjustment of French and Spanish claims took place. However, disorder in Morocco took on a more international form of menace, and in April, 1904, the world was surprised by the publication of an Anglo-French agreement, whereby Great Britain seemed disposed to recognize French predominance in Morocco in return for the abandonment of the shadowy French claims in Egypt. No particular objection was heard, however, until the German Emperor initiated a vigorous policy of protest which stirred the waters to the extent of retiring the French Minister, Delcasse, who had strenuously opposed the German policy. It later appeared that the Kaiser was intent only upon the maintenance of the "open door" in Morocco; and the French Government adopted the same policy of conciliation. In order, however, to settle the whole matter publicly, an international conference was called to meet (1905) at Algeciras in Spain. Morocco has been a source of trouble to the several nations owning possessions within its borders, for years,



THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO ON HIS WAY TO WORSHIP IN THE KUTUBIA MOSQUE IN HIS CAPITAL AT FEZ

Painting by A. Forrestier

notwithstanding the convention at Algeciras, and France experienced so much difficulty, that on May 25, 1907, it made public its intention to enforce its demands upon Morocco, which included the settlement of all claims secured in the convention above mentioned. It also demanded the thorough punishment of all those who were causing trouble for French officials. Previous to this, on March 25, 1907, French troops had been sent to Ouja, one of the towns on the frontier of Morocco, with orders to remain until reparation was made for the murder of Dr. Maucomp, a French citizen. On July 4th, of that same year, Great Britain demanded the release of its distinguished citizen, Sir Harry MacLean, who had been commander of the sultan's body guard. Both demands were acceded to. Not satisfied with the trend of events, however, on September 6, 1907, France and Spain declared their intention of taking possession of the principal Moroccan cities, owing to the permission granted them by the Powers, which had agreed to extend the scope of the specifications of the Algeciras convention. Naturally, the people of Morocco rebelled against this, and January 11, 1908, proclaiming Mulai Hafid sultan, they declared a holy war. France and Germany entered into a complete agreement regarding Morocco, on May 27, 1908, which simplified matters somewhat, but this agreement was not signed until February 9, 1909. In the meanwhile Spain was forced into action with the Moors, and King Alfonso himself directed some of the movements. The Moors practiced such atrocities upon the Spanish residents at various points, that the sultan ordered them to cease. At first the Moors were successful in the engagements between them and the Spaniards, the latter meeting with severe losses at Melilla. Morocco applied to the Powers asking intervention, and refused on September 21, 1909, to withdraw that note upon the demand of Spain. The tide turned against the Moors who lost 400 men in action. Further developments showed that public opinion was against the Moors, as the diplomatic corps of Tangier refused its intervention in the matter. Tired of war, the Moorish tribesmen requested the Spanish government to open peace negotiations, on October 26th, and on November 27th, the Spanish cabinet decided to withdraw its troops from Morocco, and 1910 opened with relations between Spain and Morocco diplomatically arranged.

Liberia and Abyssinia are both anomalies. The former has a supposedly repatriated population, but it is an African ethnical

mixture of a fantastic type. The case is different with Abyssinia, always in reality, and since 1896 once more nominally, independent; for, although anomalous as having long been a professedly Christian native state, it is in reality a community of advanced and progressive savages, and their destiny has been shrewdly guided by Menelek II, the aged fox who died March 30, 1910. The Canary Islands are administered as a province of Spain. These African possessions cover some 250,000 square miles, and have a population of about 120,000. They are of little value and should be sold; the deficit in their budget, as estimated for 1902, was almost $400,000.

No other European possession in Africa, excepting those of Spain, can vie with the colonies of the Italians in point of diminutiveness and generally undesirable character. Italian expansion had taken its rise under the ominous dual sponsorship of *megalomania* among ideas and of Crispi among men. The general temper of the movement was most clearly seen in Italy's relations with Abyssinia, over which she claimed a protectorate from 1889 to 1896; they were compounded of ignorance (geographical as well as ethnological), self-complacency, and rashness. Italy was so self-satisfied in her pose as representative of Menelek in the concert of powers that she ignored or failed to perceive the unceasing and hostile operations of the French. No attention was given to the formation of a correct view of the Abyssinians or of their customs and prejudices; the yoke of the half-acknowledged protectorate was made not easy, but galling. An awkward move leading to the occupation of the ancient capital, Adowa, in the holy country of Tigré, precipitated general hostilities; and the Italians suddenly found themselves opposed to the only strong and well-organized African state, a state whose warlike population prided itself upon its independence and its successes against invaders. They had looked upon the Abyssinian army as a "horde," an easy prey for five hundred Italians with a little artillery; they found it armed with rapid-fire guns and drilled by French tacticians. On March 1, 1896, 12,000 Italians rashly attacked the Abyssinian army of 80,000 and were all but annihilated.

In the treaty which followed this battle of Abba Garima, the protectorate over Abyssinia was given up and the Abyssinian territory which had been occupied was evacuated. Kassala, which had been "held in trust" for Egypt, was restored to that government. Here, then, Abyssinia returned to an independent status, in name as in reality; and Italy was relieved of her questionable protectorate with its unimposing figures, elsewhere given, of area and population.

The so-called colony of Eritrea (the possession on the Red Sea coast) has not been the object of much enthusiasm since the Abyssinian catastrophe; the disillusionment caused by that disaster was too shocking, the actual loss too severe. Yet it should be recorded that Italy's policy of administration among her sterile sand-dunes has been far from discreditable, especially under the direction of the unfortunate General Baratieri. In 1892, according to Brunialti, Italy had achieved "a modest but true success, without exaggeration, uncertainty, or weakness," in her endeavor to benefit Eritrea in ways hygienic, economic, judicial, and educational. Civil had replaced military government with the appointment of Baratieri in 1892.

Before leaving Italy it should be stated that she has had her eye on Tunis in the past, and at one time even took some half-steps toward obtaining a lien on the country through the construction of railroad lines. Here, however, she was again outwitted and outdone by France; and has since taken refuge in querulous complaints and muttered threats, and in a diversion of her dimly-conceived colonial schemes to the less-promising Tripoli. She is not likely to play an important part either here or in her own arid and stifling colony.

Eritrea now contains some 88,500 square miles, with 450,000 population, and the Somali protectorate, 100,000 square miles, with 400,000 population. There are but few miles of railroad or telegraph, and commerce does not meet former expectations; an Italian pearl fishing company was formed in 1898, operating in the small archipelago of the Red Sea.

The case is scarcely better with Portugal. Like Italy, she lacks size, population, and capital, and borrows a feeble present importance from a striking past. But, unlike Italy, she possesses energy insufficient even passably to manage and develop her possessions; even a reverse of any magnitude is beyond her. Angola, although it is said by Johnston to be the most flourishing of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, may be dismissed with short shrift, as may Portuguese Guinea and the coast islands; despite occasional rumors to the contrary, little or nothing of interest or moment is actually done. These sections of the continent vegetate in dullness undisturbed. As has been seen, the political twistings and turnings in South Africa have stirred the Mozambique region to the old activity of

complaint and pretense so characteristic twenty years ago. But all the information available in late years tends to show that progress has left Portugal untouched and undisturbed, so far as any wholesome effects on the colonies go. Portugal's possessions in Africa all combine to form a financial strain upon the state, and what was said of them in 1805 will do very well for a decade later. Delagoa Bay has been connected with the Transvaal frontier, and its railroads and commercial relations, including agreements concerning transit of goods, have been arranged subsequently to the Boer War between England and Portugal (December, 1901). Some miles of railroad and telegraph lines have been put into operation, and there exist projects of further extension.

There is less of change to report in the status of the Congo Free State than would have been anticipated ten years ago. It remains a piece of King Leopold's private property, constituting a personal estate unrivaled throughout human history in size and importance. Its connection with Belgium is still a purely personal one, and promises so to continue during the life of the king. The general disposition is to leave the work in his hands as long as possible. Leopold, it will be recollected, made a will in 1889 by which Belgium was to inherit his Central African domains; and, although considerable inertia and opposition had to be overcome, Belgium recognized the right of annexation by the Act of July 3, 1890. All the legal and constitutional difficulties were gotten out of the way in 1894 by the introduction into Article I. of the Belgian Constitution of a paragraph relating to colonies. In 1895 the project of annexation was actually broached in the legislative body, but encountered such determined opposition that it was practically shelved.

From the time when Leopold was authorized to assume the title of sovereign of the Congo State (1885) Belgium has thus toyed with her predestined "colony." She has even advanced funds, though with a "string attached." The present status is practically that of 1890. By the act of that year, Belgium advanced a sum of $2,500,000 and obtained the right of taking over the African dependency at any date within ten and a half years from the signature of the act. It was thought by many that the Congo State would "mature" prior to 1901. But on August 10 of that year the terms of 1890 was reaffirmed, Belgium renouncing the repayment of advance (including a subsequent grant in 1895 of

some $1,360,000) and interest, and reserving still the right of annexation.

This action seems, in the face of the eagerness of other powers, like over-conservatism, indecision, or faint-heartedness; but there are some authorities who explain it, or seek to excuse it, on other grounds. Some say the king is at last deriving profits "too welcome to be rapidly parted with"; and it is asserted by others that the thrifty Belgians do not wish to assume the necessarily large deficits of the Congo's early years—deficits which have seriously depleted the large private fortune of the king—while Leopold stands ready to guarantee them, thus avoiding all risk of financial loss, while practically assuring final possession. But, according to Boulger, a Congo State partisan, "Instructed opinion is unanimous in Belgium that, in the interests of everyone concerned, it would be unwise to change the existing state of things on the Congo during the life of King Leopold. Under the present system the Belgians possess all the advantage of a colony without any of the inconveniences, and, as long as the king survives, the situation will remain unchanged." But the situation nears its change, for the king is an old man. There is, moreover, no doubt that the deferment of the consummation is gradually adding to the anticipated charm of union; for earth-hunger is a consuming passion of nations, small as well as great.

During the years since 1895 there has been a regular advance of outposts into the less-known regions assigned to the State in the course of partition. One of the most noteworthy of these was the expedition in 1897 to the headwaters of the Nile, which established Belgian influence in this important region, and directly aided the operations of the Sirdar of Egypt by striking a serious blow at the Mahdists. Internally also the region has been reduced to better order; the administration has been adjusted and regulated, legal machinery set up, and civil law extended throughout the State (May, 1897). Between 1886 and 1897 criminal cases, mostly for theft or assault, have been taken cognizance of in greater and greater numbers (622 in the latter year as against 62 in the former). The land system also has been regulated, by a division of holdings into three classes—those of natives, of non-natives ("registered lands"), and of the Crown (vacant areas).

The construction of railroads and telegraph lines has been steadily pushed forward, some of the former anticipating projected

French lines across the river, and giving to the Free State an immense economic advantage over close competitors. Nine hundred additional miles are now ready for construction under a ninety-nine-year concession to a Belgian company. Engineering difficulties of many kinds, to say nothing of those attending transportation of materials of construction, and enlistment of an adequate labor supply, have somehow been surmounted. The wealth of the interior is now within two days of the coast, and much risk of delay and loss has been removed from commercial enterprise. The telegraph has gone almost pace for pace with the railroads; to overcome peculiar local conditions of dampness, etc., use has been made of phosphorized bronze wire and steel posts. The telephone is operated to a less extent.

In the midst of what would appear to be general peace and prosperity, however, the friction incident to the contact of two widely alien races has manifested itself from time to time. It will be remembered that the earliest beginnings of the Free State were bound up with an anti-slavery agitation, and the very first clause of the penal code placed slavery, even in its domestic form, outside the law. But the State was set down in an area peculiarly cursed by this institution in its basest form, and by other objectionable savage practices, such as cannibalism. It has struggled, or, as some of its critics maintain, it has feigned to struggle with these elements from the first.

Now, to understand the difficulties of the African colonizing power, it must be borne in mind that natives cling very tenaciously to their ancient customs, even when what foreigners regard as incomparably superior is offered to their contemplation and imitation. They resent interference the more bitterly, inasmuch as such customs are generally sanctioned by the local religion, to say nothing of time-hallowed usage. Slavery and cannibalism are two such customs, comparable in their vitality and general acceptation to private property or monogamy among ourselves. It is not at all wonderful, therefore, if in a few years a handful of Europeans make but insignificant progress against them. Again, slavery is not all of a single type; it is generally conceded that the institution as it exists in the domestic form among untouched savage tribes is a mild institution, and is preferable to the system of indiscriminate slaughter of the vanquished which appears to precede it in the course of social evolution. This domestic form has not been the one

singled out by European powers for immediate and ruthless eradication.

It is the system of slavery identified with the operations of the Arabs against which all European governments must proceed. This kind, in all its shamefulness and barbarity, is the direct outcome of the appearance of America on the scene. It was in the effort to supply the abnormal demand for slaves in America that the raid system became organized, by which tribe hunted tribe, and through which bloodshed abounded. Unspeakable atrocities attended the coastward retreat of the raiders, negro and Arab alike. But it was not long before the Arab, with his keen business scent, succeeded in creating a practical monopoly of this bad business; and then the natives fell back almost universally into the position of the hunted. The Arab traffic has been, of course, largely eastward-bound, though to some extent it has been deflected across the desert.

The only effective way to proceed against these evils is through forcible and coercive measures, and this has been the method of the Belgians, among others. It was soon clear that the Arabs were the objective point; and it was found that the natives, though they saw no harm in the local form of slavery, and will come to see it only after generations of instruction, were eager to aid the anti-slavery operations for reasons of self-interest and preservation. There was no lack of opportunity for the opening of hostilities on a large scale; the Arabs were eager for a decisive conflict, for their razzias were being checked, their hold on the Arabized negro chiefs was being loosened, and, worst of all for a Mohammedan, they were obliged to pay a tax on ivory to the despised and hated Christian. A wanton massacre in 1892 brought on the crisis and led to the destructive Arab campaign of 1892-1894, elsewhere mentioned. The annihilation of the Arab power ended the devastating raids of former years, brought about the replacement of disaffected native chiefs and a general disarmament of dangerous elements in the State. It is claimed that the resulting peace and security have affected favorably the advance of the negroes in agricultural and other settled pursuits; and that the slavery system is now practically obsolete in the Congo. But it should be noted that owing to the fact that the system has not been rejected by an essential change in the intellectual and moral attitude of the native, the Congo State, as well as other equatorial governments, has had to exhibit the greatest acuteness and foresight to forestall the ruses of those who would perpetuate the system of

compulsion under pretenses of various degrees of plausibility. Regulations provide for the official inspection of the so-called contracts between natives and employers, for the limitation of the duration of labor and other such questions.

In governing the natives the Belgians have been successful—if success be taken to mean an increase of peace and order. There are indications that this result has been too often accomplished through the exhibition of savage cruelty dishonorable to European civilization. Serious mutinies in the native military contingent have certainly occurred, the worst of them being that of the Batetela forces in 1897, closely followed by that of the Dhanis column in the same year. Here, again, the prompt resort to force has solved the situation. There has been more censure of the Belgians for the employment of violent measures than for anything else except perhaps for the vending of spirits and for the encouragement of cannibalism. It is therefore necessary to distinguish an excusable and inevitable employment of prompt measures from actions that may well be charged up as crimes against humanity; and the distinction should be perfectly clear when the latter are pointed out.

In 1897, in the House of Commons, Sir Charles Dilke proposed a new conference, in view of the following assertions: "That the officers of the (Congo) State encouraged cannibalism, or at least systematically sanctioned it during the Arab campaign," and "that they are debasing the black races, and paving the way to their extinction, by the introduction of alcohol, and, more specifically, of gin." And in the papers of recent date there have been a number of references to cruelty in the Congo region on the part of Belgian officers.[2] These are serious charges, and it should be recalled that the last two have been lodged against the Germans also, especially in the neighboring Cameroons. Some of these matters will be taken up later in this chapter, in connection with the German possessions, and it should be borne in mind that much that will there be said is designed to apply, with proper modifications, to other tropical colonies, including the region at present under discussion.

It is certain that the laws of the Congo State are in form well

[2] Of late a formal agitation has been organized in this country, as well as elsewhere, for the purpose of forcing the issue of the Congo cruelties and slavery. The case against Leopold has certainly been strengthened, especially since no adequate rebuttal has been offered. The assertions made are in general [illegible] and specific instances of those hereinafter rehearsed, and have been so widely [illegible] to require no further account in this place.

conceived, and that the intentions of Leopold have appeared to be those of a cultured and generous mind (although there are those who regard him as the greatest international bandit of our time); thus were the Indian laws of Spain, and such were many Spanish kings, in the setting of their times. Abuse was not prevented in either case. It does not excuse the act to harp upon the commission instituted for the protection of the natives, nor to quote, as Boulger does, the legal enactments. It appears, however, taking up Sir Charles Dilke's specific charges, that he has misrepresented the attitude, by not considering the environment, of at least one prominent Belgian officer, Baron Dhanis, to whom he actually refers in connection with the encouragement of cannibalism. No doubt the baron's commissary was occasionally embarrassed, with plenty of locally acceptable food within reach, in the shape of the newly-slain enemy. But there appears no real proof that he bade his men fall to. It will be noted that he was one of about six human beings present who held European ideas about the eating of human flesh; and that there were at least 10,000 indispensable auxiliaries, over whom he had no absolute power, who thought differently. Until further evidence is forthcoming, it seems possible to accuse this officer of nothing more than an enforced yielding to the situation, with, perhaps, too small a show of resistance.

As for the sale of spirits, Boulger believes that it has decreased in later years. Such statements are hard to prove. The temptation is certainly very strong to give to natives the thing they most crave and for which they will work or bargain when no other inducement would stir them from their lethargy. And it is not possible for a new government in a wild country to control unscrupulous individuals. It was impossible for the United States Government, which has nothing to accuse others of, if it would; and it has been equally impossible for all other governments when ill-adjusted to a spacious environment. No doubt the stigma will be removed as the powers of stable government extend. It is to be noted, though it is of no value as an argument, that the accuser's nation itself has taken part in a lucrative trade in a debasing commodity which "paves the way to extinction."

In the preceding paragraphs it has been shown that the state which embarks upon the government of a tropical dependency exposes itself to vicissitudes of the gravest character. It is impossible for such a government, at least at first, to control a tropical area

in such an efficient way as to curb the brutish passions of the unruly and vicious whom it is able to restrain in the home-land. Praise or blame must be dealt out, then, in accordance with the effort put forth by the colonial power to adapt itself to new conditions. All the colonizing nations have been accused, and with justice, of cruelty or the non-restraint of cruelty—the British in the Pacific, the Spanish in America, the Portuguese and Dutch in the Malay Archipelago, the French in Indo-China, the Americans in the Philippines. Against the Belgians, in addition to the charges cited above, accusations of the most serious nature have been made by H. R. Fox Bourne, in a recent work on the Congo State.[3] He lays the blame at the doors of the government itself, which he accuses of indifference to the dictates of common humanity. The "curse of rubber" has fallen not upon the individual trader only, but upon the administration itself, so that oppression of the severest nature has resulted, especially in the enforcement of unpaid labor and in the collection of taxes levied capriciously and without the slightest regard for the economic or moral welfare of the native. Delinquency in the payment of these requisitions has resulted in the destruction of whole villages, and, worse still, in the mutilation of men, women, and even children. It is asserted by a number of witnesses that hundreds of right hands were preserved, by smoking them, as proofs to the government officials that delinquencies had not gone unpunished. If one-quarter of the charges made in this book are true, the Congo State deserves the reprobation of the world; for here, it will be noted, it is not a question of the unavoidable conditions of tropical governments, but of administrative incapacity and impotence, or even connivance and encouragement.

All during the early part of 1908, the affairs of the Congo Free State were the subject of heated debates in the Belgium parliament, and finally on August 3rd, the government announced its willingness to submit all disputes to arbitration, being forced to this decision by popular opinion. On August 20, 1908, the Belgium Chamber of Deputies passed an annexation treaty with regard to the Congo Free State, which later was considered and passed by the senate. The terrible atrocities in the Congo Free State reached such a height that on January 28, 1909, the United States govern-

[3] "Civilization in Congoland: A Story of International Wrong-doing"; with a Preface by Sir Charles W. Dilke, London, 1903. An answer to this was attempted in H. W. Wack, "The Story of the Congo Free State," New York, 1905.

ment withheld its recognition of Belgium sovereignty in this state. Further demonstration of popular opinion with regard to this matter was shown in the sentencing of Lieutenant Arnold of Belgium to twelve years' imprisonment for his atrocities in the Congo. Owing to the prevalence of disease in the Congo, measures were adopted to stamp out the more virulent types, and King Leopold promised on October 28, 1909, to contribute a large sum to be used for this purpose. Since the accession of Albert I, the people of the Congo have hopes of a great betterment in the administration of their affairs.

It would not be fair to leave the Congo State without a frank recognition of the enterprise, energy, persistence, and skill of the royal founder. With little encouragement he carried on a grandiose undertaking which may yet become the agency in spreading peace, security, and civilization where, a short while ago, these were quite unknown.

To the facts which have been given in preceding pages concerning German Africa, no addition need here be made. But it is all-important, for an understanding of Germany's general attitude and colonial policy, to take a somewhat wider view and perspective of her colonial activity as especially exemplified in Africa.

It should be noted, first of all, that Germany began her operations under the guidance of a consummate master-spirit, and with the enlightened idea of profiting as far as possible by the experience of older colonizing nations and by the aids of modern science. This is the bright side of the picture. It must be recognized, however, that in spite of the best intentions, the Germans were unable to realize the utter unfitness of elaborate codes and of a minutely differentiated bureaucracy to the conditions of colonial life; and that they erred in trying to carry over to the colonies that military system, in all its rigidity, which had served them so well in 1870 and before. There was too much red tape and a too frequent brandishing of the "mailed fist." Let us see to what these factors have led.

Under the guidance of Bismarck, it is in all ways probable that British methods, and in particular the device of the Crown colony, would have been early adopted had it not been for the stubbornness of a conservative Reichstag. The chancellor was helped out of a rather embarrassing situation by the action of the Colonial Societies in the formation of Chartered Companies; later, with his rare resourcefulness, he was able to turn these less-wished-for alter-

natives into instruments to secure the realization of his original plans. For it should be noted that the economic and political conditions which rendered possible the almost sovereign and independent activities of the earlier Chartered Companies had been considerably modified; so that the Chartered Company was in itself more or less of an anachronism. This fact was not long hidden from the mind of the shrewd statesman, and he proceeded to develop to its full a subsidiary use of the Chartered Company, *viz.*, that of a convenient screen behind which a modern state can pursue its policies of extension and annexation during periods when, for reasons of external or internal policy, direct action is less to be desired.

So suited to its ultimate purpose was this device that by 1892, the recalcitrant group having submitted to changed conditions wherein it was, *nolens volens*, committed to a non-renunciation of already existing interests, all the African companies had lost their independence, and actual annexation was all but inevitable. The German possessions are now practically Crown colonies.

The comprehensive intellect of the great chancellor likewise led him to support the German leaning toward scientific thoroughness in the matter of investigation of soil, climate, and other vital conditions, so that it may be said of the Germans that they alone, among great colonizing nations, applied from the first to the settlement of the difficult problems of tropical colonization the accumulated experiences of mankind. This dexterous management of a bloodless expansion and the enlightened method of approaching a great task are achievements of which to be proud.

But the shadow-side is dark. Apparently the machine-like system of the home-land could not be adjusted so as to meet easily an extreme contrast of environment. The bureaucratic régime under which matters of social adjustment had too often to be referred to the "green baize" in Berlin, put back seriously the early development of the colonies, under both the companies and the state. And, most of all, the exaggeration of militarism and its attendant services and burdens acted as a check to possible immigration and peaceful industrial development. The streams of immigration were little deflected; the colonial population increased but slowly. What new countries need is a loose and adaptable system, capable of a myriad of local modifications to meet with all speed arising local needs.

In regard to the natives, the military disposition worked a dual

result. The Germans acted in a way to be thoroughly understood when they taught "sharp lessons" to unruly savages; their display of force was wholesome and effective. But the spirit of the subaltern, puffed up with the dignity of unaccustomed command, was too much abroad in the land; and the natives were treated again and again more curtly and capriciously than is consistent with mutual good-will and native subordination.

To this tendency of the young petty officer exercising an uncontrolled if local command are due likewise, in part, those atrocities perpetrated upon the native peoples of which accounts were rife in 1896. But to this cause, as productive of fits of blind rage that know no measure, several others must be added, if the Cameroons atrocities, and those of the Belgian Congo as well, are to be justly understood. The Germans are notoriously poor colonizers of the tropics, being affected by the contrast of climate in a way seldom seen in the case of Southern Europeans. This, as any student of the subject of acclimatization will recognize, upsets the bodily functions, and, above all, the nervous system. It is also to be noted, in a case of this kind, whether the incoming race is careful to take precautions, in view of the climatic change, to suit itself to its environment. Changes of food and dress, relaxation of social forms, etc., are indispensable; and sexual and alcoholic excesses are especially to be shunned. The military caste-system stood out strongly against the former adaptations; as for the later, while sexual vice seems to have been an exception among the Germans and Belgians, alcoholic indulgence, invited by the enervating climate, seems to have been characteristic at least of the former. The Germans imported and drank their heavy beer, as at home; but what was temperance on the Rhine became intemperance under the equator. These considerations are amply sufficient to explain that condition, recognized as pathological by German writers, to which they gave the name of *Tropenkoller* (Tropic-madness).

Nothing of this kind is encouraged by the Berlin Government. Investigations have been made in the open and summary punishment accorded the guilty. But the eradication of the difficulty is to be attained less by legal than by prophylactic measures, as the foregoing remarks are designed to show.

In spite, however, of their earlier successes in the crushing of native revolts, the Germans have not been spared expense, strenuous effort, and humiliation in native wars. Owing prevailingly to the

system as outlined above, they came into open conflict several years ago (1903) with the Hottentots and Herero of their possession in Southwest Africa—and the end is not yet. The physical features of the land and the peculiar type of warfare practiced by the foe have contributed formidable dangers to the local German domination. In trying to track down the guerrilla bands in the desert and in fever-regions, a relatively large number of privates and a choice selection of young officers have been killed in battle or by disease. Even defeat has been suffered by the Kaiser's troops, and white prisoners are said to have been burned at the stake. The trade and the industries of the colony, such as they were, have been ruined, and emigration thither further discouraged.

As the war has gone on, further defections have occurred, and the situation has not appreciably bettered. Meanwhile the Socialists and others in Germany who have opposed the expansion policy, have had ammunition put at their disposal. Up to the end of 1905, nearly 12,000 troops have been employed in the colony, and the cost has mounted to $4,000,000; that is, about $2500 for every white settler, or $5000 a head for the purely German population. And the final issue cannot yet be clearly foreseen.

The Germans, with characteristic directness, have contributed to discussion of the native labor-question the principle of "compulsory labor." It may fairly be said that of all the systems designed to create and maintain a supply of labor in the tropics, slavery alone has universally attained its end. Economic incentives are all but impotent in the tropics, taken as a whole; and substitution as exhibited in the "coolie-system" has had no satisfactory outcome. Yet the work must be done by some race other than the white, owing to the inability of the latter to withstand the tropical climate under a régime of manual labor. Now a number of influential German publicists frankly recognize these conditions and propose a sort of return to the rough-and-ready system of long ago. Their arguments deserve brief notice; for, whatever else may be said of them, they witness to a clear comprehension of the conditions of racial survival and extinction. It is the belief of these writers that the native races of Africa have no more right to a life of idleness than the members of a civilized race; that only in proportion as they fall in with the general movement of civilization have they any claim to an undisturbed pursuance of their aims. It is also asserted, with justice, that "forced labor of some kind lies at the bottom of all advance in civili-

zation, and that it must therefore form one of the earliest stages in race-education if that is to be conferred by a superior race. It is also clearly recognized that the alternatives which lie before the natives are conformity to the type of civilization represented by the dominant races—and this demands of everyone, at least in theory, his share of struggle and effort—or extinction. From the standpoint, therefore, of both the European and the native, it is well that the latter should be forced to labor.

There are not many weak points in this argument if the general premise be granted that advanced races of men must endeavor to lift up their less fortunate competitors; but there are many serious difficulties in constructing the working programme based upon it, for any system of compulsion of the weaker lends itself easily to abuse in the hands of the unscrupulous. The Germans have recognized this, and sought to provide for it; with how much success the future will show. In their relations with the natives several notably successful administrators have adopted the motto: Severity with Justice (*Strenge mit Gerechtigkeit*); the former element is not likely to be wanting among military bureaucrats, but for the latter a responsible and honest colonial administration must answer.

Sir Harry H. Johnston, an experienced British administrator, has said of the Germans: "It will be seen, I fancy, when history takes a review of the foundation of these African states, that the unmixed Teuton—Dutchman or German—is on first contact with subject races apt to be harsh and even brutal, but that he is no fool and wins the respect of the negro or Asiatic, who admire brute force; while his own good nature in time induces a softening of manners when the native has ceased to rebel and begun to cringe. There is this that is hopeful and wholesome about the Germans: They are quick to realize their own defects, and equally quick to amend them. As in commerce, so in government, they observe, learn, and master the best principles. The politician would be very shortsighted who underrated the greatness of the German character, or reckoned on the evanescence of German dominion in strange lands." [4]

Attention has already been drawn to the steady and sure progress of the French in the Sahara and Sudan; how no opportunity has been neglected of cutting into the ancient trade-region which formed the Hinterland, or back-country, of the West African settlements. Mr. Keltie has indicated the chagrin of the British and

[4] Johnston, "Colonization of Africa," p. 258.

Germans at being thus confined to the coast. This French policy has been, however, almost universally successful, although it received a severe check in the so-called Fashoda affair, later to be touched upon in connection with the British operations in the Egyptian Sudan. It is here intended to supplement the preceding account of the French colonies in Africa by affording a rather more intimate view of French activity in the formerly Turkish states of Algeria and Tunis; and, further, to set forth several characteristic aspects of French colonial policy there exemplified.

From the generally unprofitable and ill-managed colonial possessions of the French, Tunis is set apart as a "model colony," while Algeria has ever been a thorn in the flesh. In order to understand this contrast, a comparison of the various conditions of the two colonies will be necessary; by elimination of the factors found in common, a residue of dissimilarity will be discovered which should contain the germs of diverse development. Features of the local physical geography may be dismissed in a word, for both colonies consist of an almost identical formation: a strip of fertile land near the coast and a desert back-country. Climate and marine influences differ in no important degree; there are no contrasts in physical nature which could account for more than a slight diversity of development. The same may be said of population; it is a combination of Arab and Arabized Berber, completely under the domination of Mohammedanism, with all that this implies of fanaticism and hostility to Western civilization. Both colonies are practically equally distant from and equally connected by means of communication with the mother-country. This comparison might be extended to minor details of economic, social, and other conditions without revealing any essential dissimilarity in the environment in which the French were to act.

But when there is instituted a comparison of administrative policy, as exhibited in the two countries, the case is altered. Tunis differs, not only from Algeria, but from all other French colonies of any size and importance in having been emancipated from the bane of the principle of "assimilation" so characteristic of the system of Jules Grévy. This is due largely to the fact that Tunis is a protectorate and that its administration is, for this and other reasons, a product of the less exuberant spirit of late years; this administration having likewise fallen to the wise hands of Bourde and Jules Cambon, men of modern and practical genius.

The policy of "assimilation" consisted in an unrelaxing effort to assimilate the local to the French type. It cannot remain hidden to the candid student that France has long regarded herself, and, in the light of modern history, with some show of reason, as the most liberal, enlightened, and intuitively progressive of nations. She is not alone in this characteristic attitude, but has exhibited it more dramatically, perhaps, than any of her fellow-nations. This persuasion has led to a twofold attitude toward other peoples, and especially toward lower races: a light contempt for their indigenous institutions, beliefs, etc., and a missionary benevolence that attempts to exhibit to or to introduce among the benighted the loftiest (*i. e.*, French) ideals. The contempt has too often been based upon overweening self-satisfaction, ignorance, and bias, and the benevolence has been too insistent, not to say intrusive.

Now the Mohammedan population of Algeria and Tunis, as has been intimated above, had no great lust for innovation: they, too, were satisfied as to the superiority of their own civilization. Consequently when the French, in the ardor of their world-mission, tried to assimilate Algeria to the French type in respect of government, law, marriage, etc., they met an open opposition, which, if quelled under the military hand, changed form into a stolid inertia and veiled hostility which rendered healthy and mutually beneficial contact of races all but impossible. French instability was rendered the more unstable by ill-directed and fruitless efforts to create some common ground, upon which coöperation could proceed, other than the natural one of mutual or even one-sided toleration. As the reasoning of the French was largely of the *a priori* variety, little progress was made. It is impossible to give here more than an indication of measures thus based upon uninformed sentimentality, but the following may suffice. It seemed to the French very desirable that the natives should naturalize themselves as French citizens, and thus partake, at least, of the dignity of a glorious connection. But the natives did not perceive the advantage, and in spite of various inducements, only 1131 Mussulmans were naturalized between 1865 and 1889. The policy of mixed marriages between the French and the natives has also been favored and furthered: but few such unions occur (22 in the triennial period 1897-1899): a like ill-success has attended the attempt to introduce French codes of law and legal procedure, here as in Indo-China: this has worked hardship to the native population, and has kept it in a state of con-

stant irritation. Finally, as an indication of instability the form of government of Algeria has been very inconsistent, ranging from military despotism, through a well-meaning but inopportune introduction of a civil régime, to incorporation as a French department.

A further light is cast upon the causes of disquiet and ill-success in Algeria, if we observe the effects of the absence of "assimilation" in Tunis. In considering Tunis it should be constantly borne in mind that its administration was enabled to profit largely by the obviously analogous antecedent case of Algeria. Tunisian policy has exhibited in a remarkable degree the elsewhere absent toleration. The French began their occupation of Tunis so naturally and deliberately that, as Fallot says, "Even before it began to have an official existence, and before it had found a name and a permanent form, the government which was to regenerate Tunis and give it its place in the civilized world had already fixed roots in the soil of the land; all it had to do was to develop normally." And so, "instead of wiping out the past, and importing all at once the administrative organism of the protecting country, France was thus led to preserve the greater part of the old organization, while progressively modifying and ameliorating it for the purpose of adapting it to the new conditions in which the country was about to develop." The authority of the bey remained ostensibly intact, though each of his acts was inspired or counseled by a French resident; and the lower forms of government were preserved under a similar system. The sheiks were retained as tax-collectors, and the natives were responsible to their own tribunals in cases where Europeans were not involved. In short, "the indigenous society has been stripped of no part of its own organization; it has simply been obliged to give to that organization more methodical forms, and to eradicate its abuses."

This description reminds one of the ideal view of the superposition of the Dutch administration upon the native system in Java; making allowance for some exaggeration, its results have been satisfactory. This is the only practical way to manage a population where the natives predominate to such an extent in numbers over the European population; and it is an especially politic method of dealing with native tribes of so restless and dangerous a stamp as the Arabs and Berbers.

Before leaving the subject of French colonial administration and its fair criticism, a further striking example may be cited. One

of the theories applied extensively in Algeria touched upon the location and distribution of population-centers. The authorities in Paris had very pronounced ideas upon this subject, based, unfortunately, upon small knowledge of local conditions, and an even greater ignorance of the laws determining the distribution of settlements in a new country. It is an astonishing fact that whole groups of settlers were obliged to move this way and that in order to satisfy Paris-made theories as to the orderly distribution of population. They were also forced to live in an "agglomeration of houses," often far from their fields. The colonists, naturally enough, tended to settle in spots which promised the greatest return for their labors, and to these places they desired that roads should be constructed. But no such homely and practical ideas found lodgment in the brains of the colonial directors (one of the chief of these being Louis Napoleon); their proposed shifting of the nuclei of settlement had for one of its main objects the lining of systematically planned roads with villages aptly located at the normal *grandes haltes*.

Algeria and Tunis, owing to their climate, which resembles that of Southern Europe, and to their proximity to the same region, have been the objective point for a far larger European emigration (from France, Spain, Italy, and Malta) than any other of the French possessions in Africa. They have consequently benefited far more along lines of economic development; European cultures, especially those of the vine and of cereals, have been introduced successfully; the Algerian viticulture has had many years of great advance coincidently with the appearance of the destructive phylloxera in Southern Europe. Gradually also peace and order have been extended, and the unruly desert tribes have been repressed. Safer trade-routes have been opened and railroads built, extending into the Sahara Desert and tapping some of the caravan outlets of the Sudan trade. The long-projected and already partially executed Trans-Sahara Railway extended in July, 1903, to 32° north latitude. Advance in commerce under French rule has been particularly marked in Tunis; and it should be noted that three-fourths of the Algerian trade, and a large part of the Tunisian, goes to France. But industry is very backward in Algeria and is feeble in Tunis; even the agriculturists suffer from the French custom of looking to the state for reimbursement in case of unfortunate risks.

Perhaps the worst thing that can be said of French colonization in these districts is that it is costly—costly not only to the state, but

to the settler as well. The land-system has been very unfortunate in Algeria; it is better in Tunis, being based upon the Torrens system, once employed in Australia. Monopolistic companies have succeeded, however, in getting control of large tracts in Algeria, as they did in German Southwest Africa, and holding them for preposterous prices; and in Tunis absenteeism of landlords is no uncommon complaint. The cost to France has been particularly severe in Algeria; it is calculated that she has spent there between seven and eight hundred millions of dollars. And yet, to take only a couple of instances, the French themselves admit that what they have done for education in these colonies is entirely unworthy of France; and in spite of heavy guarantees to the railroads, the tariffs of the latter remain, for the most part, prohibitive. The French are, however, hopeful as to the future of both colonies.

Any attempt to discuss the last decade of African colonial history would lack perspective if it did not give the bulk of its space to the British and their operations and enterprises. Aside from the brief story of the tragic end of Italian pretensions to an Abyssinian protectorate, the history of all the rest of Africa since 1895 is tame and monotonous compared with that of Egypt, and, above all, of South Africa. The events of this history are in the minds of all, and, in the case of the Anglo-Boer conflict, at least, partisanship is rife; the design of the present treatment can scarcely go beyond the effort to place an impartial interpretation upon almost contemporary events. But, in order to conceive these facts in the setting of their development, it will be necessary to supply a certain historical background not provided for in the original design of this book. First, then, let us consider the case of Egypt.

The notable victory of Lord Kitchener in 1898 in the Egyptian Sudan was but a prelude to the final act in the inexorable advance of British influence over the ancient kingdom of the Pharaohs; or, as it might with reason be said, of the invasion of a new northern race upon a degenerate subtropical civilization. After the conquest by the Turks in 1517 Egypt suffered the fate of all countries which have fallen beneath their bigoted, brutish rule, and for centuries vegetated in a degeneracy of civilization. In fact, from 1500 on Egypt cut but an insignificant figure in the world until the beginning of the nineteenth century; the modern history of the country dates in reality from the invasion by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798. By that famous and somewhat theatrical expedition was



ARABI PASHA'S DEFEAT AT THE BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KEBIR BY THE ENGLISH UNDER LORD WOLSELEY

Painting by R. Caton Woodville

attention attracted to it. But the stay of the French was short; Bonaparte, though successful in the Battle of the Pyramids, was forced to abandon his Eastern projects as a consequence of Nelson's victory on the Nile, and by 1801 the last of the French soldiers had been conveyed home by the British fleet. Out of the turmoil, however, that attended these operations arose Mohammed Ali, a dangerous and powerful leader, later recognized by the sultan as governor of Egypt. He established by energetic and barbaric measures a power afterward bequeathed, at least in name, to his successors as khedives of the province. Ali was a rebellious vassal, and it was only through the intervention of Russia that the Ottoman Empire was enabled to hold him in a nominal subjection; he practically won his independence, but paid, for form's sake, an annual tribute to the sultan. Ali thoroughly reconstructed the government of Egypt, and his work was carried on by the next forceful member of his line, his grandson Ismail, who succeeded to the rule in 1863. The latter, however, was a man of more reckless stamp; by his extravagance, and in spite of pitiless taxation, he raised the debt of the country from sixteen and one-fourth to four hundred million dollars, and later became so hopelessly involved in his finances that England and France were obliged to intervene and assume control of the country in behalf of their bondholders. Ismail was forced to resign in 1879 and was succeeded by his son Tewfik. The powers constituting the dual protectorate undertook to collect the taxes, etc., and to restore the country to solvency; the controllers appointed by these powers were the real rulers of the land.

But while these reforms were being put into operation the whole situation was perturbed by the appearance on the scene of Ahmed Arabi, a military adventurer, who forced himself into the ministry of war as its head. An attempt to reduce this turbulent character within bounds resulted in the stirring up of a fanatical excitement based upon the rumor that Islam was in danger; and as a consequence the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt were gravely menaced. While the Porte was tardily deciding on action, a collision occurred between the British admiral and the Arabi government which resulted in the bombardment of Alexandria in July, 1882. In August of the same year British forces under Lord Wolseley shattered Arabi's power at Tel-el-Kebir.

During this period France had been unable to undertake the

part which fell to her as a joint member of the dual protectorate, for the hand of Bismarck still rested heavily upon the nation. Consequently Great Britain was left alone as the "policeman of Europe"; and by various eventualities, and despite reiterated assertions of intention to evacuate, was obliged to remain in the country year after year. During all this period she has had to contend, among other things, with the open or veiled jealousy of France. The latter felt that she had lost advantages and prestige, and let slip no opportunity of setting the powers by the ears over the Egyptian situation.

It would be a long and, to a certain extent, a tedious story to recount the labors of England in Egypt. Nubar Pasha, an enlightened prime minister of Egypt, is credited with the dictum that Egypt needed two things—justice and water. Both of these have been given in more bountiful measure by the tutelary power, and, in addition, a successful race has been run, under heavy handicap, against bankruptcy, while the fellah has been converted into a trained and competent soldier. Sanitation and hygiene have been taught in some manner, the government schools have been regulated, the civil service improved, and a deal of training has been afforded in government. The enormous labors entailed in these briefly recounted activities can be better appreciated by those who will read and ponder over some such volume as Lord Milner's "England in Egypt." Whatever may have been the faults of her administration, England has sent her best men to Egypt, and they have worked desperately and self-sacrificingly against formidable odds.

Several of the most important specific services performed may be briefly recounted. Justice was given through the reorganization of corrupt courts, and the establishment of the so-called Mixed Tribunals. In the sixties and seventies of the last century Egypt was the Mecca of rogues of all dyes, and the consular courts which had to do with "foreigners" were incompetent and lax. European plaintiffs were awarded the most absurd and preposterous demands against native defendants. But this condition of affairs became intolerable, not only to Egypt, but to the European powers as well, so that in 1876 a single strong jurisdiction was instituted for the consular courts. The Mixed Tribunals, as their name implies, gave to the natives some representation in cases which touched vitally their own material welfare. Much of the credit for their establishment falls to England, though her power was not then

supreme; and hers is the full credit for their maintenance and development along proper lines in the years succeeding 1882.

Another administrative betterment which may be ranked under the head of justice in a broader sense, is that of the system of taxation. This is a more intricate subject and is dealt with in detail in more special works. But it may be covered in brief by the statement that Egypt, which, under Turkish and khedival misrule, was ground down by capricious and unjust taxation, is now prospering under a system which, with all its faults and still existing severity, approximates nearer and nearer, as time goes on, the type recognized as Occidental and enlightened.

The provision of water called in part for activities of another sort, although the same firm hand in administration, typified by Lord Cromer, had constantly to be in evidence. As everyone knows, the life of Egypt through ages has been the Nile. For the earliest and most primitive contrivances for irrigation, as well as for the gigantic labors of modern times, one idea has been the motive force, to supply an ever-widening riparian area with the life-giving and life-supporting moisture. In 1833 Mohammed Ali began a dam across one branch of the Nile, at the apex of the delta, in order to hold back a greater volume of water. This scheme was bettered by the project of Linant Pasha, who proposed a regulating barrage, intended to command the distribution of water in both the Damietta and the Rosetta branches during the summer, but leaving free passage in time of flood. By his influence Linant at this time saved the Pyramids themselves, for the ruthless Mohammed had decreed that they should be destroyed to furnish stone for his enterprise. Preliminary works were begun under the system of forced (*corvée*) labor in 1833. Owing, however, to Mohammed's recklessness and impatience, the natural development and selection of means and methods were much hindered, and the whole was not completed (under another plan) until 1861. The total cost was in the neighborhood of $20,000,000, later increased by considerable sums. But though insufficient in its completed state, the dam was able to hold back the water to some degree, and the result was an increase of the cotton crop from about 72,000,000 pounds, the figure for 1861, to about 363,000,000 pounds in 1884. The imperfect nature of the superstructure, which became very evident in 1885, has since that date repeatedly manifested itself, so that year by year enormous sums have been expended on repairs

and reconstruction. The cotton crop has steadily risen, however, from 1890 to 1899, being in the latter year about 643,000,000 pounds.

The further extension of the dam and reservoir system is a British achievement of the most recent years. It was found in the middle nineties of the last century that the barrage had reached its limit of usefulness, and consequently the country its maximum of prosperity under then existing conditions. To render further development possible the crop area must be augmented, and this was possible only under the influence of a larger and better regulated water-supply. The English undertook, therefore, to build a dam and reservoir far up the river, across the head of the Assuan cataract, north of Philae. This was one of the most ambitious engineering projects of modern times, and its successful completion and financing another undeniable triumph for the British in Egypt.

The foundation stone was laid February 12, 1899, and the dam was opened December 8, 1902.[5] These works, together with a 2750-foot barrage at Assiut, cost between $100,000,000 and $125,000,000. The dam itself is about a mile and a quarter long and about 100 feet thick at the base. The difference between the water-level above and below is 67 feet. Experts have calculated that the reservoir thus formed will hold enough water for a year's full supply to every town and village in the United Kingdom. It is now possible to store water to the extent of one thousand million tons; the sluices may be opened early in March, and for four months a good head of water for irrigating purposes can be maintained. Here is an improvement of the most vital kind; the habitable area is pushed forward, as the desert is driven back, and room for expansion of population is afforded. All this means material wealth and comfort. The most that hostile critics of Great Britain's Egyptian activity have to say is that justice is not always impartial, that the Englishmen have their eyes on the main chance, that some of them are rogues and almost all are arrogant. But these are inevitable, natural, and social characteristics, and are of distinctly inferior consequence as compared with the actual advances in civilization which the English have made possible.

Egypt, though nominally a province of the Turkish Empire, has long been in reality a potential protectorate of Great Britain.

[5] The dam was really complete by the end of July, 1902, eleven months ahead of contract time.

But the action that set the seal upon Egypt was that Sudan campaign of Lord Kitchener of which the closing years of the last century heard so much. From most ancient times the connection between Egypt and the Eastern Sudan has been of the closest; Rameses II. is said to have first annexed the latter to the former. In more recent times Mohammed Ali had sent his son (1819) to seize and pacify the Sudan; and in 1870 Ismail pushed the frontier to the equator. Until 1882 Egyptian power in this region was all but unquestioned. In the latter year occurred the Mahdist revolt, in consequence of which the southern provinces were for the time being lost. The Mahdi, nominally a sort of Messiah whose advent was expected as a herald of the latter days, was in reality an astute leader who worked upon the blind religious fanaticism of the rude type of Mohammedans who occupied the Egyptian Sudan. The Mahdi with whom we are dealing (for there were several others) was, as was natural in a Messiah, a leader in denunciation of the extortion of the Turkish Government. He gathered a large and enthusiastic following, many of them dervishes, who held life in contempt and regarded death in battle against unbelievers as the surest road to eternal bliss. He was utterly underrated by the Egyptian Government until his strength had grown to menacing proportions. Then several victories of the Mahdi induced the government to send out Hicks Pasha with a rabble of undisciplined troops, including Turkish mercenaries and the scum of the towns. This force was annihilated in Kordofan in 1883; and soon afterward followed the surrender of Slatin Bey in Darfur, the destruction of Baker Pasha's army, and other reverses. Discretion played no part in the disposition of the Egyptian Government, for it was only by the urgency of Lord Cromer that renunciation of the Sudan was forced upon it in 1884. This was followed by the mission of General Gordon, who was to report upon the situation in the Sudan, upon the best mode of evacuation, and of securing the safety and good administration of the coast districts. The tragic death of Gordon at his post two days before the relief-force dispatched by the tardy British Government arrived is an occurrence well known and much lamented. The net result of all these reverses was that the lower boundary of Egypt was now fixed at Wadi Halfa, and all south of that point was abandoned to the Mahdi, that is, to barbarism and degeneracy. This, says Lord Milner, was the result of the "limited liability system" of the British in Egypt

But if the prudence of the British counseled a retirement from a position no longer tenable, it was with no idea of ultimate abandonment, but rather of renewed and better organized effort. During the thirteen years that intervened between the evacuation of the Sudan and the battle of Omdurman preparations of the most far-sighted and careful nature were being made to insure the complete and overwhelming superiority of Egypt in its old dominions; for it was essential to the country, living as it did on the bounty of its one river, that the sources of the latter should be the property of none other than itself. Toward regaining the old provinces one of the first measures was the reorganization of the Egyptian army, with the result that the fellaheen soldiers who fled shamefully before the dervishes in the Hicks disaster, learned to stand and resist in a truly soldierly way; and to the Egyptian regiments were added others composed of the wild and fearless Sudanese blacks. Arrangements were also made to secure co-operation on the part of the Italians from Kassala—arrangements which would doubtless have proved of avail had it not been for the disaster to the Italian arms in 1896.

After preparations along all lines, which rendered Egypt north of Wadi Halfa secure as it had never been before, the final campaign against the Mahdists began in March, 1896, under the command of Sir Herbert Kitchener. It is impossible here to detail the measures which rendered Kitchener's advance only a degree less sure than the forces of nature themselves. The Sirdar was a man of iron, and his system was a skilful, patient, inexorable one. Among his most remarkable achievements was the construction of the desert railroad south from Wadi Halfa, to which, as affording an efficient support to every onward movement, the campaign owed much of its success. Amid continuous engagements, small and great, this work was resolutely advanced until the line reached the Nile at Abu Hamed, 203 miles across the desert from Wadi Halfa. After the victory of Atbara it was extended 178 miles further, and the final issue of the oncoming struggle was thus rendered perfectly sure and evident in advance. On September 2 occurred the battle of Omdurman and the destruction of the Mahdist power. The next day a religious service was held at Khartum, where Gordon had fallen. The Mahdi had died some years before, and although the new leader, the so-called Khalifa, escaped, complete pacification was the work of but a short time. The Sirdar

was appointed governor-general of the Egyptian Sudan January 19, 1899. The Khalifa was finally defeated and slain in South Kordofan in November, 1899, and his active lieutenant, Osman Digna, was captured early in 1900.

Thus was the Sudan province secured for Egypt through British aid and direction. It could not be otherwise than that the British hold on Egypt was hereby strengthened; it was explicitly admitted by Lord Salisbury that Kitchener's victory totally changed the face of things, and there were many who looked for the immediate proclamation of the Egyptian protectorate. This, however, did not take place; the British and the Egyptian flags float together over the recovered country, and England is still the adviser-nation.

The benefits which England has given Egypt have been briefly referred to above; what she did for her in the operations of 1896-1898 may be best told in the words of the victor himself: "You may take it, that during the two and a half years' campaign extra military credits to the amount of two and a half millions have been expended. In this sum I have included the recent grant for the extension of the railway from Atbara to Khartum, the work of which is already in hand. Well, against this large expenditure we have some assets to show; we have, or shall have, 760 miles of railways, properly equipped with engines, rolling stock, and a track with bridges in good order. . . . Well, for this running concern I do not think that three thousand pounds a mile will be considered too high a figure. This represents two and a quarter millions out of the money granted, and for the other quarter of a million we have two thousand miles of telegraph line, six new gunboats, besides barges, sailing-craft, and—the Sudan."

It has been intimated that the activity of Great Britain in Egypt is unpalatable to a considerable party within the country itself. The greater part of recent British troubles have come from the young Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who succeeded Tewfik in January, 1892, and who proceeded straightway to adopt, not the conciliatory and progressive policy of his father, but the arbitrary, extravagant and high-handed programme of Ismail. A considerable number of malcontents have been, of course, always ready to work through, or in coöperation with, the khedive, and though England can doubtless carry through any measures which it may please her to advocate, this opposition is at times very irritating and irksome.

England has likewise been obliged to meet old French pretensions and jealousies, the latest prominent exhibition of which occurred in connection with the so-called Fashoda affair. During the difficulties in the Sudan, just related, the French had improved the opportunity to move up along the White Nile to the town of Fashoda. Here the British, when they were reducing the long-abandoned province to order, found Major Marchand ensconced. For a time it looked like war between the two powers, but the determined stand taken by the British in sending Marchand about his business made it perfectly evident to France that she was deeply in earnest; and a prompt acquiescence was the result. The Anglo-French understanding alluded to above, while treating of Morocco, practically waives French claims in Egypt. If in return for such shadowy rights France shall have obtained real privileges in Morocco, she will have struck a very advantageous bargain.

Egypt is, then, to Great Britain something between a sphere of influence and a protectorate; it is virtually a British possession, for no serious objection could be sustained against the declaration of a British protectorate over the country. Whatever may be said in bluster or in anger, a sense of justice would concede to England an overwhelming interest in the lands and people among which she has so long labored as guardian and tutor. This being the case, the real "occupation" of Egypt will probably be put off till circumstances seem peremptorily to demand it; for the British have been characterized in their colonial activity by a disposition to procrastinate rather than to anticipate in such matters.

We now come to the most considerable event in contemporary African history, the conquest of the Boer Republics, and their conversion into British colonies. This constitutes a series of events which is comprehensible only in the light of antecedent South African history. It is manifestly impossible in a work of this nature to more than briefly summarize this past; the reader who would know more, and in more detail, is referred to the many excellent writers, for the most part accessible in English, who deal exhaustively with the subject.

The cardinal facts to be considered, if one would form an impartial judgment, on the basis of broad issues, of the Anglo-Boer difficulties and final conflict, are two: the character of the Boer population, which is largely a function of its physical environment, and the nature of the aggression which it was forced to meet.

The natural environment of the Boers may be briefly covered by the statements of James Bryce that the region south of the Zambezi is nearly one-half desert, of about the quality of the sagebrush area of Nevada; and that of the remainder, by far the larger part, is much too dry for agriculture, resembling in its nature the ranching districts of Wyoming. Migration, as a rule, will not pay, and there is no forest area. The country is suited to a pastoral and semi-nomadic population, and to no other. From this it follows that the mining settlements which formed so speedily after the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley (1870) and of gold at the Witwatersrand (1884), are by their nature ephemeral, and not likely to pass into the form of a settlement-colony until several other sparsely inhabited areas of the world are better filled, or until the arts of life are considerably advanced. That is, the Boer population is the one best fitted to the environment in question, the only one, really, that has demonstrated its ability to live and reproduce under such unfavorable conditions.

Concerning this Boer people much has been written from an unscientific standpoint of enmity or partisanship. This may be set aside *in toto*. Approaching the matter from the standpoint of antecedent history and human evolution, the following considerations emerge: seventeenth century population, composed in no small degree of Dutch Calvinists (and later of Huguenots), were, for one reason or another of dissatisfaction with the home-system, driven across the seas. These recalcitrants were at first irritated, retarded, and oppressed by the incompetent and selfish Dutch East India Company until they receded farther and farther from the coast, and plunged ever more deeply into a rude and harsh natural environment, wherein they came into contact with a grade of civilization, or non-civilization, much cruder and coarser than their own. Like all other frontier societies placed in similar conditions and almost wholly segregated from the outside world, they sank in large degree to the level of their surroundings. In the case of the Dutch this led to an exaggeration in the rigidity and severity of the one element in their previous life which they were enabled to retain—their religion.

All this was particularly true of the Boers of the Transvaal, as the farthest removed from civilization, and proportionately less evident in respect to those of the Orange Free State and of Cape Colony itself. This situation persisted into the period of the gold

discoveries. In 1880 the bulk of the Boers of the Republics were, to most intents and purposes, of a pronounced seventeenth-century type of civilization; indeed, in many cases they were inferior in education, general culture, etc., to the Hollanders, and especially to the Huguenots, from whom they derived their descent. One author says they were "narrow, strong, tyrannical, and pious. Their faults have been born of their virtues, and their virtues of their faults, and both faults and virtues have resulted from the conditions of their life and the mixture of their blood." This is a good statement of a part of the truth; it should be supplemented by some portrayal of their actual manners and customs and mode of living, in order to unfold its implications. The Boers' organization of industry was primitive, their trade petty and of the barter-type, and of progress in the arts there was practically none. They were self-satisfied, and callous to the feelings and sufferings of others. Sexual morality was lax, as is evidenced by the number of Dutch half-breeds, or Bastards; and matrimony was based upon the sordid motives and exhibited the conjugal relations characteristic of a low civilization. Government was of a patriarchal, despotic type and of a limited range, as is inevitable in a loosely-knit pastoral community; laws were unstable and easily and capriciously alterable. To the very last the executive was not bound by the courts, but readily and with impunity overrode them. Finally, the Boer religion, over which sentimental people have become enthusiastic and which drew to the subjects of President Krüger the unintelligent sympathy of the undiscriminating and uninformed, is but little removed from the stern and uncompromising faith of that fierce "chosen people" whose after-type the Boers have conceived themselves to be. The ideal man was Joshua, who smote his enemies hip and thigh, and the ideal deity was not Christ, but the ancient Jahveh of the savage Semitic tribes. Piety was of the ritualistic, formal, and verbal sort, and like Boer "democracy," resembled the type with which the Boers were too often credited in name rather than in essence. With perfect candor and in no hostile sense, the majority of the Boers might well have been styled, as Hutton graphically denominated them, "mental mummies."

This is one side of the picture; to an American of these latter days a description of the aggression to which these peasant farmers were subjected is scarcely necessary. He can fill in the

details for himself. For no American is without experience of the restless and often unscrupulous energy of modern industrial enterprise and its promotion. When to this disquieting element were added the confusion, recklessness, and rascality which attend the opening of mining operations for precious stones and ores—even though these latter were, chiefly because of the peculiar nature of the gold-reefs, far from extreme in form, in the Transvaal—some idea may be formed of the consternation with which the conservative Boer people viewed their prospective fellow-citizens and the latters' projects.

The conflict between Boer and foreigner resolved itself shortly into one of civilizations rather than of races; if the struggles in South Africa appear to many to have been due to the friction attendant upon the contact of races, this is chiefly because the so-called races represented distinct and incompatible stages of civilization. For the more modern of these stages Great Britain stood as champion; but it must be realized that the British were not the only aggrieved parties; being in the majority, they represented a body of malcontents which contained, among members of other nationalities, a number of Americans. If one is to pass on the merits of the actual contentions of the two parties, which is as yet an extremely difficult matter for others than the vendors of snap-judgments, the following consideration should never be lost sight of, namely, that sympathy leans predominantly to the side of those who are conceived to be fighting for liberty and religion, especially if they are fewer in number and are defending their own hearth-stones. Among Americans it is likewise the rule that sympathy is felt for a "sister-republic," if it is conceived to be undergoing oppression at the hands of a monarchical power. No careful man should allow himself to be influenced by such catch-words; he should realize that the case of Briton and Boer alike must depend upon the "cumulative effect of a large number of dry and often technical details," for the sifting of which the hand of time and the arduous labor of the candid historian are all-essential.

One fact early became patent to the Boers, by their mode of life rendered self-sufficing and impatient of interference: that they would soon be far outnumbered by the swarming prospectors and immigrant adventurers. They could not keep the latter out of the country—indeed for fiscal and other reasons they desired their

presence—but they could exclude them from political power, and that, as the first and most evident recourse, they tried to do. It was not that they clearly foresaw that the miners and prospectors were, by the very nature of their employment and motive of coming, an ephemeral element in the population, sure to disappear when either a fortune was made or the metal deposits exhausted; they simply desired a maintenance of the *status quo ante* of the political power, and they held to it awkwardly and arbitrarily, but not without a certain strong right and justification. Neither side was able to understand the other, even if both had been patient and sincere, for too many decades of development lay between. The situation resolved itself, therefore, into a desperate defensive on the part of the political "ins" (the Boers) and an even more energetic and often unscrupulous offensive on the part of the preponderant number of political "outs" (the Uitlanders,[6] or aliens). It was into this struggle that the British Government was finally drawn, as champion of the "outs."

The collision of these two civilizations issued, then, in a combat for political power; it was the increasingly wider oscillations between tactless Boer restrictions and Uitlander resistance thereto, which was generally equally tactless, that made the situation increasingly intolerable for both parties. But it should not for a moment be lost sight of, in one's disgust at the narrowness of many of the Boers, that capitalistic agitation and the *auri sacra fames* contributed only too often the motive force of Uitlander resistance, destroyed again and again the slow growth of relations of mutual tolerance, and finally led the burghers, through the indefensible Jameson Raid, to an exasperation which, in their stubborn minds, took on the form of implacable, irreconcilable hostility to modern civilization and to progress in all its forms. By the stress of conflict each of the types in conflict was forced to an extreme.

Viewed from this broad and general standpoint, it becomes almost irrelevant to pronounce upon the right or wrong of Boer or alien in what was to follow. The Boer represented the type suited to the local environment, the stranger the type suited to the modern world. The latter was sure, by whatever means, at least temporarily and while its absorbing interest in the country lasted, to predominate; in all human probability it will prevail in the end,

[6] Pronounced (approximately) "oyt-lahnders."



DR. JAMESON'S RAID INTO THE TRANSVAAL

The Boers Checking his Advance and Capturing his Whole Raiding Force at Dornkoop

Painting by R. Caton Woodville

whatever the fate of the gold-fields may be. And the Boer, like the native races, must fall in with the current of the world-movement or disappear.

The conflict and outcome being thus inevitable, the exact manner in which each evolved itself becomes, though important, in a sense subsidiary and of less engrossing interest. The actual events which led up to the war can be only briefly sketched in this chapter. It is not at all probable that the Boer Republics would now be British colonies if no gold discoveries had taken place; it was the influx of the foreigners that brought on the crisis of war.

There was, however, plenty of friction before the eighties. The British never got along well with the Boers: the latter are difficult for any civilized nation to endure, and it is significant that the Germans and the French, who need settlers for Southwest Africa and for Madagascar, though they have discussed the feasibility of inviting or encouraging the Boers, have decided, in view of their turbulent character, not to do so. The British have also, it must be admitted, made an exceptional number of errors from the outset in dealing with the Boers. "England," says Bryce, referring to the early period, "managed things ill. She altered the system of courts and local government, reducing the rights which the people had enjoyed. She insisted on the use of the English language to the exclusion of Dutch. In undertaking to protect the natives and the slaves, whom the Dutch were accused by the English missionaries of treating very harshly, she did what was right, but the farmers complained that the missionaries sometimes maligned them and greatly resented the attention which was paid to the charges. Finally, she abolished slavery and allotted a very inadequate sum as compensation to the South African slave-owners, much of which sum never reached their hands, because it was made payable in London."

In later times England annexed the Transvaal (1877) against the will of a large number of the inhabitants; and though this move saved the country from utter bankruptcy and was personally approved by President Burgers, the benefits conferred were more than outweighed in Boer minds by the arrogant policy which ensued. Taxes were levied stringently upon a people who had always resisted all taxation; and delay in giving free local government was so great as to cause the people to despair of ever getting

it. Finally, with an excess of political impotence, the Gladstone Government placed itself in the position of awarding to a temporarily successful armed resistance what it had refused just before to peaceful representations. All the bitterness of former years remained; and it was now mingled with contempt for what appeared to be duplicity and cowardice.

The two republics were left (1881 and 1884) in what they at least considered complete independence. During the period of lukewarmness toward colonial expansion preceding the panic-time ushered in by the hand of Bismarck, this arrangement was regarded by the British Government as at least endurable. But with the recrudescence of colonial activity it appeared to many that the existence of these unsettled and still hostile societies in the neighborhood of newly acquired British possessions constituted a real danger to the well-being of the empire in South Africa. About this time came the gold discoveries and the arrival of a horde of foreigners in the almost primitive Transvaal. The Boer Government of this republic (with which we are mostly concerned, for the Orange State was comparatively aloof from the theater of action, and was on the whole friendly to the British) began its restrictive measures with the imposition of heavy fiscal dues, not only upon the allotment of concessions, but upon the means of exploitation and existence of the incomers such as cement, dynamite, and food. In return for a heavy taxation it secured for the population practically none of the necessities and comforts of a civilized government. Sanitation was unknown; municipal works were contemptuously neglected; the police were ignorant, brutal, and corrupt, and often more to be feared than those from whom they were supposed to protect life and property. Despite continued remonstrance, alcohol was allowed to enter the mining district in large quantities, thus demoralizing the labor supply at the mines. The government likewise accentuated the differences of race and civilization by blocking a natural development of the educational system toward the employment and teaching of English. In fact, no reasonable advance in education and schools could be expected from a people of such amazing ignorance and illiteracy.

The Boers clung to the reins of political power through the expedient of elevating and complicating the requirements of citizenship: this, of course, was the vital point, as was recognized by both President Krüger and Sir Alfred Milner in their later

conferences; given the franchise on any terms comparable to those in vogue in other states, and the Uitlanders could redress their own grievances. Meanwhile the Boer Government drew a revenue from the foreigners totally out of proportion to its former slender income, and, since it accorded these no real part in the government, it appeared to them to be fattening upon them like a huge parasite.[7] Thus from the apparently unfavorable soil of vaunted Boer integrity and piety there sprang up a rank growth of sordid corruption which cannot be explained away.

The political power remained for the most part in the hands of the old burghers, and it was wielded with redoubled severity after the Jameson Raid of December, 1895, had, by the unscrupulousness and precipitancy of Rhodes and his lieutenant, put Krüger ostensibly in the right and absolutely cut off all chance of reform. In view of a conflict seen by the Boer authorities to be inevitable, augmented revenues derived from exorbitant charges on the aliens and their enterprises were applied in providing the apparatus of war. The Orange State had meanwhile thrown in its lot with that of the fellow-republic whose acts it had so often disapproved, but whose civilization and fate were thought to be its own.

Meanwhile the Uitlanders had stirred up British irritation by the story of their woes at the hands of the Boers—whose side, naturally enough, was not known, or was ignored. The franchise became the apple of final discord, representing as it did more real, but less concrete and conclusive objects of strife. The current toward war soon waxed too strong, however, for confinement of any kind; in spite of belated Boer concessions, the candor of which, as emanating from President Krüger, was always in doubt, the conflict drew on. The necessary increase of the insufficient British garrisons in South Africa became apparent to the Boers, and, judging the time to be ripe, they put forth an insolent and pretentious ultimatum (October 9, 1899), whose non-acceptance was followed by a Boer invasion of the southern colonies.

The story of the war and its outcome is well known. Starting out with jaunty confidence that a parade to Pretoria, where the Christmas-time would be spent, would settle the whole difficulty, the British finished by spending some thirty months, considerably

[7] The Uitlanders were 60,000 to the Boers' 30,000, according to Krüger's own estimate; they owned three-fifths of the land in the country and paid nine-tenths of the taxation.

over $1,000,000,000,[8] and 100,000 lives in the struggle. Faults of army organization and awkward strategy revealed, to the surprise of the uninitiated, the antiquated character of the British army. The most disastrous fault of this organization was its incapacity for adaptation to the local war-conditions. In some respects the reverses of Braddock in America were lived over again, for the attempt was persistently made to wage warfare of the European type against antagonists who employed a system almost as primitive as that of the French and Indians. The Boers, though drilled and instructed on the eve of war by French and other tacticians of the highest rank, were uniformly unsuccessful in general mass-engagements, and naturally so. Their *forte* was guerrilla warfare, and here they exhibited that astonishing mobility, endurance, and courage which so long baffled the British in their conflicts with DeWet. Had the conditions of communication, transportation, and of the arts in general been of the eighteenth century type, and had Great Britain been as involved in foreign complications as she was

[8] The following table will give some idea of the cost of the South African War as compared with other British wars; will indicate also, to some degree, the methods of financing the several contests:

Name of War	Duration	Total Cost	Taxation	Borrowing	Average Cost per Year
1. War in Ireland and with France (1688-1697)	10 years.	£32,644,000	£16,090,000 or 49%	£16,553,000 or 51%	£3,627,000
2. War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713)	12 years.	50,685,000	21,280,000 or 42%	29,405,000 or 58%	4,224,000
3. War with Spain (1718-1721)	4 years.	4,547,000	3,545,000 or 78%	1,002,000 or 22%	1,139,000
4. War with Spain and France (1739-1748)	10 years.	43,655,000	13,931,000 or 32%	29,724,000 or 68%	4,365,000
5. Ditto (Seven Years' War) (1759-1763)	8 years.	82,624,000	22,605,000 or 27%	60,018,000 or 73%	10,328,000
6. War with American Colonies (1776-1785)	10 years.	97,599,000	3,039,000 or 3%	94,560,000 or 97%	9,760,000
7. War with France (1793-1815)	23 years.	831,446,000	391,148,000 or 47%	440,298,000 or 53%	36,150,000
8. War with Russia (1854-55)	2 years.	69,278,000	29,562,000 or 43%	39,715,000 or 57%	34,630,000
9. War with France (1869-70)	4 years.	212,609,000	62,436,000 or 29%	150,173,000 or 71%	53,152,000

(From F. R. Fairchild, "The Financing of the South African War," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. xx., No. 3, November, 1902, page 83.)

in 1780, a closer likeness to the American Revolution might have been presented.

However, this was not to be, for, with the aid proffered by her colonies, England was enabled finally to effect a conquest. The republics became respectively the Orange River Colony (May 24, 1900) and the Transvaal Colony (September 1, 1900), and were placed under a British governor. The British acted with extreme leniency and generosity in victory; $40,000,000 was voted by Parliament for the repatriation and aid of the Boers; by November, 1902, 50,000 out of 70,000 burghers had been restored. The Transvaal Boers were then lent money without interest for three years, subsequently to bear interest at three per cent., to aid them in regaining their former station in life. The British Colonial Minister himself visited South Africa ostensibly to inspect and ameliorate the conditions of the erstwhile enemy. An equal prominence was accorded to the Dutch language, and the Roman-Dutch law was allowed to remain in force. A large sum even was spent in buying up and restoring the farmers' family Bibles, characteristic souvenirs that had attracted the campaigners.

Martial law was discontinued in the Transvaal in 1902, and both the colonies were granted representative institutions with the prospect of self-government on the model of other British colonies of settlement as soon as circumstances would permit; and that the latter clause is no idle or cynical proviso the history of British colonization in the nineteenth century may stand witness. Meanwhile, the prospects of the development of the whole region according to the modern mode are higher than ever before, although it remains to be seen whether a fusion of races and of civilization can be effected. The disappearance of two leading figures from the South African stage, the representatives respectively of the most conservative and the most progressive tendencies, cannot but have an effect upon the possibilities of reconciliation. There were many people who urged the Uitlanders to have patience until President Krüger died, on the ground that he alone stood between them and their rights, and his retirement and death have doubtless removed the sturdiest of the champions of the old régime, while the still earlier passing of Cecil Rhodes has effaced forever from South Africa the curse as well as the blessing of his portentous presence. However it may be in the future, the fact that in the trying years just past the Dutch element of the Cape remained largely neutral,

if not loyal, gives promise of the growth of mutual compatibility between the races, and is a witness to a growing realization on the part of many inveterate recalcitrants of the blessings which attend on British rule, and more than make up for its faults. But the contrast in civilization, with which this discussion of the Anglo-Boer relations began, must be borne constantly in mind, if one is not to be discouraged at any slowness, halting, or even retrogression of what is called progress, as time goes on. It is too early to draw conclusions of any value as to a changed material status of the country, disorganized and demoralized as it has been during and since the war. But it cannot be otherwise under British rule but that material civilization should advance, and that these backward states should begin to play a part in the world commensurate with their capacities.

Among the as yet theoretical projects in the now consolidated British South Africa is that which has for its aim the federation of this whole section of the empire. The Australian movement has been contagious, and very likely, in so far as the new projects are the result of such contagion, they are precipitate. But no student seriously doubts that this series of colonies, in so far as they constitute true colonies of settlement, are sometime to proceed through the stages already traversed by Canada, the Australasian possessions, and the United States, and at length emerge as new states, directing their own affairs in only nominal dependence upon, if not in real independence of, the mother country. In those environing conditions which determine the form of societies, South Africa resembles the Australian settlements rather than the American, having a somewhat less opportunity than the former even for securing a thoroughly independent and self-sufficing station. It is a question above all of the natural or acquired capacity for actual colonization, that is, for agriculture, and the limits of such capacity are likely to mark the extent of independent or quasi-independent states for a long future.

During the later part of 1908, and the early part of 1909, British and Dutch delegates from the South African colonies met at Durban, Natal, and drafted a constitution uniting all the states. In December, 1909, all parties were pleased with the appointment of Herbert Gladstone as governor-general of South Africa, and his arrival there in the early part of 1910, was a time of rejoicing for the people over whose destinies he is to preside.

Beside the prominent rôles played by Egypt and South Africa in the latter-day history of British African possessions or spheres of influence, the relatively uneventful history of the rest falls into insignificance. The latter are tropical colonies and have made their recent history, as has been shown, in an orthodox manner. In all these colonies the Europeans constitute only a vanishing and ephemeral element in the population. The climate is deadly, especially on the west coast; it is said that between the British possessions on this coast and England, there have been usually two governors *en route*—the new governor on the way to his post passing the dead body of his predecessor as it was being borne home for burial in native soil. It is likewise true that the expenditure for these colonies considerably exceeds, as a rule, the revenue collected. This appears to be a necessary condition in a tropical colony where compulsory labor of all kinds is forbidden. The national gain in such cases is not fiscal, then, but must be estimated under public wealth, if there is any material return at all. As a matter of fact, a government seems willing to continue to balance the budget of such colonies from a variety of subjective reasons of national pride, vanity, or asserted humanitarianism. The usual formula—no stranger to Americans—is: "We are there, and cannot withdraw." Sinister reasons for such an apparently losing course are sometimes discovered in the undue influence of interested persons or groups; but the reasons just mentioned are certainly the ostensible and doubtless predominantly the real motive forces in the breasts of the unimaginative and dogged British and other taxpayers—"the forgotten men"—who foot the bills in the final accounting.

These latter remarks on tropical colonies may be taken to apply to most of the African settlements of all the participating nations, for practically all of Africa is of this type, except the southern tip. What they all desire, excluding other than individual and national aims, is trade. They want the characteristic products of Africa in so far as these supplement existing but insufficient temperate zone products, or fill a void locally impossible of satisfaction. What these articles are the concluding chapter undertakes to show. A wonderful advance in the civilizing of South Africa was made by the building of the railroad between Lovito Bay, through Benguella and extending in an almost direct line across Africa to Katauga. There it joins the Cape to Cairo rail-

road. The building of this railroad has brought Pretoria 3,000 miles nearer to Europe, and consequently that much closer to the centers of advanced civilization. The opening-up of Africa began in trade, and any effective progress in this line has been through trade and commercial enterprise, directly or indirectly, alone. If the status of the population shall be thereby raised, it is primarily through trade, which, with an insufficient approach to justice, has been called the "handmaid of civilization."

The trip of Col. Roosevelt to Africa has done more to awaken interest in that continent than all the events which have preceded it for many years. For months the newspapers were full of the adventures of this most representative of Americans, and his safe return was hailed with joy by millions. The start of his expedition, which went out under the auspices of the Smithsonian Institute, for the purpose of securing rare and unusual specimens of animal life, left New York City, March 23, 1909, and arrived in Naples, April 5th. Col. Roosevelt was met and welcomed by the king, but made only a brief stay, arriving at Port Said, April 9. The expedition went from Mombasa, northwest to Uganda; thence to Nairobi, and on back to Khartoum, where Col. Roosevelt was met by Mrs. Roosevelt and their daughter, Miss Ethel Roosevelt. His associates on the expedition were Dr. and Col. Edgar A. Mearns, Edmund Heller, a trained naturalist; J. Alden Loring, a collector of small animals of world-wide reputation, and his son, Kermit Roosevelt, who was the official photographer of the expedition. He was joined by R. J. Cunninghame, an Englishman, who had acted as guide for a number of famous travelers.

The expedition, from a scientific standpoint, has been an immense success. The Smithsonian Institute has been enriched beyond the wildest expectations of the illustrious explorer. His entire journey has been one continual triumph, native chiefs as well as the highest officials of the various governments, vying with each other to do him honor. From Africa, the Roosevelt party sailed to Italy, where the king and dignitaries awaited to show Col. Roosevelt the honors hitherto only accorded to reigning rulers.

ECONOMICAL VALUE OF AFRICA

Chapter XIX

THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF AFRICA

SUCH, then, in brief, is the story of the "scramble for Africa" and its results. It will enable us to form some idea of the value of the share which has fallen to each of the powers who have been engaged in the scramble if we endeavor to realize what are the leading characteristics of the geography of Africa, so far as these bear upon its economical development.

It was a prevalent belief among the ancient Greek and Roman geographers, and even down to the time of the Arab occupation, that the torrid zone of the earth, and especially of Africa, was uninhabitable on account of its heat. Though not precisely in the sense in which these ancients meant it, there is a great deal of truth in this. From the European point of view, Central Africa is believed by most authorities to be uninhabitable, or at least uncolonizable, on account of its heat.

There is another impression very prevalent at the present day, for which African travelers reproach us. We are apt, we are told, to forget that Africa is not a little bit of a country like England or France or Italy or even India, but that it is a great continent embracing some 11,500,000 square miles—5000 miles long from north to south, and 4500 miles wide at its broadest part; and that, as a continent stretching over some 70° of latitude and nearly as many of longitude, it must have many varieties of feature, of climate, of products, of people. While there is no doubt much justification for the reproach, the popular conception is, after all, not so very far wrong. Africa is the most uniform, the most monotonous, of all the continents; amid all its variety there is a certain sameness, a certain family likeness from north to south and east to west.

This comparative uniformity of the continent of Africa, and the fact of its having been so repellent to the intervention of white races reared in temperate latitudes, can to a large extent be accounted for by comparing the situation of Africa with that of the other continents. It lies almost evenly balanced on each side of the

equator, between about 40° north and 40° south latitude. The equinoctial line which passes through its center does not touch the Euro-Asiatic continent. The Tropic of Cancer, which skirts the south of China and passes through the center of India and Arabia, leaving the bulk of the Euro-Asiatic continent to the north, runs across the north of Africa, leaving only about 3,000,000 square miles between it and the Mediterranean; while less than 1,000,000 square miles lie to the south of the Tropic of Capricorn, at the other end of the continent. Again, the whole of North America is outside of the tropics. Of the southern half of that continent, much of the tropical area is occupied by the ocean with its moderating influences; and, while the larger part of South America is within the tropics, still a very considerable portion is situated to the south of Capricorn, and down almost to the verge of Antarctic influences. While the climate of the southern shores of Europe is very similar to that of the Mediterranean coast of Africa, and while the southern peninsulas of Asia are purely tropical, every variety of climate is found between that and the ice-bound shores of Siberia. In the other hemisphere, while the feet of the North American continent are laved by the warm waters of the Gulf Stream, its head is almost within hail of the North Pole. Of Australia even, the larger half is outside tropical influences, and its non-tropical shores face the broad ocean and not landlocked seas, as do the north and northeast coasts of Africa. Africa, then, is the tropical continent *par excellence*. Of its total area some two-thirds, almost 8,000,000 square miles, lie between the tropics, and have the sun vertical twice a year, while the rest of the continent is more or less sub-tropical; so that, so far as climate goes, the popular conception is not far wrong. Even of America only about one-third of the land is within the tropics.

Here, then, we have a barrier to European intercourse and settlement which does not exist to anything like the same extent on any other continent. It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader how this question of latitude acts as a barrier to the European occupation of the bulk of Africa. Perhaps it is not wise to be too dogmatic on the subject, for the data we possess are scanty in the extreme. But there is no doubt that among those who are entitled to speak with authority on the subject it is held that without an enormous advance in the arts, colonization, in the proper sense of the term, is impossible in a tropical country, unless the European

can change his constitution; unless in the course of ages a variety is developed differing materially from the races that now occupy at least Northern and Central Europe—and such a variety would practically cease to be European.

Another serious setback to Africa is its regularity of contour. Though Africa is more than three times the size of Europe, and although it is practically an island while Europe has an extensive land frontier, the coast-line of Africa measures only about 15,000 miles in length, while that of Europe is 19,000 miles. A glance at a map of the world will show how this marked difference arises. There is not a single indentation on the coast of Africa worthy of the name: the coast-line all round looks like a barrier to keep back the beneficent advances of the ocean. Compare the north coast of Africa with the opposite coast of Europe, with its long Adriatic and its Black Sea, with its entrances and offshoots. There is nothing in the whole round of the African coast to compare on the one hand with the great sea-arms and magnificent natural harbors that mark the west coast of Europe, including the British Isles, nor with the richly broken Atlantic coast of North America on the other. There is only one estuary of real magnitude on the whole continent, that of the Congo; hence partly the great hopes entertained of the future of that river. Such second-rate harbors as those of Delagoa Bay and Mombasa are reckoned valuable possessions in Africa, for which nations struggle. This monotonous outline of the African coast acts disadvantageously in two ways from the point of view of European enterprise. In the first place, the lack of deep oceanic indentations deprives the great bulk of the continent of the beneficent influences which contiguity to the sea brings with it; and, in the second place, it deprives the navigator and trader of ready highways to the interior. Thus the mere character of the contour of the coast has contributed to retard the development of the continent. At the same time, let us recall the fact that the spread of railroads over the continent would tend greatly to counteract the commercial disadvantages arising from the lack of deep arms of the sea, navigable rivers, and natural harbors. Railroads are the great levelers, shattering old geographical traditions, and tending to place all continents on a more equal footing, so far as communications are concerned.

Passing from the contour of the coast-line to the configuration of the surface of the continent, we find here again certain charac-

teristics which distinguish Africa from all the other continents, except perhaps Australia, which might have been as far behind in civilization as Africa had its latitude been different. The surface of Africa is nearly as monotonous as its outline. There is only one mountain range worthy of the name, that of the Atlas, which extends along the northern rim of the continent from Tunis to the Atlantic coast of Morocco, and rises at its loftiest point, Miltsin, to 13,000 feet. Eastward we find a line of detached heights, between the Nile and the Red Sea, with one or two points over 6000 feet, and leading us on to the great mountain mass of Abyssinia, rising in terrace after terrace to a culminating height of 15,000 feet, with a cap of perpetual snow. Proceeding southward over a lofty plateau, we come upon another smaller mass of elevated land on the northeast and east of Victoria Nyanza, which is marked by such magnificent heights as Elgon, 14,000; Kenia, 18,000; and Kilimanjaro, 20,000—all of them old volcanoes, and one of them, Dunyé-M'buro, not yet extinct. Scattered over the region between this and Lakes Nyasa and Bangweolo we find a few points rising to over 5000 feet, but there is no other mountain range till we meet the Drackensberg in Southeast Africa, rising in places to 10,000 feet, and extending under varying names and at a lower level southwest and west into Cape Colony. Between that and the Cameroons only one or two spots reach a height of over 6000 feet. In the small mass of Cameroons we rise to 13,700 feet, and find ourselves in an old volcanic region continued into Fernando Po and neighboring islands. Between the Cameroons and Lake Chad, Mount Atlantika shoots up beyond the general level of the plateau; while Ruwenzori (20,000 feet) and its neighboring summits, to the south of Albert Nyanza, may be taken as belonging to the great volcanic series around Victoria Nyanza and north to Abyssinia. Even the Sahara is not so deadly level as is popularly believed; there is a line of heights running northwest from Darfur, and culminating in Tibesti in a summit which deserves to be called a mountain, for it rises to over 7000 feet.

But when all is put together the really mountainous regions of Africa amount to little compared with the great size of the continent. We have nothing in Africa that can compare in comparative mass and extent with the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Apennines, the Carpathians, the Scandinavian ranges, in Europe, not to mention the Himalayas and the stupendous ranges of Central

Asia, and the Andes and Rocky Mountains that run the whole length of the American continent. This lack of great mountain ranges upon the African continent must be regarded as another serious drawback to its economical development, since it markedly affects its rainfall and the distribution of its water supply. Nearly all the mountain regions we have referred to bear evidence of gigantic volcanic activity at a past period in the history of the continent. The geological history of the continent is, no doubt, one of great interest. That at a recent period Africa was connected with Europe no one doubts, but the idea that the present surface of the Sahara is an old sea-bed has been abandoned in the face of recently accumulated evidence. Over much of the continent the old Plutonic rocks prevail immensely over the recent eruptive rocks, just as the older sedimentary do over the recent tertiary or quaternary. Both orders appear to be generally intermingled and largely associated with semi-crystalline and metamorphic forms. In a general way the composition of the soil of Africa is favorable enough to the varied requirements of humanity; its great want is water.

It is a striking fact that, notwithstanding the paucity of great mountain ranges in Africa as compared with Europe and Asia, the general mean elevation of the former is greater than in either of the latter. In the case of Africa it is from 1900 to 2000 feet, while that of Europe is only 1000 feet and Asia 1650 feet. This reveals to us the great characteristic feature of the surface of Africa—a high plateau, descending almost everywhere in terraces to the coast. All round the coast is a strip varying in breadth, but generally comparatively narrow, of not more than 500 feet in height. But the great bulk of the continent is a plateau of from 500 to 2000 feet, much nearer to the latter than the former. Indeed, the mass of the continent south of the equator, exclusive of a considerable section of the Congo basin, is from 2000 to 5000 feet, with a broad belt including the great lakes pushing northward far beyond the equator into the Upper Nile basin and Abyssinia. Scattered over this, we have seen, are patches which rise to over 6000 feet. The central portion of this, trending northeast from Damaraland to Abyssinia, and from 500 to 1000 miles wide, may be said to average 5000 feet in height. The northern half of the continent, while retaining its plateau character, has a considerably lower general altitude, averaging 1500 feet, though much of it rises to 2000 feet.

In Africa, in short, the relief of the land, instead of being concentrated in one or two enormous mountain ranges, has been spread over the continent with wonderful equality.

The practical importance of the plateau character of the surface of Africa will be apparent when the influence of altitude in modifying temperature is kept in view. The mean annual isotherm of 70° is almost coincident with the north coast of Africa, and just comes inside the south coast. The mean annual isotherm of 80° is in the north almost coincident with the Tropic of Cancer, and on the south enters at the Guinea Coast, but sweeps so abruptly south as to include the bulk of Africa south of the equator. These are enormous average temperatures to embrace a continent; no other land-mass has anything like them. Over a large area of the continent the usual day temperatures are of course much higher, and were it not for the rapid nocturnal radiation, Central Africa would really, as the ancients believed, become uninhabitable on account of the heat.

When it is remembered that as a general rule temperature decreases by 1° for every 300 feet of altitude, the great advantage of the plateau character of Africa, so far as the European is concerned, must be at once evident. When such altitudes are available as we find in Africa around the great lakes—Victoria, the two Alberts, Tanganyika, Nyasa, and the district between the last two, as also in the Cameroons and the Abyssinian highlands—with ordinary care and a fair constitution to start with, a lengthened residence and reasonable activity become possible, and, if on the verge of the tropics, even colonization may be practicable; though the last statement must be taken with caution. For, be it remembered, it is not the mere heat of the tropics that tells on the European constitution; there is the malaria engendered in the low-lying regions, and even in the uplands in some places. More trying even than this, both to man and beast, is the excessive variation of temperature between day and night. The difference between summer and winter temperature in some parts of Africa is very great; in the Central Sahara and in Bechuanaland it is as much as 36°, and in Southwest Africa even 60°. Such a difference can be provided for. But when there is a sudden lowering of the temperature at sundown in a tropical or sub-tropical moisture-laden atmosphere it is apt to tell severely on the European constitution. This is one point that has yet to be tested in Mashonaland, which, though sub-

tropical, is in some respects a country that promises well for European occupation.

These are a few of the advantages and disadvantages of the plateau character of tropical Africa, so far as concerns the influence of the climate on the European constitution. It entails, however, still another obstacle to free commercial development. The plateau, which prevails almost everywhere, slopes down in terraces more or less rapidly to the coast, and down these terraces the rivers from the interior must make their way, with the result that we find the courses of the Nile, the Niger, the Congo, the Zambezi, more or less interrupted by cataracts. These are a serious obstacle to navigation. Fortunately on the Niger the break occurs far up the river, leaving a long, clear waterway, but on the Congo we meet with some 200 miles of unnavigable cataracts, beginning at about 150 miles from the sea, and so cutting off from direct access the 1000 miles of splendid waterway above, which leads into the heart of Africa. Had it not been for this we cannot doubt that the Congo would have been traced from below long before Stanley's brilliant achievement from above. At the same time, as has already been pointed out, these geographical disadvantages can be to a large degree nullified by the construction of railroads. No doubt both in Europe and America river-navigation is of importance, but it is insignificant compared with the importance of railroad communication. American rivers are not infrequently flanked by railroads built directly on their banks. In fact, the judicious introduction of railroads would greatly enhance the value of the African waterways.

Prevailing winds have much to do with temperature, and still more perhaps with rainfall; and it is to be feared that here we touch upon one of the weakest of Africa's many weak points. On the east coast the prevailing winds are toward the continent, bringing with them a fair supply of moisture; all around the Gulf of Guinea the ocean sends an ample tribute of moisture, while farther south the cold Benguela current tends to diminish the supply. The northeast trades just skirt the Sahara coast, and do it little good, while the winds that cross the Mediterranean and Red Sea have already parted with most of their moisture to the Euro-Asiatic land-mass, and what little remains is levied by the coast-lands. What, then, are the results of these influences so far as the supply of moisture, the rainfall of the African continent, is concerned?

It should be remembered that we have precise and continued observations for very few places in Africa. From such meager data as we have we find that the region of greatest rainfall is round the Niger mouths and south along the coast to the Ogové, with one or two patches on the coast to the south of the Gambia. There we may have over 100 inches annually. On the Lower Niger region, up by the Benué, and on a sweep from the Upper Benué down to the vicinity of the Congo mouth, and probably including some of the northern tributaries of the Congo, the rainfall is estimated to average from 50 to 100 inches annually. The same amount is found along a broad strip of the Upper Guinea coast, and over an extensive area in the heart of the continent, on the Middle and Upper Congo and its great feeders, and around the great lakes. There is also a patch on the Tana River region, to the northeast of Victoria Nyanza, and a strip on the east coast from Mozambique to the River Jub. But the great bulk of the center of the continent from the Niger and Benué on the north to the Zambezi on the south has about 50 inches, reaching on the Upper Congo and its feeders 100 inches. Fifty-inch patches are found on the coast of Algeria and Tunis, over a considerable area of Morocco, and into Abyssinia. Over much of the western Mediterranean border, on the southern face of the Atlas, we have at least from 10 to 25 inches. A similar supply prevails over a belt of varying breadth reaching east from the mouth of the Senegal along the Central Sudan States and on the Abyssinian tributaries of the Nile. A still wider belt to the north of this receives from 5 to 10 inches, but it merges into the Sahara, where the annual average is less than 5 inches—too little to be of any avail for cultivation. To the south of the Zambezi the rainfall is about 50 inches on the east coast and on to the edge of the Mashonaland plateau, gradually diminishing to 25 inches, and still further the farther westward. The western half of this region north of the Orange River has the minimum rainfall. On the coast of Cape Colony they have 50 inches and over, but this rapidly diminishes as we leave the coast. The northeast horn of Africa, including Somaliland, has from 10 to 25 inches, with the exception of an area from Lake Rudolf to beyond the Jub, where the rainfall is from 5 to 10 inches. Thus, then, except in the center of the continent, in tropical Africa the rainfall is almost everywhere inadequate for industrial operations; so that where Europeans might settle, so far as temperature g[illegible]

the water supply is defective. Even in the central belt, especially in East Africa, there are considerable areas of desert met with where the water supply is almost *nil*.

Closely related to the supply of water from above is that on the surface of the continent. One of the most characteristic features of Central Africa is its group of great lakes—Victoria Nyanza, Albert and Albert Edward Nyanzas, Tanganyika, Mweru, Bankweolo, Nyasa—just on the eastern edge of the region where the rainfall may be from 50 to 100 inches. On the northern edge of the 25 to 50-inch area we find Lake Chad, which is really not much more than an enormous swamp varying very greatly in area according to the season. South from the southern edge we find a corresponding swampy lake, Ngami, which may be all that remains of a much greater lake, into which, at no very remote period, the Zambezi may have discharged its waters. The only other lakes of any consequence in Africa are Lake Dembea, among the Abyssinian Mountains, and Lake Rudolf, to the northeast of Victoria Nyanza, situated in a comparatively dry region, and forming the receptacle of an inland drainage basin. But the great mass of lacustrine waters is concentrated in the center of the continent.

It is not surprising, then, to find that the rivers of Africa, with one exception, draw their supplies from the center of the continent. The Nile drains the waters of the three Nyanzas, and one of its chief eastern feeders comes from a lake of Abyssinia. The Congo may be said to rise in Lake Bangweolo, while the Tanganyika sends its contribution to the same river. Many tributaries come from the south, drawing their waters from that great sponge, as Livingstone called it, an enormous marshy region that may be said to form the water-parting between the Congo and Zambezi, whence the latter rises, as well as the Coanza, which makes its way to the west coast. While the Niger itself is fed from the rainy region of Western Africa, its great tributary, the Benué, comes from the central zone. These are the four great river-systems of Africa and the Nile is the only one which, in any part of its course, reaches beyond the tropics. The Senegal and the Gambia, though tropical, are insignificant; the Limpopo is also small, and is of doubtful utility for navigation, while the Orange is not much better than a "rocky torrent." Dry river-beds or "wadies" are found in many places outside the tropics, even in the Sahara. In this enor-

mous desert we find wadies of very great length, and along these are signs that at one time they may have been permanently flowing rivers. Even now, when the rain has been more than usually copious, they may contain water for a few days, and water can always be obtained by digging. On the other side of the continent, again, in the Cape region and the countries around its borders, the dry river-beds may suddenly become destructive torrents. But, as a general rule, outside the tropical area permanently flowing water is rare.

The foregoing is an attempt to exhibit, with necessary brevity and generality, the leading data which may be said to go to constitute the surface geography of Africa. All that appears on that surface, or that may be gotten out of it by human exertion, may be said to be an outcome of the various factors with which we have been dealing. We have first the position of the continent on the earth's surface, *i. e.*, latitude; then we have the outline or contour of the coast, and its relations to the surrounding oceans; the contours or hypsometric characteristics of the surface; the distribution of the sun's heat, the prime influence of all; the direction of the prevailing winds, and the distribution and amount of the moisture which they bring; the supply of surface water, or hydrography of the continent. What, then, do we find as the first outcome of these various influences?

To begin with, in the great central region, the region of fairly abundant rainfall and of generally ample surface water supply, we find, on the whole, spontaneous tropical exuberance of vegetation and plentiful animal life. Even here, especially in East Africa, there are, however, great patches of poor scrub-land, or steppe country, little better than desert. But the main feature is rich grass-land covered with trees, sometimes in clumps, sometimes condensed into forests of no great extent, very generally of an open park-like character. In the region of most abundant rainfall, around the coasts of the Gulf of Guinea, in patches along the Benué, on the Upper Congo and its tributaries, and generally wherever we find the rainfall most abundant, we have genuine tropical forests, though nothing, it would seem, to compare in continuous extent with the great forest region of South America. Here, then, in the great central belt, from 10° north to 20° south, the region of true tropical heat and tropical rainfall, we have nature spontaneously exuberant. Outside this region there are

few districts of which the same can be said; it mainly depends on the rainfall. South of the central and eastern Zambezi, except the low-lying Manika country, the district where there is a fairly abundant extra-tropical rainfall, including Mashonaland, Matabeleland, parts of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and east and south Cape Colony, we find grass-lands with trees, though not very evenly distributed, and liable to be affected by capricious rainfall. Similar patches are found in Abyssinia, along the valley of the Nile, and along the slopes of the Atlas and the Western Mediterranean coast-lands.

North of the central belt and between the Mediterranean coast, and also over most of the northeast horn of Africa, is found an area either absolutely desert, or the next stage to it—poor steppe, scrub, or other land of a like nature. This area covers something like 4,000,000 square miles—one-third of the continent. Of this about one-half is pure desert, the veritable sandy Sahara. The true Sahara is not one compact area. On its south, with a varying breadth, we have the so-called steppe or scrub-land, much of which is really fairly good grass-land at certain seasons of the year, with vegetation of a shrubby or scrubby character. This broadens out to the north of the Senegal, and extends in a wide strip along the west coast region. It pushes its way right into the center of the Sahara, and broadens out into the Ahaggar highlands. Another wedge runs north from Darfur into the Tibesti country, while the same characteristics prevail over most of the northeast horn of Africa. On the other side of Africa we find a strip of true desert along the west coast from the Coanza to the Orange River. This spreads out on the south of the Zambezi. Over about two-thirds of South Africa, and extending well to the south of the Orange River, we have the scrub or steppe characteristics known in the Cape region as the Karroo.

Thus, then, in Africa, we have at least 2,000,000 square miles of true desert, and probably about a similar area of land at a stage above the desert, varying from the poorest scrub to land that may at some time of the year yield a fair amount of grass with only the natural moisture that may fall to its share. This, of course, is a general statement, for it is wholly impossible to draw any hard-and-fast line between absolutely good and absolutely bad land; nor is there any mathematical line between tropical and non-tropical regions. We find oases of verdure in the most desert regions, and

desert areas surrounded by exuberant vegetation. If we compare the distribution of surface with the distribution of rainfall, we cannot but be struck with the very close relations that exist between the two factors. Indeed, this factor of rainfall influences other factors in a remarkable way, not only in Africa, but all over the world. In South Australia every inch of rain above a certain quantity may, it has been calculated, be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to the wheat farmer.

Indirectly also rainfall influences the distribution of animals; for graminivorous animals go where they find the most abundant food, and the carnivorous follow in their train. The distribution of the larger carnivores and of venomous animals is of no little practical importance, for they constitute a certain amount of danger to the opening up of the continent by Europeans; but it is an element which may for practical purposes be neglected. Indeed, the existence of the larger animals, whatever order they belong to, may actually promote the opening up of the continent, seeing that they attract the sportsman, who may act as pioneer for the trader and the missionary. But from the commercial point of view the most important of African animals is no doubt the elephant, which is, in a general way, found from the edge of the northern desert region to below the Zambezi. From the latter region it is rapidly retiring northward. It used to be found quite near the south coast, but in the Cape Colony proper it is now only found in a preserve. Rarely now is the elephant found near any coast, and there can be little doubt that, unless its destruction is placed under stringent regulation, the existence of this animal will soon be confined to the most inaccessible regions. As might be expected, the elephant is found to be most abundant in the central region of plentiful rainfall and exuberant vegetation; and, in reckoning up the commercial assets of Africa, it must be taken into account.

Much more important for the development of Africa than the distribution of animal life on its surface is the extent to which minerals are found beneath it. Until the geology of the continent is more completely worked out, only the vaguest statements can be made on the subject. Gold was found in Africa even in remote times, and the gold mines of Mashonaland and Manika, so prominent in our day, were worked long before the Portuguese touched the shores of the continent, and the massive ruins found scattered over that region are evidence enough of the fact. That gold exists

in great abundance not only in that region but over much of the area south of the Zambezi, in the west as in the east, there can be little doubt. North of the Zambezi, in the Lake Nyasa region, it is also found. The Gold Coast deserves its name; but unfortunately the climate is a great obstacle to the working of the mines. Inland from the Red Sea, on the east of Nubia and down by Harrar, it is also found, and was probably worked there in the old Egyptian times. Silver is also found there, and both gold and silver in Abyssinia. Gold has been worked in Senegambia, and silver in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis. In some of the last-mentioned places these precious metals may not be abundant, still it may pay to work them. So, far, then, the most coveted of all metals seems to exist in the greatest abundance on the south of the Zambezi.

Still farther south, in Mashonaland, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Cape, we have reason to believe there is a fair supply of coal. But so far Africa can hardly be said to boast of its coal supply, while iron, and that of a very fine quality, is fairly abundant in several regions, and long has been worked by the natives. In the Transvaal, on the west of Lake Nyasa, to the west of the Upper Zambezi, in Tibesti, in Abyssinia and Darfur, in the Victoria Nyanza region, and along the shores of Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, this useful metal is found in remarkable quantities. Copper also is found in the Transvaal, and in great abundance on the south of the Orange River, in Damaraland, and in Katanga, west of Lake Bangeweolo. It is believed also to exist in quantity in the Congo region, in Algeria, Morocco, and possibly in Darfur. Nor must we overlook the diamonds of Kimberley. But as yet we know too little of Africa to be able to say with any confidence what are its mineral riches. And when they are found, their mercantile value will depend upon their accessibility.

Indeed this accessibility is the important factor which must be taken into account in estimating the value to humanity of this peculiar continent. We have already seen that there are no ocean highways into the heart of Africa. Its coast-line is nearly as monotonously regular as a circle. Natural harbours are few and far between. Still, that is a difficulty which engineering science can overcome if the interior itself were easily accessible. But we have seen that the waterways, which look so magnificent on the map, and which lead into the heart of the continent, are deceptive in their appearance. We have seen that the four

great rivers of Africa, in making their way down from the plateau to the coast, are all more or less broken by cataracts. The cataracts of the Nile are not so bad that they may not be overcome, and as a waterway it is fairly useful, and might be more so if the countries to which it gives access were under moderately good government.



However, the railroad that runs along its side for many miles is a much more important trade-route than the river itself. Fortunately the Niger presents some hundreds of miles of fairly clear waterway, though its mouths are troublesome, and shallows and sandbanks have to be avoided. Its great tributary, the Benué, is navigable by small steamers for hundreds of miles, at least in the wet season; and, as it goes almost direct east, it leads into the heart of the continent. These two rivers run through one of the richest

regions of tropical Africa. The Congo, we have seen, after some 150 miles of splendid waterway, suited for vessels of considerable size, is barred by 200 miles of rapids, above which there is a clear 1000 miles of navigable river; while some of its great tributaries, north and south, add hundreds of miles of fair routes. The railroad now being constructed past the rapids will, if ever it is completed, render this one of the finest trade-routes in Central Africa. As for the Zambezi, if once its fickle mouths are passed, steamers of moderate size may go up, during part of the year, as far as the Kebrabasa rapids (200 miles), though shoals must be avoided; above that point it is only adapted to canoes. The Shiré tributary, which leads into Lake Nyasa, though also interrupted by rapids, is navigable for small steamers. Thus all these apparently great rivers have defects more or less serious, decreasing their value as highways to the interior. The Niger is the freest, and, with suitable roads when needed, will suffice for the trade of the region for a long time. The same may be said of the Congo now that the railroad is built, or in the process of completion. What is more doubtful is whether the traffic over the line will for a long time be sufficient to make the railroad pay.

Except in those parts where Europeans have been settled for some time, that is, on the north and south borders, there are no roads in Africa worthy of the name—none on which any large traffic could be conducted. Large areas, it is true, in the center of the continent are so level that even wheeled vehicles could be run over the land; but that also would not amount to much in the way of commerce. Africa is, however, covered with a network of roads of a kind—native paths leading from village to village, formed by the naked feet of many generations of villagers, but only broad enough to admit of single file. Beasts of burden are of course scarcely available on such tracks, and, as a matter of fact, over the great part of Africa the native himself is the only beast of burden; under such conditions no serious commerce is possible, and the system of wholesale slavery almost inevitable. In North Africa, all over the desert, in Egypt, and in the Sudan states, of course, the camel is found, by whose aid alone has it been possible to create highways across the desert. In Somaliland there is a fine breed of donkeys, and there camels are also largely used. In the Sudan states the horse has been introduced, but mainly for riding purposes. Where Europeans are largely settled no doubt modern

means of locomotion are found, but the state of things described is rather of Africa in what we may call its natural condition, before the modern European invasion began. It seems strange that the natives have never attempted to utilize the African elephant as the Indian has done its Asiatic congener. There is some evidence that in the Roman times the elephant was used for fighting and carrying purposes, but his domestication never seems to have become general on the continent. There is a prevalent opinion that the African elephant never can be subdued to the uses of humanity; but no serious experiments in recent times have yet been made. There is some reason to hope that, now that Europe has taken the continent in hand, something will be done to discover whether this native force cannot really be utilized. But in time, no doubt, every region likely to yield results to commerce will be tapped by railroads. To the south of the Zambezi a network is being rapidly constructed. The same may be said of Algeria and Tunis. In both the British and German spheres in East Africa there are indications that in no long time the interior will be accessible partly by railroads and partly by roads.

In dealing with the conditions of Africa, without doubt the most important factor to be met with on the surface of the continent is the native himself, both from the point of view of science and of the economical development of the continent. It is quite impossible to deal here with the ethnology of Africa, vastly interesting as it is. Though language is not always a safe guide to ethnical affinities, still, on the whole, in Africa it presents us with a very important key to the great divisions of its population. To the superficial observer all Africans seem at first very much alike; in the same way, no doubt, to the African all Europeans, all whites indeed, have a family resemblance. Color has much to do with this. But while in Africa, as among the American Indians, and as among a large part of the population of Central Asia, there is a general continental type, there is in reality great variety, from the light-brown, regular-featured Berber in the north to the yellow, ugly Hottentot in the south. In a general way the northern and northeastern part of the continent is given up mostly to people of Semitic and Hamitic stocks. As we approach the Central Sudan this merges into the true negro type, which prevails over the whole of the Niger basin down through Senegambia and along the Gold Coast, east-southeast to the region

around the Victoria Nyanza, throwing a broad wedge northward into the Tibbu country of Sahara. Just where the continent begins to narrow, and we touch upon the Congo basin, we meet with what is known as the Bantu-speaking stock, with its various subdivisions, of which the Zulu may be taken as a high type. Scattered among both Negroes and Bantus are found remnants of various others types. Round about the great lakes the ruling people are really Hamitic. In many places over the center of Africa pygmy tribes are met with, remains probably of an aboriginal race who may have had the continent to themselves long before Hamities, Negroes, and Bantus invaded it from Asia, and to whom the Bushmen may be allied. The Hottentots also seem to be a very early people, quite unlike any other African race. The Fulah people, a superior race who prevail in the Central and Western Sudan, differ in many respects from other African races. These are the main distinctions of race-types in Africa so far as linguistic characteristics go. But from the point of view of the exploration of Africa, and the development of its resources by Europeans, the important question with regard to the natives is—Will they be a help or a hindrance? On other continents, in North America, in Australia, the question has been solved by practically getting rid of the natives altogether. In Africa this cannot be done, any more than in India, even if conceived to be to the interest of progress to do so. However it may be in the very remote future, at present little can be accomplished in Central Africa without the help of the natives. The natives of Africa, except in the more intensely Moslemized parts in the north, can never be said to have any serious hindrance to exploration. They are themselves in many parts very keen traders. Nearly the whole of North Africa (except Abyssinia) is Mohammedan, and that tells in two ways. It certainly raises the native in the scale of civilization; at the same time it is apt to create a fanatical aversion to European intercourse. That has been the great obstacle in the Central Sudan, in Sokoto, Kanem, Wadai, and neighboring states which are yet practically independent. France has overcome it in Tunis and Algeria; it is dormant in Egypt; in the old Egyptian Sudan it is rampant among the Mahdists and Senussites; in Morocco it is still a barrier to free intercourse. The people of North Africa, Moslem or other, are fairly industrious, and if once their enmity were overcome they might coöperate very effectively with Europeans.

For the future development of Africa it is, however, with the Negroes and Bantus we shall have mainly to reckon. Without labor we cannot develop the continent. We are often told that the Negro is a lazy being, who never will be trained to habits of industry. But as a universal statement facts belie that assertion. When he can pick up his living with a minimum of exertion, he will do so—that is savage nature. But in South Africa, in the Cape, the Transvaal, Natal, West Africa, and elsewhere, he does work, and that often with great steadiness and regularity. On some of the plantations of the Germans inland from Zanzibar, before the recent troubles, the people came quite willingly to work, induced to do so by the wages offered. At the same time, it must be admitted that voluntary hard work is not congenial to a people who, for ages, have been accustomed to do no more than they were forced to do. It may be possible, by judicious treatment, to lead the natives on to industrious habits; but we must not expect, in this and other matters, to force them in a generation or two up to a stage which it has taken us 2000 years to reach. Meantime, in Cape Colony and Natal it has been found necessary to introduce labor from India and the Malay Archipelago.

There are many questions suggested by the consideration of this subject of the natives of Africa into which we cannot here enter. With the intervention of European powers, the cessation of native wars, and the suppression of slave-raiding, the native population is bound to increase. According to the estimate of Ravenstein, one of the most competent authorities, the total population of Africa does not exceed 130,000,000, *i. e.*, only about ten to a square mile, though other authorities estimate it at 200,000,000. But the continent, comparatively poor as it is, is capable of sustaining a much larger population.

If the European occupation and exploitation of the continent continues, as it is almost bound to do, something must be done with and for the natives. It is to be feared that, so far, Christian missions have not had the effect hoped for. But better methods are being introduced. The great thing is to remember that these natives have a long leeway to make up; that violent and sudden interference with old-established domestic institutions will do no good; that tact and firmness and just treatment will accomplish a great deal; and that a Negro cannot by any amount of civilizing influences be evolved into a European.

What, then, is the practical result of our inquiry, with special reference to the economical value of Africa? Within what limits is it likely to be of utility, not only to the sparse indigenous population, but to humanity at large, and to Europe in particular? The obstacles which have hitherto kept it behind all the other continents will always have more or less weight; but they are obstacles which are by no means invincible. Let us first take the central zone, tropical Africa, two-thirds of the continent, which has been the chief field of the recent scramble. Most of the natural riches of the continent are concentrated in this region. Even in gold and silver, in copper and in iron, it seems to have fairly abundant stores. The animal product, ivory, comes mainly from this region. Here we meet with the great forests and a wealth of vegetation of all kinds, yielding such natural products as rubber, cocoanut and palm oils, ground-nuts, valuable seeds of various kinds, fibers, gums, and many other natural products of commercial value. We know from actual experiments that much of this area is well adapted to such cultivable products as rice and maize, tobacco and coffee, indigo and cotton. Bananas and other tropical and subtropical fruits grow in abundance, or could be cultivated to any extent. In many districts cattle are raised in enormous numbers, and under skilled direction could be increased and improved in quality, both for food purposes and for their hides. Goats are common, and in the Central Sudan sheep are raised. About the fertility of the soil, over at least one-half of the area, there can be no doubt. Thus it is evident that if we simply confined ourselves to the natural products of Central Africa, and utilized them judiciously, so as not to exhaust them, a fair commerce could be created. Still the mere natural animal and vegetable products of a tropical country could never yield a trade of great dimensions: the demand is too limited, granted that the supply is abundant. The common food products, the common textiles—corn of all kinds, cotton, wool, hemp—these with the useful minerals form the vast bulk of commerce of our own and every other country. At present it is estimated that the total exports of the whole of Central Africa by the east and west coasts do not amount to more than $100,000,000 annually. Even this is considered by some authorities an excessive estimate; yet it is a great deal less than the export trade of Canada alone. If we could add to this the cultivation, on a large scale, of some of the useful products referred to above, and if these could compete

favorably with similar products from other parts of the world, the commercial value of Africa would be greatly increased. Moreover, as the population increased, as colonization advanced and wants multiplied, the native market itself might become of increasing importance.

What, then, is wanted to develop the natural resources of Africa, and utilize the capabilities of its soil? First of all, we must have easy and cheap means of communication if a great export and import trade is to be developed. There may be the finest cattle, rice, corn, tobacco, tea, coffee, in the world, around Tanganyika, Albert Nyanza, Victoria Nyanza, Nyasa; but if the produce can only be brought to the coast on men's or even elephants' backs, it would not have a chance of success. Of course, if the river-navigation were improved, if the impassable sections of the Congo and the Niger, the Nile and the Zambezi, were bridged by railroads, it would greatly improve the prospects of success. Still more, if there were direct communication by rail from the heart of the continent. But this is a prospect of the distant future. In that future the population of the world, at its present rate, will have vastly increased, and increased supplies of the common necessaries of life will be required. Meantime, in addition to making the best of the native products, we can do little more than experiment, and, as a matter of fact, experiments are being made in various quarters. Until, however, the transport question of products in bulk has been solved, the central regions of Africa, though fertile, are practically useless. But in the meantime experiments should be made universally. We want to know what can be made of the vast plateau region round the great lakes, and of the low countries which they dominate. The rivalry among the so-called European spheres in Africa is so great that in a very few years we must have a much more precise idea than we have now of what can be made of this whole region.

It is here, however, that the importance of the consideration already discussed becomes apparent; if the way were quite clear, otherwise, if means of communication were all that could be wished, through what human agency is the work to be carried on? So far as our present knowledge goes, the native is absolutely indispensable to the development of tropical Africa. Our somewhat scanty experience tends to prove that Europeans, even southern Europeans, could not do the hard daily work that is required—in the forest, in

the field, in plantations, in mines—to render Central Africa of commercial value. It is not only the malaria that constantly broods over the coast and the low-lying river-courses, and is set at liberty to poison the atmosphere when the rotting soil is stirred; the mere heat of the tropics seems to incapacitate Europeans for work of this kind. If, then, the native cannot be employed in this direction, labor must be introduced from regions the natives of which could be readily acclimatized. But experience proves, as has been said, that there is no reason completely to despair of the African native; that in time he may take to fairly regular habits of industry.

But what about the white man himself? Apart altogether from the question of hard manual daily labor, can he settle in Central Africa in any great numbers? The prevailing belief on the subject has been already referred to; but even after obtaining all the information possible from men who have had experience in various parts of Africa, the data which we possess on the subject are extremely scanty. We find on the Nyasa-Tanganyika plateau missionaries and traders living with their wives and children; but the experiment has not been tried long enough to admit of any conclusion being drawn. Emin Pasha lived in the equatorial province for twelve years; so did Mackay, the missionary, in Uganda; and there are other isolated instances of the same kind. But what is wanted is a thorough investigation of the whole subject of European residence in tropical countries, based on existing data, and on data to be collected in the future from Central Africa. We know absolutely that over nearly the whole of the west coast of tropical Africa a residence of only two years is risky, and it is so too over much of the east coast. With regard to the higher lands in the center, the general belief is that a healthy and vigorous human race, say a race of our own type, could not be reared for many successive generations even on the high plateaus of Central Africa. The experiment with Southern Europeans—Italians, Greeks, Spanish, Maltese, Portuguese—has never been tried on sufficiently great a scale to admit of safe conclusions being drawn. Meanwhile the problem is not of immediate moment. It would be madness to encourage colonization in the true sense of the term in Central Africa at present. If the continent is to be developed, Europeans must go and fix themselves at various favorable points in the center, but they must go as unattached pioneers, [illegible] to the north and the south of the continent.

The Sahara we need not discuss. There is plenty of water underneath its inhospitable sands. On the borders of Algeria that water is being tapped with great success, and hundreds of thousands of date-trees are yielding profitable results; but the demand for dates is not such as to encourage their cultivation over 2,000,000 square miles. Under French domination, especially if railways are constructed across the desert, no doubt oases will be created at intervals, but the Sahara is likely to remain much as it is until a very remote future. The grass-lands which fringe its southern border and go on to the fertile Central Sudan might no doubt be turned to good account for cattle and sheep, and in time will be. With regard to the countries along the Mediterranean border, certainly much of the Tripoli coast region is not much better than desert; but Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, along the coast-lands, and the lower slopes of the Atlas and the valleys among the mountains, notwithstanding the occasional lack of rainfall, are all of distinct value, both from the point of view of commerce and colonization. With regard to European colonization, a communication on the subject, received from Sir Lambert Playfair, British representative in Algeria, may be quoted; it may be held as applying to all Mediterranean countries:

"I think it would be almost impossible for any Anglo-Saxons to settle here as actual laborers. They could work in agricultural pursuits during the winter months as well as, or better than, in England, but they would never stand the heat of summer, except perhaps in a few very favored localities. As employers of labor, of course, the case is different, and anyone could live and prosper here. Marshal MacMahon made the experiment; he got out a colony of Irish, men, women, and children, but they were a complete failure; many died and the remainder had to be sent home very soon. They suffered from fever, sunstroke, and general demoralization. With regard to the Latin races it is quite different; but for them colonization in this country would be at a standstill. The Italians in the east and the Spaniards in the west are the most useful classes of the population. With them may be classed Maltese and natives of the south of France. Other Mediterranean nations are not represented here. It is quite wonderful to see how the Spanish alfa-gatherers—men, women, and children—support the alternations of great cold and intense heat on the high plateaus, with hardly any shelter; an English laborer working there in sum-

mer would be dead in a week. As a general rule, you may safely say that natives of northern Europe cannot support the climate of North Africa as actual laborers, and only moderately well as employers of labor."

This, of course, applies with very much greater force to Central Africa. Still, even in North Africa, the natives themselves, the Arab and Jew population, can never be dispensed with, and must coöperate with the Europeans in developing the countries. Iron abounds, silver is found, cereals, vines, tobacco, olives, and other products are extensively grown, and no doubt there is ample room for industrial development in all these countries, including Morocco. There is no reason why Greeks and other southern Europeans could not settle with their families in Egypt; but, so far as actual work goes, Egypt is not for the European. Along the region watered by the Nile there is no doubt that Egypt is capable of much greater development than she has yet attained.

With regard to South Africa—that is to say, Africa south of the Zambezi—here we find that the western half, and the south away from the coast, have but a scanty rainfall. The natural vegetable products are of but poor account; even ivory is now obtained in comparatively insignificant quantity. But to balance this, it is the richest region in all Africa for minerals. It is one of the most productive gold regions—if not absolutely the most productive—in the world. The return of the output of gold from November, 1891, to June, 1900, was 125,662 ounces. It is through its gold that Australia has been able to advance so rapidly in all directions; so it is likely to be in South Africa, especially in attracting a large and vigorous white population. The diamonds of South Africa are well known, and its coal, its iron, its copper, are natural riches of high importance. Notwithstanding the meagerness of its rainfall, the southern half of the region has proved a fine field for sheep and cattle raising, not to mention ostrich-farming. The inhabitants have already found out methods of storing the rain which does fall, and no doubt they will find means of tapping the underground water supply. The country may grow all the corn it requires for its own wants, though it may never have much to spare for export. It is a splendid vine region, and both tea and sugar can be grown successfully in some parts. In other parts well to the north, where the water-supply is abundant, the general altitude is so great that it is hoped that in time it may

become the home of hundreds of thousands of people of European origin. Even in the subtropical parts, away from the low-lying regions and the river-beds, Europeans seem to prosper. It is not, therefore, surprising to find that South Africa already sustains a white population of considerably over 500,000, and that it has been colonized by generations of Europeans, who thrive as well as they do at home. While the native cannot, of course, be compared to the English mechanic or peasant or navvy, he still works well enough in his own way, while thousands of Malays and Indian coolies have been imported. South Africa, in short, is the one region in which we can say with confidence that European colonization, in the fullest sense of the term, is possible. It does an annual trade amounting to over $200,000,000.

It is tropical Africa, because it constitutes the bulk of the continent, which forms the great problem of the future to be faced by those European nations which have taken the destinies of Africa upon their shoulders; and what is true of that applies more or less even to the small sections outside of the tropics. Had Africa been in the same geographical position as North America, or even Australia, the problem would have been simple enough; it is to be feared it would have been solved by getting rid of the natives altogether. It may be that in the far future science may discover some means of acclimatizing Europeans in tropical Africa, but so far as our present knowledge goes, that is impossible. Men and even women may with due precautions live in tropical Africa for years, but sooner or later they must return to recruit their exhausted energies in their native air. All evidence seems to indicate that the colonization of Central Africa by whites is impossible: that means, of course, that if the resources of the continent are to be developed, it must be by the help of the natives. By themselves it does not seem at all probable that the natives could ever do more than live from hand to mouth, or would ever do more work than absolute necessity compelled them to do. If, then, anything is to be made of Central Africa, and of its natural resources—mineral, vegetable, and animal—and if the capabilities of its soil are to be turned to good account, it must be done by the natives under the guidance of others who have reached a higher stage of civilization than they have.

The subject is so important that we may be pardoned for referring to it once again in this concluding chapter. It is often said,

although there are undoubted instances of African natives being induced to undertake hard work, for wages, of their own free will, that the African native never will work unless forced to do so. Well, there are various kinds of force; slavery is not the only form of compulsion that can be brought to bear on humanity. How far force, even of the most gentle kind, may be used for the ostensible good of a people at the stage of development of the African is too delicate a question to discuss here. The compulsion exercised by the Dutch in their East India colonies has certainly led to good results for all concerned. Arab domination in Africa is not in the least desirable; but undoubtedly the Arabs on the Middle Congo, before they were ejected by the Belgians, had greatly changed the face of the country and elevated the condition of their retainers by sheer force of example. Many Arabs had settled in the Middle and Upper Congo region; they had sown fields of rice, planted bananas and other trees, built themselves good houses, and otherwise shown their followers how to live in comfort. The latter were not slow to imitate their masters, and several towns of comparatively good houses had grown up, and large areas been brought under cultivation. The natives, who a few years ago lived in the wildest savagery, come hundreds of miles voluntarily to beg for work in these plantations. Many of them have been trained to various trades; in this region a church, designed by a Scotch missionary, was built entirely by the natives under a system of free labor. The missionary and his colleagues taught the natives to make bricks, burn lime, and hew timber. All the materials were found on the spot, except glass internal fittings, and some portion of the roofing; and they were put together, brick upon brick, by the natives themselves, free laborers under white superintendence. Here there is not the least suspicion of compulsion; and the result is wonderful, though certainly exceptional.

There is one thing upon which all the powers, it is hoped, are now at least theoretically agreed, and that is, that slave-raiding and slave-export must be put down. If Africa is ever to be governed and utilized, there is no doubt that the slave-trade is doomed, and that on the east coast it will soon be as nearly extinct as it is on the west. But rural domestic slavery is another thing; it will only vanish when European nations will not permit the districts in which they are interested to be denuded of labor in order to supply slaves to work elsewhere, and when the advantage of free labor comes

home to the native (who must before then rise degrees higher in the scale of civilization than he is now). The act passed by the Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference in 1890-1891, and signed by all the leading powers, as well as those having an interest in Africa, has for its object the suppression of slave-raiding, the control over arms, and the stoppage of the importation of spirituous drinks. The obligations imposed upon the powers are very serious, and if faithfully and unitedly carried out would soon accomplish the object of the act. We give the leading provisions of the act as summarized by P. L. M'Dermott in his excellent work on "British East Africa":

On September 17, 1888, the Marquis of Salisbury addressed a dispatch to Lord Vivian, the British Ambassador at Brussels, suggesting that the King of the Belgians should take the initiative in inviting a conference of the powers at Brussels to concert measures for the "gradual suppression of the slave-trade on the continent of Africa, and the immediate closing of all the external markets which it supplies." After a sketch of the present state of the sea-borne slave-trade, the markets supplied by it, and the difficulties encountered in clearing the seas of the traffic, Lord Salisbury represented that, while the British Government would cheerfully continue "to bear the burden of further measures to effect the common object," they felt that the altered political conditions of the African seaboard now called for united action on the part of the powers responsible for its control, with a view to closing the foreign slave-markets and discouraging the internal slave-hunts.

The conference assembled at Brussels in November, 1889, and continued its sitting till July 2, 1890, when a general act was agreed to, embodying the conclusions of their deliberations. The conferring powers, "equally animated," in the words of the preamble, "by the firm intention of putting an end to the crimes and devastations engendered by the traffic in African slaves, protecting effectively the aboriginal populations of Africa, and ensuring for that vast continent the benefits of peace and civilization," declared that the most effective means for counteracting the slave-trade in the interior of Africa are the following:

1. Progressive organization of the administrative, judicial, religious, and military services in the African territories placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of civilized nations.

2. Gradual establishment in the interior, by the powers to which the territories are subject, of strongly occupied stations in

such a way as to make their protective or repressive action effectively felt in the territories devastated by slave-hunting.

3. Construction of roads, and in particular of railroads, connecting the advanced stations with the coast, and permitting easy access to the inland waters, and to such of the upper courses of the rivers and streams as are broken by rapids and cataracts, in view of substituting economical and rapid means of transport for the present means of carriage by men.

4. Establishment of steamboats on the inland navigable waters and on the lakes, supported by fortified posts established on the banks.

5. Establishment of telegraphic lines, ensuring the communication of posts and stations with the coast and with the administrative centers.

6. Organization of expeditions and flying columns to keep up the communication of the stations with each other and with the coast, to support repressive action, and to ensure the security of high-roads.

7. Restriction of the importation of firearms, at least of modern pattern, and of ammunition, throughout the entire extent of the territories infected by the slave-trade.

The powers were authorized by Article IV. to delegate their engagements under the act to chartered companies, while themselves, however, remaining "directly responsible for the engagements which they contract by the present Act," and guaranteeing the execution thereof. Great Britain had already for many years watched the maritime slave-traffic with her cruisers at a considerable annual expense; but as Lord Salisbury confessed in his dispatch suggesting the conference, the policing of the high seas and coast waters had proved to be of but little efficacy in suppressing the slave-trade. The primary object of the conference was to direct measures of repression and extinction against the evil at its sources in the interior, by the adoption of as many of the means enumerated as were practicable. Thus the duty imposed on Great Britain is to open up her African sphere in such a way as to render slave-raiding not only impossible, but unprofitable. It remains to be seen how far she will do her duty in this respect.

With the help of the natives, then, what could be made of Africa? At present, Africa occupies a poor place in the commerce of the world. Its total exports hardly exceed $300,000,000. India

alone, covering only 1,500,000 square miles, exports to the value of $450,000,000. Of the African $300,000,000 some two-thirds come from the Mediterranean states and Egypt on the one side, and South Africa on the other, leaving only one-third for the whole of the center of the continent. Surely more could be made of it than this. Even if its oil, and its gums, and its rubber, and other natural vegetable products were developed as they might be, they would yield far more to commerce. At present the world is fairly well supplied with such products from other quarters; the time will come, however, as population grows, when the world will require additional fields for food and other supplies. Barren and dry as much of Central Africa is, there is ample space for cultivation of various kinds, and for the raising of sheep and cattle. Grain and cotton, indigo and tea, and tobacco, coffee, and sugar, are all products adapted to various parts of Central Africa. We can do without drawing upon Africa for these things at present, but the time will come when she must become one of the feeding-grounds of the world. Moreover, with the spread of European domination, native wars must cease, and slave-trading be abolished, and so the population is bound to increase. Surely if India, on 1,500,000 square miles, can sustain 300,000,000 of people, Africa, on 11,500,000, might well be the home of three times its present population; and we cannot doubt that if the African were as industrious as the native Indian his continent would bear a very different aspect from that which it does at present.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

THE PARTITION OF AFRICA

The following table has been compiled (in round numbers) from the Statesman's Year Book. The figures relating to population represent in most cases the roughest of estimates; and, in some places, are derived from censuses, which, though the most recent, are some years old:

	Area: Square Miles.	Population.
BRITISH AFRICA:		
West Africa:		
Gambia	4,500	90,000
Sierra Leone	34,000	1,076,000
Gold Coast	71,300	1,500,000
Lagos	29,000	1,500,000
Nigeria	400,000	25,000,000
South and Central Africa:		
Cape Colony and dependencies	277,000	2,410,000
Natal	35,000	1,000,000
Orange River Colony	50,000	387,000
Transvaal Colony	120,000	1,270,000
Basutoland	10,300	264,000
Bechuanaland Protectorate	213,000	200,000
Rhodesia	380,000	1,200,000
British Central Africa Protectorate	42,200	1,000,000
East Africa:		
Zanzibar and Pemba	1,000	200,000
British East Africa Protectorate	350,000	4,000,000
Uganda Protectorate	80,000	4,000,000
Somaliland	60,000	300,000
Islands:		
Sokotra	1,380	12,000
Mauritius and dependencies	1,100	380,000
St. Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha	130	10,000
FRENCH AFRICA:		
Algeria	184,500	4,740,000
Tunis	51,000	1,000,000
Western Sahara	1,544,000	2,550,000
Senegal	806,000	4,523,000
Senegambia and Niger	210,000	3,000,000
French Guinea	95,000	2,200,000
Ivory Coast	110,000	2,000,000
Dahomey	60,000	1,000,000
Congo	450,000	10,000,000

	Area: Square Miles	Population
FRENCH AFRICA, *continued:*		
Somali Coast and dependencies...	12,000	50,000
Reunion	900	173,000
Madagascar and Islands.....	228,600	2,560,000
GERMAN AFRICA:		
(Cameroons) Kamerun.....	191,100	3,500,000
Togoland	33,700	1,500,000
Southwest Africa.....	322,450	200,000
East Africa	384,200	7,000,000
PORTUGUESE AFRICA:		
Angola	485,000	4,120,000
East Africa.....	301,000	3,120,000
Guinea.....	4,440	820,000
St. Thomé and Principé.....	360	42,100
Cape Verde Islands.....	1,480	147,400
SPANISH AFRICA:		
Rio de Oro and Adrar.....	70,000	130,000
Rio Muni and Cape San Juan....	9,000	140,000
Fernando Po, Annabon, Corisco, Elobey, San Juan.....	850	23,700
ITALIAN AFRICA:		
Eritrea	88,500	450,000
Somaliland	100,000	400,000
NOMINALLY TURKISH AFRICA:		
Egypt, etc.....	400,000	1,000,000
Egyptian Sudan.....	950,000	2,000,000
Tripoli, Barca, Fezzan.....	400,000	1,000,000
INDEPENDENT, OR NOMINALLY SO:		
Abyssinia	150,000	3,500,000
Congo Free State.....	900,000	30,000,000
Liberia	35,000	2,000,000
Morocco.....	219,000	5,000,000

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
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
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Arabian Desert
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