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MATHEWS
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

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PREFACE TO THE ENLARGED EDITION

In the present edition of *The French Revolution—a Sketch* I have rearranged the material descriptive of the pre-revolutionary period, and have somewhat developed the treatment of the economic forces which helped bring about the Revolution. The section dealing with the work of the Committee of Public Safety has also been revised in order to embody certain conclusions reached by specialists in the field. At various other points the older editions of the book have been modified in the light of recent literature. The most important change in the volume, however, is the addition of an entire new Part, dealing with the Napoleonic period as a phase of the history of the revolution.

It no longer seems to me possible to follow my plan in the original edition of the volume and to regard the Revolution as having closed with the appointment of the Directory. The world has of late been given many lessons in revolution as well as in the influence of socialized ideas, the rise of military efficiency, the might of unified national campaigns, and the fatal power of imperialism. Living as we do in an epoch resembling those which followed as well as preceded the French Revolution, we are able to see that event in its true perspective. The career of Napoleon now appears to be more than the successor of that social change which began so many years before the meeting of the States General. It was the continuation of that change. We have in the French Revolution not only national reconstruction, but also a well-defined at-

tempt on the part of the French, first through the Convention and then through Napoleon, to project their new liberties to the continent of Europe. Napoleon was confessedly a great general and a great administrator. There are innumerable volumes dealing exhaustively with him as a subject of biographical investigation. But from the point of view of the student of social history, his chief significance lies in his relationship to the new revolutionary equalities enjoyed by the French, his attempt to establish such equalities in conquered territory by coercion, his abandonment of the idealism of the new social mood, his consequent inability to offset the rising tide of nationalism and reaction. He was thus a child, a preserver and extender of the revolution within France. He did not so much originate as further civic equality and practically all the broad lines of his policy can be traced back to the Convention. His influence in Europe except as dependent upon the forces of revolutionary idealism can easily be exaggerated. Thus, to be understood, his career must be regarded as integrally a part of that great period of social change which we call the French Revolution. With this conviction I have not undertaken to give an account of Napoleon's career except as it stands related to the new social forces released by the Revolution. In consequence many interesting biographical details, as well as the usual full description of military campaigns, are omitted. The unit of interest is not an individual, but the group action—the social change from which Napoleon sprang, which he exploited, and to which he finally succumbed. Such an integration of his influence into the major history of the Revolution has led to a very brief treatment of certain aspects of his career, especially of the Hundred Days. Real history is something more than events. To understand truly the social forces, to estimate their psychological

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THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

PART I

FRANCE AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY

- I. The Absolute Monarchy in France: 1. Its Rise through the Centralization of Feudal France; 2. The Councils, Parlements, and the King; 3. The Provincial Administration, (a) the Provinces, (b) the Intendances, (c) the Intendants. II. The Extent of Centralization. III. The Capital and the Nation. IV. The Decay of Governmental Efficiency.

When Louis XVI. came to the throne of France, May 10, 1774, it was universally believed that the clumsy, conscientious, stupid young man and his beautiful wife were to introduce a period of national prosperity such as France had not known since the earlier days of Louis XIV. In part these hopes were realized; for the nation was more prosperous under Louis XVI than under Louis XV., or, indeed, than it had been during the last third of the long reign of Louis XIV. That they were not more fully realized, and that within fifteen years radical reform of every sort was demanded for the very existence

of France, was due to the structure of French society and the organization of the French state; perhaps as much as anything, to the irresponsible monarchy which the young king inherited.

To understand the French monarchy, one needs to begin one's study at the time that Louis XI. broke the military power of the nobles by his defeat of Charles Bold. From that time the royal power grew rapidly. The Reformation, it is true, increased the political influence of the nobles, and for a time it looked there might be two states in France, one Protestant the other Catholic. But Henry IV., and after him lieu and Mazarin, annihilated the power of the nobles and built upon its ruins an absolute monarchy. Although France remained broken up into great feudal estates, their lords had grown so subservient as to have become what Carlyle contemptuously calls them, "gilt pasteboard caryatids of the throne." By the seventeenth century France had become the one strongly centralized—it would almost be possible to say, the one modern—state in Europe. It was, in fact, the political marvel of the day. It alone of all the European powers had emerged more resplendent from the awful century and a half succeeding the Protestant movement in Germany. It was not only leader in thought, in art, in manners; it was practically dictator in European politics. The Peace of Westphalia, which in 1648 brought to a close the Thirty Years' War, was to all intents and purposes a French document, announcing that Louis XIV. proposed to control the policy of every continental state. It is true such pretensions could not and did not long endure, and after the victories of William of Orange, the Duke of Marlborough, and Prince Eugene, and even after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), the Grand Monarch's

influence had waned in international affairs. But so thoroughly had the work of Richelieu and Mazarin been done that the monarchy itself was no loser by national misfortune. It even grew the more absolute, and France the more unified. And this in the very century in which Germany had barely missed committing suicide in the Thirty Years' War, and England had been rent in twain by Roundhead and Cavalier! The records of the time show clearly enough that the French monarchy was the envy of European kings. And well it might have been in the eyes of a ruler like Charles I. of England. "*L'état, c'est moi*"—"The state? 'Tis I!"—is the definition legend makes Louis XIV.¹ give of France, and there is no more symbolical picture than that of the young "Sun King" as with the equivalent of these words on his lips he walked into the meeting of the Parlement of Paris, and, with riding-boots on his feet and riding-whip in his hand, addressed the kneeling commoners. The regency of Orleans and the reign of Louis XV., though fatal to the morals of the court, none the less increased the absolutism of the king. As all power belonged to the monarch, so all property. Montesquieu saw in monarchy a despotism limited only by the sale of public offices. Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth century, classes France with Turkey. The Sorbonne, the great theological court of the nation, said that all the property of his subjects belonged to the king, and that in taking it he took simply what was his own. The one remaining check upon his action, the High Court of Paris (*Parlement de Paris*), was suppressed during the last years of Louis XV., and replaced by a most unpopular new court, named after the minister who brought it into existence, the Court (*Parlement*) of

¹ Louis did not use these words, but made a short speech to the same effect. See Fournier, *L'Esprit dans l'Histoire*.

influence had waned in international affairs. But so thoroughly had the work of Richelieu and Mazarin been done that the monarchy itself was no loser by national misfortune. It even grew the more absolute, and France the more unified. And this in the very century in which Germany had barely missed committing suicide in the Thirty Years' War, and England had been rent in twain by Roundhead and Cavalier! The records of the time show clearly enough that the French monarchy was the envy of European kings. And well it might have been in the eyes of a ruler like Charles I. of England. "*L'état, c'est moi*"—"The state? 'Tis I!"—is the definition legend makes Louis XIV.¹ give of France, and there is no more symbolical picture than that of the young "Sun King" as with the equivalent of these words on his lips he walked into the meeting of the Parlement of Paris, and, with riding-boots on his feet and riding-whip in his hand, addressed the kneeling commoners. The regency of Orleans and the reign of Louis XV., though fatal to the morals of the court, none the less increased the absolutism of the king. As all power belonged to the monarch, so all property. Montesquieu saw in monarchy a despotism limited only by the sale of public offices. Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth century, classes France with Turkey. The Sorbonne, the great theological court of the nation, said that all the property of his subjects belonged to the king, and that in taking it he took simply what was his own. The one remaining check upon his action, the High Court of Paris (*Parlement de Paris*), was suppressed during the last years of Louis XV., and replaced by a most unpopular new court, named after the minister who brought it into existence, the Court (*Parlement*) of

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one hundred and seventy-five years preceding 1789. The legislative, like the administrative power, was centred in the king. The legal phrase summed up the whole matter, "As the king wills, so the law wills."

As far as the machinery of this absolutism was concerned, the king might in person care for the affairs of state, or, if like Louis XV. he was disinclined to such exertion, the state was managed by ministers and councils, while the master of them all enjoyed himself as he saw fit.² These councils had legally the right neither of initiation nor of decision, but were advisory. The king, if he chose, could decide all matters without reference to them, or dismiss them outright if he preferred. Yet in actual practice this seldom happened, and practically all laws were made by them, although no law was supposed to be finally binding until it had been registered by the Parliament of Paris—that is, had been formally approved and entered on the records of the state.

The administrative division of France was cumbersome. There were, in fact, three general strata of administrative units. There was, first, the ecclesiastic which concerned the Roman Church alone. Second, there were the provinces. These were the remains of originally independent kingdoms or duchies which had been gradually united into the

¹ But it should be noted that provincial assemblies continued to meet and preserve, however imperfectly, the thought of representation.

² There were five of these councils: of State, Dispatches, Finance, Commerce, and, less important, the Privy Council. Each of the first four had never more than nine members, while the Privy Council numbered 100-150. The King was supposedly a member of them all, but usually attended only the first three named.

nation, and by the time of Louis XVI. had become merely military districts under governors, whose office, except in actual revolt, had become practically sinecures. The provinces numbered thirty-two (or thirty-three if Corsica be included), and were of two classes, those of the *Pays d'Élection* and those of the *Pays d'État*. The difference between these two classes of provinces was this: the provinces known as the *Pays d'État* had been more recently conquered or acquired than those of the *Pays d'Élection*, and had preserved the privilege of holding provincial assemblies. The assemblies were composed of members of the three estates, clergy, nobles, commons, and enjoyed the right of consenting to taxation, and in other ways preserved something of self-government.¹ The *Pays d'Élection*, on the other hand, comprised the central provinces of France, and possessed no trace of that self-government which, as their name indicates, had been theirs until 1614. It was these provinces that especially felt the effects of maladministration.

A third division of France may be said to have dated from the time of Richelieu, and was wholly for purposes of civil administration, especially for the purpose of taxation. It consisted of thirty-five² *généralités* or intendancies, at the head of each of which was an intendant. They coincided approximately with the provinces, and were subdivided into subordinate districts bearing a variety of names.³

¹ There were seventeen such provinces in 1789, the most important of which were Brittany, Flanders, Burgundy, Artois, Languedoc, Provence, Dauphiné.

² Thirty-one according to the report of Necker in 1784, but for various reasons he omits four.

³ In the *Pays d'Élection* these were generally known, as *élections* or *gouvernements*; in the *Pays d'État*, as *diocèsee*, *bailliages*, *élections*, etc. On this entire matter, see Boiteau, *État de la France en 1789*, chs. 3, 4.

It was this fiscal division of France that furnished the points of contact between the monarch and his people. The intendant was a member of the Privy Council, and was thus, like the Council itself, an extension of the royal will. As John Law said, these intendants constituted the "thirty tyrants" of France. Thanks to the power delegated them by the Council, they were supreme in their districts, levying taxes, making laws, and in case appeal was taken from any of their decisions, actually judging these appeals. Was rejoicing in order? The intendant ordered bonfires; mourning? crêpe. Did a town guard fail to attend the Te Deum? It was, forthwith fined twenty francs a man. If the peasant brought an ox to market, the inspector of cattle presented himself: the inspector of calves looked after the calves; the inspector of swine took care of the pigs, and if it happened to be a sow with young, he was joined by the inspector of sucking pigs.¹ The intendants themselves mostly remained in Paris or Versailles, and the actual oversight of their districts was in the hands of their sub-delegates. These latter officials are described in the great protest presented by the *Cour des Aides* to Louis XVI. in 1775,² as men without rank and without legal authority, against whose petty tyranny the inhabitants of a village dared not defend themselves. It is indeed easy to see how an absentee official, even if he had the best intentions, might lend himself unwittingly to all the abuses attending too great reliance upon a practically independent subordinate. Yet, on the other hand, the possibility for reform that lay

¹ Von Holst, *French Revolution*, I, 14.

² This highly important document for the study of the Old Régime has been published, with a translation, in *Translations and Reprints*. V, 2. (University of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Hist.)

in the hands of a conscientious resident intendant is to be seen in the enormous improvements accomplished by Turgot during the twelve years of his administration of Limoges.

So complete was this centralization of power and administration that the government at Versailles, through the councils and intendants, cared for matters that, according to modern political ideas, might much better have been left to local magistrates and boards. Indeed, nothing within the entire range of life was too great or too small to be overlooked by the ubiquitous representatives of royalty. We should expect that the taxes would be levied by the Royal Council, and in the light of other facts it is not surprising to discover that there was no national as distinct from the king's personal treasury.¹ But even a modern Frenchman, accustomed to a republic that is more bureaucratic than some monarchies, could not imagine his government assuming such paternal functions as the Bourbon king. By means of *lettres de cachet*, or royal orders for arrest, obtained easily by the nobility, and which sometimes were even signed when blank, he could imprison any person without trial. By them he could even interfere in family life, helping a despairing father discipline his unmanageable son. In agriculture, the Royal Council advised what crops should be planted, seasoning the energetic enforcement of their advice with much good counsel. In towns and parishes the central government was supreme. "There was no city, town, borough, village, or hamlet in the kingdom; there was neither hospital, church fabric, nor religious house which could have an independent will in the management of its

¹ The proposal in 1788 to make such a distinction was revolutionary.

private affairs, or which could administer its own property after its own plans.”¹

Wits saw no limit to this absolutism. When in 1732 the government found it advisable to close up the St. Médard Cemetery in Paris because of the disorders arising from the miracles alleged to have been wrought at a Jansenist's grave, the following notice was found one morning on the closed gates: “By order of the king. God is hereby forbidden to work miracles in this place.” Just how the ignorant masses thought of this power we can well imagine. It would be impossible to convince them that this all-powerful ruler was not answerable for their misfortunes and miseries.

The centralization of France in Paris was at once the explanation and the result of this condition of affairs.² In the eighteenth century Paris was rapidly becoming France. The old nobility, who formerly had lived scattered throughout the provinces, after one desperate attempt to regain the power Richelieu had wrested from them, had flocked to the royal court at Versailles, there to make their fortunes. But not only the nobility sought the capital; trade more and more turned thither. In the sixteenth century, for instance, the provinces had many important book publishers; in the eighteenth century they had practically none; all were in Paris. Arthur Young, a thoroughly intelligent Englishman, travelling through some of the smaller cities at the outbreak of the Revolu-

¹ De Tocqueville, *The Old Régime*, 64.

² Such a statement is intended to be only general. The political relation of Paris to France was really threefold. (1) It was the capital; (2) it was one of the “royal cities” (*bonnes villes*); (3) it was a self-governing municipality. It was characteristic of the political condition of France that Paris had institutions appropriate to each of these characters. See Monin, *L'État de Paris en 1789*. 29.

tion, asked some of the leading men what they would do. "Oh," said they, "we don't know; we are only small provincial towns; we will wait till we see what Paris will do." It is true that the Revolution was an affair of the provincials quite as much as of the Parisians—perhaps in some ways even more so, for few of its leaders were from the capital; but without this centralization of authority and national life the problem of reform would have been far easier, and, one is inclined to believe, the desperation of theorists like Robespierre and the brutality of men like Hébert would have been short-lived, if indeed possible. As it was, although the Revolution was quite as much the work of the provinces as of the capital, the control of Paris proved to be the control of the state.

But notwithstanding—or better, perhaps, because of this elaborate organization—the government of France by the middle of the eighteenth century had become thoroughly inefficient. The feudal survivals in the provinces, the utter injustice of allowing the *Pays d'État* elements of self-government not enjoyed by the *Pays d'Élection*, the impossibility of administering municipal affairs equitably or effectively from Versailles, all combined to cripple the government. The weakness of the administration was increased by the neglect paid by Louis XV. to affairs of state. "The old machine will last through my days," he said, and went about his pleasures. Evidences of the inability of the monarchy to govern are numerous throughout the quarter-century preceding the Revolution. It is not merely that the state possessed a debt of hundreds of millions, that taxes were spent long before they were collected, that a deficit grew annually, that legislation was imbecile in its treatment of the most important economic matters. The country was really drifting to anarchy. Cynical old Louis XV. saw it—or if not he, the Pompa-

dour—and all too truly prophesied that after him “would be the deluge.” Chesterfield and Rousseau saw it. Indeed, the evidence was only too abundant. There being no popular representation, there were no popular leaders. The very “ward-heeler,” with his “gang,” is to-day, by some strange paradox of American politics, a guarantee that government by the people shall not perish from the earth; but even he was lacking in monarchical France. Government could not maintain order. The artisans had grown so accustomed to thinking of the state as a mere taxing organization that they were suspicious even of the call for representative assemblies in 1787. Smugglers were innumerable, despite fearful penalties; and under desperate leaders like Mandrin in 1754, or Hulin in 1782, sometimes waged miniature civil war. “Brigands” in bands ranged over the country, intimidating, robbing, even murdering, well-to-do peasants. Police protection was insufficient. In 1764 the government made a desperate effort to check the evil, and fifty thousand vagabonds are said to have been arrested in one year; but the evil persisted. An ordinance in 1778 provided that the police should arrest, not only beggars and vagabonds whom they encountered, but also those denounced as such or as suspected persons. This law reads as if it were intended to be the model of that against “suspects” passed by the Terrorists; but it did not accomplish its end. The “brigands” increased, and became an ever-increasing source of terror.

In one word, the government of France was senile. From without, it could only coerce; and brilliant as was the court at Versailles, long before the Revolution the monarchy had lost its ability to fulfil either old or new functions. For France, a magnificent nation of more than twenty-five millions, had outgrown absolutism, and

was growing spiritually ambitious, stronger, restless and determined to have equality and liberty. The problem grew more fatally simple with every year, until at last it might be said to have become this: Would the government recognize this new France with its unregulated search for rights; and if so, had the monarchy sufficient vitality to endure the rejuvenation of reform?

CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

The Economic Basis of Revolution. I. The Peasants. II. The Artisans. III. Inequality in Taxation. 1. Exemptions of the Nobles and Clergy. 2. Direct Taxes. 3. Indirect Taxes. 4. The Condition of Commerce and Manufactures.

Back of social change lie many forces. Climate, natural resources, agriculture and manufactures all serve to set in operation influences that tend to change a people's life. It is the part of good administration to adjust these forces in such fashion that changes are balanced and national experience is not left at the mercy of varying conditions. But the economic life of a people is so complicated that complete adjustment is beyond human power. Poverty in itself is seldom the cause of revolution. It is the sense of inequality in the distribution of wealth that breeds discontent. When wealth increases and at the same time tends to become monopolized and some class or group, this discontent is always keen. Depend, above all, when the rich are indifferent to the inequalities which economic change increases, and when the burdens of the economic life are not lifted from those least able to bear them, the consciousness of inequality turns into enmity.

those already possessed of privilege, and no attempt was made to readjust the pressure of taxation or to relieve the depressing conditions in which the great mass of Frenchmen lived. The old feudal system was outgrown; the new industrial order was not understood; the peasants and the artisans were excluded from the advantages which others were beginning to enjoy.

It is true that peasant proprietors were increasing in number, a third of France, according to Arthur Young, belonging to them in 1788.¹ Even if this estimate be too high, the fact remains that not all the land was in feudal tenure. Yet these peasant farms were small at the best, and became even smaller through division among the children of a proprietor at his death.² It was almost inevitable that the peasant should be forced into the landless class. Yet we must here discriminate. The indomitable thrift of the French peasantry had resulted not only in the increase of peasant proprietors, but in new privileges. "The French peasant was far freer socially than the serfs of Germany, Italy, and Spain; and in Prussia, where the burdens of a vigorous and aggressive monarchy were added to those of feudalism, the peasants had to bear heavier loads even than those of Central France."³ Travellers of the time make it evident that the condition of the

¹ Lavoisier estimated that in 1789 there were 450,000 small proprietors living on their estates. Boiteau, *État de la France, 1789*, 6. Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, I, 3, calls attention to the fact that to-day the land of France is divided approximately equally between three classes of proprietors, the very rich, the very poor, and the middle class. These last are the result of the Revolution.

² Arthur Young speaks of estates containing ten roods with a single tree, and Turgot said the division was carried so far that a property just sufficient for one family was divided among six. Cf. De Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime*, 60.

³ Rose. *Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era*, 19.

peasants varied greatly in different parts of the country, and in portions of France, especially in the north, they seem to have enjoyed some real prosperity. But as one might well have conjectured, wherever the masses had come under the influence of the new thought, this very prosperity bred a more mutinous discontent. At the best, if they were somewhat more comfortable, they were the more certain victims of the sub-delegate of the intendant and the local tax-collector. The contrast between privileged and unprivileged was made all the more galling as men began on the one hand to believe passionately in the equality of "the natural man" preached by the philosophers, and yet, as they tasted the pleasure of owning even the smallest patch of ground, found themselves unable to share in a perceptible increase of comfort. Irritation over inequality of privilege in a period of economic convalescence rather than abject poverty seems a universal characteristic of pre-revolutionary epochs.

The magnificence of the court was not balanced by agrarian development in France as a whole. "What a miracle," wrote Arthur Young at Nantes, "that all this splendour and wealth of the cities of France should be so unconnected with the country." The nobility were growing poorer, and in their places was rising a plutocratic *bourgeoisie* whose hand was against noble and proletarian alike. Over against the luxury of Versailles and the comparatively small class of wealthy persons must be placed the poverty, and even misery, of a large proportion of the peasantry. For thirty years before the Revolution the official correspondence from many portions of France reveals the pitiable condition of the lower classes, but just before its beginning bad harvests had made misery acute. The regulation of trade between the departments made it impossible for one part of France to enjoy the prosperity

of another. The large harvests which had been gathered in the preceding years were consumed or held at high prices. Many portions of France were suffering from lack of food. In 1787 Arthur Young, from Calais southward, saw peasant women pulling weeds for their cows. Potatoes had just been introduced, but were looked upon with suspicion by the peasants.¹ A provincial assembly of lower Normandy officially reported that the artisans of its province were barely able to keep off starvation, and that in five districts the inhabitants lived only on buckwheat. In other parts of the country the peasants ate only corn, a mixture of flour, common seeds, and a little wheat. In Normandy oats were the chief diet of the poor, and elsewhere mixtures of various nuts, coarse grains, and milk. In Poitiers thousands of workingmen were eager to work at half-wages, while from all over the most fertile regions of France the officials reported thousands of industrious peasant farmers reduced to beggary. So narrow was the margin of the peasant's capital that a hail-storm or an inundation would make an entire province dependent upon charity.

Nor was the misery due to mere loss of crops. Great stretches of land—one half or one quarter, says Arthur Young—lay waste. Agriculture was still mediæval in its methods. We have it on good authority that there were few or no iron ploughs in the entire country. As a result, while the English acre produced twenty-eight bushels, the French produced but eighteen.² Roads were bad,

¹ In order to encourage potato-culture, Louis XVI. at one time wore a potato-blossom in his button-hole.

² It has been estimated that while in the matter of taxes the French farmer stood to the English as $3\frac{1}{4}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$, in the matter of produce his land was in the ratio only of 9 to 14. And yet England itself was far from being agriculturally prosperous.

regular coaches almost unknown, transportation of crops almost impossible, and even when possible, checked by customs at the boundary of every province. The great majority of peasants possessed no capital, and especially in southern France were forced to become métayers, or farmers who paid rent in kind, the owner of the land furnishing all cattle and machinery. The father of Mirabeau declared that "agriculture as our peasants practise it is veritable drudgery; they die by thousands in childhood, and in maturity they seek places everywhere but where they should be."

but more often they were mere stables or barns, to which a chimney had been added, made of four poles and some mud. And as for the peasants themselves, Arthur Young finds men and women everywhere working barefooted, and declares the Souillac women to be "walking dunghills." The elder Mirabeau, who saw a company of peasants at a festival, describes them as "frightful looking men, or rather wild beasts, covered with coats of coarse wool, wearing wide leather belts pierced with copper nails, . . . their faces haggard and covered with long matted hair, the upper portion pallid, and the lower distended, indicative of cruel delight and a sort of ferocious impatience."

The condition of the artisans of cities was perhaps less rigorous than that of the peasants, but it was bound to result in misery. Wages were low, the cost of bread was high, and far more than in these days of compulsory education, the surroundings of the poor were practically fixed for life. In the place of education was endless talk. Philosophical dreams, which in some crude shape were

soon shared by the lowest classes, added new zest to discontent, while the uncertainty and severity of their life were rapidly breeding among the poor an incomparable brutality.

The chief economic privilege enjoyed alike by the nobility and the clergy was that of exemption from taxation. We shall consider the exemptions of the clergy somewhat fully later. At present we are concerned with the nobility. As an order the nobles were free from the *taille* or land tax. They were supposed to pay the *vingtième* and poll tax, but even these were levied inequitably, the peasant sharing none of the reductions or exemptions shared by the nobles. In one province \$360,000 were spent in the public service, but the two upper classes contributed nothing to it. In ten other provinces \$2,000,000 were paid by the lower classes as an income tax; the two upper orders paid about \$400,000. The princes of the blood paid \$36,000, when they should have paid \$500,000. In fact, it came to be held that to pay taxes was a disgrace, an evidence of plebeian origin, and corruption of the intendants and their officials was open. Even when the nobility paid taxes, they were clamorous for pensions from court, and seldom were they absolutely refused.

calculates.¹ And even if, as it may very probably be, this is an overstatement when made to apply to France as a whole rather than to exceptionally unfortunate provinces, there can be little doubt that the taxes were a serious hindrance to agricultural France. At the best, they put a premium upon letting one's visible property go to ruin lest it attract the attention of the tax-collector. Peasants actually requested their lord not to repair their cottages, on the ground that to replace thatch with tiles would lead the sub-delegate to increase their tax.

Yet the amount of tax collected from France was not so great that, had it been equitably levied, it should have produced the least misery. Here the utter inefficiency of the state is apparent. The taxes were levied by the Council through the intendant, who "could exempt, change, add, or diminish at pleasure. It must be obvious that the friends, acquaintances, and dependents of the intendant, and of all his *sub-délégués*, and the friends of these friends to a long chain of dependencies, might be favoured in taxation at the expense of their miserable neighbours."² The very method of collecting taxes increased the oppression. Each parish, much against its will, had to collect its own share, and its collectors were held personally responsible for the taxes set them to collect! "The service," said Turgot, "is the despair and almost always the ruin of those obliged to perform it."

§ The indirect taxes were generally farmed out to speculators—the *fermiers généraux*—who made them a source of private profit. This in itself would be fatal to good administration, but such taxes were collected only with the aid of atrocious legislation. There was the *gabelle*, or salt tax, for instance, one of the most burdensome.

¹ *Ancient Régime*, 412.

² Arthur Young, *Travels in France* (Bohn ed.), 314.

Every head of a family was compelled to purchase annually, and at a price set by the government, seven pounds of salt for every person of his family above seven years of age. Whether he needed it or not made no difference. If he neglected to purchase the salt, he was fined. Two sisters once needed salt on Tuesday. The government depot did not open until Saturday. They boiled down some brine—and paid a fine of forty-eight francs, and were fortunate to get off with that! If a man had any salt left over at the end of a year, and so refused to purchase, he was fined as well. If he smuggled salt or bought it where he could buy it at a lower price, he was punished terribly. A smuggler, unarmed, with horses and carts, was fined three hundred francs, or sent three years to the galleys. His second offence brought him, in one part of France, a fine of four hundred francs or nine years in the galleys; in another part, the second offence sent him to the galleys for life. Children and women who smuggled salt were fined for the first offence one hundred francs; for the second offence, three hundred francs; for the third offence, they were flogged and banished the kingdom for life.¹ And these laws were enforced. Calonne, one of the last ministers of Louis XVI., declared that the salt tax was the cause every year of “four thousand attachments on houses, thirty-four hundred imprisonments, five hundred condemnations to the whipping-post, banishment, or galleys.”

¶ In addition there were the *octroi*, or tax on food brought into any town, and the taxes on wine and cider, as well as on imports and exports, both at the frontiers and at the boundaries of different provinces. When one further recalls that salt, grain, and other necessities of life were

¹ See full details in Arthur Young, *Travels in France* (Bohn ed.). 315. 316.

in the hands of great monopolies formed under royal charters, and that in the notorious *Pacte de Famine*, a grain "corner" of the most conscienceless sort, Louis XV. was himself supposed to have been interested, it is no wonder that the peasants should have come to regard tax-collectors, feudal lords, clergy, and corporations as their natural enemies.

The economic life of France was more largely agricultural than industrial and commercial, but during the ten years or more prior to 1789 there had been a decided development of that industrial life in which England was the leader. Particularly was this true of the northern provinces where many cities became centres of manufacture, although coal was not widely used as a source of power. In fact, it was the policy of the ministers of Louis XVI. to develop industry. Scientific technical schools were founded. Prizes for inventions were established and other steps were taken to give dignity to new forms of economic life. Nobles also to some extent encouraged industry in various cities. The mediaeval guilds also, while not abolished, were to some extent limited and the number of such groups in various trades was limited. Artisans were thus given larger freedom and competition in industry was stimulated. What was of even more importance, largely under English influence, machines began to replace the home manufactures and the modern factory also began to appear. Iron works were established as well as other means of competing with British manufactures. In consequence of these changes, industry thrived. The total value of manufactures in 1788 had reached the sum of one billion francs. The chief increase is to be seen in the manufactures of iron and steel, textiles of various sorts, especially cottons and silks, porcelains, tapestries and other luxury-articles.

In commerce an even greater development is to be seen in spite of the burdensome system of customs between the provinces. While France had no banking system comparable with that of England, French foreign trade in 1787 was five times that of 1715. The "products of French industry" exported in 1789 had risen to 133,000,000 francs. Improvements in transportation and the partial removal of restrictions began to extend domestic trade. Foreign commerce was furthered after the general policy of the eighteenth century by the formation of great trading companies, such as the Company of the Indias, a rival of The East India Company of England. These companies traded in Annam, the Isle of France, Guinea, Senegal, and Morocco, while the trade of France with its colonies San Domingo, Guadaloupe and Martinique had become very considerable. The port cities of France, like Marseilles, Nantes, Le Havre, Bordeaux and Lorient, grew very wealthy. Altogether the total exports and imports of France in 1789 amounted to 1,153,000,000 francs, a sum never again equalled until 1835. A series of commercial treaties made in 1778-87 seemed to assure the permanence of this new commercial prosperity. France was rapidly becoming England's only rival for the trade of the world.¹

The most important of these treaties was that made with England in 1786 by which the manufactures of England were imported in large quantities, while French exports of luxuries, wines and the products of grape culture increased almost fourfold.

Manufacturing centres of France, however, complained loudly against English competition and that feeling was

¹ The Revolution and the Napoleonic wars checked this development. It was not until 1830 that France again approached the commercial prosperity of 1788.

to have no small influence in the anti-English policy of the Revolution. But not all France was of the same mind. In fact, the interests of northern and southern sections of France were not identical. The South was agricultural and devoted largely to the culture of the vine, while the North was more industrial. Southern France wished to exchange its products for the manufactures of England, whereas northern France demanded protective tariffs which would handicap English competitors.

The introduction of machinery in France had the same effect as in England. The industrial revolution, although not altogether understood, beginning with the capitalist-wage-earner organization of society, rapidly developed and machine manufacture initiated that readjustment of social life which the men of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century so little appreciated. To them as to some of their successors, labor was a commodity to be bought as low as possible regardless of human interests. In France the change from the older house manufacture to the new machine manufacture was typical. Under the Old Régime the French artisans combined their home manufacture with agriculture, but the pressure of competition with machine made goods rapidly compelled the dissociation of these two employments and thus the foundation was laid in France for a class dependent on their wages alone. And these were distressingly low, hardly sufficient to maintain life. A table published in 1786 showed the expenses of a family of five to be approximately 1735 francs and the income only 1533 francs, a yearly deficit of 200 francs, but if sickness and other exceptional elements of expense were included this deficit swelled to 500 francs. The demand was naturally made that the government rather than the

law of supply and demand should regulate labor and its returns. But the true explanation of this tragic condition of the working classes lay in the fact that machines driven by water or steam were reconstituting the economic life, particularly in the north of France, the large cities of the Provinces, and above all in Paris. In these centres social hatreds grew apace. The *bourgeoisie*, as well as the nobility, appeared to be an enemy to the masses.¹

¹ Lavisse, *Histoire de la France*, IX, 218-244. For a comparison of England and France during the early stages of the industrial revolution, see Knowles, *The Industrial and Commercial Revolution of Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century*, pts. ii, iii; Clapham, *Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914*; Kovalewsky, *La France économique et sociale*; Gomel, *Les Causes financières de la Révolution Française*.

CHAPTER III

INEQUALITIES OF PRIVILEGE

- I. The Classes of the Privileged. II. The Court. III. Sinécures and Pensions for the Nobles. IV. Feudal Privileges: 1. Feudal Dues; 2. Hunting; 3. Absentee Lords; 4. The Increase of the Nobility. V. The Third Estate: 1. Classes; 2. The *Bourgeoisie* as Compared with the Peasants; 3. Rise of *Bourgeoisie* in Importance; 4. Hatred of *Bourgeoisie* on the Part of the Peasants and Artisans. VI. The Army: 1. The Militia; 2. The Regular Army; (a) The Common Soldier, (b) The Officers, (c) The Army as a Type of the Nation.

It has already appeared that the Old Régime was characterized by economic inequality but this was only one phase of a social order filled with survivals of feudalism. The centralization of all political power in the hands of the king had not been accompanied by the abolition of privileges with roots running back into the earliest years of the nation's life. The great houses of the Second Estate, or nobility, perpetuated rights that recalled the times when their founders had been absolute masters of their villeins' life and limb; while the new houses, like all upstarts, saw in their lack of antiquity a reason for insisting the more arrogantly upon privilege and exemption. As one looks back across the Revolution upon these social inequalities and hoary abuses, it is easy to see that they, and not monarchy, were the first objects of popular hatred, and to appreciate the fact often to be emphasized that the Revolution was social as well as political. It was not primarily a revolt against absolutism, for to this day the French have had no government that in some way has not perpetuated

Bourbon centralization. It was an uprising against inequality of privilege.

Speaking for the moment very loosely, under the Old Régime Frenchmen were divided into two classes, those with privileges and those without privileges. To the former belonged the First Estate, or the clergy, the Second Estate, or the nobility, and the wealthy commoners. To the class of the unprivileged belonged all the rest of France.

The king, of course, was at the head of the fashionable as well as the political world. Versailles, a suburb of Paris with eighty thousand inhabitants, was the city of the court. There was the magnificent palace that Louis XIV., at the expense of thirty million dollars, had built in a swamp, and there the king held his court.¹ Few of the thousands of travellers who have visited that vast pile have escaped the temptation to repeople its wilderness of rooms with something more than the questionable pictures which now relate the glories of France. But for a modern it is all but impossible. The combination of vulgarity and display, of ceremony and indecency; the civilization which would permit the continuous holiday-life at the court and blinked at the total disregard of elementary economic principles that made such a holiday permanent; the possibility of a government in which the welfare of millions would be sacrificed to the whim of a light woman or the ambition of an adventurer; the artificiality of a life whose first principle was flattery and whose summit was a sinecure and a pension; the injustice of a system that, even more than the work of the modern

¹ Twenty thousand men were employed two years in building the waterworks alone. Arthur Young, in 1787, however, declared that the canal was "not in such good repair as a farmer's horse-pond."

spoils system, made the lobby and the conspiracy easy means by which to rifle a nation's income, while it put a reformer at the mercy of a court-clique or the king's confessor—all these, the inseparable elements of a picture of life at the court of Louis XV. and Louis XVI., are happily quite beyond the power of accurate representation.

It must be remembered that France had the reputation of being the most advanced nation in the world, and its customs were the model of all fashionable society. But even this consideration hardly prepares one for the extravagancies of French society. Thirty persons were required to serve the king his dinner; four, a glass of wine and water. There was the king's *lever*, in which the highest nobles of the realm stood about in the decorous flattery of silence to watch the king's toilet, a prince of the blood handing him his shirt.¹

There was sufficient etiquette in the queen's toilet to keep her waiting unclothed until the proper person was given precedence in handing her her garments. And yet so paradoxical was the court life, that the palace was noted for its vile odours; and when Marie Antoinette's first child was born, her room was so crowded with spectators of all classes that it had to be partly cleared to prevent her fainting!²

As for the number of people in attendance upon royalty,

¹ This morning toilet of the king was more or less a purely conventional thing. Louis XVI. would often rise early in the morning, go about his affairs, and then go to bed again to be ready for his *lever*!

² In 1787, Arthur Young visited Versailles, and was shown the apartments of the king. He says that "it was amusing to see the blackguard figures that were walking uncontrolled about the palace, and even in his bedchamber; men whose rags betrayed them to be in the last stage of poverty."

even after the economies of the first years of Louis XVI., the military retinue of the king numbered 9,050 persons, including all branches of the service except artillerists. His civil household numbered something like 4,000. Eighty persons were in attendance upon the Princess Elizabeth when she was a month old. Marie Antoinette's private stables in 1780 had 75 vehicles and 330 horses. The king had 1,857 horses, 217 vehicles, 1,458 men in liveries. In 1786 there were 150 pages in the palace, 128 musicians, 75 almoners and other religious officials, 48 doctors and assistants, 383 officers of the table, 103 waiters, 198 persons for the personal domestic service of the king. These were all intended for the palace at Versailles, but Louis XVI. had twelve others besides the Louvre, the Tuileries, and Chambord. Each of these palaces had its own army of servants.

Large salaries were enjoyed by those having influence at court. Madame Lamballe, for instance, was given \$30,000 a year for acting as superintendent of the queen's household. Persons were appointed to offices the very duties of which had been forgotten. One young man was given a salary of \$3,600 for an office whose sole duty consisted in his signing his name twice a year. In 1780, after Louis XVI. had inaugurated retrenchment, the three old maid aunts of the king were allowed \$120,000 for food! In addition the king was constantly paying the debts of nobles. The tutors of the king's children received \$23,000 yearly, and the head chambermaid of the queen made \$10,000 off the annual sale of partly burned candles. Altogether, from 1774 to 1789, \$16,000,000 had been given to members of the royal family.

This prodigality was by no means limited to the court. Especially in France, every noble of any importance must have his little Versailles, and waste his property and other

people's property in maintaining his state, while all Europe must go bankrupt trying to live like the king of the French—who was himself going bankrupt most rapidly of all!¹

We must next consider the nobility. By the end of Louis XV. 's reign, nearly every man who was not actually an artisan, a farmer, a shopkeeper, or a small lawyer was a noble. They numbered perhaps one hundred thousand persons, and owned a fifth of the soil. The number of those who actually owned estates, however, was much smaller, but in so far as this fact did not make exceptions necessary, they all enjoyed essentially the same privileges. It has been estimated that there were thirty-five thousand castles or châteaux in France owned by the nobility. The lower nobles, on the whole, contributed an element of strength to the nation. Living on their small estates, they felt the responsibilities of their position, and cared somewhat conscientiously for their peasants. Their sons were likely to be dissipated in early life, but when heads of families of their own, generally reformed. Their daughters were as well educated as conventionality permitted, and either married young or went into convents. One other feature of the life of these small nobles was of great influence upon the national life. As estates were divided among the children, the tendency toward a landless aristocracy was very strong. The result of this was twofold: On the one hand, many of these poor nobles grew all the

¹ The memoirs of the time abound in illustrations of this extravagance. As picturesque as any is Thiébauld's (*Memoirs*, I, 41) account of the fashionable crowd at Longchamps and the *demi-mondaine* carried off to prison in her carriage lined with mother-of-pearl and with solid silver hubs in the wheels, and drawn by horses with harnesses of silk and gold and shoes of silver.

nore strenuous supporters of the privileges of their caste, while on the other hand, some of them, like Mirabeau, cast their lot with the commoners, and were among the most implacable enemies of the privileges to which their fathers had clung. As a class, however, the *noblesse* merited the words of Chateaubriand: "Aristocracy has three stages: first, the age of force, from which it degenerates into the age of privilege, and is finally extinguished in the age of vanity."

Whether or not he had sold his château or fields, the noble had still feudal rights within the limits of what was or had been his ancestral fief. In fact, as the Duc d'Aiguillon said on the night of August 4, 1789, in many cases these feudal rights were the only property a noble possessed. He took his toll from the wine, the bridge, the mill, the fair, the village scales, the oven, the wine-press. For the noble who still owned the estate there were, in addition, still other sources of income. Every transfer of the leasehold paid some fee to the lord. In his territory the feudal lord had a monopoly, more or less complete, of the sale of wine (*banvin*), of the public ovens (*banalité*), of the dove-cotes. He was entitled to fees for landholding (*cens and censives*), portions of the fruit raised by his tenants (*carpot*) and of harvests (*terrage*) and for laying out boundaries (*champage*). What was worse, a part of the rental for some farms was the money equivalent for certain absurd and wicked duties owed by peasants of feudal times to their lords. In some regions of France, for instance, a part of the duties of the peasant farmer had been to beat the marshes to keep the frogs quiet while the lady in the château was ill, and this duty had been commuted into a fixed sum of money. Other money payments at the marriage of peasant girls

were compensation for ancient privileges far more revolting. Altogether the peasants paid fourteen per cent. of their income to their seigneurs.

Perhaps as senseless and exasperating as any privilege of the nobility was the exclusive right of hunting over the farms of the estate. For forty-five miles about Paris, for instance, were the royal *capitaineries*, or game preserves, in which all farms were to be kept free of fences or other hindrances to the king's hunting.¹ The same was true on a smaller scale about each feudal château. The peasant could not hoe his corn or pull his weeds before a certain date lest the young rabbits might be disturbed. At any moment he had to be ready to see a troop of gay cavaliers and ladies with horses and dogs sweep over his grain in pursuit of some half-tame deer. And this was not all. The deer and the pigeons and all the other game could not be killed by the farmer, even if they were destroying his crops. He could not even build fences to keep them out! He must fasten logs to his dog's collar to keep him from running after game, and he might not keep a gun to kill the wolves.² How universally hateful and oppressive were these rights of hunting may be seen from the fact that they are mentioned in nearly every bill of complaint sent to the States General in 1789.

It should be remembered that all these privileges enjoyed by the nobles were in return for practically no service on their part. In the old feudal days the lords had felt some sense of obligation toward their villeins, but while destroying the political power of the feudal nobles, the kings of France had left them all their feudal dues. It was a fatal mistake. Much better had it been for the

¹ Aug. 30, 1781, Louis XVI. killed 460 pieces. In fourteen years he killed more than 190,000 pieces of game of all sorts.

² *Cahier* of the Third Estate of Chaumont in Champagne.

peasantry if their nobles had, like the German nobles, kept some of their old rights of government. For then they would have kept nearer the peasantry; they would have lived more at home; they would have fulfilled that duty which was the chief justification of the feudal system, the protection of the weak by the strong. As it was, the French noble lived on his estate only when forced so to do in the interest of economy. The evil effects of such absenteeism were recognized by Frenchmen, and the nobility of Blois, in their *cahier*, sent the States General, justified their surrender of privileges as tending to the benefit of the small nobility. They declared their belief "that a proprietor who fulfils the obligation of his heritage, spreads about him prosperity and happiness; that the effort he makes to increase his revenues increases at the same time the mass of the agricultural products of the realm; that the country districts are covered with châteaux and manors, formerly inhabited by the French nobility, but now abandoned; that a great public interest would be subserved by inducing proprietors to seek again, so far as possible, their interests in the country." But this was precisely what the nobility as a class did not desire. Three-quarters of the upper nobility were absentee landlords. Arthur Young, writing from Nantes, describes the country as "deserted; or if a gentleman is in it, you find him in some wretched hole, to save that money which is lavished with profusion in the luxuries of the capital." And so to Paris and Versailles the noble went; there, as far as his means or his credit permitted, to live like every other absentee landlord, intrusting the management of his estate to an agent who was held less strictly to the care of the tenants than to supplying funds for his master's life at the capital. It was because the personal bond between lord and peasant was thus replaced by exactions of

agents hardpressed to meet their lord's extravagance, as well as because of the sale of estates to an upstart nobility, that in the face of the great philosophical movement making for human equality there should have sprung up between 1780 and 1789 a distinct feudal reaction. Throughout France the seigneurs were verifying their titles and their leases, and were enforcing more vigorously than ever their feudal claims.¹ This fact throws light upon the fierceness with which such rights were attacked by the peasants in 1789, as well as the stubbornness of the reactionary members of the Second Estate during the period of attempted reform.

It would be a mistake to think of the order of the nobility as closed. It was being constantly recruited from the wealthy commoners. Titles were sold by hundreds and thousands; nor was the spirit of privilege any more restricted. Even if a wealthy commoner did not purchase a title, his tastes and interests lay rather with the privileged classes than with the unprivileged. So it came about that there were many points of similarity between the first two and the wealthier part of the Third Estate.

To explain this Third Estate, it is not enough to compare it roughly with the Anglo-Saxon middle class. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there grew up alongside of the feudal nobles a class of well-to-do townspeople, who as individuals owed no feudal dues, and whom trade sometimes made masters even of the nobles themselves. As time went by, this class of untitled men gradually acquired some political importance. The king, for good and sufficient reasons, recognized its right to assent to being taxed, and its representatives formed a third of the great national assembly known as the States General, the

¹ Chérest, *La Chute de l'Ancien Régime*, I, 49.

clergy and the nobility furnishing the two other thirds. But by the eighteenth century the Third Estate, or commons, itself had begun to divide into classes.¹ They were the *bourgeoisie*, the peasants, and the artisans. The interests of these various classes were by no means identical. The *bourgeoisie*, composed of traders, had grown well-to-do, had their properties, large and small, and unfortunately, had at the same time become vulgar and selfish. They had even less sympathy with the suffering peasants and artisans than had the nobles. The peasants were the farmers of the nation. As has already appeared, they sometimes owned their little farms (though generally subject to some outgrown feudal dues), but more often tilled a piece of ground under feudal tenure, and contrived as best they could to save enough for the ever-present tax-collector and to keep body and soul together. The artisans lived in cities, and constituted a class whose rights were even less clearly seen than they are to-day.

Clearly enough, therefore, it would not be correct to think of this untitled class as homogeneous or animated by the same spirit. Such unity was impossible in anything except the most general principles. Even among townspeople, the guild system was the source of endless jealousies. Each trade thus organized had definite privileges upon which it insisted. We read of bitter warfare between wigmakers and bakers over social precedence! How much greater must have been the lack of sympathy between the peasant and the banker. Arthur Young, travelling in southern France, overtook a woman with bent form and furrowed face. He thought her sixty or seventy

¹ Reliable figures place the population of France in 1789 between twenty-six and twenty-seven millions. Of these, approximately, twenty millions lived in the country. Boiteau, *État de la France en 1789*, 11, 12.

years old, but she stoutly maintained she was but twenty-eight. She was the wife of a small peasant proprietor. They owned a patch of ground, a cow, a poor little horse, and seven children. Yet proprietors though they were, they owed one seigneur a yearly due of forty-two pounds of flour and three chickens; another one hundred and twenty-six pounds of oats, one chicken, and one sow. Compare with the misery of this poor woman the condition of a successful member of the *bourgeoisie* of some provincial town, who, after being a manufacturer or a merchant, retired on his fortune, with very likely a patent of hereditary nobility; his wife, who had probably assisted in his rise by the arts of a saleswoman and by her talent for business, being called Madame, like a duchess.

It is, indeed, not surprising to discover that there was no equality in privilege between the *bourgeoisie* and the other elements of the Third Estate. The relations of the two were those of superiors and inferiors. The *bourgeoisie* clearly constituted an untitled aristocracy, quite as conscious of its social position as was the real nobility. Nothing shows this plainer than the difference in the two elements of municipal government, the *commune* and the municipality. The *commune*—never to be confused with anything like economic communism—was the armed association of all the Third Estate in a town or village; the municipality was the governing body of the town, and was composed exclusively of the *bourgeoisie*. By such an arrangement danger was shared by all commoners alike, but the perquisites and honours of office went to the *bourgeoisie* alone. In many if not all parts of France the *bourgeoisie* was free from one or more forms of taxation. The very right of labour was safe only in their hands, and they, quite as much as the aristocracy of the court, were

ready to oppress the masses, while the mayors of the towns were notoriously venal, buying office and being bought themselves apparently with small sense of official honesty. It is to this extension of class inequality and consequent class hatred that one must look for the origin of that suspicion of the *bourgeoisie* displayed by the masses during certain periods of the Revolution. That conservative spirit which, in the Constitution of 1791, set a property qualification for suffrage, was to be followed by a fierce determination on the part of the Jacobin leaders to rid the Revolution of all *bourgeois* control. Their brief success but deepened the class hatred, and to this day the proletariat of France regards all property-holders, from the small shop-keeper to the millionaire, as hereditary enemies.

But in 1789 the horrors of the Terror were unforeseen. The Third Estate, with all its inner jealousies, was at one in its appreciation of the injustice done it by the Old Régime. Quite as galling to the *bourgeoisie* as political neglect was the social inferiority to which it was regulated by fashionable society. Commerce was already working a transfer of actual influence in the state, and the new rulers of commercial France very naturally demanded social and political recognition. Although the wars of Louis XV. had cost France her Indian and North American possessions, thanks to the Third Estate French trade was steadily increasing. The exports of 1776 were 309,000,000 francs, as over against 192,000,000 in 1748. John Law, despite the disastrous collapse of the "Mississippi Bubble," had shown the possibilities of paper money and bank credit, and the *bourgeoisie* had been the chief beneficiaries. It was possible for a banker's clerk like Necker to become enormously wealthy. Many of the old feudal fiefs, so Bouillé says in his Memoirs, were in the hands of the

bourgeois of the cities. It was natural, therefore, for the class to appreciate its own importance. Filling nearly every important administrative office in the nation; outside the sinecures and the very highest positions at court, the lawyers, bankers, physicians, however indifferent they might be to the state of the peasantry, chafed under the pretensions and privileges of the nobility. "What is the Third Estate?" asked Sieyès in his famous pamphlet. "Everything. What has it been until now? Nothing. What does it ask for? To become something!"

In no part of the national life did the distinction between the privileged and unprivileged classes more strikingly appear than in the army. The military forces of France embraced the militia, and the regular army consisting of one hundred and one regiments of infantry and sixty-two regiments of cavalry. The militia was raised by conscription, nominally from all Frenchmen between eighteen and forty years of age, but those exempted from the service were very numerous, so that practically only provincials were enlisted, and of these only those peasants who were desperately poor. Desertion from the militia, or even absence without leave, was punished with a life sentence to the galleys; but not even this severity could always hold the conscripts to their term of six years. Yet these peasant troops were noted for their valour, and together with the municipal guards, were to form the bulk of those wonderful armies that the Revolution cast out upon Europe in the name of liberty.

According to official estimates, in 1787 the "active army," on a peace footing, included 187,483 officers and men, with a total war footing, including militia, of 367,695. But these figures are certainly untrustworthy, for when, in July, 1789, Marshal de Broglie became Minister of War, the "active army" amounted only to 163,684 officers and

men.¹ The regular army was not raised by conscription, but was composed of men who nominally had been enlisted; but even a superficial knowledge of European recruiting systems of the eighteenth century, with their "force gangs" and their crimps, with their innumerable methods of stealing or deceiving men, arouse suspicions as to the voluntary character of the service. Yet among the various reforms attempted by Louis XVI. was that of this recruiting process, and it is likely that the private soldiers in the regular army were mostly men who had chosen the military profession with reasonable freedom. Their term of service was four years, at the end of which they could re-enlist for four or eight years more.

Recruited thus from desperate or worthless men, the quality of the French regular troops was inferior to that of the militia; yet even thus, they were hardly the "brigands" their officers called them. Rochambeau even boasts that the French troops in America could camp in an orchard and not steal an apple. But if this were really the case, it must have been due to unusual conditions. They were not generally noted for such self-restraint. The actual condition of the French soldier was one about which different opinions can easily be held. The fact that men entered the service by enlistment, and often, if not generally, made it the profession of their lives, argues in its favour. English observers speak with respect of them, especially of their uniformly good appearance—a uniformity reached sometimes by such expedients as fierce moustaches stuck on youthful upper lips, and uncomfortably tight uniforms. But on the other side, are facts which made military service a very hotbed of discontent, and explain the enthusiasm with which the rank and file of the army welcomed the Revolution.

¹ Boiteau, *État de la France en 1789*, 261.

Under the new regulations introduced by St. Germain, Minister of War from 1775 to 1777, military discipline was modelled upon that of Frederick II. of Prussia. Officers and privates alike were displeased, and among the petitions contained in the *cahiers* of 1789 are those like that of the Third Estate of Versailles, to the effect that "barbarous punishments, taken from the codes of foreign nations and introduced into the new military regulations, be abolished and replaced with regulations more in conformity with the genius of the nation." Perhaps it was this "genius of the nation" that made flogging in the ranks a cause of the downfall of the reform ministry of Louis XVI. Yet at this time flogging was practised in the English army, where the men only laughed at it. The food and accommodation for the privates were inferior, but the hospital arrangements were not altogether bad. The common soldier's uniform was generally in good condition, but his comfort was not a matter of great concern. Even stockings were apparently wanting, as we learn from a rather unpleasant anecdote of the times. And to cap all, the private's pay was only six *sous* a day.

From this condition there was little chance of escape through promotion. A private could almost never rise to the ranks of a commissioned officer. About ten years before the Revolution it was decreed that no one should hold even the rank of captain unless his family had been noble for four generations. Even among the nobility, promotion went by favour, and nobles without influence at court often resigned in disgust. Yet this was not due to the small number of offices, for in 1789 there was no less than one general for every one hundred and fifty-seven men.¹ But in the contrast between the private and his

¹ Stephens, *French Revolution*, I, 371.

officer the injustice of the Old Régime is especially in evidence; for, as Taine says, in place of hardship there were authority, honours, money, leisure, good living, social enjoyments, and private theatricals for the officers. Of the \$18,000,000¹ paid the army, \$9,200,000, or more than half, went to the officers. There is little wonder that the ranks should have been composed of "the scum of society" and "the sweeping of the jails," or that there should have been sixty thousand desertions in eight years; or that the common soldiers should have hated their officers; or that they should have been among the first to welcome a revolution. For hidden in this despised and abused soldiery was many a bright and ambitious man. From the ranks or the lower officers of the army of the Old Régime came a Pichegru, an Hoche, an Oudinot, a Murat, a Bernadotte, a Soult, a Ney. To these men the Revolution, whether for weal or woe, brought a career. Without it they would have suffered and died members of the despised *canaille*.²

¹ This does not include the amount paid the officials by the military bureau.

² See an excellent chapter (7) in Lowell, *Eve of the French Revolution*; and especially Babeau, *Vie militaire*; Boiteau, *État de la France en 1789*, chs. 10, 11.

CHAPTER IV

THE MORALS OF THE OLD RÉGIME

- I. The Breakdown in morals. 1. In the court. 2. In the Upper Classes. 3. The Position of Children. II. The Better Side of the Old Régime.

It is to be expected that a national sense so blunted as to admit of such contrasts as these already sketched should also have retained little susceptibility to morality in other relations. It is true that pictures of national immorality are likely to be overcoloured; witness current descriptions of life under the Cæsars and during the English Restoration. Fortunately, the vices and general reversion to animalism which characterize society which wealth has made parasitic are not to be found among the people as a whole. None the less, gladiatorial games are most damning testimony against the moral ideals of the Roman Empire, no matter how far Petronius may stand corrected by the gravestones of forgotten thousands. In the same way, the low moral condition of France may be seen with some accuracy in a literature much of which would hardly be allowed to pass through our mails, but which was praised by a woman like Madame Roland.

Most of all, however, may it be judged by the general habits of fashionable and unfashionable folk of the time. As one might expect, the saddest spectacle of demoralization is to be seen in the court circle. Before the accession of Louis XVI. the social life, and often the state policy, of Versailles had been under the control of the mistresses of the king, the most celebrated being Madame de Pompadour

and Madame du Barry, the last of whom was to perish miserably on the guillotine. Indeed, the regency of the Duke of Orleans and the reign of Louis XV. have become synonymous for all that is shameless. But with Louis XVI. matters were much improved. Louis was a young man of blameless life so far as conventional morality is concerned, and endeavoured to purify his court. The court nobility were without seriousness, and love affairs figured too largely in life to be abandoned. It is not necessary to plunge into the unclean stream of memoirs of the time, for it is altogether probable that half the stories they relate are nothing more than lies born of a prurient love of gossip. But the mere fact that about the queen, Marie Antoinette, there should so continually gather scandalous rumours, however little one may believe the worst of them,¹ is in itself sufficient evidence of widespread laxity in morals. The very imprudences of the queen, her choice of friends, and especially of four men as nurses when ill; the mere possibility of a scandalous affair like that of the Diamond Necklace, in which a cardinal of the church appeared to fancy it possible to win her favours by the presents of jewels—all these things throw a singularly unpleasant light upon the court.

A similar license in manners, to use no stronger term, ran through all society. Husband and wife too frequently lived in only formal union, and marital unfaithfulness among the fashionable classes was shockingly palliated, even expected. Gouverneur Morris tells of ladies receiving him at their toilet; others tell of being received while their hostesses were in their bath of water made untransparent with milk. There was hardly a philosopher who lived a chaste life, and many of them were notoriously licentious. The father of Mirabeau only followed a toler-

¹ Thiébault, *Memoirs*, I, 43.

ably wide-spread fashion when he brought his mistress into the midst of his family. But perhaps the most significant story—and with it we leave this unpleasant matter—concerns Voltaire. He had lived for years as the recognized lover of a most learned Madame du Châtelet. At her death he and her husband opened a locket the dead woman had worn most sacredly. The two strangely suited mourners looked at the portrait the locket contained—and silently closed its case. It was of neither of them, but of a third man!

And yet French society at this time was probably the most polished the world has ever seen. Manners were almost a profession, for who could tell what honour might not hang upon a bit of repartée or a well-done bow? From the very cradle the children of the nobility and rich *bourgeoisie* were taught the ways of the great world. Family life itself grew into a mass of etiquette. Until the rise of Rousseau's influence, children were apparently turned over to servants and teachers. Talleyrand, for instance, did not see his parents for years, and when about ten years old called on his mother once a week, on her reception-day.¹ Until 1783 little boys had their hair powdered, wore swords, and kissed little girls' hands with all the dignity of older dandies. A girl of six years wore corsets, a hoop petticoat, false hair, and—sometimes—rouge! Taine rather cuttingly says that the fulcrum of education was the dancing-master.²

¹ Talleyrand, *Memoirs*, I, 9-11.

² Arthur Young describes the reckless driving of the fashionable folk in Paris, and adds: "If young noblemen at London were to drive their chaises in streets without foot-ways, as their brethren do at Paris, they would speedily and justly get arrested." His curious deduction from the poor character of cabs and the absence of sedan-chairs is: "To this circumstance also it is owing that all persons of small or moderate fortune are

It must not be forgotten, however, that within the salons of many a Paris merchant, learned men and brilliant women gathered to discuss all sorts of questions in philosophy and economy and theology. Those who shared in this better social life of the Old Régime looked back to it as a golden age. And it was to some degree characteristic of other cities than Paris. These salons were the centres of that political influence so largely wielded by the women of the day, and were to become even more influential in the reform movements that led up to the summoning of the States General. But it would be impossible to say that they indicated or generated any moral virility or conservative influence. They were the stage upon which brilliant talkers, both men and women, could display their incomparable wit and good breeding; but they were none the less the luxuries of the wealthy. The simple fact that such institutions could flourish then, and only then, is a testimony to the poverty of political opportunity and the wealth of the dilettante spirit.¹

A meeting of the Sons of Liberty in distressed Massachusetts might have been held at the same hour as the brilliant gathering in some Parisian salon. It could have been no more radical in its utterances; indeed, beyond the accidents of place and dress and etiquette, it could not

forced to dress in black, with black stockings." The antipathy of the revolutionary régime to all of the trappings of aristocracy may have been due in part to these facts.

¹ "The society [in Paris] for a man of letters, or who has any scientific pursuit, cannot be exceeded. . . . Persons of the highest rank pay an attention to science and literature, and emulate the character they confer. . . . Politics are too much attended to in England to allow a due respect to be paid to anything else; and should the French establish a freer government, academicians will not be held in such estimation, when rivalled in the public esteem by the orators who hold forth liberty and property in a free parliament."—Arthur Young, in 1787.

have been more distracted with dreams of liberty. That one wrought a different result from the other is due, of course, to many causes, but to none more fundamentally than this: the salon was composed of dilettantes; the liberty meeting, of Anglo-Saxon men of affairs.

CHAPTER V

THE CLERGY AND RELIGION¹

- I. The Privileged and Unprivileged: 1. The Higher Clergy; 2. The Curates and Vicars; 3. Their Respective Incomes. II. The Clergy and the Peasants. III. The Clergy and Society: 1. Their Attitude toward Intellectual and Religious Freedom; 2. Unbelief; 3. Credulity; 4. The Loss of Moral Influence.

The relations of the Roman Catholic Church of France both toward the Pope and toward the government for centuries had been marked by a singular combination of independence and subservience. Into this troubled matter, however, it is not necessary for the student of the Revolution to enter. Until the formation of the Civil Code of the clergy, which was to play so prominent a part in the early period of the Revolution, the clergy may be regarded as an order of the state so compacted by history and community of interests as to be practically a unit—certainly the most unified of the three orders of the nation. Yet even within the church there was the fatal cleavage into the privileged and the unprivileged. The former included archbishops, bishops, abbots, and other high clergy, while the curates, or country parsons, who did the great work of the church, constituted the mass of unprivileged. These curates, not always models of pastoral activity, were in sympathy with the oppressed peasantry, for they themselves were drawn almost exclusively from the lower classes of the Third Estate, and could never hope to rise into the great

¹ See Sloane, *The French Revolution and Religious Reform*, chs. 1, 2; De le Gorce, *L'Église en 1789*; Pressensé, *L'Église et la Révolution Française*; *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, 53-56; Taine, *The Ancient Régime*.

offices. The church of France herein was inferior to the church of the Middle Ages. In the eleventh century the son of a poor carpenter became Gregory VII., and a wandering English priest, Hadrian IV. A few figures will tell more eloquently than description just what the relation of these two classes to each other was. The total number of the French clergy in 1789 was about 130,000, probably less than at the beginning of the century.¹ That of the monks has been estimated at 23,000; of the nuns, 37,000. Of the secular clergy there were 60,000 curates and vicars and about 11,000 higher clergy. This in a population of 26,000,000 is not excessive. Yet the church held in real property in 1789 perhaps a fifth of all France. Its total wealth amounted to perhaps three billion francs, and its total income was about \$60,000,000² or about one half that of the crown. Of this sum the higher clergy had five-sixths, the curates had the rest. The average salary received by the curates in 1784 was the largest ever known in France, and it amounted to \$140. This, considering the purchasing power of money, would have enabled them to keep body and soul together, but out of it they had to pay a tax of \$15 or \$20. "I pity," said Voltaire, "the lot of the country pastor, obliged to contend for a sheaf of wheat with his unfortunate parishioner." Contrast with this pittance the incomes of the higher clergy. Even a monk enjoyed an income of about \$800 a year. The abbot of Clairvaux—the successor of St. Bernard!—

¹ The numbers of the regular clergy had decreased more than those of the secular. Many monasteries are said by the *Cahiers* to have been almost deserted.

² \$36,000,000 from tithes and \$24,000,000 from landed property; but these figures are not unquestionable, and include the cost of collecting the tithes. Taine makes the total net income \$40,000,000. (*Ancient Régime*, 14.) Madelin, *The French Revolution*, 8, puts the total wealth of the church at 2,992,538,140 francs.

never drove out except with four horses and preceded by a mounted groom. The average income of the 131 archbishops and bishops was between \$10,000 and \$20,000. The abbot of Clairvaux had an income of \$60,000 to \$75,000; Cardinal de Rohan, of \$200,000. The latter's palace had 700 beds and his stables accommodation for 180 horses. He had fourteen butlers, and could entertain at one time 200 guests with their servants. Cardinal de Rohan, it is true, was the most magnificent as well as wealthiest of the ecclesiastics, but others were not far behind him.

If this well-to-do and privileged clergy had only earned their pay, if they had shared at all in the work of improving the condition of the lower classes, this disproportion in income would be more excusable; but as a matter of fact, with notable exceptions, the upper clergy were indifferent to the needs of the people. The curates and vicars did about all the church work that was done. In many cases these unfortunate men were hired, at a beggarly pittance, by some clergyman or monastery enjoying a good income to attend to the work of the parish, while their employer enjoyed himself in Paris. The abbot of Sainte-Croix de Bernay, in Normandy, received \$11,400 a year, but lived in Paris and hired a curate for \$210 to care for the parish of 4,000 communicants. And the worst of it all was that the curate, like the private soldier, had no hope of promotion. The higher clergy, like the officers, were drawn from the nobility and richer *bourgeoisie*. Of all the 131 archbishops and bishops, only five (and they the poorest) were from the lower classes. Ecclesiastical as well as military officers went by favour. The possible future the curate must expect was to continue his work among the half-starved and over-taxed peasants, and keep body and soul together as best he could on his wages. It is only natural to discover, therefore, that the curates, per-

haps 60,000 in number, sided with the other unprivileged classes, and when the opportunity came, opposed the upper clergy.

The clergy derived a vast income from the tithes.¹ These were not always a tenth of the produce of the farmer, but are supposed by Taine to have equalled one fourteenth of the entire product. Even if this be an exaggeration, it remains true that the tithes were paid by the peasant and not by the proprietor, and were therefore in addition to taxes and feudal dues. The tithes were obnoxious to the peasants and were the occasion of innumerable law-suits. There are said to have been 400,000 such suits in 1788. The chief if not the only justification for this ecclesiastical tax lay in the fact that the tithes constituted the only poor-fund in France.

But we are not quite done with the higher clergy. In speaking of them, it has to be remembered that under the Old Régime the upper clergy were something more than merely pastors and preachers. They were also feudal lords, enjoying the privileges of feudalism. Thirty-two bishops and many abbots besides were the temporal as well as spiritual lords of cities and territory, the receivers of all sorts of feudal dues. As feudal lords, these great ecclesiastics held their courts, administered their estates, enjoyed their feudal dues, and maintained a glorious company of attendants. And what is far more disgraceful, as feudal lords some of them kept serfs.

The inequalities of the Old Régime are again seen in the fact that the clergy, notwithstanding their enormous land-

¹ In 1789 this amounted to \$36,600,000. See Bailly, *Hist. Finan. de la France*, II, 278. It is to be remembered that the church paid practically no taxes. When reorganized in 1790, approximately \$37,000,000 were appropriated by the state for all ecclesiastics.

holdings, were exempt from the *taille* and in fact from other taxes. This privilege dated from 1710 when the church purchased the exemption. Although various attempts had been made at re-establishing their liability to taxes, the clergy enjoyed these extraordinary privileges in 1789. It is true that the clergy, perhaps in return for some legislation hostile to Protestantism, perhaps under stress of war, perhaps from a sense of duty, did occasionally vote a gift to the state, but this was in the place of, not in addition to, taxes. Even this was steadily lessened. Originally but \$600,000 a year, in 1788 it shrank to \$360,000, and in 1789 was refused altogether.¹ Had the church really paid in anything like a proportion to its wealth, the annual levy would have been vastly greater. The church received \$36,600,000 as tithes, and its taxable property should certainly have yielded the state an equal sum.² Even when the church made its gifts, however, it received a grant from the royal treasury larger than the gift it had made! In 1787 it received \$300,000 more than it gave.

The influence of the church upon social life had greatly diminished. The peasantry chafed under being forced to pay the tithes, hated the higher clergy as feudal lords, and appreciated their curates only as the curates shared in the common distress. Only in La Vendée and a few sim-

¹ In this and other estimates the livre is reckoned as a franc. As a matter of fact, from 1774 to 1789 the livre possessed value as silver of 0 fr. 98 cent. But its purchasing power was considerably greater. In 1830 the livre of 1789 had the purchasing power of 1 fr. 40 cent. and later became considerably greater. Cf. Boiteau, *L'État de la France en 1789*, 417.

² Boiteau, *État de la France en 1789*, 214, says the church paid to the state from 1706 to 1789, 295,000,000 livres, when it should have paid 2,376,000,000.

ilarly situated provinces were the upper clergy held by their people in such affection that actual civil war followed the attempt to put in force the constitution of 1791, with its provisions for making the clergy civil officials. Speaking generally, the church had lost its hold, also, upon the higher classes. The philosophic age was bitterly anti-ecclesiastical, even when not anti-Christian. In no sphere of social life was the disintegrating power of the growing revolutionary spirit more in evidence. Nor was this effect in philosophy limited to the laity. Although holding strenuously to their ecclesiastical prerogatives, the upper clergy were affected by the current scepticism. A curate of Paris was once asked whether the bishops really believed the doctrines upon which they insisted so insistently. "There may be four or five," he replied. It will not do to take such a bit of flotsam too seriously, but there can be no doubt that leading churchmen gravely discussed the probability of immortality, and were in some cases openly profligate. So far as its more lucrative offices were concerned, the church had become a mere profession, to which bright young men with no other prospects could be apprenticed. What religious influence could one expect to be exerted by men like Cardinal de Rohan, or like Talleyrand of Autun?

Yet the church still was too ready to persecute the Protestants. In Normandy we find the clergy wishing laws preventing the "Protestants from building churches, and even from assembling at sound of the bell that called Catholics to service."¹ The otherwise rather remarkably liberal *cahier* of the clergy of Blois² laments the

¹ Chassin, *Cahiers*, 1789, II, 192.

² It is signed by fifty-three parish priests, fourteen priors, eight canons, eight priests, three deans, three abbots, three curates, a chaplain, a friar, a deacon, and twenty-seven unclassified persons.

extension of religious liberty to Protestants, as well as the growing freedom of the press. Loménie de Brienne, an archbishop though a notorious unbeliever, in addressing Louis XVI. at his coronation, said: "Complete the work of Louis the Great. To you is reserved the privilege of giving the final blow to Calvinism in your kingdom." This exhortation was very possibly merely official, but not so the work of clergy in Languedoc, where the bishops controlled the province. There, almost to the time of the calling of the States General in 1789, congregations were broken up by dragoons, and Protestant ministers were hanged.¹ Even such *cahiers* of the clergy in 1789 as do not lament the extension of religious freedom to Calvinists, believe the royal decree of 1788 allowing them political protection far too generous. They would at least keep Calvinists out from all judicial offices, and Necker, when in fact at the head of the national finances, was not allowed his proper position in the cabinet simply because he was a Protestant. One cause of the great popularity of Voltaire during the latter part of his life is to be found in his securing a pension for the family of the executed Protestant Calas.

Despite (or quite as possibly, on account of) this intolerance, unbelief spread rapidly among the *bourgeoisie* and the nobility. In 1764 Hume, at a dinner in Paris, happened to say that he had never chanced to meet an atheist. "You have been somewhat unfortunate," said his host; "but at the present moment you are sitting at table with seventeen of them." Indeed, it is altogether probable that in no other age has the great mass of intelligent persons so uniformly endeavoured to fulfil the law of atheistic phi-

¹ Relatively this is not as atrocious as it sounds. Absolute religious freedom was practically unknown in the eighteenth century throughout Europe. Even in America it was a novelty.

losophy and rid themselves of "the fear of invisible powers." Horace Walpole, who would scarcely be classed among radical Christians, writes with fine sarcasm from France in 1765, "They think me quite profane for having any belief left." Yet it is possible that, as in so many aspects of French life, a reaction had set in by 1789, for the more atheistic philosophy of Diderot had quite given way to the teachings of Rousseau, in which the idea of God played no small logical part. There was, however, no appreciable return to the church, and the conduct of leading ecclesiastics, as well as the enforced privations of the curates and vicars, made ecclesiastical influence ineffective.

Along with this decay of faith came a sudden, though natural, outburst of credulity among the *bourgeoisie* and nobles. In some ways this credulity was to have unexpected results. Believers in occultism joined themselves into the enigmatical society of the Illuminati, which was supposed to have lodges in all parts of France, and whose mysterious symbols, "L. P. D.," came later to be interpreted as *Lilia pedibus distrue*—"trample the lilies (of the house of Bourbon) under foot." And there was Lavater, who could read men's futures in their faces, and Mesmer, who, driven politely from Vienna, came to Paris with his animal magnetism to win enormous popularity and fees, though at the end to be put to flight by a royal investigating commission of physicians. And besides these there were not a few others—Cazatte, Montgolfier, Babœuf, Puységur. But most fantastic of all the prophets whom the emancipated Parisians—and such provincials as were received—went out to see and to bring in to honour was one Cagliostro. This magnificent charlatan began his career one can hardly say when, but in 1781 he was astonishing the people of Strassburg by his cures. He was

one of the Illuminati, but exceeded the boldest of that body. He declared he had been a friend of Abraham, had been one of the guests at the wedding in Cana, and had discovered the art of living forever. His mighty gift of lying fairly dazzled society into taking him at his own valuation. De Rohan, a cardinal of the church, is said to have erected to him a marble bust with an inscription hailing him as God of the earth. His cures were counted miracles. He was said to make diamonds out of nothing. His charities were boundless, his wealth apparently limitless. Altogether he is the most splendid rascal of his sort one meets in history. But he was no more ready to deceive than society was eager to be duped. Take, for instance, his resurrection of D'Alembert, the atheist, one of the writers of the *Encyclopédie*. Cagliostro gathered his audience at three in the morning and placed them in front of an iron chain and put out the light. A mysterious voice bade all unpleasant reptiles and un-free men depart. A gleaming chair appeared, with the words *Philosophy, Nature, Truth* successively appearing above it. The chain rattled, and in the chair appeared a skeleton wrapped in a winding-sheet. It was D'Alembert, long since dead. He could hear, but could not speak aloud. Cagliostro, however, knew what he *would* say! So they questioned him. Among others, some one asked him if he had seen the other world. True to his pre-mortal unbelief the ghostly philosopher replied, "There is no other world." It does not seem to have been asked whence, if there were no other world, the spectre came. Such scepticism would have been unworthy of these sceptics!

It was inevitable that in this breaking down of religious authority and faith, morality itself should also have lost its authoritative elements, and to this cause must

be largely attributed the spectacle of a polite society almost perfect in its outer habits lost in perverse immorality and selfishness.

All this in time was to react with fearful violence upon the church itself. The sight of the luxury of the higher clergy, righteous indignation that they should wring their dues from peasants already overburdened with taxes, were working in many parts of France a fierce hatred of clergy and church alike. If the Revolution seems godless, the cause is to be found not only in the widespread distrust of all authority not in accord with "reason" and natural rights, but also in the church of the Old Régime.

Yet a just estimate of this anti-ecclesiastical attitude will include the fact that it had not separated the great body of Frenchmen from the Catholic religion. Their desire was not for the abolition of the church, but for its reform. This fact explains the opposition to the legislation forcing a civil status upon the clergy and the confiscation of the church lands. Radicals in France did not share in this loyalty, but notwithstanding their influence over the government established by the Revolution in Paris, they did not voice the heart of the masses. In the vast majority of the *cahiers* this loyalty can be seen implied. In all their demands and complaints there is not one calling for the destruction of the ancient religion. Radical minorities were to face opposition to such attempts from many sections of France besides La Vendée.

CHAPTER VI

THE DISINTEGRATION OF AUTHORITY BY PHILOSOPHY

Montesquieu: 1. Early Life; 2. Position as to Monarchy and the State; 3. Effect of His Work. II. The Physiocrats. III. Voltaire: 1. Early Life and Remarkable Talents; 2. His Attitude toward Religion and the Church; 3. His Chief Significance. IV. The Encyclopedists: 1. Hostility to Religion; 2. General Destructive Influence. V. Rousseau: 1. Early Life; 2. Dijon Essays; 3. *The Social Contract*; 4. His Extraordinary Influence on Society and Politics. VI. The Absence of Intellectual Freedom in France.

The French Revolution was in large measure due to the passion for liberty and equality aroused by the great philosophical movement which swept over Europe during the eighteenth century. In no period of the world's history, except, perhaps, our own age, has thought been more active than in France during the half-century just preceding the Revolution. And there was no more potent agent in the destruction of the monarchy than the philosophy that seemed to many the chief ornament of the reigns of Louis XV. and Louis XVI.

But France did not furnish the original material for this thought; that was done by the thinkers of Germany, and especially of England. Ideas, some one has said, have to pass through France to be popularized. Whether or not this is true universally, it is certainly true of that peculiarly revolutionary thought which spread over all the western world in the eighteenth century.¹ The mediating office of the French may be said to have first been filled by

¹ On the influence of English on French thought in the eighteenth century, see Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, I, ch. 12.

the great political philosopher Montesquieu.¹ Born of a noble family, and inheriting from his uncle the important and lucrative office of president of the Parlement of Bordeaux, after a few years of official life he sold his place and devoted himself to travel. He went to England in 1729 as a friend of Lord Chesterfield, and immediately devoted himself to the study of its constitution. England seemed to him "the most free country in the world." From this visit may probably be dated his bias in favour of the English form of monarchy.

The fundamental purpose of his political philosophy was the discovery of some absolute, natural standard of justice by which all laws might be tested and to which they should conform. But unlike some of his contemporaries, Montesquieu finds this standard in human reason. "Law in general is human reason in so far as it governs all the nations of the earth; and the political and civil laws of each nation should be but the particular cases to which that human reason is applied." And he goes on to say that "the government most in conformity with nature is that whose particular disposition is most in accord with the disposition of the people for which it is established."²

Over against current French ideas he declared that "the conjunction of the wills of individuals constitutes a state," and that laws "should be adapted in such a manner to

¹ Montesquieu's epoch-making work, *Esprit des Lois* (English translation by Nugent, *Spirit of the Laws*), was published in 1748. It had been preceded in 1734 by his almost equally famous book, *Considerations sur les Causes de la Grandeur et de la Décadence des Romains*, which is the first serious attempt in modern times at presenting a philosophy of history. Previous to these works he had published, in 1721, *Lettres Persanes*, a satire sometimes licentious but always witty, upon the France of the Regency.

² *Esprit des Lois*, bk. i, c. 3

the people for whom they are framed, that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit another.”¹ Yet here he halts. A republic, he thought, could naturally have only a small territory, for in a large republic—and his words, written before 1748, were, of course, those of total ignorance of any such republic—he supposed public good would be “sacrificed to a thousand private views.” A monarchy, he goes on to say, should be of moderate rather than either small or great size; and he could see for an empire no possible form of government but a despotism in which “the law should be derived from a single person.”² All this is far from revolutionary teaching; and how conservative he was appears also in these words: “It is sometimes necessary to change certain laws, but the case is rare; and when it comes they ought to be touched only with a trembling hand”; and perhaps even more in his assertion that political, like moral good, lies between extremes.³

So far as a correct philosophy of the state is concerned, Montesquieu was often far astray. His erudition, though great, was often superficial, and sometimes invalidated his generalizations. He magnifies the influence of natural forces like climate and soil; he does not perceive clearly the distinction between absolute and responsible rulers; and although he recognizes the necessity of a division of the three functions of a state, he does not insist upon the independence of the judiciary. The effect of his work, marked as it was by profound learning and sober judgment, was greater in England and America than in France; yet even in France it served to bring into sharp relief the burdens and inequalities of a nation so far removed from

¹ *Esprit des Lois*, bk. i, ch. 3.

² *Esprit des Lois*, bk. viii, chs. 16-20.

³ *Esprit des Lois*, bk. xxix, ch. 1.

anything like legal uniformity or the enjoyment of universal justice. But more important, it ushered in that great philosophical crusade of which Quesnay and the Physiocrats, Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, were the leaders. Beside the radicalism of these philosophers the moderation of Montesquieu is very marked; to the philosophers themselves it was immeasurably hateful.¹

At the same time that Montesquieu was laying the foundations for modern political science, François Quesnay and Jean Claude Marie Vincent were laying the foundations for modern economics. The so-called Mercantilist school of economists had held that national wealth depends upon the accumulation of precious metals by a country and the consequent maintenance of a "favourable" balance of trade. Agriculture had therefore been neglected, and commerce emphasized. The result of these teachings had been that from the time of their great French champion, Colbert, the minister of Louis XIV., government had devoted itself to the regulation of trade by all sorts of subsidies and restrictions. But both in France and England, as men came under the influence of the philosophical impulse, such artificial notions grew unpopular,² and chiefly under the influence of Quesnay there grew up a school known as the Physiocrats, because of its insistence upon "nature." So far from regarding commerce as the sole source of a nation's wealth, the Physio-

¹The best biography of Montesquieu is Vian, *Vie de Montesquieu*. See further, Lowell, *Eve of French Revolution*, ch. 10; Flint, *Philosophy of History*, 262-280; Woolsey, *Political Science*, I, 168-171; Lévy-Bruhl, *History of Modern Philosophy in France*, ch. 5.

²Richard Cantillon was the forerunner of the new physiocratic school. See Jevons, *Contemporary Review*, June, 1881. His most important work, *Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en General*, has been republished (1892) in *Harvard University Publications*.

crats declared that however useful the calling of merchants might be, it was "sterile," since all their profits came ultimately from the farmer. It was but a legitimate outcome of these views when they taught that as the land was the sole source of wealth, so it should be the sole object of taxation. Further than this, they insisted upon the abolition of all governmental restrictions of an economic sort and upon perfect freedom of trade as a natural right. "*Laissez faire, laissez passer*" was the motto they would give to governments.¹ "Let every man be free to cultivate in his field such crops as his interest, his means, the nature of the ground, may suggest as rendering the greatest possible return"—these words of Quesnay are a truism to-day, but were almost revolutionary when the Royal Council, through an intendant, fixed for a town or parish the crop it should plant, under threat of severe punishment. But even more revolutionary was the implication, more or less explicitly drawn by the school, that government, though necessary so far as politics went, was a necessary evil, and that in the economic sphere every individual should be allowed his natural rights to labour when, where, and as he chose, and to enjoy the fruits of his labour subject to no indirect tax of any description. Monopolies and special privileges were not to be thought of.

With their technical teaching as to natural laws governing wages and profits, with their belief in a "natural value" for all commodities, with the elaborate exposition of the increase of the "net product" as the great desideratum in national economy—with all these, now, like other of their doctrines, hardly more than a part of the archæology of

¹ On the Physiocrats, see especially Lalor, *Cyclopedia of Political Economy*. Art. "Physiocrats"; Blanqui, *History of Political Economy*, ch. 32; Ingram, *History of Political Economy*, ch. 5; Small, *The Cameralists*.

economic science, we need not concern ourselves. But one must observe that in their general principles lay one source of an irrepressible conflict. Economic France was actually a mass of privilege, and to embody the teaching of the Physiocrat in law meant the destruction of privilege. And this was what Turgot, the greatest of the school, actually did while intendant at Limoges, and attempted to do during the few months he was minister of finance, with what success will appear presently.

But while the Physiocrats were seeking soberly to reform the scandalous economic condition of the nation, they were quite unnoticed in comparison with the Philosophers, whose chief virtues were abstract generalizations and an ability to appeal to elemental principles and passions.

Here again there is the revolt against the iniquity of privilege. The entire philosophy of the eighteenth century, in France and out of France—as witness the American Declaration of Independence—is concerned with rights—*natural rights*. Privilege and inequality—these were the ineradicable traits of the Old Régime. Equality of rights and the destruction of all authority not based on nature—these are the core of the teachings of Voltaire, the Encyclopedists, and Rousseau.

Obnoxious from its insincerity and pretensions, the church was the first representative of privilege and unnatural authority to provoke attack, and its most able, though by no means bitterest critic, was François Marie Arouet, better known from his assumed name, Voltaire.¹

Voltaire was born February 20, 1694. He received an

¹ On Voltaire, see Desnoiresterres, *Voltaire et la Société Française au XVIIIe Siècle*; Morley, *Voltaire*; Flint, *Philosophy of History*, 289-304; McCarthy, *French Revolution*, I, 40-56; Carlyle, *Essays* (Am. ed.), II, 5-78; Lévy-Bruhl, *History of Modern Philosophy in France*, ch. 6.

education at a Jesuit college, and later became the secretary of the French ambassador at the Hague. He lost this position because of a love affair, conducted, it almost seems, as a sort of experiment in philanthropy. Returning to France, he attempted to study law, but was held by the authorities to have published a poem against the Jesuits, and was thrown into the Bastille. Then he turned to literature, and composed the drama of *Œdipe*, though for lack of pen and ink it was not written until his release. Once free, he composed the *Henriade*, and mingled in the most brilliant society of the day. He became involved in a quarrel with a member of the Rohan family, who, finding the young poet more than his match in repartée, inveigled him from a reception into the street, where he was thoroughly beaten by lackeys. Voltaire rushed to a fencing-master, and after a month's practise, challenged the noble. Rohan refused to fight, and through family influence had Voltaire again thrown into the Bastille. After an imprisonment of six months, however, he was released, and immediately went to England. There he lived three years in closest touch with the English philosophers, most of whom, it will be recalled, were deists.

This sojourn in England was the turning-point in Voltaire's life. He had no love for a church and a nobility that had twice imprisoned him without trial, and on his return to the continent he threw himself passionately into the crusade against both, but especially against the former. From this time till his death, whether living with that most mathematical woman, Madame du Châtelet, or visiting and quarrelling with Frederick II. of Prussia, or enjoying the admiration—and fear—of all Europe in his retreat at Ferney, Voltaire was the most influential man of his age. His talent was almost universal. He was a good philosopher, a good scientist, a good historian, and a poet

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that barely missed being immortal. Nothing was foreign to his restless mind. One minute he is urging that dead people should be buried outside cities; at another he is an enthusiast for vaccination; now he writes volumes on physics; now he is experimenting with light; now he writes a history of Louis XIV. or Charles XII. of Sweden, whose charm men cannot yet escape; now he is a poet and a dramatist, who lives down a generation of hatred and dies, all but literally, of glory. But in all he is a master of satire and sarcasm that sting like acid; and in philosophy, history, science, poetry, theology, politics, satire, is he the incarnation of the disintegrating spirit of a century that played at omniscience and laughed at belief in omniscience.

He was no atheist; rather he was a deist. "If there were no God, we should have to create one," he said; and at Ferney he erected a little chapel bearing this inscription, *Deo erexit Voltaire*. And God must be just and intelligent. "I had rather," he says in *Candide*, "worship a limited than a wicked God. I cannot possibly offend him when I say: 'Thou hast done all that a powerful, kind, and wise being could do. It is not thy fault if thy works cannot be as good and perfect as thou art.'" Yet at the same time so completely was he under the influence of his age's reaction against the church that he was capable of appreciating religion only in the same proportion as it was not characteristically Christian. Nor is it quite true that, as Carlyle says, the doctrine of the "plenary inspiration of the Scriptures is the single wall against which, through long years, and with innumerable battering-rams and catapults and popguns, he unweariedly battered."¹ It is rather against the arrogant infallibility of the church of

¹ Carlyle, *Essays*, II (Am. ed.), 60.

his day, whether Roman or Protestant; its insistence to the extent of persecution upon the necessity of accepting its doctrines; its hostility to free thought; its asceticism; its hypocrisy. Being naturally without veneration, and inimitable in his power of satire, in giving vent to this hatred he probably did more than any man of his time to break down the foundations of regard for religious authority that also support regard for authority in general. Yet however much he sought to rid men's minds of superstition; however much—as in the case of the unjustly imprisoned heretic, Calas—he proved himself the champion of religious liberty; however much his life exhibited charity—it is hard for his most ardent admirer to construct from his writings a positive system of thought in any department, and least of all in politics. Here he is in sharpest contrast to his radicalism in theology. A man without land, he maintained, had no more right to have a share in government than a clerk had the right to manage his employer's business. But none the less, Voltaire must be credited with having done more than any other man of his day to destroy the intellectual inertia in France that made abuse possible. If the Reformation had its Erasmus as well as its Luther, so the Revolution had its Voltaire as well as its Mirabeau.

But Voltaire was to be outdone as the destroyer of the bases of ecclesiastical and political authority. In 1727 Ephraim Chambers published, in England, the first genuine encyclopedia, and Denis Diderot was employed to edit the French translation of the work.¹ Diderot was already famous in the literary world, both for his brilliant fal-

¹ On the Encyclopedists, see Morley, *Diderot and the Encyclopedists*; Lowell, *Eve of French Revolution*, chs. 16, 17; Taine, *Ancient Régime*, 216-211; Lévy-Bruhl, *History of Modern Philosophy in France*, ch. 7.

sifications and for his literary style, and in undertaking the task he was not content merely to reproduce the English work. Associating with himself as a co-worker D'Alembert, and enlisting the aid of nearly every literary man in France, he set about the enormous task of issuing a work that, in his own words, should "bring together all that had been discovered in science, what was known of the productions of the globe, the details of the arts which men have invented, the principles of morals, those of legislation, the laws which govern society, the metaphysics of language and the rules of grammar, the analysis of our faculties, and even the history of our opinions." The first volume appeared in 1751, and the second in January, 1752. A month later the work was suppressed by the Council as dangerous to royal authority and religion. None the less, the publication was continued, until in 1757 the work had reached the end of the letter G. Then, because of a most radical book of Helvetius, one of the leading Encyclopedists, the storm broke out again, and it was not until 1765 that the remaining volumes were delivered to subscribers.¹

The philosophical opinions contained in the Encyclopedia itself are by no means conservative, as its history may very well suggest, but it gave its name to the group of scholars and philosophers most intimately concerned in its production, and the philosophical and political opinions expressed in other works of these Encyclopedists were radical in the extreme. In religion they did not stop with the deism of Voltaire, plead with them though he might, but they attacked not only Christianity, but im-

¹ In 1772, eleven volumes of plates appeared; in 1776, four supplementary volumes of text; in 1777, a supplementary volume of plates; in 1780, a table of contents in two volumes. The work passed through many editions.

mortality and God as well. If, according to Voltaire, God wound up the universe like a clock, and then from unknown space watched it go, according to Diderot, D'Alembert, Helvetius, Holbach, and their confrères there never was any God, and the universe wound up itself. In politics they were quite as extreme. As for morality, Diderot will have none of such conventions as marriage, and champions the most extreme of free-love doctrines. He finds in the "natural," the uncivilized man the ideal being, and believes that he continues to live in every person. To give this "natural man" free scope was the ideal of the Encyclopedist school. Government was "a mere handful of knaves" who impose their yoke upon men. "We see," they said, "on the face of the globe only incapable, unjust sovereigns, enervated by luxury, corrupted by flattery, depraved through unpunished license, and without talent, morals, or good qualities."

And all this philosophical madness was set forth with such a wealth of learning and such a delightful self-assurance that the philosophers of France and the brilliant talkers of the salons were soon atheists and anarchists of the most fashionable sort.

This doctrine of the "natural man" brings us face to face with a character of most contradictory traits, but of immense importance, Jean Jacques Rousseau.¹

¹ The literature upon Rousseau is voluminous. The best in French is by Saint Marc Girardin and the best in English by Morley. Lowell, *Eve of the French Revolution*, contains two admirable chapters, 18, 19; McCarthy, *French Revolution*, I, ch. 5, contains much interesting material. His general philosophy of history is well treated in Flint, *Philosophy of History*, 305-314; his political views, by Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, ch. 3, as well as by most writers on politics. See, for instance, Woolsey, *Political Science*, I; Schlosser, *History of the Eighteenth Century*, I, 285-314. A good English translation of the *Contrat*

Rousseau was born in Geneva, June 28, 1712. His father was a man of little kindness, and when his son was but a boy deserted him after having bound him over to a cruel master. Rousseau fled from the abuse to which he was subjected, and after a variety of vicissitudes in low life, all of which he tells with sentimental frankness in his *Confessions*, he finally became an inmate of the house of a lady of rather accommodating morals, who was to play no small rôle in his life, Madame de Warens. After ten or a dozen years, being unable to endure the presence of a rival lover in the singular family circle, Rousseau went to Paris. There, now a man of thirty, he found the back doors—so to speak—of the literary world open to him, though he produced little or nothing for several years. In the meantime he copied music and collected plants for botanists, and thus supported himself and an illiterate maidservant, Thérèse Levasseur, by whom he had five children, each of whom he promptly sent to the foundling asylum.¹ When thirty-seven years of age, he tells us in the *Confessions*,² he lay down one hot day under a tree and happened to read in a newspaper that the Academy of Dijon offered a prize for the best essay upon the question, "Whether the Progress of the Arts and Sciences has tended to corrupt or improve morals?" Whereupon he wept for half an hour, then went home, wrote an essay to establish the negative answer, won

Social is that by Tozer (1895). See further, Brunetière, *History of French Literature*, ch. 3; Lévy-Bruhl, *History of Modern Philosophy in France*, ch. 8.

¹ It was characteristic of Rousseau to make a sentimental reference to this fact in the first book of *Emile*. He apparently thought that he had not sufficient courage or ability to give practically that education the theory of which he described with so much charm. See further, Morley, *Rousseau*, I, 119-129.

² Part ii, bk. 8.

the prize—and the “Gospel of Jean Jacques” had been born! Civilization he knew to be a curse, and the natural man the ideal of life.

It was nothing new. Philosophers for hundreds of years had taught the beauty of nature and the natural man; but Rousseau made the teaching dynamic in all departments of social life.

The works with which he accomplished this end were *On the Inequality among Men*, published in 1753; the *New Héloïse*, published in 1759; the *Social Contract*, published in 1761; and *Émile*, in 1762. It is hard to systematize their teachings, so miscellaneous and often—even in the case of teachings as to civilization itself—so conflicting are they. There is practically nothing in the whole range of human experience upon which he does not give advice. Gardens, babies with colic, music, property, morals, swaddling-clothes, the proper shade-trees, illicit love, music, God, nursing mothers, all alike are considered. But back of the rambling discussions of his undoubted genius we can discover one fundamental passion—to rationalize the condition of humanity; to break down its artificial civilization, its unjust governments, and to turn men back to nature. Now this is something more than the negation of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists. Rousseau was not an iconoclast; his temper of mind was intensely constructive. And what is more, he was in earnest; and by his insistent cry of “Back to Nature!” he made a new era.

Just what Rousseau meant by Nature and the natural man is somewhat hard to say. Although he idealizes the American Indians, he distinctly says that the “natural” condition never existed on the earth;¹ and even if this

¹ In his essay *On the Inequality among Men*.

be purely formal concession to an orthodox censor of the press, he knows nothing about primitive men to justify the ideal. In fact, all his "natural" men are pure imaginations—first cousins to the "economic" men of political economy. Yet this fact made no difference in the influence of his writings. Real or unreal, back to nature men tried to go.

In some directions the cry led to rational improvement. Rousseau became the founder of a sort of cult among the fashionable and intellectual classes. His *New Héloïse*, for instance, could not be bought, so great was the demand, and each volume was let out at twelve sous an hour. Women of fashion sat up all night to read it. And it was more than a mere dissipation; it all but remade social ideals. Mothers who had forgotten they had babies began to nurse them; boys and girls who had been laced and powdered and taught gallantry ran out to play. Frenchmen came to love natural landscapes, and to grow suspicious of their beautifully regular gardens with their trees cut into impossible shapes. The world of fashion, even, liked to play at being *au naturel*, and the queen herself had little farmhouses built in the great park of Versailles, and there, in the very same marble-lined dairy of Petit Trianon which we visit to-day, she made butter and made believe she was a farmer's wife. Louis, too, since all men ought to learn a trade against coming revolution,¹ practised locksmithing, and loved to make strong-boxes—one of which was to bring him his death a few years later, when natural rights were being enjoyed. To this day education feels the influence of Rousseau's educational insight, for Pestalozzi was his pedagogical son, and every mother who sends her child to a kindergarten is

¹ *Emile*, bk. iii.

all unwittingly a fellow-scholar with Froebel in the school of *Émile*.¹

But even more influential and radical was the political philosophy of Rousseau. Utterly ignorant of the facts given modern scholars by anthropology and comparative politics, in his political theories Rousseau was wholly at the mercy of classical antiquity and *à priori* theory. Never having seen a "natural" man, he constructed him as he saw fit. And the result was a savage who was also a saint, for "coming from the hand of the Author of all things, everything is good."² His saintliness indeed vanished, but only because he had become less a savage and had devised private property in land. Civilization was, therefore, a curse, and the wise man's ambition would be to free himself from its destructive influences.

This in the two Dijon essays. In the *Social Contract* he quite abandons this position, leaves his savages enjoying the thin air of theory, and seeks with sober sense to discover the real basis upon which the modern state may safely rest. His search is no longer for a "natural man," but for practicable liberty and equality—the two virtues most prominent by their absence in the France of his day. Nor does he any longer regard private property in land as evil; it is rather assumed as a fundamental fact in society. Even his equality is equality before the law. But one thing he still holds: "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains." Freedom and equality were, he held, to be gained by the recognition of the—purely

¹ The *New Héloïse* so affected Thiébauld (*Memoirs*, I, 37) that when he reached St. Preux's last letter, he was "no longer weeping, but shrieking and howling like a wild animal." He dared not read any more of the book for a week, and then only a half or quarter of a page at a sitting.

² *Émile*, bk. i.

imaginary—fact that the state is the outcome of a compact between men, in which each “places in common his person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general will.” This corporate body thus formed constituted the true sovereign. Each citizen is a member of the sovereign. The will of this sovereign people is not only absolute, it is, though not always wise, always right. It therefore must constitute the law, and if it allowed the king to reign, it would be only that he might prevent the clashing of individual interests. This is almost the only concession Rousseau makes to the actual facts of political history.

When he passes on to carry out this general political conception into actual life, his thought of necessity grew thoroughly *à priori*. “What is the government?” he asks. “An intermediate body established between the subjects and the sovereign for their mutual correspondence, charged with the execution of the laws and with the maintenance of liberty, both civic and political.”¹ As the sovereign and the subjects would be, according to his philosophy, the same people, government cannot be a distinct political entity. It is at this point the revolutionary implication is unavoidable. Strictly speaking, Rousseau recognizes no contract between subjects and rulers. The latter are simply organs of the people itself, and may be dismissed at any moment. “It is contrary,” says Rousseau, “to the nature of the body politic for the sovereign to impose upon itself a law which it can never change.” Therefore—though Rousseau hardly dares put it quite so distinctly—therefore, a sovereign people may depose its servant king!

But it must be remembered that Rousseau cared nothing

¹ *Social Contract*, bk. iii, ch. I.

for what we call a republic. He seems even sometimes to prefer an elective aristocracy. But such an aristocracy would be only the servant of the people. Representative government he would not have; meetings should be held frequently, in which every citizen should vote on every question, for the "general will" alone is right.¹ Further, by pushing his theory of the infallibility of majorities and the subsequent subjection of the individual to the community, Rousseau at the same time that he preached this absolute democracy, preached—although he denied it—a democratic despotism. "As nature gives each man," says he, "absolute power over his own limbs, so the social contract gives the body politic absolute power over its members and makes it the master of their possessions." There are to be, according to Rousseau, no checks upon this sovereign people except compulsory religion. The sovereign people should banish all those who say there is no salvation outside the church, and all those who say there is no God.

In the light of modern political history it is not difficult to see the weakness in this theory of Rousseau. There never was any such compact between men, and civilization is not a curse, but a perpetuation of what in the main must be regarded as blessings. Popular sovereignty as he conceived of it is a chimera and a seductive fallacy. His demand that all citizens should take part in all deliberations would result either, as Voltaire prophesied, in anarchy, or as the Revolution demonstrated, in the tyranny of the mob and the Club. His disregard of minorities and his relentless subjection of the individual to the sovereign is not liberty. Indeed, his entire philosophy logically would end not in liberty, but in equality under a

¹ Probably Rousseau was influenced in this by his experience with the city democracies of Switzerland.

new sort of despotism. But after all this is admitted, there remains one magnificent thought—the rationality of society. And a rational society could be trusted to govern itself.

For a country in the condition of France this conception, if once universally joined with social discontent, meant reform or revolution. The traditional authority which was the very basis of the Old Régime was taken away before men realized the portentous fact. Natural rights, thanks to Rousseau, had become the very acid of disintegration. That he succeeded in getting this great principle diffused throughout France, and indeed in the works of others throughout the world, gave his great significance to Rousseau. But he has yet a more specific importance. Not only was he a philosophical leaven, but to many he was an all but inspired prophet. Men tried to put his entire political gospel into operation—and its evangelists were Robespierre and St. Just, and its millenium was the Terror.

One thing more, however, must be said. This great intellectual activity is not to be interpreted as arguing intellectual freedom in France. Madame de Staël was correct when she declared that the liberty of thought that characterizes the last days of an absolutism are evidence not of tolerance, but of weakness. In nothing was this weakness more apparent than in the attempts made to limit the freedom of the press. Few works of any importance failed to bring their authors into trouble. "An author or a bookseller was forced to be as careful as a kidnapper of coolies or the captain of a slaver would be in our own time. He had to steer clear of the court, of the parliament, of Jansenists, of Jesuits, of the mistresses of the king and the minister, of the friends of the mis-

tresses, and above all, of that organized hierarchy of ignorance and oppression in all times and places when they raised their masked heads—the bishops and ecclesiastics of every sort and condition.”¹ The Parlement of Paris and the other sovereign courts, the court of the Châtelet, even an ordinary tribunal of justice, had the right to burn publicly any writing judged to be contrary to religion, morals, or the state, and nearly every great work of the eighteenth century shared this fate.² The arrest of the authors, printers, dealers, as well as the confiscation of all discoverable copies, followed whenever possible,³ and there were few famous French authors in the century who did not taste the bitterness of the Bastille or of exile. It is this fact that gives a certain moral worth to even the worst of the literature of the period. If men wrote recklessly, they also wrote bravely. In the case of the philosophers this must excuse much exaggerated misunderstanding of religion and morals. They were in earnest and they were in danger, and in some strange way one is thus forced to give Voltaire and Diderot, D’Alembert and Rousseau some of the credit we give the martyrs of the church they attacked.

To trace the process by which this struggle against intellectual tyranny, this extravagant love for abstract politics and this hatred of inherited authority became united with economic and political discontent, and so produced a new French spirit, is the work of another chapter.

¹ Morley, *Rousseau*, II, 56; see also his *Diderot*, ch. 6.

² It is said, however, that the hangman sometimes threw waste-paper into the fire instead of the books, and that these latter were afterward found in the library of the judge!

³ For details, see Monin, *L’État de Paris en 1789*, 467–478; Rocquain, *L’Esprit révolutionnaire avant la Révolution*, 491–535, gives a list of works condemned from 1715–1789.

GENERAL REFERENCES TO ENGLISH LITERATURE.—On the Old Régime, the most brilliant work is that of Taine, *The Ancient Régime*, but there are others of great value: De Tocqueville, *France before the Revolution of 1789*; Arthur Young, *Travels in France during the Years 1787-9*; Lowell, *The Eve of the French Revolution*; Dabney, *The Causes of the French Revolution*; Kingsley, *The Ancient Régime*; Rocquain, *The Revolutionary Spirit*; Stryienski, *The Eighteenth Century*. Briefer accounts will be found in Louis Blanc, *History of the French Revolution*, Introduction; Alison, *History of Europe*, X, First Series, I, 1-60; Buckle, *History of Civilization*, I, chs. 8-14; McCarthy, *French Revolution*, I, chs. 1-14; Watson, *The Story of France*, I, chs. 37-39.

Among memoirs, those of Madame Campan and of Baron Besenval are especially full of descriptions of the life at Versailles. The biography of *Marie Antoinette*, by Saint-Amand, is interesting, but hardly unprejudiced. The same can be said of Mason, *The Women of the French Salons*. Much valuable historical material is also contained in the delightful novel of Ereckmann-Chatrion, *The States General*, and to a less degree in the stories of Dumas.

PART II

THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION

CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT UNDER LOUIS XV.

- I. Revolutions the Result of Spiritual Forces. II. The Struggle for Religious Freedom. III. The Parlement of Paris and Its Struggle with Louis XV. over the Bull *Unigenitus*. IV. The Crisis of 1753-4. V. The New Influence of Philosophy. VI. The *Coup d'État* of 1771. VII. The Liberal Spirit in the Various Classes of France: 1. The Nobles; 2. The Clergy; 3. The Masses of the City and the Provincials. VIII. The Moral Weakness of the New Spirit. IX. Its Universality.

The difference between a revolt and a revolution in the last analysis is a question of success. If a revolt is unable to destroy existing constitutional forms, it is a political crime, and its leaders are punished as traitors. If, however, it is able to bring about constitutional change, it becomes itself master of the state and its sympathizers become the government. Then it is properly called a revolution.¹ A comparison of pre-revolutionary epochs, however, makes this statement mean either too much or too little. The success of any uprising against an existing

¹ The most important work upon this subject is, perhaps, Lombroso, *La Crime politique et la Révolution*, although few would probably assent to some of the author's statements as to the physical conditions most potent in inducing social upheavals. Le Bon, *The Psychology of Revolution*, is a penetrating study of the psychological elements in the French Revolution.

government which is of enough significance to warrant being called a revolution is something more than a triumph of mere physical force. It is not pathological but physiological; an evidence of life, a spiritual movement—the result of a struggle of men with ideals against men with legalized privileges. Socialized desires are suppressed with ever increasing difficulty. The heart of an entire people is more than the deeds of desperate men. And therefore one must expect to find that dreams of betterment and disgust at abuses which overcome restraint and leap forth at some moment to remake constitutions are the children of long pedigrees. A revolution no more than a state is born in a day, and the Revolution in France was no more the outgrowth of sudden passion than it was of mere misery. To understand it one should study other similar movements. These have seldom been comparable in outcome or extent, although the changes in Russia now in progress are even more titanic. Revolutions as distinct from revolts are rare. Lombroso counts 7,224 revolts in the Middle Ages. There are said to have been 836 between 1791 and 1880.

Pre-revolutionary epochs have been marked by general characteristics. Chief among these are (1) an appreciable recovery from economic depression; (2) an awakening of class-consciousness due to a variety of causes, chief among which are discontent born of economic and social inequality, the agitation of radicals, the re-grouping of those living under similar economic conditions and the formulation of new demands for privileges; (3) the prevalence of widespread criticism seeking to modify or destroy existing authority; (4) the attempt to retain privileges or to make concessions without abandoning the grounds of privilege. When these conditions are widespread only a strong government is able to repress the revolts which inevitably

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occur. If no such government exists, the attempt at reform is liable to result in repeated revolts, until the basis of national administration is destroyed, concessions become surrender to disorder, and the forces of change burst forth unrestrained.

The French Revolution sprang from the co-operation of all these conditions. The weakness of government, the maddening sense of inequality, the unequal participation of Frenchmen in the economic recovery of the early years of Louis XVI. have already been sketched. We have also considered how political discontent was reinforced by a philosophy which undermined the very basis of inherited authority. Thus a revolution is more than a sociological fact. It must be studied historically as a series of events expressing and, as authority grows weaker, developing a new social mind bent upon new equality and rights.

As regards political discontent, the development of the revolutionary spirit in France may be traced from the days of the Regency, but even then its chief element was a heritage from the last bigoted days of Louis XIV. The germ of revolution was the purely ecclesiastical struggle for religious liberty between two parties of the Roman Church, the Ultramontanes and the Jansenists. Into the details of this controversy as it raged over the questions of papal infallibility, Augustinianism, Pelagianism, divine grace, and righteousness of works, it is quite unnecessary to enter. But it is indispensable to note that in 1713 the Jesuits procured from Pope Clement XI. the bull *Unigenitus*, by which one hundred and one of the Jansenist positions were pronounced heretical and proscribed. February 14, 1714, its provisions were registered by the Parlement of Paris as a law of the nation. Church and state grew thus united in opposition to free thought.

Although the death of Louis XIV prevented the enforcement of the new law, throughout the ministry of Fleury persistent efforts were made to crush the Jansenists by the use of the powers of the state, and the "constitution" of the bull became the issue of a generation's constitutional struggles. In 1730 Fleury forced through the Parlement or High Court of Paris a law making it obligatory upon all ecclesiastics to accept the bull.¹ A few of the higher clergy, many of the lower clergy, the magistrates, the *bourgeoisie*, the people at large, were at one in their hostility to the high-handed measures of the court. The question became political. The Parlement of Paris resisted to the very limit of obedience, but to no purpose. Its president on wishing to speak was told by the king to keep quiet—"Taisez vous." Several members of the Parlement were exiled, and in 1732 its powers were distinctly decreased. The people of Paris, as well as of all France, who—not quite correctly—saw in the Parlement the representative of the nation, became deeply involved in the struggle, now no longer a question of creed, but of the powers of Parlement, the one means of checking absolutism.

The succession of wars in which France became involved during the second quarter of the eighteenth century quieted domestic disputes, but at each lull in the military storm the effort of Fleury to crush the Jansenist party

¹The Parlements were judicial, not legislative, bodies. The importance of the Parlement of Paris was great, since no decree of the king could become a law until the Parlement had formally registered it. Its only power of resistance lay in refusal to register, but even in such a case the king could force it to do his will or exile it if it still was disobedient. On the Parlements, see Desmazes, *Le Parlement de Paris*; Bastard d'Estang, *Les Parlements de France*. A summary of the history of the Parlement of Paris is in Stephens, *French Revolution*, I, 4, 5.

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was renewed. Opposition on the part of the Parlement increased. The reverses of the French arms in the wars of the Austrian succession were not sufficient to arouse Louis XV. to the necessity of political reform, and the state remained under the astonishing leadership of the king's mistresses and Cardinal Fleury. Thought grew more restrained, and in 1742 an order of the Council destroyed the liberty of the press and made it a crime to have in one's possession books "injurious to good morals."

The death of Fleury in 1743, and the consequent assumption of the responsibilities of royalty by Louis XV., brought little relief. War continued, and the consequent drafting of troops furnished the occasion of seditious outbreaks in the workingmen's *faubourg* (or ward) in Paris, St. Antoine, which was later to be so puissant in affairs of state. D'Argenson wrote in 1743, "Revolution is certain in the state." But he was mistaken. France had not yet been divorced from a regard for ancient authorities or concentrated on elemental justice. Discontent in itself is incapable of producing a revolution, and when in the next year Louis XV. announced that he would be at once a better king and a better man, all evidences of discontent were lost in national rejoicing. Ultramontanism in the Council was repressed, a champion of toleration, D'Argenson, was put in charge of foreign affairs. Literature, instead of being the object of government suspicion, was befriended; and even Voltaire, in 1764, was authorized by Louis XV. to present himself as a candidate for membership in the Academy. The church at the same time ceased from religious persecution.

But the quiet was of but short duration, and absolutism again soon exerted itself in restrictions. The Parlement was told that the bull *Unigenitus* contained "the law of church and state," and a vote of Parlement to the contrary

was annulled by an order of the Council of State. The continuance of war not only brought desolation to the nation, but new taxes were imperative. Parlement, as far as it dared, remonstrated with the king, but to no purpose. Popular discontent grew marked. In vain the government gave great fêtes to the people at the establishment of peace. No one shouted *Vive le roi!* and the crowd burned one of the triumphal arches. Peace itself brought new complaints, for the government broke its promises of remitting certain war taxes.

The appearance of Montesquieu's great work upon the *Spirit of the Laws* drew public attention to fundamental political principles, and Parlement after Parlement refused to sanction the continued collection of the war tax of *dixième*, or ten per cent.¹ Government not choosing to yield all at once, attempted to substitute a tax of *vingtième*, or five per cent. The Parlement of Paris at first refused to register the law, but later did so, though entering upon their records the statement that they did so only at "the express command of the king."

Religious persecution broke out again at the same time, and France was in consequence everywhere swept by fierce hostility to the Ultramontane party. At the same time all classes united in open criticism of the king's life and administration. Church and state, thus united in disregard of the rights of the people, were henceforth to be equally the object of attack. Everywhere there was agitation, and a crisis was reached in 1752-54. A certain Ultramontane priest had refused to give the last sacrament to a Jansenist priest, La Mère. The latter complained to the Parlement of Paris. That body ordered the Ultramon-

¹ They were those of Bordeaux, Aix, Pau, and Toulouse. It is to be noticed that thus early the provincial Parlements dared oppose the royal will.

tane to perform the proper offices to the dying man. The Royal Council promptly annulled the decree, and said it would attend to the matter itself. As a result, La Mère died without sacraments. Paris was thrown into the most extravagant excitement, and Parlement ordered the arrest of the offending priest. The king annulled this decree as well. Parlement replied by a decree forbidding the clergy to enforce the decrees of the bull *Unigenitus* against heretics. The Archbishop of Paris ordered forty hours' prayer "against the dangers threatening the faith," and appealed to the king. The public replied with numerous pamphlets. Parlement grew increasingly rebellious, and at last, on April 8, 1753, refused flatly, under penalty of incurring the royal disfavour, to register certain decrees enforcing obedience to the *Unigenitus* constitution. And thereupon, April 9th, it was exiled to Pontoise, and later to Soissons. Instantly it became more than ever a popular idol. Everywhere were heard and read, "Long live the Parlement! Death to the king and the bishops!" Opposition on the part of the provincial Parlements was unified, and under the direction of the exiled Parlement of Paris they began to solidify a universal opposition to church and state. Had the influence of the philosophers been as great in 1754 as in 1789, it is difficult to see why the Revolution should not have then broken out.¹

¹ D'Argenson, writing in May, 1753, expressly states that the opposition to the religion was not due to "the English philosophy," but to hatred against the priests. In June, 1754, he writes, "The revolution is more to be feared than ever. If it is to come to Paris, it will commence by the killing of priests in the streets." Rocquain, *L'Esprit révolutionnaire*, 170, 179. Rocquain (180, 181) goes on to show the advantages which would have accrued to France had the revolution come at this time rather than in 1789. And there can be little doubt that the generation which elapsed between the two crises did much

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In December, 1756, the king held a *lit de justice*,² in which Parlement was forced to register royal decrees that practically annihilated its own powers. All the excitement of two years previous was again in evidence, and again D'Argenson feared revolution. The *lit de justice* seemed to some "the last sigh of the dying royalty." More apprehensive souls thought that "Europe was threatened by a sinister revolution."

to bring destructive rather than reformatory forces to the front. In addition, Louis XV. would never have been the vacillating ruler his grandson proved to be.

¹ *Confessions*, pt. ii, bk. 8.

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Again superficial judgments showed themselves false, for the attempted assassination of Louis XV. by the wretched Damien, in January, 1757, led the government to take extreme measures. Members of different Parlements were banished, and even thrown into prison; leaders of both sides of the warring theological parties were also banished; troops were made ready, and a new law was promulgated punishing with death the publication of writings dangerous to the authority of church or state. These severe measures restrained popular feeling, but it broke out with renewed bitterness after the defeat of the French at Rosbach (1757), and the attempt to levy an additional tax in the shape of a "gift" upon all towns and villages in the nation. One of the numerous placards of the day maintained that three hundred thousand men, under a leader, were ready to take arms in support of a revolt.

All this developing spirit of unrest, it should be recalled, had by the middle of the eighteenth century been practically untouched by philosophy. So far is it from being true that Voltaire and Rousseau originated the Revolution. But discontent is neither unifying nor constructive. A nation must have an issue and an ideal if it is to be regenerated. It is therefore of the first importance to discover that just at this time the gathering opposition to historical authority should have found its theoretical justification in a philosophy at once destructive and constructive. Under its influence, the spirit of discontent entered rapidly upon a new stage—it became truly revolutionary. It now had those indispensable watchwords so necessary for a popular movement; it had its philosophical weapons with which to attack church, state, and privilege alike; every year it had suggested to it new ideals of political and social reconstruction. Hostility to the entire social

order began to appear. Liberalism grew destructive of privilege, the enemy of inequality of all sorts. After 1765¹ it was but a question of time before the results of this new spirit should appear. By 1771 the government was in despair. The recalcitrant Parlement of Paris, supported by popular opinion and the philosophy of the salons, could be neither cajoled nor threatened into doing the king's will. The church could give no aid, for the questions now under discussion had ceased to be ecclesiastical, and were purely civil, and the Jesuits had been suppressed by the Pompadour. At last, January 20, 1771, under the inspiration of the prime minister, Maupeou, Louis XV. executed a *coup d'état*. The members of Parlement were exiled, their property confiscated, and the Parlement itself completely suppressed. Before the year was out the provincial Parlements were also suppressed and their functions assumed by six new courts.

It would be historically incorrect to think of the Parlement of Paris, or the Parlements of other sections of France, as composed of pure-minded patriots. So far from being anything like the English Parliament, they had no true legislative powers. Their members belonged to the privileged classes, and wished nothing less than reform. As corporate bodies they were without exception corrupt and often cruel. Their members purchased their positions, and used them as served their ends best. Their very opposition to the king had been largely inspired by their determination to maintain their own privileges. But corrupt as it was, the Parlement of Paris in withstanding the king had become the mouthpiece of discontent. Now that it was

¹ It is worth remembering that it was also at just this time that the American colonies entered upon that course of action that led to the American Revolution.

abolished there was practically no body to oppose royal encroachments. So long as Louis XV. lived, it is true, resistance was reduced to riotings and pamphlets, but public opinion grew daily more determined to have some sort of expression of the national wishes. It was suggested that the States General—the one national body—should be recalled from the grave to which Louis XIII. had sent it in 1614. But the old king set himself fiercely against the proposal. “If my own brother were to make the suggestion to me,” he said once, in substance, “I would not wait twenty-four hours before executing him,” and he allowed his minister Maupeou to crush every corporate body that in any way dared oppose the royal will. But such severity could not endure, and among the first acts of Louis XVI. was the reinstatement of the suppressed Parlements, only to find that punishment had but increased their capacity for opposition—in his reign, unfortunately, to proposed reforms rather than to the encroachments of the sovereign.

The leaven of idealism was not to work only among hard-pressed lawyers and judges. The great enemy of the philosophers during the last days of Louis XV. was Siguier *avocat général*, and his apprehensions furnish a striking testimony to the extent of their influence. “The philosophers,” he says, “have set themselves up as teachers of the human race. Liberty of thought is their cry, and this cry has made itself heard from one end of the world to the other. With one hand they have attempted to shake the throne; with the other they have wished to overthrow the altars. Kingdoms have felt their ancient foundations totter, and the nations, astonished at seeing their principles annihilated, have asked by what fate they had become so different from themselves. In their numberless writings the philosophers have spread

abroad the poison of unbelief; eloquence, poetry, history, romance, even dictionaries have been infected. Scarcely have their writings been published in the capital, when they spread like a torrent in the provinces. The contagion has penetrated into workshops, and even into the huts of the peasants.”¹

As for the nobility, it is noteworthy that there were many who were under the influence of the ideals of the philosophers. Especially was this true of the old aristocracy—that “of the sword”—in which were numbered men like de La Fayette, d’Aiguillon, de Noailles, the two brothers de Lameth, de Montmorency, de La Rochefoucauld, together with many of the younger noblesse. The *cahiers* which were presented by the Second Estate in 1789 show no small influence of liberal thought. Thus at Paris the nobles direct their representatives to the States General to see to it that the new body draws up “an explicit declaration of the rights which belong to all men.”² The nobles of Clermont in Beauvois, Nantes, and Menton do the same. The nobility of the *bailliage* of Tours formally declared that they were “men and citizens before being nobles,” and declared that they would resign all privileges in the matter of taxation. To the meeting of the electors of the Third Estate in Berry, the Comte de Buzançois declared, “We are all brothers, and are anxious to share your burdens.” The nobles of Rheims petitioned the king to order the demolition of the Bastile.

These liberal nobles, however, constituted only a hopeful minority of their order, and few even of them were accustomed to political life, and were thus quite incapable of perceiving the practical results of their theories. Philos-

¹ Rocquain, *L’Esprit révolutionnaire*, 278.

² Chassin, *Cahiers*, 1789, II, 15.

ophy was for them, as has been said, "confined to the limits of speculation, and never seeking, even in its boldest flights, anything beyond a calm intellectual exercise."¹ The only exception of importance to this statement lies within the sphere of sentiment. Women of quality dined with the grocer-woman who had been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the release of Latude, a wretch who had been kept in prison thirty-five years for attempting a practical joke upon Madame de Pompadour. La Fayette disobeyed the order of the court, bought a frigate, and went to the aid of the colonies of America in their struggle for the "natural rights" set forth in the Declaration of Independence. In some regions the most influential men defended the peasant against the tax-collector, and a governor of one province delivered a course on bread-making. When these enthusiasts went further and preached doctrines of natural rights to the masses, results could not fail to be revolutionary. In truth the theorists of the eighteenth century were summoning a dangerous genius when they undertook to inspire restless, ignorant, ill-regulated minds with dreams of liberty. Revolutions do not spring from merely intellectual forces. The revolutionary spirit becomes mystical and the Cause a sort of religion. "Intellectuals" too often fail to see that what to them is rational idealism, may become to the masses provocation to violence in the name of justice. Voltaire put the matter to the Encyclopedists distinctly: "Philosophize between yourselves as much as you please. I fancy I hear dilettanti giving for their own pleasure a refined music; but take good care not to perform this concert before the ignorant, the brutal, the vulgar; they might break your instruments over your heads." It was this

¹ Morellet, *Mémoires*, I, 139; quoted by Taine, *Ancient Régime*, 279, n.

same sense of the danger attending the destructive philosophy of the day that led to Voltaire's other remark: "Atheism and fanaticism are two monsters which may tear society to pieces." But neither the Encyclopedists nor these philanthropic enemies of the privileges upon which they depended for their incomes saw the wisdom of the observation, and the ferment against authority and privilege was ever the greater.

Among the clergy, the overworked and underpaid curates and vicars, most of whom were Jansenist in sympathy, shared pretty generally in this hostility to privilege born of liberal sentiments, and among the higher clergy, strenuous for their rights as they were, there were some who were ready to assist their peasants to meet and overcome want. The Bishop of Castres directed his curates to see to it that potatoes are cultivated among their parishoners. The Archbishop of Paris gave a fortune to the hospital of the Hôtel Dieu. But the liberal clergy were far less doctrinaire in their chase after natural rights than were the liberals of other orders. The sense of need growing from actual contact with the poor, as well as a practical knowledge of the impossibility of educating them for reform, seems to have made the curates, despite their sense of injustice, less enthusiastic for change. Ecclesiastics as a class had never been very keen after novelties, and the French ecclesiastics of 1774-89 least of all.

Among the masses the same ideals were rapidly spreading. Discontent might well be permanent in a people embittered by abuse and filled with a suppressed hatred of inequality. Disorders increased as the government grew enervated. The annals of the time are full of violence, local revolts, riots, and protests. Philosophical teachings like Rousseau's found men waiting to receive them, or at least to read their own desires into general phrases.

"Popular sovereignty" became everywhere the dream of the artisans and the masses of the cities, especially of Paris. The peasants, it is true, could not have fully shared in the beautiful dreams of philosophy, but they began to feel that their discontent was being reinforced, and perhaps even quieted, by respectability. A poor woman in the neighbourhood of Metz, in July, 1789, could tell Arthur Young that "something was to be done by some great folk for such poor ones as she, though she did not know who nor how."¹ At the best, however, their notions, with those of the populace of Paris, could have been but crude. Even the provincial middle class struck Arthur Young as stupid. Everybody he found talking, but heard from them—at least in Metz—not one word for which he "would give a straw." "Take the mass of mankind," he goes on to say, "and you have more sense in half an hour in England than in half a year in France."² But there is no evidence of any widespread determination on the part of the peasants to have revenge. They were ready to poach upon their lord's preserves, and if need be to kill a gamekeeper, but they seldom did any violence to the lord or his family. Their ignorance and brutality, however, were capable of

¹ *Travels in France*, Bohn ed., 197.

² His journal abounds in similar comments. Thus, in August, 1789, he was in Moulins, a capital of a province and a considerable town, and found no newspaper in the leading café. "Here is a feature," he writes, "of national backwardness, ignorance, stupidity, and poverty. Could such a people as this ever have made a revolution or become free? Never in a thousand centuries. The enlightened mob of Paris, amid hundreds of papers and publications, have done the whole." A few days later in Clermont he writes: "I dined or supped four times at the table d'hôte, with from twenty to thirty merchants and tradesmen, officers, etc., and it is not easy to express the insignificance, the inanity of the conversation. The ignorance or the stupidity of these people must be absolutely incredible."

almost any excess under excitement, and therein lay danger. The *bourgeois* liberals, and the "intellectuals" of the *salons* sentimentalized over the goodness of humanity, but their sweetness and light served to reduce the vigour of the government. And if ever a strong administration and a courageous morality are needed, it is when concessions are to be made to popular discontent. And both these were lacking under the Old Régime.

For here we meet one lamentable characteristic of the revolutionary spirit as it developed during the reign of Louis XV. If it was mutinous and brutal among the worst of the people, among the best people it was morally selfish, or at best morally neutral. The Christian ideal had been lost in the legitimate contempt for selfish and hypocritical ecclesiastics, and the constructive work of the philosophers had been based upon *rights*, not upon *duties*. The more one reads the literature of the times, the more is he convinced that "Reason" was becoming a solvent of authority. Opposition to all the institutions of the social order was becoming contagious. Moral ideas had largely disappeared, not only in the relations of the sexes, but in general theory. It is not only that corruption was prevalent; the much-vaunted "fraternity" had become only a high-sounding bit of rhetoric. Liberty may be gained by violence, but never fraternity; indeed, without the supplementary and regulating concept of love, the demand for liberty and equality can lead only to violence. One must *give* justice as well as *get* justice. No man of the nineteenth century has better understood the revolutionary spirit than Mazzini, and this is the judgment he passes upon the Revolution: "The error of the French Revolution was not the abolition of monarchy. It was the attempt to build up a republic upon the theory of rights, which, taken alone, inevitably leads to the acceptance of *les faits accomplis*; upon

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the sovereignty of the *Ego*, which leads sooner or later to the sovereignty of the strongest *Ego*; upon the essentially monarchical methods of extreme centralization, intolerance, and violence; upon that false definition of life given by men educated by monarchy and inspired by a materialism which, having canceled God, has left itself nothing to worship but force.”¹

Before passing to the consideration of the succession of ill-managed and unsuccessful attempts under Louis XVI. to express this new spirit in the actual administration of the nation, one must recall the fact that this spirit of discontent and idealism was by no means confined to France. Indeed, it characterized the history of most of the western world during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Everywhere the *bourgeoisie* was demanding rights equal to its new powers. In France the revolutionary spirit went to extremes, because it was neither properly restrained nor directed, but the demand for “liberty” was sweeping over all lands. Jefferson in America, Richardson in England, Goethe and Schiller in Germany, were but a few of its representatives. The secret order of the Illuminati endeavoured to unite under mysterious vows all liberal spirits in Europe for the purpose of spreading revolutionary teachings. Politics were making discontent epidemic. The partition of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and Austria was the international counterpart of the suppression of Parlement by Louis XV.; yet, as it proved, it was not only an exhibition of irresponsible power, but also an unintentional step toward a formulation of international law. Joseph II.

¹ Essay on M. Renan and France. In the same essay, Mazzini has this fine statement: “Revolution is sacred and legitimate only when undertaken in the name of a new aim upon the path of progress, capable of ameliorating the moral, intellectual, and material condition of the whole people.”

of Austria,¹ by his arbitrary suppression of the ancient rights of Hungary and Bohemia, awoke that national feeling among the Czech subjects of the Hapsburgs that has compelled the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire. The same monarch, in 1784, brought the Austrian Netherlands to the verge of revolt by abolishing the privileges of the clergy and nobles in the Lowlands. The American colonies rose against the anachronistic obstinacies of George III. and not only achieved independence and statehood, but what was of far greater significance to the contemporary passion for doctrinaire politics, also proved, by the aid of the French army and navy, that "all men are created free and equal."

Thus as we look back upon the century, it is clear that the French Revolution was no sudden outbreak of passion, still less Carlyle's "explosion of gunpowder." It was rather a phase of a social evolution, traceable in Europe and America, in which the *bourgeoisie*, or middle class, came into control of many states, transformed a feudal into an industrial social order, developed modern capitalism, and organized modern democracy. The spirit of France had outgrown its irrational, impotent government and the abominations of a dead feudalism. Under the influence of the philosophy of the age, it had struggled, not quite impotently, toward political and social reforms. Had this process continued under better direction, it might have ended in a constitutional evolution that would have gained peacefully the equality the Revolution brought with blood. Such was to be the experience of England. But Englishmen knew the meaning of self-government, possessed a constitutional monarchy and made laws in

¹ See Schlosser, *Hist. Eighteenth Century* V, 356, seq., Sorel, *L'Europe et la Revolution Française*, I, chs. 1, 2.

Parliament. France lacked such experience, suffered the vagaries of an irresponsible, decadent monarchy, and was yet to learn the dangers attending dreams of liberty unrestrained by political wisdom and administrative efficiency.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REFORM MOVEMENT UNDER TURGOT AND NECKER

- I. The Accession of Louis XVI. II. Turgot: 1. His Reforms in General; 2. Enthusiasm of the Nation; 3. His Difficulties; 4. The Re-establishment of the Parlement of Paris; 5. Its Struggle with Turgot; 6. Turgot's Dismissal. III. Necker: 1. His Character; 2. The Public Debt; 3. Necker's Methods of Meeting the Financial Crisis; 4. His Proposed Reforms; 5. His Dismissal and the *Compte Rendu*; 6. Significant Facts of his Administration—(a) The American Revolution, (b) Growing Hatred of Marie Antoinette, (c) Apparent Prosperity.

On the night of May 10, 1774, the crowd of courtiers rushed with "a mighty noise absolutely like thunder" down the great staircase at Versailles to announce the death of Louis XV. to Louis and Marie Antoinette. The news was not unexpected, for the old king was known to have smallpox; but in a sudden burst of emotion the new sovereigns fell upon their knees and prayed: "O God, guide us and protect us! We are too young to reign."¹

There is no evidence that Louis knew what reforms were needed by France. He had never been given any proper training for his official future, and now, hardly more than a boy, he was without any preparation except that of a private virtue, which, if unique in the royal house of the Bourbons, by no means fitted him for ruling a nation in the condition of France.

¹Louis XVI. was nearly twenty, and Marie Antoinette not nineteen. A veritable literature has grown up around Marie Antoinette. The original materials are chiefly to be found in the *Mémoires* of Madame Campan, her lady-in-waiting, and in Arneth and Geffroy, *Correspondance secrète*. Saint Armand has a good popular life of the queen.

The first cabinet of the new reign was avowedly bent upon reform, and Louis called to his aid the one great administrator produced by France between the days of Colbert and Napoleon Bonaparte, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot.¹ He had already made remarkable improvements in Limousin, over which he had been intendant, and his appointment by Louis XVI. as controller of the finances was an evidence of the young king's sincerity. Turgot refused to take any steps looking toward constitutional monarchy. He was not interested in politics as such, but set about the rehabilitation of France by the destruction of economic abuses.² First of all, in order to meet the fearful famine of 1774, he abolished all tariffs on grain passing between the provinces of the kingdom. Then he abolished the *corvée*, or forced labour on roads and other public works. Then he abolished the trade guilds and their monopolies. At the same time he declared against any new taxes and proposed tax reforms,³ and undertook to bring the expenses of the state into agreement with its receipts. Liberty of religion and the press he also championed, though less energetically. Louis promised him full support. "I will share all your views, and always support you in the courageous steps you will have to take," he said.

¹ The best English life of Turgot is that by W. W. Stephens. See also Morley, *Critical Miscellanies*, Second Series; Batbie, *Turgot—Philosophe, Economiste et Administrateur*.

² His political views appear in his "Memorial to Louis XVI. on Municipalities": "The rights of men gathered in society are not founded on their history as men, but in their nature. There can be no reason to perpetuate establishments which were made without reason. . . . So long as your Majesty does not stray beyond the lines of justice, you may regard yourself as an absolute legislator."—See Stephens, *Life and Writings of Turgot*, 265, seq.

³ Some wit suggested that he was preparing for a St. Bartholomew Day for intendants.

The country grew sanguine that a new era was about to dawn. Voltaire wrote D'Alembert: "It seems to me as if there were a new heaven and a new earth."¹

But even a king with the best of intentions and with a Physiocrat for reform minister could not meet popular expectations. Every reform meant a loss of privilege, and the very rapidity with which decree followed decree swept all classes of the privileged into one concentrated party of opposition. The extension of rights works no economic miracles. Turgot's reforms did not immediately reduce the price of bread, and in all parts of France, riots—"the grain war"—broke out, which had to be put down by the military. One mob even came to the palace at Versailles. The spirit of the Parisian proletariat grew desperate. "If the rich do not come to the help of the poor and take no pains to provide them with bread," ran one of the numerous anonymous letters and placards, "the poor will demand it with armed hand."

None the less this rapid "bleeding of the nation," as a high court lady termed Turgot's reforms, might have continued indefinitely, and might even have made the Revolution impossible, had it not been for another of Louis XVI.'s acts, which, though prompted by kindness, was utterly unwise—the recall of the Parlement and the abolition of the courts established by Maupeou. The reinstatement of Parlement was a defeat for Turgot, and, it proved, was to be the occasion of his downfall. From the moment of its reappearance it opposed reforms, and Tur-

¹ Madame Roland wrote at this time: "The ministers are enlightened and well disposed, the young king docile and eager for good, the queen amiable and beneficent, the court kind and respectable, the legislative body honourable, the people obedient, wishing only to love their master, the kingdom full of resources. Ah, but we are going to be happy!" Talleyrand was equally hopeful. See his *Mémoires*, I, 17.

got's decrees were registered with increasing difficulty. Unfortunately, also, the masses misinterpreted the decrees to mean the abrogation of feudal privileges in general, and the wave of disorders which swept over the nation aided the opposition.

The king showed signs of weakening. His minister endeavoured to recall him to something better than sentiment. "Do not forget, sire," he wrote April 30, 1776, "that it was weakness which put the head of Charles I. on the block." But Louis lost confidence in the reforms and in Turgot himself. The pressure from Maurepas and the court party grew greater. Marie Antoinette, who had always detested the fat, reserved, awkward guardian of the treasury became enraged at the recall of one of her friends who had been minister to England, and demanded that he should be reinstated with the title of duke, and that Turgot should be discharged and sent to the Bastille.¹ Then Louis yielded, and on May 12, 1776, Turgot was dismissed, and the state passed over into the hands of the court party.

Resultless as it appeared, Turgot's work was of the utmost importance, in that it gave France a taste of what honest administration could do for the unprivileged.

Cluny, Turgot's successor, in the few months of his official life, undid as many of Turgot's reforms as possible. The *corvée* once more was enforced, monopolies again throve, all reforms in taxation were abandoned, and economy was thrown to the winds. As his financial measures he established a royal lottery, and proposed to declare the state bankrupt. By October, 1776, Cluny had squandered

¹ Marie Antoinette wrote her mother, the Empress Marie Theresa, that she had nothing to do with the removal of Turgot. But we have Mercy's letter to the empress giving the account in full. Both letters are in Arneth and Geffroy, *Correspondance*, II, 441, 442.

all that Turgot had succeeded in saving. Death, however, fortunately removed him, and Maurepas, the prime minister, reverting again to the original policy of reform, gave the portfolio of finance to Jacques Necker, a Genevese and a Protestant. Because of this latter fact the new appointee was not allowed the rank of minister and a place in the cabinet, but had only the title of Director of Finance. The court party despised him, and with Talleyrand¹ chose to believe "that with his fantastic hat, his long head, his big body, burly and ill shaped, his inattentive airs, his scornful demeanour, his constant use of maxims painfully drawn from the *laboratory of his mind*, he had all the appearance of a charlatan." But self-important as he was, the court did Necker injustice.

Of the two dangers which threatened the state, bankruptcy and inequality of privilege, the latter has perhaps been sufficiently described, but the financial difficulty requires explanation. As in the case of other evils, the financial distress of France may be traced to Louis XIV. His suicidal wars and religious persecution, coupled with boundless extravagance, had bequeathed to his successors a fixed debt of but little less than five hundred million dollars (2,471 million livres). The maladministration, wars, and extravagance of Louis XV. had increased this debt, and although it is impossible to give figures that are accurate, so lacking are we in reliable information, it is safe to say that at the accession of Louis XVI. the national debt of France amounted to more than five hundred million dollars. There were few if any years in which honest statements would not have shown a deficit. The total expenses of the nation at the accession of Louis XVI. were

¹ *Mémoires*, I, 37. Von Holst, *French Revolution*, I, 104, calls Necker a "bold juggler." Gouverneur Morris thought him not a great man.

estimated at 399,200,000 livres, and the receipts at 371,980,000 livres. Even on this reckoning there was a deficit of between five and six million dollars, but as a matter of fact the deficit was nearer ten million.¹ So far as the debt itself went, the matter would not to-day be counted serious. Besides, France was in many ways economically convalescent. The deficit was not as great as it had been in 1715.² Commerce in 1778 was double that of 1763, and as has already been stated, the condition of the peasants, at least in northern France, was improving. The really serious difficulty lay in the hopelessly confused administrative system, with its duplication of officials and its useless officers, even more than in any attempt to force the privileged classes to pay their proper share of the taxes,

The problem was complicated, also, by the heavy additional expense incurred by the ill-advised, though generous, war with England in aid of the American colonies. The American Revolution gave France an opportunity to injure an enemy who had gained Canada and other French possessions in North America and was rapidly becoming the first commercial power in the world. To meet the consequent new demands, as well as to avoid a deficit, Necker had recourse to loans of various sorts. It was to prove a fatal policy, but at first it seemed a stroke of genius, for

¹ See Boiteau, *État de la France en 1789*, ch. 15. Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, bk. v, ch. 3, says on the authority of the Parlement of Bordeaux, that in 1764 the public debt was 2,400,000,000 livres. See further, Stourm, *Les Finances de la Rév. fran.*; Bailly, *L'Histoire financière de la France*. On the influence of the financial crisis in general, see Clamageran, *Histoire du Impot en France*, III; Gomel, *Les Causes financières de la Révolution française (Les Ministères de Turgot et de Necker)*; Vührer, *Histoire de la Dette publique en France*, especially ch. 10.

² See Clamageran, *Hist. du Impot en France*, III, 465 seq., and De Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime*, for fullest discussion.

he was able to borrow altogether something like one hundred and six million dollars on not unfavourable rates.¹ But these loans were to be paid from taxes, and here the question of privilege was paramount.

This Necker foresaw and endeavoured to anticipate. Less impatient than Turgot, he went about his work cautiously, but with determination. In the interest of economy quite as much as of efficient administration, he reduced the number of the various treasurers from forty-eight to twelve, and reorganized the treasury department on a business basis. Up to this time, as the Count d'Artois naïvely said later, "the expenses of the king had not been regulated by the receipts, but the receipts by the expenses." Now the system was reversed, greatly to the chagrin of the queen and her friends. Pensions were cut down twenty-eight million francs a year, and numbers of unnecessary officers in the king's household as well as in different administrative departments were discharged. By way of increasing the income, he forced upon the syndicates who bought up the right of collecting the indirect taxes, new contracts which netted the state several million dollars additional income. Nor was he so blind as not to see that the financial distress of the nation could be remedied only by improving its general condition. He favoured allowing the provincial assemblies to assess the taxes of their provinces, and he induced the king to manumit all serfs on the royal domains—an example followed by many of

¹ Among these loans established by Necker were annuities. In establishing these he disregarded all questions of age and health, and thus exposed the state to serious loss. Persons bought annuities for their children, and it is said that in 1885 there were ten persons to whom the French government was still paying annuities bought in or before 1786. Vührer, *Histoire de la Dette publique*, 272.

the nobility and clergy as a class.¹ It was due to his influence, also, that the hideous practice was abolished of torturing prisoners before their trial, although after their condemnation it was still permitted.² His plans went even further, and in a lengthy memoir sent by him to the king he proposed reducing the hated *gabelle*, or tax on salt, by destroying the monopoly in salt held by members of the court; to abolish the tax of the *dîme*; to increase the salary of the country curate to two hundred and forty dollars³ by appropriating some of the large revenues of the higher clergy and religious establishments;⁴ to abolish the office of intendant; to restrict the Parlements to merely judicial duties, thus destroying their right of "registering" edicts. All of these proposals were wise, and could they have been once put into operation would have gone far toward the regeneration of the nation, but unfortunately some person stole and published the memoir before the king had given his decisions. Immediately all of the parties whose privileges were threatened united, under the lead of the Parlement of Paris, against Necker, and he was forced to resign.

Just before he resigned, Necker issued his famous *Compte Rendu*, or financial report, in which he so manip-

¹ There were 1,500,000 serfs in France, August 4, 1789. Bailly, *Mémoires*, II, 214.

² Such a fact as this, indicating how accustomed the French people were to judicial cruelty, as well as the disregard of rights shown in the existence of thousands of imprisonments without trials by means of the royal *lettres de cachet*, go far to explain the cruel laws of the Revolution. In the same way the fact that Paris had no slaughter-houses and that cattle were slaughtered in the streets must among other things have gone far to brutalize the Parisian mob. (Thiébauld, *Mémoires*, I, 35.) Executions were public in the Place de Greve.

³ It was then less than \$150.

⁴ This proposition is interesting as anticipating the legislation of the Constituent Assembly.

ulated the accounts that the receipts of the state exceeded the expenses by about two million dollars.¹ France now knew how many millions were going to the support of royal establishments, pensions, and sinecures. But this was not the most important result of this publication. The public, which had been given by Turgot the reasons for certain of his decrees, now interpreted this act of Necker's to imply that the government had conceded it the right to know and advise about the national finances. The *Compte Rendu* was, accordingly, not only an interesting document; it was interpreted, more or less distinctly, to be a step toward constitutional government. In this respect it was in some true sense what Boiteau has rather extravagantly called it, "the first revolutionary step France took."

Two other facts of this short reform period are of importance. The American Revolution not only won French aid, but, as any reader of the Declaration of Independence can understand, it offered practical lessons to the French enthusiasts for liberty. Franklin, with his bland face, his unpowdered hair, his grey clothes, and his general patriarchal simplicity, seemed like the incarnation of the "natural man." We know well enough that Franklin was many removes from such a character, but such he might very well have appeared to the courtiers of Versailles.²

¹ This gratifying result was reached only by omitting the special expenses of the American war. In reality there was a deficit of about \$23,000,000 in 1780, and of \$16,000,000 in 1781. Gomel, *Causes financières de la Rév. fran.*, 510. Von Holst, *French Revolution*, I, 204, makes the true deficit 219,000,000 livres.

² Thomas Jefferson, in 1791, declared that it appeared to him that "more respect and veneration attached to the character of Dr. Franklin in France than to that of any other person in the same country, foreign or native," and the Constituent As-

But quite as much as Franklin did the part played by French troops and officers in the American Revolution tend to give reality to the doctrines and ideals of liberty. Many of the most prominent members of the first Assembly had, like La Fayette, been in America, and had brought back to France a knowledge of republican simplicity and a desire to see popular sovereignty embodied in French laws.¹

The other fact to be noticed in these years is the growing hatred of Marie Antoinette. It is not difficult to understand why this should have been the case. The queen was, first of all, an Austrian, and Austria had been for a century the foe of France. But this fact is not sufficient to explain the malignity exhibited in countless obscene pamphlets which began to appear in 1776, and continued despite all attempts at suppression—a most shocking testimony to the moral depravity of the Parisian public. For an explanation of such phenomena one must look further—to the indiscrete conduct of the queen, her frivolity, her attendance on public masked balls, her choice of friends,² her extraordinary talent for making enemies of persons in all classes, her extravagance, her prodigious love of gambling, and, perhaps as much as anything, her opposition to Turgot and Necker, and her known or rightly suspected share in the removal of each.³

sembly, at his death in 1790, ordered mourning for three days. Hazen, *American Opinion of the French Revolution*, 148, seq.

¹ See also the preface to the American edition of Stephens, *French Revolution*, I.

² The Count de Dillon actually had his pocket picked under the eyes of the queen.

³ The utterly baseless scandal of the Diamond Necklace greatly intensified this hatred. For the details of this extraordinary affair, see McCarthy, *French Revolution*, I chs. 12-14; Carlyle, "The Diamond Necklace" *Essays* (Am. ed.), IV.

Yet after all, France seemed more prosperous than for years, and even the clear-eyed Franklin, in all his nine years in France, seems never to have noted any tendency toward revolution. So true is it that pre-revolutionary periods are likely to appear full of prosperity to those who share in that prosperity. Equally true is it that in an outgrown social order, prosperity serves to kindle new hostility to privilege and a new passion for equality.

CHAPTER IX

BANKRUPTCY AND THE CONVOCATION OF THE STATES GENERAL

- I. The Reinstatement of Abuse. II. Calonne: 1. His Methods; 2. Extent of his Borrowings; 3. His Return to Reform. III. The Assembly of the Notables: 1. Reforms Approved by It; 2. Its Call for a National Assembly; 3. The Fall of Calonne. IV. Brienne: 1. His Struggle with the Parlement of Paris; 2. His Proposal of a Plenary Court; 3. New Constitutionalism. V. The Promise of the States General.

The next day after his dismissal of Necker, Louis declared that "though he had changed ministers, he had not changed principles." Reform was to continue. None the less, as in the case of Turgot, the dismissal of Necker gave the court party the control of the state, and with it came a rehabilitation of abuse. Joly de Fleury, who succeeded Necker, had hardly assumed office when he considerably increased the tax on objects of consumption. A new loan of a million dollars was authorized to meet the wants of the king's brothers, the Count de Provence and the Count d'Artois;¹ new taxes were levied to carry on the war; the numerous receivers-general whose offices had been abolished by Necker, as well as the other officers he had dismissed, were reinstated. At the same time, in the face of the aid the army was giving the American colonies, and as if to emphasize its reaction from liberal sentiments, the government decreed that no person should become a captain whose family had not been noble for four

¹ The Count of Provence, commonly known as Monseigneur, became Louis XVIII., and the Count d'Artois; Charles X. They both were on dubious terms with Louis.

generations—a decree most galling to the Third Estate.

Opposition came from the provinces. The Parlement of Paris registered all the new decrees without hesitation, but the Parlement of Bésançon refused, some of its members appearing in Versailles with bread made of oatmeal to show the distress of the peasantry. They met only reprimand and threats, however, and went back to register the tax for their district, but at the same time to demand for themselves their old provincial assembly and for the nation the *States General*, or national assembly of the three estates (February 17, 1783).¹ Other Parlements joined in the resistance to the new financial system, but found the ministry too strong for them. As a result under the lead of the Parlement of Besançon, these bodies of magistrates began the formation of a sort of confederation, not so much to protect their ancient privileges as to “return to great principles” and to demand by a unanimous cry the States General.

To all appearances, however, the ministry’s policy was highly successful, and the royal family itself won favour by the birth of the dauphin.² The king seems to have believed the time for economy had passed with the signing of the treaty with England in September, 1783, and set about buying the palace of Rambouillet to save some of his friends from bankruptcy. Fleury had by this time been succeeded by D’Ormesson, but he was dismissed, and a thorough-going creature of the court, Calonne, was placed

¹ It is worth noticing that this same Parlement, when the royal commandant of the town attempted to force them to register the edict, declared that “the king *ruled by law*, and that the men to whom he delegated his power were, like other citizens, obliged to respect law.”

² This prince died in 1789. The unfortunate child known in Bourbon records as Louis XVII., who disappeared during the Reign of Terror, was a younger brother.

in his stead, the eighth administrator of finance in nine years.

Calonne was for a few months the ideal of the thoughtless, reckless court ring, at the head of which stood the Polignac women, the bosom friends of the queen. His policy was that of the conscious bankrupt: to gain credit, practise luxury. No insane policy was ever so rigorously followed. Economy, taxes, reforms were all thrown to the winds, and money was borrowed with absolute madness. For a few months the court revelled in a golden age. Even the poor were cared for generously, great public works were erected in various cities, agricultural prizes were established, and, in fact, every virtue seems to have had some gold medal endowed for its encouragement.

And all this on the hollow foundations of debt. By 1786 Calonne had borrowed \$130,000,000, the annual deficit was \$25,000,000, the entire national income only about \$82,000,000, and the interest-bearing debt over \$600,000,000.¹ But there are limits even to audacity, and the inevitable result overtook Calonne. He was borrowing to pay loans, he was anticipating taxes, and his resources began to fail. The national receipts were insufficient to pay the running expenses of the government. The clergy, when asked for a gift of \$4,000,000, gave only \$3,600,000, and that on condition that the works of Voltaire should be suppressed.² The Parlements both of Paris

¹ The relative wealth of pre- and post-revolutionary France can be realized by recalling that the annual budget of France in 1900 was about the same amount as this entire debt, though in purchasing value only about a third. The financial outcomes of the World War make all these figures appear inconsiderable.

² This clergy also wished the penalty of death inflicted on writers like Voltaire, but the king refused to listen to their proposals.

and the provinces registered new loans only under protest, and Louis was increasingly obliged to adopt the arbitrary methods of Louis XV. Public confidence in Calonne himself vanished, and by the end of 1786 the subscriptions for his loans began to fall off. Thereupon he undertook a stamp tax on paper, music, carriages, and objects of luxury in general. He sold titles indiscriminately. And then, in despair of inducing Parlement to register any more loans, Calonne proposed to the king to call together the *Assembly of Notables* to consider reform in the taxes. "But that is Neckerism you are proposing!" said Louis. "Sire," said Calonne, "in the state of affairs, one can offer you nothing better."

And in truth at last, though too late, Calonne was to learn other things from Necker than the fatal art of borrowing. The programme of loans was to be abandoned and reform was to be again attempted. Necker's proposal for provincial assemblies, equalization of taxes among the three orders, the reduction of customs, the land and capitation taxes, and the abolition of the *corvée*—all these now were Calonne's. He even proposed to sell part of the royal domain, and apply the proceeds to the public debt. And the Notables, the most prominent nobles, ecclesiastics, and magistrates, were to be summoned to approve this general scheme, and thereby reduce the opposition of court and Parlement.¹

February 22, 1787, the Notables met in Versailles, to the number of one hundred and forty-five. Their sessions were held in seven boards, each presided over by a prince of the blood. To them Calonne unfolded, with charming

¹ These sensible proposals are said to have been the work of Dupont de Nemours, Turgot's most prominent disciple and a correspondent of five kings.

self-confidence, his difficulties and his proposed reforms.¹ Chiefly because of his unfortunate reputation, Calonne found little sympathy in his new assembly, although it was by no means lacking in liberal members like La Fayette. Through their influence, doubtless, the proposal for establishing provincial assemblies was approved without delay, as was the abolition of the *corvée*, but the provisions looking for an equalization of privileges found foes as well as friends. The Notables were more concerned with learning the exact state of the finances than with new taxes. They even accused Calonne of peculation, and finally assured the king that the only basis upon which they could assist him was the removal of Calonne. The king, with characteristic weakness, therefore dismissed him, and even exiled him to Lorraine.

Before departing, Calonne gave Louis a picture of the nation he was attempting to rule. "France," he wrote, "is a kingdom composed of separate states and countries, with mixed administrations, the provinces of which know nothing of each other, where certain districts are completely free from burdens the whole weight of which is borne by others, where the richest class is most lightly taxed, where privilege has upset all equilibrium, where it is impossible to have any common rule or common will. Necessarily it is a most imperfect kingdom, very full of abuses and in its present condition impossible to govern."² But Louis was incapable of seeing the facts, much less of persuading the privileged classes to remedy them.

¹ A comic print of the times represents the meeting as an assembly of poultry before a farmer who makes to them this opening address: "Dear birds, I have assembled you to advise me what sauce I shall eat you with." A cock replies, "But we don't want to be eaten." Whereupon the farmer replies, "You wander from the subject."

² Quoted by Madelin, *French Revolution*, 11.

Bankrupts are seldom ready to abandon hope and cling recklessly to the very methods that have made disaster inevitable. So it was in France. In appointing Calonne's successor Louis would not listen to the popular cry for a recall of Necker, now the very god of the populace, but again following the wishes of the queen, appointed Calonne's arch-enemy in the Notables, an impossible man, Loménie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse. The new minister immediately proposed a loan of sixty million livres, promising an annual saving of forty million in the royal establishment. The Parlement, "touched with his beautiful promises," promptly registered the loan. The Notables, however, grew impatient of Brienne's insistence upon Calonne's further theory, "submission and taxation," and La Fayette even proposed that the king be asked to summon a National Assembly within five years. "What, Monsieur," cried the Count d'Artois, who was presiding at the time, "do you demand the convocation of the States General?" "Yes, Monseigneur," replied La Fayette, "and even more than that!"

But the affair went no further. Brienne easily dismissed this anomalous representative body with a polite speech of congratulation upon its services, and on May 25th it vanished. Though it had had no legal status, it had done one great thing: as La Fayette wrote his friends in America, it had "helped the nation form the habit of thinking upon public affairs." But the Notables had really done something quite as important. Though clinging to the principle of privilege, they had sanctioned many of the reforms of Turgot and Necker, vicariously proposed by Calonne.

But even here one does not see the greatest significance of this informal assembly. It was the publication of the fact, presaged by Turgot's prefixing reasons to his edicts,

and by the publication of Necker's *Compte Rendu*, that the ancient French absolutism was moving toward constitutional monarchy. It was as Mirabeau, already a man of importance in the literary world of politics, foresaw. The day of the Notables' meeting "preceded by but little that of the National Assembly."

The Assembly of Notables had no legal power, and before the reforms it approved could become laws it was necessary to submit them to the Parlement of Paris. Brienne certainly bungled matters; but as it was, the Parlement, no more than the Notables, made any difficulty over the institution of the provincial assemblies or the abolition of the *corvée*.¹

The main questions at issue between Brienne and the Parlement were fiscal. Parlement would not register a stamp tax. It, like the Notables, preferred investigating the condition of the nation. The king bade it keep within its prerogatives, and register. The Parlement thereupon voted that for a permanent tax the States General composed of representatives of the three Estates or Orders—the Clergy, the Nobility and the Third Estate or Commons—should be summoned. The constitutional position was untenable, but the vote voiced a rapidly growing public opinion. The Parlement became instantly the idol of the crowd. It was a new rôle for it to play—it, the quintessence of privilege, now champion of popular rights—and it grew somewhat intoxicated, refused to register a decree looking to an improved land tax, as well as that establishing the stamp tax. Whereupon Brienne had the two decrees registered in a *lit de justice*, and exiled the Parlement to Troyes.

¹ One is astonished to find how glibly and frequently the men of these years used the word "revolution." On all sides it was apparently held to be synonymous with "millennium."

The exile of the Paris Parlement was followed by resolutions of all the provincial Parlements calling for the States General, and complaining bitterly against the present helplessness of the one body having even a semblance of a constitutional check upon the extravagance and violence of the court. And this universal outcry, coupled with his need of funds, compelled Brienne to patch up a bargain with the Paris Parlement. In accordance with this, the Parlement returned to the capital, and registered a loan for eighty-eight million dollars; the vacillating government recalled the two tax edicts and promised that the States General should be summoned in four years.

But the struggle still continued, the Parlement now refusing to register edicts and now passing decrees over the king's cancellations. Affairs grew desperate.

Brienne and his counsellors bethought themselves of the *coup d'état* of Maupeou, and determined to suppress the Parlement of Paris, or at least abridge its powers. In place of its having supreme registering powers, these were to reside in a Plenary Court composed of persons appointed by the king, while subordinate courts were to replace the Parlements of the provinces. But before this decree had been sent to Parlement, that body drew up a declaration of what it judged were the elements of the French constitution. Chief among the propositions of this extraordinary document was the *right of the nation to grant subsidies through the States General*.

And here we see the evolution of theoretical nationalism completed. As an historical statement the claim was impossible. For a hundred and seventy-five years taxes had been levied and paid without a thought of the States General, and in point of fact they had been summoned only fifteen times since their first meeting in 1302. But as an expression of what the government of France ought

to be if a people's political theory were to be realized, the statement was almost the French Declaration of Independence. For the States General was the nearest approach to a representative body France possessed even in theory.

Brienne, it is true, used force and got his edict registered, but the storm it raised was too great for him. The Paris Parlement became the centre of wildest popularity. Thirty thousand people, according to Jefferson, surrounded the Parlement house cheering its favourites. The great court of the Châtelet pronounced the edict invalid; the Parlement at Rennes declared any member of the new court "infamous"; at Grenoble a mob of citizens rose to protect their magistrates against two regiments of soldiers, and the soldiers themselves, incited by the nobility, refused to fire upon the crowd; in Dauphiné the military commandant was plainly told he could not count upon his troops to execute the edicts. The very bishops protested, and demanded in their turn the States General. Abandoned by the clergy, disobeyed by the army, fought by the Parlements and the courts, hated by the nation, Brienne yielded and resigned, through the queen's favour to be consoled by the money he had made and the gift of a cardinal's hat. But even before this had happened, on July 5th, Louis had called on learned societies to tell him how the States General should be chosen and organized, and on August 8, 1788, by an order of the Council, suspended the Plenary Court, and convoked the States General for May 1, 1789.

The new social mind of France, set upon gaining rights and abolishing privilege, was at last recognized. The representatives of the nation were to have a voice in reforming the national finances.

PART III

THE ATTEMPT AT CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

CHAPTER X

THE STATES GENERAL AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY¹

- I. The Results of the Revolution thus far Noticeable. II. Difficulties Confronting Necker: 1. Bankruptcy; 2. The States General; 3. The French Character; 4. Agricultural Distress; III. The Elections to the States General: 1. Method; 2. Difficulties. IV. The States General: 1. The Deputies; 2. Their Spirit; 3. Its Opening Session. V. The Evolution of the National Assembly: 1. The Struggle over the Voting; 2. The Organization of the National Assembly; 3. The Tactics of the Court; 4. The Oath of the Tennis Court; 5. The Royal Session; 6. The Triumph of the Third Estate.

"I think," wrote Thomas Jefferson from Paris in May, 1788, "that in the course of three months the royal authority has lost and the rights of the people gained as much ground, by a revolution of public opinion only, as Eng-

¹ GENERAL LITERATURE IN ENGLISH.—A brilliant account of the States General and its revolution into the National Assembly is that of Carlyle, *French Revolution*, bk. iv, ch. 4, bk. v, chs. 1, 2. A very detailed account, with brief biographical sketches, is to be found in McCarthy, *French Revolution*, I, chs. 27-40. Other accounts are to be found in Watson, *Story of France*, II, ch. 8; Thiers, *History of the French Revolution*, I, 35-52.

The literature on the Revolution, even in English, is vast. Mignet, *French Revolution*, and Michelet, *French Revolution*, are almost classical hand-books. From the socialistic point of view are Gronlund, *Ca Ira*, and Bax, *French Revolution*. Watson's work is unconventional, not scholarly, but very readable. Van Laun, *Revolutionary Epoch*, presents the traditional views.

land gained in all her civil wars under the Stuarts.”¹ And later he wrote that he believed that the nation, “within two or three years, would be in the enjoyment of a tolerably free constitution, and that without it having cost them a drop of blood.” The same enthusiasm filled France, from the ignorant peasantry, who thought that they were “to be relieved of all taxes and that the first two orders would alone provide for all the needs of the state,”² to Louis himself, who looked forward to the

Carlyle’s celebrated work is best read after one has gained some knowledge of the events. Stephens’ *History of the French Revolution* is the best in English, but only two volumes (through the year 1793) have appeared. Von Sybel’s voluminous work (4 vols.) is a mine of information, but could not have been intended to be read. Thiers is voluminous and not impartial. Taine, *The French Revolution*, is brilliant, and furnishes infinite details, but is bitterly opposed to the Revolution. Good modern hand-books are those by Johnston, Mallet, Gardiner, Morris, Rose, Stephens, Bourne (*Revolutionary Period in Europe*). The last four cover also the Napoleonic period. James Stephens’ *Lectures on the French Revolution* are among the best of the older literature. Madelin, *The French Revolution*, is a brilliant portrayal based upon Aulard and other recent French writers. Mathiez, *La Révolution française*, is very important.

The early portion of the Revolution is profoundly discussed by Von Holst, *The French Revolution Tested by Mirabeau’s Career*, and interestingly by McCarthy, *The French Revolution*. A very valuable collection of contemporary American notes is to be found in Hazen, *American Opinion of the French Revolution*.

For the political history see especially the exhaustive works of Aulard, *Political History of the French Revolution*; Sorel, *L’Europe et la Révolution française*; Lindner; *Weltgeschichte*, VII.

¹ Hazen, *American Opinion of the French Revolution*, 30-34; Jefferson, *Works*, II, 257, seq.; 469-70. The letters of Jefferson during these years are well worth considering quite as much from their mistaken as from their true judgments. That he should have favoured every change of Brienne’s administration shows one of two things: either Brienne was not as weak as historians have pictured him, or the true path was so clouded that not even Jefferson could see it plainly. Mirabeau seems about the only man of clear vision during the period.

² One is here reminded of the promises of Henry IV. of France,

moment in which he should find himself "surrounded by the representatives of a generous and faithful nation." To fill the cup of France's joy to the full, Necker, the very genius (so men thought) of finance and reform, was recalled.

The financial problem which now confronted Necker was far more serious than that of his first administration. Bankruptcy had been seriously contemplated by Brienne, and as early as October, 1787, Arthur Young reports that the question was everywhere discussed "whether a bankruptcy would occasion civil war and a total overthrow of the government."¹

But another question confronted the redoubtable Genevèse: How should the States General be elected? It is not without a humorous element, this mad race on the part of a nation after an Assembly that had been only a remembrance to the grandfathers of their great-grandfathers, and the despair of a king calling upon academies and savants to tell him how to get together the Assembly he had promised solemnly should meet on a certain day! But another difficulty confronted Necker, which neither he nor any person could successfully meet. And that was the character of the very people who clamoured for liberty and the States General. Among the masses there was brutality, ignorance, and the utter absence of any great

and of the Utopia expected by the negroes of the South when emancipation would give each of them "ten acres and a mule."

¹ The answer most commonly given was that such a measure would certainly not occasion either, if conducted by a man of abilities, vigour, and firmness. But, as Young himself declared, the man was wanting among all the ministers, past and present. Gouverneur Morris noticed the same astonishing lack. "Gods," he exclaims, "what a theatre this is for a first-rate character!" Hazen, *American Opinion*, etc., 66, gives others of his opinions to the same effect.

conservative ideals; among the courtiers there was little except frivolity, debauchery, delightful manners, and monumental selfishness; among the intellectual classes there was, it is true, great liberality of thought and elevated theories, but, though with many notable exceptions, little conservative morality, much loquacious dilettantism and a general distrust of established authority. Despite his appreciation of the rise of a liberal public opinion, and despite the results it had reached, Jefferson did not judge the nation in 1788 to be sensible of the value of trial by jury, or politically ripe to accept even the English *habeas corpus* law. "The people at large," he wrote Mrs. Adams in 1787, "view every object only as it may furnish puns and *bon-mots*; and I pronounce that a good punster would disarm the whole nation were they ever so seriously determined to revolt." As if there were not enough difficulties for any reformer, nature itself turned upon France. The harvest of 1788 was fearfully damaged by a tornado, while the winter of 1788-89 was of unprecedented severity. The Seine was frozen for two months, the government had to maintain huge fires throughout Paris to keep the poor from freezing, while bread became so scarce that the bakers were allowed to sell only a small amount to any one person; and even among the rich, guests were expected to bring their own bread to dinner. As a result of this distress, the peasants grew desperate, and thousands flocked to the cities, and especially to Paris, there to swell the brutal proletariat.

To advise as to methods of electing the States General the Notables were again summoned, but without satisfactory results, and Necker was left to his own devices. As a result, there was issued, January 24, 1789, an Order in Council providing that the States General should con-

sist of one thousand members, one half of whom should be from the Third Estate, the other half to be drawn equally from the two other orders. This double representation had been given the order by the king "because its cause was allied with generous sentiments, and would always obtain the support of public opinion." Although the number of deputies was later increased, the proportions remained the same. The order provided also that the unit of election should be the *bailliage*, or county, and that each *bailliage* should elect a number of deputies to the States General proportionate to its population.¹ All men twenty-one years of age whose names were on the tax-lists could vote. A system of election was devised more complicated than that by which American citizens elect their President. When one recalls that this was laid upon a nation ignorant of the most rudimentary processes of representative government,² that in addition to the regular deputies alternates had also to be chosen, and that at

¹ The method of election of the delegates from the two upper orders was simple. The noblesse and clergy, with feudal holdings, met in the electoral assembly of every *bailliage*, in which they owned fiefs and elected their deputies. The curates could also appear at the electoral assembly and vote in person. It was this fact that gave the States General such a large proportion of curates among the clerical deputies. They had simply outvoted the bishops at the electoral assembly of the *bailliage*. Far more cumbersome was the method prescribed for the Third Estate. The towns and villages elected delegates to the electoral assembly of their *bailliage*. Those thus elected met at the appointed place and reduced themselves to one-fourth their original number, and this one-fourth elected the deputies to the States General. But even this process was complicated in cities, where ancient guilds elected representatives to the town electoral assembly, which in its turn elected delegates to the electoral assembly of the *bailliage*.

² Brienne, it is true, had attempted to inaugurate provincial Assemblies, whose members should, in the process of time, be elected, but the edict had not been given sufficient time and trial to vitiate the statement of the text.

each stage of the electoral process instructions, or *cahiers*, had to be drawn up to be forwarded to the next electoral body, the wonder is that the elections could have been conducted at all. As it was, all the provinces were by no means content to adopt the prescribed plan, and in some cases, notably that of Brittany, were so vehement in their opposition that special decrees had to be issued in their behalf. It is indeed hard to see how the electoral process could have been carried through had it not been for the invaluable advice given all parts of France by the Assembly of Dauphiné, of which Jean Joseph Mounier was president.

The personnel of the body thus elected, though good, was by no means extraordinary. It is impossible to give the exact number there present, but the most likely figures are these: The clergy, 308; the noblesse, 285, and the Third Estate, 621. It will be seen, therefore, that the number of the Third Estate was greater than that of the other two combined. The temper of the Assembly was, on the whole, liberal. Of the 308 clergy, though the bishops were well represented, 205 were curates. Two shades of political faith were represented in the ranks of the nobility; there was the liberalism of La Fayette, and the obstinate conservatism of "Barrel" Mirabeau, the brother of the count. Of the 621 delegates who composed the Third Estate, two-thirds were lawyers or legal officials—a most important fact; many of them, also, were scholars. Only ten of them can possibly be considered as belonging to the lower classes. It will be seen, therefore, as a whole that the States General represented the well-to-do classes. It was not in the least an uncultured rabble, but was made up of the best blood in France.¹

¹ Accounts of this election are given in Stephens, *The French Revolution*, I, ch. 1; Taine, *French Revolution*, I, bk. i; Mc-

The desires of this highly intelligent body are to be found in overwhelming detail in the *cahiers*, or instructions which their constituencies had given them. In these we get a picture of the new social mind and its desires. Many of them, it is true, followed some conventional model, and abounded in academic expressions hardly to be expected from peasants. But even such formalism fails to obscure the real desires of the nation. The vast mass of *cahiers* makes it clear that, on the whole, each of the three orders was anxious to give the state reforms, and may very fairly be considered as desirous of embodying in some form of constitution the spirit which had forced Louis and his ministers to summon the body.¹ So far as revolution is concerned, it is evident from many facts that the States General regarded a revolution as already in progress, and considered itself as its product rather than its first step. Mirabeau has left the statement that "there was not one commoner who did not come with very moderate sentiments to the National Assembly." Both from the *cahiers* and the royal summons for the States General, it is apparent that there was no thought of the later policies of the Revolution. Although literary fashion led to the use of the terms of Greece and Rome, including such a word as "Republic," there is no evidence that Frenchmen in 1789 thought of destroying the monarchy. The aboli-

Carthy, *French Revolution*, I, ch. 24; Cherest, *La Chute de l'Ancien Régime*, II (very detailed). The original material will be found in the *Archives Parlementaires*; Buchez et Roux, *Histoire Parlementaire*; and in the *Moniteur* (original), introductory volume.

¹ A good summary of these *cahiers* is given in Lowell, *Eve of the French Revolution*, and they are treated in detail in Chassin, *Les Cahiers*. They are printed in full in the *Archives Parlementaires*, I-VI.

tion of feudal privileges, and *lettres de cachet*, equality in civic and legal rights, freedom of thought and the press, control of taxation, the limitation of Bourbon absolutism by some form of constitution—these were the aims of the men of 1789. They little foresaw how the attempt to gain these rights would involve them in violent revolution.

In nothing was the incompetence of Necker more clearly shown than in his refusal to decide in advance whether the new body should vote, by order as in 1614, or by member. The question was more than parliamentary. To vote by order (*par ordre*) was to maintain only a sort of corporate representation, in which the doubled membership of the Third Estate would have but one vote to the privileged orders' two; to vote by member (*par tête*) was to establish true representation and to give France a genuine national assembly, in which the Third Estate might outvote the other two.

Throughout the spring of 1789 the newly elected deputies began to arrive in Versailles, where those of the Third Estate, at least, would have suffered at the hands of extortionate landlords had the government not established legal rates. On May 4th, amid the blare of trumpets, along streets lined with rich tapestries hanging from windows crowded with spectators, the delegates of the three estates marched in procession to the Church of St. Louis, to attend mass and listen to an eloquent sermon. The newspapers of the day contain elaborate directions, drawn up by the royal master of ceremonies, as to how the deputies should dress and march. First went the Third Estate, in black clothes, white neckties, and three cornered black hats (which were to be inexorably buttonless); then the nobility, with their gorgeous court dress (the

Duke of Orleans, the enemy of his cousin the king, ostentatiously walking ahead of his order, close to the last of the Commoners); then the higher clergy, in magnificent pontificals; then the curates, a mass of somber black; and last of all the king and the court. A grand spectacle—but what were they all to do? Save France, fervently thought they, and the king, and Necker. But how? And so far as one can discover, not a soul among the twelve hundred saviours knew.

Incredible as it appears, Necker was just as ignorant.¹ This the first meeting of the body showed, when Monday, May 5th, it gathered in the *Salle des Menus*, which had been splendidly prepared to receive it. With elaborate and, to the Commoners, exasperating formality, the delegates found their places. After a couple of hours' delay the king took his seat upon a throne covered with fleur-de-lis. As the great meeting became silent, he rose and delivered a well-intentioned speech, which was received so cordially that Gouverneur Morris felt tears start from his eyes in spite of himself.² He was followed by the Master of the Seals, who succeeded in showing the genuine willingness of Louis for moderate reforms, and in saying that the nation was in debt, and that the States General had been assembled to see that it was got out of debt. Necker then read, or caused his clerk to read, a speech which contained much information and "many things

¹ Though it is true he seems to have had some fantastic notion of arranging the nobles and the clergy into an upper and the Third Estate into a lower house.

² Gouverneur Morris says that when Louis sat down he put on his hat. The nobles did the same, and so did some of the Commoners, though they took them off again. Then Louis took his off. Whereupon the queen took him to account. Morris thought the two discussed the matter then and there, but says he cannot "swear to this."

very fine," but was three hours long. In fact, he bored everybody, and so much less interested was he in reforms than in the deficit that he disappointed every liberal. But the king went back to his palace thoroughly content, certain that the end of his difficulties had come.

When the States General assembled on May 6th to hold its first business session, it was at once confronted by the question as to whether the voting was to be *par ordre* or *par tête*. The difficulty first appeared in the necessity of verifying the delegates' credentials. The nobles proceeded at once to verify as a separate chamber, the vote standing 188 to 47; while the clergy, though voting 133 to 114 to verify as an order, did not proceed to organize as such. This attitude of the two orders was a legitimate outcome of the Old Régime. The fraction of a great people which had enjoyed where others had lost privileges, was now endeavouring to block all reform by continuing to oppose itself to the nation. It was the last ditch in which monopoly could fight. But the Third Estate refused even to verify credentials until it had been decided that the three estates were to meet in one indivisible assembly. May 11th it declared itself simply a collection of citizens without organization, without credentials, without legal existence.¹ For weeks both sides obstinately sought to win over the other, and compromise became every day the more impossible. Business evidently was out of the question under such conditions, and May 28th the king interfered, commanding the three estates to verify separately. But matters had gone too far for such a command to be obeyed. Mirabeau moved to invite the

¹ The first speech of Mirabeau the *Moniteur* reports is on May 5th, opposing even the appointment of a committee for conference with the nobles.

clergy "in the name of the God of Peace" to join the commons. The curates wavered. Introduced by Mirabeau, Sieyès, the framer of nearly every constitution that France had during his life, on June 10, moved that a committee inform the clergy and the nobles that the Third Estate summoned them for the last time; that on the next day its members would begin to verify not as an estate, but as *the representatives of the nation*. The clergy wavered still more. On June 11th the process of verification of these self-styled representatives of the nation began. Two days later the curates began to come over. On June 17th the slowly swelling company of Commoners and curates adopted the name *National Assembly*, and France, if only Frenchmen would recognize it, ceased to be under the control of absolutism.

But all Frenchmen could not see it, and there began a struggle of the National Assembly for its existence. It is not difficult to understand the opposition of the nobility. The court party could not see into the future, but could see in all actions of the Third Estate supreme presumption. They applied to the king, and persuaded him to undertake to bring about by force what they had not been able to accomplish by argument. Had they been content with this plan, they would have made a sufficiently great mistake, but blindness and insolence hurried on that which they had too little foresight even to fear.

Their method of warfare was worthy of their frivolity. On the 20th of June, when the Third Estate, or National Assembly, came to its hall it found the doors closed and guarded by troops. Notice for the first time was then served upon it by the Master of Ceremonies that there was to be a special royal session on the next day but one, and that the hall must be closed for the accommodation of the carpenters.

It was a clever plan, but it miscarried. The Commoners marched to a great building in the neighbourhood of the palace—a public tennis-court, standing yet, in a back street in Versailles, at once the Runnymede and the Independence Hall of France. There, in the unfurnished room, amidst intense excitement, with upstretched hands, they solemnly swore never to separate until they had drawn up a constitution for France.¹

Yet to the king and the court all this was but a name and a joke. Third Estate or National Assembly, *Salle des Menus* or tennis-court, it was all the same. The Commoners must yield. On the 23d of June the royal session was held. In the meantime one hundred and forty-nine of the clergy had joined the National Assembly. This in itself was enough to confirm its independent spirit, but the vain, stupid malice of the court party hastened events. The Commoners, when they came to the royal sessions, found the hall surrounded by soldiers, and were forced to wait in the rain until the other estates had been granted admission. Even if they had forgotten Maupeou and Brienne, events could well suggest a *coup d'état*. The nobles expected a ready if unwilling submission. The king commanded the estates to separate, and to meet in separate chambers and there deliberate. He emphatically asserted his determination, in case of hopeless disagreement between the three orders, to carry on the work of reform alone. He further declared that all reform should leave the army, feudal dues, and the tithes untouched. The session was an illustration of the character and policy of Louis. From the time he dismissed Turgot he was always behind events. Such strong words might perhaps

¹ The oath and its signatures are still to be seen in the archives of France. See for full discussion, Fling "The Oath of the Tennis Court," in *Nebraska University Studies*, II, No. 3 (Oct. 1899).

have done six weeks before, but since the coming of the clergy the union of the orders was inevitable. To prevent it was to attempt the impossible.

Instantly the new position of the Third Estate, or the National Assembly, was apparent. The king left the hall. The nobility and a part of the clergy retired to their chambers. The Commoners remained in their seats. It was an act of disobedience. Brézé, master of ceremonies, said, "Messieurs, you have heard the king's orders." It was one of the few critical seconds in history. To leave the hall would have been to give up all claims of representing the people; to stay meant disobedience of the king's express command and probable punishment. The deputies wavered. But just at this moment Mirabeau arose, and in his tremendous voice addressed the Master of Ceremonies: "Yes, Monsieur, we have heard what the king has said; but do you, who cannot be the interpreter of his orders to the States General; do you, who have right neither to be here nor to speak here—do you tell those who sent you that we are here by the will of the people, and that we will not leave our places except at the point of the bayonet."¹ Thunderstruck Brézé left the room and the huge Mirabeau, as he was accustomed to leave the king, backward.

But the position of the Commoners had become critical. They were no longer mere reformers; they were rebels. They had deliberately disobeyed the command of the king. Immediately, upon motion of Mirabeau, they voted by an overwhelming majority that the persons of the members of the National Assembly were inviolable, and proceeded to business as before. For a day or two, it is true, it

¹ There are various versions of this story, but they seem to agree in the main facts here given. The precise words of Mirabeau are also hopelessly lost, but not their general sense.

looked as if the Assembly might be crushed by soldiery. But Louis, good-natured and vacillating, was no man to keep up a struggle, and within four days after he had commanded the estates to vote *par ordre*, he had commanded the two upper estates to unite with the third and to vote *par tête*. They, more obedient than the commons, yielded, though with protests, one noble, it is said, assembling for weeks quite by himself. On the 27th of June the union of the three estates was complete. The States General had vanished, and in its place had risen the National Constituent Assembly, the first truly representative body that France had ever known. And this new assembly had had its origin in disobedience to the king, had voted its members inviolable, had taken solemn oath to give France a constitution. Without a leader and without a programme could it evolve an efficient government, and would the king and court recognize its self-determined powers? In the answer given by events to these questions lay the future of the government so auspiciously begun.

CHAPTER XI

THE UPRISING OF THE MASSES¹

1. The New *Coup d'État* Planned by the Court: I. Paris and the Parisians; 2. The Plans of the Court; 3. The Dismissal of Necker. II. The Search for Arms. III. The Surrender of the Bastille: 1. The Bastille; 2. The "Capture"; 3. The Subsequent Lynchings. IV. The Effect and Significance of the Fall of the Bastille: 1. The First Emigration; 2. The New Institutions; 3. Uprisings throughout France; 4. The Rise of the Nation. V. The Impotence of Government.

The development within the sphere of constitutional government did not represent the only phase of the revolution through which France was consciously and exultingly passing. In closest union with it was the upheaval among the masses. For years discontent had been working in France, and at times had been with great difficulty suppressed. Yet the masses had as yet been of no very great influence in the new movement. That they should now assert themselves was due to the collapse of absolutism and the consequent impotence of the government, but more specifically to a second attempt on the part of Louis and the court to suppress the National Assembly. And this within a week after the failure of the blustering royal session of June 23d.

There had been disorder throughout the country from

¹ On the fall of the Bastille, see Stephens, *French Revolution*, I, ch. 5; McCarthy, *French Revolution*, I, chs. 42-46; Watson, *Story of France*, II, ch. 10; Michelet, *History of the French Revolution* (Bohn ed.), 132-160. For complete treatment, see Dussaulx, *De l'Insurrection Parisienne et de la Prise de la Bastille*; Bournon, *La Bastille*; and Bond, *La Prise de la Bastille*. See also the mass of original material in *Archives Parlementaires* and *Moniteur* (reprint), I.

the time the States General had been summoned, but, though the expression of hatred of ancient abuses and capable of almost any growth, it was not of sufficient importance to call for more than mention. For the first emergence of truly revolutionary violence one must look to Paris.

Paris in 1789 was by no means the beautiful city of to-day. Its streets were narrow, crooked, and dirty. Its population was without community of spirit and its government was inefficient and venal. During the past few months of want it had attracted crowds of beggars and desperate men from all parts of France, and its lower classes were incomparably brutalized. Order had been kept with difficulty, and the fatal lack of the police force of a modern city was evidenced in the impunity with which a mob could sack a great establishment like that of the papermaker Reveillon (April 27, 1789). Morris may have looked on its character with too puritanical eyes, but his words are certainly explicit: "Paris is perhaps as wicked a spot as exists. Incest, murder, bestiality, fraud, rapine, oppression, baseness, cruelty, are common." Yet there was no place in all France where the new philosophy had struck so deep or had grown so radical; and the priests of the new cult, the apostles of the newly discovered rights, were the journalists.

Never was a social contagion more spread by pamphlets and newspapers and books.¹ Good-natured, philosophical, agricultural Arthur Young was astonished at the volume of printed matter. On the 9th of June, 1789, he went into the Palais Royal, the rendezvous of booksellers, travellers, newsmongers, and scamps, to procure a catalogue of the new publications. He discovered that every hour

¹ The *Révolutions de Paris* had a circulation of 200,000.

produced something new; thirteen had come out on the day of his visit, sixteen on the day before, and in the preceding week ninety-two.¹ These political tracts, he discovered also, found their way throughout all the country. And nineteen-twentieths of all these publications he declares were in favour of liberty, and were commonly violent against the clergy and the nobility. If journals were suppressed, they appeared under a new name. Never was there greater evidence of the power of inflammatory journalism. Paris was not only full of patriotic enthusiasm and the champion of the Assembly; it was fairly alive with criminals, reformers, agitators, demagogues, and fanatics. In consequence it was increasingly the prey of that insane suspicion which seizes a community that is superficially full of wit, but fundamentally is without moral scruples and carelessly intent upon destroying inherited authority.

It was to such a city that there came rumours that the king and the court were attempting to use the army to crush completely the new Assembly, now barely a fortnight old. Just what these rumours were we cannot now decide, but we know enough to be sure that in general they must have been correct. For barely had Louis accepted the Assembly than, coming again under the influence of the queen and the court, he determined to destroy it. Absolutism, the court, privileges, all things were as before the meeting of the States General, and Marie Antoinette and her friends would have been farsighted indeed if they had seen the real significance of the mimic war between the orders at Versailles. France had seen many disorders, and the monarchy had always been able to crush opposition. It is easy to see why a new *coup d'état* should be planned.

¹ One publisher issued 1,500 pamphlets and books in two years.

The plan was simple. Marshal de Broglie was ordered secretly to gather troops and surround Paris and Versailles. Necker was to be dismissed, the troops were to move in upon the National Assembly, and then all things were to be as they had been before the meeting of the States General. By the 1st of July the plan was ready for execution. Strange uniforms began to appear in the streets of Versailles, and the troops formerly stationed far away, on the frontiers or in other cities, rapidly gathered about Paris. July 11th the royal mine was sprung. On that day, as Necker was sitting at dinner with friends, a sealed letter was brought him; he broke the seal, and without change of countenance read the letter's contents, folded it, put it in his pocket, and continued his conversation. It was a command to leave France immediately. Without a word to his servants, without even telling his daughter his plans, he started off the same afternoon in his coach for the frontier. On the next day the news was brought to Paris. Camille Desmoulins, one of the most brilliant of the Parisian journalists, plunged into the motley crowd at the Palais Royal, leaped upon one of the tables, and shouted that Necker had been dismissed, that his departure was the St. Bartholomew's bell for patriots, that on that very evening the Swiss and the German battalions were to march from the Champs de Mars to slaughter all patriots. "There is not a moment to lose," he cried; "we have but one resource—to rush to arms, to wear cockades whereby we may know each other. What colours shall we wear? Will you wear green, colour of hope, or the blue of Cincinnatus, the colour of the liberty of America, and of a democracy?" "Green! green!" the crowd shouted. Camille bound a green ribbon on his hat, the crowd pulled green leaves from the trees, and rushed out to gather arms.

As we look back upon it, we can see the alarm was well grounded. A day more and the Assembly would have been in prison or in exile, Paris in the hands of the troops, France again in the hands of an irresponsible master.

It was a wild night in Paris, that night of the 12th of July, 1789. The city officials were powerless to keep order. The French Guards, the national police, began to grow mutinous on June 28, and fraternized with the people. Mobs of the lowest characters went howling up and down the streets, looting the gunsmith shops, the bakeries, and the taverns. The city was practically without government, in the hands of a populace half-demented with one of those panics to which it was subject. The troops were at the doors, the city was to be starved into submission, and the people of Paris were without arms!

By degrees a semblance of order returned. The shopkeepers of their own accord armed themselves and began to patrol the streets. The electors of the city, who had but just met to elect the deputies to the States General, extemporized a provisional government, and began to organize a volunteer force, the National Guard, for the defence of the city and the maintenance of order. The French Guards, who should have repressed all rioting, broke from their officers and attacked the still loyal Dragoons, whose commander lost his head, ordered a retreat and left Paris to its own control. July 13th was passed in comparative quiet, but the revolutionary leaders, and especially the agents of the Duke of Orleans, were preparing for a great demonstration. On the morning of July 14th the tocsin called the new National Guard to protect the city now in the hands of the mob; but it summoned as well the mob. The gates of the city were closed, and the mob, which now included men of all classes, crim-

inals as well as patriots, took up its mad search for arms. But arms were hard to get. Flesselles, the provost of the merchants, restrained the crowd momentarily by deception, but the news soon came that there were arms in the Hôtel des Invalides. A few of the mob at the same time began to shout that there were others in the Bastille. The crowd divided, some surging thither, others starting off toward Des Invalides. There the governor attempted to deceive them. In vain. They broke into the great building, ransacked it, took every musket and sword they could find in the boxes in the cellar, in the stands in the guard-houses, or in the museum itself. At last they were partly ready to meet the soldiers of De Broglie. The news came that though there were arms in the Bastille, they had been refused the defenders of the city. And so away went the crowd to the eastern part of the city, and gathered about the grim old castle-prison.

Originally the Bastille had been built just outside the city as a sort of castle, after the fashion of the Tower of London, to control the always uneasy populace. But as time passed, the city had grown about it, and it ceased to be a fortress and had become the state prison. Within its dungeons had been confined nearly every famous man France had produced, from Voltaire, for daring to challenge a noble, to Gabriel Riquetti Mirabeau, for not minding his irascible old father. Strange stories were told of dungeons far below the surface of the ground, into whose foul air no ray of light ever came, where men lived through generations not knowing whether wife and children still lived; of nameless tortures; of mysterious bones, by accident discovered by workmen. It is true we know to-day that few abuses attended the use of the Bastille during the reign of Louis XVI., and that its prisoners had been granted no small liberty, but the populace of Paris

believed otherwise, and the great building had become the very symbol of oppression.

But hated though it was, and full of arms though it might have been, not a man of the crowd that rapidly gathered about its gates believed the Bastille could be captured. How was an unorganized mob, armed only with muskets and swords and pikes, to get over two drawbridges, and scale walls ten feet thick and ninety-six feet in height? Yet as the crowd filled the streets in the east end of Paris, swollen by additions from prisoners released from La Force and men of the lowest class as well as excited patriots; as the governor, De Launay, refused to deliver up arms, the thought of capturing the huge building began to suggest itself. But how? One worthy locksmith declared, in the good old Roman fashion by the catapult. Monsieur Caussidiere, major-general of the Parisian militia, declared that it must be taken by siege. Santerre, a rich brewer, leader of the wild men from St. Antoine, planned to pump turpentine and phosphorus from the fire-engines and set it on fire.¹

Despairing of taking the place by storm, the crowd turned to deputations. A committee from the electors spent three hours in the fortress, but accomplished little. About ten o'clock in the morning, a single man, Thuriot de Larosiere, was admitted into the Bastille to speak with the governor. Unable to speak a word of German, he yet harangued the few Swiss soldiers who formed the garrison till they positively trembled. He told De Launay, in the name of a nation, to remove his cannon. De Launay promised that the cannon should not be used upon the people. Thuriot, coming out, begged the people to wait.

¹ The pumps were actually brought, but there was neither enough turpentine nor power in the pumps to carry halfway up the sides of the building.

But even as he was speaking the tragedy began. To enable Thuriot to pass, the drawbridge had been let down over the moat that separated the people from the outer court of the castle. The unarmed crowd, in search for weapons, rushed over it and stood in the so-called governor's court, just under the walls of the fortress. For some unknown reason the drawbridge was raised behind them. And then De Launay's men fired. Why, we shall never know.

Were it not for the white stones in the Place de la Bastille, outlining the building's great towers, were it not for the great bridges that span the Seine, whose stones once made the walls of that ancient prison, one could hardly believe that a people without cannon should have been able to capture a fortress, and that within a day. Yet capture is hardly the correct word. The Bastille was not taken; it surrendered. A wild firing, it is true, was kept up upon the building from roofs and street and square, but the defenders behind the thick walls suffered little. The situation of De Launay was by no means desperate. It is true some of the troops who should have dispersed the crowd were among his besiegers: But he had promises of help from Versailles, and he had but to wait a few hours. But his troops grew mutinous, and demanded that the impregnable building should surrender. De Launay was in despair. Rather than surrender, he determined to blow up the fortress, but was prevented, and then, in new despair, he yielded to the demands of his troops. The drawbridge of the castle was let down, the crowd rushed in, and the Bastille had fallen.¹

¹ Madelin, *French Revolution*, 76-78, gives a somewhat different account, more friendly to De Launay and emphasizing the mob-elements at the expense of the patriotic. But despite the confusion of evidence, the fall of the Bastille seems to have been due to something more than anarchy.

It is a pity that the story cannot end here, and yet as we look back upon it we see that it is hardly possible. A mob that had seen eight hundred and thirty-seven of its members apparently trapped and then shot down in cold blood; that had for hours been gathering to itself the scum of the slums; toward which the "brigands" of the provinces had drifted; that had for hundreds of years been taught license in brutality and violence by the very building it had captured, could not let this victory pass without bloodshed. Hardly had the Swiss been taken from the walls than the promise of preserving their lives was broken, and an indiscriminate slaughter began. The bodies were horribly mutilated; the heads were placed upon pikes, and were carried in triumph by the howling crowd to the city hall. De Launay himself, in the midst of what protectors he could gather, started toward the same place, but before he had reached a refuge the mob surged in upon him, beat him to the ground, and in a moment his head also was on a pike. The other deaths that followed need not be spoken of. The murders of Flesselles, Foulon, and Berthier were the work of a half-crazed mob beyond all control meting out "the justice of the people." The best men—and there were best men in the crowd that took the Bastille—had nothing to do with such actions. The murder of these men made it plain that the passion of the Parisian mob, be it never so bedecked with fine phrases, was brutal and anarchic, pregnant with every evil.

The fall of the Bastille was something more than the fall of a disused but hated prison. If one will go to the Museum Carnavalet in Paris he will see a host of mementos which testify to something more than a passing delirium. There are locks from the Bastille, doors from the Bastille, models of the Bastille made from its own ma-

sonry; Bastille fans, handkerchiefs, porcelains, pictures. And if one will read the memoirs of the time, he will find all Europe celebrating the event—Englishmen orating, Russians hugging one another, Germans weeping for joy. The explanation of all this enthusiasm lies in this: the fall of the Bastille was the symbol of the fall of Bourbon absolutism, the sign of the rise of a nation. For this reason is it that the 14th of July has been added to the list of national holidays.

More immediately, also, the fall of the Bastille had important results. The *coup d'état* of the court party was ruined. Necker was recalled. The Count d'Artois and the Polignac women fled from France. Large numbers of the court clique followed their example, and thus there came about the "First Emigration." The Duc de Liancourt was the first to break the news to Louis, who was sound asleep after a day of hunting. "Why," said the king, "this is a revolt!" "No, your Majesty," replied the duke, "it is revolution." The king was startled into action. "With no escort save his own virtue" he went to the Assembly where he was given an ovation. He recognized the new government of Paris, and the astronomer Bailly as mayor; he legalized the National Guard and placed La Fayette in command. He himself—for Louis had courage—partook of the sacrament and went to Paris. There he was received with honour by the new government of the city,¹ and, as a token of his good intentions, put on a red, white, and blue cockade.² The Parisians were over-

¹ It was while receiving Louis at the city gate that Bailly, who had been elected the first mayor of Paris, uttered the famous words, "Henry IV. reconquered his capital; now the capital has reconquered its king."

² The red and blue were the colours of Paris, and white was the colour of the Bourbons.

joyed. "Sire," said Count d'Estaing, "with that cockade and the Third Estate, you will conquer Europe!" It was a prophecy to be fulfilled—but not by Louis.

But there were other and more tragic results of the fall of the Bastille. All France saw in it the evidence of the government's weakness. The suppressed passion, discontent, rebellion against the Old Régime, burst forth like a geyser. The people rose throughout the country. Every place to which the news of the 14th of July came emulated the capital by attacking its local Bastille, the house of the feudal lord. Whether or not the riots were instigated by the Duke of Orleans, who was anxious to force Louis to abdicate, that he might be regent, will never be known certainly, although Orleans was undoubtedly capable of such a policy. But with whatever aid, the peasants turned upon their hereditary oppressors. The flogging of salt-agents, the extortion of the tax-gatherers, the miseries of the frog-marshes, all the horrors of feudal tyranny, were paid back stroke upon stroke. Rights became an excuse for a new *Jacquerie*. Yet it must be added that these uprisings were less violent where the peasantry was the more prosperous, and were sometimes directed against the custom-houses, and in general were less against the feudal lord than against feudal privilege. Often if a seigneur delivered up the books containing the records of the feudal dues, violence was avoided. But anarchy none the less reigned, and the masses went demented. July and August were months of the "great fear." Plots were suspected on all sides—brigands were always on the point of breaking in upon one's town or village; huge royalist syndicates were being formed to starve the people into submission by raising the price of grain; the Duke of Orleans was hiring rascals to terrify

the people into loving him; royalists were blowing up patriotic citizens at lawn parties.¹

If it be asked why the king and his ministers did not use military force and crush out this anarchy, it must be replied that there was no army to be trusted by the king. Therein lay portentous danger. Weakness of government is complete when the military refuses obedience. Then it is that revolt becomes violent revolution.² So it was in France in July, 1789. As a contemporary writer remarked, "the sword had slipped from the king's grasp." Throughout France the garrisons refused to obey royalist officers, and even De Broglie fled to Germany. And if it be asked why the Assembly did not check these disorders, the only reply can be that the Assembly neither had the ability nor the desire to use force. It was reducing the Rights of Man to formulas.

Thus in July, 1789, the two wings of the revolution united, the masses to reform by destruction, the National Assembly to reorganize France by political philosophy. In the meantime Louis hunted, the court emigrated, the soldiers of the old army mutinied and fraternized with the mobs they should have controlled, the ministers did nothing, Necker passed sleepless nights in writing financial statements, and the Assembly, to use Mirabeau's words, "spent months over syllables."

¹ In one case it was charged that this was actually done by one Mesmai at Vesoul, but the investigating committee of the Assembly reported without even raising such a suspicion.

² See Le Bon, *Psychology of Revolution*, ch. 3. The succession of events in Russia from the abdication of the Czar to the triumph of the *bolsheviki* should be compared with the development in France 1789-92.

CHAPTER XII

THE END OF THE OLD RÉGIME¹

I. The Fourth of August, 1789. II. New Problems. III. The Removal of the King to Paris: 1. Marat and the New Popular Leaders; 2. The Fifth and Sixth of October, 1789.

The fall of the Bastille and the attendant disorders throughout France were by no means the only important facts of the early months of the Revolution. Others are to be found quite as truly in the doings of the Assembly, which since the defeat of the court party was left to effect, without fear of violence, those reforms upon which France was determined. Nor should it for a moment be supposed that the Assembly was indifferent to public disorder. Yet its interests were more theoretical than administrative, and it contented itself with appointing a committee to report upon the condition of the nation.

While this committee was making its investigation, the Assembly devoted itself to drawing up the constitution it had sworn in the tennis-court to produce. It was a slow process, made all the more difficult among men lacking political experience by the lack of parliamentary procedure and the habit of delivering set speeches of indefinite length.

First of all, came the question as to whether or not there should be a Declaration of Rights prefixed to the

¹ In general see Stephens, *French Revolution*, I, ch. 7; McCarthy, *French Revolution*, II, chs. 13-20; Taine, *French Revolution*, I, bk. i, ch. 4; Thiers, *French Revolution*, I, 80-114; Von Holst, *French Revolution*, II, ch. 7.

constitution.¹ Deciding in the affirmative, the Assembly debated for weeks the matter of the rights of man and the citizen, meanwhile allowing the country to govern itself. Its passion for philosophical generalities quite unfitted the Assembly for legislation. Its members were masters of sentimental politics, but quite incapable of instituting reform in such a way as to guarantee public peace. Their inexperience in politics made their creative spirit a source of anarchy. When abuses were destroyed, the very reform threw the country into deeper disorder. -

On the 4th of August the committee on the state of the nation reported, and a sad enough report did it make. Châteaux were burning all over France, millers had been hanged, tax-gatherers drowned, warehouses and depots of the salt trade burnt. It was evening when the report was finished, and the Assembly listened at first in a sort of stupor to the terrible facts. Then enthusiasm amounting almost to hysteria seized its members. The liberal party had found its opportunity. Vicomte de Noailles rushed to the tribune. "What is the cause of the evil which is thus agitating the provinces?" he cried. It was, he showed, the fact that the people were uncertain whether or not the old feudal demands were still in force, and were determined to see that they were utterly destroyed. As one of the privileged orders, he proposed to abolish all feudal rights. His motion was seconded by D'Aiguillon, next to the king the greatest feudal lord in France, and passed in a frenzy of self-sacrifice. Noble after noble arose and proposed the abolition of their privileges.

¹ The influence of America is here obvious. Englishmen during the struggle with the Stuarts had organized their rights in various documents, and the American colonies both before and after the War of Independence had extended the practice. Many of the new state constitutions had included such declarations. See Jellinek, *The Declarations of Rights*.

Rights of chase, rights of dovecote, rights of tithes, special eligibility to office, all followed each other into oblivion. Many nobles beggared themselves in their enthusiasm. The clergy vied with the nobles. Decrees followed for the equalization of penalties; freedom of employment; the abolition of feudal justice, customs at the frontiers of the provinces, guilds, pensions and salaries, special privileges of towns and provinces, serfdom and mortmain.¹ And to crown it all, in an outgush of loyalty, Louis, who had been ignorant of the whole affair, was voted the Restorer of French Liberty!

To understand the significance of the night of the 4th of August it is necessary to remember that the Revolution is marked by a series of stages. The first period was not so much political as economic and social. The only attack was upon the relics of feudalism, not upon the state. The National Assembly aimed not at destroying the monarchy, but the unjust privileges under which France had so long suffered. And this first period culminated in the voluntary renunciations made on the 4th of August. It is true hysterical legislation is always inexpedient. No small part of the confusion which beset the Assembly was due to the difficulty of administering these unforced renunciations. Sober thought, elementary parliamentary rules, would have prevented some of the decrees of that night. But even when all allowance is made, this much stands true: that hostility to privilege for which Turgot and Necker had stood unavailingly was converted into laws within a few hours. From that day to this France has never known a revival of the accursed condition that existed under the Old Régime. This was the real work of the Revolution. It was to make almost

¹ Compensation, however, was granted for certain of these abandoned privileges.

no permanent advance beyond the establishment of this civic equality which expressed the new social mind. Thereafter it sought to protect the new rights. It makes little difference whether we say that the 4th of August destroyed privileges or simply declared them destroyed; in either case it outlawed them. And with them the Old Régime as a whole was outlawed. It is a pity we cannot say that it was dead and buried, but actually it was simply outlawed, and, like all outlaws, its hand was against the law that drove it forth, and its hopes lay in the undoing of the good work the Revolution had thus far accomplished.

During the few months following the fall of the Bastille, the local institutions of the Old Régime rapidly disappeared throughout the provinces. It was not merely that the peasants turned liberty into license.¹ In despair of protection from the regular army, the *bourgeoisie* organized spontaneously in companies of National Guards, into which went most of the militia. Gradually these National Guards throughout the country grew affiliated. Thanks to this new military force, order was partly restored, but this very success deepened the hatred of the insurgent peasantry; and in Dauphiné the struggle between the National Guards and the peasants amounted to civil war. In the towns, also, there was disorder; but a vigorous council, like that of Rouen, had no difficulty in suppressing riots and punishing their leaders. When the old local governments proved inefficient, new permanent municipal committees, composed largely of members of the *bourgeoisie*, sprang up, and as in the case of the National Guard, these improvised governments were soon in correspondence with each other. These new organizations were authorized originally by no law and

¹ Arthur Young says a man's life was in danger from the number of peasants out gunning!

wholly independent of the Assembly. They illustrate not only the readiness with which the middle classes broke from the Old Régime, but they also show how thoroughly nationalized the revolutionary spirit had become and how spontaneously a people suffering from the breakdown of an existing government attempts to set up new institutions.

The problem of the workingman in the cities, however, had not been solved by the decrees of the 4th of August, nor had that of universal poverty. In fact, the Assembly was little concerned with such matters, questions of vested privilege and natural rights not being involved. Yet in the ignorant, hungry, half-frenzied proletariat of each city the *bourgeoisie*, which had destroyed the feudal and monarchical institutions, was to find its most inveterate enemy. As a matter of practical politics, the masses, intoxicated with the crudest ideas of liberty, should not have been neglected by the reformers. Revolutionary zeal easily turns to a programme of terror. This oversight on the part of the well-to-do deputies furnished the opportunity for radically democratic leaders, like Marat and Danton. The middle-class legislation of the National Assembly was to be followed by the ultra-democratic class legislation of the Jacobin period.

Thus the important elements in the revolutionary movement became distinct: the court, the Assembly, the *bourgeoisie*, the peasants, the masses of the cities, and especially the populace of Paris. For the moment, however, these were represented by two antagonistic bodies, the Assembly and the court, each wishing to control the king. Had France in July, August, and September, 1789, been possessed of a strong government, quiet might have been restored, and the dark days which were to follow might have been avoided. No mistakes had thus far been committed that a strong administration might not easily

have corrected. The Revolution in August, 1789, deserved the enthusiasm it universally aroused; its only danger lay in the undoing of its work. And this could be brought about only by its own indiscretions or by the success of the court.

As we look a little closer at France, it is evident that while it was likely that in its enthusiasm for humanity the Assembly might neglect administration, the danger from the court party was imminent. It would not have been human nature for persons who once had been possessed of all privileges to relinquish them immediately, because some of their fellows had been overtaken by a passionate generosity. And so it came about that from the 4th of August until the court party finally disappeared in the overthrow of the monarchy three years later, the history of the Revolution became a struggle between the parties of revolution and reaction. Louis himself grew increasingly useless; but had the court—or let us say more accurately, had the queen—been able to see things exactly as they were, had she been ready to make use of La Fayette and Mirabeau, the two men who could and would have helped her, much conflict, much misery, might have been spared. But instead, the queen grew the more bitter in her opposition to the liberal movement, and events went on at Versailles much as before the flight of the king's friends; forgetting the effects of their first attempt, the court party began to plot a new *coup d'état*.

Their projects were not well hidden, and the popular leaders of Paris determined once and for all to bring the king away from the influence of the court, and establish him in his palace in Paris, where he would be a hostage against royalist attacks. Further, it was thought that if the Assembly were only in Paris it might be induced to come down from the thin air of deductive politics and

consider the vulgar but more essential matter of the price of bread. Such a plan evidently involved many difficulties, for not only must the king be persuaded that such a transfer was necessary, but some energetic action must be taken to counteract the programme of the court party. And here, for the first time, we meet that use of the Parisian mob which later became so characteristic of the extreme revolutionists.

Since the fall of the Bastille, France, and especially Paris, had given birth to revolutionists far more ready than the deputies to champion the masses, and also to a rank sort of agitators, most of whom owned or edited journals. Chief among these latter was a Doctor Marat, a master of six languages, who had barely missed being elected a member of the Royal Academy of France, had been the court physician of the Court d'Artois, had achieved considerable reputation as an authority on light, electricity, and diseases of the eye, and the list of whose scientific publications fills three octavo pages.¹ Marat's interest in the masses was worthy of all his apologists say for him; but if he were a Wilberforce in theory, he was a Nero in method. Before his assassination by Charlotte Corday in 1793, his mind weakened, his influence waned, and his demands for heads can hardly be regarded as anything more than half-maniacal ravings. In 1789, however, he was of rapidly increasing importance, notwithstanding he was on bad terms with La Fayette. He was possessed of a profound pity for the populace, a vast talent for suspicion and denunciation, a passionate hatred of the aristocracy; and all of these traits he reduced to type in one

¹ Marat had one volume crowned by the Academy of Rouen, and another "approved" by the Royal Academy. So far was he from being the "horse-leech" of Carlyle.

of the most eccentrically bloodthirsty sheets the world ever saw, *L'Ami du Peuple*.¹

Marat² was soon to find his opportunity in the stupid blunders of those who represented the Old Régime. On the 1st of October a portion of the new troops which had been summoned by the court arrived, and the officers of the body-guard at Versailles gave a supper in honour of the regiment from Flanders. The news of the arrival of this regiment, of course, was known in Paris, and served to arouse the worst apprehensions of the Parisians, and these apprehensions were turned into frenzy by the reports which came of the banquet. The agitators seized upon this orgy, as they called it: Paris was starving while the court was feasting; the red-white-and-blue cockades of the people had been trampled under foot; the royalist song, "Richard, My King," had been sung by officers as they pledged health to the queen. Marat now comes into special prominence. On the 4th of October he seems to have gone to Versailles, and upon his return, Paris began to seethe.

If the men had learned to respect the prowess of the

¹It is perhaps worth noticing that though he believed De Launay, Foulon, and Berthier worthy of death, he denounced their lynching as a violation of justice and an outrage of nature. It might be added that several of the worst numbers of his journal were forgeries issued by his enemies. During the last twelve months of Marat's life sixty-four persons had been guillotined. Not one of them had been denounced or mentioned by him. See Bougeart, *Marat*, II, 284 seq.

²On Marat see Stephens in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and *French Revolution*, I, 216-219. The traditional view of his character is that of Michelet, *French Revolution* (Bohn ed.) 535-551. His great apologist is Bougeart, *Marat, l'Ami du Peuple*, and his most laborious and appreciative biographer is Chevrement, *Marat, Esprit politique*. See also Bowen Graves in *Fortnightly*, 1874, 2; Gottschalk, *Jean Paul Marat*, and for socialist judgment, Bax, *Marat*.

National Guard, the women of the lowest classes, especially the market-women, had not. In accord with the plans of the agitators, whose tools they were, the women, and men dressed as women, collected themselves in different parts of the city, formed rude troops, impressed every woman they met, and began to march toward the City Hall. Companies of the National Guard—not those composed of *bourgeois*, but of men of the old army, who had been overtaken by the prevailing spirit—were drawn up to oppose them. “You will not fire upon women,” they said, and threw themselves upon the soldiers’ necks. As if in an opera bouffe, the soldiers capitulated. A quick-witted man by the name of Maillard, seeing that the women were capable of all mischief if left in Paris—they were just about to hang an unlucky clergyman—placed himself with a drum at the head of the procession, and led it away from the city towards Versailles, promising the women bread. It was a wild procession, this of the women, shouting, starving, mad with the wildest of revolutionary deliriums. A modern city would have dispersed it in short order, but when La Fayette succeeded in gathering the National Guard, he found his troops were bent upon bringing the king to Paris. Either sincerely or for the sake of appearances, La Fayette endeavoured to procrastinate; the soldiers were polite but determined, and at last the general, probably not quite unwillingly, put himself at the head of another procession and also marched to Versailles.

It is a good eight miles from Paris to Versailles, and when the crowd of hungry women reached the palace it was ready for sleep or for riot. It surged into the astonished and not altogether pleased Assembly,¹ demanding

¹ The Assembly played a curious rôle in the affair. The women

that the price of bread be lowered by law, and then, after sending a deputation to the king, found its way into the great court of the palace. For a few hours the situation, if critical, was not hopeless. Some of the crowd were drunk, and others attempted to satisfy hunger by roasting a horse that had chanced to be shot. At last La Fayette arrived with his troops, and after disposing them in churches for the night, thinking all was quiet, retired to get a few hours' rest after twenty-four of constant exertion. His fatigue can hardly excuse his negligence, for as day broke, under what provocation it is not known, the mob broke into the palace, and made for the queen's apartment, apparently bent on murder. Two of the Life Guards were thrown out of the windows to the greater mob below, where in a second their heads were off and on pikes. The queen was aroused just in time. Heroic guards, at the risk of their lives, kept the inner doors of the palace closed until she went by a private staircase to the apartments of the king. This violence, however, was of but short duration, for La Fayette was able to bring about a return of order by means of his troops, and the wild night came to something like peaceful morning.

When morning came, the king appeared on the balcony, and was enthusiastically cheered when he promised to go to Paris. La Fayette led the queen and the dauphin upon the balcony, that the crowd might see her with a cockade in her hand. "No children!" howled the crowd, and the

crowded the galleries and told the deputies to "shut up," and shouted for "Mother Mirabeau." The president of the Assembly, Mounier, headed the deputation to the king, and in his absence one of the women sat in his chair. In the meantime some of the royalist deputies were flirting with the best-looking of the crowd. The desperate attempt of the Assembly to maintain its dignity can hardly be appreciated without reading the account of its proceedings in the *Moniteur* or the *Archives Parlementaires*.

queen bravely stood out alone with the general. La Fayette gave her the tricolour cockade, bent and in the most chivalrous way kissed her hand. The crowd was pleased, and in a way subdued, and a few hours later Louis, with the queen and the children, started for the capital, never again to return to the grand palace of Louis XIV.

It was a third and wildest of all the processions of these two days¹—women, men body-guards, troops, La Fayette on his white horse, and the people from the slums surrounding the royal carriage, howling, “We have got the baker, and the baker’s wife, and the baker’s little boy. Now we shall have bread.” And so they came to Paris and the shabby palace of the Tuileries.

The Assembly at Versailles, instead of acting like men, and punishing the authors of this shameful affair, yielded to mob law, voted that the king and the Assembly were inseparable, and in its turn went to Paris. Quarters were prepared for it in one of the great riding-schools of the town, close by the royal palace of the Tuileries, and at last the capital had the king and the National Assembly in its own control. It was the guarantee that the Old Régime should not be restored.

La Fayette and the extemporized *bourgeois* government of Paris (Commune) were the immediate gainers by the transfer of the Assembly to Paris. The Duke of Orleans was driven to England, the Commune repressed popular uprisings, and La Fayette, for the moment the most powerful man in France, with the aid of the National Guard, brought something like quiet into the excited capital.

But the more sinister fact cannot be overlooked.

¹ It is commonly said that the heads of the two murdered guards were borne on pikes in front of the carriage. La Fayette expressly denies this in his *Memoirs*.

Whether willingly or not, the municipal government of Paris, the commander-in-chief of the National Guard, the National Assembly, the king, had all been for the moment conquered by the proletarian mob, directed by demagogues. The end of such a triumph Mirabeau alone saw, and through LaMarck, his friend at court, he urged Louis to leave Paris and establish himself and the Assembly in some smaller and more friendly city. The advice was timely but unheeded, and both Louis and the Assembly remained in a city not only suspicious, but now inclined to violence and brutality. The revolutionary spirit was entering upon its second stage—hatred of the *bourgeoisie* as the representative of moderation and governmental control.

CHAPTER XIII

THE REORGANIZATION OF FRANCE¹

- I. The Parties in the Assembly: 1. The Extreme Right; 2. The Right; 3. The Center; 4. The Left; 5. The Extreme Left. II. Mirabeau. III. The Work of the Assembly: 1. The Weakening of the Executive; 2. The Finances; 3. The Church; 4. The Military; 5. The Judiciary; 6. The Legislature.

The events of the 5th and 6th of October were followed by more than two years of at least outward comparative quiet. Yet no years of the Revolution were more critical and resultful. It was then that the constitution was produced; it was then that, as real government collapsed, the *bourgeoisie* lost its control of public opinion, and the entire nation came under the influence of radicals supported by the proletariat; and it was then that the forces were accumulated that made France a republic.

Before it is possible to understand the course of debates and executive decrees that resulted in the short-lived constitution of 1791, it is necessary to consider the parties in the Assembly. Their origin can be seen in the numerous differences in principles and interests that characterized the deputies, but their first real appearance was due to the debates over the purely constitutional question as to whether or not the king should have the power of vetoing the acts of the Assembly. They were named from their position in the great Assembly hall in relation to the president. The Extreme Right, or Reactionist party, was

¹ In general, see Stephens, *History of the French Revolution*, I, chs. 8, 9, 10; Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, I, bk. i, ch. 5; bk. ii, ch. 3; Von Holst, *French Revolution*, II, ch. 7.

composed of a hundred bishops and a few nobles. The nobility leaders were D'Esprémesnil and the brother of the great Mirabeau, called, from his capacity to hold liquor, "the Barrel," while the leader of the bishops was the Archbishop of Aix. The party of the Right numbered from 200 to 250, and was composed of moderate men who favoured a constitutional monarchy after the style of England, and was led by Mounier and Malouet until they were forced to resign their charge to abler hands. In the centre of the hall sat about half the Assembly, who were practically neutral, and voted with either Right or Left, but were especially liable to be influenced by popular clamour. The Left was the most active division of the Assembly. It was composed of about the same number of delegates as was the Right, and included most of the young nobles who had served in America. Its most noted men were Sieyès, Talleyrand, La Fayette, but by the end of 1789 its leaders in the Assembly were Dupont, Lameth, and Barnave, the "triumvirate." Its plan was to cut loose from the past and at the same time maintain the monarchy. On the extreme left of the speaker sat a small body of radicals, completely under the influence of the philosophy of Rousseau. Chief among them were Robespierre, Pétion, and Buzot, all of whom were later to be of first importance. They had, however, little power within the Assembly, and turned to the clubs.

Besides these five parties, there was a single person who, belonging to neither, was yet the only man in the entire body who seemed capable of seeing things as they actually were, Mirabeau.

Gabriel Honoré Riquetti Comte de Mirabeau¹ was by

¹ The great works on Mirabeau are Loménie, *Les Mirabeau*, and Stern, *Das Leben Mirabeaus*. In English, the best studies are those of Fling, *Young Mirabeau*, and of Von Holst, *The French*

all means the most important character in the first years of the Revolution, though less for what he accomplished than for what he attempted. His early years¹ had been made miserable by his own dissipations and his father's spectacular discipline. Throughout his life he was licentious, extravagant, and destitute of anything like ordinary moral consistency. Yet so vast was his nature that it would be incorrect to think of him as untrustworthy or utterly without moral principles.² There were, in fact, two Mirabeaus, the great animal who came into the Assembly with face still bleeding from the leeches his dissipations had made necessary, and the orator and statesman, the implacable enemy of anarchy and privilege, who swayed a hostile Assembly or club with his eloquence while, with Cassandra-like accuracy, he foretold the fatal results of mistakes he was unable to prevent. Unfortunately the two men were inseparable, and the better was hopelessly handicapped by the worse. So notorious were his marital affairs and his relations with his father that he was hissed when he first entered the States General, and he seems to

Revolution Tested by the Career of Mirabeau. In addition, see Willert, *Mirabeau*, and the essays by Carlyle, Macaulay, and Reeves (*Royal and Republican France*). An interesting sketch is that of McCarthy, *French Revolution*, I, ch. 29. A sidelight upon the pre-revolutionary importance of Mirabeau is given by Fling, "Mirabeau and Calonne in 1785," *Am. Hist.* 1897, *Assoc.*, 131.

¹ The pre-revolutionary career of Mirabeau (1774-1789) cannot, unfortunately, be here considered, yet it was of sufficient importance to make him a leading factor in the development of the revolutionary spirit. See especially Fling, "Mirabeau, an Opponent of Absolutism," in *Nebraska University Studies*, II, No. 1 (July, 1894); "Mirabeau a Victim of the *Lettres de Cachet*," *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Oct., 1897.

² LaFayette himself gives him the credit of being true to his highest ideals for the nation, even when receiving a pension from the king.

have been suspected by all parties. None the less, his opposition to absolutism, his recognized ability as a writer upon all subjects of political importance, as well as his striking personality, had given him pre-eminence, and his boldness at the royal session and, far more, his speech in September in favour of Necker's proposed income tax gave him undisputed pre-eminence. He of all the deputies perceived how much reform was possible. Bitterly opposed to the Old Régime, he saw that France was incapable of republican government, and consequently wished only to change absolutism to constitutional monarchy. But his clear vision availed France almost nothing. Despite his increasing influence with the people and his position in the Assembly, he was neither able to induce La Fayette—whom he dubbed Cromwell-Grandison—to unite with him nor to form a coterie of followers. It is at this point that the chief criticism must be passed upon his political career. In large measure, it is true, this failure was due to the selfish, narrow spirit of the men to whom he appealed, but this is not the complete explanation; for if Mirabeau had the insight of the statesman, he too little trusted the organizing methods of the politician. His relations with the Assembly, on the whole, might almost be reduced to this: the Assembly did what Mirabeau knew it should not do, and left undone the things that Mirabeau knew it should do.

The meetings of the Assembly were hopelessly disorderly. Mirabeau had laid before it a translation of Romilly's rules governing the House of Commons, but the Assembly wanted no aid from England. Instead of a few men meeting, like the Convention that drew up the American constitution, in secret, twelve hundred men discussed constitutional articles before three galleries filled with excitable crowds. Further, the presiding officer was

changed every fortnight. Genuine debate there was little or none. A member had often literally to fight his way into the tribune, and once there he shouted and declaimed. At any minute the Assembly was liable to be swept off its feet by some passion. In the midst of a discussion on a national bank, excitable deputies took off their silver knee-buckles and threw them upon the table as a present to the state. Visitors and petitioners were always received. The proceedings were stopped to welcome a speech-making crowd of children, a newly married priest, or a liberated serf from the Jura a hundred and twenty years old. At one time the Assembly was fairly beside itself with enthusiasm as it received Baron von Clotz, who marched in at the head of a troop of men dressed like different nations, all come to salute new France in the name of the human species.

Yet through all confusion the Assembly kept steadily at its work of producing a constitution for new France. Here it was confronted by another difficulty. It rapidly assumed executive powers, and like the second Continental Congress of America, was confronted with the double problem of producing a constitution and governing a distracted country. It was a fatal union, all the more inexcusable on the part of the Assembly, since it might have had the benefit of America's experience. Still another mistake did this overtaxed body make: it put its constitution into effect piecemeal. As fast as an article was adopted it was put into operation, and thus administration was misled by political metaphysics and constitutional provisions were precipitated by the desperate condition of the country. It is, in fact, impossible to discuss the constitution without at the same time considering the entire reorganization of France.

The fundamental principles which animated the As-

sembly need not be again set forth. They were carefully codified in the "Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen" prefixed to the constitution, and embodied that teaching as to liberty and equality philosophers had popularized.¹ From any point of view the time spent upon this declaration might better have been spent upon more practical matters; but considering the unwieldy size of the Assembly, its disregard of parliamentary procedure, and its inexperience, one must admit that it might have done less, if not worse. As regards fundamentals, its work has never permanently been undone. Its destructive legislation was practically that imposed upon it by the *cahiers* of its members, and so far it was the true expression of the new spirit of the nation. It was in accord with its principle of equality that free people of colour were admitted to equal rights with whites, that all titles of nobility were abolished, and that an effort was constantly made to reverse the conditions of the Old Régime—often, indeed, to an altogether unwarranted extent, as in the matter of taxation of the land and the support of the proletariat by means of public workshops.

But dread of a continuance of absolutism was quite as influential as love of equality, and from the outset the Assembly was determined to weaken the power of the executive. In this it expressed the suspicion of a strong executive which characterized the *bourgeois* politics of the eighteenth century. It even appears in the "checks" of the Constitution of the United States which was adopted just at this time. Mirabeau and a few of the more sensible deputies were anxious for the king to have a veto power over the acts of the Assembly, but the populace

¹ For example, liberty of the individual, security of property, safety of one's person, right to resist oppression, freedom of speech, of publication, and of religion.

and the great mass of deputies believed that to give him such power would be to make themselves "slaves again."¹ Under the influence of Necker, an unfortunate compromise was effected, by which the king was given a "suspensive veto," in accordance with which he could veto a bill, but if it was passed by the two legislatures following that by which it was presented it became a law.² Nor did the Assembly restrict itself to political theory. The executive department of the state had continued as before the States General, the ministers carrying on the various bureaus. Necker, though at the height of his popularity, was growing daily more incompetent, and the only two men of actual power were La Fayette, because of his command of the National Guards, and Mirabeau, because of his position in the Assembly, Paris, and the provinces. Evidently the sensible plan would have been to form a coalition ministry, of which La Fayette and Mirabeau, if not Necker, should be members. This Mirabeau attempted, and in the face of the suspicion of the court and the supercilious attitude of Necker and La Fayette, nearly accomplished. But the Extreme Right and the Extreme Left were bitterly jealous of him; the less radical deputies were hysterically individualistic and in terror of "slavery"; and the eyes of the entire Assembly were closed to the need of anything except general principles. As a result, in its determination to maintain its independence during the time of constitution-making, the Assembly voted (November 7th) that no deputy should

¹ The public, who had never heard the word veto before, were thus enlightened by their leaders: "You are eating your soup. The king comes along and knocks the bowl from your hands. That is a veto."

² Sec. iii, art. 2, Tripier, *Constitutions qui ont regi la France depuis 1789*.

be allowed to receive office from the king. This decree was directly aimed at Mirabeau, and it resulted in ruining every possibility of his becoming a minister. With this exclusion disorder was guaranteed,¹ and unwittingly the deputies had destroyed the monarchy, and had made strong government in France possible only under terror.

More beneficial, but hardly less doctrinaire, was the constitutional provision for the administration of the nation. The provinces and intendances were abolished, and France was divided into eighty-two (or eighty-three including Corsica) departments, each divided into nine districts, each district into ten cantons, and each canton into ten municipalities.² The department and each of its subdivisions were to have their proper officers, each to be elected, the electoral process being very elaborate.³ Each department was to have at its head a *procureur-général-syndic*, each district a *procureur-syndic*, each canton and department a *procureur*. Each division had also its appropriate judiciary. Each commune, or town government, further, had charge of its own companies of the National Guard, and in other ways exercised really sovereign powers. In its reaction from Bourbon centralization the Assembly had practically destroyed all national government, and broken France up into little democracies. But this was not all; every officer, judge, and council in

¹ Mirabeau repeatedly urged the king to bring about the repeal of this fatal vote, but to no purpose. It is generally believed that its passage was due to the influence of Necker and La Fayette.

² These were the ideal numbers. Actually there were 83 departments, 574 districts, 4,730 cantons, 44,000 communes.

³ The officers of the municipality and canton were to be elected by the active citizens of the municipality and canton, respectively; but the officers of the district and department were to be elected by an electoral college chosen by the citizens of the department.

every administrative division was to be elected, and any citizen who did his duty must needs appear every few weeks at the polls. The *bourgeois* influence was also felt, for citizens were divided into two classes, the *active*—i. e., those who paid taxes equal to three days' wages; and the *passive*, or those who did not pay such tax. The franchise was limited to the active citizens, and a considerable property qualification was set for all officials. Thus in theory the responsible citizens were in control of the state. In fact, few persons were really refused the franchise, and the property qualifications became only a source of class hatred. The great powers this administrative system would give a municipality, and especially a great city like Paris, are at once evident. Its commune would be a practically independent government, controlling its own troops, more than able to confront the officers of the department to which it belonged, and certain to demand special recognition from the Assembly.

The financial expedients of the Assembly were, on the whole, temporizing and injurious. From the first it had faced the financial problem unwillingly, but the deficit was growing steadily, and on August 7th Necker informed the Assembly that practically no taxes had been collected for three months.¹ He wished the Assembly to sanction a loan of \$6,000,000 at five per cent., for which he had made provision. The Assembly sanctioned the loan, but blindly changed the rate to four and one-half per cent. The loan consequently was not taken up. Three weeks later Necker attempted to float a loan of \$16,000,000 at five per cent., but failed. Then the state lived on gifts for a few weeks, but September 29th Necker proposed an

¹ In June the Assembly had declared that existing taxes should be paid provisionally until new laws were passed. Naturally the people did not pay provisional taxes.

income tax of twenty-five per cent., to be paid within three years, the citizen himself simply declaring his income. The scheme was preposterous, but Mirabeau supported it as a last resort, and it was voted. But to no purpose. Taxes could not be collected in a state in which the executive had practically been annihilated. In November, Necker proposed that the collection of the taxes should be handed over to *Caisse d'Escompte*, or Department of Loans, which should advance a fixed sum. Mirabeau opposed this plan, and it amounted to nothing. The financial stringency was increased by the nobles and wealthy *bourgeois* exporting their specie to London, and by the various relief schemes which were being carried on by Paris. The capital was spending \$32,000 a month on public workshops, and in January and February lent \$3,400,000 to the masses to buy food, all of which it borrowed from the national treasury. In fact, the socialistic tendency was marked, and the masses were being supported in large part by the municipality. Its need, in turn, reacted upon the Assembly, for the only hope of national quiet lay in the quiet of Paris, and this had to be bought.

In this crisis the Assembly turned to an obvious, but as it proved, dangerous expedient. The royal domain had already been nationalized, and on October 10, Talleyrand proposed that the property of the church should be similarly treated. Mirabeau who saw "bankruptcy at the doors" forced the measure through the Assembly by a vote of 368 to 346. \$80,000,000 worth of church lands was ordered sold. But how could such a stupendous transaction be carried through without enormous loss? In November, Mirabeau suggested the issuing of scrip with this land as collateral, and on March 17, 1790, the Assembly voted to issue the first *assignats*. The plan was very simple, and

had no further paper money been issued, perfectly sound. Eighty million dollars of paper money were issued in interest-bearing notes, and these were to be received at their face value in payment for the church lands. At first the *assignats* circulated at par, but in a few weeks speculators in the church lands had forced them down ten per cent., and even then the municipalities to whom the Assembly had assigned the selling of the lands within their limits, kept the *assignats* and sent their own worthless bonds to the national treasury.¹ The government really was benefited but little by the transaction, and within a few months found itself in new straits. So terrible did a declaration of bankruptcy seem to Mirabeau, that through his influence (September 27, 1790), the Assembly voted an additional issue of \$160,000,000 of *assignats*, though with the solemn assurance that the sum then in circulation (\$240,000,000) should not be exceeded. But the descent into the Avernus of fiat money is easy. By June, 1791, the issue of September had been used, and the state was again in need. One hundred and twenty million dollars more were issued, much of the sum being in five-franc notes, whereas formerly fifty-franc had been the smallest denomination. The result was to people France with speculators. The very peasant was unable to tell the value of the crop he raised. Patriotism has seldom, if ever, withstood an opportunity to grow rich at the expense of the country for which one is ready to die, and every purchaser of state or church land, looking forward to future payments on the same, was anxious to depreciate the value of the *assignats*. Specie left the country; trade,

¹ The shameless dishonesty of some patriots is also seen in that after making the first payment in assignats, by which they were given possession of the lands, they cut off the timber and decamped before the second installment became due.

at first brisk, diminished; and France was soon tasting all the miseries of a hopelessly depreciated currency.¹

This seizure of the church lands was to have a profound influence upon the course of the Revolution. On the one hand it committed the new land-owning class to the new order, for the re-establishment of the Old Régime would have torn all the new land-titles to shreds. On the other hand it alienated the great mass of the clergy, including those who had favoured reform, and led to the later legislation against the clergy which in its turn led to the rebellion of loyal Catholic departments and the fall of the monarchy.

The inevitable outcome of this legislation led to the establishment of the civil status of the clergy. After nationalizing the property of the church, the Assembly agreed to pay its debts (\$30,000,000), and while dissolving the monasteries and seizing their property, it agreed to pension the monks and nuns. The state undertook to support all the clergy from the taxes, reducing greatly the salaries of the bishops and increasing those of the curates. The bishops were hereafter to be considered as the servants of the state, paid by the state. The salaries, according to the importance of the bishopric, were to vary from \$2,500 to \$10,000 a year. The curates were to have from 1,200 fr. to 2,400 fr. a year, besides a house and garden. There was much justice in this; but the position taken by the Assembly in regard to the civil position of the clergy was full of danger. It involved two specific

¹ Altogether during the Revolution 145,000,000,000 francs of assignats were issued. See White, *Paper Money in France*; Walker, *Money*, 336-347; Blanc, *History of the French Revolution*, bk. xiv, ch. 3; Dillaye, *Money and Finances of the French Revolution*; Stourm, *Les Finances de l'Ancien Régime et de la Révolution*, II, 277-329.

provisions. There was to be but one bishop for a department and one curate for each commune, each to be elected and to take an oath to support the yet uncompleted constitution. This practically amounted to a break with the Pope. If bishops were to be elected by their parishoners, and if they were to be simply the civil functionaries of the state, the ancient organization of the church was evidently at an end. Louis signed the decrees establishing this new status of the clergy with great reluctance. Thereafter he regarded himself as the disloyal son of the church, and began to listen to the plans of his court for his flight. But sign them he did. Thus by the end of the first year since the States General, the Catholic clergy had ceased to be a privileged order, had ceased to be feudal lords, had ceased to be wholly subject to the Pope.¹

It was inevitable that resistance should be made to such radical changes. The bishops refused to take the civic oath, and November 27, 1790, a law was passed that unless the oath were taken no priest or bishop should remain in office. Only four bishops took the oath. It was but natural, therefore, that a papal bull of April 13, 1791, should denounce this civil constitution of the clergy, as based on heretical principles, and that as a result, good Catholics should regard the services of all civic priests as without efficacy in birth, marriage, and death. In Alsace a petition against the nationalization of the church estates was signed by twenty-one thousand persons, including Lutherans and Jews as well as Catholics. In this case the opposition was doubtless economic, as the sale of the church lands was sure to injure the tenant-farmers. But in others parts of France religious sympathies were more

¹ See Debidour, *L'Église et l'État en France*, pt. i, chs. 1, 2; Sloane, *The French Revolution and Religious Reform*.

in evidence, and so anarchic was the nation that miniature religious wars broke out in several cities. Later, the attempt to enforce the civil constitution of the clergy in La Vendée gave rise to a great uprising against the revolutionary government.

These and other disorders showed plainly the untrustworthy condition of the entire military force. It has already appeared that after the fall of the Bastille the *bourgeois* class throughout France began to form the so-called National Guard. Under the constitution this military force was firmly established, both as a reserve and as a militia to maintain order. But the regular army was still in existence, and the Assembly proceeded to reform it. This was all the more imperative since the men were now under the influence of the current thought about equality, and demanded that they as well as other men should have a share in the new order of things. The Assembly therefore raised the pay of the soldiers, opened the rank of commissioned officers to all classes, and itself assumed control of the entire military establishment, leaving to the king the right to appoint only the commander-in-chief and the marshals. Had some way been devised by which discipline could be re-established, these military reforms would have been very beneficial; as it was, however, with the exception of the Swiss and German mercenaries, the entire army, composed as it was largely of lawless men, grew insubordinate, suspicious of its officers, and generally more in need of being guarded than capable of maintaining order. The government and particularly the court were thus lacking any force removed from radical influences, capable of enforcing its authority.

With the judiciary, perhaps, the Assembly was more successful. The Parlements were abolished, local courts were authorized in every administrative division. with

appeals, from the lower to the higher. Juries were to try all criminal cases. In accordance with the general passion for voting, all judges and juries were to be elected. A new institution was the establishment of a high court to try cases of treason.

Finally, as regards the legislative body of the nation, the Assembly decided that it should have but one chamber, its members to be elected by the different departments. The absence of a second chamber made hasty legislation easy, and this fact, when coupled with the impracticable suspensive veto, was calculated to lead to friction between the legislative and the executive branches of the government. This over-emphasis upon legislation which the constitution of 1791 everywhere shows was only a reflection of the dominating spirit of the Constituent Assembly. It believed men could be made happy and the nation orderly by proclamations and laws. It was this belief, born of the enjoyment of new privileges and the remembrance of former "slavery," that explains the Assembly's disregard of administration, of discipline in the army, and severe repression of disorder among the peasantry. If ever a strong government is needed, it is when a country is just experiencing the intoxication of new liberties, but this, as we have seen, was the one thing the Assembly was unable, even unwilling, to give France. In this as in other particulars it accurately represented the philosophical, idealistic temper of the class of society from which it was elected. But like all idealists, it could not see that it was confronted by facts and not theories; by Frenchmen and not "natural" men. Its principles were noble; the men it would benefit were unprepared to live nobly; individualism was carried to extremes; repressive government was judged unworthy of the new age. Unlike the United States of America, which at this very time were

adopting a new Constitution, France had had no experience in self-government. General principles, however admirable, will not administer themselves. A country, in revolution, if it lacks the necessary political experience, can expect only a cycle of unpractical idealism, disorder, impossible economic experiments, mass-terrorism. So has it been in Russia and so was it to be in France. And in these facts lies the explanation of the next phase of the Revolution.¹

¹ The different estimate placed upon the work of the Assembly by open-eyed contemporaries is to be seen in Rabaut St. Etienne, *French Revolution*; Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution*, and the running commentary of Mirabeau in his papers sent La Marck and Montmorin. Popular anticipations are to be seen in Arthur Young, *Travels*.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT¹

The Festival of the Confederation, July 14, 1790. II. Mirabeau and the Court. III. The Activity of Radical Revolutionists. IV. Forces Making toward Radicalism: 1. State Socialism; 2. The Jacobin Club; 3. The Cordelier Club; 4. The Indifference of the *Bourgeoisie* to Voting; 5. The Death of Mirabeau; 6. The Flight of the King; 7. The "Massacre of the Champs de Mars." V. The End of the Constituent Assembly.

On February 4, 1790, Louis unexpectedly came to the Assembly, and after a short speech intended to offset certain suspicions as to a proposed flight, in his own name and that of the queen and his young son solemnly took the civic oath to abide by the new order of things and the Constitution which was in process of making. The Assembly was raised to a high pitch of loyal enthusiasm, and with great cheering voted the king its thanks. But his oath suggested similar action, and every deputy came forward and in his turn took the civic oath;² then the substitute deputies, the galleries, the crowd about the doors, all took the same oath, until the building fairly trembled with shouts of "I swear it." From the Assembly the oath

¹ In general, see Stephens, *French Revolution*, I, chs. 11, 14, 15; Taine, *French Revolution*, II, bk. iv, chs. 1, 2; Von Holst, *French Revolution*, II, chs. 10-12; *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, 191-210; Madelin, *French Revolution*, chs. 10-14.

² The oath taken was as follows: "I swear to remain faithful to the nation, to law, to the king, and to maintain with all my power the constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by the king." Aulard, *Histoire politique de la Révolution française*, 82.

passed through Paris, and from town to town over all France. Never was the spirit of the country more heartily loyal and hopeful, and the Assembly determined that the first anniversary of the fall of the Bastille should be celebrated on a gigantic scale as a national Festival of Confederation.

Thousands of persons of all classes worked furiously to arrange seats of turf in the great Champs de Mars. Invitations were sent out to all the departments to send delegates. Enthusiasm redoubled as these representatives began to arrive in the city, and when July 14, 1790, arrived, rainy though it was, four hundred thousand persons and sixty thousand troops were assembled. In the midst of the great field stood an altar upon a base twenty-five feet high. And there, surrounded by three hundred priests, Talleyrand¹ performed mass, accompanied by the booming of cannon. La Fayette, as commander of the National Guards, received the form of oath from the king, carried it to the altar; and then the soldiers, the deputies, the king, with arms outstretched, took the oath. The queen held out the little dauphin to the people, and the vast company burst into shouts of wildest enthusiasm. At the same moment all over France smaller bodies of citizens were stretching out their arms and swearing the same oath. That night Paris was illuminated, and people danced on the spot where the Bastille had stood a year before, the symbol of a now departed absolutism. No other nation could or would have undertaken such a celebration, but to France it seemed as if liberty was at last achieved, and all suspicion of the king's sincerity was stilled. Had Louis but accepted Mirabeau's advice, and from that moment ener-

¹ "Don't make me laugh," he said to La Fayette.

getically put himself at the head of the new national movement, there can be little doubt the nation's loyalty would never have been less.¹

Nor was this action of the Assembly in calling this Confederation merely sentimental. It was in hopes of furthering the national solidification already in process. To a very marked degree the Revolution thus far had disintegrated the France of the Old Régime by the destruction of the provincial boundaries. Until the new departmental system was working efficiently there was danger lest the nation should fall apart into what Taine calls "30,000 republics," that is the municipalities. The centripetal forces which a true nationality implies had therefore to be re-established. The custom of swearing mutual loyalty and obedience to the decrees of the Assembly had been established by the National Guard in various provinces. In the Summer of 1789 the provinces of Brittany and Anjou had established a "federation." The Assembly recognized the possibilities of this spontaneous effort at unification, but somewhat alarmed at its democracy, placed the election of delegates to the Paris festival in the hands of the National Guard. As this was composed of "active citizens," the federation movement was left in the hands of the *bourgeoisie*.

¹ Illustrations of the loyalty of the departments are numerous. As the deputies from the departments were presented to Louis, the leader of those from Brittany knelt and presented Louis his sword, saying, "I place in your hands the faithful sword of the Bretons; it shall only be reddened by the blood of your foes." Louis raised and embraced him, and returned the sword, saying: "It can never be in better hands than in those of my brave Bretons. I have never doubted their loyalty and affection: assure them that I am the father and brother, the friend of all Frenchmen." "Sire," replied the deputy, "every Frenchman loves, and will continue to love you, because you are a citizen-king." Carlyle has a most vivid account of this celebration.

The celebration of July 14, 1790, not only shows how thoroughly national the Revolution was, but it marks the acme of its idealistic phase. If we except the details to be formally incorporated in the constitution during the succeeding months, all benefits had been done France that were to be permanent. Absolutism, privileges, unjust taxation and feudal dues, the provincial divisions, the parlements, all had forever disappeared, and there was left to king and courtiers simply the duty of accommodating themselves to the new condition of affairs. Nor was this beyond hope. The *bourgeoisie* was in control and radicalism was not yet possessed of political power. The problems confronting the new government were at bottom administrative, and the fact that Mirabeau was giving advice might have been a basis of help.¹ For several months he had been coming more into touch with the king. In a full statement of his political belief he had declared his persistent devotion to royalty and his determination to aid it as the one means of restoring tranquillity to the nation, but on the sole condition that the king should sincerely and without reservation accept the reforms accomplished and put himself at the head of a constitutional government. It was with no disloyalty, therefore, to his original principles that he secretly accepted a large pension from the king, and repeatedly counselled the representative of the court as to the proper course of conduct. The details of the plans varied according to the circumstances of the day, but their main purpose was to prevent counter-revolution, to lead Louis to see the real benefits of the destructive work of the Assembly, and, especially at first, to induce him to

¹ To understand the true relations of Mirabeau with the court, see *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*. This correspondence, also, is invaluable as a running commentary on the course of the Revolution.

make the government less Parisian by leaving the capital and establishing himself and a new Assembly, supported by the departments, in some city where the pressure of the mob would be removed. Mirabeau actually planned to organize royalist propaganda in the province and a royalist press in Paris in order to create a royalist party which should be sufficiently strong to make the masters of the Assembly cautious.

By no advice, however, could Mirabeau accomplish anything, because of the insincerity of the queen, the inertia of the king, the jealous puritanism of La Fayette, and the incapacity of Necker. The latter, indeed, resigned, and retired to Switzerland in September, 1790, but the other sources of difficulty remained. In the face of Mirabeau's warnings, reaction grew more open. The Right in the Assembly urged on extravagant legislation in order to bring the Assembly into disrepute; the clergy preached against the sacrilege done the church; the nobility constantly left the kingdom for other countries, there to excite Europe against the Assembly, and if possible to secure troops with which to reinstate the Old Régime; the officers of the standing army grew hostile to the Revolution; the clergy of Jalès organized against the government, and their league was to grow into a secret confederation against the new ecclesiastical legislation; England seemed on the point of involving the country in a war through its quarrel with Spain, the ally of France, over Nootka Sound; and the attitude of Germany and Austria justified apprehension. The practical question was, as Mirabeau saw, who should control and direct the masses of the departments. Those of Paris might safely be trusted to attain slowly to sobriety under the influence of the National Guard and La Fayette.

But Mirabeau's words were unheeded. This appeal to

the nation the court would not make. The inaction was fatal. While the nobility were hoping for some miraculous undoing of the New Régime and the *bourgeoisie* grew complacently indifferent to strong government, the Extreme Left was organizing public opinion throughout the masses of the entire nation.

This new radicalism may be traced directly to that revolutionary spirit of the masses, not permitted participation in the elections, whose steady growth has already been noticed. It was incipiently socialistic, in that men had come to hold that the state should aid the municipalities, maintain public workshops for the benefit of the unemployed, and by the latter part of 1790 these establishments and their beneficiaries had become so numerous as to constitute a severe tax upon the well-to-do classes. The influence of the municipalities is also seen in the legislation of the Assembly. The explanation of the abolition of certain indirect taxes and the retention of others lies almost entirely in their bearing upon the cities, and above all upon Paris. The needs of the artisans of the city rather than the agricultural interests of the peasants gained increasing attention. In fact, the Commune of Paris practically dictated the fiscal policy of the Assembly.

This development of the revolutionary spirit followed in general the lines of social psychology. Group action is never strictly rational. Prejudice and passion, fanatical devotion to a Cause and a murderous hatred of all opponents or supposed opponents—these it is that make revolutions so terrible. Nor is such spirit without its special agencies. Revolutions give rise to non-political groups each championing some aspect of reform or destruction. So it was in France.

Back of the new spirit of the masses lay the work of the Society of the Friends of the Constitution, bet-

ter known as the Jacobin Club. In 1789, while the Assembly was still in Versailles, a body of what were then rather extreme liberals began dining together for the purpose of discussing the policy of reform. It was first known as the Breton Club, and afterward as the Society of the Friends of the Constitution, and included many distinguished men, among them La Fayette, Talleyrand, and Mirabeau. After the Assembly went to Paris, the club met in a small room and, later, in the library of a monastery belonging to the Dominicans, known popularly as the Jacobins, because of their church of St. James. This nickname passed to the club. In Paris it rapidly grew less moderate. The leaders of the Extreme Left, who were too few and advanced to have influence in the Assembly, soon became the most important among its members through their great earnestness and their popularity among the masses. By the end of 1790 the Jacobins numbered more than a thousand members, and had ceased to be merely a debating club, but were seeking to influence the populace of Paris. All important questions to come before the Assembly were discussed and decided in advance by the club. In 1791 La Fayette and the more moderate members withdrew, to form the short-lived and ineffective club of the Feuillants, and men like Robespierre were left in full control.¹ Similar clubs were formed throughout France. In every municipality the citizens, no longer the indifferent persons described by Arthur Young, met to discuss the matters which busied the Assembly, and to express their views by votes. Their information came through the Parisian newspapers, which by 1791 had attained a vast circulation and conse-

¹ On the Jacobin Club, by far the most important work is Aulard, *La Société des Jacobins*. See also Challamel, *Les Clubs Contre-révolutionnaires*.

quent influence. At the outset these clubs were under the control of the well-to-do classes, and in fact were seldom if ever led by members of the proletariat. In the course of time, however, the more conservative element tired of perpetual discussion, and gradually withdrew. The control of the clubs then passed to young lawyers who embraced the cause of the masses and soon became as hostile to the *bourgeoisie* as to the aristocracy.

All these clubs were profound admirers of the Jacobin Club of Paris, and by the beginning of 1791 were gradually affiliating with that body. Through these confederated clubs most if not all of which had their newspapers and other means of shaping further opinion in the *communes*, the radicals of Paris rapidly acquired the control of the voting bodies of all the municipalities of France, and were able so to unify political action as in a measure to anticipate the modern political party. The general program of the affiliated clubs was based upon popular sovereignty, and, by degrees, became hostile to monarchy as an institution.

Almost as influential in Paris, though far less so in the departments, was the Cordelier Club. Its name, like that of the Jacobins, was derived from a monastery in which its meetings were held. From its inception it was radical, its members including Danton, Marat, Camille Desmoulins, Hébert, Legendre. All these men were opposed to compromise, and were anxious to destroy every vestige of the Old Régime, monarchy as well as feudalism.¹

¹ It should not be overlooked that the Jacobin and the Cordelier were by no means the only clubs in Paris. Nor were all clubs composed of radicals. There were the Club of 1789, composed of moderate men like La Fayette, Sieyès, and Talleyrand; the Feuillant Club, composed of deputies most of whom had seceded from the Jacobins; the non-partisan Club of Valois; the royalist Monarchical Club, which, however, was suppressed as

This supremacy of the more violent revolutionist in the clubs characterized the entire nation. The masses continued to dream of liberty as portrayed by countless club orators with ever increased emphasis upon class hatred. After the enthusiasm of July 14, 1790, the majority of Frenchmen believed further attention on their part to affairs of state was not needed. The *bourgeoisie* had won their cause, and were content now to let government manage itself. Thus the "sovereign people" rapidly resolved itself into an aggressive minority, composed of the lower classes, managed by Jacobins.¹ It is safe to say that at any moment in the Revolution this minority could have been defeated, and that in 1791 its political power could have been destroyed if the other elements of society had gone to the polls.² As it was, this minority was made increasingly violent, not alone by journalists like Desmoulins and Marat, and such Jacobins as Robespierre and Pétion, but also by thoroughly brutal men, like Santerre and Hébert in Paris and a multitude of local leaders

soon as it attempted to win the masses by supplies of food. But none of these clubs was of anything like the importance of the Jacobin and Cordelier.

¹ Taine, *French Revolution*, II, 31, 32, gives authorities and figures. In Paris, in August, 67,200 voters out of 81,400 did not vote, and three months later the absentees numbered 71,408. In the departments the disparity is far greater. At Grenoble 2,000 of the 2,500 registered voters did not appear at the polls, and even fewer at Limoges. Even when persons were chosen members of the electoral college, they did not take the trouble to perform their duties. Of 946 Parisian electors only 200 voted; and again in the departments the same neglect is to be observed.

² This conclusion is supported by these figures: In Paris, out of more than 81,000 registered voters, only 6,700 voted for Pétion as mayor, yet he received the majority of the votes cast. In 1792, he was elected by about 14,000 out of 160,000 registered voters. The case was similar in the departments. See Taine, *French Revolution*, II, 46.

throughout the departments. There the struggle between the local Jacobins and the order-loving *bourgeoisie* who, because of the property qualification for the franchise practically comprised the electorate, was more violent and more often marked by bloodshed than in Paris. There the National Guard had come to be feared. The lower classes, excluded from voting, naturally had recourse to violence. The establishment of royalist or conservative clubs was nearly always followed by riots. Mobs frequently lynched men suspected of being "aristocrats," and at Aix their victim was the *procurateur-général-syndic* of the department. In Avignon¹ the Jacobins, under a wagoner named Jourdan, massacred sixty-one persons and threw their bodies into the tower of the Glacière.² Even worse acts of violence occurred in the colonies, and especially in San Domingo, where the negroes rose against the whites.

Mirabeau himself seems to have felt the pressure of the new spirit, for during the last months of his life his speeches in the Assembly were on a plane distinctly nearer that of the demagogue.³ This change may be ascribed

¹ Avignon had been the home of the Popes during the so-called Babylonish Captivity in the fourteenth century, and at the time of the Revolution it was still under the papal legate. The French Jacobin party was the minority but gathered a mob of blood-thirsty peasants and under the direction of Jourdan inaugurated a reign of terror, but order was restored by the National Guard. Then began a miniature civil war between the citizens who wished to remain subject to the Pope and those who wished to unite Avignon to France. By the summer of 1791 commissioners appointed by the Constituent Assembly advised that the union be permitted and that troops be sent to maintain order. Through the inefficiency of the ministry these did not arrive promptly.

² Jourdan returned to Avignon and lived unmolested until July, 1794, when he was guillotined by the deputy on mission as a moderate republican!

³ For the most important of the speeches of Mirabeau and the

both to the temper of those who prepared his speeches—for Mirabeau frequently delivered those he himself had not written, and at least in one case had not even read over—and to his later and questionable policy of discrediting the Assembly in order to bring about a partial reaction in favor of the monarchy. Radical legislation might thus be discredited by *reductio ad absurdum*. But neither is the complete explanation. There was in addition the necessity of using the Jacobins. "Ill-fated nation!" he wrote in December, 1790, "to this hast thou been brought by some men, who have supplanted talent by intrigue and conceptions by commotions." At the time he wrote these words he was president of the Jacobins, and was evidently fighting for strong government with the weapons of demagogues. How far he was from approving the radicalism of the club appears from the fact that February 28, 1791, he was forced to defend himself at one of its sessions because of his having opposed a high-handed law against emigration; but affairs were in such a condition that, as his opponent, Lameth, said in his attack upon him at the club, only from the midst of the Jacobins could he wield the lever of opinion.

Yet even thus the case was nearly hopeless for a man suspected of having been bought by the king,¹ and we can only speculate as to what would have been his influence in 1792. That he could have stopped the drift toward a republic and the despotism of popular leaders is not probable. In 1794 friendship with him was one

other orators of the Revolution, see Stephens, *The Orators of the French Revolution*; on the question of the authorship of those of Mirabeau, see Aulard, *Les Orateurs de la Constituante*, 130-170.

¹ Newsdealers were selling on the streets of Paris a pamphlet, "The Great Treason of Count Mirabeau."

of the charges that brought Danton to the guillotine. Perhaps it was fate's one kindly act in his strange life that he died before the great struggle over the monarchy really opened.

To the last he strove to accomplish the impossible. The court apparently counted him as simply one enemy bribed to silence. La Fayette would not soil himself by any combination with him; the Jacobins hated him for his moderation; the Assembly rejected his sane proposals, and adopted only those in which he temporized with demagogism; Montmorin, minister of foreign affairs, alone appreciated his clear vision, and practically allowed him as a member of the diplomatic committee of the Assembly to manage the foreign relations of the state. His early death, like his political failure, came on April 2, 1791, as a penalty of his dissipations. He was buried with immense pomp in the Pantheon; but less than three years later his body was removed to make room for that of Marat.

The months that followed his death were filled with attacks upon royalty, occasioned by the new opportunities given the Extreme Left by the death of Mirabeau and by the threatening attitude of Europe. The Revolution had aroused reactionary forces in other countries. No sovereign in continental Europe but feared the success of liberal principles and began to plan suppression of liberal sentiments among his subjects. Although they were not quite ready to interfere in French affairs, they were not altogether indifferent to the plight of their royal brother. Two great camps of *émigrés* nobles were forming just over the frontier, at Coblenz and Worms, and at a secret conference held in Mantua, May 20, 1791, Austria, Prussia, the smaller German states, Spain, Switzerland, and even England, agreed in vague terms to come to the help of

the king. The Assembly knew little or nothing of these plans, but instinctively suspected the queen of treachery, and persisted in its reduction of the royal power.

Its suspicions were, on the whole, justified, for Louis was making plans to escape to Bouillé, who was in charge of the military force of Lorraine, there to put himself at the head of civil war. Even in this he was not unsuspected. On the 18th of April, 1791, he had undertaken to drive out to St. Cloud in order to celebrate mass with a non-juring priest. But the crowd thought he was planning to escape, and for twelve hours thronged about the carriages, preventing their moving, and Louis had to give up his plan. But the insult, the revelation that he was in reality a prisoner in the Tuileries as well as his growing sense of disloyalty to the church, overcame all his scruples. He yielded to the entreaties of his friends, and determined to flee in real earnest. Through a Russian lady a large travelling-carriage was ordered and passports taken out, and on the night of June 21st the king and queen were spirited out of Paris in cabs and started for the frontier in the great coach, the queen as the Russian lady and Louis as her valet.¹ The plan was desperate at the best, but was rendered even more so by the queen's preparatory dressmaking, her demands for maids and a bathtub, and by the king's refusal to go by the most direct roads in some faster conveyance than the great coach. Bouillé, however, arranged his troops at the proper place; a charming adventurer, Count Fersen, arranged all de-

¹ If the plan is in any way traceable to the old advice of Mirabeau, nothing could have been less in accord with his purpose. Carlyle's account of this flight is inaccurate in details, but a piece of marvellous writing. For the sober facts of the case, see Oscar Browning, *The Flight to Varennes*. Briefer accounts are in McCarthy, *French Revolution*, II, chs. 32-35; Stephens, *French Revolution*, I, ch. 15.

tails in Paris—which no one seemed bright enough to carry out—and for several days France was without a king. Indeed, it was also in a sort of legal anarchy, for before leaving Paris, Louis drew up a paper in which he withdrew his signature to various bills on the plea that it had been obtained by force. But the flight proved a succession of blunders. The fugitives travelled so slowly that Bouillé thought the plan had been abandoned, and did not meet them at the appointed place. At the little town of Sainte Menehould Louis put his head out of the window, and was recognized; at Varennes the party was stopped; the troops, who were near by, were unable or unwilling to render aid, and the unhappy fugitives in their disguises were kept prisoners in the home of the mayor, over his grocery-shop, and finally taken back to Paris by the National Guards and representatives of the Assembly.¹

From one point of view, it seems as if it would have been the part of wisdom for the French people to let Louis escape; they would have had one less complication with which to deal; they would not have been obliged to kill him. But looked at from another side, it was exceedingly fortunate for France that the king did not escape, and become a nucleus for disaffection and counter-revolution. France in 1791 was less ready to withstand invasion than in 1792. And the success of the invader would have meant the undoing of the work of the Assembly and the punishment of its leaders.

Considered simply historically, we find that this attempted escape of the king cost him the confidence of the nation.

¹ One of these representatives, the Jacobin Barnave, was so charmed by the queen that he lost his former enthusiasm for the Revolution, retired to private life, and was subsequently guillotined as a reactionist.

On June 25 Louis was suspended from exercising his royal powers (June–Sept. 14, 1791) and became practically a prisoner in the Tuileries. It is true that when, a few months later, he accepted the Constitution he regained in a way the love of his people. But the tide was running out too fast for Louis ever again, with his vacillating, commonplace nature, to hold the the love of the nation. From the day of this flight toward, even if not to, the enemies of France, the monarchy was doomed.

It is no mere coincidence that the final separation of the Parisian *bourgeoisie* from the masses and the consolidation of the growing republicanism are to be placed at almost the same time as this blow to monarchy. The three were the results of the same rapidly developing spirit. For months La Fayette had been endeavoring to maintain order in the turbulent capital, and at his request the Assembly had decreed that in case of a more than usually dangerous disturbance a red flag should be hung from the Hôtel de Ville, the riot act read thrice, and then if the mob did not disperse, the troops were to fire. No occasion for such drastic measures arose until after the return of the king from Varennes. At that time Danton, a man in many respects like Mirabeau, and one who was to play a great part in the next period of the Revolution, seeing that the Assembly was incapable of good government, and hating monarchy as an institution, proposed at the Cordelier Club a popular petition for the removal and trial of Louis. The Cordeliers (and Jacobins as well) approved the plan, and despite the orders of Bailly, the mayor of Paris, the petition was drawn up, and on July 17, 1791, laid on the great altar in the Champs de Mars for signature. The Parisian crowd was charmed, and the great field was alive with men and women, half-anxious to sign the petition and half-curious

to see whether Bailly really would live up to his threat and disperse them. Everything went quietly until a couple of men were found under the platform. Their explanation for their presence was not convincing, and the crowd immediately suspected they were agents of some diabolical royal gunpowder plot, and tore them to pieces. A riot ensued, and the mob refused to disperse. Whereupon the red flag was displayed, the riot act read by Bailly, and the National Guard ordered to fire upon the crowd.

As a result, a number of persons were killed or injured. In itself this affair does not appear important, but its influence was lasting. It was not merely that republicanism had appeared. The National Guard was composed of members of the *bourgeoisie*, the crowd of the masses; and this "Massacre of the Champs de Mars" became the watchword of a new and murderous class hatred.¹ For the moment, however, the party of the constitution and order had triumphed. Danton, Marat, Desmoulins, Robespierre disappeared, and the Assembly publicly thanked the National Guard. But the moderates did not follow up their victory. As is usual in revolutions they shrank from energetic direct action and sought peace by concessions to the leaders of disturbance. The inevitable result was to increase the power of the radicals. The Jacobins almost immediately recovered their supremacy, and through the mother society in Paris the affiliated clubs were excited to further opposition to monarchy and the *bourgeoisie*. The mob of Paris might be forced into order, but the Jacobin minority of the departments was to sweep the Revolution far beyond the control of La

¹ Bailly was guillotined in 1793 on the very spot where the firing had occurred.

Yet so optimistic was the country and so unwilling to forecast evil, that when, on September 14, 1791, after a fortnight's consideration, Louis accepted the Constitution and solemnly swore to uphold it, Frenchmen believed the foundation of constitutional liberty had been laid forever. "The Revolution," said Robespierre in an address, September 29, 1791, "is finished";¹ and Rabaut St. Etienne, a member of the Constituent Assembly, published in 1792 his panegyric upon its work.

How far mistaken was this optimism appeared in the first expression of the new revolutionary spirit at the polls.

¹The speech, which was repeatedly interrupted, is in full in *Archives Parlementaires*, XXXI, 620. In it Robespierre argues that for the very reason that the Revolution is finished the Jacobin Club is needed to explain and enforce the articles of the Constitution as well as to maintain the proper spirit of patriotism.

CHAPTER XV

FOREIGN WAR AND THE END OF THE MONARCHY¹

- I. The Legislative Assembly: 1. The Elections; 2. The Girondins; 3. Marat, Danton, and Robespierre. II. The Growth of the Revolutionary Spirit. III. The War: 1. The Girondin Programme; 2. The Grounds for War; 3. The Declaration of War. IV. Growing Opposition to the Monarchy: 1. The Two Vetoes; 2. June 20, 1792. V. August 10, 1792: 1. The Proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick; 2. The Preparations; 3. The Capture of the Tuileries; 4. The Suspension of the King.

With the first session of the National Legislative Assembly, October 1, 1791, France began to live under its new constitution. Could Louis have been induced to reign as a constitutional king, and to abandon all attempts at reinstating the Old Régime, something like quiet might have returned. But as it was, the entire nation was almost immediately convinced that the court was plotting against the new order of things and invoking foreign aid to help punish the patriots. This suspicion, apparently justified by so many acts of Louis, made even a constitutional monarchy with him as its representative no longer possible. It was not that France as a nation wished to be a republic; it was rather that it was determined to maintain the liberties gained by the Constituent Assembly,

¹ In general, see Stephens, *French Revolution*, II, chs. 1-4; Carlyle, *French Revolution*, chs. v, vi; Thiers, *French Revolution*, I, 247-331; Taine, *French Revolution*, bk. ix, chs. 4-8; *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, ch. 8; Madelin, *French Revolution*, chs. 15-20. Especially valuable for diplomatic history is Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*. One should also read such novels as Erckmann-Chatrion, *The Country in Danger*, *Madame Thérèse*; Gras, *The Reds of the Midi*.

and that it was filled with abhorrence of the Old Régime and terror lest the *émigrés* should be able to reinstate it. That this fear of Louis and the *émigrés* was not ungrounded appeared within a few months after the meeting of the new Assembly.

The Legislative Assembly was a very different body from that which had drawn up the Constitution. Upon motion of Robespierre, the Constituent Assembly, by an act of foolish though well-intended self-denial, had decreed that none of its members should be elected to the succeeding house. Accordingly, the legislators who assembled in 1791 to carry on the affairs of the nation were almost as untried in statesmanship and in legislative proceedings as had been the members of the old States General. The elections had occurred under the circumstances already described, and, because of the indifference of the more moderate "active citizens," who affected to believe that a stable government had been established, the more radical candidates had generally been elected. Besides, there can be little doubt that the French leaped with all facility into the secrets of intimidation and counting out. Refusal to take the civic oath, which included the clerical oath, threw out thousands. Many of those who sought to vote, but who were known to be opposed to or only half-hearted in favour of the Revolution, were beaten, stoned, stabbed. In Montpellier, for instance, the ballots were deposited and the ballot-boxes sealed. The Conservatives had a majority. Thereupon the Jacobin clubs burned one of the boxes, and in the process killed two men. A riot followed, in which four more men were killed, and the authorities terrified into disarming the well-to-do inhabitants. In the next three days six hundred families emigrated. The authorities then reported that the elections were proceeding in the quietest manner!

Yet France continued to indulge in optimism and in the exaltation of human nature. "Everybody is expecting to see men like Aristides, Fabricius, Cato and Cincinnatus arriving from the depths of the provinces," wrote Madame Jullien in August, 1791. But, despite the idealizing of classical republics, great men like these are not elected by a people on the verge of political hysteria.

In fact, the new Assembly was decidedly inferior to the Constituent, although many of its members had had some experience in the new administrative offices. It was far less conservative than the Constituent Assembly. Very few of its members were landed proprietors or shopkeepers. Most of them were needy "intellectuals" welcoming their salary of eighteen francs a day. The old reactionary party was absolutely wanting, and the men whose opinions represented the Left of the first Assembly had become the Right of the second, the Feuillants or Constitutionals, liberals like La Fayette and Barnave. A neutral body, known as the Plain, or Swamp, occupied seats in the lower and central part of the hall. The radical opinions of the Extreme Left of the Constituent Assembly were represented by a large delegation known as the Mountain, from the high seats in which they sat. To them the liberals of the Right were "anti-revolutionaries," "friends of Austria." The most important party, however, in the Legislative Assembly was that of the Girondins, who, with the Mountain, composed the Left. They were all from the departments, and derived their name from the fact that their leaders, about whom they loosely gathered, came from the Department of the Gironde, in the southwestern portion of France. The Girondins have been immortalized in the great work of Lamartine as pure-minded patriots who finally became martyrs to their zeal for good politics. As a matter of

fact, they were a body of hot-headed, inexperienced, eloquent young lawyers, full of admiration for Greeks and Romans, but with scarcely a statesmanlike idea among them. Wherever there was an opportunity for them to make a mistake, they enthusiastically accepted the opportunity.¹ But their leaders were so eloquent, and their confidence in themselves so cheering, that for a few months they were able to control the policy of the Assembly. Their programme was simply the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. Their ideas and their vocabularies were drawn from classical dictionaries. Religiously they were pagans. Their high priestess was Madame Roland,² mistress of a *salon* for "intellectuals," the romantic wife of a highly respectable, conscientious politician, double her age; a bright, ambitious woman, with a touch of genius, a taste for clubs, an obsession of Roman republicanism and a great fondness for attending to her husband's business.

Three persons, however, clearly outranked all others as popular leaders—Marat, Danton, Robespierre. Of the three, Marat had been prominent from the summoning of the States General as a fanatical preacher of popular vengeance, but during the restoration of order by La Fayette and the National Guard he had seen his printing establishment broken up, and had been forced to hide

¹ The political sagacity of the Girondins may be judged not only by their determination to establish a republic by a foreign war, and the astonishing Constitution of Condorcet, but by the proposal of Brissot, chairman of the Diplomatic Committee, that Dunkirk and Calais be ceded to England as pledges that France would abide by any treaty made with that country.

² On Madame Roland, see Sainte Beuve, *Portraits of Celebrated Women*, 90; Lamartine, *Girondists* (Bohn ed.), I, 272-293; Dauban, *Étude sur Madame Roland*; Yonge, *Life of Madame Roland*; Johnson, *Private Memoirs of Madame Roland*.

himself, sometimes even in the sewers. With the coming of the new Assembly, however, he again took up open conflict with the hated aristocrats. Clear-eyed as to dangers, his one prescription was the death of those through whom dangers might arise.

Far different from Marat was Georges Jacques Danton,¹ who under the Old Régime had been a successful young lawyer in Paris. He had entered heartily into the elections for the States General, but soon grew dissatisfied with the work of the Constituent Assembly, and at first favoured a change of dynasty. As the founder of the Cordelier Club he soon became known as an advanced revolutionist, and in 1791 was elected substitute to the *procureur* of the Commune of Paris, an official position which gave him great influence in the capital. Though not of exceptional ability, he was easily the most forceful man the Revolution produced between Mirabeau and Bonaparte. He has, indeed, often, and with justice, been compared with Mirabeau in point of eloquence, resourcefulness, and freedom from that doctrinaire madness which perverted the minds of most of his contemporaries. Unlike Mirabeau, however, he was able to gain a following, and was ready to adopt extreme measures.

Totally unlike Marat or Danton was Maximilien Robespierre,² a young lawyer of thirty-three, from Arras. He

¹ On Danton, see Bougeart, *Danton*; Belloc, *Danton: A Study*; Beesly, *Life of Danton*; Gronlund, *Ca Ira*; Madelin, *Danton, Homme d'État*. For unfriendly view based on Danton's relations with foreign powers see Mathiez, *Danton et la Paix*.

² The great work upon Robespierre is *Histoire de Robespierre*, by his enthusiastic admirer, Hamel. In English see G. H. Lewes, *Life of Maximilien Robespierre*, and Morley, "Robespierre" in *Critical Miscellanies*, I; Stephens, "Robespierre," *Encyclopedia Britannica*; McCarthy, *French Revolution*, I, ch. 30; Belloc, *Robespierre*. Taine, *French Revolution*, III, 143-168, is characteristically severe. Robespierre's poem, "The Rose," is in

was a precise, austere, intense, mediocre little man whose youth had been passed in poverty and study. He early became a disciple of Rousseau, and as far as his native town permitted, devoted himself to law and literature. There remain to this day a few of his poems and other writings, some upon birds, and one upon *Disgraceful Punishments*. He seems to have been successful in his law practice, and was at last appointed to a judgeship. This, however, he resigned after he had been obliged to pronounce a sentence of death. At the time of his election to the States General he had, therefore, some little reputation as a lawyer and *litterateur*, but less as a political theorist. From the time of his appearance in Paris, however he gradually rose in importance, and as Mirabeau prophesied while others were laughing at him, he was "to go far, since he believed what he said." As a popular leader he had two remarkable characteristics: he was absolutely incorruptible and he refused to pander to the mob.

Thanks to their leaders, the advanced revolutionary spirit of the Jacobins affected both the Assembly and all "good citizens." Extreme opposition to anything that might look like sympathy with the "aristocracy" became a sort of fever. Throughout all these months of deepening political distress the court had maintained as best it could its old state. Balls and receptions, the king's *lever*, all the rigorous etiquette of the Old Régime had continued.

But now etiquette weakened. Among the first deeds of the legislative Assembly was to abolish "Sire" and "Your Majesty" as terms with which to address the king, and on January 1, 1792, Pétion, the new Girondin mayor

Harper's Magazine, April, 1889. Its translator, Mrs. E. W. Latimer has reprinted it in her *Scrap Book of the French Revolution*.

of Paris, did not make the customary call at the royal palace. Even styles in clothing changed. Well-to-do classes of the Old Régime had worn short breeches with knee-buckles and silk stockings; the workingmen had worn long trousers. The fashions of the sovereign people had to be followed, and all men who were good revolutionists (except Robespierre) put away their short trousers, and wore long pantaloons, long beards, and the red caps of the workingman. The expression *sans-culottes*, or "without short breeches," became the watchword of all good revolutionists, and *sans-culottism* an expressive word to indicate the wild extravagances into which the revolutionists rushed in their endeavour to show the equality of all men.

With the new Assembly, Rousseau's doctrine of popular sovereignty comes more than ever to the front. If the sessions of the Constituent Assembly had been disorderly, those of the Legislative were riotous. The sovereign people could not be excluded from the hall in which their servants debated, and the masses of Paris soon became the dictators of legislation. They crowded into the Assembly, howling their disapproval, stamping their approval of the measures passed by the delegates below. Brissot, for a long time a popular idol, when favouring a measure that happened not to please the sovereigns in the gallery, was pelted with plums. As another of the Girondins was trying to push his way up to the door of the Assembly, he met a market-woman, who stood in his way; he requested her to make room for him, whereupon she seized him by the hair, and bade him (and made him) bow his head to his sovereign!

With populace and popular leaders, Mountain and Girondins thus united in opposition to monarchy, despite

the growing devotion of the *bourgeoisie* to constitutional provisions,¹ there was almost certainty of a republic, but the method of reaching this end was worthy of the new spirit and the new leaders. Constitutionally it was impossible to remove the king, except for some overt act, like treachery. His flight to Varennes might have served as the basis for such a charge, but in the era of good feeling succeeding Louis' acceptance of the Constitution all unfavourable decrees had been repealed, and the king had regained a momentary popularity. Removal by petition had been stopped by the "Massacre of the Champs de Mars." There was left, the Girondins thought, but one alternative, and that was war with the king's friends and suspected foreign allies. As a result of such a war, it was believed Louis would soon be detected in some traitorous act, and could then be legally suspended.

The plan was cumbrous and freighted with infinitely more misery than the most *enragé* deputy could have imagined a monarchy like that represented by Louis was capable of producing, but it was not altogether without reason. The interest of Europe in the Revolution, as we might easily imagine, was intense. A movement which had begun so peacefully and with so much *éclat*, and yet which had developed so rapidly into more than disguised opposition to royalty; a nation whose king, at first hailed as the saviour of French liberty, had become practically its prisoner, and in which the wilder elements were gaining power, were not likely to be passed unnoticed by an age trained to expect revolutions.² As early

¹ It should be remembered that there was in October, 1791, a decided reaction toward the king among the more wealthy class of Parisians. Morris says that the theatres were full of shouts for him and the royal family.

² Reference can again be well made to Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*.

as August, 1791, the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria had concluded a treaty at Pilnitz, and issued a Declaration to the effect that the cause of Louis XVI. was conditionally made the cause of all the monarchs of Europe. Thanks to the mutual jealousy of these two powers, this Declaration was made so general and ambiguous as to amount to but little more than bluster. Yet it was never forgotten by the French, and increased their suspicion of the king and their dread of foreign intervention in behalf of the Old Régime. Nevertheless, after Louis had accepted the Constitution, the attitude of the European powers grew pacific. The king had apparently adjusted matters with the nation, and foreign intervention seemed no longer needed. But the fatal—and, as we know now, well-justified—suspicion of the royal family persisted.

Another source of danger to France were the emigrant nobles, who had formed two great military camps: the one at Coblenz, composed of intriguing, inefficient courtiers under the Count d'Artois, and the other at Worms, under the Duke of Condé, composed of earnest and determined enemies of the New Régime, especially as it concerned the church. The latter body of men constituted a real danger to France, but the Girondins found it more to their purpose to deal with the former, who had issued a violent and threatening Manifesto at the time of the Pilnitz Declaration. In itself this Manifesto was of small account, but the fact that it came from the Count d'Artois made it alarming and aided the plans of the Girondins. Their war policy, however, was not favoured by the Jacobins. Robespierre opposed it in three strong speeches, on the ground that, so far from giving a democracy, it would strengthen the power of the king and the *bourgeoisie*—precisely the reason for which

Narbonne, a constitutionalist rather than Girondin at heart, favoured the policy. Marat, with the foresight that characterized him on most questions where his peculiar hatreds were not concerned, argued pertinently in his paper: "Who is it that suffers in a war? Not the rich, but the poor, not the high-born officer, but the poor peasant." Danton completely vanquished Brissot, the war leader of the Girondins, in a debate at the Jacobin Club. With a bankrupt treasury, a disordered state, an ill-disciplined army, untrustworthy officers, and an untried constitution, there was everything to lose and little, except what was already inevitable, to gain. But the Girondins and Madame Roland would not so see the future, and the subsequent Reign of Terror, which sprang directly from the panic and anarchy caused by foreign invasion, is to be laid at the doors of the hot-headed young men who precipitated a foreign war as a measure of domestic politics.¹

The grounds for war were not difficult to discover.

On the side of the European powers there was the fear and hostility which liberalism aroused in absolute monarchies and which prompted intervention in French affairs as a phase of self-protection. Sympathy with Louis and the *émigrés* was also not lacking. But quite as influential was the policy of national aggrandizement which had dominated international affairs in the eighteenth century, and of which France had been a champion. A weak nation was at the mercy of its stronger neighbours. To dismember it was all but a duty. Russia, Prussia

¹ This policy of a foreign war is by no means peculiar to the Girondins. Napoleon III, recurred to it three times, and Seward proposed it to Lincoln in 1861 as the means of preventing the Civil War in America. But in each of these cases it was intended to allay, not intensify, political troubles.

and Austria were rivals in such an opportunity offered by distracted France. Russia in particular, because of her ambitions to become the master of Eastern Europe and Turkey, wished to involve Prussia and Austria in a war with France that she might be free to annex more of Poland, a land which all three powers sought to strip of territory. Indeed, this lust for Polish territory was more than once to prove the salvation of France. Prussia and Austria, though jealous of each other, were keen to gain territory from France as well as to readjust their boundaries by seizing some of the smaller continental states.

But the Assembly was not to wait for the fruition of this international policy. It was eager to wage war for "liberty." It is true France had unexpired treaties with Austria and Prussia, but they might very fairly be said to have been strained by the aid given the *émigrés*, as well as by the declaration of Pilnitz. It also appears that the Girondins attempted to disregard such formalities. Brissot declared that "the sovereignty of the people was not to be bound by the treaties of tyrants." Fauchet, another of the war party, proposed that the Legislative Assembly should make alliances with nations like England and America, that were free, and with other nations as soon as they conquered their freedom, and that in the mean time these other nations should be treated like "good-natured savages."¹ But such methods did not please the Assembly, and the Girondins returned to the *émigrés*. In this they were unexpectedly aided by the

¹ The political vocabulary of the eighteenth century, with its "tyrants," "slaves," "liberty," "freeman," is to be seen in most modern political songs including those of America. Compare, for instance, "Hail Columbia" and "The Star Spangled Banner" with the "Marseillaise."

king himself, for Louis had dismissed his incompetent minister of war, and in his place had appointed Narbonne, at heart a constitutionalist, but, as has been said, who sided with the Girondins for a reason precisely opposite to theirs. The electors of Trèves and Mayence were protecting the *émigrés*, and December 13th the Assembly declared to them, through the king, that unless all armaments were dispersed, they would be treated as enemies. January 16th, Louis informed the Assembly that the *émigrés* had been expelled from the electorates. It was, however, but a shadowy expulsion, and as a matter of fact, the camps remained. On January 25th, the Assembly requested the king to inform the emperor that if by March 1st he did not declare his intention to do nothing against France, his silence would be regarded as a declaration of war. Leopold replied in a letter inspired by Marie Antoinette, in which he attacked the Jacobins. These negotiations were momentarily interrupted by the death of Leopold, but his successor, the young Francis II., neglected the demand of the Assembly for an explanation of the declaration of Pilnitz, and undertook to champion the cause of his aunt, Marie Antoinette. Through his minister he therefore wrote France demanding the re-establishment of the Old Régime on the basis fixed by the royal session of June 23, 1789. He further demanded damages for those of his nobles who had suffered because of the abrogation of feudal dues on the estates they held in Alsace. At the same time Austrian troops marched toward the French frontier. His letter was welcomed in the Assembly with a burst of laughter, and after receiving it there was only one road to follow. March 27 Dumouriez sent an ultimatum to Austria and despatched Maret—who was later to be an indispensable aid to Napoleon—to stir up Belgium against its suzerain

Austria. On April 20, 1792, Louis appeared in the Assembly, and in a low voice proposed that war be declared upon Austria. On the same day, with a minority of only seven votes, war was declared—a war not for territory the Assembly voted,¹ but for the defense and spread of liberty. And thus light-heartedly France entered upon those twenty-three years of struggle that were to give to her a republic, a Reign of Terror, an empire, and a Bourbon restoration; to Europe territorial readjustment, constitutions, and public debts; but to both the imperishable blessing of civil equality, and in our own day, political liberty.²

While thus the Girondins were leading the nation into war, Louis again had an opportunity to place himself at the head of a nation for the moment united by a common danger. In a measure he did this by appointing a Girondin ministry, in which were Dumouriez and Roland; but both he and Marie Antoinette were fighting for time. They contemptuously rejected the aid of La Fayette and Barnave, and as we now know from their correspondence, while they were apparently leading France into war with Austria and the *émigrés*, they were at the same time appealing to both for help. The Assembly knew nothing of this fact, though the air was full of attacks upon the king and "the Austrian woman"; but reasons for suspecting the king's sincerity were also given by his use of his constitutional power of veto.

¹ Avignon it is true was annexed to France, but at its own request.

² The formal declaration of war and Condorcet's Statement of Motives are given in Thiers, *French Revolution*, I, 238-240. The condition of the army may be imagined from the fact that 6,000 of the 9,000 officers had already withdrawn from the service. For full discussion see Clapham, *Causes of the War of 1792*.

Two bills had been passed by the Assembly. The first, though perhaps necessary, exhibited the growing hatred of the church, and proposed that the priests who had refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Assembly must either take it within a week or leave their canton in twenty-four hours, the department in thirty-six, and the kingdom in one month. The king vetoed it. The other bill concerned the establishment of a camp of twenty thousand men outside of Paris, as a reserve for the protection of the capital itself. The king vetoed this bill also.

In ordinary times the king's action in both of these cases would have admitted of considerable justification. The bill against the priests was certainly severe,¹ and the establishment of such a camp might well arouse fears lest the extreme revolutionists would use soldiers to destroy the state. But the time in which the vetoes were made was unfortunate. Not only were the clergy fomenting rebellion, but war had begun disastrously on the frontiers. The army had been divided into three great divisions, and each had moved against the enemy. Belgium was, it is true, for a few days invaded, but generally the first attempts of the raw French troops against the combined powers were singularly unsuccessful; the soldiers had fled almost before the enemy had fired, and one division, with wild shouts of "Treason!" had murdered its commander. Suspicion is endemic in France. It was epidemic in 1792. It was openly charged that the king was in correspondence with foreign courts and that the clergy were dis-

¹ Robespierre opposed the bill. In this as in other matters he showed himself no mere demagogue. He had taken no interest in a hysterical celebration in favour of certain Swiss soldiers who had been released from the galleys, whither they had been sent for refusing to fire upon a mob; and he had refused to let some Jacobin put the "red cap" of liberty upon his head, and had even trampled it under his feet.

loyal. La Fayette began to be the object of others' than Marat's hatred; his division retreated, Marshal Rochambeau resigned; no man knew whom he could trust. In the light of these facts the two vetoes of the king seemed to indicate that he was expecting aid from without and was setting himself in opposition to the will of the people. And this suspicion was increased by the subsequent ill-advised, if intelligible, action of Louis in dismissing Roland¹ and two other Girondin ministers, who had been forced upon him by the Assembly. Dumouriez, an exceedingly able soldier, accepted the position of minister of war, but with condition that the king should sign the two bills. The king promised to sign them. Three days later Dumouriez had taken office, and presented the bills; but the king refused to keep his word, and Dumouriez, righteously indignant, resigned. The situation of France thus was critical. Its armies had been defeated; its enemies were exultant; its internal affairs were in disorder; its king was apparently expecting aid from the armies on the frontiers; its queen was universally believed to be a traitor.²

Under these circumstances, some form of emphatic protest seemed indispensable. On June 20th a demonstration was made which was evidently intended to terrify the king into signing the bill against the priests and that in favour of the camp of reserves. It was planned and managed by subordinate popular leaders, though opposed

¹ Madame Roland had written for her husband a letter to the king in which she had outlined the royal policy frankly, if not imperiously.

² That these suspicions were not gratuitous appears from the fact that in March, 1792, Marie Antoinette forwarded to the Austrian court the proposed plan of campaign. It was a piece of supreme treachery, and under any law would be liable to the death sentence.

by Robespierre and Danton. It was peaceful, and on the whole, were it not for what it portended, half-ludicrous. The original plan of Santerre and Pétion, the mayor of Paris, seems to have been for a huge delegation to carry a petition to the Assembly, then to plant a liberty tree in honor of the Oath of the Tennis Court, and then to go home. Events proceeded at first without great disorder. The crowd from the poorest wards marched through the Assembly hall, under the inspiring banners of a pair of short breeches on a pole, and a calf's heart, labeled "the heart of an aristocrat," on a pike. Then in some way not understood it was allowed to enter the Palace of the Tuileries. It marched through the royal apartments howling "Down with Monsieur Veto! Monsieur Veto to the Devil!" The king stood in a window recess, and put the "red cap" on his head; the queen barricaded herself and the dauphin behind a table and fat Santerre, the dauphin also wearing a red liberty cap. The crowd was rude, but it was good-natured, offering Louis a drink from a black bottle, huzzaing for the dauphin, and finally for the king. The outbreak was simply a threat. But what it might have become but for the stolid courage of Louis and the dignity of the queen it is not hard to guess. One gets a new respect for the personal bearing of both Louis and Marie Antoinette from this day on; neither of them was lacking a whit of courage. When Louis was asked by a grenadier if he was afraid, he replied: "Afraid! Certainly not; put your hand on my heart and feel it beat." The queen, addressed by one of the women who hung on the outskirts of the crowd, answered so kindly and so majestically that the woman burst into tears. Indeed the whole affair produced a short-lived reaction in favour of the king. The queen's treachery was of course unknown, and Louis, though himself in

correspondence with the enemy, was loud in his protestations of his devotion to the Constitution. Pétion, the mayor of the city of Paris, who had certainly been concerned in the affair and had not taken any steps to preserve order, was suspended from office, and La Fayette came hurrying on from the frontier to demand justice against the participants. It almost seems as if he might have headed a *bourgeois* army against the Jacobins. There was good prospect of success, but both Louis and the queen refused to be saved by him or any other liberal, and he returned to his army after having been attacked by the Girondins for having left it without leave.

It was impossible that any royalist reaction could be more than a sort of eddy in the great flood of the revolutionary stream. The Girondins through Vergniaud attacked Louis both as ungenerous and as a cause of the war. The leaders of the people, and the people themselves, were so thoroughly imbued with the teachings of Rousseau that nothing could satisfy them except the end of the monarchy. A young deputy expressed this feeling well on June 20th. After the crowd had left the palace the unhappy king and queen fell into each other's arms. All present were deeply moved—this young deputy to tears. But he explained this weakness: "I weep, madame," he said to the queen, "for the misfortunes of a beautiful and sensitive woman, and for the sufferings of a mother; I do not weep for the queen. I hate queens and kings; to hate them is my religion." It was indeed about all the religion many Frenchmen had.¹

On July 11th the Assembly declared that "the country was in danger," and called for eighty-five thousand volun-

¹ In addition to the general references given above, on June 20, 1792, see Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, I, 129-223.

teers. The action was not without cause. In the coalition against France were Prussia, since the days of Frederick the Great recognized as the greatest military force in Europe, and Austria, nearly the equal of Prussia, the ancient enemy of France. There is little wonder, therefore, that France, be it never so enthusiastic for liberty, should have regarded with apprehension this union of its old enemies. Reverses, with suspicion of widespread treason, it will be remembered, had marked the first efforts of the revolutionary armies. The suspicion of treachery on the part of the government had increased, and with it the fear of coming retribution.

To France, thus pendulating between a delirious dream of popular sovereignty and the fear of punishment at the hands of an invading army, came suddenly the declaration of the Duke of Brunswick, the commander of the allied forces. Had Austria and Prussia deliberately planned to aid the Girondins and Jacobins in destroying the French monarchy, they could have chosen nothing more suited to that end than this declaration which, at the suggestion of Marie Antoinette, the Duke of Brunswick published in the summer of 1792. In this manifesto Brunswick declared that the allies were entering France to deliver Louis from captivity; that all members of the National Guard found fighting against the invaders would be banished as rebels; and further declared that "if the Tuileries were forced or insulted, or the least violence offered to the king and the queen or the royal family, and if provision were not made at once for their safety and liberty, the allied powers would inflict a memorable vengeance by delivering up the city of Paris to military execution and total annihilation." With this proclamation spread broadcast before him, Brunswick moved upon France. It was a challenge as well as a threat to both

bourgeoisie and Jacobins, and all France accepted the challenge and answered the threat. And the answer was the destruction of the monarchy.

It is impossible to tell just when the plan was formed that led to the events of the 10th of August, but it could not have been long after June 20th. The hope of bringing about the abdication of Louis and the peaceful or parliamentary end of the monarchy was abandoned.¹ In such a supreme affair, however, the popular leaders appear to have been unwilling to trust the rabble of Paris. They had accordingly turned to the departments, and under the excuse of preparation for a new Festival of Confederation on July 14, 1792, the Girondin Barbaroux, one of Madame Roland's *côterie*, summoned a band of men from Marseilles. These men of Marseilles are commonly spoken of as a band of ruffians. Recent historians, however, have shown that the band was composed of picked men from the National Guards of Marseilles who "knew how to die." On the 2d of July they left Marseilles five hundred and thirteen strong, with two cannon. Their coming along with other "Federates" was expected, and even the Girondins shrank from the violence expected from their arrival. On July 11 the Assembly declared the fatherland in danger. The festival of the Confederation served only to show the increased hostility to the

¹ The nervous temperament of the Assembly is to be seen in the "Lamourette Kiss." At one of the sessions of the Assembly in July, in which the demand had been made that the king should be made "powerless," Lamourette, bishop of Lyons, made an eloquent appeal for union in the presence of the country's danger. The members in a frenzy of excitement threw themselves into each other's arms. Louis, hastily summoned, gave them his blessing, and the Assembly adjourned in tears. But the Clubs were not impressed. They persisted in their plans for the king's deposition.

nonarchy. The "Federates," several thousand in number, were urged by Robespierre at the Jacobin Club to "save the State." On July 17 they presented a petition to the Assembly denouncing the king as a traitor. Vergniaud wrote a letter to Louis urging rational action. Madame de Staël endeavored to persuade the royal family to escape through her aid. Her offer was coldly declined. The hopes of king and queen, who, after the "Lamourette Kiss," had gained a momentary confidence in the Assembly's ability to withstand the masses, were now built on foreign invasion.

On July 29 Robespierre demanded that the Assembly suspend Louis and summon a National Convention. August 3 Pétion presented to the Assembly the demand of the Sections of Paris that Louis be deposed. On July 30th the Marseillais came into Paris, singing the hymn that has been the pæan of revolutions, the "Marseillaise," while all France, taught the song by their march across the country, joined in the chorus, "Rather death than slavery." Their arrival was felt to be the beginning of the culmination of a great plot against the king. The Assembly, even before their arrival, had authorized a committee to draw up a list of acts that might lead to dethronement. The Jacobin Club had been indefatigable in organizing the different sections of Paris. Santerre had promised to lead out again the wild men of Faubourg San Antoine. The National Guard was carefully sifted, and those who could not be trusted to join an uprising were replaced by members of the mob. A secret organization, of which Santerre, Danton, and Camille Desmoulins were leaders, took charge of all the movements. An uprising was planned for July 26th, and then for July 30th, but both miscarried. All these facts were known to every man in Paris, and the king's friends made every effort

to persuade him to escape, but the queen would have nothing to do with them because they had favoured the Constitution. The king knew that on August 9th the tocsin would be rung, and that on the next day his palace would be attacked. He therefore summoned his ministers and Pétion, the mayor of Paris, and endeavoured to gain from them protection. Pétion declared, with a smile, that there was no need of alarm, that the rising would all end in smoke, and went home.

Yet at the Hôtel de Ville eighty-two leaders of the Sections of Paris were organizing themselves into an Insurrectionary New Commune that was presently to control the city and for a brief period France itself. Mandat, leader of the troops of the palace, was the only man who seems to have taken any measures to protect the king. His chief reliance was on the Swiss guards, who, on the 8th of August, to the number of eight hundred, had been ordered to come to the Tuileries. In addition, there were perhaps two hundred personal friends of the king in the palace, as well as several battalions of the National Guard—altogether perhaps two thousand men, though, as it proved, not more than one thousand could be counted upon to defend the king. Mandat had requested the Assembly to issue ball cartridges for his troops, but his order was refused. He thereupon made the best use he could of the resources at hand, and stationed his troops at strategic points about and in the Tuileries. Thus the two sides, on the 9th of August, were ready for the struggle.

The plan of the secret committee seems to have been first to involve the defenders of the king, and so the king, in a struggle with the mob, which should give countenance to a charge that the king was false to his country, and then, after he had been taken prisoner by the storming of the palace, to take the second step of deposition by

the Assembly itself. Westerman was to have charge of the military operations, Danton of the legislative. Only one thing seems to have excited the anxieties of the leaders of the uprising—the precautions taken by Mandat and his evident intention to offer serious resistance. They therefore resolved to remove such an efficient officer. Mandat was summoned to the city hall; there, after being questioned closely as to his plans, he was dismissed; but as he was returning to the palace he was seized, taken before the new Commune now in charge of the uprising, and on his refusal to sign an order for the Swiss to return to their barracks, he was suspended from his command, and Santerre appointed as his temporary successor. As he was going down the steps of the city hall, a crowd of ruffians closed upon him and killed him. Whether or not this murder was a part of the original plan it is hard to decide. It certainly benefited the leaders of the insurrection, for the force stationed for the defence of the king was left without a recognized commander.

Early in the morning the crowd began to gather about the Tuileries. Although it was not the insurrectionary army, the king was evidently in danger. The ministers begged him to go to the Assembly for protection. Between eight and nine in the morning Louis yielded an uncertain assent, and accompanied by his wife, the royal family, the ministers, and a few soldiers, walked from the Tuileries to the Assembly hall, where he was received decently by the deputies and conducted to a room or reporter's box, twelve feet square, just behind the president's seat. There he and his companions remained for more than thirty hours, the Queen dignified, the king "stunned and helpless."

Up to the time of the departure of the king there seems to have been little or no bloodshed, and it is pos-

sible that the events of the 10th of August might have passed off as peacefully as those of the 20th of June. The crowd began to disperse when through some mistake they were allowed to pass through the court of the palace. The Marseillais rushed up the stairway of the palace, where the Swiss were drawn in line. For a moment it seemed as if the Swiss would yield to the appeals of Westerman, who spoke German, and fraternize with the Revolutionists, but their officers brought them back to their duty. Almost at that moment a shot was fired; it was immediately followed by a volley from the Swiss stationed in the windows of the palace, and by a charge of the Swiss down the staircase that sent the mob flying, cleared the court, and captured the guns of the Marseillais. The firing then became general, and the Swiss, though having no commander, being well officered and protected by the walls of the palace, were doing well. Napoleon Bonaparte, then an unknown officer in the artillery, was watching the mêlée from the other side of the Seine, and was of the opinion that had the Swiss been properly led they would have completely routed their assailants. Three years later he demonstrated the truth of his judgment by putting a mob to flight almost on the same ground. But just at this critical juncture the king, hearing the musketry, sent an order for the Swiss to stop firing and dispatched it by a messenger. This messenger neglected to deliver the order for nearly three-quarters of an hour, and in the mean time a hundred of the insurgents had been killed or wounded. On the reception of the king's order a portion of the Swiss immediately stopped firing, fell into line, and began to retreat from the Tuileries to the Assembly. There they were disarmed and placed for safety in a neighbouring church. But there were other Swiss soldiers in the halls and corridors of the palace, who had not

heard the order of the king to stop firing, and kept up the fighting. When they found themselves deserted by their companions, they began to retreat, only to find themselves hemmed in by their enemies, who shot them down. At last the wretched men formed a square about the statue of Louis XV., and there perished almost to a man. These Swiss were mercenaries, like the Hessians in the American Revolution, but they were faithful to their service, and no one of the hundreds of travellers who look up at the noble lion of Thorwaldsen at Lucerne but shares with Switzerland the admiration that erected the memorial.

While thus the Swiss were being shot down, an indiscriminate slaughter was begun in the palace, not probably by the organized insurrectionists, but by the bloodthirsty rabble that always hangs about a riot. The very cooks and servants were murdered, the palace was sacked and the royal stables burned.¹

Thus began the short but terrible reign of the Insurrectionary Commune of Paris—a body utterly without constitutional basis. Even while the Swiss were being massacred this Commune appeared in the Assembly and ordered the few members of that terrified body who were present to dethrone the king. In answer to their demand, the Assembly, in his very presence, suspended Louis,² surrendered him to the care of the Commune, and three days later, in accordance with the constitutional provision, summoned a Convention to draw up a new con-

¹ Ready wit sometimes saved one's life, as in the case of the royal physician, who faced his would-be murderers, told them he was not afraid of them, and so escaped. The ladies of the court were also saved by some one's shouting, "Spare the women, let us not dishonour the nation."

² According to Madame Campan, Louis ate so imperturbably and heartily while at the Assembly, that the queen felt obliged to apologize for him!

stitution, Vergniaud, chief orator of the Gironde, making the motion. French monarchy had followed French feudalism.¹

So far had the Revolution under the guidance of its new leaders proceeded. In comparison with Danton, Camille Desmoulins, and the leaders of the Insurrectionary Commune of Paris, the leaders of the Constituent Assembly were reactionaries. They had attempted simply the abolition of privilege; the Legislative Assembly, under the guidance of the Girondins, had sought through war the end of monarchy. At last the wishes of the Girondins were realized—a republic was to be established. But far enough was this republic from that of which they had dreamed, and farther still from their planning was to be its future.²

¹ Though neither permanently, for there was to be a Restoration, nor formally. No revolutionary movement was more regardful of the letter of a constitution. The king was not dethroned, but suspended. An actual change in the Constitution, such as the establishment of a republic would have been, to be legal needed the work of a Convention. The vote of the Convention, September 21, 1792, declaring France a republic, was strictly constitutional, and marks the formal end of the reign of Louis XVI.

² On August 10, 1792, see, in addition to general references given above, Mortimer-Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur*, II, 213-269, Wallon, *La Terreur*, I, 15-31; Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, I, 498-531; Carlyle, *French Revolution*, II, bk. vi. The material is given in great detail in Buchez et Roux, *Hist. Parl.* The best contemporary account of the fight at the Tuileries is that of Baron de Durler, one of the officers in command of the Swiss. It is published by Stephens, *English Historical Review*, II, 350 (April, 1887). The statement of some writers that Louis wrote the order to stop firing is not confirmed by Durler, but he speaks of a written order signed by Louis for the Swiss (apparently those who had retired to the Assembly) to lay down their arms. Durler himself escaped to England through the aid of a German deputy in the Assembly.

Perhaps as good an expression as any of the spirit of the

Parisian masses on the 10th of August, 1792, is to be found in the *Carmagnole*, a revolutionary song and dance, some of the numerous verses of which are here given:

CARMAGNOLE

Madame Veto avait promis,
Madame Veto avait promis,
De faire égorger tout Paris,
De faire égorger tout Paris.

Mais le coup a manqué,
Grâce à nos canonniers!
Dansons la Carmagnole
Vive le son, vive le son!
Dansons la Carmagnole
Vive le son du canon!

Monsieur Veto avait promis (*bis*)
D'être fidèle à sa patrie (*bis*);
Mais il y a manqué.
Ne faisons plus quartier.
Dansons la Carmagnole, etc.

Antoinette avait résolu (*bis*)
De nous fair' tomber sur le cu (*bis*);
Mais son coup a manqué;
Elle a le nez cassé.
Dansons la Carmagnole, etc.

Les Suisses avaient promis (*bis*)
Qu'ils feraient feu sur nos amis (*bis*)
Mais, comme ils ont sauté,
Comme ils ont tous dansé!
Dansons la Carmagnole, etc.

Le patriote a pour amis (*bis*)
Tous les bonnes gens du pays (*bis*)
Mais ils se soutiendront
Tous au son du canon.
Dansons la Carmagnole, etc.

L'aristocrate a pour amis (*bis*)
Tous les royalist's à Paris (*bis*)
Ils vous les soutiendront
Tout comm' de vrais poltrons
Dansons la Carmagnole, etc.

PART IV.
THE REPUBLIC

CHAPTER XVI

THE JACOBIN CONQUEST¹

- I. The Crisis of August and September, 1792. II. The September Massacres: 1. In Paris; 2. In the Departments. III. The Success of French Arms. IV. The Convention: 1. Declaration of the Republic; 2. The Girondins and the Mountain. V. Struggle between the Girondins and the Mountain: 1. The Attack of the Girondins; 2. The Counter-Attack of the Mountain; 3. The Execution of Louis XVI. VI. Final Struggle between the Two Parties: 1. The New Crisis; 2. The *Coup d'État* of June 2, 1793.

The suspension of the king and the call for the Convention naturally paralyzed all existing government. To meet the need of some executive head, the Assembly, on August 10th, created a Provisional Executive Council, composed of ministers whom it proceeded to elect. In this new Council, the forerunner of the great Committee of Public Safety, Roland was given the portfolio of the Interior, Servan that of War, and Danton that of Justice.² He was also Chairman of the Council. Danton's policy

¹ In general, see Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, II, 47-111, 260-296, III, 54-83; Madelin, *French Revolution*, chs. 21-28; Stephens, *French Revolution* II, chs. 5-8; Taine, *French Revolution*, bk. iv, chs. 11, 12; Carlyle, *French Revolution*, III, bks. i-iii; *Cambridge Modern History* VIII, ch. 9.

² Aulard, *Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut public*, I, 1-4. For source material see Mantouchet, *Gouvernement Révolutionnaire: Textes*.

was primarily to make France truly republican. It was not an easy task, for the country was by no means hostile to the monarch. To accomplish it Danton turned from the classical idealism of the Girondins and relied upon force. He found an agent ready at hand in what was the real ruler of France between the suspension of Louis and the declaration of the republic, the Insurrectionary Commune or Town Council of Paris. It was composed of men chosen without legal warrant from the forty-eight *sections* or wards of Paris, who had forced the original Commune to resign, and now ruled as the representatives of the lower classes and of the Jacobin minority. Its members were elected from the most radical and desperate of the popular leaders, and included Marat, Collet d'Herbois, and Billaud-Varennes. It gave form and organization to the attempt of the masses of Paris to take the control of the Revolution away from the Girondins, the representatives of the departments.¹

The new governors found the situation of France desperate. August 18th, La Fayette, who had attempted and failed to win over his army to the cause of the imprisoned king, fled over the border to the Austrians, by whom he was imprisoned for five years. The peasants of La Vendée, already goaded into madness by the laws against their beloved non-juring priests,² revolted, with the war-cry, "Long live the king! Death to the Parisians!" The Sardinians crossed the southeastern frontier. The advancing Prussian army took Longwy; then Verdun fell, its commandant in despair blowing out his brains;

¹ The complete reorganization of the military force of Paris in the interests of the workingmen rather than the property-holding classes was a part of the same programme as the organization of the Commune.

² That is, those priests who refused to take oath to support the new Constitution with its ecclesiastical provisions.

and by the end of August the Duke of Brunswick was only three days' march from the capital.

But Brunswick was only one of the enemies the popular leaders feared. The armies in the field, under the influence of the commissioners sent them by the Assembly, might still confront him. The Jacobins knew very well that Paris was full of men and women who sympathized with Louis, and who hoped for the speedy arrival of the Prussian army. The Assembly endeavoured to provide against this danger. On the 17th of August, upon motion by Robespierre, the Assembly established a tribunal to try the conspirators of the 10th of August, meaning thereby the Swiss and the royalists who had fired upon the insurrectionary army. On the 27th it called upon Paris for an army of thirty thousand men to protect the capital. On the 28th, upon motion of Danton, a general search for arms and suspects through the city was ordered to be conducted by the Commune. That body chose Marat chairman of the committee to which the matter was referred, and the next few days he was the most important man in Paris. On the 30th the gates of the city were closed, and no man was allowed to go out or come in; the streets were illuminated, and bodies of the National Guards entered every house and searched it from top to bottom. "Patrols of sixty pikemen were in every street. The nocturnal tumult of so many armed men, the incessant knocks to make people open their doors, the crash of those that were burst off their hinges, and the continual uproar and revelling which took place throughout the night in all the public houses, formed a picture which will never be effaced from my memory." So wrote Peltier, of his own knowledge. Few arms were found, but three thousand persons suspected of sympathizing with the invaders and the king were arrested and shut up in the prisons, and as they

were not large enough to contain them all, in convents. The Assembly, to its credit be it said, attempted to restrain the actions of this over-zealous Insurrectionary Commune, and even ordered it to dissolve. Robespierre, always the enemy of anything approaching anarchy, advised the Commune to obey. But in the face of both vote and advice, on the 2d of September the Commune resolved that instead of dissolving it would increase its numbers to 288, and carry out its hideous policy. On the same day, while Danton was in the Assembly, the tocsin began ringing. Danton sprang to his feet. "That tocsin sounds," he shouted, "the charge upon the enemies of France. Conquer them! Courage! courage! forever courage! and France is saved!" The Assembly rang with applause, and decreed that every one who was unable to march to the frontier himself should give up his weapons to some one who could, or be forever infamous. But whether or not Danton knew it,¹ the tocsin sounded for two purposes, both to summon volunteers to the Champs de Mars and to summon murderers to the prisons. "Can we go away to the war and leave three thousand prisoners behind us in Paris who may break out and destroy our wives and children?" demanded the brutal, panic-stricken enthusiasts for liberty. And under the inspiration of Marat the Commune undertook to see that this danger was removed.

It is noteworthy that the first act of the approaching tragedy expressed the popular hatred of the church. Several carriage-loads of priests who would not take the civic oath were being carried from the Hôtel de Ville to

¹ For an able defense of Danton in this matter, see Beesly, *Life of Danton*, ch. 12; the articles by Robinet in *Rev. de Rév. française*, Nov., 1882, to July, 1883; and by Dubort, *ibid.* Aug.-Dec., 1886. See also Bougeart, *Danton*, and Gronlund, *Ça Ira, passim*. Madelin believes Danton was implicated in the massacres. *French Revolution*, 283-284.

the Abbaye, a convent that was for the time used as a prison. Hardly had they arrived when they were dragged from the carriages and slaughtered. One only escaped, the Abbé Sicard, noted for his work among the deaf and dumb. The deed was a signal for similar massacres, but in the other prisons there was more evidence of premeditation.

Any visitor to Paris may walk from the quiet gallery of the Luxembourg along the Rue de Vaugirard to the Church of the Carmellites. The guide will lead him to the rear of the church, and there show him two rooms and a narrow entry—rude, peaceful, the last place in which to look for reminders of massacre. Yet on the second day of September, 1792, one of the rooms was filled with priests; in the other sat an irregular tribunal, before which one after another of these priests was brought, passed a moment of examination, and then—most of them—passed out through the entry into the arms of butchers, hired at six francs a day. There are few more terrible days in history than the first four days of September, 1792, when France was without a constitutional government. In Paris alone 1,100 persons of all ranks were butchered, among them 250 priests, three bishops or archbishops, one former minister of Louis,¹ and the Princess Lamballe, the intimate friend of Marie Antoinette, whose loyalty had brought her from safety in England to death and nameless mutilation.²

These massacres, though traceable immediately to a

¹ Montmorin, the friend of Mirabeau. These figures of Stephens, II, 146, are given differently by various authorities. Mortimer-Ternaux, *La Terreur*, gives the total as 1,368.

² The murderers among other things dragged her headless body through the streets, and stuck her head upon a pike. Then they tried to hold it up before the window of the queen's room, but Marie Antoinette was fortunately unaware of the fact.

minority under the control of the Commune of Paris, were none the less the outcome of the revolutionary spirit of no small fraction of Frenchmen. The passion for "rights" among the educated classes might result in legislation, but among the ignorant and brutal was sure to lead to suspicion and violence. "The people of Paris," said the Girondin Louvet a few days later, in his attack upon Robespierre in the Assembly, "can fight; they cannot murder." But Louvet should have known better. The people of Paris could do both. "Do you think I deserve only twenty-five francs?" shouted a baker's boy. "Why, I have killed forty with my own hands." And the Commune paid 173 such butchers, as we know from an official list. In itself this shows that the massacres were not the product of mere mob-frenzy, and how deliberate the proceedings were is to be seen from other facts. Wine and food were sent to the men at work in the prisons. Benches, under charge of ushers, were marked *Pour les Messieurs* and *Pour les Dames*, and upon them through days and nights the "gentlemen" and "ladies" sat to enjoy the spectacle! All France was summoned by circulars of the Commune to join in purging the nation of its enemies and in terrifying the aristocrats.¹ "Apprized," ran this circular, "that barbarous hordes are advancing against it, the Commune of Paris hastens to inform its brothers in all the departments that part of the ferocious conspirators confined in the prisons have been put to death by the people, acts of justice which appear to it indispensable for repressing by terror the legions of traitors encompassed by its walls, at the moment when they were about to march against the enemy; and no doubt

¹The Assembly's submission to the Commune was complete. The actions of the latter body were simply usurpations of sovereignty, and with its rise to power, liberty ceased in France.

the nation, after the long series of treasons which have brought it to the brink of the abyss, will eagerly adopt this useful and necessary expedient; and all the French will say, like the Parisians, 'We are marching against the enemy, and we will not leave behind us traitors to murder our wives and children.'"

And France heeded the call. Atrocities were committed throughout its entire extent—atrocities that are without excuse, though unhappily not without parallel.¹ Danton closed his eyes to the horrors of the moment for fear lest he should lose his power with the masses. Above everything he wished to maintain the unity of France in the presence of a foreign invader.² Here as later, the war led the distracted leaders of France to justify or ex-

¹ Murders of one to eight persons of quality occurred in Meaux, Rheims, Couches, Lyons, Charleville, Caen, Gisors, Bordeaux, Cambrai, while at Versailles one Fournier, called the American, massacred forty-four prisoners who had been charged with high treason and were being conducted by him to Paris. The Commune congratulated him on the deed. There was mob violence in many other towns. The abysmal brutality of it all was inevitable among masses so debased as the proletariat of all cities in France. Yet one constantly meets with instances of kind heartedness. Probably the best term with which to describe the entire homicidal epidemic is "political persecution." The church allied with absolutism had taught men the lesson of bloodshed all too well in France and neighboring countries. Recall only the Albigenses, St. Bartholomew's Night, and the Low Countries. On the September massacres, see Carlyle, III, bk. i; Mortimer-Ternaux, *Hist. de la Terreur*, III, i; Buchez et Roux, *Hist. Parl.*, XVII, 331-475, XVIII, 70-477 (including the accounts of several eye-witnesses, some of whom barely escaped death); Wallon, *La Terreur*, I, 31-45. Taine, *French Revolution*, bk. iv, chs. 9, 10, contains a large amount of information concerning the violence in the department. The Russian Revolution in nothing more parallels the French than in this homicidal tendency. But its tragedy is vastly greater.

² See Mathiez, *Danton et la Paix*, ch. 2, however, for a severer estimate of Danton's share in saving France.

cuse violence. Revolutions, when threatened by force, invariably developed a homicidal frenzy.

Yet it must be admitted that the massacres of September did what they were intended to do—they stopped counter-revolution in Paris, and terrified the *bourgeoisie* into submission to the Jacobin programme. The shame of it is that this could be true, and that there was no government strong enough to bring the Commune and its agents to punishment.

While Paris was thus inhumanly delivered from its absurd fears of unarmed prisoners, the victorious advance of the Prussians, already jealous of their Austrian allies and swept by illness, was stopped by the insignificant “cannonade of Valmy,” and all danger was past. The massacres were forgotten in fêtes and theatres and receptions. The royal family, comfortably imprisoned in the Temple, could no longer intrigue, and Paris regained its gaiety.

France began its republican epoch with a new propagandism in behalf of liberty. All administrative, municipal, and judicial bodies were ordered to be remade, lest they should be “gangrened with royalism.” “Citizen” and “citizeness” (*citoyen and citoyenne*) replaced “monsieur” and “madame” as terms of address. Savoy and Nice had been conquered in September, and by the end of October no enemy remained within France. Dumouriez invaded the Low Countries, and November 6th his barefooted, ill-armed troops, shouting the Marseillaise, defeated the Austrians at Jemmapes, and by the middle of December the French were masters of the Netherlands, the Meuse, and the Scheldt. Custine captured Mayence, and threatened all western Germany. By the decree of November 19th, the Convention declared that the cause of nations was arrayed against that of kings, and prom-

ised aid to any nation which would rise against its tyrant.¹

But during these military successes France was passing through a new period of internal struggle.

Under the influence of the September massacres elections had been going on for that body which, according to the Constitution of 1791, could alone produce a new constitution. The political campaign, except in Paris, was lukewarm. Radicalism was the gainer. The property qualification for voting having been abolished through the influence of the Commune, the *bourgeoisie* was no longer supreme. Radicalism in Paris and several industrial centres was further aided by terrorism at the polls. Only 630,000 persons voted. France was to be ruled by a minority.

In the Convention, which assembled on September 21, 1792, parties were more than ever marked, and again show more clearly than any other symptom the progress of the Revolution. The Right was now the loosely joined, mutually jealous Girondin party, which had formed a part of the Left in the Legislative Assembly; the Centre, or Plain, was again neutral; the Mountain was now strongly represented. In it were to be found the leaders of the Jacobins, and indeed most of the extreme popular leaders including Robespierre, Danton, and Marat. Taken as a whole, the members of the Convention had been also members of the Constituent or Legislative Assembly, and were therefore not without experience. Many of them, especially in the "Plain," or Centre, were men of high character. Yet there was an absence of definite purpose on the part of the great mass of delegates. The idealism of 1789 was no longer in evidence. In its place was

¹ This absurd decree was later repealed through the efforts of Danton.

revolutionary radicalism on the part of the Mountain, and among the other representatives a fear lest counter-revolution might bring reprisals and the loss of the new land-holdings. The delegates as a whole were thus naturally hostile to the church, while the Departments were bitterly opposed to the "Dictatorship of Paris." To all appearances the Girondins had gained power, but they were too obsessed with classical examples and political theories to be capable of vigorous action. Their very liberalism unfitted them for united action. Again the history of France was to be written by well-organized, aggressive minorities—notably by the Mountain, among whose leaders professional education and philosophical sympathies had not destroyed political energy.

In the first session of the Convention (September 21, 1792) all parties united in abolishing monarchy and in declaring France a Republic, and in due time a committee was appointed to draw up a new constitution. But constitution-making was of far less importance than the question as to whether the Girondins or the Mountain should control the Revolution in its new constructive phase. Both parties were devoted to the Republic, but differed in many details. The Girondins were opposed to the supremacy of Paris in the state, and favoured a decentralized government, in which the departments should be allowed a large share of independence. The Mountain, composed largely of Parisians, believed in a strong, centralized state, in which, if necessary, there should be, as Marat said, a dictator in behalf of liberty.¹ Yet this divergence of opinion need not necessarily have been a ground of strife. The real difference lay in the men composing the two parties and

¹How thoroughly the Girondins represented the departments is shown by the fact that in Paris they were able to elect only one representative to the Convention.

their popular support. The Girondins were cultured enthusiasts, incapable of organizing a political "machine" and creditably disgusted with the Commune. The men of the Mountain, on the other hand, were no less devoted to the public weal than the Girondins, and no less philosophically inclined; but they were men of action rather than words, and knew how to organize and control the proletariat of Paris. In consequence, they were ready to co-operate with the brutal Commune, of which some of them were members. The struggle was, therefore, not for liberty, but for mastery; not between the privileged and unprivileged, but between the representatives of the middle class of the departments and the representatives of the proletariat of Paris.

The struggle began in the attempt of the Girondins to obtain a seat on the floor of the Convention for Roland, a minister. The proposal was undoubtedly wise, but the Mountain opposed it strongly. The Girondins controlled the Ministry. The struggle grew bitter, until Danton put an end to the matter by saying that if M. Roland was to be admitted to the Convention, Madame Roland had better be admitted also!¹

The Girondins had in the Legislative Assembly attempted to investigate the September massacres, and in the Convention they followed up the matter by accusing Robespierre of aiming at a dictatorship, and by attacking Marat for proposing that very thing. Both attacks resulted only in giving the two men greater popularity among their constituencies and in winning the implacable hatred of the Mountain. Nor were the Girondins any more fortunate in their proposal to give the Convention a guard of three thousand men from the departments.

¹ Madame Roland was in fact given a seat in the Convention for at least one session.

It was their fatal mistake always to threaten and not to act, to debate and not to organize. The very departments they trusted were later to be discovered among the supporters of their enemies.

The Mountain's attack upon the Girondins had the support of the "sovereigns" in the gallery, the Commune, and the poorer wards. It charged them with being federalists—that is, with seeking to make each department in France a separate state and the nation simply a federation—and with being royalists because they were not willing to go to extremes in their attack upon the imprisoned king. Yet during the latter months of 1792, the Girondins were able to defeat the Commune in the abandonment of unnecessary public works which served to attract loafers to Paris, and to elect their candidate for mayor of the city. But the political interest of their supporters waned and they could not prevent the election of members of the Insurrectionary Commune to the Constitutional Commune of Paris. While the French armies were wonderfully successful on the frontiers, the Girondins were able to control the Convention. They properly claimed the war as their creature. November 19th the Convention promised "fraternity and aid to all peoples who wished to recover their liberty." In fact it was largely as a war-party that the Girondins controlled the Convention. They continued to waste time, however, over the September massacres, which, as Danton said, had become ancient history. But one great problem, whose solution would determine who really were the masters of the Swamp and the Convention, was yet to be solved—the disposition of Citizen Louis Capet, ex-king of France. Little by little the cause of the king and the Girondins became united. Since the 10th of August Louis had been kept a prisoner in the old fortress of the Knights Templar, known as the Temple, and with him also the

members of his family. But the hatred shown him by the people of Paris was not satisfied with deposition and imprisonment. It declared that he was in league with the foreign invaders, and that he must be tried for treason. The Girondins were willing that he should be tried, and even moved that a committee be formed to examine the papers found on the 10th of August, but they were not willing that he should be executed. The Jacobins, on the contrary, through Robespierre, declared that, traitor or not, the death of Louis was a political necessity. "You are not judges, but statesmen," he told the Convention. It is in this light that the trial granted him by the Girondins is to be regarded. It is true that new evidence, more or less compromising, was found in an iron box of the king's own manufacture; but after all, the Convention did not have the evidence we now possess, and the real grounds on which Louis was condemned were political, not legal.

Three questions were put to the Convention, and each had to be answered by each delegate aloud:

1. Is Louis guilty of conspiracy? Six hundred and eight-three of seven hundred and thirty-nine members voted yes. Not one voted no.

2. Shall sentence be referred to the people? Four hundred and twenty-four voted no.

3. What shall be the penalty of conviction? On this last question voting continued through the night of January 16 and the day of January 17, 1793. In the galleries was the wild crowd pricking each vote with pins in cards, howling, cursing, threatening. Every deputy knew his future, and perhaps his life, hung upon his vote. Many of the best men believed Louis must die for the nation, many timid men were terrified into submission. At last, amid deepest silence, Vergniaud, president of the day, de-

clared the vote. Seven hundred and twenty-one deputies were present. Three hundred and sixty-one were needed for a decision. Besides 26, who voted for death and delay, 361 voted for death. The deciding vote, one might say, was cast by Philip Égalité, Duke of Orleans, cousin of the King.

Three days later came a final struggle for delay in executing the sentence. But the Convention voted 380-310 that it should be executed immediately. On the next morning, the 21st of January, 1793, the unfortunate man, who, as he told his counsel, had been unable during two hours' consideration to discover that he had ever given his people cause for reproach,¹ after a painful interview with his family, was taken from his cell and carried to the guillotine. He attempted to address the crowd on the scaffold, but his voice was drowned in the roar of drums, and a second later Louis added another to the short list of monarchs who have died like criminals.² It was not merely the fault of the times, so fearfully out of joint and so madly bound to be rejointed. There is indisputable evidence that Louis had been guilty of unfaithfulness to the Constitution he had sworn to maintain. Yet this evidence was not known to the Convention, and even a modern student, recalling the unfortunate man's good intentions, his bearing and answers at his trial, and the simple nobility of his last hours, is almost ready to forget his share in bringing about his own downfall.

The execution of Louis was to have lasting effect upon the Convention, and later, on the Directorate. Their mem-

¹ Such a statement can hardly stand as correct. Louis had been in constant communication with the enemies of France.

² The various orders for the conduct of the execution are now preserved in the Carnavalet Museum in Paris. Some good sources declare that Louis was allowed to finish his address.

bers could never forget that they were regicides. Personal danger aroused opposition to all efforts to check the Revolution and urged on the war. The success of the allies meant punishment to regicides as well as the undoing of the reforms of 1789-91. More immediately the fall of Louis meant much to the Girondins. They had been beaten in their half-hearted struggle for moderate action; the radical party of Danton and Marat had triumphed. From the trial of the king the final struggle between the now comparatively moderate Girondins and the Mountain increased daily.

There was little excuse for the struggle. France needed united leaders rather than party struggles. England, under the influence of Burke, and angry at the loss of trade monopolies through the opening of the Scheldt to unrestricted commerce, had been growing increasingly hostile to the Revolution, and on December 31, 1792, had refused to recognize the minister of the French Republic. More overt acts of hostility followed, and February 1st the Convention declared war against England and Holland; and March 7th against Spain. A levy of three hundred thousand men was laid upon the nation, and commissioners with unlimited powers were sent to quiet the rapidly disintegrating departments. Nevertheless, the future darkened. On March 9th the great coalition of all Europe was formed against France; two days later the peasants of La Vendée as one man rose in arms against forced service in the army of a republic they hated because of its treatment of the church; March 18th came the disastrous defeat of Dumouriez at Neerwinden; on April 4th came the news that Custine had abandoned Mayence, and, what was more appalling, that Dumouriez had gone over to the enemy. His treachery ruined the prestige of the Girondins. He had been their favourite and they had supported him.

It was natural that the Jacobins should charge them with disloyalty. The Mountain determined on their destruction.

To no small degree the fall of the Girondins was due to their own perverseness. It was no time for dissension. Divided counsels might destroy the state. As a war party they should have subordinated all plans to the success of French arms. But they were incapable of rising above their prejudices and their love of rhetoric. The real greatness of Danton appears at this crisis. In his speech of March 10th he said: "What matters my reputation? May France be free and my name forever sullied! . . . Let us fight. Let us conquer our liberty. Extend your energies in every direction. Let the rich listen to my words. Our conquests must pay our debts, or else the rich will have to pay them before long. The situation is a cruel one. . . . We must break out of the situation by a great effort. Let us conquer Holland. Let us reanimate the republican party in England. Let us make France march forward, and we shall go down glorious to posterity. Fulfil your great destiny. No more debates, no more quarrels, and the country is saved."

But with a foolish arrogance of superiority the Girondins, notwithstanding many offers on the part of Danton, whose whole interest lay in saving France from the foreigner, refused to unite with his party, charging it with being stained with the blood of the September massacres. Such a refusal was unfortunate for France and fatal to themselves. The Girondins, although they still were able to control a majority of the house, were incapable of bringing any sort of success to their arms, or order to the state. There is, indeed, scarcely a measure of importance traceable to them during the months of their leadership, and their attack upon the Mountain was no more

suicidal for themselves than dangerous to France. They justly fell before a party which at heart was no more revolutionary, but which saw the need of the moment and was pre-eminently the party of action.

The final struggles came about through an effort to control the agitators of Paris by a committee of twelve, but even more immediately by a new attack upon Marat, who had stung the Girondins to madness by nicknaming them "the little statesmen." The Girondins were able to bring about a vote to send Marat before the newly established Revolutionary Tribunal—only to have him promptly and unanimously acquitted by judges who were by no means the creatures of the Mountain.

The month of May was devoted to preparations for the last struggle. The Girondins were divided among themselves and averse to extreme measures. The Commune came to the aid of the Mountain, and again looked to the mob. It was a bitter time, too full of complicated debate and voting to be easily followed, but the last three days of struggle were a French Pride's Purge. Just as the king had been brought to Paris by insurrection, as he had been intimidated and at last deposed by insurrection, so now the party of moderation—or better, inaction—was to be intimidated and deposed by insurrection. On May 31st and June 1st the Commune attempted to bring about the fall of the Girondins, but failed, once because the Convention unexpectedly adopted measures intended to precipitate disturbance, and once because Saturday was pay-day, and the poorer sections preferred wages to riots. But on Sunday, June 2d, plans were better laid. A special troop of roughs was hired at forty sous per day, and together with other armed men, formed into a sort of insurrectionary army. Backed by this force, the Commune, through its representatives, demanded that the Con-

vention vote the arrest of about thirty-seven of its members, including twenty-two prominent Girondins. This demand was refused.

Thereupon the Convention was surrounded by armed men. In solemn procession, with the president at their head, the deputies went forth to reconnoitre. They found that there was no mistake; they were all prisoners. In the presence of soldiers, Marat summoned the deputies to return to their seats. Couthon, with patriotic cynicism said: "You see, gentlemen, that you are respected and obeyed by the people, and that you can vote on the question which is submitted to you. Lose no time, then, in complying with their wishes." Unable to leave their hall, tired of the prolonged struggle, quieting their consciences by not voting at all, the great majority of the Convention allowed the Mountain to vote that thirty-one deputies should be put under arrest. They were not imprisoned, but were allowed to go about at will. But they no longer had a voice in the Convention, and with their expulsion the triumph of the Mountain was complete. The war party of inefficient theorists, the champions of an impossible nation composed of thousands of all but independent municipalities, had gone down before the party of action, at once the idols of a "sovereign" people and the champions of a centralized government compared with which Bourbon absolutism was constitutional monarchy.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE REPUBLIC UNDER THE TERROR ¹

- I. The Suppression and Punishment of Counter-Revolution: 1. Preventive Measures; 2. La Vendée; 3. Carrier at Nantes; 4. Auvergne; 5. Lyons; 6. Marseilles and Bordeaux; 7. Toulon. II. The Conduct of Foreign War: 1. The Inefficiency of the Coalition; 2. The Deputies on Mission in the Armies; 3. French Victories. III. The Administration of the State: 1. Poor *vs.* Rich; 2. The *Maximum* and other Laws in favour of the Masses; 3. The Constructive Legislation of the Terror; 4. Life under the Terror.

After the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, his widow received a medal struck by the French liberals, on which, among other sentiments, was this: "He saved the Republic without veiling the statue of liberty." The Committee of Public Safety saved France, to use Marat's words, by a "despotism of liberty." Avowedly the Terror sprang from a determination to maintain the new rights which had been gained by the Constituent Assembly. That these

¹In general, see Stephens, *French Revolution*, II, chs. 10-12; Madelin, *French Revolution*, ch. 31; Aulard, *Political History of the French Revolution*; Thiers, *French Revolution*, II, 336-372; Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, III, 159-258; Taine, *French Revolution*, III, 352-419. There are many historical novels covering the Reign of Terror the best of which are Felix Gras, *The Terror*; Victor Hugo, *1793*; Erckmann-Chatrian, *Year One of the Republic*, although the latter is more concerned with the military operations. Other novels are Dickens, *Tale of Two Cities*; Mitchell, *The Story of François*; William Sage, *Robert Tournay*. The great works are Wallin, *La Tribunal révolutionnaire*; Gros, *Le Comité de Salut public*; and Mortimer-Ternaux, *La Terreur*. The most valuable collections of sources are Aulard, *Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut public*, and the *Archives Parlementaires*. Buchez et Roux, *Histoire Parlementaire* is of less value from the governmental point of view.

were by no means assured is evident from the threats of the *émigrés* and the Coalition, yet it is not probable that even a counter-revolution could have undone the work of the political and social evolution that found expression in the decrees of August 4, 1789. But the Republic had travelled far from that day. The work of the Legislative Assembly had been less that of reform than of punishing disloyalty, and by the beginning of 1793, as far as the popular leaders were concerned, the fear of the loss of liberties had come really to mean fear for themselves. Counter-revolution meant not only the return of confiscated property and the re-establishment of the monarchy; it meant revenge. Clergy and nobles were no more eager to recover their lost privileges than to bring the Jacobins to punishment, and the French defeats of the early part of 1793 made the probability of their success strong. These two motives, therefore, the one genuinely patriotic and the other personal, lay behind the measures taken by the Convention through its various committees and agents, while the intense class hatred between the masses of the cities and the *bourgeoisie* was an added source both of suspicion and of severity.

The three great dangers confronting France in 1793 were counter-revolution, foreign war, and anarchy.

As far as counter-revolution went, the measures of the Convention were both preventive and punitive. To make certain of the loyalty of all citizens, every person had to carry about constantly a properly countersigned "civic card." As the Terror developed suspicion became, as always, a phase of the revolutionary psychology. No person was safe from being denounced as an enemy of the Republic. It took ever less evidence to make a person a "suspect." Any man who was of noble birth, who had held office under the Old Régime, who was a servant or

relative of an "emigrant"; any one who could not show that he had made some sacrifice for the Revolution—all such were legally declared to be suspects, liable to instant arrest and summary trial before the Revolutionary Tribunal.¹ By the law of April 16, 1794, all those who lived without doing anything and complained of the Revolution were to be transported to Guiana. Even the Jacobin Club had to be "purified," and its members were obliged to answer the question, "What have you done to deserve punishment in case of the reinstatement of the enemies of the Republic?"

Actual counter-revolution was punished in a way that beggars description. By far the most serious outbreak against the Convention was that in La Vendée, a department of about 2,600 square miles, lying on the Bay of Biscay between the Loire and La Rochelle. It was peopled by sturdy but ignorant peasants, who had welcomed the States General, but who had been alienated from the Revolution by the laws against non-juring priests. Riots had broken out in 1791, and a somewhat serious revolt had been crushed in the following year; but the law of February 25, 1793, ordering a levy *en masse*, threw the entire region into actual rebellion. The Vendéans would not fight for the Republic, and under the leadership of members of the lower nobility and self-elected captains of the peasants, defeated the republican armies.²

¹ A good brief account of the laws against suspects is in Wallon, *La Terreur*, II, 1-22.

² On the rebellion in La Vendée, the literature is voluminous. Stephens, *French Revolution*, II, 259 n., gives some of the principal French literature. Reference may, however, be especially made to Lescure, *Mémoires sur La Vendée*; Chassin, *La Préparation de la Guerre de Vendée, La Vendée Patriote*, and *Les Pacifications de l'Ouest*; Jephson, *The Real French Revolutionist*, gives a full account of the Vendean war, but is violently partisan in his sympathies with the peasants.

In June, 1793, their commander-in-chief, Cathelineau, a former postillion, proclaimed the little Louis XVII., then a prisoner in the Temple, king. No quarter was given by either peasants or the republican troops, and the war became indescribably cruel. The Vendéans defeated Westermann, and the new generals of the Republic, no longer professional soldiers, but a goldsmith, a printer, and a comic actor, were equally unsuccessful. Even the regular French troops under Kleber did not at first escape defeat. By the middle of October, 1793, however, the incompetent generals were superseded, and the peasants were utterly routed, most of their leaders killed, and armed resistance was limited to small bands. Then the Committee of Public Safety undertook to punish the unfortunate department. Troops were sent into all portions of it, and during the first three months of 1794 they burnt villages, executed peasants, and spread desolation as widely as possible. In the mean time the Terror had been established (October 19, 1793) in the great city of Nantes by the deputy Carrier, a provincial lawyer of no reputation and less character. His method was not that of the Revolutionary Tribunal in Paris, the systematic but legal condemnation and execution of political criminals; the Vendean prisoners numbered thousands, and the guillotine worked too slowly to suit this republican tyrant. Prisoners who had actually borne arms against the Republic, to the number of at least 1,800, were shot in batches, utterly without trial. Finding even this process too slow, Carrier invented the *noyades*, or "drownings." The wretched men and women were stripped naked, bound, and sent out by companies in old vessels, which were sunk in the Loire. Perhaps 2,000 Vendean prisoners were thus killed within less than two months. Then Carrier attacked the *bourgeoisie*, and 323 persons,

including most of the old officers of the region and 132 prominent and wealthy citizens, were sent to the Revolutionary Tribunal at Paris.

The horrors of the situation were ever on the increase. Men and women were bound together in "republican marriages,"¹ as Carrier said, and thrown into the Loire. The mouth of the river was stopped with corpses, and thousands of the inhabitants of the city died from the pestilence resulting from unburied bodies. In the mean time, Carrier conducted himself most scandalously, making his brief sway a continuous orgy. But atrocity which did not make toward public order was not in accord with the plans of the Committee of Public Safety. However ready it may have been to execute nobles and *bourgeois*, it did not wish the masses to hate the Republic. Almost as soon as Carrier's actions were known, the Committee's agent, Julien, a boy of nineteen, was sent to investigate. At considerable personal risk he reported (January 21, 1794) the awful condition of the city, and two weeks later vehemently urged the removal of the deputy. February 8th, the Committee recalled Carrier, and although the Terror continued, his atrocities were not repeated. La Vendée, however, had been driven to new revolt, and was pacified only years after by the Directory (August, 1796). Carrier himself went unpunished by the Committee, but was guillotined soon after the fall of Robespierre.² This was the only important case in which the

¹ It is true that these marriages have been denied (see Wallon, *Les Représentants en Mission*, I, 422, seq.), but they are distinctly mentioned in the trial of Carrier.

² At the least calculation five thousand persons were killed in Nantes. Stephens, *French Revolution*, II, 392. Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, III, 257, says fifteen thousand. For full details, see Wallon, *La Tribunal révolutionnaire*, V, 326-344; Jephson, *The Real French Revolutionist*.

measures of the Committee of Public Safety failed to produce the desired order, and even here all real danger to the Republic was, at least for the time, ended.

Another royalist rebellion, although on a much smaller scale than that in La Vendée, broke out in upper Auvergne. It was there that the miniature religious war at Jalès and a widespread conspiracy of the nobility had been crushed as early as 1792. In 1793 Charrier, an emissary of the Count d'Artois, organized a new revolt, which for some time met with considerable success. By May 31st, however, the government had taken such precautions that the movement collapsed. Two deputies were thereupon sent by the Committee of Public Safety to establish the Terror in the departments adjacent to the scene of the revolt. All prisoners who had actually taken arms were executed, and hundreds of poor lace-women were imprisoned and killed because they wished to begin their work with prayer and, for some reason, refused to take the oath of fidelity to the Republic.

Those cities which, like Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux, had risen, partly because of a desire for the municipal independence granted by the Constitution of 1791, partly in behalf of the Girondins, and partly against the rule of the masses, were subjected to fearful punishment.¹ October 12, 1793, the Convention decreed that Lyons, which had offered the most obstinate resistance to the armies of the Republic, should be annihilated, and the name of its site changed to Commune-Affranchie. The decree was never literally obeyed, for even Couthon, a member of the Committee, was unwilling to do more than destroy forty houses. But the Committee could not let

¹ The hatred of these cities was greatly increased by the fact that Marat had been assassinated (July 13, 1793) by Charlotte Corday, a sympathizer with the Girondins.

the opportunity of establishing the Terror in the provinces pass, and Collot d'Herbois himself was sent on mission to the city. Though by no means the equal of Carrier in brutality, with the aid of a *sans-culotte* army he instituted wholesale massacres in addition to the executions by the guillotine, and nearly 2,000 persons of all classes perished during five months.¹

Marseilles, because of its importance as a base of military operations against Toulon, as well as because of its public spirit, suffered less severely, although 406 persons were executed. Here, as in Lyons and La Vendée, it should be recalled, the victims were those who had actually been in arms against the Republic.

It is characteristic of the arbitrariness with which the deputies acted that the Terror at Bordeaux was greatly mitigated during its later days by the fact that Tallien, a young man of twenty-five, came under the influence of a beautiful and tender-hearted woman of nineteen—a fact that nearly brought him his death in Paris. Yet in Bordeaux 301 persons perished.

But next to La Vendée, the greatest victim of punishment inflicted upon those who revolted against the Republic was Toulon. There the *bourgeoisie* had not submitted readily to the rule of the Jacobins, and on August 3, 1793, they joined with the royalists, imprisoned the two deputies on mission in the city, and surrendered to the English. Toulon was then held by the English and Spanish in behalf of the little Louis XVII.,² was strongly

¹ It should be added, however, in justice to the administration of Collot d'Herbois that 1,684 persons were also acquitted—a fact going far to show that the Terror in the hands of anyone but a brute like Carrier did not rest upon indiscriminate massacre.

² The fate of this little boy will always remain in doubt. As far as certainty goes we can say only that he was separated

fortified, and its harbour was filled with the allied fleets. The republican armies immediately besieged the city, but with no result until Napoleon Bonaparte, at that time an obscure captain in the artillery, advised capturing a promontory commanding the harbor. After weeks of fighting this was accomplished, the fleets withdrew, and Toulon fell (December 19, 1793). As in the case of the other cities, it was delivered over to punishment, and by January 4, 1794, as Barras, the deputy on mission, wrote the Committee of Public Safety, every one who had been employed in the navy and the army of the rebels, or the naval or military administration, had been killed.¹ As in Nantes and Lyons, hundreds were shot in batches, four hundred men, for instance, who met the deputy Fréron at the dockyards, being killed on the spot. Fréron is said to have even attempted to exterminate the entire population, but the troops refused to turn butchers, and the *sans-culotte* army succeeded in massacring only about 800 persons.

These instances must suffice to illustrate the fearful severity with which the Committee put down and punished revolt. If one looks at its conduct of foreign war,

from his mother, and put in charge of a brutal keeper, Simon. On June 8, 1795, a child said to be the dauphin died in the Temple. There have always been those, however, who claimed that the dauphin was carried to America. An interesting summary of the case is given in Latimer, *My Scrap-book of the French Revolution*, 1408, seq. See also Louis Blanc, *Révolution française*, XII, ch. 2. For the accepted account of Simon's brutalities, see Von Sybel, IV, 320-328; and Chantelauze, *Louis XVII*.

¹ The horrors of war were never better illustrated than at Toulon when the English ships fired upon the crowds of fugitives who were seeking safety in them, in order to prevent overloading. Four thousand of the citizens of Toulon were crowded into the English vessels when they finally left the city to its fate.

its energy appears as relentless, although not as brutal.¹ The first six months of 1793 had seen not only the revolt of the cities, but also the repeated defeat of the French armies. It was to prevent the threatened destruction of France that Danton had been eager to solidify the power of the great Committee. Here can be seen the value of a cool-headed, systematic man like Carnot. The levy *en masse* had resulted in sending 300,000 new troops to the armies, and before the year closed France had in the field fourteen armies, numbering at least 750,000 men. But discipline, arms, provisions, were lacking, and the royalist officers were justly suspected. Carnot met these needs successfully. The young peasants forced into the Republic's armies were brigaded with the seasoned and disciplined troops of the time. Their enthusiasm gave new power to military operations and in a few months they formed the troops which under Napoleon Bonaparte were to be the conquerors of Austria, Italy and Prussia. Promotion stirred ambition. Every soldier, it has been said, carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack. The needs of the commissariat of the new armies were met by requisition. Citizens were forced to share their shirts, shoes and pigs. Gunpowder and weapons were manufactured all over France. War thus not only served to unify but to employ the nation.

To supply energy, the Convention had recourse to its Deputies on Mission. In every army there were two or more of these deputies with their eyes constantly on the

¹ A good summary of the military history of this critical year is given by Mahan, *The Influence of the Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*, I, ch. 3. The best general account is that of Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, III, bk. iii; IV, bk. i.

generals, and merciless in their demands for victory. Never shunning danger themselves, they more than once snatched victory from defeat by leading the troops. The generals of the raw levies knew that they must win if they were to live. Failure was interpreted by the deputies and the Revolutionary Tribunal to mean treason, and not a few officers, like Westermann and Custine, expiated their defeats on the scaffold.¹ In January, 1794, it was voted that a condemned general should be executed at the head of his army.² And the result of this merciless patriotism was just what the Committee sought. French armies became all but irresistible.

But victory was due to other causes as well. The Coalition was but half-heartedly in the war. As Mallet du Pan said in 1792, "Europe had no basis for a general resistance." Austria was not bent upon invading France. Poland was more important in her policy of expansion. But Poland was a perennial source of enmity between Austria, Russia and Prussia, the three powers by which it had already been partitioned. In March, 1794, the Poles under Kosciusko rose in rebellion. In consequence Prussian troops were diverted to defeat the new leader, and Austria grew suspicious. "We shall be left out of the partition," wrote Francis. Prussia had no desire to fight France for fear lest Austria should seize more Polish territory. Russia in her turn was plainly embroiling her two rivals in war with France in order that she might dismember Poland and Turkey. Furthermore, while all

¹ For obvious reasons, this policy was not as successful in the navy as in the army. One cannot make men sailors by decrees. Yet the Convention attempted it—e. g., by voting death to any captain who surrendered to a force less than double his, and if in charge of a ship-of-the-line, to any force unless his vessel was sinking. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power*, etc., I, 95 n.

² See Mortimer-Ternaux. *La Terreur*, VIII, 247-314.

three powers believed that France was too distracted to avoid ultimate partition, they could reach no agreement as to a division of the prospective spoils.

This attitude of mutual suspicion on the part of the Coalition prevented energetic action against France, and gave Carnot needed time for his preparations. Even more important, the danger of national destruction at the hands of ancient enemies begot a new unity in France. Indeed it is not too much to say that the war which at first all but destroyed, ultimately saved France. It became the source of a new national enthusiasm. For the supreme source of the victories of the Republic lay in the new spirit breathed into the troops by the Deputies on Mission. Out from the ranks there began to emerge the great soldiers of Napoleon. Never were armies more enthusiastic for their cause, or, thanks to Carnot, better directed. The success of the systematized Terror in the autumn of 1793 was in fact hardly short of miraculous. In June-July, France had faced absolute destruction. In September, 1793, the English were defeated at Hondschoote; October 15 and 16, Jourdan defeated the Austrians at Wattignies and opened up the Low Countries; in December, Pichegru defeated the Austrians again, tumbled them over the Rhine, and recaptured Worms and Spire. At the same time, it will be remembered, La Vendée had been subdued, Lyons and Toulon captured. The year 1794 found France delivered from all danger of invasion, and already carrying the war into foreign territory.

In administering the internal affairs of the Republic the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety were seriously handicapped by the expenditure required by the war, as well as by the almost complete destruction of commerce. From the beginning of the Jacobin period

the popular leaders had turned their attention to incipient state-socialism, in which the rich were to be governed in the interest of the poor.¹ After the September massacres the personal property of the victims, to the value of millions, was confiscated by the Commune. The Commune also stripped the Tuileries and the other royal palaces of their gold and silver plate, and coined that of the churches. All export of silver and gold was forbidden, and the Assembly began to control the grain trade. "The poor man alone," said Robespierre, "is virtuous, wise, and fitted to govern." "The rich," said Marat, "have so long sucked out the marrow of the people that they are now visited with a crushing retribution." The rich were distinctly held to belong to a conquered party, and charged with "hoping for protection from the Austrians." The economic policy of the Convention grew distinctly socialistic in its tendencies.² "To what purpose," some one said as early as August 16, 1792, "is the controversy about a republic or a monarchy? Create a government which will raise the poor man above his petty wants, and deprive the rich man of his superfluity, and you will thereby restore a perfect equilibrium." In fact, just as the Constituent Assembly destroyed the inequalities arising from the privileges of the Old Régime, the representatives of the people in the Convention endeavoured to destroy the inequalities arising from wealth.

¹ On the inner condition of France during the Terror, see Goucourt, *Histoire de la Société française pendant la Révolution*; Williams, *Sketches of Manners, etc., in the French Republic*; Wallon, *La Terreur*, I, 168-178; II, 341-352.

² Had French radicals been obsessed with Marxian Socialism, the programme of the *Bolsheviki* might have been anticipated. But socialism in the modern sense of the term had not become a philosophy, and the industrialization of society was only beginning. Class consciousness as now preached was hardly known.

The Legislative Assembly had confiscated the estates of the *émigrés*, and to help the *sans-culottes* offered them for sale in lots of two and three acres, to be paid for in small annual instalments. A few weeks later (September 25-28) the Convention abolished all ground rents without compensation.¹ In May, 1792, a forced loan of \$200,000,000 was levied on the rich, despite the opposition of the Girondins.² The *assignats*, which had depreciated to less than a sixth of their face value, were ordered to be taken at par under penalty of death. Twenty-five million francs were levied upon the clergy, nobility, and corporations of the recently conquered territory of Belgium. The tendency of speculators to take advantage of the blockade and the great demand for grain, and so raise its price, was met by the law of the *Maximum* (May 4, 1793), which declared that grain and flour should be sold at prices to be fixed by each Commune.³ Later laws, with the aid of elaborate statistical tables, applied the principle to all articles of food, and offenders were punished with death. When farmers and dealers refused to put their goods on sale at the legal prices, the *sans-culotte* army dragged the unfortunate men before the Revolutionary Tribunal. Further laws limited the amount of bread one could buy, and made men and women stand in line at the bakeries. To prevent food being purchased before its arrival in Paris, the mayor threatened to do nothing to prevent the entire city's starving. Thanks to an abundant harvest in 1793, as well as to this legislation, so utterly in violation of ordinary eco-

¹ Von Sybel (II, 67) estimates the value of the landed property disposed of by these decrees at \$1,200,000,000.

² See Mortimer-Ternaux, *La Terreur*, VIII, 332; Stourm, *Finances de l'Ancien Régime et de la Révolution*, II, 369-377.

³ The law of Sept. 11, 1793, fixed the rate at that of 1790, plus one-third.

conomic laws, the proletariat of the cities was in a measure furnished with food, but the economic condition of France remained desperate.¹ Agriculture suffered, with a million men taken from the fields to serve in the army, food sold at the *maximum* was poor and scarce, and the punishment inflicted on the cities had been the finishing blow to commerce and manufacturers. The *bourgeois* were the chief sufferers, for the Convention cared for the masses. Their needs were provided for by assuring all good *sans-culottes* forty sous per day for attending the assemblies of their sections,² by fixing wages at the rate of those in 1790 plus one-half and by a law establishing a paid revolutionary *sans-culotte* army. At the same time, in direct violation of the grand watchwords, "Liberty and Equality," which were oftenest in men's mouths, and which the Commune of Paris had ordered every householder to inscribe over his door, and yet, as it believed, in the interest of the nation at large, the Committee of Public Safety suppressed freedom of thought, opened letters, instituted a secret police, destroyed the right of trial by jury.³ Nor did the radicals of the Convention stop here. Their passion for regenerating every element in French life drove them to absurd extremes. They would have nothing that had belonged to the hated Old Régime. Every man was to be called "Citizen" rather than "Monsieur." The statues of the kings in the great church of St. Denis were mutilated, and the royal bones thrown into a ditch and covered with quicklime. For the same

¹ The Russian Revolutionists adopted similar economic methods, with even more serious results.

² For instance, 1,200 were supposed to be in attendance every day at each section in Paris. As a matter of fact about 300 would be present and answer for those absent.

³ For reports of this police during the Terror, see Schmidt. *Tableaux de la Révolution française*, II, 99-220.

reason the calendar was changed. The year was divided into twelve months, each containing three weeks of ten days (*décades*), every tenth day (*décadi*) being for rest; the names of the months were changed, and the era made to date from the establishment of the Republic, September 21, 1792.¹

Quite as revolutionary was the Convention's treatment of religion. The philosophy of the day and the struggle over the non-juring priests had made the Jacobins fierce haters of Christianity, and among the necessities of the regenerate nation and the new epoch they were establishing was a new religion. On November 7, 1793, Gobel, the Bishop of Paris, and his chief ecclesiastics appeared in the Convention and solemnly abjured the Christian faith. Their action was emulated by many of the sections of Paris.² As to what the new religion should be, the Commune and the Committee of Public Safety differed, but until Robespierre's brief supremacy, the Commune was able to carry out its plans. As usual with this party of brutality, they were coarse and irrational. On November 10, 1793, the Convention established the Worship of Reason. Decked out in red liberty caps, the deputies went in a body to the cathedral at Notre Dame,³ and

¹ The names of these months were (beginning September 22d) *Vendémiaire* (vintage-month), *Brumaire* (fog-month), *Frimaire* (frost-month), *Nivose* (snow-month), *Pluviose* (rain-month), *Ventose* (wind-month), *Germinal* (bloom-month), *Floréal* (flower-month), *Prairial* (meadow-month). The five extra days were called *sans culottides*, and were holidays.

² Gobel himself may possibly, as Thiers asserts, have renounced only his ordination vows, but this qualification is not to be extended to his followers.

³ Desecration of the churches by the Jacobins was common. At Lyons, during a festival given in honor of Chalier, a donkey was adorned with a mitre, made to drink out of a consecrated cup with a crucifix and Bible tied to his tail. Marat's heart was

consecrated it to the Goddess of Reason, whose representative, a beautiful actress, sat on the altar, while women of the town danced in the *Carmagnole* in the nave. Then the "service" in the noble church degenerated into a shameless orgy.

This atheistic debauch was approved neither by the people at large, nor by the Convention as a whole, nor even by all the Jacobin minority. It was one result of the influence of the Commune of Paris, under the lead of Hébert. As Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety gained influence, the cult of Reason was suppressed, and France recalled to the better but no less revolutionary and anti-Christian worship of the Supreme Being. Even while "Reason" was being worshipped and most churches were closed¹ throughout France, in a few left open thousands of faithful women still worshipped as catholic Christians.

All of this legislation must be traced to a hatred of the Old Régime, and much of it to a desperate attempt to maintain order. There were other laws of a far different sort established by the Committee of Public Safety the value of which one need not be an apologist of the Terror to appreciate. It is true, some of the proposals of Robespierre and Saint-Just were absurd, even for admirers of Rousseau and classical antiquity. A society in which there should be no servants, and no gold or silver vessels;

placed on a table in the Cordelier Club as an object of reverence. See Aulard, *Le Culte de la Raison et le Culte de l'Être Suprême*.

¹ The Jacobin opposition to the churches may be seen from a request of the Society (December 25, 1793) that the Convention decree that in every town of four thousand inhabitants there should be built a hall where edifying spectacles could be given to help the people "forget the tricks of the priests." Schmidt, *Tableaux*, etc., II, 135, 136.

in which boys from five to twelve and girls from five to eleven should be brought up in common at the expense of the Republic, and in which no child under sixteen years of age should eat meat; in which divorce should be free to all; in which friendship should be a public institution, every citizen being bound on attaining his majority to publish the names of his friends, or having none, to be banished; and in which the friends of a criminal should be banished—such a society even the Terror itself could hardly hope to establish.

But if these men of blood were visionary, they must also be credited with having conceived many of those great social reforms that give value to modern life. While England and America imprisoned men for debt, the Convention abolished the practice; first of all sovereign powers it abolished negro slavery; in advance of even modern states, it protected the wife's claim upon property held in common with the husband; it first of all European governments outlined a system of public education, in which were included common schools,¹ manual training schools, technical schools, universities, a conservatory of arts, museums, and a polytechnic institute; pensions were given the needy; and, finally, that *Code* which Napoleon regarded as his greatest contribution to posterity, and which has been such an agent in guaranteeing political freedom upon the Continent of Europe, was itself begun and to a considerable degree completed by the Terrorists.

It is easy to say with Burke that during the Terror

¹ Children were to be taught to read by using the Declaration of Rights and the Constitution of 1793. Indeed the entire educational system was centred about patriotism. Boys were to be trained as soldiers, but, during harvest time, were to work in the fields. See Duruy, *L'Instruction publique et la Révolution*, esp. 164-172.

Frenchmen were of two classes, executioners and victims, but in the light of these facts the statement is quite untrue. The Terror was simply the frightful basis of a government looking toward an ideal state. No government ever worked harder for the good of the masses, and almost without exception the members of the great Committee were neither speculators nor bribe-takers. Robespierre and his few friends were poor and absolutely incorruptible. Nor was the Reign of Terror without its brighter side. The prisons were full of "suspects," but sad as was their fate, a merely cursory reading of the newspapers of the time, or of the reports of the secret police upon the state of Paris, shows that after the fear of foreign invasion had passed, life went on in Paris and in most of France much as before. Theatres were crowded, new books were published and reviewed, salons were held, cafés flourished, the market-women were told the Republic had no need of Joans of Arc and were suppressed. Indeed, for any one except a possible "suspect" life was probably no worse under the absolutism of the Committee of Public Safety than under that of Louis XVI. One might almost say that the masses of France were actually terrorized into happiness.¹ Criminals dared not show themselves. Men no longer feared the *lettre de cachet*; all were equal before the law; provisions were no longer in the hands of monopolies; military promotion was open to the peasant and artisan; lands could be bought by the poorest; education was free to all.

Had the Committee of Public Safety come under the

¹ James Monroe was perhaps indiscreet in his admiration of the Revolution, but his observations were made on the ground. Among other things, he says, "I never saw in the countenances of men more apparent content with the lot they enjoy." See Hazen, *American Opinion*, etc., 124-126.

influence of a really great man, France, during 1794, would almost certainly have gradually returned to a normal condition. But here again there was difficulty, for except Carnot and Danton the Republic had not produced a man of striking ability, and of these two Danton was to fall a victim to his own inertia and the brief supremacy of Robespierre, while Carnot was to lay the foundations for the military empire of Napoleon.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE REIGN OF TERROR AS A POLITICAL EXPERIMENT¹

- I. The Immediate Effects of the *Coup d'État* of June 2, 1793.
- II. The Circumstances giving Rise to the Reign of Terror:
 1. The Crisis in France; 2. The Supposed Failure of Ordinary Bases of Constitutional Government; 3. The Terror not Anarchic.
- III. The Terror: 1. Instituted by the Organization of the Committee of Public Safety; 2. The Government Declared Revolutionary.
- IV. The Instruments of the Terror:
 1. The Committee of Public Safety; 2. The Committee of General Security; 3. The Revolutionary Tribunal, the *Sans-Culotte* Army, the Local Tribunals; 4. The "Deputies on Mission"; 5. The Terrorists' Principle definitely stated.

The immediate results of the *coup d'état* of June 2, 1793, were, on the one hand, the supremacy of the Mountain and of the Commune, but on the other, the increase of the dangers by which France was beset. Several of the Girondin leaders, including Barbaroux and Buzot, left Paris, and endeavoured to head a revolt of the departments against the Convention. The nation as a whole was by no means ready to submit to the irresponsible rule of Paris, and citizens in two-thirds of the departments as well as four of the largest cities of France, Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Caen, rose in rebellion. In each of these towns the Jacobin influence had been supreme, but in each the *bourgeoisie* without difficulty regained possession of the municipal government and prepared to

¹ In general, see Stephens, *French Revolution*, II, chs. 9, 10; Taine, *French Revolution*, bk. vii, chs. 1-3; Madelin, *French Revolution*, chs. 29, 30; Mignet, *French Revolution*, ch. 8; Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, III, 84-118. See also Pariset, *La Révolution*, 165-234 (Lavise, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, II); Aulard, *Histoire politique de la Révolution française*.

resist the Convention. Could they have combined under some competent leader, these cities might have put an end to the Commune's influence; but here again the inefficiency of the Girondins showed itself. An attempt to establish a national Assembly at Caen proved abortive. The revolting departments were too scattered to unite effectively. Furthermore the Communes did not join in the revolt. It was strictly a movement of leaders in a department rather than of a department with its entire organization. The Girondins committed a serious blunder in putting royalist sympathizers in responsible positions in their army. Their presence argued counter-revolutions and the republican departments were unalterably opposed to even the suspicion of any such policy. They would not co-operate with La Vendée which was in arms against the Republic. The opposition of the departments against Paris was thus too weak for combined effort. The Convention was able to deal with each city independently, while the Girondins themselves were declared outlaws.¹ This half-hearted effort at civil war therefore failed, but none the less for the time being it constituted a real danger to the Convention, and gave apparent justification for extreme measures. The permanence of the Republic seemed to depend upon the masses rather than upon the *bourgeoisie*. So far had political indifference done its work.

The danger from foreign war was vastly greater and

¹ Such of them as had not left Paris were subsequently guillotined, and those who had gone to raise the departments, after months of adventures and hiding, perished miserably almost to a man. Pétion, the former mayor of Paris, and Buzot, the Platonic lover of Madame Roland, committed suicide. Guadet, Salle, Barbaroux, and others were guillotined. Louvet returned to Paris to visit his mistress and later escaped.

of immeasurable influence upon the course of the Revolution. Had there been no war, the dissensions between the Girondins and the Mountain for the control of the Convention would in all probability have arisen, but the Terror would hardly have been endured. The awful mistake of the Girondin war policy is therefore patent. The war brought the Terror.

When the Mountain, with the aid of the Paris Commune, had triumphed over the champions of Greek and Roman sentimentality, and was able to act as well as debate, it saw Holland, Portugal, the Two Sicilies, the Roman States, Sardinia and Piedmont, Spain, Austria, Prussia, England, united against France; French ports blockaded by the most powerful navy in the world; the departments rising to avenge the Girondins; the French armies everywhere defeated; Dumouriez, the greatest commander in the French armies, gone over to the enemy; a third of the territory of France, including La Vendée and several great cities, in open insurrection; the *assignats* rapidly depreciating; and throughout the nation misery, poverty, and approaching anarchy. No government was ever beset with greater or more desperate needs, and no government ever proceeded more relentlessly to bring success to its armies, order to its domestic affairs, food to its poor, annihilation to rebellion. But on what could government be based? Not on the past, for the Old Régime and the Constitutionalists of 1789-91 were the Mountain's bitterest opponents; not on the armies, for generals might at any moment imitate Dumouriez or La Fayette; not on the ready assent of law-abiding citizens, for the *bourgeoisie* were enemies of the Jacobins. The question was as legitimate as pressing, and the Mountain's answer, like that of all revolutionary oligarchies, was *upon Terror*. If men would not obey government

from love, they must be made to obey from fear.¹ The action was only a rigorous application of the dominant political philosophy of Rousseau: the sovereign people must be obeyed. "It is by violence that liberty must be established; and it is indispensable that a momentary despotism of liberty should be established to crush the despotism of kings." "What constitutes a republic is the destruction of everything which is opposed to it." Such was the philosophy of Marat and Saint-Just—a philosophy that invariably characterizes revolutionary psychology.

It is therefore a fundamental mistake to think of the Terror as a carnival of brute passion or the outcome of anarchic forces become ascendant. This was true of certain days, like October 5 and 6, 1789, and especially of the work of the Commune during the interregnum of August 10–September 20, 1792, and of the work of certain agents of the Convention, but utterly false in the case of the government by committees between June, 1793, and July, 1794. The Terrorists were seeking to found an ideal state. They aimed at order, not anarchy. While it lasted the Terror was a genuine experiment in politics—crude, hideous, and never to be confounded with the work of the generous idealists of the Constituent Assembly; but in a politically ignorant, ununified and morally weak nation like France, possessing not a single man of first-rate ability among its legislators, probably in-

¹ See Danton's speech of September 5, 1793, Stephens, *Orators of the French Revolution*, II, 262; Barère's speech of September 5, 1783, *Moniteur*, Year I, No. 251; Robespierre's speech of 17th Pluviôse; Buchez et Roux, *Hist. Parl.*, XXXI. 288-290; *Moniteur*, Year II, No. 251; the law of 22d Prairial, *Moniteur*, Year II, No. 264. For the application of the principles to national problems see Wallon, *La Terreur*, II, 341-352; Mortimer-Ternaux, *La Terreur* VIII, liv. 46-48.

evitable. It was all but foreseen by Mirabeau when he failed to induce the court to regard the work of the Constituent Assembly seriously and to accept its results sincerely. But more than all, it was implicit in the absolutism and the morals of the Old Régime. The methods, the instruments, the intolerance, the disregard of personal rights which marked the Terror had all been learned under the Bourbons. The triumph of the masses over the king and privileged classes brought not liberty but a new autocracy. So has it been in Russia where the absolutism of the proletariat followed the precedents of the absolutism of the Czar. So has it been in all revolutions where a social class has gained control of the state. Tyranny is succeeded by tyranny.

The legal basis, so to speak, of the new government was found in the declaration of martial or revolutionary law for the entire nation. The Convention had been summoned to draw up a new Constitution, and had fulfilled its purpose when, on June 24, 1793, the report of its committee was adopted.¹ The new Constitution was

¹ This Constitution was the second proposed to the Convention, the other being that of the Girondins, and drawn up by Condorcet. According to this proposed Constitution the executive was to consist of seven ministers and a secretary elected by the primary assemblies, each of 450 to 900 members. These ministers were simply to carry out the decrees of the legislative body, an Assembly of one chamber. The initiative in legislation was not to be confined to the Assembly, but any citizen could propose a new law, the repeal of an old law, or a vote of censure of any act of administration, and this had to be considered by the Assembly if favoured by the primary assemblies of his department. The principle of election was carried to an extreme, and the Constitution as a whole is a most striking illustration of the impracticable spirit of the Girondins. The entire scheme was elaborated with the intention of making party spirit and the election of popular leaders impossible. See Stephens, *French Revolution*, II, 530-553; Biré, *La Légende des Girondins*, ch. 7; Guadet, *Les Girondins*, 228-242. For a discussion of the compari-

adopted by a *plébiscite* of 1,801,918 votes to 11,000. Its adoption quieted the rebellious departments for it was radically republican. In fact it was a sort of compact between the departments and the Convention in that it was expected to decentralize the state and thus remove the well grounded fear of the supremacy of Paris and the Commune.

In general it might be described as a codification of Jacobin Rousseauism. The people were declared to be the seat of all power, and the government was to consist of a Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council of twenty-four ministers, chosen by the Assembly. The most remarkable feature of this instrument was the *referendum* provision, according to which laws were to be referred to the people for approval in their primary assemblies. In some respects, notably in its municipal administration, it resembled the Constitution of 1791, but was much simpler. But as some one said, "It was too Spartan in its nature to suit France." The weakening of the executive, as well as the difficulty of putting any new Constitution into effect during the crisis resulting from the war, led the Mountain, October 10, 1793, to suspend this impossibly idealistic Constitution until a general peace. The document itself was placed in a sort of shrine in the midst of the Convention Hall. It never was heard from again. It had, however, served its purpose in healing the breach between the "federalist" departments and the Convention, and there was no new outbreak of civil war when France had passed into the hands of the Convention.

Singularly enough, the practical result of this change was

son of the two Constitutions see Aulard, *Histoire Generale*, VIII, 179 sq. In Aulard's opinion the Mountain's Constitution showed less confidence in the intelligence of the people than did that of the Girondins.

to place France in something the same constitutional condition as England under the government of the House of Commons, the actual executive being not the ministers, who became hardly more than clerks, but the great Committee of Public Safety. That which Mirabeau had urged, that the ministers, as representatives of the executive, should share in the legislative body's deliberations, was now brought about in fact—though not in name—by the very elements by which it had formerly been opposed. The chief agencies of this terrible new government were the Committee of Public Safety, soon to be the supreme power in the Republic; the Committee of General Security with the Revolutionary Tribunal; the Revolutionary Army; the Deputies on Mission; local Revolutionary Committees in all the *communes*.

The Committee of Public Safety¹ was in large measure due to Danton's desire for a strong executive to free France from the foreigner. It was appointed April 6, 1793 and consisted of twelve men, among whom were Danton and two sympathizers. The other nine were from the Centre. It was appointed for only one month. Its temper was on the whole too moderate for Robespierre and the Commune. The Mountain and the Jacobin Club united in charging it with too little vigour in its prosecution of the Girondins and the *fédérés*. When on July 10 it was reappointed its members were reduced to nine and the three Dantonists were dropped. This body, with the three others subsequently added, constituted the "Great Committee" of Public Safety.

August 1, Danton procured for it from the Convention a credit of ten million dollars, to be spent as the Committee judged best, and the Convention intrusted to it the

¹ See Gros, *Le Comité de Salut public de la Convention Nationale*.

execution of a number of important laws providing for the confiscation of the property of all outlaws, the arrest of all foreigners not domiciled in France, the condemnation to twenty years' imprisonment of all those refusing to take the *assignats* at their face value, and the conduct of the war in *La Vendée*. A few days later the Committee was given full direction of the foreign war. Such powers demanded new members, and Carnot and Prieur-Duvernois were added to care for military affairs. On September 5, 1793, a number of decrees were issued, which, as Barère moved, made "terror the order of the day." These decrees established the Revolutionary *sans-culotte* army, divided the Revolutionary Tribunal into sections to facilitate its work, and ordered the revolutionary committees "purified." On September 6th two men who had been concerned with the September massacres of the year previous, Billaud-Varennés and Collot d'Herbois, were made members of the Committee of Public Safety to take charge of Terror, as Carnot had charge of military affairs. Danton, though elected to membership, and the champion of the Committee in the Convention, would not accept a position upon it. He had sworn not to become a member of any executive body, and as a matter of fact he was not well fitted for detailed administrative work. Perhaps, too, as Marat cuttingly said, he "preferred an upholstered chair to a throne!" The suspension of the Constitution in October left the committee the real governor of France.

As finally organized the Committee of Public Safety was composed of twelve men,¹ all well educated, three belong-

¹ Their names and ages in 1793 were as follows: Saint-André, 44; Barère, 38; Couthon, 38; Herault de Séchelles, 33; Prieur of the Marne, 33; Saint-Just, 26; Robert Lindet, 50; Robespierre 35; Carnot, 40; Prieur-Duvernois, 30; Collot d'Herbois, 43; Billaud-Varennés, 33. Stephens, *French Revolution*, II, 288-315, gives brief biographies of each.

ing to the nobility and the others to the engineers; one a Protestant pastor; one an actor and dramatist; one a law student. Two only were Parisians. None of them, if we may possibly except Carnot, was in any degree specially gifted or fitted for the great task which they undertook, but all were desperately in earnest and, in their own mad way, genuinely devoted to the Republic. Seven of them were poor speakers, and only three, Robespierre and his two followers, Saint-Just and Couthon, a small minority, were thorough followers of Rousseau.

The actual work of administration was divided among the members, Carnot caring for the army, André for the navy, Lindet for economic matters, Saint-Just for constitutional legislation, and Robespierre for "education" and "public spirit." But there was no hard and fast division of duties with the Committee. Each member might at one time or another undertake some task nominally in the field of another. All signed the Committee's decrees, which were reported through Barère to the Convention. Until the fall of the Dantonists in April, 1794, Robespierre cannot be said to have been in any sense a dictator. The final step in the Committee's control over France was taken December 4, 1793, when the Convention decreed that it should be in charge of all constituted authorities and public officers, and that it should nominate and receive the reports of all deputies on mission. Centralization could not have been more complete.¹ The enormous activities of the Republic were now in the hands of a small—but as it soon appeared—by no means unified group.

Subordinate to this Committee of Public Safety was the

¹ Even the ministries were abolished in April, 1794. A complete account of the doings of this committee is given in Aulard, *Recueil des Actes du Comité de Salut public*.

augurated as early as March 10th, and whose origin may be traced to Danton.¹ Its office was that of frightening the people of Paris and France into submission to the Committee of Public Safety by mercilessly arresting, trying and probably executing, any person suspected of disloyalty to the Republic. It was finally reorganized at the formal institution of the Terror, on September 5th, and a few weeks later was made to consist of sixteen judges, sixty jurors, a public accuser, and five substitutes.² As a sort of assistant to this tribunal there was established a revolutionary army of 5,000 infantry and 1,200 gunners, all *sans-culottes*, who travelled over France with a moveable guillotine.³ Local tribunals, also, were everywhere established, whose duty it was to search out suspected persons, and pronouncing them guilty, to send them to Paris for further examination and sentence.

¹ The great work on this tribunal is Wallon, *L'Histoire du Tribunal révolutionnaire*.

² The public accuser was Fouquier-Tinville, perhaps the most selfish, cold-blooded brute the Revolution produced. Herein he differed from such men as Marat, who were bloodthirsty from—paradoxical as it may seem—motives of patriotism and genuine love of the masses.

³ The guillotine was invented by a philanthropic Dr. Guillotin, who wished to substitute in capital punishment an instrument sure to produce instant death in the place of the bungling process of beheading with a sword. The guillotine is still used in France. It consists of two upright posts between which a heavy knife rises and falls. The criminal is stretched upon a board and then pushed between the posts. The knife falls and instantly beheads him.

Nor was this all. The Convention, not trusting to the energy of the local boards, took up itself the immediate control of the most important centres through its members delegated for that purpose, who reported to the Committee of Public Safety. Two of these "deputies on mission" were also in every army, watching over the general, seeing that he never faltered or showed the ~~least~~ signs of defection. At their word he might be arrested and sent on to Paris, there to be tried.

And throughout this simple governmental system ran the principle of the Terror: maintenance of the Republic through the daily legal execution of genuine or suspected enemies. In October, 1793, the guillotine in Paris began its systematized work and in that month 50 persons were executed, including the unfortunate Marie Antoinette¹ and twenty-one prominent Girondins. In November 58 were executed, including Philippe Égalité, formerly the Duke of Orleans, notwithstanding he had voted for the death of Louis XVI, and Madame Roland, whose traditional words on the scaffold were a veritable epitome of the republican régime, "O Liberty, how many crimes are committed in thy name!" In December, 69 were executed; in January, 1794, 71; in February, 73; in March, 127, in April, 257; in May, 353; in June and July, 1,376. This sudden increase in the number of executions was due to the efforts of Robespierre to establish his Utopia of Virtue.

¹ On the trial of Marie Antoinette, perhaps as brutal as any trial in history, see Wallon, *Tribunal révolutionnaire*, V, ch. 10.

CHAPTER XIX

THE DICTATORSHIP OF ROBESPIERRE¹

- I. The Struggle between the Commune and the Committee of Public Safety: 1. The Attack of Robespierre upon the Hébertists; 2. The Fall of the Hébertists. II. The Fall of the Dantonists: 1. Its Causes; 2. The Real Issue; 3. The Execution of the Dantonists. III. The Dictatorship of Robespierre: 1. His Relations to the Committee of Public Safety; 2. His Character; 3. His Ideal Republic; 4. Administrative Difficulties; 5. The Festival of the Supreme Being; 6. The Increase of the Terror. IV. The Fall of Robespierre: 1. Opposition to His Plans; 2. The Events of the 9th and 10th of Thermidor.

The events which had led to its establishment left the Republic in the control of two sets of leaders. On the one hand were the Convention and its committees, and on the other was the Commune of Paris, possessed of unlimited power over the proletariat of the capital, and dominated by brutal and anarchic men, at the head of whom was Hébert. For months after the establishment of the Republic these two governments co-operated alike for the administration of the state and the destruction of the Girondins; but by the autumn of 1793 Robespierre began to feel the difficulties of such a union, and, after the scandalous festival in honor of Reason, as a true follower of Rousseau and in the interest of his own ideal Republic,

¹ In general, see Thiérs, *French Revolution*, II, 414-458; III, 1-108; Madelin, *French Revolution*, chs. 32-34; *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, ch. 12; Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, IV, 3-68; Taine, *French Revolution*, III, 145-168; Mignet, *French Revolution* (Bohn ed.), 234-272; Aulard, *Histoire politique de la Révolution française*, 487-501. Belloc, *Robespierre*.

undertook to reduce the Commune to subjection to the Committee.

The struggle that ensued was not without its difficulties, and, so popular was Hébert, its dangers. It began with the ever-ready charge of conspiracy. Among the papers of the Committee of Public Safety is a sketch of a report written as early as November, 1793, in which Hébert is charged with a plot to send the leaders of the Convention to the guillotine, and then, with his friends, to take control of the state. The charge was not more improbable than many others which had sent men to the guillotine, but Hébert was at the time too strong in the Jacobin Club to be overcome. Robespierre's enmity was increased by the obscenity and lawlessness of Hébert's journal, the *Père Duchesne*, and by November his influence in the Committee was strong enough to warrant his beginning the conflict. On the 17th Robespierre denounced the Hébertists as engaged "in the basest of all crimes, counter-revolution under the mask of patriotism." He even succeeded in getting the alleged conspiracy referred to the Committee of General Security; but strange as it may seem to those who have been accustomed to think of him as always a dictator, he judged it unsafe to push the attack upon the city party farther. He therefore began to undermine Hébert's influence in the Club,¹ by censuring his atheism and sacrilegious conduct. It was good policy, for the great mass of Frenchmen were horror-stricken at the blasphemous proceedings of the festivals in honour of Reason. Robespierre still followed good policy when, with the aid of the Dantonists, he made use of the journals to fix all the atrocities of the Terror

¹ Morley in his essay on Robespierre (*Miscellanies*, II) says that, in order to hold his influence in the Jacobin Club Robespierre spoke every night for eighteen months.

and the inefficiency of the generals in La Vendée upon Hébert.¹ Yet it was not until all powers, including the Commune, had been subjected to the two Committees, and the Committee of Public Safety had, in January, 1794, won over the proletariat of Paris by a law condemning the property of suspects to be sold for the benefit of the poor, that Robespierre dared to attack his opponents openly.

The first struggle between the Terrorists led to the fall of the Commune. Carrier, the Commune's creature, was recalled from Nantes; another of Hébert's friends on mission was recalled for having spoken ill of Couthon; the revolutionary *sans-culotte* army, the chief support of the Commune, was dispersed throughout the country; and on March 4th one of the Hébertists was arrested. His friends immediately planned an insurrection, but that power which had been theirs as late as the *coup d'état* of June 2d had now disappeared before that of the great Committee. Anarchic patriotism at last had found its master. On March 13th, Hébert and a number of his friends were arrested, and eleven days later were guillotined, amid the exultation of the masses themselves. Thenceforth the Commune sank to its proper position as only a subordinate agent of government.

After this destruction of the party of brutality, there was left the single question, Did the successes of the Republic warrant a moderation of the Terror as a basis of orderly government? Danton, who as much as any one man had been the originator of the absolutism of the Committee of Public Safety, believed the time for severity had all but passed, and, as has appeared, with the aid

¹ Robespierre himself corrected proofs of the first two numbers of Desmoulins' new journal, *Le vieux Cordelier*, in which "moderation" and hostility to Hébert were eloquently urged.

of Robespierre and Camille Desmoulins, had taken the preliminary steps toward changing public opinion. His policy had aroused the hopes of the better class of citizens, and the execution of the Hébertists had been interpreted to mean a speedy undoing of the fearful revolutionary government. But these hopes were abortive. A new struggle between the Terrorists for the control of the Republic immediately followed.

Unknown to Danton, the Committee of Public Safety had determined not only to maintain the Terror, but to kill him. Even while the Hébertists were in prison, Saint-Just, Robespierre's chief ally, announced to the Convention the arrest of Héroult de Séchelles, Danton's one friend on the Committee. Why Danton did not defend him we cannot say; it may have been the belief that he could not be condemned; it may be that he was overconfident as to his own influence in the state; but quite as likely is it that he did not wish to oppose the Committee. Whether, indeed, he could have saved his friend is very doubtful. Shortly after his second marriage, when the affairs of France seemed thoroughly prosperous, he had been absent for weeks from the Assembly, passing the time at his country-house in Arcis. This interval had seen the steady rise of Robespierre's influence in the Committee of Public Safety, as well as the complete establishment of systematized Terror by Collot-d'Herbois and Billaud-Varennes. A reaction toward moderation was full of danger for these three men, and they determined to crush the party of Danton. That the matter was largely personal appears from the charges against Danton, as well as his contempt for the precise Robespierre¹ and his methods, however valuable he may have regarded them

¹ "Robespierre!" once Danton exclaimed, "— take him with my thumb and twirl him like a top."

for certain stages of the Revolution. Attempts were made by Tallien to bring about a reconciliation between the two men, but without success. At the meeting arranged between them Danton is reported to have said, "We ought to crush the royalists, but not confound the innocent with the guilty." "And who," said Robespierre, "told you a single innocent man had lost his life?" "What, not one?" said Danton, ironically. Whereupon Robespierre left the room. But even then the break was not open, and Robespierre drove and ate with Danton after he had signed the order for his arrest.

The issue was clearly drawn. On one side was a revolutionist who had favoured Terror as the last means for saving the state from foreign foes,¹ but now that it had wrought its work, wished gradually to reinstate constitutional government; on the other side were a revolutionist who, having an ideal commonwealth in view, saw in the execution of its possible enemies the only method by which it could be established, and two revolutionists without either statesmanship or ideals, who hated Danton personally, and who had a well-grounded fear for their own safety in case of a reaction. Since the second group was possessed of despotic power, it was inevitable that they should win unless Danton should organize revolt. As a good patriot he was unwilling to do this. Neither would he flee. "Does a man carry his country on the soles of his shoes?" he replied to his friends, who saw his danger and urged flight. And as he waited inactive, the agents of the Committee of General Security arrested him.

His trial and that of his friends, among whom was

¹ "I did not intend the Revolutionary Tribunal," Danton said, when in prison, "to be a scourge of humanity, but only to prevent the renewal of the massacres of September."

Camille Desmoulins, was a matter of form. The charges adduced by Saint-Just were furnished him by Robespierre, and were either ridiculous or untrue.¹ It is possible that Danton's passionate defence would have cleared him if the Tribunal had not closed the hearing and obtained from the Convention the power to pass immediate sentence. Then both he and his friends were summarily condemned (April 5, 1794). "Show my head to the people," said Danton on the scaffold to Samson, the executioner; "they do not see the like every day."²

The fall of the Hébertists and Dantonists left Robespierre, for the first time, in control of the Committee and the Convention. Even now, however, his influence was not undisputed, for Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois were jealous of his pre-eminence, and the other members of the Committee were indifferent to his ideals. Yet so complete was his mastery over the Jacobins and the cowardly Centre that for something more than three months he was virtually dictator of France.

The members of the Coalition, sore from defeat and mutually jealous of each other's ambitions in Poland, affected to believe that a new Cromwell had arisen who

¹ For instance, he was charged with having been connected with Mirabeau in the latter's connection with the court, with having suggested that Robespierre's one female friend should be married, with having misappropriated funds, and with conspiracy. Of the part of Robespierre in the plot against Danton, there is indisputable evidence in his own draft of the accusations brought by Saint-Just. This is reprinted in Stephens, *Orators of the French Revolution*, II, Appendix. Hamel, *Hist. de Robespierre*, II, 454-468, attempts to relieve him of all initiative, and even responsibility, in the matter.

² A full account of the trial is in Beesley, *Danton*, ch. 29, as well as in the writings of Bougeart. Most complete is Robinet, *Procès des Dantonistes*. See also Wallon, *Tribunal révolutionnaire*, IV, and Mortimer-Ternaux, *La Terreur*, IX.

would lend the Revolution. They, therefore, still further lessened their pressure upon France. Robespierre was to be given a free hand!¹

It has sometimes been said that Robespierre is one of the enigmas of history, but if one take his point of view, his character and career are simplicity itself. A mediocre man of narrow, pedantic honesty, a legalist in morals and a martinet in action, he was determined to found a well-ordered republic upon virtue; but with perverted vision he was a slave to consistency, a false judge of other men's motives, ready to kill any person who stood between him and the achievement of his Utopia. He would found a kingdom of heaven according to the method of the Tempter.

The process by which France was to be founded anew upon virtue, religion, and the philosophy of Rousseau was outlined in a series of the most remarkable speeches and decrees the Revolution produced. On the one hand "conspirators" were driven from points of danger by a decree compelling all ex-nobles to leave Paris and frontier towns within ten days; and on the other, the turbulent supporters of the defeated Commune, the *sans-culotte* army, were disbanded. The centralization of France was completed by removing all the ministers and distributing their duties among twelve commissions appointed by the Committee of Public Safety on the nomination of Robespierre. The irregular revolutionary committees throughout the nation were abolished, and their places supplied by a sort of police, in immediate communication with the committees of Paris. The capital itself was controlled by closing all clubs and societies except the Jacobins.² April 15th, "in order to strengthen the fabric of govern-

¹ Madelin, *French Revolution*, 401 sq.

² The Old Cordeliers did exist, but was of no significance.

ment, to rouse the servants of the state from their negligence and brutality and their indulgence to traitors and scoundrels,"¹ all revolutionary tribunals in the departments were dissolved, and justice, like government, was centralized in Paris.

With all powers thus within its control, the Committee of Public Safety proceeded to "create those civil institutions, which are the only secure foundation of the state." In a speech of April 20th, Billaud-Varennes declared that "the state must lay hold of every human being at his birth, and direct his education with a powerful hand"; and the Convention decreed that "it is necessary to refashion completely a people one wishes to make free—to destroy its prejudices, alter its habits, limit its necessities, eradicate its vices, and purify its desires. Strong forces, therefore, must be set in motion to develop the social virtues and to repress the passions of men." May 7th Robespierre delivered a speech to the Convention upon morality and religion as the foundation of a republic.² In it he showed himself again the follower of Rousseau. "In the eyes of the legislator," he declared, "all that is beneficial and good in practice is truth. The idea of the Supreme Being and of the immortality of the soul is a continual recall to justice; it is therefore social and republican." In response to his desire, the Convention decreed that the French people acknowledged the existence of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul; that the worship most worthy of the Supreme Being is the practice of the duties of man; that the *décadis*, or revolutionary Sundays, should be devoted to festivals in honour of different days and virtues beneficial

¹ Speech of Saint-Just on that date.

² The speech is printed in full in Stephens, *Orators of the French Revolution*, II, 390, seq.

to man; and that there should be held a great festival in honour of the Supreme Being on June 8th. The decrees were received by the Jacobins with enthusiasm, and the Committee of Public Safety ordered that the words "To Reason," which the Hébertists had caused to be printed on the churches, should be replaced by the words "To the Supreme Being." At the same time religious liberty was granted, at least in name, to all.

The first reaction to this new policy was favourable. The property owners looked forward to quieter economic conditions, and even the "Constitutional" clergy began to have hopes of a better future for the church.

While thus Robespierre was laying, as he believed, the foundation of his new commonwealth, French arms had continued to be successful. Hoche—a brilliant young general who but for his early death might have rivalled Bonaparte—drove the Germans from Weissenburg; La Vendée was crushed; the Austrians were beaten at Tourcoing; Jourdan with his army of revolutionists beat back the Prussians at Fleurus and entered Brussels; Pichegru captured Antwerp. With the exception of England, which, under Pitt, was passing through a period of reaction against all liberalism, there was no member of the discordant Coalition that would not have welcomed peace.¹

At home, however, the Committee found complications inevitably resulting from the laws of the *maximum* and the steady issue of *assignats*. Peasants would not sell their grain, shopkeepers retired from business, the country towns diverted the food supply of the capital. Yet it did what it could; the amount of meat one could purchase was limited by law, certain exceptions were made

¹ See Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, III, 439-478; Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, IV, liv. i, ch. 3, esp. 91-101.

in the application of the *maximum*, and a beginning was made of refunding the national debt bequeathed the Republic by the monarchy.¹ Nature assisted these efforts with an unusual harvest, while, despite the blockade American vessels exchanged grain for wine and articles of manufacture, and Switzerland, which maintained neutrality, supplied the country constantly with cattle and horses.

But as a disciple of Rousseau, Robespierre looked beyond mere administration. The Republic was to be terrorized into virtue and theism. "If there had been no God," one of his proclamations plagiarized from Voltaire, "we should have been obliged to invent Him." On June 8, 1794, the Festival of the Supreme Being was celebrated, Robespierre being the president of the day. The Convention marched in solemn procession to the Garden of the Tuileries, Robespierre at the head, dressed in his very best, and carrying, like all the deputies, flowers and stalks of grain. There an amphitheatre had been erected under the direction of David, the celebrated painter, and in it Robespierre set fire to three colossal figures, symbolizing Atheism, Discord, and Selfishness; and from their ashes rose the figure of Wisdom. Then, after a speech by Robespierre, the Convention marched to the Champs de Mars, where a great crowd solemnly swore allegiance to the Republic and homage to the Supreme Being.

How genuine all this sudden piety of the Parisians may have been each will determine for himself, but there can be no doubt as to the sincerity of Robespierre. Yet

¹ See Vuhler, *Histoire de la Dette publique*, I, ch. 13. In capitalizing the annuities at five per cent., the Convention was obviously reducing them, but it characteristically left those of aged people unchanged.

his sincerity did not give him wisdom. Had he been a really great man, he might have forestalled Bonaparte, but as it was he remained a slave to the spirit of the Terror, and could think of no agent of enforcing his plans except the guillotine. Had not Rousseau excluded atheists from pity? That he planned to maintain the Terror indefinitely, or even at all after his opponents had been removed, is improbable. We have it on good authority that after he had removed the factions he was forced to fight, he meant to return to a system of order and moderation.¹ But even with this concession, his method can only be condemned. On the 22d of Prairial (June 8th), the very day of the Festival of the Supreme Being, he caused Couthon to propose to the Convention one of the most terrible laws ever put into force among civilized peoples. The Revolutionary Tribunal was to be divided into four sections, one to sit every day; it was to punish with death all "enemies of the people," and the provisions of the law made this phrase include members of the Convention as well as almost every conceivable wrongdoer or suspect. The two committees, the Convention, the deputies on mission, and Fouquier-Tinville, the public accuser, could bring persons before the Tribunal. If the prosecution could adduce either material or moral proofs, no witnesses were to be examined; and no counsel was allowed the accused.²

It was with difficulty that this hideous and unnecessary law was passed. By it Robespierre was placed in control of the Tribunal, for Fouquier-Tinville reported to him every evening. Yet his position was not alto-

¹ Napoleon's quotation of the words of Cambacérés.

² The results of this law are to be seen in the fact that in the seven weeks it was in operation, 1,376 persons were guillotined in Paris.

gether assured. Still another internecine struggle for power within the ranks of the Terrorists was developing. In the Committee itself there was friction. Robespierre and his two friends were opposed by Billaud-Varennes, Collot-d'Herbois, and Carnot. Robespierre's constant insistence upon morality and religion became a subject of ridicule.¹ His vague suggestions as to the need of still further purification of the Convention aroused the fears of men like Tallien and Barras, who knew well that their careers as deputies on mission would not bear careful scrutiny from the point of view of either terrorism, honesty, or morality.² In the Committee he could count certainly on only two supporters, the fanatical young Saint-Just and the paralytic Couthon. In the Convention men were already turning against him, remarking his pride in the Festival of the Supreme Being. The people, too, although they dared not attack him, were evidently hating the new régime, in which patriotic virtues were to be chosen as a less evil than death; and among the proletariat, whom he sought to benefit, but who now, as well as the wealthy, were being drawn into the net set for suspects by the terrible law of Prairial, there was a suspicious lack of enthusiasm with occasional outbursts of pity. The prisons were filled with crowds of men and women of all classes from bishops to shop-girls, from ministers of state and generals of victorious armies to women of the *demi-monde*. Fear of Robespierre's power grew nation-wide. The Revolutionary

¹ "You begin to bore me with your Supreme Being," said Billaud-Varennes.

² Robespierre fell into a serious mistake when he refused to exempt members of the Convention from the law of the 22d Prairial, and at the same time refused to name the members he would attack. Every member of the Convention feared for himself.

leaders like Fouché, Barras, and Tallien saw that his success meant their destruction.

All this hostility had opportunity to develop, for toward the end of June Robespierre withdrew from the Committee and went into retirement, according to his apologists because of his despair at the growing influence of unscrupulous men like Barras, Tallien, and Billaud-Varennes, none of whom shared his ideals for a morally regenerate France.¹ Whatever truth there may be in this supposition—and improbable as it appears, it is not absolutely impossible—during his weeks of absence a conspiracy was formed against him and his two friends in the Committee, under the lead of Fouché, Barras, Tallien, and Billaud-Varennes. The Committee of Public Safety was thus divided, but the Jacobins and the newly reorganized Commune were wholly with Robespierre. No change in public policy seems to have been in prospect. The issue was simply as to which group of Terrorists should kill the other. Had Robespierre appealed to the mob upon his return to Paris, he might have saved himself; but this, despite the entreaties of his friends, he would not do. Thoroughly alive to his danger, however, on July 26th he attempted to make the Convention pass a decree against his enemies, but was met by an open attack. The Centre suddenly grew brave. "One man alone paralyzes the will of the Convention," cried Cambon, whom Robespierre had attacked in a long oration, "That man is Robespierre." Representatives demanded that he name the men whom he would attack. Had Robespierre named a few, the Convention might have again reverted to cowardice. As it was each member feared for

¹ Some writers think it was for the purpose of courting a young woman.

himself. Robespierre lost his self-control, and left the Convention. Even then he might have crushed his opponents by an appeal to insurrection, but this he still refused to make.

During the night the conspirators in the Committee grew desperate. They knew Saint-Just was drawing up an accusation against them. Every moment was precious. Self-preservation became "the order of the day" with this particular band of terrorists.

On the 9th Thermidor (July 27th) Robespierre again appeared in the Convention, and attempted to speak, but was silenced with shouts of "Down with the tyrant!"¹ His strength and voice failed him. "The blood of Danton chokes him!" shouted one of the conspirators. In desperation the Convention voted to arrest him, his brother, Saint-Just, Couthon, and Le Bas. "Liberty triumphs!" shouted Billaud-Varennes. "The Republic is dead," retorted Robespierre, "and rascals triumph!" And the one saying was as true as the other.

In the mean time Robespierre's supporters in the Commune had made ready the military forces of the capital for an insurrection in his defence. He and the other Terrorists were released from prison, and the troops of the Commune surrounded the Convention. It was then that as a last resort the Convention outlawed Robespierre, his friends, and the Commune.

The crisis came during the night of July 27th. The city troops filled the great square of the Town Hall, and had the sections but risen, Robespierre's power would have been supreme. But the National Guards would not join readily in the insurrection, and Robespierre himself refused to sanction a popular uprising. "Then," said

¹ In a speech on July 22d, Saint-Just had distinctly said that a dictatorship on the part of Robespierre was necessary.

Couthon, "nothing remains for us but to die." "You have said it," replied Robespierre. The crowd dispersed, and the troops of the Convention surrounded the city hall. Then, too late, Robespierre relented. The call to arms was given him for signature. He had written "Ro—" when one of the soldiers of the Convention burst into the room and shot him in the jaw.¹ Two of his friends leaped from the windows, one shot himself, Couthon tried to stab himself. All were arrested.²

In the building of the Archives of Paris there is a table taken during the Revolution from the Tuileries for use in the City Hall. Upon this table the wretched Robespierre lay for hours, exposed to every insult, but uttering no word, waiting his death. On the evening of the 10th Thermidor (July 28th) he and twenty-one of his friends were hurried without trial as outlaws to the guillotine. Tradition has preserved the words of an unknown old man, who, as Robespierre was stretched out upon the plank of the guillotine, shouted: "Yes, Robespierre; there is a Supreme Being."³

And with the fall of that shattered head all France breathed freer. The "Thermidorians," in their determination to save themselves from their colleagues in the Committee of Public Safety, had been forced to rely upon the moderate Centre. Probably quite unexpectedly

¹ The fac-simile of this document, with the drops of blood after the two letters, is given in the *Mémoires* of Barras. It should be added that there have been efforts made to prove that Robespierre shot himself in an attempt at suicide.

² The most satisfactory account of the 9th and 10th of Thermidor is in Wallon, *Tribunal révolutionnaire*, V, 199-255. See also Blanc, *La Révolution française*, XI, ch. 2; Héricault, *La Révolution de Thermidor*; Quinet, *La Révolution française*, bk. xix.

³ There is also an alleged epitaph for Robespierre:

*Passant, qui que tu sois, ne pleure pas mon sort:
Si je vivais, tu serais mort.*

they found themselves regarded as national deliverers! An internal struggle for primacy within the Committee was to end the Committee's dictatorship and policy. For if the dream of a republic founded upon morality and religion had passed, so also (as it proved) had passed the Terror.

CHAPTER XX

THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT¹

- I. The Reaction from the Terror: 1. Parties after Thermidor; 2. The Legislative Reaction. II. Problems before the Victors: 1. The Economic Crisis; 2. Peace with Foreign Nations. III. The Fall of the Mountain: 1. Anti-Jacobinism; 2. The Revolts of 1st Prairial. IV. The Crushing of Royalist Rebellion: 1. "The White Terror"; 2. The Quiberon Expedition. V. The Constitution of 1795: 1. Its Provisions; 2. The Two Decrees; 3. The 13th Vendémiaire. VI. The Return to Constitutional Government. 1. Last Struggles of the Jacobin Element; 2. The Inauguration of the Directory and Councils. VII. Tendency toward Militarism at the End of the Revolution.

After the fall of Robespierre and the re-emergence of the power of the Convention, the Revolution began to retrace its course, both as regards the spirit and the legislation of the Convention. Three parties came to be clearly distinguished—the still considerable group of the Mountain; the Thermidorians,² most of whom had been friends of Danton; and the great body of the Swamp or Centre,³ now daring to become Moderates. In the over-

¹ In general, see Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, IV. bk. xii; Madelin, *French Revolution*, chs. 35-38; *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, ch. 13; Carlyle, *French Revolution*, III, bk. vii; Taine, *French Revolution*, III, bk. ix; Mignet, *French Revolution*, chs. 10, 11. See also the novels of Gras, *The White Terror* and Erckmann-Chatrian, *Citizen Bonaparte*. Particularly valuable is Pariset, *La Révolution*, 235-293. (Lavissee, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, II.)

² This term is used to indicate those who like Barras and Tallien had been most active on the 9th and 10th of Thermidor.

³ The spirit of this body during the Terror had been despicably cowardly. "What did you do during those years?" Sieyès was once asked. "I lived," was the reply.

throw of Robespierre the Thermidorians and the Moderates had been aided by the enemies of the "dictator" on the Committee of Public Safety, and for a few weeks this anomalous partnership was maintained. Then the Centre gradually gained full control and reaction was in full swing. But none the less Terror was still the basis of government. One set of Terrorists had destroyed the other. Rôles were reversed. The Jacobins and Mountains were now the objects of suspicion and enmity. But it was no longer the Terror of the past. Legislation began to reverse its course. Wholesale execution of "suspects" ceased, and although trials and condemnations continued for several months, the terrible law of the 22d Prairial, denying counsel to prisoners brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal, was repealed, and the number of executions was small.¹

Above all the Thermidorians, with the support of the Centre, reconstructed the revolutionary government so that no dictator could again arise. Control of the Committee of Public Safety was made difficult by the provision that one-fourth of its members should be renewed every month, and at least one month should pass before a member was re-elected. This reversion to the decentralized government of the early years of the Revolution is further seen in the fact that most of the powers exercised by the Committee of Public Safety were distributed between sixteen independent and co-ordinate committees. The Committee itself was left in charge of the

¹ See the discussion in Aulard, *Histoire politique de la Révolution française*, 503 sq.; Pariset, *La Révolution*, 235-259.

From July 31st to September 16th, of 290 accused, only 14 were condemned; from September 17th to October 21st, of 312 accused, 24 were condemned; the next month only 5 out of 236, and at last, January 20 to February 18, 1795 (Pluiose, year III) of 30 accused, none was condemned.

test against the *coup d'état* of May 31–June 2, were reinstated. At last the wave of moderation reached the proscribed Girondins themselves, and such of them as still survived were readmitted into the Convention, there to join the leaders of the new movement toward constitutional government.¹

It was inevitable that such a reversal of a previously unquestioned policy should sometimes go to excess. On the one side the hitherto oppressed *bourgeois* and “aristocrats” suddenly began to play the master. The sections of Paris purified their assemblies of *sans-culottes*, and their young men—the *jeunesse dorée*, or *Muscadins*,—armed themselves with clubs, organized in bands, and patrolled the city, attacking the Jacobins.² Revolutionary songs were tabooed. Styles of clothing changed, and with a levity Robespierre could not efface, men and women dressed their hair as had those preparing for the guillotine,³ and to cap the climax, gave balls *à la victime*, to which no one was invited who had not lost a relative during the Terror.

It is not strange that the new attitude of the Convention should attract many persons of royalist sympathies, and that there should appear no small prospect that moderation might give way to a royalist reaction. Here was cause enough for a struggle between the Mountain and the Moderates. Excitement was widespread. The Convention itself endeavoured to forestall the suspicion

¹ On the Thermidorian legislation see Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, IV, 122-132.

² It is interesting to compare this movement with that of the *Fascisti* in Italy in 1921.

³ That is, the men cut theirs short or turned it up behind, and the women plaited theirs and fastened it with combs high on the top of their heads. It is interesting to observe how so many conventionalities of fashion, like these and long trousers, date from this period.

of royalist sympathies, but the Mountain not only chafed under the new necessity of acting in self-defence, but suspected its opponents of hostility to the Republic. Nor is its suspicion difficult to understand. So far as the Terror went, the Convention had been quite as guilty as the Mountain, and the Thermidorian party, also composed of Terrorists, was by no means incorruptible. Many of its members were already growing rich in ways that would hardly bear close scrutiny.¹ The royalist colour given the Thermidorian control, the Mountain rightly judged, did not express a genuinely national feeling. The people of France as a whole wanted nothing but a republic. Malet du Pan in November, 1794, expressed the matter clearly, "The mass of people has begun to forget it ever had a king." In La Vendée itself it began to be apparent that if the priests were allowed to minister to the peasants, the causes of the revolt would utterly disappear.

Nor were these the Mountain's only grounds of complaint. The undoing of the centralized government of the Committee of Public Safety had brought France into the most serious economic embarrassment. The enforcement of the *maximum* had been abandoned, with the immediate result of encouraging stock jobbing and every sort of speculation. The *assignats* were depreciating with frightful rapidity, and the price of food rose enormously.² With a million men withdrawn from agricul-

¹ Gouverneur Morris seems to have suspected the Terrorists of the same wrongdoing as early as August, 1793. See Morris, *Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris*, II, 51. Barras had got control of ecclesiastical property worth two or three million francs. Fouché died worth 15,000,000 francs.

² In July, 1795, a pound of meat was worth 36 francs. Bread was selling in January, 1796, at 50 francs a pound and meat at 60. A cup of coffee cost 10 francs. In January 1795 a gold

ture, famine was actually at the door of nearly every town in the nation. From all over France there went up the cry of hunger. The crops in many of the departments failed. Around Dieppe the entire population of villages ate herbs and bran. In Picardy men and women scoured the woods for mushrooms and berries. In the towns the misery was more intense. The poor were given a daily allowance of grain, but this was sometimes as small as three ounces of wheat for each person every eight days. Even in cities like Amiens or Troyes the poor were allowed only a half-pound of flour each day. And this misery, so appalling to men who, though demagogues, had championed the masses, existed notwithstanding the unparalleled agrarian revolution which had enabled the peasants, workmen, and small shopkeepers to buy up the lands of church and nobles confiscated by the state. The political changes of the Revolution were paralleled by a vast transfer of wealth. Speculation grew mad. Fortunes were made by sheer profiteering. A plutocracy was replacing the exiled aristocracy. Social excesses followed. In Paris alone 644 dance halls were opened; new dances were invented. Gambling became universal. It would have been strange indeed if the Mountain had not seen in such an orgy of pleasure in the midst of a starving people an argument against the moderate régime.

But probably the most fundamental difference between the various parties of the Convention, now that the Terror was decadent, concerned the establishment of peace

louis (normally 20 francs) was worth 130 francs in assignats; in June it was worth 1200. But as compared with the depreciation of German and Austrian money in 1920, this seems small indeed.

with Europe, of giving France a constitution, and thus of closing the Revolution.

The campaign of 1794 had been wonderfully successful for the Republic. It was not only that the raw levies had become veterans and that the unrestricted opportunity for promotion had brought to the front able generals; the leaders of the allied forces had displayed amazing stupidity, and the huge Coalition was giving unmistakable signs of approaching dissolution. In January, 1795, Holland was conquered,¹ and a few weeks later erected into the Batavian Republic, which (May 16th) formed an alliance with France. This success of the French, as well as its own financial straits, its jealousy of Austria, and its interest in the partition of Poland, always a hindrance to war with France, led Prussia to enter upon negotiations for peace (January 22, 1795).

On April 14th the Peace of Basle was definitely ratified by the Convention.² By it the Republic was assured the possession of the Prussian territory on the left of the Rhine until a general peace, and northern Germany was made neutral. By secret clauses France was ceded all its conquests on the left bank of the Rhine upon condition of compensating Prussia; for which act means were to be gained by secularizing the church property within the conquered territory. The doctrine of the "natural boundaries" of France was thus to some extent recognized and grew in favour. In July, Spain also made peace,

¹ It was in this campaign that (January 20th) a force of French cavalry captured a Dutch fleet which had been frozen fast in the ice.

² On the diplomatic process, see Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, IV, bk. i, ch. 5, and bk. ii; Von Sybel, *French Revolution*, bk. xi. On the war in general see *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, chs. 14, 15;

ceding France Spanish San Domingo in return for all places taken by the French.

Advantageous to the Republic as was the Peace of Basle, the months devoted to the necessary negotiations had shown the deep-seated hostility of the Mountain to any measure looking toward the increased power of the Moderates. Both the Thermidorians and the Mountain knew that party supremacy was possible only as long as war continued, and it was inevitable that there should again arise a struggle between the Mountain and the Moderates for the mastery of the Republic. But now the issue was to be reversed. Moderation, not Terror, was to be the order of the day. None the less, Jacobinism died hard. The Mountain had been deprived of Robespierre; it had been forced to see Dantonists and Girondins return to the Convention; it had been unable to punish the belligerent Muscadins, even when they threw the body of Marat into the sewer; it had seen its clubs suppressed, and one of its most outspoken members in the Convention imprisoned for several days for abusive speech; it had been unable to prevent the treaties of peace. The readmission of the Girondins was an explicit condemnation of all its actions since June 2, 1793, and none of its members could hope to escape punishment. As first fruits of this future, Collot-d'Herbois, Billaud-Varenes, Barère, and Vadier were all arrested, brought to trial, and sentenced to transportation.

Unaccustomed to such defeats, the Mountain turned again to the masses of Paris, and organized insurrection. With utter disregard of its former suspension of constitutional government, its war-cry was "Bread and the Constitution of 1793!" Again crowds of frenzied women tried to intimidate the legislators, and on April 1, 1795 (12th Germinal, year III), a mob forced its way into

the Convention. For four hours it howled and threatened violence, until at last the wealthier sections of Paris armed themselves, and under the direction of General Pichegru, came to the relief of the Convention. Then the mob fled. As a result of this riot several members of the Mountain were arrested on the explicit charge of having been Terrorists, and a little later the occurrence or danger of riots in Amiens, Rouen, Marseilles, and Toulon led to the arrest of still others of its members.

The struggle at last resolved itself to this: Could the Convention draw up a constitution that should incorporate the new moderatism and the experience of the six years of revolution, or would the Jacobins be able to intimidate it into enforcing the radically democratic Constitution of 1793?

The issue was joined May 20, 1795 (1st Prairial). The Jacobins, after careful preparation, again summoned the people to insurrection, declared the end of the revolutionary epoch, the dismissal and arrest of the members of the existing government, the establishment of the Constitution of 1793, and summoned a new Assembly to meet within a month. A desperate mob again filled the Convention Hall. So unexpected was the uprising that the Convention was totally unprepared; but it dared oppose its foes even after they had killed the deputy Féraud. Boissy d'Anglas, the president of the day, respectfully saluted the bleeding head of his colleague, but though pikes were at his breast, refused to put the motions demanded by the mob. The Mountain thereupon passed them all, and France was apparently again in the hands of the Jacobins. But it was only for a few hours. Again the wealthier sections armed, and their troops with fixed bayonets cleared the hall of its murderous invaders.

Order was restored, the votes were annulled, and fourteen deputies who had aided the rioters were arrested. The next day an attempt was made to renew the disorder, but it proved unsuccessful. Six members of the Mountain who had been leaders of the uprising were arrested, brought before a military commission, and condemned to death. They all stabbed themselves with the same dagger, three fatally. The others were promptly guillotined. Then, in order to prevent a repetition of such disturbances, the Convention authorized General Menou to use troops in disarming the Faubourg Saint Antoine. Not content with this drastic measure, it put him in command of a permanent guard for itself.

While thus the Convention was crushing that aggressive minority which had been so long its master, it was forced also to repress royalist uprisings and conspiracies. The middle course between Jacobinism and royalist reaction was not easy to hold, and with the executive powers divided among sixteen committees strong government was difficult. Every day pointed to the army as the one certain means of maintaining order. How insufficient was ordinary municipal government in dealing with violence, appeared in the "White Terror," or anti-Jacobin violence, that swept over the Republic, and particularly southern France. The vengeance of the French middle class is always as hideous as the uprising of the proletariat, and in 1795 the royalists, the "aristocrats," and the *bourgeois* inflicted on the Jacobins the same horrors they had themselves suffered at the hands of the *sans-culottes*. Anti-Jacobin clubs were formed with the names of "Companies of Jehu," "Companies of the Sun," and the massacres of September, 1792, were repeated, with characters reversed. In Marseilles several hundred former Terrorists had been arrested and lodged in prison.

On June 5, 1795, many of them were massacred,¹ and then the prison was set on fire, many of the prisoners being burnt alive. Several of the murderers were arrested, but released without even so much as a trial. In Tarascon Jacobins were thrown from the top of a tower upon the rocks of the river-bank; in Lyons, Avignon, in fact in twenty departments, similar acts of vengeance were perpetrated.

Such disorders were interpreted by royalists and *émigrés* to indicate a desire on the part of France for a counter-revolution against the Republic. Not only did Bourbon cliques begin to reassert themselves, but in La Vendée the *émigrés* attempted civil war. The efforts of the Convention to pacify both Brittany and La Vendée had not been successful, and discontent was growing rapidly among the peasantry. A heroic Vendean, Charette, who had maintained a small royalist army, was promised aid by England and the brothers of Louis XVI. An expedition composed of about 6,000 men, including French prisoners of war and 1,500 *émigrés*, was fitted out in England, and landed on a sandy point in Quiberon Bay, prepared to advance upon France. Had the Bourbon princes promised the nation the reforms accomplished by the Constituent Assembly, it is not impossible that they might have found themselves at the head of a formidable uprising; but they had not learned the lessons later to be taught by the Napoleonic era, and they denounced the Constitutionals as disguised traitors, more worthy of the rack and gallows than the Jacobins. At the same time that they thus alienated the liberal party, their agents succeeded in antagonizing the leaders of La Vendée, while jealousy of the English and their share in the

¹ The total number of those butchered was about 200.

expedition, prevented any royalist movements in Brittany. The leaders of the expedition itself could not act in harmony, and blunders were made at every step. Under these conditions the Quiberon invasion could be nothing but a fiasco. The republican forces under General Hoche swept all before them, and shut up the entire invading army, as well as large numbers of Vendean peasants, in an indefensible fort erected on the sandy points. When this was taken by a night attack, the *émigrés*, with the the Vendean women and children, retreated to the extreme end of the point, and there attempted to embark in the English ships. But again their effort failed, and the wretched survivors were forced to surrender. The women and children were released, but a courtmartial found six hundred of the prisoners guilty of treason, and they were shot.

A short time later, the Count d'Artois made a second attempt at invasion, but was too much of a coward to face the republican troops, and finally returned to England, leaving Charette to his fate.¹

Thus relieved from royalist anarchy and royalist invasion, the Convention turned to the duty for which it had originally been summoned, the making of a constitution. Even while the *émigrés* were at Quiberon a committee, of which Boissy d'Anglas was chairman, reported the first draft of such a document, in which, after a review of the work of the Constituent Assembly and the Convention, it insisted that the legislature should consist of two chambers, and that the legislative and executive branches should be independent. These two principles were embodied in the Constitution of 1795. The legisla-

¹ He was captured and shot March 29, 1796. La Vendée was not finally pacified till August, 1796.

ture was to consist of two Councils, that of the Five Hundred and that of the Ancients, each to be elected by electors chosen by the people. An executive body, known as the Directory, was to be established, consisting of five members, one of whom should retire every year, to be chosen by the Ancients from a list submitted by the Council of the Five Hundred. The influence of the *bourgeoisie* was felt in the provision that all officials should be property-holders, and that, although the suffrage was declared a natural right, all persons should be excluded from voting who did not pay some kind of tax. Freedom of labour, commerce, religion, and the press was established; all political clubs were prohibited; the *émigrés* were forever outlawed, and the titles of confiscated lands were guaranteed to their new holders. The Directory was to have full control over military affairs and the various agents of the government. It had, however, no power of initiating measures, or of dissolving the Councils.¹ As the legislature had full control of pecuniary grants, it is obvious that a deadlock was always possible, and that it could be broken only by a *coup d'état* on the part of one or the other branches of the government.²

In many ways the new constitution was evidently a return to the ideas of the Constituent Assembly, and in so far favoured the royalist reaction.³ The Convention,

¹ When this was proposed, it was silenced by the cry, "That is the *veto*; that is monarchy!"

² It is worth noticing that this Constitution of 1795 was preceded by a Declaration of the Rights and *Duties* of the Man and the Citizen.

³ It should be remembered that the royalists were of two sorts, those favouring the Old Régime and those favouring the constitutional monarchy of the Constitution of 1791. The first group included the remains of the old privileged orders, while the second embraced many of the *bourgeois*. As has already been

however, was farthest possible from planning a re-establishment of the monarchy, and remembering its own history under the Terror, was determined that the government about to be established under the new constitution should abandon neither republicanism nor the Terrorist delegates to the mercy of those who had injuries to avenge. The Quiberon affair, and the boldness of the royalists of Paris made it necessary to provide for a continuance in power of those who had founded and saved the Republic. Nor should it be forgotten that the men in control of the state had voted for the death of Louis XVI. They needed to retain power in order to protect themselves from royalist revenge. So unpopular was the Convention¹ that if the country were granted absolutely free election, it was almost certain that reactionists would be elected to both the new Councils. With considerable sagacity, therefore, the Convention turned to the constitutional proviso for the renewal of but a third of each Council, and decreed that two-thirds of the new legislature should be chosen by the electors from its own membership, and that the Convention should fill any vacancies due to the election of the same man by different departments. To intimidate the now insolent *bourgeoisie*, it was also decreed that the Constitution should be laid before the armies for acceptance. At the same time, in order to insure order at the elections, another decree provided that large bodies of troops should be assembled near Paris.

These two decrees roused the wealthier sections of Paris to fury. If they were accepted by the people, for a year at least the Republic would be controlled by a legislature

said, the absolute royalists hated the constitutional royalists as cordially as they hated the Jacobin.

¹ Even their official sash became an object of derision when the deputies were on the street.

the majority of whose members had maintained the Terror. The approach of the troops added to the suspicion already aroused by the actions of the Convention, and section after section appeared before it to protest against the decrees. When their protests were unheeded, the *bourgeois* and reactionists determined to crush the Convention with the weapons of the mob. The issue became increasingly one to be determined only by military force. It was not merely a local crisis. All over France the agents of the Convention were insulted and abused,¹ and the republican General Pichegru began to enter into negotiations with the Prince of Condé.

Yet, when the Constitution and the decrees were submitted to the nation, despite all the efforts of Paris, they were accepted by large majorities.² The announcement of this fact caused even wilder agitation in Paris, and by October 4th forty-four of the forty-eight sections of the capital were in open revolt and organizing armed resistance. In a short time an army of nearly 30,000 men of the National Guard, mostly *bourgeois*, were ready to march upon the Convention. The government, in its turn, brought in the regiments it had concentrated near the city, and prepared for actual battle. Its general, Menou, however, proved to be in sympathy with the insurgents, and was removed. Had the National Guard advanced promptly, it might have crushed the Convention, but it preferred to spend the night of October 4th (12th Vendémiaire) in shouting and torchlight processions. The Con-

¹ At Chartres the market women forced the Convention's representative to lower the price of bread and then led him around the town on an ass, they the while shouting, "*Vive le roi.*"

² Again but a small part of the citizens voted. The Constitution was accepted, 914,000 votes to 44,000, and the decrees, 167,000 to 96,000.

vention meanwhile remained in permanent session, and among other steps for its defence appointed Barras commander-in-chief of its forces. Barras himself, to judge from his *Mémoires*, was one of the greatest braggarts and liars of his day, but now, as at Thermidor, he was able to bring the necessary thing to pass. He had under him a force of perhaps 5,000 men, but no second in command. Immediately he turned to Jacobin sympathizers. Among them was one of his friends, then a clerk in the Topographical office, Napoleon Bonaparte, a young Corsican of twenty-five, a former friend of Robespierre, who had distinguished himself in the siege of Toulon, but who had been discharged from the army on account of his refusal to accept a transference from the artillery to the infantry. Bonaparte's professional sensitiveness had brought him to narrow circumstances, and had it not been for his brother Joseph's marriage with an heiress he would have been obliged to sell his books. Until his appointment to the Topographical office he seems to have lived a poor sort of life, and despite his numerous plans, to have grown half desperate from discouragements, but even more from the fatalism that marked his life. On August 12, 1795, he wrote his brother Joseph: "I can meet fate and destiny with courage, and unless I change I shall very soon not move out of the way when a carriage passes." Certainly he would have been counted a wild prophet who should have prophesied great things for this penniless clerk and discharged Jacobin general, dependent upon a sister-in-law's bounty!

Yet destiny, as Bonaparte believed, was before and with him. He was well known to Barras, who had discovered in his face a likeness to Marat, to whom he had been warmly attached, and remembering Toulon, and in despair of finding a man equally trustworthy and ener-

getic, he intrusted to him the protection of the Convention. Bonaparte took half an hour for calculation, and with the true adventurer's instinct accepted the command (Vendémiaire 13). Not relying merely upon infantry, but true to his devotion to artillery, he ordered Murat, then a faithful Jacobin but destined to be a king, to gather all the cannon that were at hand in Paris and plant them about the building in which the Convention was assembled. In the morning the National Guard somewhat tardily, because of a rain, began to gather for its attack. It found itself confronted by Bonaparte's troops. For hours the two forces stood facing each other not fifty feet apart, neither willing to begin the struggle. At last, at half-past four in the afternoon, the leader of the insurrectionists gave the signal for attack. Instantly Bonaparte ordered his guns loaded with grape-shot, to be fired upon the crowd. Their execution was deadly; the members of the National Guard, crowded into the streets and quays, were cut down in great numbers. No man could stand that "whiff of grape-shot," and although they were brave, and were led by brave men, the insurrectionists after one last stand on the steps of St. Roch, broke ranks and fled to their homes. *The army had saved the government.*

For a moment there was the danger of a new reign of Jacobinism. The struggle of Vendémiaire had again brought together the Thermidorians and the survivors of the Mountain, all of whom feared the presence of new deputies, sure to be elected from their enemies. When the elections under the new Constitution began, a week after the revolt, their fears were justified. The polls were largely attended, and not only were those members of the Convention elected who were least implicated in the Terror, but all of the new deputies were moderate, and even royalist in sympathy. The Thermidorians and the

Mountain declared that such a legislature would mean nothing less than an undoing of the Republic. They determined to suspend the Constitution, prevent the meeting of the Councils, and maintain the Convention, together with a commission of five of their number as a sort of executive. But the tide of Jacobinism had ebbed. The Convention was not to be coerced, and the bare exposure of the scheme by Thibaudeau was enough to defeat it utterly. On October 26th the Convention peacefully dissolved, after having declared a general amnesty for all political offences committed since 1791, the rebels of the 13th Vendémiaire alone being excepted. In truth it was tired of its own career. "Four years spent under the assassin's blade have worn out our faculties, physical and mental," wrote one of the Mountain. Yet this extraordinary, paradoxical body had not been merely destructive. It had executed the king, but it had also declared the Republic and produced two Constitutions, separated church and state, and extended the boundaries of France. It had relied upon terror, but it had founded schools and colleges, the Conservatoire des Arts et Metiers and the Institute of France. It had not fully administered the new conditions set by August 4, 1789, but it instituted new international policies and established a new economic basis for France. No political body was ever more brutal and tyrannical but few governments have ever built more solid foundations for national development. Napoleon was to extend what it began.

On October 27 the new Councils assembled. Their first duty was to elect the 105 members who were still needed to complete the Council of the Five Hundred. In general, those chosen were unimportant persons, committed neither to the Moderates nor to the Mountain. Next, the Council of the Ancients, all of whom were required to be

forty years of age and married, was also chosen by lot from the mass of delegates. Then came that most vital matter, the choice of the Directors. All the delegates knew that each new election would be certain to return an increasing number of anti-Terrorists. Accordingly, to insure a continuity of government, and above all, to provide against a counter-revolution in case the Councils should become royalist—a condition that was actually to arise—the Council of the Five Hundred, by carefully selecting its list of candidates, brought about the election of five Directors, each of whom had voted for the death of Louis XVI.

Thus assured of at least a temporary continuance of the republican régime, France, after a revolutionary interregnum of three years, began again to live under a constitution. It was not yet free from danger. Within were a people oppressed by hunger, poverty, and disorder; a religious freedom that was hardly more than a name; a national debt already of appalling size; a hopelessly depreciated currency, and a commerce all but destroyed; a growing reaction toward constitutional monarchy, and in La Vendée the remains of actual civil war. Without were a war against England and Austria, and a swarm of *émigrés* plotting invasion and vengeance. But with these dangers there were also resources. The struggle for the maintenance of rights gained in 1789 had not been in vain. The peasants were beginning to develop their newly acquired lands; the peace with Prussia and Spain, as well as the alliance with Holland, promised to revive commerce; the armies on the frontiers were the pledge of new victories.

With the armies, indeed, lay the fate of the Directory. As absolutism had given way to constitutional monarchy, and constitutional monarchy had been followed by a Re-

public at once revolutionary and warring, so the Republic by its victories was to test the stability of the new government. If, as the Convention had declared, war was to continue until Europe recognized the Rhine as the boundary of the Republic, constitutional government could not hope for the peace which internal development so sadly needed. The Directory like the Convention must needs win victories if it were to avoid destruction.

PART V.

THE EMPIRE

CHAPTER XXI

THE DIRECTORY AND NAPOLEON BONAPARTE¹

1. The Army the sole efficient Element of the State: 1. The Loss of revolutionary Morale; 2. The Accomplishments of the revolutionary Armies. II. The Italian Campaign of Bonaparte. III. Growing Incompetence of the Directory. IV. Bonaparte's Campaign in Egypt. V. *Coup d'Etat* of Brumaire 18, 1799: 1. The Disorganization of France. 2. Return of Bonaparte and Fall of the Directory.

The return to constitutional government worked no political miracles in France. The dominant personalities had all held office under the Convention. No new element had entered politics in France. The Terror was past, the nation was still without experience in self-government, and in the hands of the survivors of its former masters. But the state had acquired momentum. The war had given it unity and permanence. The great mass of Frenchmen, however, had been more interested in getting privileges than in giving justice, and liberty had been too frequently a synonym of class control. The Revolutionary spirit was being replaced by the desire for the unrestrained enjoyment of acquired privileges, equality in taxation and before the law, freedom from feudal exactions, internal order and national safety. Political liberty, the dream of

¹ In general see *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, chs. 14-22; Bourne, *The Revolutionary Period in Europe*, chs. 13-16; Rose, *Life of Napoleon*, I, chs. 1-9; Fournier, *Napoleon the First*, chs. 1-6; Thiers, *French Revolution*, IV, 1-430; Lanfrey, *The History of Napoleon*, I, chs. 3-12.

the early Revolution, no longer was a cause for which men would die. From 1791 to 1815 the offices of France were mostly filled from the same group of men.

The new government found itself threatened by the same dangers that had occasioned the Terror. On the one side there was the ever-present threat of mob control, and on the other were the forces making to the restoration of royalty. The latter danger was the more critical since royalist sympathizers were still numerous in certain portions of France, and England and other European powers were not only filled with *émigrés*, but they were conducting a war for the re-establishment of the Bourbons.

November 3, 1795, the Councils elected five Directors in accordance with the new constitution. They were all former Revolutionists, chosen from a list of fifty: Barras, Carnot, La Revellière, La Tourneur and Rewbell. Of these, only Carnot and La Tourneur can be regarded as sincere patriots. The others were venial, incapable and in constant fear of royalist revenge.

The Directory carried on the general principles and policy of the Convention, but in a vacillating and often inconsistent fashion. Its various attempts at re-establishing national order were ineffective. Money the government had practically none. A forced loan on the rich was a failure. Had it not been for the enforced contributions paid by the conquered states, the nation would have been penniless. Peace was refused England except upon the return of all their colonies captured by England and the retention of all the conquests made by France. War remained, it might almost be said, the normal state of the Republic.

The demand upon the Directory for governmental efficiency once more raised the problem of finding a basis for authority. *Bourgeois* liberalism, revolutionary enthusiasm, terror, all alike had proved unequal to bearing the

weight of a state capable of guaranteeing the results of August 4, 1789. The Councils, like any new governmental body facing a problem of national morale, increasingly failed to find its answer. Partly as a cause and partly as a result of the decline of revolutionary enthusiasm and fear, economic forces were beginning to shape themselves and exercise a control destined to become too great even for an Emperor to withstand. The people of the rural districts had become possessed of farms cut out of estates confiscated from the nobles and the clergy. They wanted no counter-revolution to annul the titles to this land, but they were more concerned about their crops than political reforms. Leadership could not be expected from them. Nor was there much more promise in the *bourgeoisie* and other social classes. The policy of the Terror had removed most of the men of administrative experience, and, with two or three exceptions, no successful administrator had remained in the service of the Republic for any period long enough to organize the new state. Indeed it is clear that in 1795 the French, freed from the Bourbons and feudalism, had grown indifferent to political idealism, had lost the moral enthusiasm which appeared in so many of the earlier revolutionary leaders, and both in Paris and the provinces the citizens were turning from politics to business. The general tone of society, especially in Paris, was vulgar. The memoirs of the time display the collapse of morals. Reckless gaiety, self-indulgence, immodest dress, a craze for dancing, indiscriminate divorce and marriage, profiteering and graft marked the new period.¹ Such decadence was as fatal to the efficiency of the nation as had been the moral severity which

¹ The same cycle of enthusiasm, suffering, reaction, vulgarity, was to be seen in modern times as a result of the World War.

Robespierre had tried to inculcate. In truth France was being transformed, disillusioned, growing ready to welcome any government that would give stability to the accomplishments of the Revolution. And the course of events was to meet the need.

The one element of French society in which revolutionary enthusiasm was more than a name was the army.

It was indeed no accident that militarism began to play an important rôle in the new era begun by the Revolution. It seems a general law that when an abstract idea becomes an obsession of any society, it will find expression at the point where that society is most efficient. The conception of equality and liberty, for example, in America and France was much the same, but its expression in social institutions was very different.¹ In America it expressed itself constructively in precisely these fields in which the Colonies had developed efficiency: in commerce, religion, education and the extension of existing political institutions. In France, however, neither the Old Régime nor the revolutionary period had accustomed Frenchmen to self-direction in such matters.² The French constitutions persisted in attempting to separate the executive and legislative branches and are filled with marked suspicion of the former. Political inexperience is likely to

¹ This is not to say that its origin was identical. American idealism was the extension of English political experience into new fields; French idealism was theoretical, derived from the teachings and accomplishment of England and especially the United States. There can be no better study in political and social minds than the comparison of the constitution of the United States and those of the various French legislative bodies which were produced almost contemporaneously.

² The only exception to this general statement would seem to be the rapid development of agriculture during the Revolution, but the new landowning peasants were not active in politics.

prefer making laws to enforcing them, but efficiency in arms is dependent upon and develops organization and authority. It is always capable of more rapid growth than efficiency in civil administration. How relatively great was this efficiency can be seen by comparing the list of notable generals who emerged from the French citizen army with the small number of even approximately efficient civil officials who appeared at the same time.

In tracing the development of France during the years that elapsed between the establishment of the Directory and the restoration of the Bourbons, it is necessary for clarity of narrative repeatedly to separate events that were in point of fact contemporaneous and interwoven. A correct appreciation of this extraordinary period, however, will be the resultant of a study of two outstanding currents of events, one social and the other military. For a few years the two united in the career of Napoleon Bonaparte, but after his fall the former is seen to have been the real continuation of that development which brought about the end of the Old Régime and gave permanence to the new civic order the Revolution had preserved from reaction and foreign conquest. It is merely arbitrary analysis that separates the Napoleonic era from the Revolution. Military success, the romance of an extraordinary career and the final supremacy of imperialism, should not obscure the continuity of the process which transformed the France of the Bourbons into a nation from which revolutions and changes in rulers during three-quarters of a century could not strip its blood-bought rights. Napoleon organized, preserved and extended to Europe the really permanent results the Revolution transferred to him. The French state today is structurally as Napoleon left it, but it still sings the Marseillaise, the hymn of the Revolution.

We shall first consider military history and how it gave a master and organizer to new France.

In order to understand why France should have been engaged in almost continuous war for more than twenty years, it is necessary to remember that in 1796 the Republic faced a continent of reactionary states, from which it continuously took territory by force of arms. European rulers feared lest they should suffer the fate of Louis XVI. War against France was their sole means of self-defence if Europe was to be preserved from the extension of French principles. During the years prior to the Directory, the Republican army had owed its rise to the necessity thrust upon the revolutionists of repelling the *émigrés* and their Austrian and Prussian supporters. After the popular rising of the latter part of 1793 it had been able to push back the forces of the Coalition. With this success, it will be recalled, the character of the war changed. It became ever more one of republican propagandism. Organizers of the Convention formed conquered countries into small French republics blessed with "liberty." To stir up insurrection among peoples who were under kings had been a revolutionary duty. On the other hand, Prussia and Austria feared alike the growing leadership of France on the continent and the progress of the new system. They were determined to defeat the new Republic. Thus there had been thrown about war a glamour of enfranchisement. The invading French brought with them equality and constitutions. Wherever French arms were successful, feudalism was abolished, laws were codified and the general condition of the people improved. New hopes came to the despised masses. French soldiers spoke of themselves as liberators and it was this spirit that gave to the French troops their enthusiasm and fighting power. The Directory even in its

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most abject days busied itself in the formation of republics by military conquest.¹

It will be recalled that the success of the armies of 1794 and 1795 had been great. Belgium and Holland had been conquered and made to share in republican privileges, the former being incorporated into France and the latter transformed into the Batavian Republic, a dependency of France. An English invasion had failed. Spain had been invaded and Prussia had made peace (Basle, April 14, 1795). Austria alone remained in arms on the Continent. Nor was this all. The armies had grown better officered. Now that promotion was open to all citizen soldiers there began to be not only veteran troops but veteran officers. In the North were Moreau, Jourdan, and Hoche. In the South, was Napoleon Bonaparte.²

¹ Years later, Napoleon in his *apologia* written at St. Helena, sought to make it appear that his supreme ambition was the "regeneration" of Europe. Nor must this be regarded as hypocrisy. In most men, to say nothing of a superman like Napoleon, such altruistic ambition is repeatedly accompanied by relentless devotion to personal advantages and a total indifference to professed ideals, because of the pressure of immediate duties. But the Directory was a discovered hypocrite.

² Napoleon Bonaparte was born August 15, 1769, of an Italian family, living in Corsica, although he always objected to be regarded as a Corsican. He was the second of eight children, of whom he made three kings, one a queen and two others wives of princes. In 1769, shortly before his birth, the island became a French possession and the family thus became French citizens. In 1779, he entered the military school in Brienne and in 1784, the military academy at Paris. At sixteen years of age he received his commission as sublieutenant of artillery. He joined the revolutionists but did not prosper as an agitator, either in France or in Corsica, where the Revolution failed, and he, together with his entire family, became the object of popular hatred because of his opposition to the Corsican patriot Paoli. He was, however, in 1793 a Jacobin, and was made a captain because of his activity in the siege of Toulon. He advanced rapidly

We can see, therefore, that as the administrative inefficiency became apparent and France outgrew the fear of foreign invasion; as Frenchmen devoted themselves more thoroughly to the development of the nation's inner resources and the spread of republican principles; as these principles were defended against the armies of reactionary nations; the importance of the military in the new state would be great. War was inevitable as long as Austria and England were set upon defeating the Republic and the Republic was determined to gain its "natural frontiers." National existence hung upon military efficiency. While the doings of the Directory in France during 1795 and 1796 advertised its incompetence, war, idealized by devotion to liberty, was giving a new phase to the history of the Republic.¹

There were two chief bases of military operation against Austria—Germany and Italy. Carnot, the Minister of War, was a sincere and able official. He was the one strong member of the Directory, and it is in no small measure due to his efforts that the armies had been so successful. He deserved his title of "Organizer of Victory." Yet after the Terror even his plans were failures. The armies on the German frontier were divided into two divisions, one under Jourdan, and the other under Moreau. This disposition of the troops, however, was dan-

and was made Brigadier General. After Thermidor, he was imprisoned as a friend of the Robespierres for a short time, but was released and saved the Directory by his leadership on the 13th Vendémiaire. As a young man he was moody rather than romantic, and was ambitious to become a writer. A short and unimportant novel written in his youth has been preserved, as well as a preface to a proposed history of Corsica. He also submitted an essay to a prize contest, in which he deals with political ambition and the ideal state.

¹ Guyot, *Le Directoire et la Paix de la Europe*.

gerous, as it prevented the armies from acting in concert and permitted them to be attacked in detail. This danger was all the more marked in view of the fact that these northern French armies were opposed by a no inconsiderable soldier, the Archduke Charles of Austria. For these reasons, Jourdan and Moreau were unable to accomplish anything decisive. They did, to be sure, win several battles, but failed to break the power of the Archduke. Indeed, Jourdan was defeated in two battles, retreated and resigned his command. Moreau was ultimately forced to retreat across the Alps, a manœuvre which, despite its difficulty, he carried through with remarkable ability. The total result of the operations in the North was to expose France to an attack from the Austrians through Southern Germany.

In the South, failure was also threatening, but there a very different history was to be written. Thither Napoleon Bonaparte had gone after his marriage with Madame de Beauharnais, March 11, 1796. It has been claimed by many that his appointment to the command of the army of Italy was due to the questionable influence of his wife with Barras. But such a view seems improbable in the light of recently discovered facts,¹ and it is fair to say that Bonaparte was given this position by Carnot (for whom he had drawn up a plan of campaign against Piedmont) because men had come to recognize in him a promising young officer who refused to go into obscurity and who had the courage to settle the difficulties of Vendémiaire. As an adventurer he had come to Paris, as an adventurer he left Paris. "My sword," he told Josephine during his courtship, "is at my side and that will carry me a long way."

¹ See Levy, *The Private Life of Napoleon I*, 150.

The character of this young man of twenty-seven who steps so suddenly into the centre of the world's stage will probably be the subject of endless disputes, nor is any final opinion easy to reach. In no small degree because of his own planning, there has grown up a Napoleonic legend, which too often defeats any effort to discover the actual Napoleon of history.¹ Partisanship also has obscured the real man. To one historian, he is a scoundrel, to another a demi-god. An impartial estimate discovers him to have been neither, but rather a man of extraordinary ability, given opportunity by his times, both as general and an administrator; a calculating opportunist, possessing great clarity of thought and daring promptness of action, embodying in his earlier period the social mind of France; unrestrained by conventional moral scruples, but loyal to France and to the privileges and rights gained by the Revolution; possessed of a sense of mission to extend these rights to Europe yet incapable of appreciating the deeper passions of nationalism; quick to coerce where he should have made concessions and, as his power in-

¹ The best lives of Napoleon are: Rose, *Life of Napoleon I*; Fournier, *Napoleon I*, with elaborate bibliography; Lanfrey, *History of Napoleon*; *Cambridge Modern History*, IX; Lentz, *Napoleon*; Sloane, *Life of Napoleon Bonaparte*; Ludwig, *Napoleon*; Seeley, *Napoleon*; Morris, *Napoleon*; Rose, *Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era*; Johnston, *Napoleon*; Fisher, *Napoleon*; Ropes, *Napoleon*, the latter less a biography than an interpretation. Napoleon has left an autobiography written at St. Helena. His immense correspondence has been published in several series, the original, *Correspondance de Napoléon I*, being in 32 volumes. Among the great number of memoirs of the period, especially helpful are those of Constant, Bourrienne, Rémusat, Thiébauld, Marbot, and Gourgaud. *The Corsican* is a collection of sayings of Napoleon arranged so as to appear an autobiography, by R. M. Johnston. For his early life see Browning, *Napoleon, The First Phase*; Chuquet, *La Jeunesse de Napoléon*; Masson, *Napoléon inconnu*.

creased, contemptuous of "idealogues" and too reliant on destiny and military power. Ready to follow his pleasures but never swayed by passion; dominated by a measureless ambition, alike for France and himself; driven by circumstances as well as by the will to power; possessed of a marvellous ability to win personal loyalty; in his rise and fall he illustrates the power and weakness of a "superman," produced by an epoch of tumultuous reconstruction.¹

At the time of his appointment, the mismanagement of the Directory was rapidly making the condition of the troops in the South as desperate as that of those in the North. The campaign had degenerated into a slow and aimless marching about Piedmont. Bonaparte found the troops in great destitution and lacking in military enthusiasm, faced by the strong armies of Austria and Sardinia. But the allied enemies of France had not joined forces and were separated by considerable territory. Bonaparte immediately determined to deal with each before the three could unite. The project was dangerous but well suited to the temperament of the young general. Then as later, he chose the more daring of two courses. Crossing the Alps, he wrought his soldiers to a high pitch of enthusiasm, promising them success, and, as they could hardly fail to understand his words, the loot of Italy:

¹ To appreciate Bonaparte's personality, one should not overlook the gossip of the innumerable memoirs of the day, but even more should one study his vast correspondence, which is now at the service of the student. In it as nowhere else does one see his conviction that he represented a new social order, as well as the unparalleled activity, precision, and mastery of detail of his mind. A side light on his personality is given by comparing his ardent letters to Josephine during his Italian campaign (selections in Levy, *Private Life of Napoleon*, Vol. I) with his official papers struck off at the same time.

“Soldiers, you are hungry and nearly naked. The government owes you much. It can do nothing for you. Your patience and courage do you honour, but can neither procure you profit nor glory. I am going to lead you into the fertile plains of the world. There you will find great towns. There you will find honour and great riches. Soldiers of Italy, can your courage fail you?”

These words were more than the harangue of an invader. They expressed the new spirit of the Revolution. The Directory was seeking to spread republicanism, but it was also bound to enlarge the territories and the treasure of the Republic. Missionaries of liberty were to be providers of national income. War was to support war. On May 7, 1796, the Directory sent Bonaparte these extraordinary instructions, as he was about to move upon Milan for the avowed purpose of delivering that city from the tyranny of the Austrians: “Levy heavy contributions there in cash. Some of their fine monuments, statues, pictures, medals, libraries, silver madonnas, and even bells will pay the expenses of your visit.”

The courage of the soldiers did not fail! Bonaparte marched rapidly through Northern Italy, threw his army between the Austrians and Piedmontese, held one Austrian army in check until he had completely defeated another and had wrenched a treaty of peace from the King of Sardinia (May 15, 1796) by which Sardinia withdrew from the Coalition, Savoy and Nice were ceded to the Republic and the Piedmontese fortress was garrisoned by the French. He then turned upon the Austrians, and defeated them May 10, 1796, at Lodi, where he was the second man upon the bridge over the stream that divided the two armies.

It was the same general plan that was so often to bring him victory—separate the enemy, attack him in detail

with an overwhelming force. Under a bold and skilful leader, a small army with this strategy might do wonders against a large.

This brilliant campaign, enough in itself to win him reputation, was but the beginning of a succession of remarkable manœuvres and victories. City after city submitted. Bonaparte sent back to the Directory millions of francs and some of the choicest treasures of the art stores of Italy. When, during the latter part of 1796 Wurmser replaced the octogenarian Beaulieu, Napoleon drove him into Mantua where he was besieged. For a moment the French arms suffered repulses, but Alvinczy, bringing relief from Austria, again made the mistake of dividing his army and was defeated at the desperate battle of Arcola (November 15-17, 1796); Wurmser was defeated at Rivoli (January 14, 1797); and Mantua surrendered February 2, 1797. On February 19, 1797, Bonaparte forced the Pope to sign the treaty of Tolentino, by which he engaged not to aid the enemies of France, his ports were closed to the English, Avignon was ceded to France, and the Cispadane Republic (later partly included in the Cisalpine Republic) including Bologna and Ferrara, was recognized and 3,000,000 francs and one hundred works of art were given France.¹

Austria transferred the Archduke Charles to the southern campaign. In a succession of skilful moves he de-

¹ These campaigns were fought in accordance with a new military strategy, already taught in scientific treatises. With the possible exception of Dumouriez, Bonaparte was the first to put this new teaching into action. When later it was followed by his opponents his victories were won at greater cost. He was the first military genius to recognize the necessity of destroying a defeated army, the possibilities of rapid marches, deployed lines of battle, attack by columns and the new artillery.

tached himself from Moreau and attacked Italy from the north. Had the Archduke been given more freedom in the conduct of his affairs, the success of Bonaparte might have been much less, but the Austrian cabinet still undertook to determine the policies of Austrian generals on the field. Bonaparte while theoretically under the control of the Directory was practically dictator in Italy. He did not hesitate to disobey the directions sent him by Carnot, relying upon his victories for his justification.¹

This freedom from the control of distant authority enabled Bonaparte to block out a far more elastic campaign than could his opponent. The Archduke Charles with a discouraged army was unable to withstand the assault of the French, flushed with victory and republican zeal, and was gradually beaten back until the road to Vienna was open. Neither party wished to continue hostilities. At his own request Bonaparte was given extraordinary powers by the Directory and on the 18th of April, 1797, just a year after he had crossed the Maritime Alps, he signed the preliminaries of peace at Leoben which six months later were ratified by the Treaty of Campo Formio. It would be difficult to parallel such success.²

¹ At the beginning of the Italian campaign in 1796 he had been forbidden even to sign an armistice without the consent of Salicetti, the representative of the Directory. By the Summer of 1797 he had concluded four treaties on his own responsibility!

² Thiers whose *History of the French Revolution* reflects the opinion of French liberals in the 19th century when France was still dispossessed of the full results of the Revolution, thus expresses the feeling of France, as yet not disillusioned as to Bonaparte, after the Italian campaign: "O days ever celebrated and ever to be regretted by us! At what period was our country ever greater and more glorious? The storms of the Revolution seemed to have subsided. . . . A govern-

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Now that he had territory to reorganize, Bonaparte adopted the general policy which he was hereafter to follow—a policy inherited from the Revolution and already seen in the formation by the Directory of the Batavian Republic which separated France on the north from German states. In brief it was the establishment of small states possessed of civil rights to serve as dependents and buffers of the French Republic against Austria. But the revolutionary excuse for conquest still held. As Mahomet bade the Arabs choose between death and the Koran, as Charlemagne offered the Saxons death or Christian baptism, so Bonaparte and the French generals were to bring to every petty state in Europe the choice between “liberty” and destruction. Bonaparte’s application of this policy was the formation of the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics in northern Italy.¹

But although he thus followed the lines of revolutionary foreign policy, Bonaparte was not a man to be lost in the enthusiasm of republican propaganda. The French public desired an end of the war. The Directory was set upon the same end. To Bonaparte peace with Austria was an un sentimental good which must be obtained on the best terms for France. The greatest result of his victories in

ment composed of citizens, our equals, ruled the republic with moderation. The best were elected to succeed them. All votes were free. . . . No eye could distinguish him who . . . should crush liberty or who should betray his country. . . . Frenchmen, let us, who have since seen our liberty strangled, our country invaded, our heroes shot or unfaithful to their glory—let us never forget those resplendent days of liberty, greatness, and hope.”

¹ It is interesting to observe the same general policy in the French plans for reorganizing Europe, and particularly Poland, the Balkan states and the territory along the Rhine, after the World War, 1914-18.

Italy was such a peace. He reached it by characteristic indifference to the rights of weak states. In the northern part of Italy there had been a number of small kingdoms and so-called republics. Among the latter was Venice. It was, however, a republic only in name, as for centuries its government had been vested in the hands of nobles. Although urged to side with either Austria or France, Venice had chosen to remain neutral. Bonaparte, however, who had organized the states of northern Italy in a Republic, saw in Venice a state too rich to be included in that Republic and too weak to protect itself. Accordingly, he determined to use Venice for the furtherance of his own schemes. The French propaganda in favor of Italy was soon in full operation in the Venetian territory. Insurrections were incited in the cities subject to its control, after which no punishment was permitted to be inflicted. The revolutionary party within Venice itself was assisted and there was developed within the republic an aggressive minority that favoured the French. Bonaparte was able to take advantage of a series of insurrections in Verona and other cities in which the French soldiers had been massacred by Italians. By various means the Venetians were led to place themselves under his protection and admitted a French force into the city. For a while it seemed as if the Venetian Republic would remain as one of the buffer states of France. When, however, after the agreement at Léoben, Bonaparte came to draw up the Peace of Campo Formio (October 17, 1797) it was necessary for him to make some concessions to offset the demands he was making upon Austria. By this treaty the Austrians (mostly in secret articles) formally turned Belgium, already conquered, over to France, recognized the French claim upon Lombardy and other Italian territory

in favour of the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics, and the left bank of the Rhine (with the exception of lands given Prussia by the treaty of Basle in 1795) as the boundary of France. France also gained the Ionian Islands and the Venetian territory in Albania. In return, France gave Austria Venice, Istria and Dalmatia, all the Venetian territory to the Adige, as well as Salzburg and the Bavarian territory to the Inn. The German states, in return for concessions on the left bank of the Rhine, were given territory on the right bank. The political significance of these territorial changes is to be seen in that the principle of the integrity of the Empire was abandoned and Austria reduced to a position from which she could be rescued only by war.

So far as Venice was concerned, the act was high handed and destined to be the source of future complications, but in general the Peace of Campo Formio was destined to have lasting results. Not only did it make Austria an implacable enemy; the recognition of the Cisalpine Republic laid the foundation for modern Italy. And it must be remembered, also, that along with these high-handed acts of a military dictator there went also successful attempts at reform within the new territories. The principles of the Revolution were thus extended beyond France. Feudal privileges were swept away and although the people had little political liberty, they did enjoy more social and legal privileges. Bonaparte was a child of the French Revolution and military power had not lost its propagandist aims. To appreciate this fact one has only to compare the condition of Italy under his control and its miseries under the reactionary rule of Austria after 1815. But it is also apparent that Austria would not patiently submit to either reform or the status set by Campo Formio.

Success itself was to force Bonaparte and France into new wars. Austria would seek by war to regain what by war had been lost.

While the army in Italy had been winning victories and sending home immense spoils, the Directory had grown increasingly unpopular. National bankruptcy had actually arrived. Public order had been threatened repeatedly in 1796, and 1797 showed a distinct reaction against the Directory's control. Royalists began to reassert themselves, while conspiracies of revolutionary extremists were numerous. Chief among these was that of the Socialist, Baboeuf. This conspiracy was crushed and its leaders were guillotined. But the majority of the Directory began to fear lest counter-revolution was to begin and the Bourbons be reinstated. Their apprehensions were not groundless. With the connivance, if not the aid of England, plans had already been made for the restoration of the Bourbons. The elections had returned a large number of moderate men to the Councils, and it was not long before they and the Directory reached an *impasse* from which there was no constitutional escape. Within the Directory Carnot and Barthélemy were in sympathy with a moderate undoing of the extreme legislation of the Convention. Possessed by the fear for their own positions and lives to which we have already referred, the three Jacobin Directors appealed to the military. Hoche was their first hope, but the Councils refused to accept him as Minister of War on the ground that he was not of constitutional age. In response to the request of Barras, Bonaparte sent General Augereau to Paris. September 4, 1797 (18th Fructidor), the Tuileries, where the Councils were assembled, were surrounded by an armed force. Within a few hours those members opposed to republicanism were arrested, their seats

declared vacant, and many of them were banished. Pichegru (who was badly compromised) and Carnot were ordered deported, *émigrés* and those classified as such were ordered to leave France, liberty of worship which had been granted and of the press was checked, priests were imprisoned, and military tribunals were once more able to execute alleged enemies of the Republic.¹

The triumph of the republicans, thus ready to renew the Terror, was apparently complete. But a dangerous precedent had again been set. Political problems had been solved by force. France was still in the hands of ex-Terrorists. The army had been summoned not only to protect the government but to form a basis for the government. Bonaparte (who had so managed affairs that his part in 18th Fructidor was unknown) came to Paris only a few weeks after this *coup d'état* (December 10, 1797) and was received with wild enthusiasm.

It is, of course, idle to speculate as to whether at this time he had matured the plans which subsequently he carried into execution. On the whole, it seems hardly possible that the requisite detailed foresight could have been his. But he was possessed of keen political insight as well as boundless ambition and self-confidence, and the possibilities of the situation must have been perfectly evident. The Directory, incapable of maintaining civil authority, had only one consistent policy—the maintenance of its own power and the extension of revolutionary principles into foreign states through war. The revolutionary forces of France had disintegrated, but the nation had grown warlike. The army alone was in a position

¹ 160 persons were executed and 330 were sent to Guiana, half of whom soon died. 1448 priests were deported or sent to the

to give a consistent and permanent basis for administrative actions. And the army would be loyal only to a victorious general.

Bonaparte was strong enough to wait. "The pear was not yet ripe." Throughout his career he had an uncanny power of seeing and seizing the psychological moment. In Paris he affected to retire from politics. He was elected to the Institute of France in the place of Carnot, who had been driven into exile because of his opposition to the events of the 18th Fructidor, and declared that he found more pleasure in the robe of a member of the Institute and the company of savants than in the uniform of a general and the company of soldiers and statesmen. Listening to the debates of the Institute, he waited opportunity.

Never were his powers of calculation better rewarded. By calculation he had been revolutionist and had been made a general; by calculation had he accepted the command on the 13th Vendémiaire and had been appointed to the command in Italy; by calculation he had refused a bribe of millions, violated treaties, robbed museums, misled his allies, beaten his enemies in the name of liberty and established new popular rights in Italy. And now by calculation he allowed the Directory to display to the full its incapacity. A weaker man would have acted too soon, a poorer calculator might have waited too long; Bonaparte both acted and waited, retired and remained in public. He went to Egypt.

His decision was not merely that of an adventurer. In 1798 the French government, apparently freed from danger from Austria, experienced one of its recurring desires to invade England, with which it was still at war. Indeed, hatred of England, the one unconquerable enemy in commerce and war, became a dominant element of

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French policy. In this Bonaparte shared. "Our government," he declared in October, 1797, "must destroy the English monarchy, or it must expect itself to be destroyed by these active islanders. Let us concentrate our energies on the navy and annihilate England. That done, Europe is at our feet."

It is well at this point to pause in order to consider the reason for this hatred of England, at that time a nation with a population hardly a third that of France. Biography here will not suffice. History deals with social forces. Individuals gain historical significance as they control and modify such forces; and few there are who have not found that these forces are impatient of control. Napoleon Bonaparte with his extraordinary powers was for a few years the creature, the master, but finally the victim of a Titanic social change, one phase of which was a struggle between France and England for the economic mastery of the world.¹

This struggle began with the settlement of America and the ambition of both countries to establish colonies in the New World. It had continued through the wars of Louis XIV, and in the Peace of Paris (July 10, 1763) had resulted in a check of French colonization by the practical exclusion of France from the continent of North America through the enforced cession of Louisiana to Spain and of all Canada to England.² Both France and England desired to conquer India, where each had colonies, and to this end sought to control the Mediterranean Sea and the Cape of Good Hope.

¹ For a discussion of the relations of the individual to social evolution, see Mathews, *Spiritual Interpretation of History*, pp. 111-118.

² France retained San Domingo and other islands in the West Indies, certain ports on the Gulf of Mexico, and two islands and fishing rights on the St. Lawrence.

To this contest for colonial expansion was added that for markets demanded by the industrial revolution which, especially in Northern France and England, was substituting factories and wage earners for hand looms and house manufacturing. Here the American colonies of England were of prime importance. In 1786 a commercial treaty had been adopted which permitted the importation of English goods into France. This was favoured by that part of southern France which exported wine to England, but was opposed by northern France. By 1793 this treaty became the point of attack by the Convention as a part of Pitt's plan to ruin France, and was abrogated by the war forced upon France. Gradually there grew up a definite policy of opposition to the English commerce as the chief foundation of England's power, and on October 31, 1796, the Directory excluded English goods from all countries under French control, including Spain and Holland. England, therefore, seeing a rival in Continental policies and, herself threatened with commercial ruin, fought France with economic boycott and blockade, as well as by arms. Like the Directory, Bonaparte saw in this economic war the one great means of hastening his enemy's ruin. Always under the sway of economic theories (Mercantilism) formulated before the rise of factories and the modern industrial organization of society, Bonaparte could not appreciate that new methods of production were more than commercial. His military and continental policy increasingly centred around the destruction of England through the destruction of her commerce on the continent of Europe, in America and Asia. While, of course, other than economic forces were at work in this period of social reconstruction, the possibility of preventing England's commercial expansion in these three areas was always in

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Bonaparte's mind, and, as will appear later, was a chief cause of his abortive efforts at colonization, his repeated efforts to control the Mediterranean and threaten India, and his remorseless but fatal Continental System.

On its face, an invasion of England was by no means impracticable, although difficult in an age that knew nothing of steamboats.¹ Bonaparte was later to consider such an expedition and to make elaborate preparations to transfer troops across the Channel. But when in 1797 he was appointed to the command of "the army of England," a study of the situation led him to report that the plan was ill-advised because France lacked a strong navy. He preferred a more adventurous undertaking. Then it was he asked and obtained permission to conquer Egypt. It was characteristic of his political methods that he so manipulated the situation that the Directory, despite its unwillingness to permit the expedition, appeared to be ridding itself of its best general. He realized on this impression later.

During his sojourn on St. Helena, Bonaparte explained this action as a part of his political programme.² Such it undoubtedly was, but it is hardly safe to find explanations for his actions by reading back into Bonaparte's plans any policy which he systematized in the last years of his life when he was endeavouring to rewrite history

¹ Invasions of Ireland were more than once planned also.

² These are his words: "The most influential and enlightened generals had long been pressing the general of Italy to take steps to place himself at the head of the Republic. He refused. He was not yet strong enough to walk quite alone. He had ideas upon the art of governing and upon what was necessary for a great nation, which were so different from those of the men of the Revolution and the Assemblies, that, not being able to act alone, he feared to compromise his character. He determined to set out for Egypt, but resolved to reappear if circumstances should arise to render his presence useful or necessary."

to his own credit. In 1798 he also talked enthusiastically of the possibility of converting the world to revolutionary non-religious morality. But that was largely for the purpose of persuading one of the Directory, La Réveillère-Lépaux, who was founding such a propaganda. Although he was doubtless moved by these motives, as well as by his love of the spectacular, the fundamental reason for the Egyptian expedition lay in the anti-English policy already described and is to be found explicitly stated in several of Bonaparte's letters of the time, as well as by a secret decree of the Directory. Egypt was a key to India. If France could control the eastern end of the Mediterranean, it would seriously injure England.¹ And also France would be in a favourable position to share in a possible dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

On May 28, 1798, he set out from Toulon for Egypt, intending to reduce the Near East to the control of France. The expedition consisted of a considerable army, to the command of which he appointed all his chief rivals for popular favour. It was supported by as powerful a fleet as France could gather at that time.² From almost any point of view the plan was foolhardy, for France had at this time a relatively weak navy, while England was exceedingly strong on the sea and had a powerful fleet in the Mediterranean. The only means of maintaining communication between France and the expedition was by sea, and the line of communication was constantly imperiled by no less a seaman than Lord Nelson. But

¹ It is noteworthy that while setting forth this scheme for crippling England, Bonaparte still uses the vocabulary of the Revolution. Peace with England was to "consolidate liberty."

² The expedition was largely financed by funds extorted from Switzerland, which had been forced to submit to French "liberty," by the Directory.

desperate chances were welcomed by Bonaparte, and in this period of his life fortune repeatedly favoured him. "I regard myself," he once wrote, "as probably the most daring man in war who ever lived." The expedition succeeded in eluding the British fleet which was scouring the Mediterranean, captured Malta from the Knights of St. John, partly through treachery (June 12, 1798), seized all the gold and silver of the Order to be discovered, and in something more than six weeks landed at Alexandria.

The campaign in Egypt, in itself dramatic, is so much an episode in the career of Bonaparte as to demand but little attention.¹ In none of his undertakings does Bonaparte appear less subject to the ordinary course of human events. He saw his fleet completely defeated by Lord Nelson in the Battle of the Nile (August 1-9, 1798,²)

¹ The student should not overlook the fact that the work of the scholars attached to the expedition was of great importance in opening up the history of Ancient Egypt.

² The Battle of the Nile was one of the most decisive in naval annals. It showed alike the leadership of Nelson and the inefficiency of the Directory. The French fleet consisted of 13 ships of the line, 7 cruisers, 26 smaller fighting vessels, and 318 transports, on which were 38,000 troops. The British had 14 ships of the line, without cruisers. The French had a weight of metal of 13,880 lbs., the British, 11,330. But the French fleet was in bad repair (one ship was so rotten that it could not carry its proper batteries), poorly manned and with low discipline. Not having sufficient crews to manœuvre at sea, it was ordered to anchor in five fathoms, but anchored in seven, thus making it possible for the British fleet to attack on both sides. The French ships were arranged in a single line, a mile and three-quarters in length, too far distant from land to be sufficiently protected by forts. Nelson was thus enabled to concentrate his fire on successive French ships, which were soon destroyed or forced to surrender. Only three ships of the line escaped. The French loss was approximately 1,700 dead, 1,479 wounded, 2,000 prisoners and 350 who were killed by the Arabs. Largely as a consequence of this victory, Malta was later forced to surrender (September 5, 1800) to England, and Turkey be-

but his army was victorious, (Battle of the Pyramids, July 21, 1798). He marched northward through Syria, possibly planning after having lost his fleet, to gather the Christians of Syria to his standard and to cut his way through to the Dardanelles, and thus to reach Europe "by the back-door." But he failed to take Acre, gallantly defended by an English force under Sidney Smith, supported by the English fleet, and armed with cannon captured from Bonaparte. By this defeat and the outbreak of disease among his troops he was forced to return to Egypt, where after utterly defeating the Turks at Aboukir (July 25, 1799), he was once more swept into the course of European history by news which reached him through the English papers given him by English naval officers.¹

To understand this new condition, it is necessary to recall the course of events in France. During the first months of Bonaparte's absence, there had been increasing weakness in the government of the Directory. The economic conditions of the nation were growing fatal.²

came ally of England. Thereby new complications were added to European politics.

¹ To this Syrian campaign belongs an incident that shows how merciless was Bonaparte's efficiency. Finding himself possessed of 3,000 or more Turkish prisoners he could not feed nor permit to escape, he killed them all. On the other hand must be counted his remarkable reorganization of Egypt, the introduction of European agriculture, the extension of the study of the monuments and inscriptions of Ancient Egypt. Rose, *Napoleon I*, I, p. 179, sharply contrasts these activities of a leader only twenty-nine years of age and in desperate straits, with the contemporary life, careless or worse, of Nelson and the Austrian generals.

² One of the first acts of the Directory had been to substitute *mandats*, a paper currency convertible into specified amounts of land, for the *assignats*, of which 145 billion francs had been issued. The *assignats* had depreciated from 100 for 95 gold

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France was all but ruined financially. Transportation systems had broken down, "brigands" were everywhere, industry and commerce were destroyed. In Lyons, 13,000 of 15,000 workshops and mills were closed. Great centres of industry like Lille, Bordeaux, Marseilles, were all but abandoned. Poverty and famine threatened the entire state. Commercial relations with England had been reduced to smuggling; those with America had been completely suspended. Not a single merchant vessel carried the French flag. England and Russia were intriguing against France and in the latter part of 1798, despite mutual jealousies and distrust, had completed a treaty which formed the basis of the Second Coalition against the Republic, consisting of England, Russia, Austria, Naples, Portugal and Turkey. Its avowed purpose was the re-establishment of the pre-revolutionary boundaries of France. Back of this, however, were the jealousy of the growing power of France on the Continent, and, taking into account the reactionary character of all its members except England, the intent of European powers to check the spread of constitutional idealism. On the part of England, besides a determination to maintain its commercial leadership, there was the purpose, later abandoned, of re-establishing the Bourbons.

More specifically, the motives of the Second Coalition include the re-establishment of Germany with feudal rights preserved; the territorial expansion of Prussia;

livres in November, 1789, to 7200 for 24 gold livres in 1796. By the end of 1796, the *mandats* were worth only one per cent. of their face value. May 21, 1797, the Directory demonetized all *assignats* and *mandats* in circulation, causing vast suffering both to individuals and the government. September 30, 1797, the consolidated debt was reduced by two-thirds, the reduction being represented by bonds payable to bearer, receivable in payment for national property. They soon became worthless.

the wresting of Italy from the control of France and the recovery of Lombardy and Venetia by Austria; the restoration of Holland and Belgium to the House of Orange; the recession of France to her ancient frontiers. The purposes of Russia were less specific, except as regards Poland and Turkey, but her ambition to become a leader in European affairs made her a central factor in the policies of the Coalition.¹

The Directory failed to meet the crisis. The armies of the Republic, though successful in Switzerland and Holland, suffered severe reverses in Italy, and on the upper Rhine. Except Genoa, all the territory which had been won by the Italian campaigns of Bonaparte and other French generals had been lost. French envoys to the conference called at Rastatt to administer the Peace of Campo Formio had been assassinated by the Austrians. Royalist reaction threatened again in La Vendée, as well as in other parts of France. People were afraid at once of a counter-revolution and a revival of a system of Terror. Nor was this latter fear fully unfounded. The Directory, which was opposing everything that seemed to threaten its own safety, gradually had come again into conflict with the Councils. Jacobinism rather than royalists was now its fear. In June, 1798, constitutional government again was in danger. To offset the renewed Jacobin movement, the army was for a second time called upon to maintain the Directory.²

¹ Pariset (in Lavisse, *Histoire de France contemporaine*), *La Révolution*, II, 396, 397.

² One step, however, the Directory took in these days which was to be of a very great importance. In September, 1798, it established the law of conscription. Although the plan did not at once produce large results, henceforth the armies were to be made up from levies rather than from volunteers. The effect of such practice, the first in modern history, was very great,

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In the spring of 1799, the Councils, which had become gradually changed in character through the elections, undertook to purge the Directory. Three Directors were forced to resign and their successors feared royalists, Jacobins and revolutionary anarchy, alike. Sieyès described the matter accurately when he said, "France needs a head and a sword." He promptly undertook to draw up a new constitution which should give that head. He lacked only the military leader. Turning from the other young generals, he found him in Bonaparte.

For, just at this moment, when the danger of the Republic's collapse was most apparent, Bonaparte returned to France. Taking with him the men who were to be his great support, Lannes, Marmont, Berthier, Murat, among others, he had left the army in Egypt under the command of Kleber, had barely escaped the British fleet on the Mediterranean, had landed in Provence and proceeded to Paris. He was received with wild enthusiasm. On his arrival in Paris, he immediately saw the alternatives in the political situation, and joined in the *coup d'état* already planned by Sieyès and the moderate party of the government. The Directory could no longer stand, for it could no longer govern. France could expect order only by return of the Bourbons or from a dictatorship. Bonaparte, now, as he once said, "the hinge" of the conspiracy, lost no time in helping Sieyès bring his plans to a focus. The hour of his destiny, in which he implicitly believed, had struck. Most of the prominent statesmen and soldiers of the day were involved in the effort to rid France of the Directory. The plea was

not only in France but throughout continental Europe. From this time on, its armies have been raised by conscription and military service has been required of all young men.

made that the government was in danger of falling into the hands of the Jacobins, and Bonaparte was put forward as the saviour of the state. The overthrow of the Constitution was in a sense constitutional. Three of the Directors (including Barras and Sieyès) resigned, thus destroying executive power, since the signature of three Directors was necessary for the enforcement of decrees and laws. The Legislature was called upon to move itself to St. Cloud, place affairs in the hands of three Consuls, and appoint a commission to bring in a new Constitution and then adjourn. This plan worked well with the Council of the Ancients. (Brumaire 18, or November 9, 1799). It barely missed failing with the Council of the Five Hundred. On the 19th Brumaire, that body was surrounded by armed soldiers, assembled by Bonaparte ostensibly for review. Bonaparte illegally entered the Chamber and attempted to persuade the Representatives to join in the *coup d' état*, but lost his head, grew incoherent and nearly ruined the plan. The Council was about to outlaw him and bring him to Robespierre's end. Bonaparte fainted and was carried from the hall by grenadiers. At this point Lucien Bonaparte, who as a compliment to his brother had been elected President of the Council, saved the day. Parliamentary proceedings having failed, he turned to the soldiers. They hesitated. Drawing a dagger he swore to bury it in his brother's body if ever he proved untrue to the Republic—and won over the soldiers. The grenadiers under pressure of the troops of the line by whom they were surrounded, advanced, the Council was freed from every one who opposed the *coup d' état*, the Directory was sent into deserved oblivion and France saw another new government. Three Consuls, of whom Bonaparte

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was one, assumed the management of the state until the new constitution could be adopted.

When the Consuls first met, Bonaparte promptly took the head of the table. No one opposed him.

CHAPTER XXII

THE CONSULATE¹

Equality replaces Liberty. 1. The Constitution of the Year VIII. II. The Reconstruction of France: 1. The Centralization of the States, 2. Finances. 3. Amnesty to *Émigrés* and Priests. 4. The *Code Napoléon*. 5. The Concordat with the Pope. 6. The new Aristocracy. 7. Bonaparte made Consul for life. III. Military Operations: 1. The Revolution as a Cause of War with Austria and England. 2. Campaign in Italy. 3. Naval Affairs. 4. Peace of Amiens. IV. The attempt at re-making Continental Europe and French Colonial Possessions. V. Renewal of war with England. VI. Bonaparte made Emperor.

Whatever place personal ambition may have had in his plans, Napoleon Bonaparte in the *coup d'état* of the 18th and 19th Brumaire did not destroy the work of the Revolution. He saved it and France. Left to itself, the Directory would have made France the victim of renewed disorder and the reactionary policies of a triumphant Coalition. It was a government, inefficient, suspected, without the solid foundation of popular favour, devoted chiefly to the maintenance of itself in power. Results of the Revolution were now to be preserved and policies of the Revolution were to be pushed by actions

¹ In general, see *Cambridge Modern History*, IX, ch. i; Fournier, *Napoleon the First*, chs. 7-10; Rose, *Life of Napoleon I*, chs. 10-13; Lanfrey, *History of Napoleon*, I, chs. 14-16; II, chs. 1-10; Thibadeau, *Bonaparte and the Consulate*; Lenz, *Napoleon*, ch. 4; Fyffe, *Modern Europe*, I, chs. 3-5; Thiers, *The Consulate and the Empire*. See also the Memoirs of Madame Rémusat for a vivid picture of life under the First Consul. For full treatment see Aulard, *L'État de la France en l'an VIIIe et l'an IXI sous le Consulat*; Pariset, *Le Consulat et l'Empire*, (Lavisse, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, III); Vandal, *L'Avènement de Bonaparte*; Lanzaç de Laborie, *Paris sous Napoléon*.

rather than debates. "We have been pulling down," said Bonaparte. "We must now build and build solidly." Passionate devotion to the great principles of the Revolution, equality of men with its corollaries of popular sovereignty and the freedom of the individual, had been destructive to existing institutions in France, but by a brutal trial and failure method it had already begun permanent construction. The struggle to protect its work had developed on the continent of Europe a new sense of genuine nationality which no reactionary force could destroy. The actual accomplishments of the Revolution had been in France the destruction of feudal society, the establishment of 1,200,000 peasant land-holders, civil equality before the law, participation in government, educational institutions and a war at once defensive and propagandist. Various governments in France had undertaken to rebuild the state as if the Revolution had assured radical political change. Bonaparte made no such mistake. He may have underrated its spiritual forces, but he estimated its social and civic results to a nicety. These he was to carry to all western Europe. Indeed, one might almost say he forced western Europe to share in the Fourth of August, 1789.

The establishment of the Consulate was followed by no bloodshed. France, wishing security and order, was glad of any form of government, however gained, which would face the problems the Revolution had bequeathed the state. Bonaparte's triumph was indeed more than personal. It was the expression of national forces that had tired of incapable governments. The Revolution never had given genuine political liberty. The French of 1799 wanted and had gained equality of privileges, and not liberty. They were ready to fight desperately a coalition of European powers seeking to destroy these

privileges, and equally desperately to conquer and exploit people to whom similar privileges could be extended. And above all, France wanted internal order. Who gave it was of secondary importance. "I still feel persuaded," the American Morris had written on August 23, 1795, "they will fall under the yoke of a single despot." In 1799 this prophecy was in the way of fulfillment.

An understanding of the new epoch upon which France now entered demands that we recognize the impossibility of a break with historical processes. All permanent gains of the revolutionary period had been accomplished by the voluntary reforms of 1789-91. What had occurred under the Convention and the Directory was a series of desperate attempts by men who thought history could be violated or destroyed, to preserve these gains. They failed as all such revolutionary radicalism had failed. Not the least claim of Bonaparte to recognition as a constructive force was his perception that these reforms were final.¹

But France was not to be stabilized in peace. The Directory bequeathed the Consulate a terrific complex of war with England and Austria, embarrassed finances, violence in the Departments, suppressed Jacobinism, a disordered administration of justice, an abused church and clergy. All those elements combined to create a developing situation which, from its own momentum, was to sweep the Consulate on to new complications. Furthermore, the international situation born of the wars and policies of the eighteenth century was unstable. Only as we realize that such vast forces were at work can we escape the popular illusion that the events of the next

¹ See Le Bon, *The Psychology of Revolution*.

fifteen years were due to Bonaparte and his ambition. He himself was the creature of a world which for a time he partly controlled.

Our interest, however, lies neither in general European affairs nor even in the personal career of Napoleon Bonaparte. The history of the Revolution must now be written in a different *tempo*. The last phase of the Revolution is not national but international as its spirit and results were carried by Bonaparte to Germany and other European lands by force of arms. French history now shades off into international reorganization and the affairs of nations replace the acts of individuals. France, in the person of Napoleon, becomes to Europe what the Jacobins had been to France. Idealism was not dead, but under the Consulate as under the Committee of Public Safety it receded into the background of national consciousness as the task of maintaining a too rapidly developing state brought reliance upon unscrupulous realism.

To recount in detail the history of the amazing years 1799-1804 would require far more space than is at our disposal. On the one hand was a political and social reconstruction conservative rather than radical despite its extent and rapidity; and on the other, were military campaigns, among the most brilliant in history, against Austria. These two currents of events, never to be regarded as merely aspects of the biography of Bonaparte, were the inseparable and interdependent outcome of the Revolution. For the sake of clearness, however, they must be considered separately in the hope that their mutual relations may be felt and appreciated as the solidification of the results of the Revolution appears in the transformation of France and Europe. For such an understanding it is necessary to perceive that Bonaparte

was the representative of no party. He relied upon neither the Jacobin nor the royalist. Indeed during his entire career, political parties which had played so great a rôle during the Revolution disappeared from public life, though royalist, Jacobin, liberal and other groups existed, so to speak, below the surface of politics. Whatever may have been his personal ambition—and who can deny him ambition?—Bonaparte was a soldier and an administrator, not a politician, attempting to control, defend and exalt a new and all but unmanageable nation.

The Consulate inherited a disordered France, but one in which administrative beginnings had already been made. Bonaparte built upon their foundation. Power did not make him a reactionary, but he used it relentlessly to bring about order.

The first step towards such order was the new Constitution. The Constitution of the Year VIII (promulgated December 15, 1799, and adopted by a *plébiscite*) was the fourth adopted by France since 1789, and showed the persistence of classic ideals in its very terms.¹

It was largely the work of Bonaparte who gradually overcame the influence of the more theoretical Sieyès. It provided for a government which might be described as a transition from the older republican type where the representatives of the people were really supposed to have all power, to the militaristic, in which they had little more than registering power. In fact, it was a monarchical republic. It consisted of (1) a Senate of eighty members elected for life; (2) a Tribunate (100 members) that could discuss measures proposed by the executive without voting; (3) a Legislature that could vote

¹ It is worth noticing that this Constitution like so much of revolutionary legislation, revived the terminology of ancient Rome.

but not discuss; (4) a Council of State which could draft and initiate legislation; and (5) an executive, the Consulate, consisting of three Consuls, to hold office for ten years. The First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte, had all executive power, appointing ministers and officials of the nation, departments and municipal councils, officers of the army and navy, judges, ambassadors. The two other Consuls were to be consulted, but they had no power to control his acts. Popular elections were preserved, although so complicated as to prevent immediate control of the state by the nation. Largely because of his control of the Council of State by which all legislation was initiated the First Consul was an autocrat for his term of ten years.¹

Bonaparte, surrounded by his Council of State appointed by himself as well as other able advisers, showed amazing administrative ability.² His general policies were those initiated by the Revolution and blunderingly followed by the Directory, but now the Republic was to discover how efficient can be a highly centralized government and a bureaucracy. Political liberty, which had been the watchword of the Constituent Assembly, was no longer a dominating passion. Although the vocabulary of the Revolution was still preserved, freedom of the press was limited for the purpose of the control of public opinion. As Bonaparte said to the Council of State, the romance of the Revolution had passed. Under the direction

¹The associates of Bonaparte were Cambacérès, a really great lawyer, and Lebrun, an agreeable man of learning. In elections the people voted for *notables of the communes*, who elected a tenth of their members as *notables of the departments*, who elected a tenth of their members, and from these the Senate chose members of the legislature. There was thus reached a compromise between an elective and an appointive government.

²The activity of this Council can be inferred from the fact that in 1804 it discussed 3365 matters.

of the First Consul, assisted by such ministers as Talleyrand, Maret, Fouchè, and Berthier, it was to care "only for what is real and practicable in the application of principles and not for the speculative and hypothetical." After a decade's trial of oratory, terror and theoretical idealism, government at last had found an efficient basis—a standing army at the command of a man of no political party, who could win victories.

Under its reorganization France preserved the really permanent work of the Revolution. Land tenure was unchanged, civil rights were protected, the constructive legislation of the Terror was not repealed. The provincial and communal organizations were maintained, but the endless elections of the earlier constitutions were abolished and local government was made dependent on the central government.¹ And what was even more important, order returned to the distracted state.

Both now and throughout his career, Bonaparte showed himself a remarkable financier, especially in his ability to keep expenses within bounds. The credit of the Republic was restored by a new system of taxation, the establishment of a sinking fund used to keep up the price of national bonds, the refunding of a considerable portion of the public debt and the founding of the Bank of France which could assist in the financial operations of the Treasury. Trade began to revive with public credit and the

¹ Thus the prefect of each province was subject to the Minister of the Interior. The First Consul appointed the mayors of *communes* of more than five thousand, the prefect those of smaller towns. The electoral bodies were continued, but had little power, except to give advice, and exercise some share in taxation. The police (which included the Secret Service) was controlled by the central government. Thus was laid the foundation for the present French bureaucracy, and by way of example, that of continental Europe.

ending of reckless profiteering invited by a depreciated currency. The peasants had their land titles respected. Laws of inheritance passed by the revolutionary legislatures were not abolished. The internal customs, the feudal exactions, the tithes, and the inequitable fiscal system of the old régime were not revived.

Promotion in civil and military life was open to all. The bloody decrees which had been passed so indiscriminately against the *émigrés*, royalist sympathisers and non-juring priests were repealed. Bonaparte was to be the head of a nation. Even the revolt of La Vendée which had so often threatened the stability of the state was ended. Royalists, Republicans, and radicals alike were forced into subjection to the new government.

The most significant act of the First Consul was the publication of the *Code Napoléon*. Here again he completed the work of the Revolution in its search for legal equality and regularity. Ever since the Constituent Assembly, the various legislative bodies of France had attempted to reduce the great mass of decrees, precedents and special laws into some system. Bonaparte gathered about himself the ablest lawyers of the nation and impetuously urged the *Code* forward to completion. He himself took part in the discussions and in a case of division of opinion applied his own good sense to an establishment of the proper statute. Without legal training, he made decisions when experts differed. He would tap his head and declare, "This good instrument is more useful to me than the advice of men who are accounted well-trained and experienced." And generally his decisions were justified. In 1802 the work was issued, Bonapart saying that he would go down to posterity with the *Code* in his hand. His estimate of its importance has been fulfilled. Today the *Code* is the basis of the law of

France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Java and South Africa. It even appears in the laws of Louisiana. It is a marvel of condensation, although so inelastic as later to be the buttress of conservatism, and does not fully express modern ideas as to the rights of women.

Another important measure was the Concordat (1802) made with Pope Pius VII, by which the Roman Church was re-established in France under the protection of the government. Bonaparte regarded religion as a good means of keeping the people quiet, and despite his high-handed treatment of the Popes, wished their sanction and support with the masses.¹ Millions of Frenchmen were loyal Catholics and the persecution of the clergy had been one of the worst mistakes of the Terror.²

The Concordat met with violent opposition on the part of many of the prominent revolutionists who had embraced atheism, but in adopting it Bonaparte not only solidified

¹ No small discussion has arisen regarding Bonaparte's personal attitude toward religion. During the revival of Napoleonic fervour in 1840 he was credited (not very reliably) with an eloquent testimony to Christ. He is also said to have received extreme unction, but whether this was by his own choice is open to serious question. He seems to be an illustration of disillusionment from extreme religious feeling in youth, which swept him into the atheism of the Revolution. From this he passed to a philosophical theism and a perception, if not admiration, of the power of the Roman Catholic church. In Egypt he all but became a Moslem. But whatever religion he had seems to have played no part in his personal life, beyond his careful attendance upon mass while Consul. After the manner of successful men, he grew fatalistic and self-reliant and seems to have regarded religion only as a means of social control. "Society," he declared, "cannot exist without inequality of material wealth, and this inequality cannot exist without religion." See Rose, *Napoleonic Studies*, ch. 3.

² Thibadeau estimated that of the population of 35,000,000, 15,000,000 were Catholics and 17,000,000 were without religious beliefs, but the first figure is probably too high.

the national spirit, but gained the support of the papacy and made friends with the church throughout all Europe. "The Pope's support is worth an army of 200,000 men," was his characteristic estimate of his new relationship. By the Concordat the Roman Catholic religion was recognized as that of the great majority of the French people and of the Consuls, and was to be observed, subject to general police regulations and a respect for the old self-government of the Gallican church, although later more stringent regulations were established and the French church in reaction lost much of its independence of the Pope. The French bishops were all to resign and ten French archbishops and fifty bishops were to be appointed by the government and confirmed by the Pope. The state undertook to support the clergy, including the Lutheran and Calvinist. Later similar treatment was accorded the Jews.¹

Not so conducive to goodwill, however, were a series of so-called Organic Articles which Bonaparte issued without the assent of the Pope, on the basis of the police power of the state. These Articles among other things reasserted the old Gallican claim to the immunity of the French church from papal bulls and decrees of non-French synods; forbade the assembly of French bishops in councils and synods, or their absence from their own dioceses without the permission of the government. Such laws deprived the Roman church of full freedom without making it strictly a state church.²

¹See Debidour, *Hist. des Rapports de l'Église et de l'État en France* (1789-1870); Sloane, *the French Revolution and Religious Reform*, chs. 14, 15.

²Yet the ultimate result of Bonaparte's policy was to throw the French church into new dependence upon Rome. Only in Ultramontanism did there seem to be protection from the aggressions of the state.

The scheme of public instruction instituted by the Revolution was manipulated so as to consolidate the intellectual life of the nation and put it under the control of the government. Later the University of Paris was re-established on a firm foundation as the examining body of a system of national education, including public school, *lycées*, and professional schools. The various other institutions of education begun by the revolutionary government, as well as the National Institute of France, were reorganized. From the days of the First Consul dates the present system of education in France.¹

The First Consul also appealed to popular psychology by establishing an aristocracy of a new sort. "A constitution without an aristocracy," he said later, "is a ball lost in the air." While the equality of the Frenchmen before the law was carefully guarded, Bonaparte did not undertake to maintain an equality of honour. He knew men's love of honours. He established a number of distinctions, of which the Legion of Honor was the most remarkable and which was so highly esteemed as to survive all political changes to this day. At last he ventured to organize a new series of titles. With this new aristocracy, many of whose members were of humble birth, he attempted to amalgamate members of the old *noblesse* who had returned to France by the thousands. His new nobility possessed none of the old feudal privileges the Revolution had destroyed and was not regarded as of quite the same dignity as the original aristocracy, but its establishment served undoubtedly to enhance the splendour of his administration.²

¹ See Liard, *L'Enseignement supérieur en France*.

² An anecdote, whether historical or not, shows the spirit of this new aristocracy. A member of the old nobility once sneeringly told a member of the new that he had no ancestry. "I

It further marked more sharply the distinction between his position and that of the ordinary citizen. This distinction was not only seen in his brilliant Court, but was made legal when the Constitution of the Year VIII was changed so as to reduce almost to nothing the power of the Legislature and the Tribunal, and by popular vote (August 1, 1802) Bonaparte was made Consul for life with the privilege of choosing his successor. The forms of the Republic, like its foreign policy and civil equality, continued, but it was a republic like that of Rome after the Battle of Actium. The powers of the Senate were increased, the Tribunal was reduced to fifty members. Constitutionalism was becoming a disguise for militarism. The Empire only gilded what the Consulate had built. But France had become an indestructible nation with institutions lasting to this day.¹

What made this administrative efficiency more remarkable is that while solidifying the new France, Bonaparte was waging desperate war against enemies of the new social order. No fair understanding of either the Consulate or the Empire is possible without some recognition of the general European situation and the policies of the great powers of the times. France was only one unit in a complicated world. The eighteenth century had seen a bewildering succession of policies and wars in which the

am an ancestor," was the reply. Bonaparte realized the status of his new nobility. "The virtue and magic of an aristocracy," he later declared, "consist in time and antiquity, the only things which I was unable to create."

¹ Bonaparte's policy of maintaining the pose of republican appears in his solemn funeral celebration of George Washington (December 14, 1799) who, France was given to understand, had found a successor in the First Consul! It should be added that this celebration marks the establishment of good relations with the United States, which the Directory had all but forced into war.

various European states had sought self-aggrandizement at the expense of each other, and in consequence had developed general lines of enmities and alliances. Prussia and Austria had waged long wars over Silesia; Austria's ambitions in Poland and Turkey ran counter to those of Russia; France had fought Prussia, England and Austria; England, who had sided now with one and now with another continental power in order to prevent any one of them growing too powerful, had now made friends with Russia who was seeking leadership over the continent. All powers alike feared the supremacy of France.

The war which the Consulate inherited from the Convention and the Directory was, therefore, a disturbance of European affairs in general and liable at any time to draw into its course nations who feared reduction of territory or relative reduction of influence in continental affairs. The course of events was to show that this possibility could become actual, and the wars against France soon grew confused with the plans of various nations for self-aggrandizement.

Against this continental background of unstable international relations and undeveloped theories of a balance of power must be thrown the new war between France and Austria.

From the point of view of Austrian statesmen, the resurgence of French power was unendurable. Not only had Austrian influence in Italy been lost, but Austria persistently schemed to regain the territory taken from her by Campo Formio. The success of Bonaparte seemed too incredible, too much the sport of chance, to be permanent, and, with or without causes of war, Austria repeatedly broke peace. A fair understanding of the wars of the Consulate rests upon the recognition that the whole world

was still ready to stake national prosperity upon the issue of battle. For two generations European statesmen had known no other policy. If Austria had won in these wars, France would have been stripped of her new territories, as later by the Congress of Vienna. But instead of being defeated, Bonaparte was victor. That meant more territory for France to reorganize according to the new political ideals, new influence of France in continental politics, and new determination on the part of Austria to recoup herself. In so doing, she sought the alliance of other countries each of which had its own fear of French primacy. These in turn staked their fortunes on battle—and again France won! War was thus inevitable because of the very situation into which Europe had been forced.

But there were deeper grounds for the opposition of Europe to France. The success of France had brought revolutionary principles to the door of every state in Europe.¹ These principles were, it will be recalled, latent in most of the European states before the outbreak of the Revolution. But the Jacobin rule had given them an entirely new significance. Even such romantic idealism as that of Joseph II seemed to be a threat of violent Revolution. It is no wonder that governments which, cherishing feudal institutions and mediæval limitations on trade and land owning, feared a Constitution like the plague, were aroused to self-protection by Bonaparte's victories. Even England who had welcomed the Constituent Assembly as the herald of a new day was swept by a reaction that found its prophet in no less than Edmund Burke. It is true that sympathy with the principles of the Revolution in England found expression in such works as Paine's *Rights of Man*, but such publications simply increased the

¹ For details see *Cambridge Modern History*, VIII, ch. 25.

alarm of the government. Liberal Englishmen were forced into the background, the Whig party grew powerless and Toryism flourished. Parliament refused reform, and the church and the Universities were outspoken in their condemnation of revolutionary principles. The rise of Bonaparte consolidated the reaction because of a war which threatened the foundations of England's prosperity.

In Germany the philosophy of natural rights had not gained anything like the hold it had acquired in France, but the philosophers and poets had hailed the Revolution with enthusiasm. But in Germany as in England the violence of the Jacobins made men fear the principles which they professed. The ruling classes crushed all attempts to reform. Political clubs were abolished. Revolutionary publications were seized. Feudal institutions were reinforced. There were in the German states men like Stein in Prussia who were opposed to feudalism but they were opposed by the *junker* class. There was also a large number of intellectuals who were in sympathy with the Revolution, but this fact gave new anxiety and fear to governments which saw the steady approach of expanding France.

In Austria the reforms of Joseph II had served to strengthen rather than weaken conservatism, and to commit the government to a policy of political immobility. The intellectuals as a class attacked the Revolution violently, but the masses were too ignorant to be affected by Rousseau and too wretched to undertake agitation for their own improvement. The government made no concessions and suppressed all symptoms of Jacobinism severely. Austria was still a feudal state with a government more interested in territorial aggrandizement than in reform. The fear begotten by the doings of the Convention finally triumphed in Austrian politics when in 1794 Thogut be-

came Prime Minister. Sympathizers with the Revolution were thrown into prison, executed; liberal books were burned; discussions even among the intellectuals were suppressed.

In the other states of Europe circumstances were much the same. The educated classes were filled with French ideals, but after 1792 the governments, with the possible exception of Sweden, looked upon liberalism as a threat of revolution and suppressed all efforts at reform.

There was thus in the political consciousness of Europe a fear of the outbreak of revolution. It is not hard, therefore, to estimate the effect in the minds of the governing classes of the extension of those principles by the French conquests in Italy and Germany. Even though the people of these territories were not possessed of the revolutionary fervour, they were ready to enjoy the new revolutionary rights which came from the dissolution of feudalism and the abolition of absolutism. For the first time in the eighteenth century, if not indeed in the history of Europe, territorial expansion brought constitutional change. The peoples of the conquered territories were really better off under Bonaparte. If this expansion were to continue French victory meant nothing less than the expansion of such constitutional changes across the continent.

The Second Coalition gradually disintegrated because of the antagonizing interests of the nations involved, but England and Austria, the century-long enemies of France, remained in arms. Nor can it be denied that France had grown warlike. Victories had made the nation keen to win more victories. That this national temper was the outcome of the Revolution can be seen in the determination to spread republican principles by arms. Both these motives were matched by Austria's fear of the spread of

political liberty and a determination to regain lost territory and European prestige. National dislike and fear of Bonaparte as well as the commercial struggle between England and France for the control of Asia and America made peace between these two powers out of the question.

In these tremendous social forces, rather than in the personal ambition of an adventurer and war-lord, although that was by no means lacking, must be sought the explanation of the wars of the Consulate and the consequent growth of French supremacy on the continent of Europe.

For a time Bonaparte, probably with a sincere desire for a peace that would leave him time for his reorganization of France, undertook by diplomacy to bring England and Austria into friendly relations, but neither dared to accept his terms. France was thus again convinced that it was carrying on a war of national defence. In no small degree this was true. Eastern Europe, as events showed, was not only opposed to the hegemony of France but was determined to prevent the spread of civil equality and constitutional government. Until the last years of his career, war was forced upon Bonaparte by the ineradicable enmity of Prussia, Austria and Russia to the extension of the new ideals embodied in the French state and extended by French arms. When Napoleon fell, Europe for half a century and more was at the mercy of a reaction that refused popular rights and constitutional government.¹

¹ This conviction of national danger was deepened by the reply of England to Bonaparte's overtures. In this it was stated that the most acceptable guarantee of the sincerity of France would be the recall of the Bourbons. If England really wanted peace, a more unfortunate answer could hardly have been framed. It gave Bonaparte precisely the psychological ground he needed for renewed war. And it is hard to see how war could have been avoided when one recalls the total situation.

While England patrolled the seas and furnished subsidies, the war on land was pushed by Austria. Two great armies threatened France, one under Kray on the Rhine, and the other under Melas in Italy. Switzerland lay between these two forces and Switzerland, thanks to the conscienceless policy of the Directory, was in the power of the French. This made possible one of the most brilliant of Bonaparte's military campaigns. Massing his troops under Moreau on the Rhine, he ordered them to cross the river and attack the troops in Southern Germany. This plan was carried out by Moreau in a campaign characterized by great foresight and caution. Meanwhile, in May, 1800, Bonaparte himself led an army dragging its cannon through the snow in hollowed trunks of trees, over the Great St. Bernard Pass and appeared in the north of Italy. Old Melas could hardly believe the news. He promptly retreated, but Bonaparte (June 2) entered Milan and pressed after him. On June 14 and 15, 1800, was fought the great Battle of Marengo, in which the Austrians, after having won in the first day's fighting, were thoroughly defeated. By this victory, all Italy was open to France. Moreau's brilliant victory at Hohenlinden (December 3, 1800) made the fall of Vienna inevitable and the Austrians sued for peace.

The Treaty of Lunéville, February 9, 1801, once more made France supreme in Italy, reaffirmed the Rhine as its boundary and assured it all territory gained by Campo Formio together with some additions. The large states of Europe were made still larger at the expense of the small, and every German princeling became a beggar at the court of the First Consul, seeking for grants of ecclesiastical lands in Germany which were secularized and used as a source of reparation for lands taken on the left of the Rhine. The position of Austria as head of the old Ger-

man Empire (or better, the Holy Roman Empire) was thus weakened, and a basis laid for the later Confederation of the Rhine.

In the necessary reorganization of these conquered territories the First Consul had to adopt some policy. This he found in that of the Revolution. Feudal privileges were destroyed, ecclesiastical lands were secularized, equal rights before the law were guaranteed by the giving of the new states a published scheme of government based on the *Code*. But the divergence of his policy from that of the Revolution begins to appear clearly. He did not attempt to further political liberty. In these conquered and re-established states as in France control was centred in a national government under his control. It was, in fact, constitutional autocracy—if such a paradox is permissible—rather than republicanism that was re-making both France and her new dependencies.

But although Austria, for the time being at least, was thus made harmless, the permanence of this success was contingent upon a general peace and England refused to abandon war. Bonaparte's victories upon land were balanced by Nelson's victories upon the sea. The situation was unique. Neither country could fight the other on its own terms. The war threatened to become a stalemate. But neutrals were drawn in. Still possessed of the idea that the economic strength of England was commercial and financial and that this could be destroyed, the First Consul had closed all the ports under his control to English commerce. England had retaliated by establishing a paper blockade of French ports and by seizing French property on the high seas even when under a neutral flag. It was a policy severely injurious to the neutral nations, and helped the First Consul to develop an armed neutrality in the northern states. As an inducement to Russia, Bonaparte

vaguely suggested a partition of the Turkish Empire and proposed that Malta should be put under the protection of the Czar, a proposition which England refused to consider. Russia joined Denmark and Sweden in an armed league to withstand the English blockade, seized all English ships in her ports, and joined with Bonaparte in planning an ambitious expedition against India from the north, with which the French forces in Egypt were to cooperate.

Just at this time England lost the services of Pitt. His resignation was not due to foreign affairs, but to complications which had arisen in England, where January 1, 1801, there had been established the Legislative Union between Ireland and Great Britain. In bringing this about, Pitt had promised that the political disadvantages of Roman Catholics should be removed, but George III repudiated the promises of his Prime Minister. Thereupon Pitt resigned (March 14, 1801).

The outlook for England was dark indeed and Addington, the new Prime Minister, immediately made overtures of peace to Bonaparte.

The negotiations for this peace extended over nearly a year. During their progress Bonaparte showed that he had diplomatic as well as military and administrative genius. And never was genius more needed. Hardly had the English proposals been made than there came disconcerting news from the north. On April 2, 1801, Nelson had defeated the Danish fleet at Copenhagen and reopened the Baltic to English commerce.¹ Paul I, of Russia, who had been friendly to Bonaparte, was assassinated (March 23, 1801) and Alexander I, his successor, immediately

¹ So slow was the transmission of news, however, that Paris knew nothing of this fact until April 17, 1801.

transferred his friendship from France to England. The projects which his father and Bonaparte had planned vanished in thin air. The French army in Egypt surrendered to the English and Turkish troops (August, 1801) although the news of this collapse of the French plans did not reach Paris until the peace negotiations were practically ended. Spain made peace with Portugal, the ally of England, and thus gave ports for the entrance of English goods in the South as a supplement to the Scandinavian and Russian ports in the North.

As may be well imagined, this sudden transformation of a situation was not without its influence on the negotiations for peace, but throughout them all Bonaparte refused to make any considerable concessions to England and Joseph Bonaparte, his representative, was more than equal to the English envoy, Lord Cornwallis, who proved as inefficient as a diplomat as he had been as a general in America. October 1, 1801, preliminary articles of peace were signed by England to be followed in a few days by other treaties with Russia, Turkey and Bavaria. March 17, 1802, the negotiations finally culminated in the Peace of Amiens, and for the first time in a decade, Europe was at peace.

When one recalls the condition of France in 1798, the situation disclosed and established by these treaties seems all but incredible. The France of 1802, while not fully recovered from the disorders of the Jacobin régime, had been given a strong government, new industrial prosperity, religious freedom, and the assurance of civil rights; the national boundaries had been extended beyond those of even Louis XIV; Italy had been made a dependent; England had restored all lands taken from France and her allies, with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon; Egypt was returned to Turkey; the Cape of Good Hope was in

the hands of an ally of France, the Batavian Republic, and Malta was to be restored to the Knights of St. John, although left temporarily under the protection of the King of Naples and garrisoned by English troops; the friendly Republic of the Ionian Isles had been recognized. Bonaparte agreed only to guarantee the integrity of Portugal and withdraw his troops from Naples. Thus France, provided she had naval force, indirectly controlled the two routes of England to India.

Yet no concessions regarding England's commerce had been made. War had stopped, but no foundations for a lasting peace had been laid. The Peace of Amiens was in fact an armistice favourable to France, but containing seeds of new wars. The peace it brought was a soldier's peace and lasted barely a year. Bonaparte hoped it would last ten.

In the interval between wars, the First Consul devoted himself tirelessly to the consolidation of his power and the development of his foreign policies on the continent and overseas. Later he was to be more powerful, but never more creative. "Work," he once said, "is my element. I am born and built for work. I have known the limits of my legs. I have known the limits of my eyes. I have never known the limits of my work." As regards the internal affairs of France, industries were fostered, foreign trade was developed as rapidly as the lack of ships permitted, the national income was severely budgeted, Bonaparte insisting on meticulous economy, and commercial intercourse with other states was favoured.¹

Great preparations were made for building a vast navy, and public works were projected all over France. What

¹ In 1802 ten thousand English visitors are said to have been in Paris.

was, however, of less happy augury, a protectionist tariff was enforced in 1803, which seriously affected the importation of English manufactures.

As regards continental affairs, Bonaparte followed a traditional policy of France: hostility to Austria and friendliness toward the small German states and Russia. It will be recalled that by the Peace of Lunéville the loss sustained by the German princes because of the extension of the French boundaries to the Rhine was to be offset by the grants from the enormous estates of the church in Germany, which had become secularized with the consent of Austria. Bonaparte, in association with Russia, was the dispenser of these indemnities. As a result, the smaller states of Germany were drawn together. Bavaria's centre of interest was shifted from Austria to France and the foundation was laid for that recombination of the states of Europe which was soon to follow. The buffer states were compelled to relieve the financial burden of France by supporting the troops quartered among them, as well as by making large contributions to the French treasury. Prussia, though soon to regret its action, was won to friendship. Elba and Piedmont were annexed to France; the progress of revolutionary ideas with their accompanying disorders in Italy was checked; the Pope and the King of Naples became dependent on France; the Grand Duchy of Tuscany was ceded to Spain in return for Louisiana. France thus became the dominant power on the continent of Europe.

Bonaparte's colonial policy during this respite from war aimed at weakening England by building up colonies, both in the East and in the West. In the West he had ambitions to develop the French possessions in the West Indies and on the continent of North America. Among the former, San Domingo was by far the most important.

It had long been under French control, but after civil war had come under the control of a most remarkable negro, Toussaint l'Ouverture, who professed loyalty to France. Its commerce was mostly with the United States and England, and geographically it was a connecting link between France and Louisiana. Bonaparte, failing as usual to see that the real source of a nation's prosperity is not commerce but production, and possessed of the fixed idea that economic forces can be arbitrarily controlled, determined to crush the new government in the interest of commercial expansion. He was successful, but at a fearful cost of men, money, and honour. The San Domingo expedition served only to irritate England, destroy any illusion that might have persisted as to Bonaparte's republicanism, and drain the resources of France.¹

The First Consul also had great plans for the development of the vast Louisiana territory, which included the entire Western half of the Mississippi basin. American opposition to the transfer of this territory from Spain to France had been pronounced. For years the expanding republic had seen the necessity of its control of the Mississippi and the possession of New Orleans. It was clear that if there were any development of a foreign power in this territory, the prosperity of the United States would be seriously threatened. The incompetence of Spain made this danger remote, but when France obtained possession of the territory, protests immediately swept over America. French relations with the United States had been strained and had led to what amounted to naval war in 1798. Peace had been declared in 1801, but this new opposition to Bonaparte's plans toward Louisiana threatened a new

¹ See Adams, *Historical Essays; Cambridge Modern History*, IX, 419-22. Wendell Phillips has a famous oration on Toussaint l'Ouverture.

struggle. The whole danger, however, quickly passed when the certainty of war between France and England induced Bonaparte to sell the Louisiana territory (1803) to the United States for \$11,250,000.

India and the Far East were also factors in the development of Bonaparte's ambitions. Not only might they be expected to provide a base of commercial expansion for France, but the East was to furnish a vulnerable point for attacking British commercial expansion. The Eastern policy of Bonaparte during this year of peace argues that he regarded war inevitable. France had for a considerable time held possessions in the Indian Ocean, but in 1801 the British had seized all except the Isle of Bourbon and the Isle of France. These, it will be recalled, had been returned by the Peace of Amiens, but Bonaparte in 1802 sent Decaen to India as Captain General, with secret instructions that, in case war broke out, he was to be ready to seize the Indian possessions of England, Portugal and Holland. And this although peace had just been declared! Decaen's expedition, however, did not sail until 1802 and by that time Sir Arthur Wellesley's victories over native rulers enabled him to checkmate all Bonaparte's plans. The French expedition, however, did succeed in destroying a large number of English merchantmen.

Under the guise of a scientific expedition, Bonaparte sent a number of ships to Australia with the apparent aim of seizing South and Central Australia and Van Diemen's Land. The purposes of the expedition, however, are somewhat obscure, since affairs at home soon made any expansion in Australasia impossible.¹

In all of these far flung plans there is disclosed the

¹ On colonial policies see Roloff, *Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons*.

centre of Bonaparte's foreign policy—the establishment of France as the first power on the continent and the destruction of England through the destruction of her commerce and colonial power. It was natural, therefore, that England should regard them with anxiety. The Peace of Amiens had never been popular in England and Bonaparte's growing influence in continental affairs, particularly his occupation of Holland and Switzerland, aroused antagonism since it threatened to destroy that continental balance of power which England desired as a guarantee of her supremacy on the seas.¹ Bonaparte did nothing to allay this dislike and, in fact, increased it by his insistence that England take action against *émigrés*. England demanded a return to the conditions set by the treaty of Amiens. Bonaparte, believing the English were averse to war, demanded non-interference with his high-handed treatment of Switzerland and the removal of English troops from Malta. But England refused to be brow-beaten. When on January 30, 1803, the *Moniteur* published a report of Colonel Sebastiani on the military weakness of English control of Egypt, dislike turned into indignation. The purposes of Bonaparte were obviously to gain every advantage for a future war. England thereupon refused to surrender Malta in accordance with the treaty of Amiens unless Bonaparte would abandon Holland. Bonaparte wanted peace for the completion of his plans, but he was as indifferent to the psychology of peace as any Jacobin. The situation brought its own results. He refused the British terms and on May 18, 1803, England declared war. In the same month the French oc-

¹ Pariset, *Le Consulate et L'Empire*, 193 (Lavissee, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, III). From the English point of view: Browning, *England and Napoleon in 1803*; Rose, *William Pitt and the National Revival*.

cupied Hanover, the ancient home of the royal family of England, but now within the recognized sphere of Prussian influence, and planned the invasion of England. The war that thus broke forth was to continue until the fall of Napoleon.

In the midst of all this rapid political change, Bonaparte had steadily been assuring himself the control of France and its dependencies. Even while engaged in the negotiations with England regarding peace, he had been elected (January 25, 1802) President of the Italian Republic (formerly the Cisalpine Republic) and in the same year the Doge of the Ligurian Republic and later (October 4, 1802), taking advantage of the disturbed situation of Switzerland, had unscrupulously reorganized that country by the Act of Mediation and become Mediator of the Helvetic League. It was natural that he should chafe under the ten years' limitation of his power. The reconstruction of France, much less that of Europe, could not be accomplished in so brief a period. It is likely that the nation itself shared in his desire for permanence. As long as an autocracy is creative and assures civil equality, it is popular and seems preferable to political liberty that promises only debates and disorder. Bonaparte determined to remove the time limitation on his power. August 2, 1802, he was appointed by *plébiscite* Consul for life, with the right of appointing his successor. After the outbreak of the new war with England Bonaparte exploited his position by taking a step which must have appeared inevitable. France would not have consented to the restoration of the Bourbons, or the establishment of a monarchy, but it did not object to having a First Consul for life assume the title of Emperor of the French! Under the stress of the new war and the popularity gained by attempts at assassinating him, he was proclaimed Em-

peror on May 18, 1804, by the Tribunate and the Senate and this act was ratified promptly by a *plébiscite* of 3,572,329 to 2,569. A new Constitution (the fifth) insured his autocracy by limiting the already reduced powers of the Tribunate and the Legislature. Napoleon Bonaparte, former sub-lieutenant of artillery, became Napoleon, Emperor of the French. The Revolution had ended. Imperialism had taken its place. An Empire with civil rights but no liberty confronted reactionary governments which with the exception of England had neither.

The coronation of the Emperor took place in the Cathedral of Notre Dame. It was a brilliant exhibition of Bonaparte's growing love of display and self-assurance. The Pope was brought to Paris to consecrate him. Napoleon met him in state, but so planned affairs that the Pope could not avoid entering Paris in Napoleon's own carriage, seated on the Emperor's left hand. During the service of consecration Bonaparte took the crown from the Pope's hands and placed it on his own head. A year later (1805), emulating Charlemagne, whose successor he now claimed to be, he went to Milan and crowned himself with the iron crown of the Lombards as King of Italy, saying as he did so, "God has given it to me. Let him who touches it beware."¹

A shadow on the new Empire was the banishment of Moreau and the imprisonment and mysterious strangling of Pichegru on the charge of participation in the plots against the First Consul. Even more serious and unjustifiable was the execution of the Duc d'Enghien, a member of the House of Bourbon. He had been an

¹ As a sort of return for his recognition of the new Emperor, the Pope gained the re-establishment of the Gregorian calendar on January 1, 1806, as well as the recognition of the Saints' days in France.

active representative of the royalist movement and was living on the frontier of France. He, too, was charged with being engaged in the royalist attempt to assassinate Bonaparte, was seized on German territory, taken into France and summarily executed. This act was chargeable in no small degree to Bonaparte, who at St. Helena justified it. Talleyrand, however, described it more accurately as "worse than crime, a blunder." It was to cost Bonaparte a much needed alliance with Prussia, the indignation of the Austrian court, and the trust of several men upon whom he had to rely.

Criticism born of these acts, however, was silent in the face of the calculated brilliancy of the new Imperial Court and the extraordinary military success of the new Emperor. But the national spirit, despite an undercurrent of distrust, had changed. Insensibly Frenchmen began to distinguish between France and the Emperor. A military empire could preserve non-political privileges, but could not embody the national ideals which had fired the hearts of the men of '89. Its permanence was at the mercy of the Emperor's military prowess. Its victories were to bring progress to continental Europe, but in a few years it was to prove inferior to the national idealism evoked in the nations Napoleon conquered and failing to understand, oppressed. But for the moment France, no longer filled with the idealism of the Revolution, revelled in glory.¹

¹ It is worth noting that Napoleon even at the height of his power maintained a simple personal life. All the *mémoires* agree on this. He was genial in his relations with his attendants, accustomed to hold long gossiping conversations with his valet. His table was anything but elaborate and he allowed only twelve minutes for his dinner which was served at six o'clock. Eight minutes sufficed for his breakfast. Although accumulating vast sums of money from various sources, he

was ready to use his resources for the state and was exceedingly generous though always in fear of being cheated or overcharged. His household expenses were always under his scrutiny, and he planned to make his clothes last him three years. In contrast Murat spent 27,000 francs for ostrich plumes. In his correspondence Napoleon exhibited an almost uncanny devotion to details. He regulated the bread his soldiers should eat and the number of shoes they should carry on their marches—one pair on their feet and two pairs in their knapsacks. He worked most of the night with his secretaries and when necessary he could spend a hundred hours in his travelling carriage. He once wrote Josephine: "I have not been dry nor have my feet been warm for a week."

CHAPTER XXIII

THE EMPIRE OF THE FRENCH AND THE REORGANIZATION OF EUROPE.¹

General situation. I. War with Third Coalition: 1. Naval success of England. 2. Defeat of Austria. 3. Defeat of Prussia. 4. Defeat of Russia. 5. Peace of Tilsit. II. The Federal Empire of Europe. III. Economic war with England, the Continental System of Napoleon; 1. The Battle of Decrees. 2. General economic effect. 3. Political Effects. IV. Extension of Napoleon's Empire: 1. Spain. 2. War with Austria. 3. War with Russia. 4. Napoleon and France. 5. Napoleon and Europe. 6. His Divorce and Marriage.

The central fact in the career of Napoleon is his attempt to bring Europe under the hegemony of France. This attempt involved three vast undertakings: the destruction of the European balance of power by uniting the Continent against England; the establishment of new but dependent states enjoying the civil rights already established in France by the Revolution; and the accomplishment and maintenance of these conditions by military power. The first aim was accomplished by the Peace of Tilsit; the second, by his founding of states following his successive victories; the third, military imperialism, proved only a temporary possibility.

To the student of military affairs the record of the battles of the Empire is important. To the student of the French Revolution it has meaning only as battles

¹ In general see Fournier, *Napoleon the First*, chs. 11-13; Lanfrey, *History of Napoleon*, II, III; Rose, *Life of Napoleon I*, II, 1-212; Bourne, *The Revolutionary Period in Europe*, chs. 20-24.

affected the success of the Napoleonic programme and the extension of the revolutionary ideals. To give them detailed attention throws the course of events out of perspective. The development of institutions, the reorganization of conquered territory with constitutions and civil rights, the rise of personal ambition in the pursuance of national greatness and international readjustment, the sudden collapse of militarism and the spectacular failure of the greatest effort of modern times to enforce European unity, all these are the true material for an understanding of the Empire. Its wars have significance as they determine the fate of the results of the Revolution in Europe and testify to the impotence of militarism as a basis of social reorganization. Napoleon as Consul was the champion of civil equality, the destroyer of ancient privileges, the founder of a powerful state. As Emperor he became the servant of conditions he was able and even forced to establish, of international situations and policies he created but was unable to control. After the outbreak of the war in 1803, militarism, born of the success of the Revolution, and for a few years the basis of vast reconstruction, became a terrible master but was doomed to destruction at the hands of the new spiritual forces of Europe it had outraged.

More significant than the change of titles, therefore, was the fact that the welfare of France and the fortunes of the continent were identified with an individual's career. From this time on, although at St. Helena he was to argue at length that he never abandoned republican ideals, Napoleon was caught in the vicious circle which authority won by coercion creates. He clearly saw that as Emperor he lacked the security possessed by other monarchs. He ever needed more power to hold what he had gained. Every reorganized state became a hostage given to fortune.

International rivalries compelled national expansion. War became necessary to his policy.

Yet in 1804 he would have been an exceptionally keen observer who could have detected weakness in the Empire of the French. The new Emperor¹ was promptly recognized by Prussia and Austria. Russia was friendly, and Prussia, though greatly distressed by the Emperor's oppressive treatment of Hanover, was determined to remain neutral and serve two masters. Spain declared war with England (Dec. 12, 1804). Thus at the beginning of the war England was Napoleon's only enemy.

But the situation soon changed. The hostility of England always involved the organization of coalitions against Napoleon. Pitt was recalled as Prime Minister and adopted that policy of united action by all European powers which ultimately was to prove successful. Sweden entered into an alliance with England in December, 1804. Pitt was soon able to enlist Alexander I of Russia to his support. That young idealist immediately upon his accession had attempted various reforms and was without great difficulty persuaded by Pitt to see in Napoleon an enemy of progress and in the French activity in the Mediterranean a threat to Russian policy in the Near East where Alexander was seeking to dismember the Turkish Empire. An offensive and defensive alliance was made by England and Russia (April, 1805).

British negotiations with Austria did not succeed easily. Francis II hesitated to enter upon hostilities. Two wars with Napoleon had resulted in disaster and Austria's internal affairs were weak and disorganized. Francis II maintained a scrupulous neutrality, closing his ports to both French and English and forbidding any popular agi-

¹ England never formally recognized Bonaparte as Emperor and used the title only in the negotiations of 1806 and 1814.

tation against Napoleon. But at the same time he made preparations for war. With Russia and England united against him, delay was full of danger for Napoleon. He saw Austria as a certain enemy if fortune should turn against him. Imperialism and self-defence alike compelled immediate war. His plans for ruling and reorganizing Europe were at stake.

November 6, 1804, Austria had made a defensive alliance with Russia in fear of what was actually to occur, the transformation of the Republic of Italy into the kingdom of Italy (1805) with Napoleon as king. The incorporation of the Ligurian Republic with France and the gift of Pombino and Lucca by Napoleon to his sister, Elise, was interpreted as a violation of the Treaty of Lunéville. Francis feared that Venetia would suffer the same fate, massed troops in the Tyrol and later mobilized his forces.

While thus Austria hesitated, elaborate preparations were made by Napoleon for the invasion of England. An army of 150,000 men was gathered at Boulogne, where a huge camp had been established. All shipyards under the control of the Emperor were building flat bottomed scows which were to be towed by sailing vessels across the English channel. To draw off the English fleet from the channel, Admiral Villeneuve sailed for the West Indies. Admiral Nelson followed. The French fleet arrived a few days in advance of the English and promptly returned to Europe. Nelson still pursued. After various manoeuvres, the two fleets finally met on October 21, 1805, in the great battle of Trafalgar. Nelson was killed, but in that battle the naval power of France was completely broken and all danger from invasion of England passed. With this danger also passed the hope of French colonial Empire. A new epoch had begun in the struggle

for world supremacy. Before 1805 Spanish and French ships combined outnumbered those of England. Trafalgar made England's shipping supreme. France could not challenge British control of colonial expansion, and the markets of the world.¹

England controlled the seas. The ambitions of Napoleon to dismember Turkey, make the Mediterranean a French lake and gain control of India, though often to reassert themselves during intervals of comparative peace, were all made impracticable. And what was to be of even greater moment, all possibility of defeating England with military and naval forces being now destroyed, Napoleon turned implacably to the use of economic boycott as the one weapon by which England could be forced to seek peace.²

But even before the battle of Trafalgar, events had taken a turn which make it a debatable question whether Napoleon ever seriously intended to invade England but had made his preparations at Boulogne in order to distract the attentions of Austria.³

¹ Wahl, *Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1789 bis 1815*, 153 sq.

² In no small degree the failure of the invasion of England, assuming that it was seriously intended, was due to the wind. Robert Fulton, who had just invented the steamboat, offered Napoleon the fruits of his invention, but was treated with contempt. It is easy to speculate how history might have been changed if Napoleon had used the new motive power, but such speculation is as worthless as that which undertakes to describe what would have happened if Villeneuve had been able to live up to Napoleon's calculations for the trip across the ocean and back again. For the Battle of Trafalgar see Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution*, II, chs. 15, 16.

³ At least this seems probable from a speech made by Napoleon to the Council of State in January, 1805. In his later years he said that he had never seriously considered invading England. Yet, with his characteristic mastery of details, he had ordered medals struck in honour of his victory. In the opinion of many

Napoleon, always keen to hold the initiative, forced Austria from armed neutrality into war. Orders were openly given to embark the troops against England and in August he served an ultimatum on Austria, demanding the removal of Austrian troops from the Tyrol within two weeks. Otherwise, Francis "would not celebrate Christmas in Vienna." Austria refused to remove the troops. Napoleon chose to see in this a determination to attack France without any *casus belli*, while his troops were in England. His interpretation was correct. For on August 9 Austria made an alliance with England and was at war.

Thus in 1805 arose a Third Coalition the purpose of which was to protect Europe from the domination of the too aggressive French Empire and French ideals. Russia, Austria and Sweden were to furnish troops while England patrolled the seas and furnished subsidies. No peace was to be made except by consent of all members of the Coalition. The French were to be driven from Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and Northern Germany, while Holland and Belgium were to be formed into a new state removed from French influence. No agreement was reached regarding the constitutional reforms in the states organized by Napoleon. At the end of the war a Congress was to be called to make all other needed adjustments. It is easy to see in these plans the same policy that dominated European affairs after the Congress of Vienna. More than the ambition of Napoleon was thus involved. The permanence of the results of the Revolution in France and Central Europe were threatened.

The Allies expected Napoleon to attack Austria by way writers, especially the English, he would have inevitably failed to conquer England, even if he had succeeded in crossing the Channel.

of the Black Forest, and the Austrian General Mack waited for him at Ulm, expecting large reinforcements from the Russian forces already approaching. With extraordinary rapidity, Napoleon marched through the neutral Prussian territory of Anspach and before General Mack knew that he was in the vicinity, he was between the Austrians and Vienna at the head of overwhelming forces. There was nothing for General Mack to do but surrender (October 17, 1805). Napoleon in his proclamation declared that he had captured 60,000 men with a loss of less than 1,500 out of action.¹

The way was now open for the converging French armies to march upon Vienna. The prophecy of Napoleon was fulfilled. Francis did not celebrate Christmas in his capital. Vienna was occupied by the French November 13, 1805. The position of Napoleon, however, was critical. Francis would not make peace because he felt that a single defeat would prove fatal to the French in the midst of an enemy's country and without good lines of communications. The safest policy seemed to be that of waiting until the Russian troops came up in force. Furthermore he knew that Prussia, indignant at the violation of her territory, was taking the first steps toward a break with Napoleon, indeed was sending him an ultimatum. Napoleon knew the importance of an immediate victory. He secretly changed his base of supplies from Vienna to the West and established a line of communication which would have made retreat safe in case he met with disaster. Then he moved out from Vienna to the little town of

¹ Napoleon is said to have defined history as "the lies men have agreed to believe." His despatches and proclamations, from this point of view, made history. 30,000 would probably be more accurate than 60,000 prisoners.

Austerlitz. The Austrian commander undertook to intercept the supposed communications of the French with Vienna. It was precisely what Napoleon expected of his opponents, for he tempted them by weakening his right wing while concealing his centre and right. At this period of his career he could almost uniformly expect his opponents to commit some blunder. When the famous sun of Austerlitz rose December 2, 1805, he waited until the enemy columns attacked his carefully weakened right, massed his forces at the enemy's centre and ordered a charge. The Austrian and Russian armies were separated and completely disorganized. Napoleon never won a more decisive victory. He is said to have been prouder of this battle than of any other that he fought. "Roll up the map of Europe," said Pitt when the news of Napoleon's victory reached his deathbed.

And in truth the battle of Austerlitz was to have great results. It assured Napoleon the loyalty of his army, at that time largely composed of seasoned French troops, and it silenced whatever opposition to his growing power there was developing among the French liberals. On December 15 Prussia made a treaty, ceding territory on the left bank of the Rhine and receiving Hanover in exchange. December 26, 1805, there followed the Peace of Pressburg with Austria. In accordance with its terms, Austria lost all that had been gained by the Peace of Campo Formio, being compelled among other concessions to surrender Venice with its dependent possessions, except Trieste, recognize Napoleon as King of Italy, cede her German possessions to Bavaria and other German states, recognize Bavaria and Würtemberg as kingdoms, and to pay an indemnity of 40,000,000 francs.

August 6, 1806, Francis, now Emperor of Austria, abdi-

cated as Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and that ancient but powerless heritage of the Middle Ages ceased to exist. The last vestiges of rivalry to the plans of the new Charlemagne were removed. A "federative system," as Napoleon described it, was to be the nucleus of a new Europe. It was a stupendous undertaking and for it Napoleon was ill prepared. Prophetic statesmanship and a mastery of economic laws, not militarism, are needed when a new social order is in the making.

Living in the early stages of what has become known as the Industrial Revolution, Napoleon seems never to have appreciated the social significance of the economic changes in process before his very eyes. Like all soldiers who control states, he saw military power and dynastic unions rather than community of economic interests as the basis of European unity. Motives to loyalty, therefore, he sought in family ties and personal rewards rather than in national sympathies and commercial solidarity.¹

"I am making a family of kings attached to my federative system," he said. He dethroned the Bourbons in Naples by proclamation, making his brother Joseph King of Naples in 1806 and in 1807 King of Spain. His brother Louis, much against his will, was made King of Holland. His brother Jerome was later King of Westphalia (1807). Murat, husband of his sister Caroline, was made Duke of Berg and later King of Naples (1807), Eugène Beauharnais, his stepson, became Viceroy of Italy; his sister Elise was married to the Duke of Lucca and Pauline to Prince Borghese. And, as a means of compelling concerted action, all these rulers of dependent states were to be citizens of France and thus subject to

¹ It will repay the student to discover points of likeness and difference between Napoleon's world empire of "liberty" and Kaiser Wilhelm's world empire of "kultur."

the Emperor, holding powers and estates at his pleasure.¹ Much of the income and territory of Italy he kept at his personal disposition and used it as a source of revenue outside the national treasury and to establish new states which he gave to his Marshals, whom he made dukes and princes.

The reorganization of Europe proceeded rapidly at the hands of an undefeated master. In July, 1806, was formed the Confederation of the Rhine, with Napoleon as its Protector. The small German states were already more attracted to France than to Austria, for they had to some extent been touched by the new spirit of the age. To this Confederacy ultimately belonged most the German states not annexed to France, with the chief exceptions of Austria, Prussia, Brunswick, and Hesse. For the first time in Germany, petty states and free cities were wrought into larger units and there was a beginning of a real coherence among them as well as the enjoyment of civil privileges. As the Kingdom of Italy was to be a sort of prophecy of united Italy of modern days, so this Confederation of the Rhine was the forerunner of the German Empire of Bismarck. But it was not permitted independence. It was forced to furnish soldiers, munitions of war and subsidies to its Protector.

By the end of 1806 this new Europe possessed of the rights first gained by France and bound together by the personal dependence of its rulers upon the Emperor of the French, extended from the mouth of the Rhine to the Straits of Messina. The continent of Europe with the exception of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Turkey on the East and North, and Spain on the South was at his dis-

¹ His mother, who was to outlive her great son, was generously treated, but saved her income believing Napoleon would some day need it. He was to benefit by this thrift in later years.

posal. And Spain was his ally, while Austria had been reduced to subjection. There remained Prussia and Russia.

Prussia was the first to yield. During his campaign in Austria, Napoleon, ever suspicious of possible coalitions, had been carrying on negotiations with Prussia, the second German power. As yet it was the state of Frederick II, all but untouched by progressive policies. King Frederick William did not wish to enter war, but at the same time he feared the preponderance of French influence on the Continent and the contagion of French ideas of liberty and equality. Napoleon's treatment of Hanover, which he overran with troops and all but ruined, and the forming of the Confederation of the Rhine, aroused the growing indignation of the military group in Prussia, but the king refused to be swayed from his impossible effort to maintain friendship with both France and England. War with Prussia was not wanted by Napoleon, already at war with Austria, but Prussia had mobilized, ostensibly against Russia. Bernadotte, in bringing up the army of Hanover to help Napoleon in Austria, had violated Prussian territory. In retaliation Frederick William offered the Czar passage for his armies through Silesia and November 3 Prussia agreed to demand of Napoleon a reversal of various elements of his policies and in particular the evacuation of Germany, Switzerland and Holland. If these terms were not accepted, Prussia was to enter the war with 180,000 men. The Prussian ambassador was Haugwitz, joint foreign minister, a man incapable of vigorous action, who was soon a plaything of Napoleon and Talleyrand. By a series of clever postponements, he was given no chance to propose the Prussian demands until the Battle of Austerlitz made Prussia's demands impossible. December 15 Haugwitz instead of presenting an ultimatum signed with

Napoleon a treaty. In return, Hanover, which it will be remembered, was now in the possession of the French, was given to Prussia, which had now lost all self-respect. The Duke of Brunswick actually endeavoured to persuade the French ambassador at Berlin that the entire policy of Prussia had been one of dissimulation in order to help France!

The death of Pitt six weeks after Austerlitz put English politics under the direction of Fox, who had been in sympathy with the French Revolution and an admirer of Napoleon. The latter immediately undertook to bring about peace by forcing Prussia into war with England. He saw the opportunity in Hanover, which had been the property of the English crown. Frederick William owned the territory, but in view of its history and his desire to keep on good terms with England, wished to hold title from England, rather than from Napoleon. Accordingly, he issued a proclamation stating, instead of the truth, that Hanover had been placed under the protection of Prussia until peace had been made between France and Great Britain. Such a statement was not only false but stupid. Napoleon seized it to force a break between Prussia and England. In March, 1806, at the demand of Napoleon, Prussia actually closed the ports of Northern Germany and Hanover to English vessels, whereupon England proceeded to seize several hundred Prussian ships in its harbours and wipe Prussian maritime commerce off the seas.

Having thus isolated England and forced all continental powers except Russia to help in the destruction of English commerce, Napoleon approached Fox with the proposals for peace. Fox demanded that Hanover should be returned to England. Napoleon, who had just given it to Prussia, immediately assented, although Prussia did not know of this for several months. For a short time it

seemed as if peace might be established, but negotiations were wrecked over Sicily, where the Bourbon King and Queen of Naples were endeavouring to maintain themselves under English protection. Napoleon demanded Sicily as part of the Kingdom of Naples. England wished no expansion of French power in the Mediterranean. The Emperor of Russia, with whom Fox was carrying on negotiations, agreed to England's policy. Fox broke off negotiations with Napoleon and notified Prussia of Napoleon's promise to England regarding Hanover. Thereupon vacillating Frederick William, despite Prussia's moribund condition, yielded to the military party and declared war upon Napoleon.

Twenty years before, under Frederick II, the Prussian army had been the finest in Europe. In 1806 it was still organized under its old rigid system, officered by elderly gentlemen, most of whom were over sixty, filled with warlike pride, but representing a nation lacking in national spirit and with no unity or vigour in command. Queen Louise of Prussia described this situation in one of her tragic interviews with Napoleon. When asked why Prussia had entered war under conditions so unfavourable to itself: "Sire," she replied, "I must confess to your Majesty the glory of Frederick the Great has misled us as to our real strength." But Prussia was not to be left long in ignorance concerning her actual condition. Immediately upon the proclamation of war, October 1, 1806, the Prussian armies advanced, divided, along the River Saale. Though there never were more faultlessly drilled troops than the Prussians, their generals represented a military science that the Austrian campaigns of Napoleon should have shown to be outgrown. October 14, 1806, in the double battle of Jena and Auerstadt Napoleon completely defeated the Prussian armies, drove them across the Elbe,

received the surrender of garrison after garrison and fortress after fortress, and entered Berlin in triumph on October 27. Thereafter the surrender of fortresses continued. The Prussian generals seemed to have lost all spirit and patriotism. Frederick William was forced into Eastern Prussia, while the Elector of Saxony joined the Confederation of the Rhine, with the new title of King. The French occupied Hanover and the Hanseatic cities. The one hope of Prussia now lay in the support of Russia.

Alexander after Austerlitz had withdrawn his troops, but had not made peace. His plans for the partitioning of Turkey, however, were threatened by Napoleon's success and July 1, 1806, he had made a new treaty with Prussia. By it he promised to support Prussia in return for Frederick's promise not to support France in a war with Austria or Turkey. With this support for his hegemony in Eastern Europe, Alexander had sent troops to the aid of his ally. Before the rout of Jena the Russian command had pushed an army across the frontier. Napoleon fought a number of engagements with the combined Prussian and Russian forces, but they were not decisive and he put his troops into winter quarters in Poland with headquarters at Warsaw. The Poles were summoned to revolt and again became an element in the relations of France with Russia, Prussia and Austria, all three of whom always regarded Poland as a quarry for territory. Each was afraid that the other would get more than herself. Napoleon never lost sight of this rivalry.¹

¹ The first division of Poland between the Allies took place in 1772, the second in 1793, and the third in 1795. By these successive divisions Russia gained 181,000 square miles with 6,000,000 inhabitants; Austria, 45,000 square miles with 3,700,000 inhabitants, and Prussia 57,000 with 2,500,000. Little wonder that Poles should welcome Napoleon as the enemy of the three powers which had thus ruined their national aspirations!

The army of the Allies moved upon Napoleon. February 7, 1807, was fought the indecisive battle of Eylau. For the moment Napoleon was in peril, but undismayed he captured Danzig (March 24, 1807) and on June 17 won the decisive battle of Friedland, where the Russian army was all but cut to pieces. He followed this success by taking the great fortress of Koenigsberg and all territory to the Niemen. Alexander saw the hopelessness of the struggle and made a truce, leaving Prussia at the mercy of an indignant conqueror.

On July 7-9, 1807, the two emperors met in a tent which had been pitched on a raft in the River Niemen. It was a dramatic meeting. Napoleon had an almost hypnotic power of persuasion and this he used to its utmost. Alexander was fascinated by the picture of a reorganized Europe, but even more by the vision of the conquest of Turkey and the East, the possibilities of a descent upon India—in fact, of a new world in which the will of two Emperors should reign supreme. The treaty of Tilsit resulted.

This treaty was in effect two—one between France and Russia, and the other between France and Prussia. Prussia got little mercy. It was forced to cede Napoleon the territory between the Rhine and the Elbe, surrender all lands taken from Poland in the three partitions (from which was created the Duchy of Warsaw), close all harbours to British ships until France made peace with England, reduce its standing army to not more than 42,000 men, pay a war indemnity of 120,000,000 francs,¹ leave its chief fortresses in the possession of France until this amount was paid, and finally to recognize the sov-

And that too, despite the fact that Napoleon was shy of making explicit promises of Polish independence.

¹ In 1808 this indemnity was raised to 140,000,000, but was again reduced to 120,000,000.

ereignty of the three brothers of Napoleon and support 150,000 French troops. Frederick William thus found himself the ignored sovereign of an insignificant state.

The treaty with Russia had less to do with territory, although a part of East Prussia was ceded to Russia. By it Russia recognised various new states Napoleon had created (or, as in the case of Westphalia, was about to create), and each Emperor agreed to use his good offices in making peace for the other in wars Alexander was waging with Turkey and Napoleon with England. Alexander further agreed to enter into war with England providing peace was not established. But the importance of the Treaty of Tilsit cannot be measured even by these remarkable provisions. It apparently combined the two plans for European hegemony. England's opposition to Russian conquest of the Turkish Empire was offset by Napoleon's apparent consent to such action, and the two great powers were thus apparently free to pursue their respective plans for a co-operative hegemony on the Continent. But the Peace of Tilsit, like that of Amiens, carried within it the seeds of war. There was no written consent on Napoleon's part to Russia's control of Turkey, on which he had set his own ambitions. Russia was not to have a free hand in the Near East; its frontiers were exposed to invasion by the erection of an independent Polish state, the Duchy of Warsaw; and its participation in the Continental System was to prove as ruinous to itself as to England.

The action of England in carrying off the Danish fleet after bombarding Copenhagen (September 1807) threw Denmark into alliance with Napoleon. To complete the military record of this wonderful year, we may add that Portugal, who as a friend of England had not excluded British commerce, was occupied by a French army under Junot.

At the end of 1807, after the abolition of the Tribunal, Napoleon was an absolute monarch, controlling, or an ally of, practically the continent of Europe. His vast plans for a new Europe seemed on the way to fulfilment. Italy and all the German states with the exception of Austria and Prussia, shared in the extension of civil rights which France had gained through the Revolution. Feudal privileges had been removed; the *Code Napoléon* had been established as the basis of administration; the old class privileges had been ended and the new administration was pledged by Napoleon to the maintenance of civil rights. The advantages which this reconstruction of Europe established or promised provided the new régime could continue, were immense. These new states of Napoleon were not to pass through the agonies of the Terror, for they were in the hands of a master who saw clearly the difference between political and civil equality. For the former he knew that Europe was not prepared; for the latter he saw it was ready. In this rearrangement of Western Europe, as in his consolidation of Italy, is to be seen the most prophetic of the accomplishments of Napoleon.

The Napoleonic Empire thus represented a serious, even if impracticable, attempt to reorganize Europe under a supreme ruler but upon the basis of the experience of France. It shattered the mediæval mould in which the new age was restrained. Even the reaction that marked the domination of Metternich and Austria after 1815 could not rebuild what 1803 to 1814 destroyed. For the Empire was more than destructive. It built the gains of the Revolution into the social development of continental Europe. How far this was true can be seen by an examination, all too brief, of the new conditions established in the territory which Napoleon gained by war and unhesitatingly reorganized.

In general it may be said that the results of the Revolution as embodied in his policy varied in accordance with the closeness with which these territories were associated with France. The countries actually annexed to France came under the general law and administration of the nation. Dependent and tributary states were not so thoroughly transformed.

In Italy the French had been welcomed as deliverers. But the hopes of political independence cherished by the Italian liberals had not been fulfilled. Independence was not given to buffer-states. The Directory had looted Italian museums, heavy contributions had been laid upon cities, the estates of the church had been sequestered. French generals and officials had pillaged on their own account until checked by Bonaparte. Thanks to his efforts, the middle class and the masses had been won over to the new régime which embodied the general results of the Revolution. Although neither the Italian Republic nor the Kingdom of Italy was given full independence, it was given a constitution and a considerable amount of self-determination. Its internal condition greatly improved, agriculture flourished, feudal privileges were abolished, the clergy were restrained, civil liberty was established, a body of electors was created, the royal domains were sold, the finances were put in order, roads and canals were built, public instruction and the universities were re-established. Even the uneasy Kingdom of Naples enjoyed new popular rights. The Illyrian provinces, under Marshal Marmont were freed from brigandage, given new roads and a tentative system of public education. All these advantages were in sharp contrast with conditions in those portions of Italy not immediately under French control.

In Germany, where the ideas of liberty and equality had

been to some extent popularized by the philosophers and poets, the old political structure, the central pier of which was the Holy Roman Empire, was shattered. The various German states on the left and later on the right bank of the Rhine began to enjoy new liberty for development. Here also, as well as in dependent states like Bavaria, the old feudal system was demolished, the administration was reorganized, constitutions were given, the principles of the *Code* were applied, equality before the law was granted, the peasants became owners of lands formerly in the public domain, serfdom was abolished and ecclesiastical burdens were removed.¹ Civil freedom furthered agriculture, and various industries were expanded by trade with France. The burden of taxation, though increased, was more equitably distributed. As in Italy, public works gave employment and Napoleon saw to it that the livestock was improved and fruit trees were planted. The readjustment of territories following the secularization of church lands in the western German states and the consequent compensations, weakened the small states and strengthened the large. The free cities were reduced in number from 50 to 6. Mediæval Germany thus suddenly vanished. Even the Duchy of Warsaw was given a constitution which abolished serfdom, although the condition of the peasants was not so greatly improved as in central Europe.²

But by his policy Napoleon had divided the nations of Central Europe into two groups: those under French control possessed of new popular rights although not thor-

¹ In Westphalia some compensation was allowed the lords but the peasants were too poor to pay it.

² See Bourne, *The Revolutionary Period in Europe*, ch. 23; Fisher, *Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany; Cambridge Modern History*, IX, ch. 5.

oughly reconstituted or treated as the equals of France; and the reactionary, anti-progressive states of Spain, Austria, and Russia. Between the two groups, as it were, was Prussia, where in October, 1807, Stein had begun his reforms. It was not merely that Austria like England hated and feared the Emperor personally. Its ruling classes were increasingly alarmed lest under his protection constitutional reform should spread to their own kingdom. England was on the side of these powers, partly because of the reaction from the early liberal hopes as to the outcome of the French Revolution, but more particularly because of the danger which threatened her commerce and her very existence from the policies of Napoleon.

It was a supreme crisis that Napoleon now forced upon England. Thus far his attempt to ruin English commerce had not met with the success he had expected. He could close ports but he could not prevent smuggling nor could French commerce extend overseas without a navy. England's naval strength had so far been proved that in 1805 not a merchantman under an enemy flag was on the high seas. In February, 1806, Napoleon made it apparent that his control of Europe included the annihilation of all trade connections with Great Britain, for Prussia had been compelled to refuse English goods from neutral ports as well as close her own. Then came a succession of decrees by which each nation sought to ruin the other. An English Order of Council May 16, 1806, answered the challenge by declaring all the coast closed between Brest and the Elbe. November 21, 1806, just after he had entered Berlin in triumph, Napoleon retaliated by issuing the Berlin Decrees. According to these decrees, the British Isles were to be regarded as in a state of blockade, all commerce with them and the admission of any product

of Great Britain or its colonies into France or any of its dependent states were forbidden under penalty of confiscation. November 11, 1807, a British Order in Council proclaimed a paper blockade of all enemy ports, but neutrals were permitted to trade with colonies and to sail to and from such ports provided they passed through a British port. England became, as it were, a bonded warehouse for all Europe. Napoleon answered with the Milan Decree (December 17, 1807): any ship of a neutral power which came from Great Britain or one of its allies could be taken as a prize of war. Great Britain answered by another Order of Council (January 7, 1807) which provided for the confiscation of any ship with its cargo which traded with the ports of France and her allies or with ports that observed the Berlin Decrees. Twenty days later, Napoleon issued the Warsaw Decree ordering the seizure of all British goods of England and her colonies then in the Hanse towns. After the Peace of Tilsit, Napoleon felt so secure as to tell the representatives of foreign countries gathered at Fontainebleau that the Continent was to have no dealings of any sort with England.

The issue was thus joined. Could international trade be stopped? Could England do without continental markets longer than the Continent could go without English goods? As it proved, the question of endurance was partly answered by the impossibility of destroying international trade. In that failure lay one great reason why France never succeeded in wresting from England economic supremacy and a resulting preponderance in continental affairs.

This Continental System (which like so many of his policies was an expansion of a policy of the Convention) became the evil genius of Napoleon. Intended to give

France commercial supremacy in Europe by crushing that of England, it led its creator continually to coerce more European countries into its support. It became the central policy of Napoleon. It was this which led him to the occupation of Portugal, the attempted conquest of Spain, and the ill-fated war with Russia.¹

Napoleon, a product of the eighteenth century, was still blind to the fact that he was facing a rapidly developing industrial revolution. Great administrator though he was, he was no economist. That he should have over-emphasised the importance of commerce and money is due undoubtedly to his acceptance of Mercantilist teachings, but it can hardly excuse his failure to see the significance of the rising industrialism. As we look back on this period it is plain that he was fighting a new world. Not only was the *bourgeoisie* gaining political power, but it was also establishing a new social order, the centre of which is universal production. Feudalism was less an industrial than a military system, based upon land-tenure. The destruction of feudal political privileges during the eighteenth century was due in no small degree to the recasting of economic forces. War, which was a normal activity in the non-industrial feudal order, became increasingly dangerous in a civilization where all must be workers. In such a civilization, an entire nation and not merely armies conduct war—with what consequences we now know only too well. Napoleon, with

¹ The United States was finally drawn into this maelstrom, British policy on the high seas, as well as the curtailment of American manufactures, led to the War of 1812. That Napoleon's influence is to be seen in Madison's policy can hardly be doubted. His revocation (August 5, 1810) of the application of the Berlin and Milan Decrees to American ships was followed by Madison's non-importation decree against England, February 2, 1811.

no precedent to guide him along new ways, could see only what the older political economy had seen and could not realize that he was defeating himself by the conscription of national forces in France and the dependent states. Although he attempted simultaneously to develop the productive forces of France, his wholesale militarism drained the man power of the nation and prevented the development of markets on the Continent.¹

As it proved, his Continental System, though bringing distress to England, was forcing that country to become the one industrial nation of Europe. The British commerce turned to the Western Hemisphere and India, and thus developed British shipping. Neutral ships almost disappeared from the sea, except for coastwise trade.²

The development of the coal, iron and textile industries of England was marked,³ and although overproduction of goods at times threatened national bankruptcy, the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire found England ready to flood the markets of the world.

Nor could the Continental System be enforced. Smuggling was carried on by the wholesale and Napoleon

¹ He was himself compelled to buy 50,000 overcoats in England when engaged in war with Russia. In one respect, the establishment of the beet sugar industry, his plans were not unsuccessful.

² Even the persistent capture and destruction of British ships by privateers and warships did not work as disastrously as Napoleon hoped. The numbers of British vessels grew from 16,728 in 1795 to 23,703 in 1810 and the actual loss by capture was only about two and one-half percent. And this was partially made good by the capture of other vessels. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution*, II, 224 sq. and his entire discussion, II chs. 17, 18.

³ See Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, II, 442-522. In 1801 looms were first driven successfully by steam power. In 1805, there was not a merchant ship under a flag of an enemy of England sailing on the high seas.

was forced to issue licenses for favoured traders. Furthermore, by the Continental System Napoleon was inevitably making an enemy of Russia, which needed to gain iron and coal as well as cloth from England.

The first noticeable effect of this Continental System upon Napoleon's fortunes was to be seen in Spain. Until the outbreak of the war with Prussia, Spain had been submissive to the Emperor's will. During that war, however, under the pretence of making war against Portugal, Charles IV, or rather, the Queen's lover, Godoy, had gathered an army intending to defy Napoleon. Jena made that impossible and he once more submitted. But the military danger which lay in an uncontrolled country to the south of France was supplemented by danger to the Continental System in both Portugal and Spain. It must needs be enforced there if English goods were not to find distributing points on the continent. Napoleon on his own authority made an agreement with Spain for the division of Portugal, which was immediately attacked. England could not help her weak ally and the royal family was forced to flee to Brazil. Thereupon Napoleon without warning turned his troops against Spain. Despising the Spanish military power, and quite ignoring the fact that he was dealing with a people of intense national pride, at Bayonne he deposed the son of Charles IV, Ferdinand VII, by compelling him to give back the crown to his father who in a moment of fear had abdicated, then deposed Charles IV and gave the crown to his own brother Joseph. But to his amazement and indignation the nation refused to submit to the change in government. Napoleon's severe treatment of the Roman Catholic church in Spain, which opposed his reforms, gave the Spanish resistance the character of a Holy War. From this time (June 6, 1808) Napoleon

was engaged in a constant struggle with the Spaniards, who had no interest in the reforms which Joseph promised and would undoubtedly have established, but were fired with a revival of a national spirit which Napoleon never could fully appreciate. Even after Joseph had established a brilliant court at Madrid and the best troops of France had been housed in the country, Spain refused to play the rôle of the other kingdoms of Europe. Aid came from the English under Sir Arthur Wellesley, better known later as the Duke of Wellington. The French were driven back and Joseph was obliged to flee.

The nations of Europe were quick to estimate the dangers facing Napoleon in Spain. They rightly foresaw that the war there might become a military quicksand. In Prussia, still too weak to revolt, Stein began the reorganization of the state, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau that of the army. Universal military service developed a large reserve although the standing army of Prussia never exceeded the 42,000 permitted by Napoleon.¹ Other reforms followed inspired by those accomplished in France by the Revolution. In October, 1807, serfdom was abolished, the right to hold land was extended to all classes, monopolies were at least professedly abolished, and Prussia under the inspiration of Schiller, Arndt, Schleiermacher and Fichte as well as the implacable Blücher, began to feel the rise of a genuinely German spirit. Napoleon in revenge seized Stein's property and later forced that statesman himself to flee. Highhanded imprisonment and execution of persons suspected of

¹ To this period belong the romantic but futile uprisings in Prussia of the Duke of Brunswick, who, at the head of a small body of troops, attempted to precipitate a revolution. On Stein's reforms see Lehmann, *Freiherr von Stein*; Ford, *Stein and the Era of Reform in Prussia*.

sharing in the new patriotism fed the flame of the new national spirit.¹

Napoleon affected to see no serious danger in either Spain or Prussia, but did fear a break with Alexander, who had begun to recover from the spell cast over him at Tilsit and saw that Napoleon had no intention of permitting Russia to partition Turkey or of engaging in an expedition against India. A meeting was arranged between the two Emperors at Erfurt in September, 1808. Never was there a more gorgeous meeting of lords of the earth. Napoleon brought all his dependent kings and princes to the meeting. The actors of the *Comédie Française* were there; Goethe and Wieland were there, offering homage to their master and receiving the Cross of the Legion of Honour. But complete accord between the two Emperors was absent. The Czar was disappointed because Napoleon would not join him in the partitioning of Turkey, or withdraw his troops from Prussian fortresses. Napoleon was disappointed because Alexander, though not interfering with his invasion of Spain, would not bring pressure upon Austria to cease its preparation for war. Napoleon, who was always ready to assume anger, at one meeting with the Czar threw his hat on the ground and stamped on it. Alexander said: "Let us talk, let us reason, or I go," and started for the door, whereupon Napoleon began to talk reasonably! In short, the negotiations at Erfurt did not result in all that Napoleon wished. Alexander agreed to help Napoleon in case he was attacked by Austria, and recognized Joseph as King of Spain, but he refused an offensive

¹ The Spanish War very probably saved Prussia from partition. The plans of Napoleon may very well be understood to have included this further humiliation of the mutilated kingdom.

and defensive alliance. He did join Napoleon in a demand that England make peace, but Canning, then Prime Minister, refused to abandon the Spaniards, his allies.

Napoleon, however, given a moment of respite from fear of Austria by the meeting at Erfurt, himself went to Spain and re-established Joseph in Madrid. There he was directed by Napoleon to maintain order by severity. "With the Spaniards," wrote the Emperor, "it is necessary to be more severe. . . . When they are treated with kindness, the rabble think themselves invulnerable. When a few of them are hung, they begin to take a dislike to the game and grow humble and submissive as they ought to be." "It is essential to hang about twenty of the worst characters of Madrid." To severity was added the confiscation of some fifty masterpieces of the Spanish School, needed to complete the collection in the Museum at Paris!

Thanks to the Emperor's vigour, in a few weeks the Spanish revolt, though not repressed, was forced back into the mountains. Thereupon Napoleon rushed back to Paris, where he suspected (and with justice) that Talleyrand and Fouché, Minister of Police, were conspiring against him. The danger was removed by the disgrace, though not the dismissal, of Talleyrand, but it deepened Napoleon's conviction that a victorious campaign against Austria was essential, if he were to enjoy the whole-hearted support of the nation. For already Talleyrand, looking only to national well-being, was unfaithful to his master. Even at Erfurt he had secretly advised Russia and Austria not to yield to Napoleon.¹

¹ In his meetings with Talleyrand Napoleon became violent, probably from policy. Talleyrand waited until the Emperor was finished and then remarked: "What a pity that so great a man has been so badly brought up." Personal hostility was thus added to Talleyrand's political opposition to Napoleon's growing autocracy.

The new war was without specific occasion. In reality, it was the expression not only of Austria's hope to utilize the Spanish troubles as an occasion to recover lands lost by former wars, but also of a growing national spirit. In Austria bankruptcy was imminent, but there as in Prussia, reforms in the army had been undertaken and preparations for war were being pushed. Moreover, the deposition of the King of Spain touched the family pride of the Hapsburgs and aroused the apprehensions of Francis. Austria could not hope for aid from Russia, but was assured by Prussian leaders that Prussia would become her ally at the first safe opportunity. These assurances, however, were not recognized by Frederick William who was persuaded by Alexander to urge Austria to keep the peace.

But the war party in Austria prevailed, convinced that the national feeling in Prussia could be counted on to override the royal policy, if only Napoleon should suffer a reverse. Every effort was made to set forth Austria as the champion of an emancipated Europe. Never were promises more alluring. The Tyrol, hating its new Bavarian masters, rebelled. The Archduke Charles, who was in command of the army, issued a proclamation to his troops in which he declared: "The freedom of Europe has taken refuge beneath your banners. Soldiers, your victories will break her chains." Twenty years later, Europe was to know how sinister was the freedom Austria would give, but the Archduke's proclamation gave new impetus to the spirit of revolt which repeated defeats at the hand of Napoleon had developed among the Austrian and German peoples. At last the Archduke's preparations were completed and on April 9, 1809, Austria declared war. For a second time Napoleonic imperialism confronted national enthusiasm.

Napoleon in the meantime had gathered a new army. By the middle of April, 200,000 fresh troops were ready for service. They were, however, not the soldiers who had won at Austerlitz and Jena, but unseasoned French youths and levies from his dependent states, like Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg and Italy. Hundreds of boys of seventeen and eighteen were drafted from schools to become subordinate officers of these new troops. The total forces gathered numbered 424,000. Napoleon was still the master of campaigns.

Whatever reforms had been accomplished in the Austrian military administration did not enable the Archduke Charles to gather or move his forces rapidly. Although at the outset possessing the advantage of having his troops concentrated, he was overcautious, and Napoleon was able to concentrate his scattered forces and, despite the mistakes of his Marshals, in a series of brilliant engagements defeated the Archduke. In three weeks after his appearance at the front, he was again in Vienna. Here by a decree he annexed Rome and the papal states to France. But his position was critical in the extreme. He was in an enemy's country, at the head of an army composed largely of Germans, with the arrival of reinforcements dependent on the defeat of another army in his rear. Prussia waited only the first symptoms of weakness to plunge into war and the Austrians were in force before him. He was defeated by the Archduke Charles in the considerable battle of Aspern and Essling (May 21-22, 1809) in which Lannes, one of his ablest Marshals, was killed. Just at this moment occurred what to another man would have been an overwhelming catastrophe. The French were encamped on the island of Lobau in the Danube. The bridge upon which all communications depended was swept away. But Napoleon was unmoved,

illustrating his own saying that "the first quality of a commander-in-chief is a cool head." He built two bridges each half a mile in length at the other end of the island of Lobau and waited until Eugène arrived with the army of Italy. July 5, 1809, was fought the terrible battle of Wagram. Napoleon's victory was not decisive, but the Archduke Charles was forced to retreat. A few days later he sought an armistice.

For weeks Austria hoped for aid from England or some defeat of the French in Spain, but neither came. An expedition of England against Hanover proved a ghastly fiasco and Wellesley, with Madrid almost in his grasp, was forced to retreat because of the failure of the Spanish forces to co-operate with his plans. In disgust, the Archduke resigned his command and Austria for the fourth time in twelve years yielded to Napoleon.

The peace of Vienna or Schönbrunn (October 14, 1809) carried still further the results of Campo Formio, Lunéville, and Pressburg. Austria was forced to cede a territory of 32,000 square miles, with 3,500,000 inhabitants, to Bavaria, West Galicia to the new Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw, a portion of East Galicia to Russia, Trieste and much of the Dalmatian coast to Napoleon, to be reorganized into the Illyrian Provinces, and to join the Continental System against England. Yet this final victory over Austria, paradoxically, gave Europe hope. Napoleon's ability was unquenched, but his armies were no longer irresistible. And what was even more significant, the conquered peoples no longer submitted hopelessly to his rule. Their governments might surrender, but the nations themselves were awakening.

As it proved, the Emperor had conducted his last victorious campaign.

Fortune, however, still was with him. His enemy

Gustavus IV of Sweden, was forced to abdicate, and Sweden made a treaty with the Emperor whereby she joined the Continental System and in return was restored Swedish Pomerania. Bernadotte, one of the Emperor's Marshals, was elected Crown Prince of Sweden—a choice which was to bring Napoleon bitter disappointment a few years later.

One thing, however, gave Napoleon concern. National stability appeared to be dependent upon a dynasty as a sole defence against a return of the Bourbons or a renewal of internecine strife. But he had no heir to whom he could bequeath his crown and his family was filled with ambition and jealousy. He had adopted Eugène, the son of Josephine, but there was no certainty in case of his death that the rights of his stepson would be recognized. There was no one of his brothers whom he would have as his successor. Josephine had borne him no children. For several years there had been hints that Napoleon would get a divorce and remarry. Josephine was in deepest anxiety over the matter and when the Pope was in Paris at the coronation of Napoleon, she had induced Napoleon to submit to a church marriage, their original marriage having been civil. To no small degree because of Josephine's own attitude in the early years of their marriage, Napoleon's affection had long since cooled and been replaced by many irregular love affairs. Although he always cherished respect for Josephine as a good companion, he looked upon marriage from the political point of view. "Love," he cynically said, "is the occupation of the idle man, the distraction of the warrior, the stumbling block of the sovereign." Divorce and a new marriage seemed imperative and he took the step. Yet both Napoleon and Josephine carried themselves with dignity through this sad affair. In a family council Napoleon declared that "the interests and needs of my people, which have at all times regulated my

actions, demand that I leave behind to my offspring this throne upon which Providence has placed me." Despite Josephine's agonized protest, her consent was gained "for the welfare of France" and the divorce was sanctioned December 18, 1810, by the vote of the Senate and the Archbishop of France, though never by the Pope.¹

Already Napoleon, in consultation with the council of state, had been quietly planning for a royal marriage which should cement some national friendship. He had tentatively approached the Czar for the hand of one of his sisters, but one of them was promptly married to another suitor and the Czar pled that the other, a girl of fifteen, was too young for marriage. In the meantime, both Metternich and Napoleon conceived the plan of a matrimonial alliance with the ancient house of Hapsburg. Their choice was Archduchess Maria Louisa, daughter of Francis, a girl of eighteen. The plan met with success. The marriage was celebrated in Vienna by proxy, in Paris on April 1, by civil law, and on April 2, 1810, with imposing ceremony in Nôtre Dame. The service was the same as that which had been used in the marriage of Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI. It was an unfortunate omen, but to all appearances the alliance strengthened Napoleon's position as a monarch. Although the new Empress was never popular, France was pleased with the union, since Austria, it

¹ Josephine retired to the palace of Malmaison where she lived in melancholy state, retaining the friendship of Napoleon. Both she and her daughter Hortense assisted in bringing about the marriage of Napoleon and Maria Louisa, and Napoleon wrote her a letter on the birth of the King of Rome. By the terms of his abdication she was left in possession of her property and given an allowance of 1,000,000 francs. She died in 1814, just after Napoleon's first abdication. It may have been some revival of his romantic love that led Napoleon to spend four days at Malmaison after Waterloo. His last intelligible word on his deathbed was "Josephine."

was expected, would be the permanent ally of the Empire and peace between the two nations would thus be assured. The birth of a son, the king of Rome (reckoned by the Bonapartists as Napoleon II), March 20, 1811, seemed to be the supreme gift of fortune to the Lieutenant of artillery who had become Emperor of the French, the son-in-law of an Emperor, the remaker of Europe and the successor of Charlemagne. In the words of De Tocqueville, he had "become as great as a man can be without virtue."

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FALL OF THE EMPIRE¹

The Empire at its Height. I. Elements of Weakness: 1. The Emperor's Treatment of Pius VII. 2. Commercial depression. 3. The Rise of National Feeling in Dependent States. 4. Lack of a Unifying Force in the Empire. 5. The new Policy of Austria. II. The Invasion of Russia: 1. Causes of the New War. 2. The Advance to Moscow. 3. The Retreat from Moscow. III. The Uprising of Europe. IV. The Fall of the Empire: 1. The Choice of War. 2. Campaign in Germany. 3. Deposition and Abdication of Napoleon.

From 1807 to 1810 the Empire of Napoleon was at its incomparable height. The reorganization of Europe, under French supremacy and with the civil rights enjoyed by post-revolutionary France, was rapidly progressing. France had been enlarged by the addition of territory from the North Sea to the City of Rome. Members of the Bonaparte family were kings in Holland, Spain, and Naples; Eugène was Napoleon's viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy. The small German states were supporting his army. Prussia had been reduced to an insignificant and oppressed state. Austria had been four times beaten in war and its Archduchess was now the Empress of the French. Russia and Sweden were allies. And over the Empire with its enormous aggregation of states Napoleon ruled

¹ In general see Oscar Browning, *The Fall of Napoleon*; Seely, *Life of Stein*; Rose, *Life of Napoleon I, II*, chs. 31-42; Fournier, *Napoleon the First*, chs. 16-21. *Cambridge Modern History*, IX, chs. 13-17; Bourne, *The Revolutionary Period in Europe*, chs. 21-26; Pariset, *Napoléon* (Lavis, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, III); Vendal, *Napoléon et Alexandre premier*.

as an absolute monarch, beyond the reach of constitutional control.

But he was not really his own master. He was forced forward by the very conditions he established. The magnitude of his power demanded its increase and argued greater ambitions. He must needs think and act as a European rather than as merely a Frenchman. He was no longer the child of the Revolution but of an imperial past. "I am not the successor of the Kings of France," he declared, "but of Charlemagne. In four years I shall have a navy. Within ten years I shall have subjugated England. I take in 900,000,000 francs annually from my own country and have three hundred millions lying in the Tuileries; the Bank of France is filled with silver, while the bank of England has not a shilling. Since 1806 I have brought in more than a billion francs in war contributions. I alone have money. Austria is already bankrupt, Russia will be, and England no less."¹

The new Empire was now to have two capitals—Paris and Rome. Again Napoleon began to plan for the extension of the Empire to the East. He gave orders that two huge fleets should be fitted out within three years. With one of them he planned to conquer Ireland; with the other Sicily and Egypt. "We shall make an end of Europe and then throw ourselves like robbers on robbers less bold than ourselves, and possess ourselves of India, of which they have made themselves masters."

Yet brilliant as was the Empire of the French, it was too rapidly built to be either solidified or possessed of firm foundations. It resembled a huge business that has over-extended its credit. It was master of submissive governments, but not of their peoples. In politics as in economic

¹ Quoted from Fournier, *Napoleon the First*, 513, whose text is different from that given by Thiers.

policies, Napoleon was swayed by outgrown theories. The days of actual democracy and constitutional supremacy of a sovereign people had not come in Europe except partially in England. In the Napoleonic "federative system" despite the *Code* the people had not become identified with the state. The distinction between a government and a people was yet sharply drawn. Napoleon can hardly be blamed for continuing the political estimates of the past, but his failure to appreciate that political solidarity is something more than the combinations of ruling houses was to prove fatal. Governments he could keep together by military coercion, and so long as he could win victories he could expect his plans of political reorganization to be observed. But a break in his military success might mean the end of the commercial boycott of England, the collapse of his "federative system," and the recombination of its constituent elements. Yet why should he expect such a disaster? He had never been defeated.

Unfriendliness to Napoleon arose from his treatment of Pope Pius VII. Friction between the Emperor and the Pope may be said to have begun with the refusal of the Pope in 1805 to sanction the divorce of Jerome Bonaparte from Elizabeth Paterson, a young American girl, whom Jerome, a youth of nineteen, had married in Baltimore in 1803, which marriage Napoleon had annulled.¹ But

¹ Napoleon had no small difficulty in arranging the domestic affairs of his family, Lucien married the abandoned wife of a stockbroker by whom he already had a son. Napoleon's anger was intense, but Lucien fled to Rome where later the Pope made him Prince of Canino. Louis Bonaparte was compelled by his brother to marry Hortense Beauharnais. The Emperor's lack of a son made Josephine's children rivals of the Bonapartes as his possible successor. A lasting quarrel resulted and became one cause of the divorce of Josephine and the marriage with Maria Louisa.

the real ground for the quarrel was the fact that the Papal States were the only section of Italy not controlled by Napoleon. The French had occupied Rome in 1808 but no pressure could lead the Pope as a temporal sovereign to enter into an alliance with France and to close the seaports of the Papal states to England. In May, 1809, from Vienna Napoleon issued a proclamation annulling all temporal power of the Pope and incorporating the Papal States and the City of Rome with France. The Pope excommunicated him. Thereupon Napoleon had him arrested (July 6, 1810) and taken to Savona. In this high-handed act Napoleon again disclosed his new conception of himself as the successor of Charlemagne. Thereafter, according to his theory of church and state, the Pope was to have simply spiritual power, and was to be supported by France. As time passed, the Pope was treated with increased severity until at last he was practically dependent on alms and all but without means of communication with the outer world. Still he refused to submit to Napoleon. According to the Concordat, the Pope was to invest newly appointed Bishops with the spiritual powers. Pius refused to act and the French church was in disorder. Napoleon summoned a national council in 1811 and forced it to pass a law that in case a bishop was not invested within six months after being nominated by the Emperor, the archbishop might invest him. The Pope was forced to submit, but only in the case of bishops in France, and thus retained the right of investiture which Napoleon wished for himself. This spectacle of the head of the Roman Catholic Church in humiliation shocked the religious sensibilities of all Catholic Europe. But Napoleon in this regard, also, was indifferent to public opinion. He was reinstating Charlemagne's Empire and, as he told the Pope, "bore the sword." And again

his success and power made opposition for the moment negligible.¹

Yet despite his victories, the position of Napoleon even in France was not quite secure. Gradually there developed a distinction in thought between the Emperor and the nation. Although his success had quieted criticism, his meteoric rise had never met with the approval of many liberal Frenchmen. The *salons* were not quite silenced. The royalist and reactionary elements of France were never won over to a sincere support of his supremacy. Men like Talleyrand and Fouché, women like Madame de Stael, had viewed his growing autocracy with disapproval. Talleyrand in particular ventured to oppose certain of his plans and increasingly saw peril to France, the nation, in the growing expansion of the power of the Emperor of the French. But his advice was seldom followed when it ran counter to Napoleon's purposes, and he himself was often humiliated—an experience he apparently disregarded, but which he was later to avenge.² Napoleon affected indifference to public opinion but he nevertheless sent Madame de Stael into exile and declared that every official of the Empire whether political or civil (including the faculty of the University) should regard the exposure of intrigues and disloyalty as a sacred duty. A censorship was established over all publications, books and newspapers alike. Persons suspected of unfriendliness toward the Imperial government were arrested. In 1811 there are said to have been 2500 state prisoners. The oppressive measures employed in the dependent states were not employed in

¹ Madelin, *La Rome de Napoléon I.*

² An English diplomat of the times once said of Talleyrand that he was the one man who could be kicked without changing countenance.

France, but continued war brought oppression, and the danger of arbitrary arrest under Napoleon was almost as great as from the *lettres de cachet* of Louis XVI.

The public finances of the Empire, while not altogether satisfactory, had been so administered that there was probably no nation in Europe in better financial condition. The tax levy amounted to 900,000,000 francs in 1810, but this was more than 50,000,000 short of what was needed to carry on the state. More than two-thirds of this amount was spent on military and naval administration. Napoleon refused to issue a loan and to meet the deficit he used money he saved from his own income which he derived from the large part of conquered territories he reserved for his own use. He also looked to new indirect taxes and imposts, confiscations, alienation of crown lands in conquered countries, and of national property in France.

But the general economic condition of France was not flourishing. A new commercial policy was adopted in 1810. By it foreign trade became a licensed smuggling. It was now to be permitted, but the old restrictions were maintained. This amazing paradox was the *reductio ad absurdum* of the system of commercial non-intercourse. English commerce, despite the Berlin and other Decrees had not diminished, but had actually increased in the period 1807-1810. But France and the Empire faced economic ruin.¹ The Continental System while protecting French manufacturers against English competition, worked against the receipts from customs and only on the continent of Europe was French commerce of significance. Russia was soon to declare a protective tariff which would bear severely on the imports of France to that country. It was impossible for customs officials to detect

¹ See Pariset, (Lavisse, *Hist, de France, contemporaine III*) *Napoléon*, 416-422.

and punish thousands of smugglers, although special courts were established for the purpose. Licenses for foreign trade were for sale to large merchants, but the state lost income because of restrictions upon the importation of colonial goods.¹ Napoleon, realizing this fact, in August 1810 undertook to levy a tariff of 50 percent on coffee, cocoa, sugar and cotton. But as a consequence of extensive smuggling, English goods were still on sale in France but cotton, sugar, and other imports were selling on the continent of Europe at ten times the prices paid in London, and at the very time that Napoleon was endeavouring to ruin English commerce, England was buying grain in Prussia, Poland, Italy, and even France.

The scientific procedure would probably have been the organization of a customs-union on the Continent. But the Revolution had bequeathed France a protectionist tariff which was directed against Continental as well as British competition. With his unscientific economic beliefs, Napoleon thought he could prevent Continental states from competing with France and drain England of its gold by stopping its exports and permitting its imports. He exulted in the approaching bankruptcy of the great states of Europe, oblivious to the fact we know only too well, that, be it ever so powerful, no nation can escape the economic depression of a world. And this France was to experience. In 1810, 1811, and 1812 the nation confronted a dangerous economic crisis. The harvest of 1811 was bad, prices of food rose despite a revival of the *maximum*, the industrial centres were filled with the unem-

¹ The chief smuggling centres were Holland, Jersey, Sardinia, Malta, Sicily and especially Heligoland, which little island was occupied by the British in 1807. In three months in 1808 the volume of business in Heligoland amounted to £8,000,000 and a Chamber of Commerce had been established.

ployed, especially among the industries producing luxuries, the chief exports of France. The total exports and imports of France fell from 933,000,000 francs in 1806 to 621,000,000 in 1809.

The people of France thus suffering from economic troubles were growing tired of war. Even the victories of 1809 aroused no enthusiasm. France as a nation gained nothing by the treaty of Vienna. What advantage could there be in the extension of territory which in turn demanded new wars? And despite all treaties with other nations, the war with England and Spain persisted without any promise of ending. Napoleon's generals were growing impatient of continuous fighting and wished to enjoy their new honours and wealth. Conscription brought nothing like its expected return. Despite their former readiness to find employment in the army, thousands of peasants fled their homes and wandered in the hills to avoid entering military service. They were hunted down by soldiers, and punishment for avoidance of conscription was inflicted on the families and communes of the offenders. Pride in the success of the Empire could not abate the war-weariness natural in a nation that had been in arms for nearly twenty years.¹

If there was silently developing a cleavage between the Emperor and the French people, how much more would be the restiveness of the continent of Europe! The Emperor who granted civil rights to peasants took no pains to

¹ The number of conscripts rose from 60,000 yearly in 1801-5 to 1,140,000 in 1813—a total of 2,673,000. The early classes were compelled to serve several terms. The National Guard, originally intended only for service at home, was in 1813 forced to serve in Germany. It then became as unpopular as conscription itself. Altogether Pariset (*op. cit.* 372) estimates that the Napoleonic wars cost France 1,700,000 lives and the rest of Europe 3,000,000-6,000,000.

obscure the dependent position of all the German states. For Austria alone, doubtless because of his marriage and the rising power of Metternich, did he seem to show anything like respect. His "federative system," on which the reorganization of Europe depended, had become one of burdensome oppression and could not prevent an economic crisis throughout the continent. All of the controlled states were obliged to furnish contingents of troops, as well as large quantities of supplies and money. These demands, together with the Continental System and the arbitrary regulation of trade, brought financial ruin to the great cities of Germany.¹ Troops seized all colonial goods found within four days' distance from the frontiers of the Empire. Prussia, Westphalia and the German Confederation, Naples and Italy were ordered or urged to levy heavy imports on American cotton and all other colonial products. The very laws of economics were thus to be subject to the imperial control! As one of his Ministers said, Napoleon thought he could manœuvre commerce like an army!

Nor was any state safe from sudden annexation to France. No "federative system" could be exclusively political. Commerce with the dependent states was curtailed by the ill-arranged protectionism of France. It was easier to annex territory than to adjust economic relations. Despite the opposition of his brother Louis, Napoleon determined to annex Holland. Was it not "formed of the alluvium of the French rivers?" Despite the Continental System the foreign trade of Holland included British goods. This was a serious breach in Napoleon's policy. From March, 1808 to December, 1810, the matter of annexation was planned by the Emperor. In the midst of

¹ For instance the exports of Berg had amounted to 60,000,000 fr. but in 1811 they were only 18,000,000.

the ebb and flow of schemes, Louis abdicated the Dutch throne in disgust and withdrew to Austria. In December, 1810, as a result of the Emperor's new commercial policy, Holland became a part of France, and by the same decree of the Senate all the German coast of the North Sea, including Oldenburg and Lauenburg, the cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, altogether something like 12,000 square miles, were also annexed.¹ In the same year he annexed the northern part of Spain, as far as the Ebro, and the Swiss republic of Valais. There were rumours of a plan to annex the Kingdom of Naples. When one recalls Napoleon's treatment of sections of Italy, the Papal States, and other territory derived from Austria and Prussia, it is plain that by the end of 1810 no one of the dependent states could have been certain of even the modicum of independence it enjoyed under the new Charlemagne. Any day might see it annexed to France.

In addition, family ties as a basis for the "federative system" were proving unequal to the task of holding the Napoleonic states together. "I ought to have appointed only regents and viceroys," he said to Metternich in 1810. Move his brothers and sisters where he might upon the board of Europe, unity failed to appear. While Louis was refusing to become an agent of his brother's policies in Holland, Joseph was proving incapable of subduing Spain. Lucien, whose abilities would have been of real service, preferred his wife to a crown. Jerome, for whom there had been organized the Kingdom of Westphalia, found it all but impossible to meet the demands of his imperial brother for troops and supplies; and Murat, a

¹ But there were advantages attending the incorporation of this German territory. The peasants were not only given free tenure of land but thirty-six forms of feudal service were abolished.

swashbuckling though able leader of cavalry, who had married Caroline Bonaparte, was to desert Napoleon in the hour of his greatest need. It is not strange, therefore, that Napoleon should have increasingly felt that the only possible efficiency in government should lie in his own control. He had no Parliamentary support such as gives continuity to the English government. His inability to use strong men except as they yielded him full obedience lost him indispensable helpers. Personal relationship with the Emperor as the basis of honours and wealth ultimately could mean only a divided loyalty and petty jealousies. Napoleon had built up by rapid military success a political complex too big to control. National histories, prejudices and commercial interests, dissatisfaction over hastily outlawed inequalities, dislike of foreign control, all conspired to make the task beyond human ability. As the history of Central Europe and the United States of America show, permanent political unity is of slow growth. It cannot be enforced from without. And yet Napoleon was endeavouring to hurry it into existence by compulsion of arms and economic boycott. It was this distortion of social law, this reliance upon militarism alone that was to be his ruin. No single mind, be it ever so exceptional, could be equal to the task of settling the innumerable questions of detail and fundamental policy to which the colossal aggregation of peoples, governments, histories and territories daily gave birth. Alexander had insight when after Tilsit he said Napoleon was like a torrent. "You have only to wait until the flood subsides."

Forced thus to attempt European unity by militarism and by making various governments dependent upon himself, Napoleon showed himself indifferent to the peoples over whom his appointees governed. The more power he gained, the more alien does his attitude become to the rev-

olutionary conception of popular rights. If, as the master of France, he had no hesitation in dissolving the Tribunate and coercing the *Communes*, as master of Europe he would not be likely to regard the popular prejudices and hopes in conquered territory. True, as has already been indicated, the gains made by the Revolution were extended to the states which he erected out of territories taken from European powers. Such states enjoyed civil rights and a freedom from the feudal privileges which persisted in all the German states, but beyond this they seem to have had no right which Napoleon recognized. Although he granted rights by the wholesale he had no time to study national psychology. From his point of view, a good dependent state possessed two virtues: a willingness to support the Continental System and an ability to furnish soldiers and supplies for his armies.¹ Yet to possess these virtues meant almost certain bankruptcy. Compulsory military service was hard for the German people to bear, while the system of espionage and military trials, the suppression of literature opposed to the new imperialism, arbitrary imprisonments, executions and exile of offenders from an inconspicuous bookseller to the "man named Stein," fastened the sense of humiliation deep in the popular heart. Even in the Confederation of the Rhine, which in many ways was the most significant of Napoleon's achievements, there was no regard for boundaries or national feeling.

Nor was it without importance that after the defeat of Austria, Napoleon found himself facing a new opponent, his equal in point of unscrupulousness and his superior in secret diplomacy, Prince Metternich, who in October, 1810, became the Foreign Minister of Austria. No man more

¹ The French army in Italy cost that kingdom 30,000,000 fr. a year; that in Westphalia cost 10,000,000 fr.

clearly gauged the European situation. To him Russia, Prussia and France were alike objects of suspicion, yet war with Napoleon he saw was futile as long as Austria was isolated. He therefore determined upon an alliance with Napoleon. The first step was the marriage of the Archduchess to the Emperor. The second was a treaty March 12, 1812, by which Austria became the Emperor's ally, but was to keep an independent command of its thirty thousand troops. Alliances with Prussia and Russia he constantly held in reserve, waiting for a weakening of Napoleon's military power. When that weakening came he planned to consummate such alliances and throw the weight of a reorganized Austrian military system into the balance. Against the furtive and burrowing schemes of the man who for a quarter of a century was to be the master of cabinet diplomacy and the dictator of continental policies, Napoleon was to stake only a disintegrating military suzerainty. He had conquered the Archduke Charles, but he could not outwit Metternich. Indeed, in sublime indifference to everything except the precedents of his own career, he developed the very situation that his arch-enemy who had history behind him and Talleyrand beside him, could exploit.

Yet to think of Napoleon as a tyrant is to misjudge him and the exigencies of his position. Forced to become, as he believed, the sole dependence of his nation, yet without the support of a national party, he could see only one means of retaining continental supremacy for a France already far in advance politically of his enemies—military control over the continent.

Nor should he be regarded as always obsessed with the desire for war. He needed peace and sought it. But no more than the dominant group of Germany, in 1914, could he think of peace except in terms of subjection

to his own control. France was to bring peace to a subdued world. Such a policy meant only one thing—military success. And to military success as the sole basis of imperial unity he again turned.¹

Napoleon's disregard of prejudices and histories, as well as his belief that the supremacy of France demanded that he should coerce all Europe, to which he denied free trade with France, to aid him in the economic boycott of England, led to a new war with Russia. Rivalry between the two Emperors was unavoidable, because of difference in fundamental interests. Here again European policies must be considered. Alexander was ambitious to gain possession of Poland, or at least to prevent Poland's becoming an independent state. He wished also to obtain territory in the Balkans from Turkey, in order that he might unite the Slavic peoples and so gain access to the Dardanelles. Napoleon, on the other hand, wished to keep the Poles nationally intact as a lure for the loyalty of Poland and he did not wish Russia to gain Constantinople or to attempt any partition of Turkey without his sharing in the spoils. At Tilsit he had fascinated Alexander with visionary promises in both these fields, planning to share with him the mastery of Europe and the East. In 1810, he planned to be master of Russia as truly as of Prussia and Austria. War with Russia, he told Metternich, "is in the nature of things."

The lack of mutual confidence which the casuistical diplomacy of Napoleon produced was the background against which a number of disturbing incidents were

¹ He recognized the delicacy of his position. After Waterloo, he said, "If I had been chosen by the English as I have been chosen by the French, I might have lost the battle of Waterloo without losing a single vote in Parliament." But could he ever have been chosen as Emperor by a nation with the constitutional structure of England?

projected. It will be remembered that at one time Napoleon had made tentative proposals to marry one of the Czar's sisters. While Alexander was delaying his answer, the Emperor married Maria Louisa. Although it is improbable that Alexander seriously intended to give his sister to Napoleon, the want of courtesy in not waiting for his reply was regarded as a personal slight. Furthermore, Napoleon's annexation of Oldenburg to France, although accompanied by promises of reparation, aroused the anger of Alexander, because the deposed ruler of the territory was his brother-in-law. On his own side, Napoleon was greatly angered by the fact that Alexander disregarded the Continental System by permitting trade in neutral vessels, made peace with Turkey, formed an alliance with Sweden where Bernadotte was openly hostile, and levied a protective tax on luxuries, thus seriously affecting the export of French goods to Russia.¹

Despite the advice of his ministers and in the face of the economic crisis already mentioned, Napoleon was determined to make war. Alexander regarded the conflict as irrepressible. In October, 1810, Metternich had told Francis that Napoleon would attack Russia in the spring of 1812. Austria was anxious for war and agreed to support France against Russia with troops under command of their own officers. In return she was to be given territory in Galicia or Illyria, while Turkey was to remain intact. Doubtless also Metternich hoped to induce Prussia to side with Russia, in order that after the victory of Napoleon she should be punished by the loss of Silesia, which would be restored to Austria from whom it had been taken by Frederick II.

¹ On the Russian campaign, see not only the general references but George, *Napoleon's Invasion of Russia*; Wolseley. *The Decline and Fall of Napoleon*.

Thus the war which Napoleon forced on Russia differed in character from those he had previously fought. The first war with Austria had been inherited from the Revolution, when Austria had attempted to restore the Bourbons. It still expressed the zeal for the new principles which the Revolution was introducing into Europe. The subsequent wars with Austria had been decreasingly in the interest of revolutionary principles, but were due in large measure to the natural desire of Austria to maintain her prestige in continental affairs, and to recover lost territory. The wars with England were similarly an inheritance from the revolutionary period and were phases of definite economic rivalry. The war with Spain was the outgrowth of exigencies of the Continental System as truly as of ambition to extend territory. But in the war with Russia, the diminishing zeal for spreading liberty was replaced by the crescendo of imperialist ambition to make France the master of the Continent and to destroy England. The extension of civil liberties may have given certain idealistic justification to this ambition but difficulties in the administration of liberated countries and the Emperor's obsession regarding the Continental System dulled the sense of mission. He knew the dangers of war on the plains of Russia, but Russia was a rival and excepting England the only rival to the Emperor's power. Without her co-operation the boycott of England's trade would be impossible and his entire policy would be ruined. A military empire for its very existence demanded military success and needed also a Europe sealed against England. Its financial prosperity demanded contributions and subsidies from conquered territories.

Thus the student of Napoleon's career as an outgrowth and in a large way a continuation of the Revolution, cannot fail to see the change of emphasis in his policies and a

withdrawal from the precedents of the Revolution. The Revolutionary spirit had passed. From the days of the Consulate, when he preserved for France the results of the Revolution, to the extravagant display of the meeting at Dresden, in May, 1812, when seven Kings and thirty Princes gathered at his word, the Emperor had travelled the way of all conquerors who have judged their own will in the conduct of a state to be that of Providence. In all his expanding reorganization of Europe, in all his establishments of rights by proclamation, he had never been thoroughly sure of his position. He knew himself to be an upstart among kings, dependent wholly upon military success for the maintenance of himself and his house and his Empire. "I feel myself driven," he said, "to a goal that I know not. When I have reached it an atom will suffice to overthrow me. Until then all the efforts of men avail naught against me." He was soon to realize how true was his prophecy.

Until the World War there probably was never gathered such an army as that with which Napoleon prepared to force Russia to conform to the Continental System. Xerxes may possibly have had larger numbers but Napoleon's forces were organized and equipped with all the care and wisdom of his day. A fair estimate puts the total number of his troops at 650,000. 1,350 cannon, thousands of wagons, an almost incredible amount of ammunition were moved toward the frontier or left in cities of Prussia and Poland. The "Grand Army" was divided into three parts, under himself, Eugène, and Jerome. In the army marched troops from all the dependent kingdoms, as well as France: Italians, Bavarians, Poles, Saxons, Westphalians, Prussians. In May he moved forward into Russia, but the Russians would not fight decisive battles. By the end of June he had crossed the Niemen, the Russians still

retiring. He captured Smolensk. Still the Russians retreated. It was the one reasonable policy, but naturally unpopular. September 7, 1812, the Russian generals yielded to the pressure of the Court and fought the bloody battle of Borodino. Napoleon won a victory at a fearful cost. He then marched directly toward Moscow. It was a fatal mistake. He might have paused at Smolensk, reorganized Poland and made it a barrier against Russia. But he still hoped for a decisive victory. The Russian commanders, seeing that it was impossible to hold Moscow, persuaded its inhabitants to set it on fire. When Napoleon and his troops arrived he found a city in flames with practically no provisions upon which they could depend for their support.¹

Had Napoleon promptly undertaken to retreat from Moscow, he might have withdrawn in safety, although his troops had suffered severe losses from the heat of a prolonged summer and their morale had been weakened by a lack of victories as well as by the fatigue of the long march and the necessity of constant foraging in an enemy's country. For long before Napoleon reached Moscow his commissariat had broken down. Yet discipline and organization were not altogether lost, although the disintegration of the Grand Army had begun on the plains of Russia.

Napoleon had not crushed the enemy and he waited at Moscow, probably in the hope that Alexander would sue for peace. It was another fatal mistake. Delay was to cost him the Empire. It was not until the 19th of October that he began to move South. The Russian winter closed

¹There has been no inconsiderable discussion as to whether Moscow was set on fire by its defenders or by drunken French soldiers. The drift of opinion at the present time seems to be slightly in favour of the former, but the chances are that the conflagration was due alike to the desperation of the Russians and the acts of the invaders.

in upon him. The service of supplies for so vast a force was destroyed. Foraging was impossible. The troops, drawn from dependent and not thoroughly loyal states, lost all semblance of an army. Neither officers nor men were prepared for the intense cold which suddenly came upon them. With Cossacks hanging upon its rear to cut off stragglers, with provisions rapidly diminishing, the French army pushed its way back toward Smolensk. A quarrel between Marshals Ney and Davout added new confusion to the catastrophe. Ney, "the bravest of the brave," with wonderful skill managed, however, to withdraw his forces from Smolensk and after blowing up the walls of the city, succeeded in crossing the Dnieper on the ice, but lost all his cannon. At Orsha, the 19th of November, Napoleon undertook to restore order and to re-outfit the troops from the stores in that place, but by this time reorganization would have required a miracle. The army had become a mob of all but unarmed soldiers, confused with camp-followers and fugitives of all sorts. They could not cross the bridges rapidly enough to escape the Cossacks, and men perished by the wholesale. Two bridges had to be built across the Beresina, the engineers standing in the icy water while they worked. Napoleon wished to give the mob of noncombatants time to cross the river, but he found it could not be controlled. One bridge collapsed under the artillery, and the other was set on fire by the French rearguard, and thousands of the fugitives were left to their fate at the hands of the Russians and the cold. The following spring 12,000 corpses were found along the river. 24,000 bodies were cremated at Minsk. It was at this terrible crossing of the Beresina that the Grand Army may be said to have ceased to exist. Disorder reigned supreme. The temperature fell to 35 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, killing more thousands.

Of the 650,000 men who had crossed the Niemen on what was to be the final campaign for the subjection of Europe, there returned in anything like military efficiency two wings (mostly German troops) under McDonald and Schwarzenberg, numbering 60,000 in all.¹ Approximately 300,000 men were left in Russia, wounded, prisoners or dead. Of this number a large proportion were soldiers furnished by the German states, but the loss of the seasoned French troops was irreparable. The armies of Marengo and Austerlitz and Jena were no more. Their places were to be filled by the conscription of French boys and the enforced service of the troops furnished by the dependent states.

The results of this *débauche* were at once apparent. Poland was lost, the Russians entering Warsaw, February 18, 1813. The German states began to hope for deliverance. Even more serious, if possible, was the effect of the catastrophe upon peace with England. While it is idle to speculate as to what might have been, it is evident that England in 1812 was in a serious condition. The Continental System had brought commercial distress, the United States had declared war and was winning naval battles, Wellington had been forced to retreat to Portugal. The news from Russia more than offset these backsets. Peace was out of the question now that Napoleon had suffered severe losses. England was ready as never before to fight an upstart she had never recognized as Emperor or the legitimate representative of France. British operations in Spain were more vigorously pressed. Indeed the Spanish campaign under Wellington was now to be a decisive element in affairs. French troops needed there could not be re-

¹ There must have been several thousand others, mostly officers, who came from the main army.

called, and the success of Wellington now began to threaten France from the South.

On December 5 Napoleon left the remnants of his army, trusting the command to Murat. He hurried to Paris with the utmost speed possible in an age that had no railways, to raise another army and to punish conspirators who, under the leadership of General Malet, had undertaken to assume the government at Paris when it was rumoured that he was dead. Arrived in Paris on December 18, he began with his astounding energy to offset the blow which his prestige and resources had suffered, but the full significance of which he refused to realize. By this time he seems to have acquired an almost fatal facility of seeing things as he wanted to see them, rather than as they really were. He had prepared the public mind by cleverly worded dispatches and in their light his explanation of the Russian disaster was simple and for a century served to suffice; he had suffered reverses but not defeat; it was the cold weather and the brutality of the Russians in burning towns that caused his losses. The magnitude of the catastrophe became known only gradually and in the meantime Napoleon retained his grip on the government which he had established. He was still *l'Empéreur*.

He turned his attention to strengthening his position as the head of the nation. He planned to assure his dynasty by the succession of his son as the King of Rome. The Malet affair, though of small account, had shown that in case of his death the state might be again thrown into disorder. He could see in dynastic succession the only preventive. During his son's minority Maria Louisa was named as Regent assisted by a Council of Regency in case of the Emperor's prolonged absence or death.

Napoleon also in characteristic fashion sought peace

with the Pope, whom he had brought to Fontainebleau, where he was kept in almost solitary confinement. Napoleon now saw the danger to public sympathy which lay in the continued mistreatment of the Holy Father and soon after his return from Russia visited him for the purpose of bringing about a new agreement. At first obdurate, the Pope, at least wearied by his confinement, yielded to the appeals of the Emperor and his ecclesiastical followers and on January 25, 1813, signed a memorandum covering eleven points in dispute. The most important of these provisions were to the effect that the Pope was restored to old-time dignity and freedom, that his territories were not to be subject to tax, that he was to be paid an annual income of two million francs for that portion of the patrimony of St. Peter which had been secularized and sold. Other provisions provided for the investiture of bishops and archbishops nominated by the Emperor and the appointment of bishops in Italy and France. Two months later, the Pope declared that the "Cardinals compelled him to go to the table and sign," and claimed that the agreement was to be kept secret for future confirmation. Napoleon, however, published it promptly, ordered a *Te Deum* to be sung in all the churches to celebrate the establishment of peace between the church and the Empire. He very properly expected to win thereby new support among the Catholics of Europe.

It was characteristic of Napoleon that throughout his career he sought advice of men of ability, although he did not always follow it when given. His success in administration was in no small degree due to the unremitting labour and counsel of experts. Following his general habit, Napoleon now summoned his Cabinet and advisers to ask what should be the policy of the Empire in its new situation. With the exception of Murat their advice

was to seek peace. Napoleon assented to the opinion that peace was desirable and affirmed his willingness to seek it, but he refused to take any steps which he deemed inconsistent with his dignity or the glory of the Empire. Furthermore, he was immovable in his determination to surrender no territory which he had taken. Nor was his position without reason. The disaster in Russia had not been followed by any defection of dependent states. His troops were in the fortresses of Prussia. He was gathering another army of hundreds of thousands. He had never been defeated in a battle. There was no general counted his equal in Europe and he believed that he could repeat the successes of the past. While, therefore, he was ready to consent that his ally, Austria, should act as mediator for peace with England and other powers, he refused to make the concessions which Europe, discerning the extent of the Russian disaster, was determined he should make. The nations of Europe were beginning to distinguish between the Emperor and the French nation, but he believed himself France itself.

Never was the extraordinary power of Napoleon more evident than in the spring of 1813. By a sort of miracle, in three months he assembled a huge army¹ though with a small complement of artillery and cavalry. The France he knew so well how to arouse to enthusiasm, forgetting the moments of disaffection, once more responded to his appeal. The country was again in danger!

But the Europe which Napoleon faced was no longer the Europe of 1803. As has already been pointed out, a new spirit had been developing among the German peoples in Austria and in the German states, particularly Prussia.

¹ The Senate had voted an army of 350,000 men and to these figures are to be added other forces from his allies, making approximately 500,000.

The various governments had not immediately responded to this new feeling, for it was natural that they should fear their conqueror and maker. But the course of international events compelled these governments to yield to the new national enthusiasm, which did not pause to reason but was eager to fight. For the first time in history the peoples and their government were as one in Germany. The Empire of the French was now to confront a Europe possessed of something like the spirit of the France of the Revolution. Never was there a more dramatic reversal of attitudes. France became the "oppressor," Prussia and the other German states the champions of "liberty."

It would, however, be a mistake to think of the movement of European states against Napoleon as wholly one of highminded patriotism. While in no small degree a movement stimulated by *bourgeois* liberalism and filled with national spirit, along with the new enthusiasm for liberty on the part of the various peoples there ran the persistent accompaniment of eighteenth century diplomacy. Even while Napoleon was still the undefeated master of the continent, Alexander of Russia and Baron Stein were planning readjustments of frontiers. While Stein was calling upon Alexander to be the liberator of Germany, he was proposing the division of Germany, which would involve the subjection of all the old kingdoms and others to be created to either Austria or Prussia. Russia while ready to have Prussia regain the position she had possessed before Tilsit, wished to gain territory from Poland and other territory upon which Austria also had intentions. But whatever hypothetical readjustments of Europe would have been considered, the only significant thing is that Prussia and Russia by the treaty of Kalisch (Feb. 27, 1813) agreed to help one another, the former

promising an army of 80,000 at least and the latter one of 150,000. The Czar agreed not to lay down arms until the purpose of the Coalition had been met, and promised that Prussia should be restored to the position she occupied in 1806 and be given other territories in Northern Germany; Prussia on her part, agreed to give up to Russia its Polish possessions, except a sort of corridor which connected East Prussia and Silesia. Yet Russia, if Prussia remained an ally of Napoleon, claimed the right to partition Prussia and as a matter of fact there was strong feeling in Prussia against the predominance of Russia and a preference of an alliance with Austria. On March 3, England made a treaty with Sweden in which she recognized Sweden's rights to conquer Norway and promised subsidies. March 23 Sweden began war.

National spirit hurried all plans into revolt. If the various governments wanted to end the Continental System and the hegemony of France, the people wanted independence, and began to hope for constitutional rights. General York, who commanded a Prussian corps of 30,000 men under Marshal McDonald, on his own initiative entered into negotiations with the Russians and declared his corps neutral. Frederick William hesitated to ratify such an act of disloyalty, but the news of York's actions aroused the utmost enthusiasm throughout Germany. The king was in a difficult situation. If he supported York he risked punishment from Napoleon; if he abandoned York and remained loyal to Napoleon, he feared that Russia would keep her threat of partitioning what was left of Prussia. He sought a middle course. He was ready to disclaim the action of York, providing that Napoleon paid the balance of 46,000,000 francs which Prussia claimed was due for supplies after settling the war indemnity. Frederick William also demanded, in view of this settle-

ment, that the French troops be removed from the fortresses which they were holding as pledges, and further asked money to support 120,000 troops.

While Napoleon delayed answering these conditions, an irregular parliament or *Landtag*, summoned by Stein, met under the presidency of General York. A plan for national defence provided for an army of considerable strength. The Prussians forced the hand of their king. February 3, he issued a summons for volunteers. The response of Prussia was amazing. In Berlin, 9,000 young men enlisted in three days. Arndt's book explaining the war measures sold by the thousand. On March 27, the Prussians declared war and drove the French from Berlin. England promised arms, provisions and clothing for 20,000 men.

Austria followed the new policy of Metternich. As an ally of France she did not join the coalition of Russia and Prussia, but furthered the policy of armed neutrality. As a matter of fact, Austrian suspicion of Russia was always in the background of Metternich's policy—a policy which, handed down to his successors, was to be one element in the tragedy of 1914. In the condition of Europe in the early part of 1813 he saw possibilities of strengthening the Austrian power against his northern enemy, but judged it good policy (Jan. 30, 1813) for Austria to make a treaty of peace with its northern rival. Above all, Metternich saw the advantages in a general peace and urged both Napoleon and the British government to conclude one. Napoleon was ready for peace but only on the condition that all countries annexed by France should be retained. It is worth noticing this condition because it represents a position which Napoleon consistently maintained. He was ready to make concessions in the matter of the dependent states, but was not

ready to reduce the limits of France itself. Austria, in return for her mediation, wished Galicia. She secretly endeavoured to win over Saxony and Bavaria, planned to make Prussia a buffer state between herself and Russia, wanted the abolition of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the freeing of the Hanseatic towns. While maintaining secret negotiations with all the powers of Europe, Metternich planned quietly to have an army of 130,000 men in Bohemia. There it could threaten the flanks of either the Allies or Napoleon.

Thus in the summer of 1813 Napoleon faced a new Coalition composed of Russia, Prussia, England and Sweden, in all of which countries there was a new spirit and military enthusiasm. The peoples rather than the governments compelled a war in which the Russian catastrophe and the Spanish campaign seemed to prophecy success.

At that time, before hostilities had fairly begun, Napoleon had to make a supreme decision. He undoubtedly wished peace, for his plans for the development of his empire could be fulfilled only in peace. The decision was forced upon him whether he should gain that peace as a soldier or as a statesman. He undoubtedly could have avoided war by abandoning the policy of reducing the European nations to a suzerain France. But that would have meant the abandonment of his rôle as the successor of Charlemagne and his becoming the King of France, instead of the Emperor of the French. While any judgment as to rejected policies is unsafe, it seems reasonable to suppose that if in 1813, when he faced a Europe filled with the same sort of frenzy for defence that had made France victorious in 1793, Napoleon had permitted Austria and Prussia to adjust conditions in the portions of Germany he had reorganized, and had abandoned the German area he had incorporated into France, he might have ruled

over a France with its so-called natural boundaries of the North Sea, the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees and retained his control over Italy which much preferred French to Austrian rule. He could thus have been sufficiently powerful to be a determining factor in the adjustment of the Austrian, Prussian and Russian claims to Poland and Turkey. From such a position he could have entered hopefully upon peace negotiations with England. This in a general way was the proposal which Metternich made to him, but to have adopted it would have meant an abandonment of his Continental System and the economic struggle with England for the trade of the continent and the world. It would further have meant an abandonment of his own personal ambitions, as well as his belief that the future development of civil and political equality in Europe demanded the protecting power of France.

As over against such a policy of contraction was the probability of military success which would put him in a position to carry his vast plans for France and Europe through to completion. The precedents of his career, his own just estimate of himself as the incomparable soldier of his time, made the choice almost inevitable. Furthermore, as he came into middle age, Napoleon became more inflexible in following these precedents. He persistently underrated his opponents and refused to see the weaknesses of his own situation. In fact, it would have required a far more adjustable will and a more sympathetic understanding of economic and social forces than Napoleon possessed to substitute a career of a statesman relying on the forces of peace for an all but consistently successful policy of a state-builder dependent upon the results of war.

At all events Napoleon chose his favourite instrument of war and that too with an ill drilled, poorly equipped

mass of recruits. Never was he more clearly and exclusively reliant upon military outcome. "I shall continue the war as General Bonaparte," he said, "not as Emperor."

His first engagement seemed to argue the wisdom of his decision. The forces of the Allies were not united. On the north were Bernadotte and Blücher with an army of Swedes and Prussians, on the east were the Prussians and Russians, and in the mountains of Bohemia was a large army which Austria was keeping there pending the decision whether she was to remain with Napoleon or go over to the Allies. Napoleon with his troops disposed along the Elbe, was in the centre of these armies. Following his usual strategy he attacked them in detail before they could unite in the vicinity of Leipzig. He defeated a large force of Russians and Prussians at Lützen, (May 2), but the victory was indecisive and costly.

Convinced of Metternich's insincerity, Napoleon proposed to Russia terms of peace which involved practically relieving Russia from the Continental System and making Prussia dependent upon the Czar. Russia referred Napoleon to the mediation of Austria. Austria, in the meantime, was endeavouring to bring about peace along the lines already indicated. Napoleon, however, could neither trust Austria nor believe that the time had come for him to concede what the Austrian proposals for a general peace involved. "I am determined to die if need be," he wrote his father-in-law, Francis II, "rather than become the derision of the English and secure the triumph of my enemies." This conviction was strengthened by a victory at Bautzen, (May 20), which, again, was not decisive because Napoleon lacked cavalry. These two victories were not sufficient to give the military decision

for which he hoped. He had checked the advance of the Allies, but his armies too seriously lacked numbers, discipline, cavalry, and artillery to make a decisive engagement possible.

On June 4 he agreed not without hesitation to an armistice—an act which most historians regard as a fatal mistake. His motives, however, are not difficult to discover. His Intelligence Department seems to have failed to keep him posted as to the extent of Austria's preparation and the forces which she was capable of throwing into the military balance. The Treaty of Vienna was still in force and he had given Austria no ground for declaring war. He expected the armistice to give him time to bring up forces from Italy and to reorganize his army. Pending these results he consented to an extension of the armistice until August 10.

During the armistice continuous negotiations looking to peace were carried on with Austria, who was the armed mediator with the Allies. The policy of Metternich involved a very thorough readjustment of the boundaries of the European states. (1) The Duchy of Warsaw was to be dismembered, (2) Danzig and her old Polish territories was to be restored to Prussia, and (3) Illyria to Austria, (4) the Hanseatic towns were to be made independent, (5) the Confederation of the Rhine was to be dissolved, and (6) Prussia as far as possible to be restored to her position of 1806. Austria agreed that if Napoleon would not accept the first four of these provisions, she would declare war on France. In that event, the victorious Allies would reduce France to her so-called natural boundaries and end her autocracy in Central Europe.

The six demands were presented as an ultimatum by Metternich to Napoleon with the further demand that he

should make answer not later than midnight of August 10. Napoleon, not yet persuaded that his father-in-law would declare war, refused to accede to these demands, but on August 11 proposed certain other concessions in their place. But Austria had already made her decision. On the same day she declared war. All Europe except Denmark was thus arrayed against Napoleon.

Such tremendous facts conspired to make 1813 one of the great years of history. The spirit of a new world was in control. What the American Colonies had felt in 1776 and France in 1789 was now world-wide. In South America the Spanish Colonies were struggling for emancipation; the United States was again at war with England for the protection of the rights of American seamen and commerce; Spain, with the aid of Wellington, was pushing back her French masters; Germany and, at least ostensibly, Austria, were fighting for national freedom. The spirit of the Revolution, spread by French arms and inculcated by a French *Code*, was rising to crush the French Emperor who had abandoned the ideals of the Republic from which he had risen. It is true that this new soul of Europe was to be bitterly tried in later years; that reaction against constitutional and responsible government was to suppress liberal aspirations in Russia and Austria; that the governments were soon to divorce themselves from their peoples. But 1813 saw nothing of this. It was the year of Liberation.

The final act in the drama was short and tragic. Although the armistice had given Napoleon opportunity to increase his forces and to bring organization to his new levies, the army was far from those of his earlier wars. Many thousands of his best French troops were fighting in Spain and isolated in the fortresses of Prussia, the forces at his disposal were largely boys and German levies in

whose loyalty he was to be deceived. He lacked officers and above all the leaders who had made his former campaigns so brilliant. Many of his great generals had been killed, Bernadotte was in arms against him and Moreau was adviser to the Czar. The allies correctly estimated this weakness, and determined so far as possible to avoid battle with troops led by Napoleon in person and to attack only his marshals. Napoleon had approximately 350,000 troops whereas his opponents had nearly 500,000 divided into three armies—the northern, composed of 130,000 men under Bernadotte, the main army of 250,000 in Bohemia, composed largely of Austrians and Prussians, reinforced by the Russians, and an army of 100,000 Prussians and Austrians in Silesia under Blücher. Their plan was to converge upon Napoleon, but if one army was attacked by him in person it was to retire and the other two were to advance upon the forces led by his marshals. It was similar to the strategy of Wellington in Spain. In fact, it might almost be said that Napoleon was beaten by the retreats of his enemies.

Napoleon's plan was daringly aggressive. It involved the capture of Berlin, the crushing of the army in Bohemia and the one in Silesia, who were to be driven back and attacked on the flank by the army which had taken Berlin. He never showed greater energy or military power than during this campaign. But his plans miscarried. His generals were invariably defeated. The troops under Ney sent to capture Berlin were turned back. He lost the entire corps under Vandamme. The enemies' forces increased, but though he had lost 150,000 men he had no reserves upon which he could call. He dared not recall his garrisons from Germany and his troops in Spain now so sadly needed, were being steadily defeated by Wellington, who had come to the very frontiers of France. After one

last victory at Dresden (August 26) he was forced to retire from that city, which, doubtless to influence Saxony, had been made his headquarters, to Leipzig. There, hesitating to retreat and greatly outnumbered by his enemies, deserted by his Saxon divisions, he saw his wearied troops completely defeated by the united Allies in what is known as the Battle of the Nations (Oct. 14-18, 1814). The war of Liberation had reached its triumphant conclusion.

The losses which Napoleon sustained were overwhelming. His army was utterly disorganized and in its retreat suffered terribly from typhus. He reached the Rhine with barely 50,000 troops, pursued by forces immensely superior.

Again Metternich, wishing to regain Austria's pre-eminence in Germany, was not willing that Prussia, or Russia, should profit largely by the victory. At Frankfurt he offered peace on the basis of withdrawal of the French to the so-called natural frontiers. Napoleon temporized with a proposal for a Congress to discuss terms. From that moment the allies struck at the line of cleavage between Napoleon and France. In a manifesto to the French people they declared that they were not at war with Europe but with Napoleon's enforced preponderance in Europe. It was good psychology. The Empire dissolved almost in a night. Holland rose against its French masters; the German states in the Confederation of the Rhine made peace with the Allies; the other Napoleonic states in Germany resolved themselves into their ancient components; Austria recaptured parts of northern Italy and Murat in Naples abandoned his fallen brother-in-law. Wellington invaded southern France.

Despite the collapse of his Empire, Napoleon thought only of new victories. Each day saw the Allies more confident of a complete success and less ready to abide by their conditions of peace. But Napoleon never wavered.

Once arrived in Paris, he undertook preparations for repelling his victorious enemies. But there he confronted a new national spirit. The Senate, always obsequious, it is true, gave him a levy of 300,000 in addition to that previously permitted, and later ordered 450 cohorts of the National Guard to be raised as well. The response of the country was unsatisfactory. Not more than a fifth of the levy could be raised while not more than 20,000 men were recruited for the National Guard. Napoleon was reaping the results of the war weariness of the nation.

He undertook to re-establish peace with Spain, in order that he might bring his seasoned troops from that country, but was again disappointed. Ferdinand VII, whom he had kept a sort of prisoner, was released and made to sign a treaty of peace. Had the King actually returned to Spain with his treaty, the Spanish war might have come to an end, but Talleyrand, now plotting against Napoleon as the chief enemy of France, persuaded the Emperor not to send the King back to his country until the treaty had been ratified by the Cortes. The Cortes declined. The French armies had still to be kept in the South.

Napoleon also undertook to regain popularity by releasing the Pope in return for a treaty which would cede the papal territories to the Kingdom of Italy. The Pope declined to enter into negotiations except in Rome.

The victory of the Allies was to have immense repercussion upon France itself. To vast numbers of Frenchmen who were tired of war and wished only peace, the fortunes of Napoleon and of the Empire of the French were being distinguished from those of France the nation. Unwillingness to identify them grew intense.

The Legislative Assembly voiced this attitude on the 19th of December, 1813, when in a report of its committee it said that the national "blood would be shed only in de-

fence of the fatherland and her protecting laws." Napoleon dissolved the Assembly and rebuked it severely, declaring that he, since he had been elected by the entire people, was more truly the representative of the nation than the delegates of the departments. Public opinion grew more unfriendly. Civil war might have followed had not the Allies once more aroused national feeling by invading French territory. Instantly the indomitable spirit of France revived. The country was once more in danger and the French arose with something of the spirit of the Revolution to protect their land.

The opening months of 1814 were filled with a succession of brilliant victories won by Napoleon over the various divisions of the Allies, procrastinating and ineffective negotiations for peace which reflect the rise and fall of the military fortunes of Napoleon, the steady advance of the Allies in overwhelming numbers. Peace Napoleon might have had any moment during these feverish months, if he not been obsessed with the determination of the soldier to stake everything on battle. But again the delay in negotiations which he brought about in hopes that he might get time for raising his troops, brought him no help. On the contrary, it was seized by Talleyrand and Metternich to widen the breach between Napoleon as an adventurer and France as a nation which he had victimized and thus to bring about his personal fall.

Again Napoleon faced a crisis which would be met in one of two ways. The statesman's solution would have been to make the best peace possible, exploiting the mutual jealousies of the Allies. The soldier's solution would be to stake everything on military victory. Napoleon, in effect, endeavoured to adopt both, but his chief reliance was upon the possibility of victory. The chances of such a success, were small indeed. March 9, 1814 at Chaumont, England,

Russia, Austria and Prussia bound themselves for twenty years, engaging not to treat separately with Napoleon. Wellington had already pushed across the Pyrenees, making it impossible for Napoleon to summon the forces which had been carrying on the war in Spain. One hundred and eighty thousand soldiers, mostly French, were in the fortresses of Germany, where they were practically prisoners. The troops which he could gather from the survivors of the retreat which followed Leipzig, and the boys raised by his new levies, were untrained and much fewer in numbers than the forces of the Allies. From a military point of view his position was helpless. Yet still he fought. No more amazing activity was ever shown by Napoleon than in these months when he dashed back and forth over France, within the circle of the Allies, repeatedly defeating divisions of their armies and yet being steadily pushed towards the precipice.

The end came suddenly. Out from the midst of the divided councils of the Allies, where Austria was opposing too vigorous action, there suddenly emerged the determination to ignore Napoleon and to march direct upon Paris.

Alexander, who had learned from intercepted letters of the exhaustion and discontent in Paris favoured the plan. The Prussians and finally the Austrians gave their consent. On March 25, 200,000 men marched on the capital.

On March 27, 1814, Napoleon heard the news. He had just won a considerable victory over troops which he supposed were those of the Austrian general, Schwarzenberg, but to his amazement found were Prussians. The truth suddenly burst upon him that the Allies were marching on Paris. Yielding to the opinion of his generals, he abandoned his plan to get into their rear and cut off their communications and hurried toward Paris, intending to endure a siege. But Blücher could not be checked and

after a bloody battle, seized the heights of Montmartre commanding the unfortified capital. On March 30 Marmont surrendered Paris, the next day the Allies entered the city in triumph, the royalists kissing the stirrups of the Cossacks.

The next day Napoleon arrived at Fontainebleau, a few miles from Paris, where he was joined presently by the remnants of the army. The Empire of the French had dissolved. Its armies were scattered and defeated. Its enemies had captured its capital. Its fate was to be decided by Talleyrand and the *idéologues* so despised by Napoleon.

Among the Allies there was no desire to destroy France. But who should be its ruler? Certainly not the defeated Emperor of the French. All were agreed that he must abdicate. In that event, three possible successors might be considered: his son, who would be Napoleon II, one of the Bourbons, or some new appointee. For a few days Alexander seemed to favour the third alternative and proposed Bernadotte. Talleyrand, however, objected. Whatever judgment may be passed upon his relations with Napoleon, he was at least genuinely loyal to France. "Why choose a soldier when we reject the first of all soldiers," he said to Alexander, "Neither you, sire, nor the Allies nor I can give a king to France. The selection must be based on a principle. The only possible principle is legitimacy and Louis XVIII is the legitimate king." To this the Allies agreed. A proclamation was issued to the effect that no negotiations would be held with Bonaparte nor any of his family, that the integrity of French territory as it existed under Louis XVI would be respected, and that the provisional government and the adoption of a constitution would be left to the Senate. Louis XVIII was recalled from his comfortable exile in England.

On April 1 the Senate deposed the Emperor and released the nation and the army from its oath of loyalty to him. The news was brought to Napoleon at Fontainebleau the next day. He proposed to attack Paris, but his generals refused. Marshal Ney told him frankly that he must abdicate; that the army would not follow him. With this the other generals agreed. In fact, the proposal was more impossible than the little group at Fontainebleau knew. For even at that time Marshal Marmont had agreed to go over with his troops to the Austrians. The next day after breakfast they were together, Napoleon, as was his custom, walking restlessly about the room. Suddenly he stopped before his faithful Caulaincourt, who had been his representative in the futile negotiations with the Allies he said: "I will abdicate." A little later he said: "I have desired the glory and happiness of France. I have not succeeded. I abdicate and retire."

The document of abdication read as follows: "The allied powers, having declared the Emperor Napoleon to be the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to leave France and even to lay down his life for the good of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from those of the Empress' regency and from the laws of the Empire."

But the Allies would not accept this suggestion of abdication. They were determined to exclude the Bonaparte family from the throne. They knew only too well the unconquerable will of Napoleon. The inevitable happened. On April 13, Napoleon ratified the agreement of abdication which the Allies presented to him. In accordance with its terms he was to keep the title of Emperor, to be given an annual income from the revenues of France of

2,000,000 francs, his family to keep its property and a grant of 2,500,000 francs annually. The little island of Elba was assigned to him as his home and he was permitted to keep a small force of soldiers as an army and a few unarmed vessels as a navy.¹

On April 20, Napoleon set out for Elba. He had not been permitted to see his wife and child. In fact, Austria saw to it that he should never see either of them again. Maria was to prove unfaithful and the King of Rome was to die in young manhood. In the court of the palace the Old Guards were drawn up to receive their Emperor. He called the officers together and addressed them in a speech which has become famous. "I bid you farewell. For twenty years I have found you always brave and faithful in the path of duty and honour. Serve your new sovereign with fidelity. . . . You are all my children. I would embrace you all, but I will embrace you all in the person of your general." He then kissed General Petit on both cheeks, embraced the standard of the Guards, bade the officers and men farewell and entered his carriage and went off at a gallop.

The journey across the country gave the final touch of bitterness to his downfall. The farther South he went the more outspoken was the hostility of the crowds who met him. The imperial insignia were torn from the carriages by the mob. In order to avoid assassination he was obliged to take the imperial insignia from his carriage, to change uniforms with the commissioners who accompanied him, and at one time actually to mount one of the

¹ Napoleon on the night of April 12 was taken suddenly violently ill. It has been claimed by many historians that he attempted to commit suicide by taking poison which he always carried about him on his person. In view of the remarks which Napoleon made about this same time in criticism of suicide, other historians discount such an explanation of his illness.

horses and ride in front of the party. He sailed from Frejus, the port at which he had landed on his return from Egypt, the idol of the nation that now repudiated him. He was received with honour on the British man-of-war which took him to Elba. There May 4 he landed, an Emperor without an Empire or more accurately with an Empire eighteen miles in length.

And meanwhile the Bourbons returned.

CHAPTER XXV

THE CLOSE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY CYCLE¹

- I. Louis XVIII and his Nation. 1. Peace. 2. Disaffection in the Army and among the Peasants. II. The Return of Napoleon and the Hundred Days. 1. Disaffection with the Bourbon Administration. 2. Return of Napoleon to France not in Response to National Demand. 3. Reluctance of France to Re-enter war. 4. The Opposition to the Re-establishment of Autocracy. 5. Final Collapse of Napoleonic Imperialism. III. Reorganization of Europe by the Congress of Vienna. IV. Conclusion: the Results of the Revolution.

The restoration of the Bourbons was more than the act of foreign conquerors. It was the closing of the cycle of Revolution. France had run the gamut of political controls. It had grown apathetic, without either royalist or republican enthusiasms. It was in the hands of the *bourgeoisie*, and the *bourgeoisie* wanted stable government, peace and commercial prosperity. Once the personal empire of Napoleon had been swept away the only logical recourse seemed the Bourbons. They at least had historical claims which the world and France itself could recognize.

But the France of the Restoration was not the France of Bourbon absolutism.² The Revolution had determined

¹ Rose, *History of Napoleon*, chs. 38-42; Fournier, *Napoleon the First*, chs. 19-21; Bourne, *Revolutionary Period in Europe*, ch. 27; *Cambridge Modern History*, IX, chs. 18-21, 24; Rosebery, *Napoleon, The Last Phase*; Ropes, *The First Napoleon*, 220-308.

² See in particular Charl  ty, *La Restauration*; Lavissee, *Histoire de France contemporaine*, IV.

that Louis XVIII should be a constitutional monarch. Before his accession to the throne of his house he had promised to rule in accordance with a Constitution. Yet, although the old absolute monarchy of the Bourbons had disappeared, the responsibility of the crown to the people was not frankly recognized. Louis refused to accept the Constitution which the Senate had drawn up, while he solemnly promised to maintain a government in accordance with a Charter which he himself gave. By this device he avoided recognizing the constitutional basis of the monarchy, at the same time ruling in co-operation with the representatives of the people. Thus while one supreme result of the Revolution was recognized, the conviction that sovereignty was vested in the people was ignored. Furthermore the Charter was ambiguous as to whether the ministers were responsible to the King or to the Chambers. For half a century France was to suffer successive *coups d'état* because of this insidious policy. But in 1814 it was perhaps the only workable theory of government. Popular sovereignty had plunged the nation into the Terror. Military autocracy had brought war and economic distress. The new state which the Bourbons established by the new Charter was calculated to arouse neither foreign war nor internal dissension. By the Charter there was established a constitutional government composed of a House of Hereditary Peers named by the King, which deliberated in secret, a Chamber of Deputies to be elected by limited suffrage, which was to initiate all financial legislation. The Crown possessed the right of initiative in legislation. Religious freedom was accorded, trial by jury, military pensions, the Legion of Honour and all land titles established by the Revolution, as well as civil and legal reforms, were unconditionally guaranteed. France became the first continental power to define equality as equality before the

law, in taxation, as regards justice, and in public employment.

On May 30, 1814, Louis concluded the (First) Peace of Paris with the Allies, and France grounded arms. The war that had lasted almost continuously for nearly a quarter of a century was over. A Congress was called at Vienna to readjust affairs on the continent. France was not treated as a conquered state, although forced to return to her boundaries in 1792—which were somewhat more extended than those of 1789. When she declined to meet the demands of Prussia for a war indemnity the demand was withdrawn. The art galleries of Paris were not forced to restore their stolen treasures.

Taken as a whole, the opening months of the Bourbon rule showed that the fat, gouty, unromantic Louis XVIII was sincerely determined to give the country a good administration. He was loyal to the Charter and made little or no discrimination against the administrators trained by the Convention and the Emperor. The attempt of the extreme royalists to destroy the titles to the nationalized lands was defeated.

The France of Louis XVIII was however not the France of Napoleon. No political cleverness, no proclamation of a distinction between France and the Emperor could conceal the fact that the nation which a few weeks previously had been the suzerain of half a continent was now subject to a royal family it had proscribed and all but forgotten, helpless in the hands of nations it had repeatedly conquered. But the clergy, the nobility and the *bourgeoisie* were satisfied. The new government was not tinged with radicalism!

But the King was incapable of evoking the national spirit or developing a strong national policy. As the creature of the Coalition, with its reactionary leaders, he

was naturally, although unjustly, exposed to the suspicion of favouring the undoing of the Revolution.

Disaffection with the government soon showed itself within the army. In the interest of economy, expenditures of the army and navy were reduced by two-thirds; ten or twelve thousand officers were retired on half-pay; troops were forced to wear the white cockade in place of the tricolour; the household Corps of the King was re-established as if to indicate that the King did not trust the Imperial Guard. Distinctions were made in the training of officers and in the respect paid the marshals and the nobility established by Napoleon. When one recalls that for nearly a generation the army had been the chief power in France, that it had opened careers of honour and emoluments to every Frenchman, it is easy to see how these discriminations and especially the re-establishment of class distinctions between the privates and officers must have aroused resentment. Especially was this true among the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who returned from Germany and Spain to find their Emperor in exile and their own condition one of poverty and unemployment.

While the new government at first gained favour among the peasants by the abolition of conscription, it soon lost their confidence, except in the Southern part of France, by its maintenance of the excessive taxes which Napoleon had established in 1813-14. The peasants came to believe that the tithes and other taxes of the old régime were to be re-established. In many parts of France revolt was prevented only by the show of force. But, as subsequently appeared, despite these difficulties the new constitutional government might have brought about national stability if it had not been for the sudden reappearance of Napoleon.

Elba was too near France for a place of exile. The Emperor knew from English and French sources of the disaffection of the army and the suspicions of the peasants. The promises of an income made him by the Coalition were not fulfilled, and he was in financial straits. He knew also that a conspiracy under Fouché looked to the overturn of the government and that the Austrian court wished his deportation from Elba. He suddenly determined to return to France, oust the Bourbons and take up again his career.

In the early days of March, 1815, he secretly embarked his few troops on such vessels as he could get, and, avoiding the English warships, landed in France. There was no conspiracy for his return, and no party in France expected him. He had only himself and national psychology upon which to rely. Nor was he disappointed. His march to Paris is perhaps the most dramatic event in history. Troops were sent to arrest him. He had simply to present himself for them to follow him. Ney, who was a member of the Council of Louis XVIII, boasted that he would bring back Napoleon to Paris in an iron cage.¹ On the 14th of March, Ney once more was one of Napoleon's marshals. The old soldiers welcomed their Emperor with mad enthusiasm. They brought out the hidden eagles and gathered about his standard. As he rapidly drove towards Paris his reception became even more frenzied. Louis fled across the border. Almost on the same day Napoleon arrived at Fontainebleau. That night he arrived at the Tuileries, to be received by a brilliant crowd of courtiers in the throne room. In two days he had reorganized the government with practically all his old administrative of-

¹ In his subsequent trial for treason, Ney denied having used these words.

ficials at their desks. The Emperor again had an Empire. But it was an Empire limited to France, and with only the remains of an army upon which to rely.

When this return of Napoleon, spectacular as it was, is viewed, not as a chapter in a biography, but in relation to France and the Revolution, it is evident that it is only an episode in the course of events. There was no reason for his return except his own personal ambition. No social change furnished opportunity. France did not need him, and, as it soon appeared, as a nation did not want him. Under Louis XVIII Frenchmen were enjoying more liberty than they had known under the Empire and France was at peace. The return was the short lived child of an anachronistic personal ambition. With all regard for the services rendered by the militaristic expansion of equality before the law, it is plain that France and Europe had tired of the method and its champion. After the first few days of enthusiasm, the nation returned to that attitude of mind into which it had fallen after Leipsic. Confirmed in its possession of the gains of the Revolution, it was sick of war, tired of autocracy, no longer in search of the glory that had cost France its youth, its peace and its prestige.

Here, to the student of the French Revolution, is the chief significance of the Hundred Days (March 20—June 22, 1815). They show how far the nation had gone in its determination to have a responsible government, how liberalism had persisted and developed during the years of Terror and of the Empire. Napoleon sensing the social mind, turned liberal—at least in words. He modified the Constitution of the Empire by an *Acte additionel* and promised a House of two Chambers, the Upper composed of peers of his own choosing, and the Lower elected by electors. France, accustomed to accept any government that controlled Paris, approved of his *Acte additionel* by

a new *plébiscite*. But the election showed how little Napoleon represented the nation at large. Of the 629 deputies in the Chamber of Representatives, only 80 were wholeheartedly his supporters. Five hundred were liberals. Napoleon for the first time found himself opposed by a legislative body that dared to act. The *idéologues* whom he despised had become his master. He accepted the new situation as a choice of evils, but there is reason to believe that he planned to restore his autocracy as soon as he was safe from his foreign enemies. He said to Molé, "I would never have left the island of Elba, if I had foreseen to what extent it was necessary to comply with the democratic party in order to maintain myself."

The official bodies of the nation and Paris demanded a Constitution and Napoleon, now in reality dependent upon the *bourgeoisie*, was forced to grant one. He thus found himself in new conditions and he could not act with his old vigour against the enemies of the resuscitated Empire. It is more than doubtful whether he ever could have met the new situation. Post-revolutionary France was determined upon a Constitution and parliamentary government. When it was apparent that Napoleon could not avoid war, depression seized the nation. And war was inevitable. The rulers of Europe would not recognize the Emperor whom they had deposed as the successor of the King they had restored. Their armies were still in the field. With Napoleon again in control of a dismembered Empire, peace was not to be expected. He was to be eliminated once and for all from European politics. He was placed under the ban of the Coalition. As Talleyrand said, he was under sentence of civil death.

It is all but impossible to maintain a true perspective in dealing with the history of the Hundred Days. The spectacle of a banished Emperor returning to his Empire;

the enthusiasm of his old comrades in arms; his indomitable facing of a Coalition which had voted him an outlaw and had solemnly promised never to abandon a war which would remove him forever from the stage of history; his brilliant campaign against overwhelming numbers; the battle of Waterloo, the very name of which has become the synonym of irretrievable defeat; his second abdication and surrender to the British; his exile to St. Helena, where was born a new Napoleon, the mighty war-god of *Des Invalides*¹; all this is so dramatic as to have caught the imagination of the world. But it was all without serious effect upon the course of events. To the student of the French Revolution and of the actual course of history, the significance of the Hundred Days is in the popular sentiment disclosed and in what might have been rather than in what was. Had Napoleon been victorious the liberal movement in France would have been doomed. His defeat, like his victories, contributed to the permanence of the results of the Revolution.

The Allies assembled at the Congress of Vienna were wise enough again to distinguish between Napoleon and France. They did not want a weakened France to be the prey of continental ambitions. After Waterloo, the abdication and the surrender of Napoleon to the English, Louis XVIII returned to his kingdom, and took up his matter-of-fact reign over a confirmed *bourgeois* state as if his flight had been only a sort of vacation. The second Peace of Paris still further reduced the territories of France, compelled the restoration of art treasures, and levied an indemnity of 700 million francs.

Thus France again took up its national history. The struggle between the extreme Royalists and the liberals was to continue; but France was not to become an abso-

¹ Napoleon died in St. Helena, May 31, 1821.

lutism under either a Bourbon or a Napoleon. Monarchies and republics, *coups d'état* and constitutions, were to follow one another in rapid succession; but the heart of the French people was set upon equality before the law, a constitutional government and a republic. This much of the work of the Revolution neither Napoleon nor the House of Bourbon could undo. In a little more than half a century, the ambitions of Napoleon III to rival his uncle served only to plunge the nation into a new *débauche* from which arose the France of to-day—a Republic embodying the hopes of the Revolution and the administrative centralization of the Convention and Napoleon.

Thus in 1815 the cycle of the Revolution closed. Externally the twenty-six years of mingled hope, terror and imperialism had brought few results. The boundaries of France, after having been extended across Western Europe, were to all intents and purposes again those of Louis XVI. Certain changes had been made in the territories of Prussia, Austria and other German states, but they still remained independent, moved by rivalries that were to lead to tragic results. Italy was again broken up into small principalities, although Austria now controlled Venetia. English colonial power was extended, but England had gained no territory on the Continent. From the point of view of the 18th century cabinet policies, one might thus almost say that the years had been fruitless. No state in Europe, except England and Austria, was appreciably stronger than it had been in 1789.

But other changes to some extent were apparent. The Congress of Vienna did not attempt to re-establish the old continental conditions regarding land tenure, civil status and freedom from feudal institutions. Its purpose was largely political. It sought to maintain a balance of

power on the Continent by such re-adjustment of the territories of Russia, Prussia, Austria and France as to prevent any single nation's being great enough to wage war alone against the others. It hemmed in France with small states. It organized a new Belgium, including what is now Holland and Belgium, to guard the northern frontier of France; a Confederation of the smaller German states in which Prussia and Austria were to have the leading rôles, to guard it on the east; and set an enlarged Piedmont to guard it on the south. England could be trusted to rule the seas.

But social forces are far more significant than national boundaries. The restoration of the Bourbons marked the close of a period of social reconstruction. In closing our study of the revolutionary epoch, we must observe just what had been accomplished both in France and in Europe.

1. The essential characteristic of this period may be described as a change in the fundamental basis of social organization. The *bourgeoisie* had gained immensely both in power and privileges. Before the meeting of the States General, France, as well as the continent of Europe, was suffering from an unsystematized social order due to the preservation of feudal privileges and absolute sovereignties. There was no equality in legal rights, the mediæval restrictions were still upon trade, political divisions perpetuated antiquated rivalries and boundaries. Industries were only feebly developing, the peasants were in large measure excluded from the ownership of land. Representative bodies and political constitutions there were none, or if extant, of no real significance. Laws were uncodified, taxation was unequal. In a word, society in continental Europe was full of privileges and inequalities, which the mass of the people endured.

Within France where the intellectual life had been most

active there was growing up the *bourgeoisie*, a well-to-do class of people who increasingly felt they had a right to some share in the government. Absolutism was breaking under its own weight. Autocracy was being dissolved not only by its own inefficiency, but by the new intellectualism which undermined its very basis. Out from the midst of this came the attempt at reform and this reform led to the effort on the part of the senile monarchy to preserve itself by certain concessions and the summoning of the States General. Within this body the sense of injury was particularly keen. The genius of liberalism led to an abolition of most of the privileges and thus on the 4th of August, 1789, France unexpectedly found itself freed from that mediæval feudal mould in which its life had been run, but which it could no longer endure. The first result was a new sense of liberty and the confused reorganization of the state.

The attempt to carry this forward naturally alienated and infuriated those members of the privileged classes who would inevitably suffer from the removal of their privileges. They therefore undertook to check the progress of reconstruction and undo the work of the early days of the Revolution. They were anachronisms fighting against the creative social order.

That social order, however, in self-protection was forced to adopt methods resting ultimately upon terror and war. At last the basis of terror collapsed, the more moderate elements of the new social order gained control over the terrorists and France was left in disorder under a weak government engaged in foreign war, the end of which was not only self-protection but also the extension of the new privileges of France into the rest of Europe.

Out from this war came Napoleon Bonaparte. He inherited the policies of the revolutionary governments and

as he conquered territories extended the new principles and privileges of France to these territories. Revolutionary creeds began to transform Europe and there seemed to be no likelihood of Europe checking their advance by war. But militarism is an illegitimate child of democracy and liberalism. A little later Napoleon ceased to be interested in the extension of rights and by the very magnitude of his control became increasingly indifferent to the new rights for which France stood. The rise of the national spirit throughout Europe in opposition to Napoleon was evoked by the very ideals which had made France supreme. The inability of Napoleon to maintain governmental efficiency by war, his obstinate attempt to ruin England commercially, his ill-advised attempt to reduce Russia to his subjection, the fear of the reactionary governments, all united with the new nationalism to bring about his ruin.

But out from this ruin, France itself emerged a different nation from that which had chosen representatives to the States General. The Revolution assured the supremacy of the *bourgeoisie* and the permanence of constitutional government.

2. To appreciate the difference between the Old Régime and the new nation one must take the point of view of the peasants and the members of the *bourgeoisie*, rather than that of the members of the privileged classes. The doctrine of equality before the law and the rights and duties of citizenship were to have a vast economic as well as political effect. The nationalization of the estates of the church and the crown forever put an end in France to the old type of land owning and assured France a lasting body of small peasant proprietors. The abolition of the rights of primogeniture and the practice of dividing up land owned among children served at once to check the growth of the population, to develop a large class of com-

petitive small proprietors, and to limit the powers of the large land owners. The removal of class restrictions on public employment, opened the way to more efficient administration.

The development of industrialism in France was contemporaneous with the Revolution, but it would be difficult to say to just what extent it was a result of the Revolution itself. Reorganization of the economic life had already begun before the meeting of the States General, but it is probably safe to say that the Revolution tended to develop in cities the power of the artisan classes and to accentuate the class struggle between them and the *bourgeoisie*—a struggle that still exists.¹

But even more important was the fact that the Revolution ended in France the reign of feudalism, absolutism, and the inequitable distribution of all sorts of privileges, which marked the Old Régime. It is true that Utopian reign of bliss for which the theorists of the *salons* looked did not dawn. Humanity remained humanity, and the laws of genetic development could not be destroyed. But the peasant had gained the right to hold land in fee simple and France became a nation of small farmers. Mediæval restrictions on trade were abolished. Equality before the law was irremovably built into French society. Trial by jury was assured. In place of the arbitrary will of the king and the tyranny of feudal practices laws were codified, principles enunciated, government under a constitution established, and democracy recognized by the civil Code. Freedom of worship replaced the supremacy of the First Estate. Instead of the various and irresponsible government of the *Intendants*, France was well organized into departments, and governmental officials were everywhere subject to law. While governmental centralization

¹ But see Ogg, *The Economic Development of Modern Europe*.

and bureaucracy may have been overdeveloped by the Convention and Napoleon, it nevertheless is true that since the days of the Revolution the French people have been under the direction of a highly efficient government. Suffrage was insured and political equality, while not fully reached, was inevitably to come. Liberty in the practicable sense of the term became a part of the life of France. Democracy, in the *bourgeois* sense of the word, triumphed in France as in America.

Yet the collapse of Napoleon's Empire made reaction temporarily triumphant. There had spread over both England and the continent a sort of panic born of the fear lest the radicalism of the Jacobins should reappear in various states and the social and political structure should everywhere be destroyed. As has been pointed out, this anxiety was not altogether groundless. But now that the military power of France had collapsed, the dominant control of European policies fell into the hands of those who represented reaction. It is worth while to compare this cycle of radicalism, war and reaction with the situation established by the Treaty of Versailles. The fear of bolshevism was like the fear of Jacobinism, and the rise of a capitalism intent upon repressing the developing labour movement as well as socialism in the industrial world, is not dissimilar from the political movements among the states of Europe. Then as now reaction was even given an idealistic colouring.

Largely because of the influence of Alexander there arose from the Congress of Vienna a Holy Alliance composed of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the members of which professed to band themselves together for the purpose of maintaining Christian principles among the peoples of Europe. According to its terms princes were to regard themselves as brothers; all their acts were to be founded

on the principles of the gospels. It was subsequently joined by all the sovereigns of Europe with the exception of the King of England, the Pope, and the Sultan. Such lofty idealism was certainly commendable, but it was only a few years before the Holy Alliance came to be regarded as a means of opposing the progress of liberal sentiments and democracy. For a generation Austria was able to check reform within Germany and Italy. But even with this opposition, the ideals of the Revolution were not to be suppressed and Metternich lived to see reaction conquered and himself an exile.

While it is true that Central Europe did not enjoy a full measure of equality before the law and the liberty and constitutional government enjoyed after 1815 by France, wherever the administrative finger of Napoleon had touched Europe, the mediæval moulds had been broken and the *bourgeoisie* had gained economic privileges, and civil rights, ecclesiastical control had been modified, and the idea of constitutional law had been introduced. Especially was this true in Italy, Sicily, and Central Germany. It is true that the force of reaction in these states served for a time to repress these privileges, constitutions were refused, and liberty of thought was checked, but the ideals which the Revolution had inculcated remained buried in the hearts of nations and in a generation began to bear fruit in new liberties, new political ideals, larger economic freedom and efficiency. As a matter of fact, the revolutions which after 1848 brought about the partial reorganization of Austria and the German states were due to the new enthusiasm for the ideals which the French Revolution had broadcasted over Europe. In nations where such forces were again crushed, where democracy and constitutional government were refused, we see to-day the horrors of a revolution even greater than those of France.

All of these facts make it evident that revolutions are indications of the struggle for democratic rights. Political change and social evolution are more normal, but when the institutions of a country are outgrown and insufficient, when the creative ideals of a people are outraged by the selfish maintenance of monopolized privilege, revolution seems to be the inevitable last resort. Thus it is that although a comparison of the France of the Old Régime and the France of the Restoration does not disclose the realization of all the ideals for which the men of 1789 had hoped, it must be said that, despite the Terror and the distortion and perversion of French idealism by Napoleon's militarism, the Revolution brought to France and, through her expansion, to Europe permanent good. In politics, industry, commerce, land tenure, law, education, the status of women and children and social privilege, old things had passed away. And if all things had not become new in 1815, the promise of such creation had been given and partly fulfilled. Social evolution had not been impotent and could not be crushed either by violence or radicalism or the forces of reaction. Therein lies the great meaning of the Revolution. For if one has the eye to see the moral significance of this great period of social change, the failure of revolutionary violence and Napoleon's militarism to pass beyond the equality and rights gained by the French people through the voluntary surrender of privilege on August 4, 1789, makes it plain that no reform can be permanent except that born of socialized ideals, and that militarism, be it never so sagacious and efficient, is impotent to make a better world. To give justice sacrificially is both nobler and wiser than to fight for the preservation of monopolized rights.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 1789/ May 5. Opening of the States General.
 June 17. The Third Estate constitutes itself the National Assembly.
 June 20. The Oath of the Tennis Court.
 June 23. The Royal Session.
 June 27. The union of the three orders.
 July 2. Attempted *coup d'état* of the court.
 July 14. Fall of the Bastille.
 Aug. 4. End of the feudal system.
 Oct. 5, 6. The King brought to Paris.
 90 June 19. Abolition of nobility.
 July 14. Festival of the Confederation.
 Sept. 29. Creation of 800,000,000 *assignats*.
 '91 April 2. Death of Mirabeau.
 June 21-25. The flight to Varennes.
 July 6. Appeal by Emperor Leopold to sovereigns in Europe in behalf of Louis.
 July 17. The Massacre of the Champs de Mars.
 July 25. Treaty between Prussia and Austria against France.
 Aug. 27. Treaty of Pilnitz.
 Sept. 13. Constitution accepted by Louis.
 Oct. 1. First sitting of the

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

- Oct. '30. Massacres at Avignon
 Nov. 17. Pétion the Girondin elected mayor of Paris.
 1792 Feb. 7. Treaty between Prussia and Austria to quell the disturbances in France.
 Mch. 30. Property of emigrants confiscated.
 April 20. Declaration of war against Austria.
 June 8. Louis vetoes bill providing for a military camp at Paris.
 June 12, 13. Girondin ministry dismissed.
 June 20. The mob at the Tuileries.
 June 26. First Coalition formed against France.
 July 11. The country decreed to be in danger.
 Aug. 10. The sack of the Tuileries.
 Aug. 11. Louis suspended.
 Aug. 13. The royal family imprisoned in the Temple.

- Sept. 2-6. Massacres in the prisons at Paris.
 Sept. 20. "Cannonade at Valmy."
 Sept. 21. End of the Legislative Assembly; opening

NATIONAL CONVENTION

- Sept. 22. Declaration of the Republic.
 Nov. 19. The Convention promises aid to all nations
 siring to overthrow their kings.
 1793 Jan. 15-21. Trial and execution of Louis XVI.
 Feb. 1. The Convention declares war against
 and Holland.
 Mch. 7. War declared against Spain.
 Mch. 9. The great Coalition formed against
 Mch. 10. Institution of the Revolutionary Tribunal.
 Mch. 11. Rebellion of La Vendée.
 April 1. Defection of Dumouriez.
 April 6. Institution of the Committee of Public
 May 4. First law of the *Maximum*.
 May 30. }
 June 2. } Downfall of the Girondins.
 June 8. French ports blockaded.
 July 13. Marat assassinated.
 Aug. 10. Constitution of 1793 accepted (but not
 forced.)
 Aug. 23. The levy *en masse*.
 Sept. 17. Law against "Suspects."
 Oct. 10. The government declared revolutionary
 peace.
 Oct. 16. Execution of Marie Antoinette.
 Oct. 31. Execution of the Girondins.
 Nov. 10. Institution of the "Worship of Reason."
 1794 Jan. 21. Terror at its height in Nantes.
 Feb. 4. Slavery abolished in French colonies.
 Mch. 24. Execution of the Hébertists.
 Apr. 6. Execution of Danton and Dantonists.
 The supremacy of Robespierre.
 June 8. Festival of the Supreme Being.
 June 10. Law forbidding counsel to persons brought be-
 fore the Revolutionary Tribunal.
 July 26-28. Fall and execution of Robespierre.
 Aug. 12. The Revolutionary Tribunal reorganized.
 Aug. 24. Powers of the Committee of Public Safety les-
 sened.
 Oct. 12. Clubs forbidden to correspond in their own
 names.
 Nov. 12. The Jacobin Club suspended.
 Dec. 2. Amnesty offered La Vendée.
 Dec. 8. Girondins readmitted to the Convention.

- Dec. 24. The Maximum repealed.
 1795 Jan. 19. Conquest of Holland.
 April 5. Treaty of Basle.
 April 24. "The White Terror."
 May 1. The mob attacks the Convention.
 May 30. The Catholic religion reinstated.
 June 8. Death of Louis XVII.
 June 17. Fall of the Mountain.
 July 21. *Émigrés* surrender at Quiberon.
 July 22. Treaty of peace with Spain.
 Aug. 22. The Constitution of the Year III adopted.
 Oct. 1. All conquered countries on left of the Rhine incorporated in France.
 Oct. 5. Insurrection of Vendémiaire 13.
 Oct. 26. End of the Convention.
 Oct. 28. France again under a Constitution.

THE DIRECTORY

- 1796 Mch. 9. Marriage of Napoleon Bonaparte and Josephine de Beauharnais
 April, May. Bonaparte's Campaign in Italy.
 May. Peace with Piedmont and Treaty with Spain.
 1797 April. War in Italy.
 1797 April 18. Preliminary peace of Leoben.
 July 9. Cisalpine Republic formed.
 Sept. 4. *Coup d'état* of 18th Fructidor.
 Oct. 17. Peace of Campo Formio.
 Dec. 16-April, 1799. Congress of Rastadt.
 1798 Feb. 15. Proclamation of Roman Republic.
 Mch. 29. Formation of Helvetian Republic.
 May 19. Bonaparte sailed for Egypt.
 June 12. Capture of Malta.
 July 21. Battle of the Pyramids.
 Aug. 1. Battle of the Nile.
 1799-1802 War of Second Coalition.
 1799 Jan. 23. Formation of the Parthenopean Republic.
 Mch. 12. Austria declared war on France.
 Mch.-Aug. Defeats of French by Coalition.
 June 7. End of Parthenopean Republic.
 June 18. Revolution of the 3d Prairial.
 Oct. 9. Return of Bonaparte to France.
 Nov. 9. *Coup d'état* of the 18th Brumaire. Fourth Constitution. The Consulate.
 1800 April-Feb., 1801. Campaign of Bonaparte in Italy (Marengo) and of Moreau in Germany (Hohenlinden)
 1801 Feb. 9. Peace of Lunéville with Austria.
 Mch. 18. Peace of Florence with Naples.

- July Concordat with the Pope.
 Aug. Surrender of Egypt to England.
 Formation of the *Université*.
- 1802 Mch. 27. Peace of Amiens.
 Aug. 2. Bonaparte elected Consul for life. (Fifth Constitution.)
- 1803 Feb. Enactment of the Delegates of the Empire.
 April 30. Sale of Louisiana to United States.
 May War declared between France and Great Britain.
- 1804 Mch. 21. Arrest and execution of the Duke d'Enghien.
 Publication of the *Code Napoléon*.
 May 18. Napoleon proclaimed Emperor of the French and later (May, 1805) King of Italy. Eugène Beauharnais appointed Viceroy of Naples.

THE EMPIRE

- 1805 Third Coalition against France.
 Oct. 17. Defeat of Mack at Ulm.
 Oct. 21. Battle of Trafalgar.
 Nov. Capture of Vienna.
 Dec. 2. Battle of Austerlitz.
 Dec. 15. Peace of Schönbrunn with Prussia.
 Dec. 26. Peace of Pressburg with Austria.
- 1806 Mch. 30. Joseph Bonaparte made King of Naples and
 June 5. Louis Bonaparte of Holland.
 July 12. Establishment of the Confederacy of the Rhine.
 Aug. 6. End of the Holy Roman Empire.
 Oct. 8. War with Prussia.
 Oct. 14. Battle of Jena and Auerstadt.
 Nov. 21. Berlin Decree.
- 1807 Jan.-Nov. British Orders in Council.
 Feb. 7, 8. Battle of Eylau.
 June 14. Battle of Friedland.
 July 7, 9. Peace of Tilsit.
 Aug. Foundation of Kingdom of Westphalia with Jerome Bonaparte as King.
 Sept. 2. English bombard Copenhagen. Denmark joins France.
 Nov. French occupy Portugal.
 Dec. 17. Milan Decree.
- 1808 June 15. Joseph Bonaparte made King of Spain and Murat of Naples.
 War in Spain. Defeat of Joseph.
 Beginning of reforms of Stein in Prussia.
- 1809 Mch. War with Austria.
 May 11. Capture of Vienna. Annexation of Papal States to France.
 May 21, 22. Battle of Aspern and Essing.

- July 5, 6. Battle of Wagram.
 Oct. 14. Peace of Vienna.
- 1810 Jan. 6. Sweden joins the Continental System.
 Mch.-April Divorce of Josephine and marriage of Napoleon with Maria Louisa.
 July Abdication of Louis King of Holland and annexation of Holland and German cities to France.
- 1811 Mch. 20. Birth of the King of Rome.
- 1812 War with Russia.
 Sept. 7. Battle of Borodino.
 Sept. 16-19. Burning of Moscow.
 Oct. 19-Dec. 13. Retreat from Moscow.
 Dec. 30. York makes treaty with Russians.
- 1813 Feb. 3 and March 17. Appeals of Frederick William III to Prussia.
 Feb. 28. Alliance of Prussia and Russia.
 War of Liberation began.
 Mch.-May. Battles in Saxony.
 June 4-Aug. 10. Armistice.
 Aug. 12. Austria declared war with France.
 Aug. 26, 27. Battle of Dresden.
 Sept. 9. Alliance of Austria with Prussia and Russia.
 Oct. 16-19. Battle of Leipzig.
 Oct.-Nov. Wellington crossed Pyrenees into France.
 Nov. 8-Dec. 11. Negotiations between Napoleon and the Coalition.
 Dec. 21-25. Allies crossed the Rhine.
- 1814 Jan. Pius VII returned to Rome.
 Feb. 5-March 19. Congress at Châtillon.
 Mch. 31. Allies entered Paris.
 April 6, 11. Abdication of Napoleon.
 May 4. Napoleon arrived at Elba.

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS. LOUIS XVIII.

- May 30. Peace of Paris.
 Sept.-June, 1815. Congress of Vienna.
- 1815 Mch. 1. Napoleon landed at Cannes.
 Mch. 13. Napoleon placed under ban by Coalition.
 Mch. 20. Napoleon entered Paris.
 Mch. 20-June 29. The hundred Days.
 June 18. Battle of Waterloo.
 June 22. Abdication of Napoleon.
 July 7. Paris again captured. Return of Louis XVIII.
 Sept. 26. Formation of Holy Alliance.
 Oct. Exile of Napoleon to St. Helena.
 Nov. 20. Second Peace of Paris.
- 1821 May 31. Death of Napoleon.

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